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Military assumptions about the military leadership found in the literature today are based on outdated data. An analysis of socio-economic backgrounds, career patterns, and perceptions of Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy leaders past, present, and future was made in order to develop a data base of updated material.

The military leaders of the future will no longer be predominantly from the old family, upper class, Protestant, rural background. There is no single "military" portrait, but each service has its own recruitment patterns and
20. Abstract (cont.)

...therefore, socio-economic analysis is not sufficient to explain the persistent conservative identification claimed by the future military leaders.

The future military leaders believe they are imbued with superior values of sacrifice, discipline, and patriotism. They do not feel they are appreciated by the American society and characterize themselves as isolated from that society. In spite of this isolation, the future leaders do not question the requirement for civilian control of the military. Finally, it is concluded that the concern about what formulates the political logic of military leaders is overstated and efforts in this area should be directed primarily to insure that the outward manifestations of that logic are consistent with national objectives.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the past few years there has been a great deal written about the military. When these articles, books, and periodicals are studied closely, many general assumptions are found that can be traced to Morris Janowitz' The Professional Soldier. This book is based on data collected in the 1950s which, for the most part, have never been updated and expanded.

Janowitz' data on 310 past Air Force and Navy flag officers (generals and admirals) were used to compare data collected from biographies and transcripts of 756 present-day Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy flag officers. In addition, a survey was made of 892 officers who have been identified as having the potential for flag rank into the 1990s.

The study begins with a look at the social composition of military leaders past, present, and future in an attempt to gain an understanding of military political logic. There appear to be no significant overall "military" trends in regional affiliation. There is a continuing slight overrepresentation of the West in all of the services' future leaders, but other than that, each of the services appears to be following its own unique pattern. The Navy's past, present and future leaders consistently have been lightly overrepresentative of the East and West. The Air Force representation has been shifting but apparently reaching a closer representation of the U.S. population. The Marines show an amazing consistency in the Northeast overrepresentation. Over one-
fourth of the Marine generals on active duty in 1978 are from two states, New York and Massachusetts.

The projected overall socio-economic profile of the three service's leaders in the 1990s is as follows: The Air Force leaders will be drawn from a lower middle-class family, Protestant, urban background broadly representative of the U.S. population; the Marine Corps future leaders will be led by men from a lower-middle class family, Catholic, urban background and will overrepresent the Northeast, and the future Navy leaders will be from a lower-middle class family, Protestant, urban background and will be disproportionately from the Northeast and West.

It was concluded that, because of the significant diversity within the socio-economic backgrounds of the various services' military leaders, it is possible to place too much emphasis on these factors when trying to understand the political logic of military leaders. Arising from this conclusion is the hypothesis that other factors such as service socialization and career patterns may hold an even more powerful key than socio-economic factors to the political logic of the military.

Future military leaders are generally satisfied with their profession but there is a growing concern among them about its future. Their primary motivation for joining the officer corps was the draft and their choice of the military as a career was not really by design or a deep sense of
commitment. Most would choose the military again, if given the choice; but the future leaders would not encourage their sons to choose the military as a profession.

The future military leadership should not be dominated by academy graduates. The future leaders believe the best way to obtain flag rank is outstanding performance in the right job at the right time and the best way to obtain the right jobs is by having a sponsor. Only the Marines felt the personnel system alone would insure that the right career steps are fulfilled without some outside help.

The future military leaders' aspirations were lower than expected. Reasons for this were a realistic idea of the low numbers who will enter flag rank; the unwillingness to make the sacrifices necessary to make the rank; and the perception that in order to make flag rank it may require actions which will compromise their integrity.

The future military leaders believe they are imbued with superior values of sacrifice, discipline, and patriotism. However, they do not feel they are appreciated by the American society. There is little evidence that this perception of non-appreciation has much basis in fact but is derived from viewing the national media, an element of the society which the future leaders consider biased and anti-military. The crisis in self-image and self-esteem on the part of the future leaders appears to have its basis in the memories of Vietnam.
The self-image crisis does not appear to have closed the minds of future leaders to conceptual changes in military roles and missions. How these changes are operationalized does cause concern on the part of the future leaders. They do not want to take on roles that may detract from their primary mission of defense. In spite of their feeling of isolation from society, the future leaders do not question the requirement for civilian control of the military.

Military leaders have and will continue to identify themselves as conservative. Socio-economic background and rising education levels do not appear to be the key factors in the development of this political logic. The aspects of military command do not require an unchanging authoritarianism since the future leaders appear to accept new behaviorally-oriented management practices. There is a strong positive correlation between conservatism and combat experience. On the other hand, neither increased age and experience nor attendance at a war college, nor identification with conservative politicians appears to explain the consistent conservative identification of military leaders.

Military Leadership in the 1990s concludes that the political logic of military leaders appears to be ideologically consistent and operationally variable depending on the issue under consideration. When national defense issues are under consideration the conservative bias of the military prevails. On the other hand the future military leaders are open to change in such things as conceptual roles and
leadership strategies. It may well be that concern about what formulates the political logic of military leaders is overstated and efforts in this area should be directed primarily to insure that the outward manifestations of that logic are consistent with national objectives.
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It cannot be taken for granted that the services will continue to provide competent leadership for the nation's future needs. Both the services themselves and the circumstances they face are different from those in the past.¹

It has never been more important for the American people to understand the values of their military leaders. With modern technology and changing global relationships, the role of the military as an instrument of national power is undergoing changes that will be shaped by future military leaders. The dedication and judgment of our military leaders have never been more critical because of the awesome power at their disposal and their responsibility for the military strength of the country.

In 1971 Toffler described the world situation as "... a roaring current of change, a current so powerful today that it overturns institutions, shifts our values and shrivels our lives."² The military institution has not been immune to this change and the future portends some hard questioning of the essence of the military as we know it today. In the next 12 to 15 years today's "flag officers" (admirals and generals) will be almost completely replaced. Will the replacements be made in the image of today's leaders or are
the future military leaders going to be different? When this question is answered, the future military and its ability to defend this country can be better understood.

In the past few years there has been a great deal written about the military. The field of sociology in particular has produced a proliferation of material dealing with the effect of the All-Volunteer Force on the future military. When these articles, books, and periodicals are studied closely, one finds many general assumptions about the sociological makeup of the military and especially its leadership. Upon inspection, these assumptions are found to closely parallel the findings outlined by Morris Janowitz in his book *The Professional Soldier*. This book has become recognized as the best study of the United States military ever written. The influence of this monumental study can be seen in the writings of scholars, reporters, and interestingly enough, military personnel themselves. Janowitz' book, first published in 1960, is based on data collected in the 1950s. Although much of the data is now over 20 years old, there has been little attempt to question or update his data to better reflect the present situation in the military. Because there has been no better study since the 50s, Dr. Janowitz' study was reprinted in 1971 with only a prologue added. This prologue did not present an update of the original text but described environmental changes that had taken place during the intervening years and their possible effect on the military.
In his more recent writings, Janowitz has recognized that there have been changes to some of his original conclusions. For instance, based on ROTC unit openings and location of military bases, he now feels that the Southwest is approaching the military representation of the South. Even though writers have commented on the changing military environment, it is interesting that in an age of computerized information and sophisticated sampling techniques no one has attempted to replicate even a major portion of *The Professional Soldier*. New data are needed to insure that assumptions based on Janowitz' study are still valid and if they are not, a new baseline of data for future writings on the military needs to be developed.

In particular, new data are needed for the Air Force, an organization which had been in existence for only three to eight years during Janowitz' study. The Air Force leadership at that time was a product of the Army Air Corps. The Air Force did not have its own academy and had not developed a character of its own. This is no longer true. By the 1980s, all Air Force generals will have spent their entire careers in a separate Air Force.

*The Professional Soldier* did not deal with the Marine Corps at all. This is not unusual since in the 1950s the Marines were still considered to be primarily a branch of the Navy. Since then the Marines, while functionally and administratively still attached to the Navy Department, have
developed almost equal status with the other services at the policymaking level. The Commandant of the Marine Corps sits on the Joint Chiefs of Staff with commensurate rank. The Marine Corps is now a strong element in the Defense Department policymaking structure and needs to be studied along with the other services.

Not only has the Air Force developed its own character and the Marine Corps approached equal standing with the other services, but all of the military leaders of the 1990s will have lived and fought in a unique era. The military officer, since the 1950s, has been required to function in a rapidly changing social and professional environment. The diversity of weapons, tactics, and policies; the conflict of the traditional military management philosophy with new behaviorist-oriented philosophies; and the challenges of an All-Volunteer Force lead one to suspect the military, if it has not changed already, is undergoing significant changes. In addition, the prestige of the military officer has been affected by involvement in an unpopular war and a strong continuous questioning of defense costs and management. The question that needs to be answered is: "What are the effects and resultant attitude patterns of future military leaders whose military careers span a unique era and a rapidly changing world?"

In addition to studying the background and formulation of the next generation of military leaders, Janowitz' recent
suggestion was heeded and an evaluation was made of their perceptions concerning the changing role of violence in international relations. Especially significant are their ideas on the role of the military in a world where the enemy has reached parity in weapons and where preparedness must be maintained without the "...inevitability of conventional combat involvement." Their perceptions of many other sociological, leadership, and political factors can also be invaluable in assessing the possible reactions of future military leaders to various political and military situations.

There has been no comprehensive study since Janowitz' classic work. The time seems overdue for the development of a biographic, demographic, and perceptual data base for a better understanding of future military leaders. Using The Professional Soldier as a model, Military Leadership in the 1990s will attempt to test the hypothesis: The passage of time and the changing nature of military leadership have altered the portrait of future military leaders from that recently portrayed in the literature.

**Methodology**

The precursor to Military Leadership in the 1990s was begun in 1973 as a research project at the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) of the Air University located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The original study, Air Force Leaders in the 1980s, was conducted by the students and
The faculty leader of the research, Colonel Franklin D. Margiotta has published several articles reporting findings of the Air Force study which have generated a great deal of interest, both within the military and among civilian scholars.

The opportunity to expand the study to the Navy and Marine Corps presented itself when I, the student research leader of the Air Force study, was assigned to the Naval War College in 1977. Taking advantage of this opportunity a proposal was submitted to the Naval War College's Center for Advanced Research which agreed to sponsor an extension of the Air Force study.

The expansion of the study into the Navy and Marine Corps added another dimension to the study's original purpose. Not only can a comparison of past, present, and future leaders be made but differences among the future leaders of each of the services studied can now be made.

Three primary sources of data are used to make the past, present, and future comparisons. The past sample was taken from Janowitz' *The Professional Soldier* and includes 106 Air Force generals and 204 Navy admirals. For comparison a sample of biographies of 351 (90%) Air Force generals serving on active duty in 1974 and 333 (100%) Navy admirals and admiral selectees and 68 (100%) Marine generals serving on active duty in 1978 were analyzed for biographic, demographic, and career information.
In order to study the third group, future military leaders, the biographic, demographic, and career information was expanded to include insights into attitudes and perceptions. In order to gather this information a 70 item questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire provided data for comparison of past and present leaders as well as questions dealing with religion, heritage, political orientation, professional perceptions, and leadership strategies.

The original instrument was constructed under the supervision of two officers with extensive experience in the development of questionnaires. Before administration, the questionnaire was circulated through several university professors for comment and criticism. Changes were incorporated and the instrument was validated with small groups of officers. The reliability of the instrument was tested by the four years between its two administrations. The questions developed in 1973 needed only organizational revamping for application in 1978. The only changes in the original questionnaire dealt with broadening the terminology (i.e., generals to flag officers) and changing several questions dealing with intraservice career patterns. The two questionnaires were essentially the same and served as a basis for interservice comparisons.

The questionnaires (Appendix 1) were distributed to almost 1000 officers serving on active duty with the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The vast majority of the
participants were attending one of the services professional military education schools. Participation was strictly voluntary and the responses could be anonymous. An excellent overall return of 91.5% was received. In addition, many of the participants volunteered unsolicited comments and requested interviews to expand on their answers to the issues involved. Over 300 such interviews were conducted in the sample groups.

