**THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY: IMPACT ON READINESS**

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The All Volunteer Army: Impact on Readiness

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A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
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ABSTRACT

THE ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY: IMPACT ON READINESS, by Major John William May, USA, 78 pages.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Scope

This study was conducted to determine whether or not the All Volunteer Army has caused any significant impact on readiness. According to the opening statements in Field Manual 100-5, Operations: "The Army's primary objective is to win the land battle... Above all else, [the United States must] prepare to win the first battle of the next war."

The last draftee left the service in November 1974. Since then the U.S. Army has relied on career soldiers and volunteers to maintain the military might of the United States. Articles and studies about the All Volunteer Army have both praised its efficiency and proclaimed its failure. Some believe the program is a total success and others believe it is simply not working. This thesis examines both points of view.

Hypothesis and Limitations

The All Volunteer Army has had an adverse impact on readiness. My research was undertaken to determine the truth of this hypothesis and, if true, the extent of the reduction in readiness.

My research was confined to the readiness of the Army. Any
impact on other services, while certainly important, is generally beyond the scope of this thesis.

**Value of the Study**

The United States must be able to rely on its military might as a deterrent to other nations that would threaten world peace as well as a force that is capable of defending the United States, her territories, allies, and citizens abroad. For this reason, the readiness of American military forces cannot be allowed to deteriorate. On the contrary, the readiness posture of the United States must be maintained at the highest level, and looking to the present and the future is essential to insuring this. The strength of the Soviet Union is quite impressive now and is growing in terms of men and equipment at a rate that could ultimately alter the balance of power to a lopsided degree in her favor. With this in mind, the United States must be prepared to fight outnumbered. If it is to win, it needs motivated soldiers who are trained to use modern equipment.

The United States relied on the draft for years before it adopted the all volunteer concept. With the end of the draft and subsequent pressures against the benefits awarded for military service, the question that must be asked is: Can the United States continue in this vein and maintain the state of readiness required to be a deterrent in the eyes of any nation that may be considering another world war or, for that matter, a limited war? This study attempts to provide some insight
to that question, which is obviously an important one, considering the
attention it gets from the news media, Congress, and senior military
officials.

William R. King, Professor of Business Administration, Graduate
School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, has referred to the All
Volunteer Force (AVF) as a "revolving door which takes in young people
and turns many of them back into the street labeled as rejects."¹ Some
critics of the All Volunteer Army have expressed the opinion that the
Army too often has become a last resort for youth. For example, Con-
gressman R. Beard has said:

They [the Department of Defense] never . . . told us they are pres-
ently downgrading all of the training manuals, downgrading the
reading level from 11th grade to 8th grade and putting them out as
comic books.²

On the other side of the coin, Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.,
Secretary of the Army, defends the soldiers against the critics. He
says that

fully 40% of today's young men do not meet the standards to qualify
for entry into the Army. Many of those who meet the entry standards
cannot adjust to the demands of Army life. The Army is made up of
those who are qualified and who can cope.³

He also points out that the numbers of high school graduates are

¹Andy Plattner, "Hill Told All-Vol Is In Trouble," Air Force
Times, 14 March 1977, p. 4.

²"Volunteer Army Experiencing Serious Problems," Leavenworth

increasing, even though troops may score lower on aptitude tests than they did years ago.

With the apparently valid points of the critics and the defense of Secretary Alexander in mind, it appears the All Volunteer Army is in need of rather close scrutiny. If it is a failure, there is little doubt that its advocates have only the best interests of the country in mind in terms of national security and will seek change. If it is successful, all the better. We can then seek to improve it.

**Design of the Study**

Chapter II introduces the all volunteer system in detail, to include its origins, implications and meanings, changes that have occurred since its inception, and why and how they came about. The matter of who serves is addressed with regard to race, sex, and education.

In Chapter III, readiness goals and concepts are examined as they concern active duty standards and the total force concept. Personnel strengths are addressed from the readiness viewpoint, with particular emphasis on what is believed necessary as opposed to what is on hand.

In Chapter IV, the impact of the All Volunteer Army on readiness is examined from the points of view of unit readiness, mobilization, and morale. Each of these is viewed as an indicator of readiness.

Conclusions of the research are presented in Chapter V. In
addition, recommendations for further study concerning personnel strengths, mobilization, and soldier morale are also offered.
CHAPTER II

ALL VOLUNTEER SYSTEM

Origins

On 27 March 1969, President Nixon appointed an Advisory Commis-
sion on an All-Volunteer Force (see Appendix A). A former Secretary of
Defense, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., served as chairman. The commission was
to formulate a plan to end the draft and establish an All Volunteer
Armed Force. Additionally, the commission was to determine how to cope
with a national emergency in terms of manpower and how to evaluate
requirements for a reserve force. ¹

That was the beginning of the Gates Commission and its subse-
quent recommendation to the President that the United States could
proceed with the all volunteer force concept without jeopardizing
national security. The favorable report of the commission, submitted on
20 February 1970, states:

We unanimously believe that the nation's interests will be better
served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by
draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts; that
steps should be taken promptly to move in this direction.²

¹ Thomas S. Gates, The Report of the President's Commission on an
   p. vii.

² Ibid., pp. 6-7.
The stand-by draft system mentioned was to be established by 30 June 1971 and was to be activated by joint resolution of Congress at the request of the President. 3

As a point of interest, the United States relied on a voluntary armed force until 1948, when Congress passed the Selective Service Act. The act authorized conscription into military service during peacetime and was extended for 4-year periods through 1971, when Congress acted upon the request to terminate the draft in two years.

Even though the President appointed the Gates Commission in 1969, he had promised in campaign speeches in 1968 to end the draft, 4 which was unpopular in the United States and was being resisted, avoided, and demonstrated against. The Vietnam conflict was in full swing at the time, but it did not have full support of the American people. Sons, husbands, fathers, and brothers were dying at an alarming rate, and the American people, particularly those at draft age, did not like the idea of joining the ranks for what they considered an unpopular cause. In Senator Sam Nunn's opinion,

the draft card burnings, campus riots, draft evaders, and SIT-INS of that era probably had more to do with the decision to end the draft than did any careful analysis of the merits of an AVF [All Volunteer Force]. 5

3 Gates, p. 10.
Defects in the Selective Service System were numerous. Granted, it provided the numbers of young men needed within a reasonable amount of time, but human considerations were practically non-existent. One author's list of five defects that many critics agreed with follows.

The system does not expose all qualified men equally to the risk of induction but provides legal havens for some.

The system is erratic in its operation, drafting men in some areas of the country who would be deferred in others.

The system keeps our young people in a prolonged state of anxiety, unable to make coherent plans for the future.

The system, if it followed the letter of the law, would quickly empty all but our medical and dental graduate schools of able-bodied men and create a serious gap in our intellectual resources.

The system, if it followed the letter of the law, would fill the military ranks with overly qualified men at an age when there would be maximum discontent over a crucial interruption to their lifetime career plans.6

It is not difficult to appreciate why the United States move to abolish the draft received popular support. Whether the decision was or was not a wise one is the target of constant debate and will probably remain so for some time. In any event, on 27 January 1973, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced the end of more than thirty years of conscription. The Administration had accepted the recommendation of the Gates Commission, with the exception of the effective date. The draft was to end officially on 1 July 1973.

What type of young man or woman chooses to enter military service? What are their expectations of military life? What does "volunteer army" mean to them? One author states: "To young people, the phrase means only that those who want to fight will be called upon to do so." The world situation, the economy, and general values and attitudes of service-aged youth are all contributing factors to why young men and young women enter military service. Many believe that patriotism is also a major factor. Others believe that job security, educational and travel opportunities, and other benefits are the main reasons. Richard V. L. Cooper, director of Defense Manpower Studies, states: "People are signing on for the same reasons they always did. They are young people not sure of what they want to do."