The Samples

The Professional Soldier and its data on flag officers are probably the most accepted source of data on past flag officers and were used as a comparative basis. The biographies of present generals and admirals is an excellent source for particular data points. Table 1 shows the sample numbers and sources for these groups. The only sampling problem was to identify a group of officers that would fairly represent those who will hold flag rank into the 1990s. The military promotion system is designed to advance the best qualified of the eligible officers to positions of greater responsibility commensurate with the needs of the service. The promotion phase points have been spaced to allow a flow through various grades in a visible pattern that provides varied experience and avoids stagnation. In order to do this, decreasing percentages of eligible officers are promoted to the next higher rank. The Navy, Marine and
TABLE I

PAST AND PRESENT MILITARY LEADERS

SAMPLE GROUP

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<tr>
<th>Sample Group</th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Present</th>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force Leaders</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>351</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Leaders</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Leaders</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>333</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Leaders</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>752</td>
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2. Source: Official biographies on 90% of the Air Force general officers serving on active duty as of January 1974.

3. Source: Official biographies on 100% of the Marine generals serving on active duty as of April 1978.

4. Source: Official transcripts on 100% of the admirals and admiral selectees serving on active duty as of April 1978.
Air Force officers used in the "future military leaders" sample have competed successfully in the promotion systems of their respective services identifying them as having the potential for further promotions and flag rank into the 1990s. The samples included majors and lieutenant commanders; lieutenant colonels and commanders; and colonels and captains who had successfully competed to these ranks. (Table II.)

In addition, the services, especially the Marines and Air Force, identify future leaders by selecting officers with the most potential for further advancement to attend professional military education (PME). The top Air Force and Marine majors as well as Navy lieutenant commanders attend various intermediate PME schools, however, the majority attend the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) or the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS). The majority of the Air Force and Marine lieutenant colonels and colonels and their Navy counterparts, commanders and captains, attend the senior service PME schools, Air War College (AWC) or the College of Naval Warfare (CNW).

There is some debate within the Navy whether or not attendance at a senior service school enhances the chances for flag rank. There is no such question in the Marine Corps and Air Force where service school selection and attendance is almost mandatory for being promoted to the flag ranks. In April 1978, 139 admirals or admiral selectees had attended a senior PME school. The mode of this group, 51 attended
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<tr>
<td>AWC(^1) - 209</td>
<td>CNW(^3) - 100</td>
<td>CNW(^5) - 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSC(^2) - 472</td>
<td>CNCS(^4) - 68</td>
<td>CNCS(^6) - 15</td>
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<td>681</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>43</td>
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2. Air Force majors attending the Air Command and Staff College in 1974.
3. Navy commanders and captains attending the College of Naval Warfare in 1978 plus submarine officers of equal rank.
4. Navy lieutenant commanders attending the College of Naval Command and Staff in 1978 plus submarine officers of equal rank.
5. Marine lieutenant colonels and colonels attending the College of Naval Warfare in 1978.
6. Marine majors attending the College of Naval Command and Staff in 1978.
the College of Naval Warfare. Additionally 62 of the admirals attended the College of Naval Command and Staff. These figures would be higher except for the fact that almost no admirals with operational background in submarines have attended either of the two Navy Colleges. This fact will remain constant for the foreseeable future since very few submariners attend the colleges even today. The stated reason for this is the lack of sufficient qualified submarine officers to allow any of them the necessary 10 months to a year away from their operational duties to attend one of the colleges.

When the admirals with submarine and various other specialties, (i.e., medical) who do not normally attend a PME school, are subtracted from the total number of 1978 admirals, over 45% of the remaining have attended a school from which the sample groups of future leaders were drawn. In addition the sample group attending the Navy schools in 1978 were specially screened for attendance which has resulted in an even stronger potential for flag rank in the sample group.

This study does not attempt to measure the perceptions and thoughts of those future admirals in the specialized professional fields such as medicine and religion. However, the lack of submarine representation in the future leader data base was felt to be a major flaw. In order to correct this flaw and thus insure a representative sampling of officers
with a submarine background, officers of equal rank and potential stationed at the U.S. Navy Submarine Base, Groton, Connecticut, were included in the survey group.

Assumptions and Limitations

A major assumption underlying this study is that members of an organization are able to conduct an objective investigation of that organization without creating "...tension between the host body and the people involved." The problems of internal tension and objectivity were always in mind while conducting the research and analyzing the results. The purpose of this study is neither to denigrate nor to enhance the image of military leaders. The purpose of the study is to present an updated description of demographic/biographic characteristics of future military leaders and to derive insights into the attitudes and perceptions of these future leaders.

In reality being members of the military gave the researchers two distinct advantages over Dr. Janowitz and other writers outside of the military. First, we had access to many sources not generally available or known to outside researchers. Also, being a research fellow under the sponsorship of the Naval War College's Center for Advanced Research opened many doors for an Air Force officer studying the Navy and Marines.

The second advantage military affiliation gave was ready accessibility to a large number of Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps officers. As problems of interpretation arose, interviews of the officers in the sample groups were conducted. In addition the questionnaire generated a great deal of interest among the sample groups and resulted in many spontaneous, unsolicited and extensive discussions of the issues involved.

Another assumption was that the four years between the administrations of the questionnaire to the two sample groups would not affect the results inordinately. This assumption presented no problem with the biographic/demographic data; however, some significant events occurred in the intervening years including the final solution of the Vietnam War and some penetrating discussions concerning the very essence of all three of the services involved in the study. The B-1 manned bomber was cancelled, the nuclear aircraft carrier was threatened, and the Marine Corps mission was continuously under review. None of the questions in the study were directly related to the issues involved, but responses to some of the issues (e.g., civilian control, the All Volunteer Force and military roles and missions) certainly were affected by the events occurring between the two administrations of the questionnaire. Once again, recognition of the time lapse was always paramount in the analysis of the responses to any questions that could be affected by changes in the 1974 and 1978 situations. The questionnaire turned out to be a great deal more universal than initially suspected. Almost
no changes in the questions were necessary due to changes brought on by the time lapse. Both questionnaires are in Appendix 1 and any substantive changes between them are noted in the text of the study.

The major limitation to the study was time. Janowitz took eight years to complete his study; this product was completed in less than six months. The short time involved required a delimiting of the study to a comparison of demographic/biographic data on past, present, and future leaders and comparison of perceptions and attitudes of future leaders among the three services. Several items were studied from the viewpoint of young versus older officers but this was very limited. The collected data would allow many more comparisons between subgroups within the services, such as academy/non-academy graduates; early promotees/on-time promotees; aviation/surface/submarine Navy officers; etc.

The data base has been prepared for computer compilation and will be left with the Naval War College. Hopefully, students attending one of the Colleges in the next few years will be able to expand the scope of this study. Of course the study would benefit greatly if a sampling of Army officers were included.

Organization

The study begins with a look at the social composition of military leaders past, present, and future. Comparisons are made of educational background and the origins of military
leaders. Included are such items as nativity, social strata, religious background and intensity of affiliation, ethnic heritage and rural/urban/geographic origins. Conclusions drawn from this part of the study will test whether or not Janowitz' conclusions about past military leaders are valid today. The picture presented will give insight into the future military leader's perspective.

From social composition the study will look at Professional Perceptions in Chapter III. Attitudes about a military career will be compared to perceptions of the societal status of the military and the question of media influence and civil/military relations in a changing international situation will be discussed.

After setting the perceived environment the study will look at the military career, the process by which military leaders are molded. Is it a process that insures the military stereotype as so many detractors claim? Or is it a process which insures that only the very best talent reaches the top?

From a look at advancement and assignments in the military the study will delve into perceptions of the future military. The issues of roles and missions, civilian control, service unification, and the all volunteer force are studied.

The pertinent facts and significant changes found in the study are brought together in the final chapter in order to describe how the Military Leadership in the 1990s may differ from that of yesterday and today. Finally, conclusions
are drawn about how the socio-economic heritage, career patterns, and basic issues have influenced the political logic of our future military leaders.
CHAPTER II

MILITARY LEADERSHIP PATTERNS OF SOCIAL COMPOSITION AND EDUCATION

...the analysis of the social origins of the military is a powerful key to the understanding of its political logic.¹

The social personality of the military, especially its leadership, has been a subject of great interest to modern scholars. This interest has peaked with the demise of the draft and the implementation of the all volunteer force. Moskos, a leading writer, represents most scholars when he predicts: "The movement toward an all volunteer force will be accompanied by significant changes in the social basis of officer recruitment."²

Many writers believe that the recruitment and eventual movement into leadership positions of a broadly representative cross section of social backgrounds will insure no harboring of military intentions to upset the political balance. Janowitz in his later writings felt that the military leadership was moving toward this broader representation. However Moskos stated in 1973, "Recent evidence shows that starting around the early 1960s the long-term trend toward recruitment of the officer corps from a representative sample of the American population has been reversed."³ Is the military leadership of the future going to achieve this representation or will the social reality be an elitist organization drawn from limited segments of the society?
In order to provide some insight into the representation/non-representation issue, *Military Leadership in the 1990s* studied several elements in the backgrounds of current and future military leaders and compared them to the American population. The background elements studied were social origins and education which most sociologists consider to be significant in molding the "political logic" of individuals. In developing the portrait of social origins, the analysis made it possible to describe the patterns of regional affiliation, rural/urban background, family socio-economic class, and the heritage and religion of military leaders.

**Regional Affiliation**

...a military hierarchy dominated by Southerners in today's volunteer environment would be dysfunctional if the goal is to obtain a representative and broad based military force.  

During the 1960s nearly all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were southerners. Professor Lawrence J. Korb, the foremost expert on the JCS, believes that "While it is difficult to make a direct connection between regional origins and subsequent behavior of the Chiefs, this concentration of southerners during the height of the war in Vietnam was not a healthy situation."

The idea that military leadership is overly representative of the South is based on historical fact. Tracing Army and Navy leaders from 1910, Janowitz showed that southern
connections have been consistently strong and overrepresentative of the U.S. population. However, Janowitz reported that the 1950 Air Force generals, in contrast to the Army and Navy, were, "...most representative in terms of region." In later writings, Janowitz reports that, based on new ROTC unit openings and other factors, there is a shift in officer procurement from the South to the Southwest. Military Leadership in the 1990s studied the regional issue and described the regional affiliations of current and future Air Force, Marine, and Navy flag officers.

The American population has become so mobile that no longer is place of birth a sufficient measure of geographic affiliation. For purposes of this study, the regional analysis of future military leaders used their places of rearing (state or foreign country where they spent most of their formative years, birth to 18 years old) and where they received their formal education, exclusive of academy attendance.

In order to make comparisons and provide easily replicable and understandable data, the definition of region by the U.S. Bureau of Census was used. Janowitz also used this definition while recognizing the limitation of restricting a study of regionalism to state boundaries. Bureau of Census data from the years 1920 and 1950 were selected for comparisons since they best represent the birthdates of the present military leaders and the period in which the future military leaders were reared. Table III shows the results of these comparisons.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>CURRENT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>FUTURE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>MARINE CORPS</td>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>U.S. POP</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>MARINE CORPS</td>
<td>NAVY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH EAST</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH CENTRAL</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(n) (341) (66) (326) (149m) (630) (33) (154) (151m)
Little evidence was found of an overall military leadership recruitment pattern. Each of the services' leaders appear to have unique patterns of regional affiliation.

The regional affiliation of current Navy admirals is the most representative of the U.S. population. There is a slight under-representation of the North Central and a slight over-representation from the West. The South and Northeast represent the U.S. population very closely. The future Navy leadership appears to be shifting in regional background to the Northeast and West coasts while representation of the North Central region is decreasing to a significant under-representation. From interviews it was determined that the growing coastal overrepresentation appears to be caused by no more than the historical concept of a country attracting its Navy personnel from those who live close to the sea.

The Air Force has experienced a greater shifting in the regional representation of its leaders. In Janowitz' study of 1950 Air Force generals, the North Central region was disproportionally overrepresented. This North Central orientation diminished after 1950 and the current Air Force general officers were drawn disproportionately from the South. This trend appears to be transitory and the future Air Force leaders appear to be returning to a closer representation of the U.S. population.

The Marines present an interesting picture of an extremely high and consistent representation from the North.
Janowitz did not include the Marines in his study and no reliable data on Marine Corps generals were available from the 1950 period. The current Marine generals and the future leaders show an amazing consistency in that almost one-half of their number have a Northeast affiliation. In fact, of the 66 Marine generals on active duty in 1978 born in the United States, 18 (over one-fourth) were from two states, Massachusetts and New York. Added to this strong Northeast representation has been a shift upward in North Central representation while the South is experiencing a rather significant decline. Both the North Central and South continue to be underrepresented when compared with the U.S. population.

During subsequent interviews with Marine Corps officers, an attempt was made to pinpoint the reason for this heavy recruitment of their leaders from the North. Several large Marine officer procurement programs are located in northeastern universities, but this does not necessarily explain their over-representation in the Marine leadership. No other definitive answer was found and if, as Janowitz and others suggest, social origins are important and if as Korb indicates, a strong affiliation with any one area is "dysfunctional," the Marine Corps may want to study their recruitment patterns and promotion policies to gain an understanding of the consistent overrepresentation of the Northeast region of the United States among their leaders.
There appear to be no significant overall "military" trends in regional affiliation. There is a continuing slight over-representation of the West in all of the services studied but other than that each of the services appears to be following its own unique pattern. The Navy remains fairly consistent, the Air Force shifting but apparently reaching a closer representation of the U.S. population, while the Marines show a consistently strong North East over-representation and strengthening overall northern influence among their current and future leaders.

Rural/Urban Background

The data on the place of birth of military leaders indicates that they are overwhelmingly of rural and small town origin. 7

Agreeing with Janowitz, Moskos stated in 1973 that newly commissioned officers are being over-proportionately drawn from rural and small town backgrounds. 8 On the other hand, Coates asserts that there exists a trend toward urban recruitment primarily as a result of "...the continuing trend toward city dwelling in the nation as a whole." 9

Military Leadership in the 1990s findings support Coates. The future military leadership will be more urban than the U.S. populace (Table IV). The Air Force more closely approximates the U.S. population while the Marines have a significantly more urban background. Another interesting aspect was the low 2% of the Air Force and Marine sample
### TABLE IV

RURAL VERSUS URBAN BACKGROUNDS OF FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>U.S. POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural or Farm Home</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Town Under 2500</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL RURAL</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL URBAN</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY SITE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (N)                  | (678)     | (43)         | (167) | (132m)          |

Sources: Air Force from survey of AMC and ACSC students, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CACCS students, 1978; and U.S. population as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, 1961.
claiming to have been raised on military sites while 7% of the Navy respondents reported having been raised on military installations. While 7% is still rather low, the difference between the Navy and its counterparts in the Air Force and Marines is consistent with the findings in the discussion of self-recruitment.

**Family Socio-Economic Class and Heritage**

American military leaders traditionally have come from the more privileged strata. However, recent trends in their social background supply striking confirmation of the decline in the relatively high social origins of the military, and of its transformation into a more socially heterogeneous group. 10

Moskos and others agree with Janowitz' 1950 observation and believe the move toward heterogeneity is continuing if not accelerating. 11 Janowitz in 1970 concluded that, "... the armed forces lost their last direct linkage with sons of the upper class." 12

In order to determine if the perceived social class standing of military leaders is indeed declining, the future leaders of the three services were asked to describe the environment in which they were raised, based on their parents' income, their social standards, and their general standard of living. In order to confirm their perceptions, the respondents were asked the principal occupation of their family's primary wage earner during their formative years (i.e., until they were 18 years old). Tables V and VI
show the results of the survey compared to Janowitz' findings and the U.S. Bureau of Census statistics on the principal wage earner occupations of the U.S. population in 1950.

Future leaders of all three services are predominantly from lower-middle class families. The most dramatic change has occurred in the Navy where 61% of the past admirals were from the two highest strata of society. In the future, less than 30% of the admirals will come from these classes. Most of the drop has occurred from the upper-middle class. It appears Janowitz' finding that, "...the Navy has the highest social base of recruitment" will not necessarily be true in the future.¹³

Janowitz' early observation that, "...the military establishment is becoming an avenue of social mobility"¹⁴ does seem to be affirmed by the gradual and continuing increase of officers with a background from the lower strata of the economic scale. The decline in the social class status is confirmed in Table VI with a significant proportion of all three groups of future leaders reporting backgrounds of middle-class occupations. Though under-representative of the U.S. population, there has been a significant upward trend in leaders from a blue collar background.

Janowitz reported in 1950 that "sons of military officers, lawyers, doctors, public officials, and of
### TABLE V

**FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASS OF MILITARY LEADERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>PAST</th>
<th></th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>MARINE CORPS</td>
<td>NAVY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER-MIDDLE</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER-MIDDLE</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER-LOWER</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER-LOWER</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(162)</td>
<td>(671)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data not available

Sources: Past as reported by Janowitz (1960); Future Air Force from a survey of AWC and ACSC students, 1974; Future Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS student, 1978.
TABLE VI

OCCUPATION OF FAMILY'S PRINCIPAL WAGE EARNER - FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>U.S. POPULATION 1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Managerial</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Sales</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL WHITE COLLAR</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Worker</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Worker</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BLUE COLLAR</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Owner/Manager</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(693)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
<td>(42.6m)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from a survey of AWC and ACSC students, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CMCS students, 1978; U.S. Population as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, 1961
particular interest, teachers and ministers were most prominently represented. The offspring from these groups will continue to be prominently represented in the future military leadership.

The Navy draws almost twice as many of its future leaders from the scientific and engineering professions than the other two services. This is also true of the law and medicine professions. Slightly less than 4% of the Air Force and slightly more than 2% of the Marines in the sample reported the principal wage earner in their family to be a professional scientist or engineer while over 7% of the Navy respondents came from these backgrounds. Doctors' and lawyers' offspring constituted 2% of the Air Force and Marine future leaders in the sample groups and almost 6% of the Navy group.

Bridging socio-economic status and family heritage is the proportion of military leaders who have entered the profession through self-recruitment; namely the offspring of professional military. This study could find no strong evidence of this happening. Fully 70% of the Air Force officers reported no military experience in at least two generations of their family. A significant number of Marine (58%) and Navy officers (59%) reported that their fathers had no military experience. On the other hand the Navy reported 12% of their fathers were career military personnel (9% officer; 3% enlisted) while only 5% of the Air Force and 7% of the Marine respondents stated their fathers were career military.
Less than 2% of all the respondees cited a second generation career military connection. These figures appear to show that self-recruitment will not be a significant factor in military leadership of the future.

Another major factor in family heritage is nativity. Janowitz stated in 1960 that, "The military profession and its elite members, with rare exceptions, are native born." No more than 3% of the flag officers serving between 1910 and 1950 were foreign born. Only 3 (of 333) of the 1978 admirals are foreign born, one Marine general was born in Guam, and about 1% of the Air Force generals are foreign born. The future military leaders continue this strong native born trend with no foreign born Marines in the sample group and only about 1% of the Air Force and Navy officers stating they were not born a U.S. citizen. These figures are significantly below the approximately 7% foreign born representation in the U.S. population.

This native born tendency is also strong among the future leaders' parents where only 9% of the Air Force and Navy future leaders report at least one foreign born parent. Marine future respondents reported a somewhat stronger foreign born affiliation with slightly over 16% having one foreign born parent while another 37% have a foreign born grandparent. Further interviews showed that this higher foreign born affiliation among the Marine Corps is consistent with the high Northeast urban representation of the present and future Marine leaders.
Religion

Religious affiliation and belief is an index which gives deeper meaning to social background. 18

Janowitz found the American military leaders to be overwhelmingly Protestant with the concentration of Catholics increasing, but lagging. Table VII depicts the continuing growth of Catholic representation in the military leadership. It is predicted that by the 1990s the Marine leadership will be at least representative of Catholics in the larger society and will contain a significantly higher percentage of Catholics than the other services.

The traditionalist religions (Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Congregationalist, Lutheran, and Evangelical) which historically have been the denominations of the military dropped dramatically in our sample of future elites. The Episcopalian representation which Janowitz felt may have held special symbolic interest for the military is now a significant percentage of only the Marines whereas Janowitz reported over 50% of the Navy and 43% of the 1950 Air Force flag officers were Episcopal.

A sidelight is the small but interesting number of future military leaders reporting themselves to be agnostics or atheists. Further, when they were asked about the extent of their religious interests, 35% of the Navy, 22% of the Air Force and 21% of the Marines in the sample of future military leaders reported they were not church members of their
### TABLE VII

**RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DENOMINATION</th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
<th>U.S. POP 1974 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTANT</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPISCOPALIAN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUTHERAN</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPTIST</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESBYTERIAN</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODIST</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEWISH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATHEIST</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGNOSTIC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO PREFERENCE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(689)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not reported

Sources: Air Force from a survey of AWC and ACSC students, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978; U.S. Population from the 1974 World Almanac.
preferred religion and did not attend services regularly. In addition, 33% of the Air Force, 16% of the Marines, and 25% of the Navy claimed church membership, but stated they do not attend services regularly. Therefore, almost one-half of the Air Force and 60% of the future Navy leaders do not regularly practice a religion, even though they still identify a religious preference. On the other hand, the largest number (41% Air Force, 47% Marines, and 33% Navy) stated that they were church members and attended church regularly. Another 5% of the Air Force, 16% of the Marines and 7% of the Navy reported they were not church members, but attended services regularly.

In summary, Military Leadership in the 1990s found that Janowitz's conclusion that "The military elite has been drawn from an old family, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, rural, upper middle-class professional background" will, for the most part, not be true in the future. As a matter of fact, it is the conclusion of this study that when speaking about patterns of social composition, there is no single portrait of the military as a whole. Each of the services has its own composition, some of the elements of which are very much in transition and are not clear-cut.

The Air Force leadership of the future will be drawn from a lower middle-class family, Protestant, urban background broadly representative of the U.S. population's regional affiliation.

The Marine Corps of the future will be led by men from a lower-middle class family, Catholic, urban background and will overrepresent the Northeastern regions of the U.S.
The future Navy leaders will be from a lower-middle class family, Protestant, urban background and will be disproportionately from the Northeast and West.

**Education**

...the military profession in the past has placed higher emphasis on 'doing' than on intellectual accomplishment.20

Together with social origins education is usually cited as a precursor of "political logic." The findings of this study foretell a weakening in the emphasis stated by Janowitz. The Air Force and Marines appear to have placed an emphasis on education leading to a significant diversity of advanced degrees not necessarily tied to their official duties. The number and diversity of advanced degrees is not so prevalent in the Navy.

Table VIII depicts the service entry education level of future military leaders. Future leaders who entered the service without at least a bachelor's degree are primarily from the Marine commissioning programs as well as the Air Force and Navy cadet flying training programs. The Navy leadership with its emphasis on an academy background has historically had the lowest number of leaders coming from the ranks or other commissioning programs. Currently less than 10% of the admirals entered the service without at least a bachelor's degree. By comparison, over 40% of the 1978 Marine generals entered the service without a degree.
### TABLE VIII

EDUCATION LEVEL OF FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS UPON SERVICE ENTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School Grad</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s Degree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Master’s Work</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(677)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from a survey of AWC and ACSC students, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
Both the Navy and Marine leaders in the 1990s will continue these trends. The Navy will have the smallest, although increasing, number of leaders who entered the service without a degree. The Marine leaders will continue to have the largest, though decreasing, number of leaders entering service without a degree.

The Air Force currently has a large number of general officers who were commissioned without degrees through the Aviation Cadet program. The sample of future leaders in this study includes the last officers who entered the service before this program was cancelled in the early 60s. Since then the Air Force has required a degree for commissioning. This change in policy is seen in the percentages of younger future Air Force leaders attending ACSC compared with the older AWC officers. Over 45% of the lieutenant colonels and colonels in AWC entered the service without a degree whereas less than 25% of the ACSC majors entered without at least a bachelor's degree. Similar, yet less significant drops in age groups were noted in the other two services.

Education level at entry into the service is not necessarily the best indication of intellectual accomplishment. Janowitz recognized as early as 1960 that the services were sending an increasing number of officers to civilian schools for advanced degrees in addition to those officers who attend the Navy Postgraduate School and the Air Force Institute of
Technology. These latter two programs are small and driven by peculiar service needs which are not fulfillable through other sources. Military sponsored graduate programs are designed to fill the needs of the services however many officers obtain degrees through the diverse off duty education programs. All services have arrangements with civilian colleges to provide education programs, at all levels, on military bases. The military pays 75% of the tuition costs of these education programs which has led to the dynamic increase beyond entry level education of current and future leaders depicted in Table IX.