Some reports say that many soldiers in the All Volunteer Force come from middle income families and neighborhoods. Neither the very rich nor the very poor have ever served in great proportion. Some young men and women with middle income backgrounds consider the Armed Forces as merely a place of employment. They are particularly interested in equal treatment for the sexes, reasonable working hours, fair pay, and a

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7 Reedy, p. 47.
8 "Rating the All Volunteer Army," Time, 10 October 1977, p. 36.
chance for advancement. A philosophy like this can perhaps be linked to the unionization movement that has been recently associated with the Armed Forces.  

Another factor that contributes to why people join is the recruiting effort. The recruiter has a target of about 10 million males between the ages of 17 and 21 to sell military service to. Approximately one-half of the available males are unqualified for military service. In terms of living conditions, salaries, family considerations, and on-duty educational opportunities, the Army has made vast improvements. The recruiter points out these advantages to prospective recruits with the aid of television, films, magazine articles, and personal observations. To the young man or woman just out of high school who has been searching for a job, probably in vain and regardless of whether he or she did or did not graduate from high school, military service does not seem a bad choice. A great deal of money has been spent on the recruiting effort, and it shows. Although the Army has failed to date to meet its recruiting goals, the quality of the soldier in terms of education seems to be on the rise. For example, 70 percent of non-prior service enlistees in Fiscal Year 1978 were high school graduates. This percentage is the most favorable when compared with some other fiscal years: 67 percent in 1964, 50 percent in 1974,

10 Ludvigsen, p. 18.

58 percent in 1975, 59 percent in 1976, and 59 percent in 1977.\textsuperscript{12}

As far as education is concerned, the high school diploma seems to be the measure most used when discussing the All Volunteer Force.\textsuperscript{13} Formal education is unquestionably an important indicator in terms of whether or not young men and young women will successfully complete their term of service. Another viewpoint on the importance of education is that in the 1980s and 1990s the technology soldiers will have to work with will be so advanced, even in the combat arms, that an individual will have to be mentally able just to fire his weapon.\textsuperscript{14} This is not a difficult circumstance to imagine. Anyone who believes weapons systems are not complex and are not becoming more so every day has only to visit an infantry battalion. Once there, he can examine the Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracker, Wire-Guided Weapon System or the Redeye, take a look at the firing tables that mortar platoons use, or follow a firing calculation made by the fire direction center of the mortar platoon. The visitor should not be impressed by a civilian engineer, for he may have designed the system for a large civilian corporation and could certainly fire the weapon and hit the target while making everything look easy.

\textsuperscript{12}Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Five Years of the All Volunteer Force, 1973-1978," Table 3, for insertion on p. 32 (68 pp., courtesy of the authors, July 1978).

\textsuperscript{13}DeWitt C. Smith, Jr., "People Support Improves the Total Force," \textit{Army}, October 1977, p. 86.

Instead, the visitor should think of the system in the hands of a high school graduate who made "Cs." The point is that the measure of the "thinking" abilities of today's soldiers in terms of how many have a high school diploma probably means next to nothing. What is important about the graduate is that he is less likely to be a quitter. He is more likely to finish what he starts.

Reading ability is a better indicator of success in military training schools than a high school education. The limited reading ability of some high school graduates and many non-graduates is causing concern among military leaders and educators. The numbers of individuals who are poor readers are alarming (see Appendix B).

In the final analysis, however, soldier aptitude test scores are declining even though the Army's ability to attract high school graduates appears to be on the upswing. About 60 percent of new enlistees score in the below average categories, Categories IIIB and IV, compared to about 40 percent in those categories during the draft era.  

The discussion of educational standards as a measure of military effectiveness by Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., provides an added perspective. They point out that in World Wars I and II and Korea "the military accommodated itself to those men 'who could not soldier but who could fight.'" They were often unemployed as


16 Janowitz and Moskos, p. 30.
civilians, and many were high-school, even college, dropouts who were not necessarily model citizens. Today, there is little room for soldiers who are not steady and reliable. They are required to perform routine tasks, and there is little room or opportunity for them to do anything out of the ordinary.

An educated soldier is unquestionably more preferable than an uneducated one. Even though reading levels are at an alarming low and test results are not very impressive, the Army still needs young men and women who have had the courage and willpower to remain in high school and graduate. Enlistees who have not graduated certainly can become good soldiers in some fields, but they may have more trouble completing their obligations.

Race is another pertinent topic when discussing those who join the All Volunteer Army and why. "Race is the country's most disturbing cleavage, and it is hardly surprising that race is one of the all-volunteer force's most difficult problems." When the Gates Commission was conducting its study it reported that the proportion of enlisted blacks on active duty in the Army would rise to 19 percent. By March 1978, however, the Army's black enlisted strength was 27.5 percent.

There is no implication that ethnic origin has any impact on readiness or any bearing on individual performance, but black

18 Janowitz and Moskos, pp. 34-35.
representation has been and is now the subject of much public discussion and is worthy of being addressed. The staff of the Defense Manpower Commission displays a great deal more academic and political interest in the subject of race relations than personnel at the unit level. For example, 154 commanders were asked whether the increased numbers of blacks in the All Volunteer Force had impacted on ability to carry out its mission. Of the commanders responding, 44 percent said they perceived no increase in the number of blacks in their unit. Of the 87 unit commanders who perceived an increase, 93 percent stated there had either been no impact or their unit ability had improved. 19

The argument still exists that an army should be representative of the citizens it defends. Black representation of 27.5 percent in the Army compared to 11 percent in the population is certainly lopsided.

Janowitz and Moskos point out that the proportion of white high school graduates entering the service compared to blacks has declined since Fiscal Year 1974. The Army is attracting blacks and other minorities of high ability, but the white volunteers are less skilled than the white draftees were (see Appendix C). 20 Based on this, the fact that


20 Janowitz and Moskos, pp. 35-36.
higher percentages of blacks are assigned to occupations that require lesser skills is surprising (see Appendix D). The most logical explanation for this is that black soldiers show great esprit de corps and enjoy being associated with combat arms units. They are proud young men who seem to welcome the challenge combat units offer.

The increasing role of women in the All Volunteer Army is another fact to be considered in readiness. Women in uniform are seen on most, if not all, military installations in the United States and abroad. They do anything from directing traffic at busy installations to flying UH-1 helicopters. Of the 377 enlisted military occupational specialties in the Army today, about 347 (92 percent) are open to women. The only specialties not open to women are in the combat arms (see Appendix E). The Army recognizes that women in combat arms assignments would be exposed to hostile fire. Women are not assigned to units in which their primary duties would require them to participate in combat on a regular basis.

Women's attitudes are commendable. Women believe they can do practically anything men can do. The following comments seem representative of women's attitudes:

We're being trained in combat support roles, which means we'll be near or in the vicinity of fire--if not the front line. If my

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21 Coffey and others, p. E-17a. 22 Smith, p. 89.

company is deployed for combat, then I'm going, too. I'm not going to stay behind just because I'm a woman.

Pound for pound, I'm as good a sailor and aviator as any man.

We should all be treated the same as men. We're just as qualified if properly trained.24

The number of women who want to go into combat is not significant, but women realize they will be required to share risks and to undergo hardship like their male counterparts if such are the requirements of their military occupational specialties. On several occasions General Bernard W. Rogers has pointed out that the United States cannot continue to use women in skills other than those for which they are trained. This indicates that women will deploy with their assigned units and will be an essential part of mission accomplishment.