A further analysis shows that advanced degrees achieved by the Navy tend to be more technical than those received in the other services and the off-duty education programs are not as large as those in the Air Force. There are almost three times the number of Master of Science (MS) Degrees over Master of Arts (MA) and Master of Business Administration (MBA) Degrees won by admirals. The MS degrees tend to be in the fields of physics, nuclear physics, nuclear engineering, and marine engineering and design. The Air Force advanced degrees reverse the Navy emphasis with a preponderance of MAs and MBAs rather than MSs in technical fields.

Interviews of Navy officers and a comparison of current and future leader education levels point to a signal that the trend toward higher levels of education is being reversed in the Navy. One of the best opportunities for future
## TABLE IX

**EDUCATION LEVEL OF CURRENT AND FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>CURRENT</th>
<th></th>
<th>FUTURE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>MARINE CORPS</td>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>MARINE CORPS</td>
<td>NAVY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO DEGREE</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACHELOR'S DEGREE</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASTER'S DEGREE</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASTER'S PLUS</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(351)</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(317)</td>
<td>(677)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Current—from flag officer biographies and transcripts; Air Force 1974; Marine Corps and Navy 1978; Future—survey of AMC and ACSC students, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CMW and CNCS students, 1978.
naval leaders to obtain a Masters degree was while attending the Naval War College. George Washington University offered a Masters degree program in conjunction with the CNW and CNS courses. This program has been dropped and the opportunity for future Naval and Marine leaders to achieve a masters degree is now somewhat diminished. A similar program with Auburn and Troy State Universities at the AWC and ACSC will probably contribute to a continuing increase in the percentage of Air Force leaders with advanced education. The Navy officers interviewed who had worked in Washington policymaking and budgetary assignments claimed that they have felt at a distinct disadvantage to other services' officers who generally have higher levels of education and who have a better understanding of the analysis techniques taken from the business world that are so important in the defense budget and management process today.

Future military leaders will be well educated with many having advanced degrees. The Air Force and Marine Corps will probably have more diversity in their education while those Navy officers with advanced degrees will have earned them in technical fields directly related to their job.

Social characteristics and education may offer a partial insight to the "political logic" of military leadership. However, it is the conclusion of this study that because of the significant diversity and transition within the socio-economic backgrounds of the various services' military leaders over time it is possible to place too much emphasis on these
factors when trying to understand the political logic of military leaders. Arising from this conclusion is the hypothesis that other factors such as service socialization and career patterns may hold an even more "powerful key" than socio-economic factors to the "political logic" of the military.
CHAPTER III
CAREER PATTERNS AND ADVANCEMENT

... in the broadest terms, the internal indoctrination system rather than social origins, will determine the political orientations of the military profession. 1

After studying the elements that go together to make up the social backgrounds of military leaders, Military Leadership in the 1990s arrived at approximately the same conclusion as Janowitz did in the statement above. Although The Professional Soldier spends a great deal of time studying military career patterns it did not appear ready to admit that social elements are a rather small and declining element in the formulation of the "political logic" of military leaders. For instance, in the same paragraph as the quote above, Janowitz concludes, "The social basis of recruitment is likely to continue to operate to select persons with a conservative orientation toward life styles and human nature. The organizational milieu of the military profession is likely to reinforce such belief patterns." 2

Whether or not career patterns reinforce or mold political logic cannot be decided without looking at the attitudes on the part of military leaders toward their careers and the assignment/advancement policies that go into formulation of the military leader.

In order to better understand the career perceptions of the future military leaders it is interesting to note...
their reactions when they were asked three questions which when brought together provide insight into the reasons for: (1) their selecting the military as a profession; (2) their attitude toward their career at the mid-career point; and (3) what they perceive to be the future possibilities in the military.

When asked, "What was your attitude toward a military career when you first entered the service?" very few of the future leaders stated they planned on making a career of the service (Table X). Further interviews brought out the fact that the majority of the future leaders' primary motivation for joining the military as officers was to avoid the draft. Once in the service the decision to make a career was more of a process of non-decision than a well thought out commitment. There was no compelling reason to leave and the lure of a rather comfortable lifestyle coupled with the promise of only a 20 year commitment if subsequently the career became less appealing, led to the career choices.

The draft motivation to enter the service as an officer is now gone and Janowitz, along with others, believes it may have unhealthy repercussions for the country. Since the "All Volunteer" Force is a new phenomenon, the results of a non-draft motivated military leadership will not be felt at the higher echelons until after the turn of the century. If it can be shown that military career patterns are the primary stimulus to the political logic and attitudes
**TABLE X**

ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY CAREER WHEN FIRST RECRUITED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLANNED TO GET OUT</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOOK, Then MAKE UP MIND</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORE THAN ONE TOUR, BUT NOT CAREER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNED MILITARY CAREER</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(681)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from a survey of AMC and ACSC students, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CMW and CNCS students, 1978.
in military leaders then the lack of a draft is only a recruiting problem. If, on the other hand, the social background of those recruited into the officer corps is the critical factor in political logic then all services should probably be formulating mechanisms to insure a representative profile of the U.S. population among its leadership.

The officers making up the sample of future military leaders, though draft motivated, are at this stage in their careers relatively satisfied with their accomplishments. They were asked, "If you had the opportunity to do it over again, would you choose to enter another profession?" (Table XI). Over two-thirds of the Air Force officers agreed that they would again choose the military profession. Interestingly only 51% of the Marine and 56% of the Navy officers said they would choose the military if given the opportunity to do it over again. While this is still a majority, it is felt that this is not a strong endorsement by a group of officers who have been identified as being successful in their chosen profession. It was interesting to find the younger Marines (majors) were still very enthusiastic about their profession with over 73% of them saying they would not select another profession. The older Marines (lieutenant colonels and colonels), on the other hand, had only 42% respond that they would not choose another profession. Through interviews an attempt was made to pinpoint the reasons for the lack of a strong commitment.
TABLE XI

CAREER SATISFACTION ON PART OF FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS

Response to statement: "If you had it to do over again, would you choose to enter another profession?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEFINITELY YES</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBABLY YES</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDECIDED</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBABLY NO</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFINITELY NO</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(678)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
The older Marines cited many of the expected reasons: the perceived lowering prestige of the military in the eyes of the American public; slower promotions than the other services; and various personal career reasons. The overwhelming factor affecting their uncertainty about selecting the military profession again cited by both Marine and Navy officers was the inordinate pressures on families caused by separations. Since the Air Force also undergoes family separations this seemingly significant difference was pursued further. Apparently the length of separation is the key. Both the Marine and Navy officers are separated for longer periods than their Air Force counterparts. Six month cruises and one year tours in the Pacific are a lot more prevalent in most Navy and Marine lives than the short deployments and one or two remote unaccompanied tours experienced in an Air Force career.

In an attempt to extend the analysis of career attitudes the officers were asked, "If you had a son, would you want him to have a career as a military officer?" (Table XII). Only the Navy showed less than a majority willing to have their sons pursue a military career. The interesting point here is that an overwhelming 94% of the Navy officers and over 85% of the other two services were uncertain or would not encourage their sons one way or the other. This stands in stark comparison to Janowitz' findings from a similar question asked of potential military leaders in 1958. Only
TABLE XII

DESIABILITY OF OFFICER'S CAREER FOR SON

Response to statement: "If you had a son, would you want him to have a career as a military officer?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would encourage him</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, but would not influence</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, but would not influence</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would discourage him</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(679)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(167)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
28% of the Navy officers and 32% of the Air Force officers were uncertain or would not provide such encouragement to their sons. The high uncertainty the present study connotes was further pursued through interviews. The response most often given for the uncertainty was the belief that the military career is losing its advantages over other professions. The special aspects of a military career, in particular early retirement and the chance for a second career, are not certain enough in the future to encourage one's offspring to make the sacrifices a military career entails.

The results of these three questions seemingly point to a growing uneasiness with the military as a career choice by those who have been tapped for its future leadership. While it is hard to discern what effect this will have on the future military it does point to a probable unlikelihood of the military leadership becoming filled with the sons of military sons.

What are the perceptions of these future military leaders of the career they chose and now appear, if not uncertain about, at least ready to question? A series of questions was posed concerning career patterns, assignments, promotions, and background they thought were necessary to be successful in a military career. Some of their responses were compared to the career patterns of flag officers past and present. Put together the questions, expanded by interviews, lead to a picture of what the future military leaders believe to be the steps to success.
It is the general impression of most civilians that the flag officer ranks are filled with graduates from one of the military academies. In 1950, Janowitz found that 97% of the Navy's admirals were academy graduates. Further, between 1910 and 1950 there had never been less than 90% academy graduates among the admirals. In 1950, 48% of the Air Force generals were academy graduates. 5

Both services have seen a decline in the academy influence among their flag officers. In 1974, the academy graduates constituted only 32% of the Air Force generals and in 1978 the number of academy-educated Navy admirals had declined to 66%. Although past figures on academy-educated Marine generals were not available, the Marine officers interviewed related that it hadn't been too long ago that there was a high percentage of Naval Academy graduates among Marine generals. In 1978, less than 10% of the Marine generals were academy graduates.

The sample groups for this study indicate that this decline in flag officer academy graduates will probably continue into the 1990s. Less than 14% of the Air Force potential leaders are academy graduates and only one-fourth of the Navy and 21% of the Marine future leaders are academy graduates. Through the 1990s it does not appear that academy graduates will dominate the Air Force, Marine Corps, or Navy. However, there are several mitigating factors that could slow the decline and even reverse it during the 1990s.
First, whenever the armed forces are reduced academy graduates are generally not released from active duty and therefore increase their overall representation in the officer force. A second reason for the belief that the decline in academy graduated Air Force generals may be reaching its nadir is the entry into the general officer ranks of the first Air Force Academy graduate as this study was being conducted.

The question which arises about the academy background is whether or not being a graduate of one of the academies gives an individual an advantage for promotion to the flag ranks. When the future Air Force leaders were asked this question, over 88% answered in the affirmative as did 78% of the Navy respondents. On the other hand, only 44% of the Marines felt being an academy graduate was an advantage. One of the Marines summed up the perception of many of the others when he said, "The Marine Corps has worked so hard to not become dominated by academy graduates that in the last three or four years it looks as if being an academy graduate is almost a negative factor." Over 90% of the Marine future leaders who graduated from the Naval Academy agreed with this officer when they disagreed with the statement, "When all other factors are in balance, academy graduates have the advantage for promotion to the flag ranks." 6

The Air Force and Navy potential leaders who were not academy graduates were interviewed about their overwhelming belief that academy graduates do have an advantage. Surprisingly almost all of them felt no bitterness about this
advantage. They all believed that the selection process to get into the academy followed by four years of intense military training developed an advantage for most academy graduates. The respondees believed if, truly all factors were in balance, then the extra investment the military had in academy graduates should give them the advantage. The only reservation about academy graduates expressed by the respondees concerned the selection of an academy graduate over a non-graduate based solely on the academy stereotype with no thought to ability or subsequent performance. There is a general belief, strongest in the Navy, that there is a "ring knocker syndrome" where the mere fact that an individual is an academy graduate is enough to insure the "right jobs" leading to early promotions. Although this is a concern, the very fact that academy representation in the flag ranks is declining should result in less concern about it.

If academy attendance is not the overwhelming entrée into the flag ranks it once was, what does it take to make it? Table XIII provides the responses of the future military sample when they were given four choices to select the most important criterion for promotion to flag officer. The Air Force respondees had a surprisingly low opinion of the part performance plays in promotion. Many respondees indicated that they preferred combinations of these four choices. The consensus seemed to be that outstanding performance in the right job at the right time is the essential
TABLE XIII

CRITERION FOR PROMOTION TO FLAG OFFICER

Response to: "Which is the most important for promotion to the Flag Officer ranks?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIGHT JOB AT RIGHT TIME</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNOW RIGHT PEOPLE AT RIGHT TIME</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPONSOR</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(671)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(164)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
criterion for promotion to the flag ranks. The Air Force officers interviewed stated that outstanding performance alone will not guarantee promotion; it is essential to get the right jobs and the best way to do this is through a sponsor.

The low percentage of Marines answering "sponsor" as the most important criterion headlines the confusion as to just what is meant by the term. Although the sponsorship issue is most prevalent in the Air Force, there is no consensus even among Air Force officers as to what a sponsor is. Some defined a sponsor as a senior officer for whom a person works the majority of his or her career and who insures promotions as early as possible; sometimes regardless of performance. The majority, however, agree with Janowitz that a sponsor is a high ranking officer who is able to influence the careers of young officers by requesting their assignment to high-level staffs or recommending them for appropriate jobs.

There were two more questions dealing with the sponsor issue (Table XIV). The reaction of the Marine future leaders was interesting and the "I don't know response" by 40% of them to the question of whether or not they need a sponsor for flag rank reflects the fact that they had never really thought of the issue as "sponsorship." The Marine Corps officer cadre is so much smaller than the other services that by the time Marines reach the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel they have had significant professional contact.
TABLE XIV

SPONSORSHIP AND PROMOTION

Response to: "Do you believe that most officers who are promoted to flag rank have a sponsor?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Response to: "Do you believe you have a sponsor?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEFINITELY YES</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I'M NOT SURE, BUT I THINK SO</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I'M NOT SURE I DON'T THINK SO</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFINITELY NO</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(673)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1974.
with a higher percentage of flag officers than their counterparts in the other services. Apparently the more senior Marines (lieutenant colonels and colonels) think this contact does have a significant impact on whether or not flag rank is attained. Over 60% of the senior Marines believed a sponsor was needed while 60% of the Marine majors said they don't know. In any case the sponsor issue generated a great deal of discussion among the Marines in the survey sample and produced more requests for interviews than any other part of the study.

When the potential future military leaders were asked if they had a sponsor (Table XIV) the overwhelming majority responded "no" or "I don't think so." The conclusion drawn from this is: the sponsorship issue has a small but true basis in fact. It is indeed helpful to have a flag officer ask for you or know your performance record in order to provide a personal recommendation for the "right jobs." However, there is no evidence that general officers can insure promotion of any particular officer especially if that individual's performance has been less than others competing for promotion. The sponsor issue is a great deal larger in the minds of officers than it is in reality.

Janowitz states, "...future members of the military elite were more often military aides." Most officers agree with Janowitz and believe the best way to gain a sponsor is to be selected as an aide to a flag officer. In 1978 32% of
the Marine generals and over 28% of the Navy admirals and admiral selectees had served at least one tour as an aide, administrative assistant, secretary, or special assistant to a flag officer or high Department of Defense (DOD) civilian official. Interestingly almost all of the Navy admirals whose primary operational experience is with surface ships have served a tour as a senior aide or had a high visibility job in the most senior offices in the Navy or DOD (i.e., Aide to Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary of the Navy, etc.). On the other hand, there are very few Navy aviators making admiral who have been aides.

In the future it appears that Marine generals more than other flag officers still continue to consist of officers with aide experience. The future Marine leaders reported 28% have been aides. The potential Navy leaders showed 11% with aide experience while only 5% of the future Air Force leaders have been aides.

Turning from sponsorship, Military Leadership in the 1990s studied several other perceptions of what it takes to be successful in the military. Cited by many future military leaders as a negative aspect of a military career is the hardship imposed on families. One aspect of this hardship is the frequent moves required; however, it is the perception of the future military leaders that, "Frequent changes of duty assignments are essential to career advancement." (Table XV). When quizzed about this aspect of military life the
### TABLE XV

**ASSIGNMENTS AND CAREER ADVANCEMENT**

Response to: Frequent changes of duty assignments are essential to career advancement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY AGREE</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(677)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(167)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Air Force from survey of AMC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
officers stated that frequent moves, though hard on the family, were essential in order for flag officers to get the breadth of experience necessary for higher level leadership positions. Personnel officers from the three services agree with this observation and add that change of assignments, entailing a change of duties, every two or three years is optimum for rapid career advancement. The personnel officers suggest that in the future the change in duty assignments will not necessarily involve a change of station. Reduced travel budgets and increasing costs are forcing longer tours on station. The services' personnel systems will have to develop reassignments without move mechanisms to insure the necessary breadth of experience will continue in the future.

When asked about the personnel assignment system within each of their services, almost two-thirds of the Navy officers and three-fourths of the Air Force officers felt that personal contact outside the formal system was at least helpful in getting a desired assignment. On the other hand over 53% of the Marine officers felt the formal system allowed them to participate adequately in assignment selection. The seemingly high rate of discontent among at least the Air Force and Navy officers is not really unusual when one considers that the personal desires of an individual can only be secondary to the system's need to provide resources to accomplish the mission.

What are some of the aspects of career patterns that go together to make up the breadth that is needed for the
top leadership positions? Janowitz stated, "A successful military establishment must be run by military managers, but must include in its very elite a leaven of heroic leaders." The heroic leaders of the 1990s have for the most part had their heroic experience in Vietnam. The Marine future leaders in this study had all served in a combat area during hostilities while 85% of the Air Force officers and 80% of the Navy officers had. The Marines, with the largest group having combat experience, were strongest in contending that such experience should be a criterion for promotion to the flag officer rank (Table XVI). Only about one-third of the Air Force and Navy officers agreed with the majority of the Marines. The comparison reflects the different roles in combat of the three services. In the Air Force and Navy a lower percentage of individuals engage in direct combat while the majority are engaged in direct support of the highly technological aspects of the two services' war-making machinery. The Marines, on the other hand, have smaller support contingents and more personnel engaged in direct combat. The nuclear age has also changed the war-making thrust of a large portion of the Air Force and Navy. Those officers who are in the strategic nuclear arms of these services have deterrence as their primary mission and their chances for combat experience will hopefully never be fulfilled. Although strategic bombers were converted to a conventional role in Vietnam and many of these Air Force
TABLE XVI

COMBAT EXPERIENCE AND PROMOTION TO FLAG RANK

Response to: "Do you feel that combat experience should be a criterion for promotion to the flag officer ranks?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES, WITH COMBAT EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES, WITH NO COMBAT EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO, WITH COMBAT EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO, WITH NO COMBAT EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N) (N) (N) (N) (N)

(680) (43) (168)

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
flyers did experience combat, the Navy submariners probably will never be engaged in conventional combat.

Another aspect to combat experience is the apparent reluctance on the part of this country to become engaged in another war that could turn out like Vietnam. This could result in a generation of officers after the turn of the century entering the highest leadership positions with no leavening of heroic leaders. As one officer put it, "We surely don't want to leap into a war just so we can develop leaders with combat experience!" But into the 1990s there will be a leavening of heroic leaders in the leadership of all services.

Technological advances not only have changed many military combat roles, they have created new leadership positions. Officers are now reaching flag rank as specialists with a career pattern that has not followed the normal generalist pattern of alternating operational and staff positions leading to ever increasing responsibilities including command positions. Although many of these new specialists have held such positions, the commands have been specialized such as command of a research and development laboratory. The question arises of whether or not specialist staff positions at the highest levels will really require command experience. The future military leaders were asked if they thought command duty was essential for promotion to the flag officer ranks. The Marine and Navy future leaders were strongest in
their conviction that it should be essential (Table XVII). This is not surprising since only the Air Force future leaders reported any officers (7%) with no supervisory experience. They also reported considerably less time in supervisory positions than the Marine and Navy officers. Approximately two-thirds of the Air Force future leaders had less than six years of supervisory experience, whereas 82% of the Navy and 93% of the Marine officers reported over six years of supervisory experience.

Another aspect of a military career is the time spent in school or training situations. Janowitz states, "Before World War II...the typical professional spent as much as one-quarter of his career in school or in training situations. The amount of educational training continues to increase...." The respondents in this study do not appear to confirm an increase in educational training since over 70% of all the future leaders reported less than four years of their military career (including their current school year) will have been spent in formal training programs (Table XVIII). This amounts to less than one-fourth of most respondents' careers. An interesting sidelight to this question was that the Navy future leaders average less time in educational pursuits than the other two services. This appears to confirm a perception that recurred throughout the interviews that the Navy does not presently place as much emphasis on education as do the other services. This has not always been true since between World War I and World War II there was a great emphasis on the
TABLE XVII

COMMAND DUTY AND PROMOTION TO FLAG RANK

Response to: "Command duty is essential for promotion to the Flag officer ranks"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY AGREE</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(680)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
TABLE XVIII

TIME SPENT IN FORMAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Response to: "How much of your active duty military career will have been spent as a student in military/civilian schools or formal training programs (including this year)"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LESS THAN 2 YEARS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 TO 4 YEARS</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 TO 6 YEARS</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 TO 8 YEARS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 + YEARS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(680)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
education of Naval officers. The official reason given for this apparent recent deemphasis on education is that the Navy cannot spare the officers.

In addition to the criteria already discussed, Military Leadership in the 1990s attempted to confirm Janowitz’ description of "...the accepted career ladder into the military elite. In each service, there remains a discernible series of steps which alternate between staff and command assignments plus successful course completion at service schools..."¹⁰

It was found that there is a "discernible series of steps" in each service but, especially in the Navy, the path which is followed is usually restricted to a specialty area within the service. For instance, the three primary operational paths in the Navy are aviation, surface and submarines. There are various other specialized fields (medicine, supply, religion, etc.), but the majority of the admirals come from the line elements of naval operations. There is almost no cross fertilization between the three elements, at least at the command levels. The Naval officer enters one of the three major factions and remains there throughout his career.

Korb suggests that to be effective at the highest echelons of a service’s leadership, "...the military officer must have an appreciation for and the support of the various factions in his service."¹¹ The Navy does not provide mechanisms to insure this appreciation and this may give some insight to the capital ship debate that reached a peak during this study when
President Carter threatened to cancel further nuclear aircraft carriers. The Navy's strong objection to this move may be better understood when the primary operational experience of Navy admirals and admiral selectees in 1978 is noted. At this time, of the 333 active duty admirals, 123 were aviators, 85 were surface admirals, and another 64 were submarine admirals.

The Air Force and Marine officers, though experiencing patterns of specialization in their careers, generally hold positions which give them an understanding of the other factions within their service. The Marine Corps' three major operational elements: aviation, infantry, and artillery, are represented in 1978 by 21, 33, and 7 generals, respectively. One Marine commented: "I have been an infantryman my whole career but I would not counsel a young man to come into the infantry. The flyers have an easier life and receive extra pay." There are jealousies and competition among service factions in each of the services and they begin with service entry and continue into the highest echelons.

The Air Force has its tactical, strategic, and airlift factions, but there is a great deal more cross fertilization of officers among the elements than found in the other services. The one dominant feature of Air Force leaders is that they are pilots. Navigators and nonrated officers have not received the necessary broad experiences to qualify them for top leadership positions. Almost 90% of the Air Force generals are pilots and the navigators and nonrated officers...
usually achieve flag rank only through specialized career fields. Air Force navigators until recently were forbidden by law to command flying units, but the law has been changed and several navigators are receiving the necessary flying commands that ease entry to the flag ranks. However, at least through the 1990s the Air Force leadership will continue to be dominated by pilots.

The future leaders of each of the services were asked, "To which rank do you realistically aspire?" Table XIX depicts the response which shows about 40% of the Air Force and Marine officers believe they will achieve flag rank while only 20% of the Navy officers thought they would make admiral. Somewhat surprisingly, a majority in all three services did not "realistically aspire" to flag rank. This could represent recognition of the realities of the military promotion system and the very small percentage of the officer force who can attain flag rank; however, it was felt that this explanation was not totally satisfactory.

During interviews, reasons given for the seemingly low aspirations included a small but significant number in all services saying that to make flag rank they must sacrifice most of their personal lives. Most of those who gave this answer further stated they were not sure they were ready to make the necessary sacrifices.

Throughout the interviews, whenever career aspirations were discussed, the issue of integrity kept arising. Many interviewees believed that in order to make flag rank, too
**TABLE XIX**

**RANK ASPIRATIONS OF FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS**

Response to: "To which rank do you realistically aspire?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Level</th>
<th>Air Force %</th>
<th>Marine Corps %</th>
<th>Navy %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4 (MAJ/LCDR)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5 (LCOL/CDR)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-6 (COL/CAPT)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-7 (BGEN/RADM)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-8 OR HIGHER</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(675)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(167)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
much time is spent on self-aggrandizement and not enough on accomplishing the mission. Many personal experiences were recounted, such as officers attaching their names on other officers' work and receiving full credit for that work. Several officers cited experiences which involved officers who limited their efforts solely to projects which would gain them recognition while sloughing off the more mundane responsibilities. By far the most prevalent experiences recounted by the future leaders concerned the various reporting systems. In many cases, an officer from his earliest military experience sees uncomplementary and possibly career-damaging facts withheld from superiors and higher headquarters. The examples most often heard concerned the reporting of training requirements being complete when the training had not been accomplished.