One train of thought is to increase the role of women in the Armed Forces and to recruit them in greater numbers. Women can be recruited easily, and in terms of cost the military services can obtain a well-educated female for about the same as they can a poorly qualified male.25 The numbers of women on active duty will continue to increase through 1983 (see Appendix F).26


The ever-increasing numbers of service women perhaps indicate a belief on the part of the Department of Defense that women "can save" the military. This may well be a valid assumption. Its corollary is that the role of men would decrease. The obvious problem here is that a woman could easily replace a male communications specialist, but that male soldier would not necessarily reenlist for the combat arms. Also, he would not necessarily have enlisted for the combat arms the first time around. Regardless of the number of women on active duty, there is still a requirement for men to fill a number of specified combat arms slots. Mel R. Jones, a retired lieutenant colonel, said it all in one brief sentence: "Unless they are trained to fight and expected to fight when told to do so, women and civilians remain noncombatants." 27

CHAPTER III

READINESS

Discussion

The Armed Forces of the United States play a major role in the world arena insofar as maintaining peace is concerned. The United States, because of its strategic nuclear capability, acts as a deterrent to nations that would provoke or promote hostilities. This idea probably evolved from the Eisenhower era and the philosophy of massive retaliation. It emerged from the economy-inspired mood the American people displayed.

President Eisenhower recognized that the United States was in a military and economic battle with the Soviet Union. He realized that the latter could be the more devastating of the two if the United States tried to match gun for gun with the Soviet Union. The obvious solution to the decisionmakers at the time was to develop a policy in which strategic nuclear weapons could be held as a deterrent. This "balancing" of the economy against military needs became Eisenhower's "New Look" program.

All went well until the Soviet Union developed a significant strategic nuclear capability. Apparently the arms race was about to accelerate, and the logical question was "Where do we stop?" The
Administration realized that once both sides had a certain number of strategic nuclear weapons with the capability to land a massive retaliatory blow, large stockpiles of the weapons would serve no purpose. The general theme of "sufficiency" came to bear, and Eisenhower developed his "New, New Look."

Army divisions varied in number and organization. For example, Eisenhower restructured the infantry and airborne divisions to pentomic divisions. Generally speaking, each division had five battle groups and each group had five companies. Again in concert with the times, these organizations were primarily defensive in nature.

As the years passed and the Soviet Union continued to develop and multiply its forces toward attaining a powerful offensive capability, the defensive posture of the United States was reexamined. General Maxwell Taylor, who saw a need to change with the times, believed the United States force structure and general strategic ideas were too rigid and needed some flexibility. He called this idea the strategy of flexible response. Without elaborating on the entire concept, it referred to developing "improved planning and training for limited war" as one of the four "quick fixes" necessary for the United States to improve its readiness posture.¹

General Taylor's ideas were fairly well received and many of them were implemented. Under the concept of the Reorganization

Objective Army Divisions, the pentomic divisions were reorganized with the brigade as opposed to the battle group. The numbers of divisions continued to fluctuate.

My main intent for bringing this historical perspective into focus is that the Army's mission has not changed significantly since then. The excerpt below provides the best explanation.

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of--

(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;

(2) supporting the national policies;

(3) implementing the national objectives; and

(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.\(^2\)

The United States must maintain its status as a strategic power for the sake of deterrence; therefore it must maintain adequate forces that are trained, equipped, and ready to deploy and fight virtually anywhere in

any type of war on very short notice.

The current line of thought is that a nuclear attack is probably the least likely military contingency the United States will confront. According to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "mutual strategic deterrence and essential equivalence exist between the two super-powers" and the goal is "to continue the current state of affairs."³

General George S. Brown, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out a thought that is probably too seldom heard when he amplified the need for early combat capability in insuring a successful defense. He also pointed out the need for sustainability. The forces of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States lack this capability.⁴ History, at least as far back as Napoleon, shows that the Russian military successes have been due in part to Russia's sustaining power. Today, virtually all Warsaw Pact countries are building their logistical systems and are stockpiling ammunition and equipment.

Thus the time has come to look at the readiness posture of the U.S. Army. At the same time, it must be recognized that the defense budget appears to be going downhill regularly, military manpower and weapons systems are becoming more expensive, and force levels for the future cannot be accurately predicted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have

⁴ Ibid.
indicated that "in order to meet ground force requirements with less risk . . . the United States would need thirty-two divisions rather than the present twenty-four (16 active, 8 National Guard)." They have also pointed out that, proportionately, more of the divisions need to be in the Active Force. In addition, the force structure has been reduced because of the market situation in manpower, not because of strategic reasons.

The Army's present means of monitoring its readiness posture is by the establishment of a readiness condition with regard to personnel (including assigned versus authorized strengths with proper military occupational specialties), training, and logistics (including supply and maintenance aspects). When this monthly system is discriminately adhered to, it reflects a fairly accurate picture of the readiness condition of a unit. The Department of the Army establishes the authorization levels that are used in conjunction with the various readiness conditions.

Army Training and Evaluation Programs and Skill Qualification Tests are other means of evaluating individual and unit readiness. A discussion of current results from these measures is presented in Chapter IV.

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6 Ibid.
Total Force

The Active Army and the Reserve Components (Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve) make up the Total Army. When one hears the term readiness, it applies to both active and reserve units. The Total Force idea is not new and has more meaning than the title implies. It is a national defense policy within itself.7

Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Secretary of the Army, and General Bernard W. Rogers, Army Chief of Staff, issued a joint statement in September 1977 that listed six major goals aimed at insuring combat effectiveness for all components of the Total Army. They are:

The Readiness Goal--Prepare the Total Army for rapid transition to combat, fully capable of performing its wartime mission.

The Human Goal--Provide the Total Army with highly effective and morally responsible military and civilian personnel capable of performing reliably in war; provide quality of life support for our soldiers and their families and require from them reciprocal dedication to service.

The Material Goal--Develop, field and maintain a balanced warfighting and sustaining capability.

The Strategic Deployment Goal--Improve Army deployment capability to move forces as scheduled in order to increase early availability of combat power.

The Future Development Goal--Improve Army equipment and concepts to exploit new technology.

The Management Goal--Manage and utilize existing and programmed resources more effectively to strengthen the Army's resource

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justification process.\textsuperscript{8}

Realizing the monumental task at hand is not difficult when one considers the goals. Such heavy reliance on the Reserve Components requires them to maintain standards equal to active units. Some would argue that to achieve and maintain this state of readiness, reserve units must actually be better trained, manned, and equipped than the active forces.

An interesting note at this point is that of the 16 active divisions in today's Army, the 5th, 7th, 24th, and 25th are round-out divisions. That is, each of these four divisions is filled out by one Reserve Component brigade. A valid question that can be asked here concerns the capabilities of these four divisions with their current force structure.\textsuperscript{9}

The Reserve Components comprise in excess of 50 percent of the Army's total deployable forces. These units must be available in the numbers and at the time they are required. An active force obviously could meet this requirement more easily, but due to budget constraints, that is not an affordable luxury. Rapid mobilization and deployment to Europe to fight in a major, high intensity, conventional war are required of Active Army and Reserve Components if the Total Force policy is to be successful.\textsuperscript{10}

Personnel

When the Gates Commission conducted its study on the feasibility of the All Volunteer Force, it did not attempt to determine the size of the force the United States needs. The range of estimates the commission was given for planning purposes as far as maintaining a Total Force in the future was between two and three million men.11

The world population is more than four billion. It is predicted that there will be 6.3 billion people on the planet by the year 2000, all in competition for the limited resources available.12 The military must compete with private industry for qualified young men and women to fill its ranks. The Armed Services are particularly concerned about the decreasing supply of young men and women in the years to come. With the total numbers decreasing, the number eligible for military service also decreases. Without significant decreases in our forces, the competition between the military and the private sector for the better qualified young people will increase (see Appendix G).