After so many of the future leaders expressed their views on integrity, it was not surprising to see almost two-thirds of the Air Force and Navy officers agree with the statement that, "Too often our military system rewards those who succeed without being certain that the task was done in an honest and forthright manner" (Table XX). Only the Marine officers had a majority, and it was slim, disagreeing with this statement.

A corresponding question, "I can be a success in the military without compromising my integrity" resulted in a complete reversal of the previous question's findings (Table XXT). When the potential leaders were asked about
TABLE XX
INTEGRITY OF PRESENT MILITARY LEADERS

Response to: "Too often our military system rewards those who succeed without being certain that the task was done in an honest and forthright manner."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY AGREE</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(672)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
TABLE XXI

INTEGRITY OF FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS

Response to: "I can be a success in the military without compromising my integrity."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY AGREE</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(676)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AMC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
this seeming incongruity in the results of the two questions several answers were provided. First, many of the future military leaders stated that if one of the costs of making flag rank was degradation of their integrity they were not willing to pay it. This partially accounts for the low aspirations of some of the respondees. Second, many of the future leaders felt that they were already relatively successful in their military career and their integrity was pretty much uncompromised. One suspects that the present military leadership might say the same thing. Nevertheless the issue of integrity seems to be a very real one and from the level of interest displayed by the future military leaders concerning integrity it may be surmised that the integrity of our leaders will be an issue of growing future interest.

In summary, Military Leadership in the 1990s delved into the attitudes and aspirations of the future military leaders concerning the military career. It was found that future military leaders are generally satisfied with their profession but there is a growing concern among them about its future. Their primary motivation for joining the officer corps was the draft and their choice of the military as a career was not really by design or a deep sense of commitment. In spite of this, if they had it to do again, most would choose the military. However, the future leaders would not encourage their sons to choose the military as a profession.

The future military leaders probably will not be dominated by academy graduates, but all things being equal the
academy graduates in the Air Force and Navy will probably have an edge in promotional opportunity. More important than an academy education, however, is outstanding performance in the right job at the right time. The future military leaders believe that the best way to obtain the right jobs is by having a sponsor; however, very few of these successful officers believe they have one. Other factors necessary for entry into the top military leadership include frequent duty changes leading to increasing responsibilities, command experience and combat experience. Only the Marines felt the personnel system alone would insure those steps were fulfilled without some outside help. Frequent duty as a student does not appear to be increasing, especially in the Navy.

Each of the services has internal factions, each with its own career pattern. The Navy provides for very little cross fertilization among these factions and the Air Force, with somewhat more movement among the factions, will continue to have its leadership dominated by pilots.

The future military leaders' aspirations were lower than expected. Reasons for this were a realistic idea of the low numbers who will enter flag rank; the unwillingness to make the sacrifices necessary to make the rank; and the perception that it may require actions that will compromise their integrity in order to enter the top military leadership.

We have now seen that the future military leaders will come from diverse social backgrounds, are highly educated,
and have developed dedication and concern for their careers. The process they have traversed has included command and combat, they have moved often, and they have a deep concern for integrity. What does this background mean in terms of attitudes on military issues?
CHAPTER IV

PERCEPTIONS OF FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS

...The 'crisis' in the military profession is as much a crisis in self-esteem and self-image as it is a crisis in organization and purpose.1

Military Leadership in the 1990s has characterized the backgrounds and career pattern perceptions of the flag officers who will direct the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy in the 1990s. The future leaders come from varied backgrounds and have entered the service from many sources other than military academies. The commitment to military service seems to have developed after service entry and most of the future leaders are relatively satisfied about their careers but are concerned about their future.

In addition to the differences in backgrounds military leaders have spent their careers in a unique era. They have lived through some of the most challenging international and domestic political events that have ever influenced a military population. No longer are military objectives as clear cut as MacArthur's dictum, "There is no substitute for victory." In an age of nuclear weapons the definition of victory has become blurred in the restrained use of force necessary to prevent Armageddon. The boundaries between political and military roles that have always been clear to the military have now become fuzzy.
The use of the military as an instrument of national power must be integrated with the economic, political, sociological and psychological activities in the decision making process.

The first war to be fought totally under the restraints of the new realities was in Southeast Asia. There, the military operated in an environment of limited, vaguely defined objectives using a strategy of gradual escalation. Under these restraints not only was "victory" not achievable but the war was lost.

In addition to the frustrations of losing the war, the military underwent a traumatic domestic confrontation. An intense criticism of the military grew and support of the military, especially during the war, plummeted to a depth never before experienced. After the war the opposition to the military continued with intense criticism and attacks against military budgets.

The latest event in the continuing perceived attacks on the military is a serious questioning of the roles and missions of the services by the Administration. First the Air Force B-1 bomber was cancelled, closely followed by attempts to "heavy-up" the Marine Corps for a role on the NATO central front and attempts to cancel the Navy's capital ship, the nuclear carrier. Each of these moves would change the very essence of the service involved but objections on the part of military leaders went
for the most part unheeded. There is also fear that the Carter administration may be ignoring military advice on other critical security and defense issues, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

The military leaders of the future have experienced unprecedented turmoil during their careers. The question then arises as to whether or not the military's organization and purpose is in "crisis" and, possibly more important, are the future military leaders experiencing "...a crisis in self-esteem and self-image?"³

_Military Leadership in the 1990s_ surveyed the potential future military leaders of the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy to explore their perceptions of their status in American society; the roles and missions they envision for the future military; the effects of the All Volunteer Force; and, ultimately their views on civilian control of the military.

**Military Self-Image**

In Chapter III we saw that the future leaders were relatively satisfied with their careers and their accomplishments. Janowitz states military leaders believe, "...they are superior to the bulk of the population."⁴

When asked if they believed the values of discipline, sacrifice and patriotism were found more in the military than in U.S. society in general there was overwhelming
agreement (Table XXIII). The Air Force officers reported 90% agreeing; 93% of the Marines agreed, with one one-half expressing strong agreement; and 84% of the Navy officers were in agreement. Subsequent interviews brought forth an even stronger feeling that the military is the one remaining stronghold for these traditional values.

The belief that they are superior in certain values to the U.S. society as a whole could point to a growing tension between the military and the society if it was thought that these values were not appreciated. Huntington observed that, "The outstanding aspect of civil/military relations in the decade after World War II was the heightened and persistent peacetime tension between military imperatives and American liberal society." One could hypothesize that events since Huntington's observation have, if anything, raised tensions between the military and the society it serves.

In order to test the tension hypothesis several questions concerning military/society relationships were asked. A question was posed to see if the military leaders felt that they were appreciated by the society they served. Over 70% of the Air Force officers polled felt that the military officer's status in U.S. society was declining and 11% said it was static-low. Almost two-thirds of the Marine Corps officers and over 60% of the Navy officers agreed with the Air Force (Table XXIV). In addition, two-thirds of the Air
TABLE XXIII

MILITARY SELF-IMAGE

Response to: "The values of discipline, sacrifice, and patriotism are found more in the U.S. military than in U.S. society in general."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY AGREE</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(678)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
### TABLE XXIV

**MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND SOCIETY**

Response to: "The military officer's status in U.S. society is:"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RISING</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECLINING</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATIC-HIGH</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATIC-LOW</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(673)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(164)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Response to: "Alienation is the best way to characterize present civil-military relations"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY AGREE</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(679)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(167)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
Force, 40% of the Marine Corps and 43% of the Navy respondees agreed with the statement, "Alienation is the best way to characterize present civil-military relations."

The results on these two questions needed to be studied from the civilian point of view. Segal, Blair, Margiotta and others have found through studies of public opinion polls and other surveys that, although the public has diminished confidence in most major institutions, the military has not been singled out. Further, there is no proof that the public has either a very good or a very bad image of the military. Margiotta concluded that military officers have lagged in adapting their positive self-concept to societal realities.

One explanation for the self-deprecation and withdrawal on the part of the future military leaders is found in Table XXV. The overwhelming majority of the potential leaders of all three military services agrees, "The American military is more isolated from society as a result of the Vietnam experience." The high percentage of the Air Force response taken in 1974 is consistent with the other two services who were asked in 1978 and testifies to the trauma inflicted on the military by the Southeast Asian experience. The four years between the two surveys saw a lessening in the perceptions of declining status and alienation but the time so far has not healed the scars of Vietnam within the military. Thus, while the greater society is attempting to
TABLE XXV

MILITARY ISOLATION RESULTING FROM VIETNAM EXPERIENCE

Response to: "The American military is more isolated from society as a result of the Vietnam experience."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY AGREE</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(679)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
to place Vietnam in the past and concern itself with other things, the effects of the war are still reflected in the attitudes of future military leaders.

Further reasons for the perceptions of low status and alienation were found in the respondents' attitudes toward the media. Hadden's study documented that "Rejection of existing institutions...is much less total than the mass media tend to indicate." Many officers have interpreted the liberal anti-war position of the more influential segments of the news media as anti-military sentiment.

When asked how they would characterize military coverage by the news media, the overwhelming response was "biased against the military" (Table XXVI). The number believing that the media were strongly biased has diminished over the last four years; however, interviews and reactions of the students attending the professional schools' media symposiums tends to confirm that there is a continuing distrust among future military leaders of a major and influential national institution.

Mariotti reports that Professor Lucian Pye of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology suggests a further explanation for the low self-perception of the future military leaders. The low percentage of these potential leaders who have a military heritage leads Professor Pye to suspect that their immediate families and friends outside of the military do not understand and therefore cannot value
TABLE XXVI

MILITARY ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEWS MEDIA

Response to: "How would you characterize coverage of the military by the news media?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY BIASED AGAINST</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLIGHTLY BIASED AGAINST</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAIR AND OBJECTIVE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLIGHTLY BIASED IN FAVOR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY BIASED IN FAVOR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(679)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(167)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from a survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
the military profession. Margiotta found ample evidence of Pye's thesis in his interviews of Air Force officers. The Marine and Navy officers, although not providing as strong support, did agree there were still many misunderstandings about the military on the part of their non-military family and friends.

In summary, we have seen that the future military leaders of the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy perceived themselves to be the last bastion of the once highly praised values of discipline, sacrifice, and patriotism. They do not believe that they are appreciated by the society they serve and this has resulted in alienation with that society. Reasons for this perceived non-appreciation are the isolation of the military brought on by the Vietnam War and the belief that the news media are biased against the military. A look at society gives very little credence to these perceptions. There is no evidence that the military has lost any relative status in the society and the Vietnam War is being put into the country's past. One officer suggested that the data in this study are symptomatic of military institutional paranoia; another officer felt that the solution was for the military to become more involved with the civilian community.

The perceptions are there; how do they affect the military in the definition of its roles and missions?
Roles and Missions

The roles and missions of the various military services have come under intense critical scrutiny. The roles of the future military address a wide spectrum of issues. The all volunteer force, internal military discipline problems, secondary roles, unification of the services, and the proper vehicle for military dissent are only a few of the issues but these are issues which affect all services and are of continuing interest. The attitudes of future military leaders on these questions are important to understand the foundation of future civil-military relations and the involvement of the military in the total political system.

Janowitz as early as 1960 saw the military role evolving into a constabulary force which he says will happen when the military is, "...continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory...." This is a departure from the classic military role but approximates the military's role since 1960. In order to test the acceptance by future military leaders of a military with objectives beyond those directly related to combat they were asked whether they agreed with the statement, "It is possible to incorporate in military men and in military institutions the potential for combat and for peacekeeping and arms control." (Table XXVII) Remarkably, over 90% of the respondents from each of the services agreed with the statement. The response
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>44</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(676)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from a survey of AMC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CW and CNCS students, 1976.
indicates that the military leaders of the future understand the need for operational alternatives to the use of direct force. The overwhelming positive response suggests that the future military will actively pursue the goals of a constabulary force. This strong reaction seems to belie Janowitz' warning that, "...the notion that a soldier may have an effective career without ever fighting, enjoys a widespread but superficial acceptance. But only a small minority fully internalize the implications of such a professional outlook." The strong agreement with expanded military roles does not appear superficial and could ease the institutionalization of the constabulary force.