The All Volunteer Army has been on its own five years, and according to statistics it is doing very well as far as maintaining its authorized strength is concerned. For example, the active duty actual Army strength at the end of Fiscal Year 1977 was 781,800 compared to an


authorized strength of 789,000. This was within 1 percent (0.9 percent) of the authorized strength.13

The projection is that active military strengths in all services will decline by about 22,000 between Fiscal Year 1977 and Fiscal Year 1980. Combat capability will increase as supporting functions become more efficient. Between Fiscal Years 1978 and 1979, for example, the Active Army will lose 2,500 men, from a planned Fiscal Year 1978 total of 774,200 to a planned Fiscal Year 1979 total of 771,700. Combat forces, however, will increase by 7,900, auxiliary and supporting soldiers will decrease by 4,800, and trainees, students, cadets, transients, patients, and prisoners will decrease by 5,600.14 Over the period Fiscal Year 1978 to Fiscal Year 1979, combat forces, made up of strategic, tactical, and mobility forces in all services, will increase by approximately 10,000. Additionally, the Army intends to increase manning in the first units to deploy from the Continental United States to Europe in a NATO contingency and in manning NATO units in general.

The strength of selected reserves, reservists who are in units or who are paid to drill, has declined since implementation of the All Volunteer Army. In Fiscal Year 1977, the Congressional authorization was 602,400 and the actual strength was 549,200 (91.2 percent of the


14 Ibid., pt. 3, p. 4.
authorization). These figures include both Army reservists and National Guard authorizations and strengths. Secretary of Defense Brown has indicated that he expects these actual strengths to rise in Fiscal Year 1979.

The strength of the enlisted Individual Ready Reserve (IRR; not on active duty) has decreased from 1.5 million in Fiscal Year 1971 to below 300,000 in Fiscal Year 1977. The bulk of this drop has been in the Army (around 900,000 in Fiscal Year 1971, up to 1 million in Fiscal Year 1972, and down to around 150,000 in Fiscal Year 1977). The IRR is extremely important insofar as the Department of Defense mobilization planning is concerned. In keeping with the Total Army concept, IRR personnel are used for three basic contingencies: to "fill our active force units to combat strength," to "raise deploying selective reserve units to full mobilization strength," and to "provide replacements for initial combat losses until new people can be drafted and trained."16

As of now, plans call for use of the IRR in any future contingency that requires a rapid expansion and/or mobilization of active duty Army units. The hope in this apparent dilemma is that a careful evaluation of requirements for the IRR is underway and a realistic strength of this force will be established. It may now be too high.

15Brown, pp. 332-33. 16Brown, pp. 334-35.
CHAPTER IV

IMPACT OF ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY ON READINESS

Unit Readiness

"The Army's readiness objective is to provide units capable of performing their TOE missions in support of operational requirements."\(^1\)

The acronym TOE refers to table(s) of organization and equipment, a listing of personnel and equipment assigned to a unit. All TOEs also specify a particular mission for the type unit they represent.

Specific details of the Unit Readiness Report are classified and thus are not addressed in this thesis. All Army units report periodically to Department of the Army on their readiness postures in the areas of personnel, training, and equipment status. A comparison of personnel and training areas for April 1974 and December 1978 revealed that 1,041 units were examined in April 1974 and 875 units were examined in December 1978. The personnel and training postures reported were extremely similar with regard to readiness conditions. This finding provides no way to evaluate an upward or downward trend in unit readiness without using classified data.\(^2\)

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\(^2\)Telephone conversation with Mr. William J. DeSalvo, Program
The next likely area for examining readiness postures of units appeared to be results of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The ARTEP is an evaluation of a unit, often from battalion down to squad level, in its ability to perform its mission. The evaluation covers all missions a particular unit is expected to perform in combat, sets conditions for the evaluation, and depicts standards to be met. Individual ARTEPs have been developed for most units and are in development for the others. The ARTEP results are maintained locally only; no ARTEP results are kept at Department of the Army. The program is not to be viewed as a test. It is an evaluation tool that will help the commander in identifying his unit's weaknesses so he can take corrective action. Thus the ARTEP is not a means of addressing unit readiness because no statistics are maintained other than at unit level.  

The notion of compiling skill qualification test results for individual soldiers was discarded as a means of evaluating unit readiness. The results are poor, the tests are poorly written, and most tests are now being rewritten. The tests would be a good indicator of individual skills but not a valid measure of a unit's readiness.


Telephone conversation with Captain Russel Hall, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, February 1979.
Having found that unit readiness reports, results of Army Training and Evaluation Programs, and skill qualification test results were not satisfactory means of evaluating readiness, other means of evaluating the All Volunteer Army were sought. The two major indicators of readiness appear to be the Army's capability to mobilize in the event of war and the morale of the soldiers.

**Mobilization**

To meet its wartime requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on several sources of manpower. These are the active forces, selected Reserve Components, pretrained individuals, and untrained individuals. The active forces are relatively well-manned and, as the first line of defense, continue to have a high priority. The selected reserves, pretrained individuals, and untrained individuals constitute the DOD mobilization manpower.  

Six DOD Reserve Components augment the active duty force during mobilization. They are the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserves. These forces are an essential part of the total force. During peacetime, they attend drills and receive military training. In the event of a major war in Europe, selected reserve units are scheduled

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to deploy in the early phases.\textsuperscript{5}

A great deal of combat power rests in the reserve forces. For example, National Guard and Army Reserve units make up

fifty-eight (58) percent of the Army's field artillery, sixty-five (65) percent of its combat engineer battalions, fifty-two (52) percent of its infantry and armor battalions, forty-five (45) percent of its aviation forces, and sixty-five (65) percent of all the Army's tactical support.\textsuperscript{6}

Unlike the active forces, the selected reserves are experiencing a severe manpower shortage. In 1973, as the All Volunteer Force began, the selected reserve strength was 919,000. In Fiscal Year 1977, that strength had decreased by 12 percent (to 807,500). Most of the decrease was in enlisted strength. Interestingly, the strength reduction in the Army components has been the largest. The Army Reserve has suffered the greatest drop. Between Fiscal Years 1973 and 1977, the decrease was more than 21 percent (from 195,000 to 153,700).\textsuperscript{7}

Even though the combined Army Reserve and National Guard enlisted force is manned at about 80 percent of peacetime authorization, a wide degree of variation exists among the strengths of various units. "Twenty-eight percent of all the Army selected reserve companies (and equivalent units) are less than 70% manned" (see Appendix H).\textsuperscript{8} Personal

\textsuperscript{5}U.S., Department of Defense, p. 101.


\textsuperscript{7}U.S., Department of Defense, pp. 101-102.

\textsuperscript{8}U.S., Department of Defense, p. 103.
experience indicates that some National Guard infantry brigades have attended summer training with rifle companies at less than 40 percent strength.

Indications are that the decline in selected reserve strength is a direct consequence of stopping the draft. Overall readiness posture in the Army Reserve and the National Guard "continues to decline for the 5th year in a row, principally due to losses in personnel." Reservists and Guardsmen have expressed the belief that maintaining a strong reserve force will be difficult without the pressure of the draft.

During the Vietnam War, quality youth seeking to avoid the draft made up a substantial part of the reserve enlistees. Those "temporary soldiers" seldom reenlisted. Today, most reserve accessions are veterans. For example, in Fiscal Year 1977, 65 percent of enlisted accessions in the Army Reserve and National Guard were veterans, compared to only 16 percent in Fiscal Year 1970. The disadvantage is that the dollar cost for previously trained personnel is higher than for those with no prior service. The obvious advantage is that veterans are more

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9 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Status of the All-Volunteer Armed Force, Hearing, Committee Print, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 20 June 1978, app., p. 138 (the appendix, "An Analysis and Evaluation of the United States Army (The Beard Study)," a staff research study prepared for Congressman Robin Beard by J. L. Reed, a Congressional Fellow, 1978, of the American Political Science Association (Federal Fellow, Department of the Navy), covers pp. 129-266).

productive than untrained recruits.

Personnel shortages within the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard appear to have no immediate solution. Authorized strength projections for the selected reserves climb year by year, at least through Fiscal Year 1990 (see Appendix I). In looking at the selected reserves, three basic conclusions are obvious: first, they are of extreme importance; second, they are not up to strength; third, continued reliance on them appears likely.

Pretrained soldiers, those in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), are the second source of DOD mobilization manpower. Each enlistee incurs a 6-year military obligation. In most cases, only part of this obligation is served on active duty. The remainder is spent in the IRR. Present personnel shortages in the IRR were discussed in Chapter III. In considering IRR shortages, the evaluation must be made with the following in mind:

The exact number of pretrained individuals needed depends on the type of conflict expected. For example, an intense war which begins with little warning and has high early combat losses requires a greater number of pretrained people than a war which builds up slowly after a long warning period.\(^\text{11}\)

It is difficult to attach a precise figure to the desired personnel strength of the IRR.

In the past several years, little effort has been exerted to manage the IRR resource or to encourage individuals to continue their

\(^{11}\) U.S., Department of Defense, p. 121.
service in it. Because a constant influx of personnel served out the remainder of their initial 6-year obligation, the IRR strengths were so high there seemed to be little concern for developing any sort of direction to maintain the membership. Management actions aimed at preserving the strength of the active and selected reserve forces eventually depleted the sources of trained manpower available for the IRR and reduced the time an individual spends there upon completion of his active or reserve service.

These actions included: (1) increasing the minimum active duty enlistment from two to three years, (2) enlisting people in the delayed entry pool for up to one year prior to commencement of active duty and (3) increasing the number of prior service accessions admitted to the selected reserve.¹²

"Up or out" policies and the generally high attrition rates of the All Volunteer Force have also decreased the size of the IRR. Still, the major factor in the strength reductions of the IRR is the decreasing size of the active force since the Vietnam War.

Even though plans call for use of IRR personnel as fillers for active forces in the event of the outbreak of all-out war, the former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and present executive director of the Defense Manpower Commission, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., is not enthusiastic about the reliance placed on them. He said:

As a source of trained manpower, the IRR is kind of a weak reed. [People being what they are,] they don't maintain their physical condition and many of them are older and would be less willing [to face the demands and hardships of military service]. Those

replacements we would need in Europe would be infantry replacements. . . . [Since there would not be many infantry replacements from the IRR, the Army would] do just as well to take brand new recruits.

The plight of the IRR has been recognized, and something is now being done about it. Several Army initiatives that will double the enlisted force of the IRR by 1984 are:

1. Stopping Automatic Transfer Between IRR and the Standby Reserve. Title 10 of the United States Code provides in Section 269(e) that

except in time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress, a Reserve who is not on active duty . . . shall upon his request be transferred to the Standby Reserve for the rest of his term of service . . . if—(1) he served on active duty . . . in the armed forces for an aggregate of at least five years.

Until recently the Army interpreted this statute to mean that an automatic transfer to the selected reserves would occur after completion of five years of a 6-year obligation. That policy of automatic transfer was cancelled in April 1968. The main advantage of the cancellation was that more soldiers were available earlier. The members of IRR now "become available by M + 30 while those in the standby reserve generally are not available until the M + 60 to M + 90 time frame."

2. Screening Losses for IRR. Many of the almost 90,000 active duty personnel released each year prior to completion of normal service and many of the 16,000 personnel released by the expeditious discharge

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14 U.S., Department of Defense, p. 124.
program could be valuable assets in a major mobilization. The Army is beginning a screening program that may add 70,000 people to the IRR by 1984. Those released from active duty who show no potential will be discharged. Those who show "potential to meet a mobilization requirement will be transferred to the IRR for the remainder of their military service obligation."

3. Reenlistments in the IRR. The Army is currently studying the management system of the IRR and making improvements that are geared to those who have completed their initial obligation but would remain in the IRR. The projected increase by this action is 8,000 in a steady rate.

Also being considered to increase the strength of the IRR are the following:

(1) additional initiatives . . . such as changing the military service obligation and recruiting people directly into the IRR; and
(2) using other sources of pretrainud manpower such as recent retirees [see Appendix J] and veterans [see Appendix K] who have satisfied their military obligation.15

Congress would probably not be receptive to recalling veterans, and no present law provides for that. The DOD believes the President needs the authority to recall veterans in the event of a major conflict and is preparing a legislative package in support of the recall.16

The IRR is in trouble. The All Volunteer Army is part of the

16 U.S., Department of Defense, p. 128.
reason its strength is down, but it is not the only one. Accurate requirements must be determined for contingencies and steps must be taken to insure that the appropriate strength is attained and maintained.

The third source of DOD mobilization manpower is untrained manpower. These are individuals who have no military training on mobilization day but are subsequently trained to meet a requirement. "Law requires a minimum of twelve weeks training before a military member is sent to combat." For this reason, untrained manpower will not have much impact during the first several months of the war.

The length of time for training to begin after mobilization is announced determines the time lag. Young men were preregistered and preclassified during the draft years. Draft calls could be made in anticipation of mobilization. The Selective Service System dwindled from 8,000 to 100 employees between Fiscal Years 1972 and 1977. By Fiscal Year 1977, more than 3,000 local draft boards were dissolved and the Selective Service System was put into "deep standby" status.18

When the Selective Service System reported that almost seven months would be needed to put the first draftee in the theater, the debate on standby draft requirements began. The dollar once again prevailed, however, and it was determined that "the easiest and cheapest

17 U.S., Department of Defense, p. 129.
18 U.S., Department of Defense, p. 129.
way to meet wartime requirements is to draft and train people when they are needed."\textsuperscript{19} The debate has been going on since Fiscal Year 1977 and is still the subject of much controversy and public attention.

The reinstatement of some sort of selective service system is receiving considerable support. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, recommended in November 1978 that draft registration and classification be reinstituted. The General Accounting Office (GAO) encourages the same. The Selective Service System says it would need about 60 days to start a registration program. The GAO says the military would need 100,000 draftees within that time and 600,000 induction orders would have to be issued to insure delivery of 100,000 inductees. The GAO pointed out that of those notified,

about 98,400 would claim deferments; 23,400 would request postponements for emergency reasons; 208,200 would request student postponements, and about 70,000 would fail to report. . . . Only 200,000 of the 600,000 notified would be available for induction. Of these, 70,000 would not pass induction tests for physical or mental ailments and 30,000 would be rejected on moral grounds.

Thus a review of 600,000 would produce only 100,000 inductees ready for training.\textsuperscript{20}

Many Congressmen are now leaning in favor of registration, classification, and, to some extent, a draft into the Standby Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. Representative G. V. Montgomery, who advocates drafting up to 200,000 men during the next 5 years to fill the

\textsuperscript{19}U.S., Department of Defense, p. 130.

IRR, is soon expected to introduce a bill that will require "young men to register at age 18 and require Selective Service to classify them." 21

Mobilization relies on manpower from the selected reserves, the IRR, and untrained sources. The selected reserves and the IRR are understrength, and there is no positive indication they will be brought up to the needed strength levels any time soon. The untrained manpower source is doing better than expected with regard to enlisting and keeping the active forces within an acceptable reach of their objectives. In the final analysis, however, the All Volunteer Army has adversely affected the ability of the United States military forces, particularly the Army, to mobilize in the event a major conflict should occur.

**Morale**

General George C. Marshall, a renowned military planner and manager, realized the value of the human element. He said: "The soldier's heart, the soldier's spirit, the soldier's soul are everything. ... It is morale that wins the victory." 22

General George S. Brown has suggested the following two areas of motivation as being important to the service member: "A personal sense of fulfillment from the service way of life" and "[a]n adequate standard

21 Andy Plattner, "DoD Polled on Need for Draft Registration," Army Times.

22 DeWitt C. Smith, Jr., "People Support Improves the Total Force," Army, October 1977, p. 82.
of living in relation to peers in civilian life." He pointed out that the first area of motivation is intangible in that it "has to do with how the service member sees his efforts and his life." The second area is tangible. Personal and family needs must be equitably met.23

Intangible rewards come from personal pride in job performance and recognition for that performance. A soldier's time is valuable. It must not be wasted, but too often this is not the case. Soldiers feel less and less important because they are given menial tasks to keep them busy while commissioned and noncommissioned officers are busy playing catch-up with administrative requirements and other matters. Then, extra hours are required after normal duty hours and on weekends so the soldiers can catch up. If good use of their valuable time is made during the week's normal duty hours, this would not be necessary.