The expansion of roles into the military related areas of arms control and peacekeeping are one thing. However, the future military leaders do not believe that the expansion should lead the military into fields such as domestic social problems with only a remote military connection. Table XXVIII shows the response of the potential leaders to the questions of secondary roles for the military. The respondents did not believe that the military should take on secondary roles. During the interviews it was brought out that experience with Project 100,000, a program designed to induct and train individuals that would otherwise have been passed over by the draft, convinced the future leaders that the military should not be involved in solving problems they are not equipped to solve. On the other hand,
TABLE XXVIII

SECONDARY ROLES FOR THE MILITARY

Response to: "In a world without direct U.S. intervention in war, the U.S. services should take on secondary roles such as remedial education programs, engineering projects, ecological, reclamation, highway rescue, etc."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(674)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(167)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from a survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
engineering projects and highway rescue provide excellent training for a peacetime military. There was a consensus among the respondents that it should not accept roles which may detract from their combat role.

A related aspect to military roles and missions is the all volunteer force. Janowitz stated, "As long as the armed forces must rely largely on drafted personnel... (it) must accommodate itself to personnel who are essentially civilians. This constant flow of civilians into and out of the ranks of the military is a powerful influence against military traditionalism and authoritarian forms."13 The majority of future military leaders appear to disagree with the corollary to Janowitz' theory when they disagree with the statement, "With the all volunteer force, the military will find its membership much more inclined to accept established procedures and organizational goals" (Table XXIX). The officers believe, after several years of experience, that the young people attracted into the all volunteer military are not any more ready to accept the military discipline than their predecessors entering through the draft. When asked how they viewed the all volunteer military the majority felt it would be little different or worse than the draft motivated forces. Most of those officers expressing the view that it would be worse were fearful that the all volunteer military will not represent a cross section of American society. Of note is the fact that less than 10% of the
TABLE XXIX

THE FUTURE MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

Response to: "With the all volunteer force, the military will find its membership much more inclined to accept established procedures and organizational goals."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(673)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from a survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
potential leaders expressed the view that the all volunteer force will be an improvement because it will mean the military can become more professional and elite.

Another issue affecting future roles and missions concerns unification of the services. The present U.S. military establishment is functionally divided into Army, Navy, and Air components. However, the three frequently operate as joint organizations. For example, Pacific Command is designated a unified command and has a mission covering the entire Pacific area. Headed by a Navy admiral, combat forces of the command are provided by the three services.

Based on the unified command experience, the future leaders were asked if they favor extending unification to all military activities (Table XXX). The Marine Corps responders were overwhelmingly (98%) opposed to unification with the Navy closely following with 88% in opposition. The Marine Corps opposition can be explained by their fear of losing their identity and unique mission to the Army element of the unified service. The Air Force which was the last service to gain a separate identity was not as opposed to unification as the other two services.

During interviews the resistance to unification was based on the need for unit esprit in a combat outfit and the cohesion it provides for units. The future leaders were not as opposed to unification of support activities and for the future this appears to be the only area where unification goals will be met.
TABLE XXX

UNIFICATION OF THE MILITARY

Response to: "The American military should be unified into one service."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRONGLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(674)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(167)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from a survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
In sum, the future military leadership appears ready to internalize an expanded constabulary role for the military. However, the leaders do not believe that role expansion should include non-military related missions. Additionally, there is a significant concern over the nature of the military that will operate within future organizational concepts. The all volunteer force is not viewed as providing for an improved military primarily due to the long standing American belief that the military should be representative of the country's people. The leaders are not ready to give up their service identity. Overall it appears the military will accept conceptual changes to roles and missions but certain manifestations of these changes will be resisted. The question then becomes: What happens if the civilian leaders declare changes against the advice of military leaders?

**Civilian Control**

As we have seen the future military leaders are still concerned about the Vietnam war. The extensive civilian involvement in the planning and operations of that war might raise serious doubts in the military about the viability of civilian control. In spite of the Southeast Asian experience of the respondees they overwhelmingly support civilian control of the military as a proper constitutional requirement to insure preservation of our democracy and believe it should not be weakened (Table XXXI). Less than 15% of each of the
### Table XXXI

**Attitudes Regarding Civilian Control of the Military**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Air Force %</th>
<th>Marine Corps %</th>
<th>Navy %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interferes unacceptably with military requirements and should be diminished.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a necessary evil; should not be changed.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a proper constitutional requirement to insure preservation of our democracy and should not be weakened.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not provide a sufficient check on the military and should be strengthened.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N) (679) (43) (167)

**Sources:** Air Force from a survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
services' future leaders questioned the amount of civilian interference in military affairs.

With such a strong belief in the requirement for civilian control how will the future military leaders express disagreement with policies which they consider wrong? Janowitz makes a strong argument that military leaders have only one form of protest after a decision has been made and that is to resign. He points out although military tasks have become more difficult to accomplish because of national and political forces, no chief has resigned. Janowitz is emphatic when he says, "That has to change, so that professional dissent can be made manifest in a responsible fashion." Ginsburg on the other hand, says resignation in protest is part of the military folklore, "...but people who say that too easily, too flippantly, ignore the fact that resignation separates the military man from his profession, unlike resignation in another profession."15

In order to test how the future leaders feel toward protest, they were asked a question about resignation and their recent experience in Vietnam (Table XXXII). Two-thirds of the Air Force respondees disagreed that Air Force leaders should have resigned if they disagreed with the bombing constraints over North Vietnam. On the other hand, almost two-thirds of the Marine Corps and Navy respondees believed military leaders should have resigned if they disagreed with the constraints in Vietnam.
TABLE XXXII

RESIGNATION AS A LEGITIMATE MEANS OF PROTEST

Response to: "If top military leaders disagreed with the constraints in Vietnam, they should have resigned; or (Air Force only), If top Air Force leaders disagreed with the bombing constraints in North Vietnam, they should have resigned."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIR FORCE %</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS %</th>
<th>NAVY %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRONGLY AGREE</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>GENERALLY AGREE</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>GENERALLY DISAGREE</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRONGLY DISAGREE</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(675)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(167)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Air Force from a survey of AWC and ACSC, 1974; Marine Corps and Navy from a survey of CNW and CNCS students, 1978.
Pursuing the subject of resignation during the interviews brought forth a variety of reasons for the disparate positions. Many of the Air Force officers believed there were other less severe means of internal protest having a greater potential for positive action. Several officers from all of the services felt that resignation is too public and would ultimately create turmoil within this country and with our allies. Several other officers felt that it would become a form of blackmail and could be abused. On the opposite side those who were in favor of resignation believed that an outlet is needed for the military leader to voice his convictions on issues of special import. Without a legitimate means of protest, leaders will be tempted to circumvent the civilian decision. These officers cited the General Lavalle case where an Air Force general, disagreeing with bombing restrictions, altered the reporting system so that his pilots could stretch the rules of engagement. There was consensus among the officers, for and against resignation, that if an officer disagrees with civilian leaders they cannot protest the decision publicly once it has been made.

Overall it was found that there is no questioning of the legitimacy of civilian control in the military and civilian control of the military will not be an issue with military leaders into the 1990s. Resignation as a means of protest is an issue and probably should become an item for discussion in senior professional military schools along with other ethical issues.
In conclusion, we have found the future military leaders believe they are imbued with superior values of sacrifice, discipline, and patriotism. However, they do not feel they are appreciated by the American society as a whole. There is little evidence that this perception of non-appreciation has much basis in fact but is derived from viewing the national media, an element of the society which the future leaders consider biased and anti-military. The crisis in self-image and self-esteem on the part of the future military leaders appears to have its basis in the memories of Vietnam.

The self-image crisis does not appear to have closed the minds of future leaders to conceptual changes in military roles and missions. How these changes are operationalized does cause concern on the part of the future leaders. They do not want to take on roles that may detract from their primary mission of defense. In spite of their feeling of isolation from society the future leaders do not question the requirement for civilian control of the military.
CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LOGIC

Up until 1920, it would have been most rare to find an officer who thought of himself as anything but conservative.¹

If there is a connection between social heritage and political logic then one could hypothesize that the continuing move away from an old family, upper class, Protestant, rural background coupled with increased education would be reflected in a move towards a more liberal identification among military leaders. In fact a 1954 sample of officers assigned to the Pentagon indicated a growth in the liberal minority of the military leadership, especially in the Air Force. Whereas previously few officers in the military would identify themselves as liberal, the 1954 study found a significant minority (Air Force 35%; Navy 24%) stated they were at least "somewhat liberal."²

The apparent move toward liberalism has leveled off according to the response of the future military leaders (Table XXXIII). The Air Force and Navy officers identifying themselves as "conservative" and "somewhat conservative" remain within a percentage point or two of the 1954 officers. The Marines show an even stronger affinity toward the conservative end of the spectrum with 86% of the future leaders identifying themselves there. When compared with the American public the future military leaders are somewhat more conservative.

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### TABLE XXXIII

**POLITICAL IDENTIFICATION CONSERVATIVE - LIBERAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Future</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Table" /></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **Conservative**
  - Past: 15 (Air Force), x (Marine Corps), 23 (Navy)
  - Future: 23 (Air Force), 37 (Marine Corps), 20 (Navy), 28 (Public)

- **Somewhat Conservative**
  - Past: 47 (Air Force), x (Marine Corps), 45 (Navy)
  - Future: 41 (Air Force), 49 (Marine Corps), 49 (Navy), 23 (Public)

- **Middle of the Road**
  - Past: xx (Air Force), xx (Marine Corps), xx (Navy)
  - Future: 22 (Air Force), 12 (Marine Corps), 22 (Navy), 49 (Public)

- **Somewhat Liberal**
  - Past: 32 (Air Force), x (Marine Corps), 18 (Navy)
  - Future: 13 (Air Force), 2 (Marine Corps), 8 (Navy)

- **Liberal**
  - Past: 3 (Air Force), x (Marine Corps), 6 (Navy)
  - Future: 1 (Air Force), 0 (Marine Corps), 2 (Navy)

- **No Answer**
  - Past: 4 (Air Force), x (Marine Corps), 7 (Navy)
  - Future: (157), (208), (675), (43), (168)

- **Institutional Sources**

- **Notes**
  - x: No Data available
  - xx: Not a response in Janowitz
Why the persistent identification with conservatism on the part of military leaders? Can the answers be found in the recruitment of future leaders? Or is the answer found in the military career itself? Military Leadership in the 1990s has attempted to shed some light on the issue of military leaders and the molding of their political logic. At the same time the study has presented a data base of socio-economic and perceptual factors for future military leaders of the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.

The study first looked at the patterns of social composition. The conclusion was that the socio-economic characteristics of military leaders have been in a state of flux. There are sufficient differences within and between the services to conclude that: 1. There is no single "military" portrait but each service has its own recruitment patterns, and with the possible exception of the Marine Corps, these change over time; and 2. Because there is no single portrait, the socio-economic patterns of regional affiliation, rural/urban background, religion, socio-economic class and heritage are not sufficient, in and of themselves, to provide a reason for the persistent conservative affiliation of military leaders.

Next the study turned to education and found there has been a continuing rise in level of education among military leaders. Higher education normally is equated with a more liberal identification. The growth in liberal identification has not paralleled the rising education levels of military
leaders; therefore education also is probably not the "key" factor in developing military political logic.

After looking at the socio-economic and education back-
grounds of military leaders, past, present, and future, 
Military Leadership in the 1990s turned to service socializa-
tion and career patterns. Here several reasons normally 
given by authors and military experts for the traditional 
values of the military were studied. For instance, the dom-
inination of the military elites by service academy graduates 
has diminished over the years yet the conservative identifi-
cation of military leaders has remained static. Other possi-
ble reasons for the conservative leaning of military leaders 
may be found in the unique aspects of military command and 
combat involvement.