General Brown mentioned other items of interest that are worthy of consideration when intangible rewards are discussed. They are:

That the periodic and often sudden uprooting of families and the extended family separations are not forgotten.

That the special hazards of training, of physical and psychological stress are acknowledged.

That the personal risks of combat--always on the horizon for a ready force--are not overlooked.

That the potential for the ultimate sacrifice--life itself--is not forgotten.24


24Ibid.
While a sense of accomplishment is important, that sense alone will not sustain a good fighting force. Along with the necessary pat on the back, one must also consider the tangible compensation. Two interesting questions General Brown asked are: "What is the dollar value of a day of fierce infantry battle or an extended battle at sea?" "What is it worth, in dollars and cents, for a pilot to fly a helicopter into a fire racked landing zone, already littered with the bulks of choppers that didn't make it?"25

The point General Brown made is obvious. No real way exists for hanging a price tag on the commitments expected of men and women in the Armed Forces. Although military pay has increased in recent years and looks impressive when compared to salaries paid prior to the end of conscription, it neither keeps up with nor approaches keeping up with inflation. In addition, the caps on military pay for the next several years indicate a national belief that soldiers are paid too much.

The real areas of military compensation that can be viewed as "deteriorating" are retirement, housing, commissaries, and medical care. One need only pick up a copy of Army Times to sense the dissatisfaction soldiers and their families feel about military compensation. The theme is a recurring one.

Retiree benefits are less now than they were several years ago and are likely to continue to deteriorate because maintaining the system

25 George Brown, p. 18.
is expensive. A good retirement system was the reason many soldiers joined the Army, but that reason hardly persists today. Military quarters are adequate on some posts and substandard on others. Married officers and enlisted personnel in all grades often encounter housing shortages. Even if on-post quarters are desired, a soldier and his family may be forced to live off post. (Married E1s, E2s, and E3s are not allowed base housing.) Rental in communities around military installations is often quite expensive. All landlords know the quarters allowance a soldier receives for living off post, but rarely, if ever, does that allowance cover the rent and utilities the service member must pay. Commissaries offer savings, but they are often crowded and open at hours that are inconvenient for the soldier. A soldier who works long hours rarely finds the time to take his non-driving wife to the commissary. Medical care is another area of concern for the soldier and his family. With the present shortage of doctors throughout the services, little hope exists for improvement in the near future.

The theme of this discussion thus far has been to point out the tangibles and intangibles that impact on morale. Pride and a sense of importance are certainly necessary for a soldier to accomplish his job well. Yet, he cannot be fully devoted if his family is having financial problems or is in need of medical attention that is not available. Deterioration in a married soldier's job performance can often be traced to financial or health problems at home. For the most part, family problems are not common among unmarried soldiers, and barracks life,
even though boring and lacking in privacy in the older barracks, is improving.

The Beard Study contains a great deal of information regarding the morale of today's soldiers. Its author, Jerry L. Reed, a Congressional Fellow, visited a number of installations and talked to a large number of randomly selected soldiers. All individuals with whom he talked were first enlistment volunteers, average age of 20 years. Overall, they appeared "sincerely interested in performing their military jobs in a 'professional' manner." The majority were dissatisfied with their inability to complete college and, in Reed's words: "Most feel they do not train enough to remain proficient at their skills, most are deeply disappointed in the quality of military life and a large majority are not interested in reenlisting." Most of the soldiers contacted believed the training they received prepared them well for their jobs, wanted firmer discipline by commanders, and wanted to perform meaningful daily work. The complaints about medical care, food, and inadequate housing were numerous. More than 98 percent indicated they received all that had been guaranteed them in writing at enlistment, but as many felt they had been exploited by the recruiter's verbal promises. For example, unit commanders often disapproved requests to attend college after duty hours. When such requests were approved, the soldiers often had to drop out of college to attend field training and other mission related tasks. 26

26 U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 209.
Soldiers also complained about skill mismanagement. Many stated they were not in the military occupational specialty they had requested and were doing jobs for which they were not trained. A great majority felt underutilized. Soldiers who indicated recruiters had misled them often said they were told to sign up for one specialty and, if it did not work out, they could change after a year or so. A large majority said the quality of Army life was a great disappointment, that recruiting literature, advertising, and films, as well as recruiters, seemed to paint a picture of Army life that was not representative of reality. 27

Military training was a topic all interviewees wanted to discuss. Most felt that basic training was fine and combat arms soldiers felt the same about advanced individual training, but soldiers with more technical skills--clerks, mechanics, and intelligence analysts--reported their schooling had been too rushed and they were perhaps unprepared to do their jobs properly. The soldiers felt good about their training at graduation and looked forward to unit assignments. Seventy-eight percent of those interviewed stated their unit assignments were very disappointing for the following reasons: "Limited on-the-job training"; "Improper assignment to jobs for which they are not trained"; "Under utilization"; "Too much time spent on meaningless drone-like jobs." On several occasions Reed asked, "Are you ready to fight as a unit?" The response he received was skeptical laughter. 28


28 U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 211-12.
Soldiers of the Beard Study were eager to discuss general Army life. They considered pay extremely marginal in view of job factors such as "long working hours (60 to 80 hours/week," "non-reimbursement for dependent travel expenses and costs to move to new duty stations," and "increased costs for all goods and services . . . outstripping military pay increases." Soldiers pointed out that civilians receive extra pay for working overtime. They complained of very high moving and housing expenses (particularly for E1s, E2s, and E3s), deterioration of the 20-year retirement system, and promised medical care that was never delivered. 29

The soldiers offered little praise for noncommissioned officers, the Army's middle managers. They saw the noncommissioned officer as lacking technical knowledge on many items of equipment (e.g., weapons and vehicles), as unwilling to study the problems and learn about equipment, as poorly motivated and lacking desire to coach and teach soldiers, and as overusing "classical military authoritarian behavior." 30

The women Reed encountered in the seminar groups were "articulate, bright, and well informed." They appeared to be good and capable soldiers who wanted an equal opportunity. Men and women generally enjoyed working together, and the men had general praise for women soldiers but sometimes expressed a feeling of the need to protect them.

29 U.S., Congress, Senate, p. 213.
Female soldiers were disappointed in the quality of Army life and the low caliber of many military jobs. Most of the women did not intend to reenlist. 31

At the close of each session, the soldiers were invited [by Reed] to furnish "messages to Congress." The following list ... [represents] messages given most frequently:

a. Stop cutting the defense budget and expecting soldiers to do more.

b. Improve housing, medical care, PX [post exchanges] and Commissaries. Take prompt action to fix up the medical benefits.

c. Let us train more. Provide more training at all levels: "Reduce the Mickey Mouse work and let us train to do our jobs."

d. Retain 20 year retirement plan.

e. Make recruiters "tell the whole truth about Army life."

f. Give us all of our equipment, vehicles and weapons.

g. Stop treating us like "Second Class Citizens." 32

Sergeant Major of the Army William Bainbridge, on the other hand, said:

Today's soldier is motivated, of the highest caliber, with personal and collective concern for his peers, unit, and nation. He knows his duties, respects his responsibilities and is satisfied that the Army's leaders are concerned about his needs. 33

The sergeant major also said soldiers have confidence in their noncommissioned officers; however, Reed's conversations with soldiers do not...

32 U.S., Congress, Senate, pp. 215-16.
support the sergeant major's statements regarding concern of Army leaders and confidence in noncommissioned officers. This difference of opinion is perhaps healthy. Even though the Army's highest ranking enlisted man praised soldiers of the All Volunteer Army, many senior noncommissioned officers would be likely to say the all volunteer soldier is not as good as the soldier who was conscripted. Reed, an outsider, found many negative points of view.

Another contrast is the staunch support of the All Volunteer Force by Secretary of the Army Alexander and the somewhat critical point of view by General Rogers, the Army Chief of Staff. General Rogers has recommended the immediate establishment of a limited version of the draft to meet manpower shortfalls. Secretary Alexander, opposed to such a measure, has stated: "To enact a draft ... would be unnecessary, unfair and counterproductive to the best interests of the Army." These differences only begin to point out the disparities in points of view concerning the All Volunteer Force.

Another contributing factor to morale is the overseas tour. While visiting a foreign land is a wonderful experience, a tour of duty in Germany for 30 to 36 months can hardly be equated to a recreational visit. It can be a long, boring, lonely life for a young soldier who is perhaps away from home for the first time. Moskos found that "a severe decline in soldier morale [occurs] around the end of the second year in

He noted that tours during conscription were only 18 months in length. Also, during conscription the dollar had not declined to the point it has now. For a young enlisted soldier, a tour in Germany is extremely expensive.

No discussion of soldier morale would be complete without mention of the Army's haircut requirements. Soldiers generally feel their haircuts should be similar to moderate civilian styles. Young women are important to young men, and young women apparently prefer young men with a moderate amount of hair. Because of the Army's haircut requirements, soldiers sometimes feel at a disadvantage in making new female friends. One soldier said: "If we are supposed to be representatives of our country, why can't our hair look like our congressmen?"

Many of today's military leaders shrug off youthful desires for longer hair as childish and unimportant. Military sanitation reasons for shorter hair are the normal responses to the question of longer hair. Rarely, if ever, are the values of the younger generation viewed with the idea in mind that older military leaders perhaps had their own "foolish" values when they were younger.

Morale is an important quality to consider when discussing readiness. To fight and win and to be a disciplined, dedicated fighting

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36 Ibid., p. 42.
force, the Army must consist of highly motivated soldiers. They must feel pride in their jobs, must have faith in their leaders, and must be assured their families will be taken care of when they are gone. They must be well trained for their jobs, must be used effectively, and must be allowed to advance and better themselves. They must be compensated at a rate equal to or better than the civilians with similar qualifications, because soldiers work harder and suffer greater hardships in peacetime and are expected to make the greatest sacrifice of all in the event of war.

The morale of soldiers in today's Army appears to be very low. Much of the problem is attributable to the All Volunteer Force. It seems that military officials are ignoring the problem, and consequently very little is being done about it.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The favorable report of the Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Force was made on 20 February 1970. The Gates Commission pointed out that the system would require an effective standby draft. The recommendation to end the draft was well received by a great portion of the population and was viewed as dangerous by many skeptics. When conscription ended on 1 July 1973, the composition of the Armed Forces began to change. During the draft era, poor, middle income, and rich conscriptees served, though neither the very rich nor the very poor. Now, volunteers seem to be less representative of American society.

The recruiting effort has maintained the Army’s active duty strength at an acceptable percentage of its authorized strengths. The recruiters also appear to be attracting young people who are better educated than their draft era predecessors. Army accessions with high school diplomas are on the increase. This is important for two reasons: first, a young soldier who has completed high school is more likely to finish his enlistment; second, as technology in Army equipment increases, the better educated soldier is needed to operate the equipment. The alarming factor, when discussing education, is that even
though the numbers of high school graduates are increasing, the reading level of these graduates and the results on soldiers' aptitude tests are declining.

Race is often mentioned when discussing the All Volunteer Force. The Gates Commission predicted that the portion of enlisted blacks on active duty in the Army would reach 19 percent. The figure was 27.5 percent in March 1978. Interestingly, many commanders have perceived no increase of blacks in their units, and those who have noticed an increase have indicated there has been no change in unit readiness or there has been an improvement. Also noteworthy is the fact that the caliber of white soldiers is declining and the quality of black soldiers is improving.

The role of women is another major concern of skeptics of the All Volunteer Army. Even though women are not allowed in combat positions, their presence is obvious and is increasing at a significant rate. Their attitudes are commendable and their work is often recognized as being as good as or better than that of men. The problem appears to be that women are not always used for jobs they are trained for, which places the burden on male soldiers. This is not the women's choice. They want to be assigned commensurate with their training.

In the matter of readiness, the United States cannot afford financially or socially to have the largest military force in the world. The American people would simply not allow it. The United States cannot match the Soviet Union "gun for gun." Therefore, it must maintain a
relatively small, well-trained, properly equipped force with the ability to deter any nation from committing an aggressive act. This small force must be able to deploy quickly and must be sustained in combat. Reserve units and members of the Individual Ready Reserve will provide round-out units and filler personnel for soldiers who are killed in battle. Reserve units and the Individual Ready Reserve never had personnel Manning problems until recently, but now their strengths, particularly the Individual Ready Reserve's, are significantly below the levels required. The Army is also experiencing personnel shortage problems, and in the years to come the problem is likely to increase due to a smaller population pool of eligible males to draw from. Continued reliance on Reserve Components and the Individual Ready Reserve will be made in keeping with the total force concept, but there are no real assurances their strengths will improve.

The subject of mobilization is an area of major concern. The All Volunteer Army has had an adverse impact on readiness in terms of mobilization. Considering the importance of reserve units and the Individual Ready Reserve and their present understrength levels, the combat power of the United States is severely hampered. Severely unmanned reserve units cannot properly train to meet wartime contingencies. The Individual Ready Reserve strength is extremely low and no sure immediate means of improving it are available. Replacements and filler personnel the Army relies on so heavily are becoming fewer and fewer.
When the draft ended, the selective service machinery was put into deep standby. The Selective Service System would need about seven months to produce the first soldier and place him in a theater of operations. The predominant theme seems to be that the United States will initiate a draft to cope with future wartime requirements, but this is a fallacy that will not work. With today's technology, the next war is not likely to last seven months. Unit replacements, filler personnel, and up-to-strength units will be needed shortly after the conflict begins. The reduction of the Selective Service System has indeed impacted adversely on the staying power of the United States military force in an armed conflict.

Morale in the Army's enlisted ranks appears to be low. Soldiers enlist with great expectations of educational opportunities, a high quality of life, meaningful job assignments, good leadership, and opportunities to travel. More often than not, they are disappointed. Recruiters who are striving to meet enlistment quotas may inadvertently contribute to disappointments by making verbal promises that are not kept later. Soldiers find that their opportunities to attend college after duty hours take second place to unit activities. Unmarried soldiers soon discover the hardships and loneliness of barracks life. Married soldiers face the real world problem of living off post in high rent districts with substandard housing. For single and married soldiers, the income is simply not enough considering the hours worked, the family separations, and expenses associated with military life--moving
costs, uniform cost and maintenance, haircuts, reliance on public transportation, and the like. Soldiers find that they are often poorly utilized with regard to their military occupational specialties when they reach their units of assignment. They express little faith in their leaders, whether in the area of technical competence with equipment or as someone who shows concern for his subordinates. As far as travel opportunities are concerned, assignment to Europe, Korea, or a variety of places in the United States is easy. The problem lies in the excessive lengths of overseas tours, the low value of the dollar in many foreign markets, and, quite candidly, the low value of the dollar in the United States. In short and regardless of where he is assigned, the American soldier does not earn enough money to take advantage of travel opportunities.

One observation worthy of consideration in discussing low morale is a possible reluctance of officers and senior noncommissioned officers to accept the All Volunteer Army and to try to make it work. If a soldier in a leadership position is against the concept from the start, he may subconsciously do more harm than good. He does not understand that the new enlistees have been promised a “home away from home.” barracks and messhalls are now much more representative of homelife, yet the Army’s long hours, hard work, and low pay are still present. The contrast can be overwhelming to a young enlistee. His only outlet may be to a chain of command that does not understand the problem. The result: Poor leadership equals low morale.
The All Volunteer Force has impacted adversely on the morale of the young soldier. When he enlists he is convinced he is a valuable asset and will play an important role in the service of his country. He is led to believe he will be well compensated, both tangibly and intangibly. As the Army begins to come up short on its promises, the young soldier, in turn, feels less obligated to perform dedicated service. It is hard to say whether morale was or was not lower during conscription than it is now, but the point is that now the morale of the All Volunteer Army appears to be very low.

Recommendations

The All Volunteer Army appears to be in a deteriorating condition with regard to mobilization of the total force and morale of its soldiers. These apparent situations provoke much controversy and are worthy of further study. Recommendations for future areas of investigation are:

- Determine actual requirements for reserve forces and the Individual Ready Reserve. Where there are excesses, trim them. Where there are shortages, determine why and begin planning methods for filling them.
- Listen to young soldiers' complaints and suggestions. They must believe in what they are doing and must feel someone cares about them.
- When complaints and suggestions of young soldiers are
compiled, act on correcting complaints and implementing suggestions. Soldiers' views on the quality of Army life will soon improve and the word will spread.

- Consider removal of the Selective Service System from deep standby. Begin the registration, testing, and classification of all males as they come of age.

- Improve the incentives for personnel on active duty, in Reserve Components, and in the Individual Ready Reserve. Incentives could be more appropriate pay raises (raises that are at least in concert with inflation), more reasonable working conditions, and better training and job utilization.

- Consider drafting for the Individual Ready Reserve and selected reserves as a last resort. If drafting must occur, equitable regulations must be efficiently and fairly managed.

- Consider the psychological transition from civilian to military life. The change can be quite a cultural shock. Preparation for the change as part of basic training may prove beneficial.

- Concerning adverse impact on morale and performance, evaluate new messhalls and barracks, with their homelike atmospheres, vis-à-vis the rigors of the duty day, with its long hours, hard work, and lack of job satisfaction.

Soldiers are the key to any future military conflict, regardless of its scale. The Army must regain its credibility with many young men and women who have enlisted into volunteer service. Once this is done,
perhaps more will join and feel pride in the fact that they are in the service of their country, a country that, in turn, looks out for them and their families. Today's youth do not understand the immense powers of the Warsaw Pact countries and the threat they pose to the Free World. Therefore, the Army must view the world situation, perhaps through the eyes of an 18-year-old high school graduate, in terms of defining motivators, values, and ideas on the quality of life. The full support of the Army's most valuable asset may then become available in the numbers required.
APPENDIX A

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE

Thomas Gates
Chairman of the Executive Committee of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
Former Secretary of Defense
New York City

Thomas Curtis
Vice-President and General Counsel, Encyclopedia Britannica
Former Congressman from Missouri and ranking Republican on Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress
St. Louis, Missouri

Frederick Dent
President, Mayfair Mills
Spartanburg, South Carolina

Crawford Greenewalt
Chairman, Finance Committee
E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company
Wilmington, Delaware

Alan Greenspan
Chairman of the Board
Townsend-Greenspan & Company
Economic Consultants
New York City

Alfred Gruenther
Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Washington, D. C.

Stephen Herbits
Student
Georgetown University Law Center
Washington, D. C.

Theodore Hesburgh
President, University of Notre Dame
Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
South Bend, Indiana
Jerome Holland  
President, Hampton Institute  
Hampton, Virginia

John Kamper  
Headmaster, Phillips Academy  
Andover, Massachusetts

Jeanne Noble  
Professor, New York University  
Vice President, National Council of Negro Women  
Former member, National Advisory Commission on Selective Service  
New York City

Lauris No-stad  
Chairman of the Board of Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation  
Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
New York City

W. Allen Wallis  
President, University of Rochester  
Rochester, New York

*Roy Wilkins  
Executive Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People  
New York City

*Mr. Wilkins was ill when the last five meetings convened. He did not sign the report.

APPENDIX B

PERCENTAGE OF FISCAL YEAR 1977 NO PRIOR SERVICE ENLISTED ACCESSIONS
BY READING GRADE LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reading Grade Level</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Civilian Non-College</th>
<th>Applicants Not Qualified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 and above</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 and below</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX C

PERCENTAGE OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AMONG ARMY ENLISTEES BY RACE, FISCAL YEARS 1974 THROUGH 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>No Prior Service Males</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX D

DISTRIBUTION OF BLACK ENLISTED ARMY PERSONNEL
AMONG OCCUPATION GROUPS, 1968-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry, Gun Crews and Allied Specialists</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics Equipment Specialists</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and Intelligence Specialists</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and Dental Specialists</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Technical and Allied Specialists (Photography, Drafting, Surveying, Mapping, Weather, Music, etc.)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Specialists and Clerks</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairmen</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and Supply Handlers</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Others</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX E

ARMY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES
CLOSED TO ENLISTED WOMEN

11B Infantryman
11C Indirect Fire Infantryman
11H Heavy Antiarmor Weapons Crewman

12B Combat Engineer
12C Bridge Crewman
12E Atomic Demolition Munitions Specialist
12Z Combat Engineering Senior Sergeant

13B Cannon Crewman
13E Cannon Fire Direction Specialist
13F Fire Support Specialist

16F Light ADA Crewman (Reserve Forces)
16P ADA Short Range Missile Crewman
16R ADA Short Range Gunnery Crewman

17K Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman
17M Unattended Ground Sensor Specialist
   (no career progression)

19D Cavalry Scout
19E M48-M60A1/A3 Armor Crewman
19F Tank Driver
19G Armor Reconnaissance Vehicle Crewman
19H Armor Reconnaissance Vehicle Driver
19J M60A2 Armor Crewman
19Z Armor Senior Sergeant

## APPENDIX F

**NUMBER OF ENLISTED WOMEN ON ACTIVE DUTY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Department of Defense</th>
<th>U.S. Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>199,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:** Statistics for 1978, 1979, and 1983 are projections.

Women now comprise 6.4 percent of the active enlisted strength.

Department of Defense plan is to increase to 11.1 percent by Fiscal Year 1983.

### APPENDIX G: SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR YOUNG MEN (000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>18-Year-Old Males</th>
<th>Estimated Military Eligible</th>
<th>Total Male Accessions</th>
<th>Active Duty Male Enlisted No Prior Service Accessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,838</td>
<td>1,491</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,959</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2,003</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,083</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>1,766</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2,159</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2,156</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,163</td>
<td>1,782</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,159</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2,145</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>1,748</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>1,644</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,839</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1,817</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,843</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1,679</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX H

### ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT MANNING VARIATION AMONG COMPANY SIZED UNITS
#### MID-FISCAL YEAR 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force and Unit Manning Level</th>
<th>Percentage of Authorized Strength in Units</th>
<th>Army Reserve</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Deploying Force (M + 30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 70%</td>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70% to 99%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% and higher</td>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 70%</td>
<td></td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70% to 99%</td>
<td></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% and higher</td>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX I

**ENLISTED SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH PROJECTIONS (000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX J

ARMY'S REGULAR ENLISTED RETIREES AVAILABLE FOR MOBILIZATION, FISCAL YEAR 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
<th>Years of Service</th>
<th>Years on Retired Rolls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The statistics are based on retirees for Fiscal Years 1969 through 1978 "who have not reached their 30th service anniversary. The availability formula assumed was [that] 90% of the retirees would be available in the retirement year and [that] this availability would decrease by five percentage points for each retirement year."

APPENDIX K

ARMY'S ENLISTED VETERAN POOL, FISCAL YEAR 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>585,000</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: "One short term solution to pre trained individual shortages would be to recall veterans who recently left the military service but who have no residual military service obligation. . . . [One estimate is that between Fiscal Years 1971 and 1976] 1.2 million people . . . [who could be valuable mobilization assets] left the service . . . after completing their term . . . These veterans had no military obligation in FY 1977. Furthermore, about 150,000 of the Army veterans are trained combat soldiers and could serve as combat replacements . . . ."

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