Almost all military leaders have had command experience 
and this will continue to be true. Some might say there is 
a positive correlation between the traditional military 
authoritarianism and their strong conservative bent. In 
order to better analyze leadership strategies the future 
military leaders were asked a series of questions. An over-
whelming majority (80% to 90%) agreed with statements such 
as, "A military supervisor may be personally friendly with 
subordinates yet retain order and discipline," and, "Almost 
every job can be made more stimulating, interesting, and 
challenging." On the other hand, there was equally strong 
disagreement with statements such as, "Additional pay is one
of the effective methods of improving job performance," and "A senior manager or commander loses prestige and authority by admitting to an error or a bad decision." It appears that authoritarianism as a leadership strategy is giving way to modern behavioral management theories. It further appears that the future military leaders do not believe that their command duties require a unique unchanging approach to leadership.

There is a strong positive correlation between conservatism and combat experience. The majority of military leaders have served in combat theaters. The Marine Corps future leaders who have the most direct combat involvement among the three services studied also have the strongest conservative identification. It could be that the unique combat aspect of the military profession is the reason for the consistent conservative identification on the part of the military leaders.

Janowitz found that conservative attitudes increased with higher position and older age. Almost 93% of the CNW Marines (lieutenant colonels and colonels) characterized themselves as at least somewhat conservative whereas only 73% of CNCS Marine Corps majors chose the conservative responses. There was also a more conservative trend in the higher ranks of the Air Force but it was not as strong. The Navy officers on the other hand, reported a slightly more, though not significant, conservative bent among the lower
ranking and younger officers. Increased rank and age do not provide a clear cut reason for conservatism.

Janowitz reported that "Attendance at a war college was also linked to more conservative political preferences for Army and Air Force officers, but not for the Navy." Very few of the future military leaders in this study were willing to admit to any change in their political orientation as a result of their professional military education. Over three-fourths of all of the respondees perceive no change while the remainder felt the education had changed them only slightly.

Finally, military personnel might find it easiest to identify with those politicians who argue in favor of and reject those politicians who criticize the military. Usually those politicians who most visibly favor the military also espouse a conservative domestic political orientation. This relationship is closely tied to the isolation from society the future military leaders feel. The only voices that were ever neutral during the Indochina war were those usually identified as conservative. Having a national figure provide a justification for your personal and family sacrifice would prove more soothing than listening to critics question the worth of your chosen profession. The severest critics of the military tend to be at the liberal end of the spectrum. Before too much emphasis is placed on the identification theory of conservatism it should be noted that right wing spokesmen were extremely critical of the military during the
post-Korean War period while liberal commentators generally stood in the military's defense. However, the military did not change their conservative identification during this period.5

Care should be taken when identifying anyone, including oneself, as "conservative" or "liberal." Adopting a term does not necessarily guarantee certain behavior will follow. The majority of Americans are ideologically conservative but operationally liberal; for instance people articulate a basic distaste for the expanding role and sphere of government, yet they are willing to support massive welfare programs.6

This reasoning may be extended to the military. In an extensive analysis of conservatism and the military establishment, Guttman argues that, "...the professional soldier in America departs markedly from the conservative model...the professional soldier shares rather than opposes the liberal-democratic tradition...."7 Additionally, one might see an inconsistency in a group that professes to accept traditional conservative ideals yet lives with the paternalistic institutions of the Federal Government. "The generals stand stiffly as they point in indignation to the wilted moral fiber of those who live at the government's expense."8

The political logic of military leaders appears to be ideologically consistent and operationally variable depending on the issue under consideration. When national defense issues are under consideration the conservative bias of the
military prevails. This is especially true on the most vital issues such as military strength and the legitimacy of civilian control. On the other hand, the future military leaders are open to change in such things as conceptual roles and leadership strategies. It may well be that concern about what formulates the political logic of military leaders is overstated and efforts in this area should be directed primarily to insure that the outward manifestations of that logic are consistent with national objectives.
CHAPTER VI

MILITARY LEADERS IN THE 1990s

The purpose of Military Leadership in the 1990s was to present an updated description of demographic/biographic characteristics of future military leaders and to derive insights into the attitudes and perceptions of these future leaders. The underlying hypothesis tested was: The passage of time and changing nature of military leadership has altered the portrait of future military leaders from that recently portrayed in the literature. Using Janowitz' The Professional Soldier as a base, the study attempted to see what changes have taken place and to gain insight into the effects and resultant attitude patterns of future Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy leaders whose military careers span a unique era and a rapidly changing world. A secondary purpose of the study arose from the unique position of having close access to future leaders of three of the services. Not only a comparison of past, present and future Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy leaders was made, but differences among the future leaders of each of the services were studied. Although the purpose of the study was to present an updated data base on military leaders, an underlying theme throughout the study was an attempt to pinpoint how demographic/biographic data, insights and attitudes affected the political logic of future military leaders.
The results of Military Leadership in the 1990s show that there are many similarities in the military leaders described by Janowitz and extant in the literature today. However, there appear to be many significant differences between the military leader's image portrayed in the literature and the reality of present and future leaders. Janowitz concluded in The Professional Soldier that "The military elite has been drawn from an old family, Anglo-Saxon, protestant, rural, upper middle-class professional" background."¹ Military Leadership in the 1990s concluded that this will, for the most part, not be true in the future. A major finding of this study is that when speaking about patterns of social composition, there is no single portrait of the military as a whole. Each of the services has its own composition, some of the elements of which are very much in transition. It is further concluded that because of the significant diversity and transition within the socio-economic backgrounds of the various services' military leaders, over time it is possible to place too much emphasis on these factors when trying to understand the political logic of military leaders. Arising from this conclusion is another hypothesis that other factors, such as service specialization and career patterns, may hold an even more "powerful key" than socio-economic factors to the "political logic" of the military.
In order to test this last hypothesis and obtain data, the career patterns and advancement of future military leaders were studied. It was found that there is a growing uneasiness with the military as a career choice by those who have been tapped for its future leadership. An overwhelming number of the future leaders were uncertain or would not encourage their sons to have a career as a military officer. The apparent uneasiness with their profession stems from a growing belief that the military career is losing its advantages over other professions.

The future military leaders probably will not be dominated by academy graduates. More important than an academy education is outstanding performance in the right job at the right time. The future military leaders believe that the best way to obtain the right jobs is by having a sponsor; however, very few of these successful officers believe they have one. Other factors necessary for entry into the top military leadership include frequent duty changes, command experience and combat experience. Each of the services has internal factions, each with its own career pattern.

The future military leaders' aspirations were lower than expected. Reasons for this were a realistic idea of the low numbers who will enter flag rank; the unwillingness to make the sacrifices necessary to make the rank; and the perception that it may require actions that will compromise their integrity in order to enter the top military leadership.
Janowitz saw a crisis in the military profession and described it as a "... crisis in self-esteem and self-image." Military Leadership in the 1990s found Janowitz' 1960 description to be even more correct today. The future military leaders believe they are imbued with superior values of sacrifice, discipline and patriotism. However, they do not feel they are appreciated by the American society. There is little evidence that this perception of nonappreciation has much basis in fact, but is derived from viewing the national media, an element of the society which the future leaders consider biased and anti-military. The present crisis in self-image and self-esteem on the part of the future military leaders appears to have its basis in the memories of Vietnam.

The self-image crisis does not appear to have closed the minds of future leaders to conceptual changes in military roles and missions. How these changes are operationalized does cause concern on the part of the future leaders. They do not want to take on roles that may detract from their primary mission of defense. In spite of their feeling of isolation from society, the future leaders do not question the requirement for civilian control of the military.

A final hypothesis was developed that the changes in socio-economic background of military leaders, coupled with
their increased education, would be reflected in a move away from the traditional conservative identification of military leaders. In 1954, Janowitz found a developing element in the services which identified itself as liberal. This apparent movement toward a more liberal identification has not grown in the intervening twenty-plus years. The future military leaders identify themselves as conservative. Delving deeper into this conservative identification, Military Leadership in the 1990s came to the conclusion that the political logic of military leaders appears to be ideologically consistent and operationally variable depending on the issue under consideration. When national defense issues are being discussed, the conservative bias prevails while the future military leaders are open to change in such things as conceptual roles and leadership strategies.

Military Leadership in the 1990s presents an updated data base for further study of demographic/biographic characteristics of military leaders. Over 50 different data elements are presented for the future leaders of the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. When taken as a whole, it was found that there have been many changes in backgrounds, attitudes and perceptions of military leaders. The passage of time has altered the portrait of future military leaders. First and foremost, those studying military leaders must realize that there is great diversity among the individual service leaders and, over time, there are
many characteristic changes within the services. There is no military leader stereotype. This leads to the second major finding of this study: Because of this diversity, it is possible to place too much emphasis on any one element in the recruitment and development of military leaders in looking for keys to the formation of the political logic of military leaders. Finally, it may be that concern about what formulates the political logic of military leaders is overstated and efforts in this area should be directed primarily to insure that the outward manifestations of that logic are consistent with national objectives.
NOTES

Chapter I


5. Ibid., p. 64.

6. The members of the Air Force research team were Col Franklin D. Margiotta, the faculty advisor and Majors Don W. Box, Lawrence D. Clark, William T. Crabb, John P. O'Neill, Richard C. Parker, Clinton D. Summerfield, Robert K. Wagner, and Rodney V. Cox, Jr. Much of the data on Air Force leaders and supporting research of the present study were developed by these officers.

7. The author is indebted to Professors Dean Burham, Ira Sharkansky, and Frederick W. Frey for their help in reviewing the methodology of the study.

8. The official transcripts of admirals and admiral selectees serving on active duty in April 1978 show the following breakdown of intermediate and senior professional military education (PME) schools attended:

   a. Senior PME schools:

      College of Naval Warfare - 51*
      National War College - 41
      Industrial College of the Armed Forces - 28
      Air War College - 12
      Army War College - 4
      Foreign schools - 3

   b. Intermediate PME schools:

      College of Naval Command and Staff - 64*
      Armed Forces Staff College - 38
      Army Command and General Staff College - 2
      Other - 2

* Two admirals attended both of these schools.

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Chapter II

1. Janowitz, p. 81.


3. Ibid., p. 545.


5. Ibid.

6. Janowitz, p. 89.

7. Ibid., p. 86.


11. See Traeger and Oppenheimer.

12. Janowitz, p. xxv.

13. Ibid., p. 90.


15. Ibid., p. 91.

16. See questions 17 and 18 in Appendix A.

17. Janowitz, p. 82.

18. Ibid., p. 97.

19. Ibid., p. 100.

20. Ibid., p. 135.

Chapter III

2. Ibid.
3. Compared to the other services, the Marine Corps has a very limited "below-the-zone" or "deep-selection" program where a small percentage of officers are promoted to the next higher rank earlier than their contemporaries. Marine officers also are usually promoted later in their careers than officers in the other services.
4. Janowitz, p. 121.
5. Ibid., p. 106.
6. Ibid., p. xxxi.
7. Ibid., p. 166.
8. Ibid., p. 154.
9. Ibid., p. 126.
10. Ibid., p. XXX.
11. Korb, "New Men for a New Reality."

Chapter IV

2. Portions of Chapter III are based on work done by one of the original Air Force researchers, Major Robert Wagner. Much of it was subsequently published as part of Franklin D. Marziotta's, "A Military Elite in Transition," Armed Forces and Society, Winter, 1976.
4. Ibid. p. 80.


13. Ibid., p. 32.


Chapter V


2. Ibid., p. 237.

3. Ibid., p. 239.

4. Ibid., p. 241.

5. See Margiotta. Also the basis for this discussion is found in an unpublished paper by Major Robert Wagner for Air Force Leadership in the 1980s.


8. Ibid., p. 121.
Chapter VI

1. Ibid., p. 100.
2. Ibid., p. 225.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN STUDY
MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THE 1990s

1. Have you ever been promoted "below-the-zone?"
   a. Yes - one time.
   b. Yes - twice to successive ranks.
   c. Yes - twice, but not to successive ranks.
   d. Yes - three times.
   e. No.

2. Are you:
   a. Surface Navy
   b. Navy Air
   c. a Submariner
   d. Restricted Line or Staff
   e. a Marine

3. What is your current rank?
   a. 0-3
   b. 0-4
   c. 0-5
   d. 0-6

4. What was your highest level of education when you first entered military service? (If you had a break in service, indicate your highest level of education at the time of latest entry into service.)
   a. High school graduate
   b. Some college
   c. College degree (B.S., B.A., or equivalent)
   d. Master's degree
   e. Graduate work beyond Master's degree

5. What is your highest level of education NOW? (If you are presently working on a degree, and have reason to assume that you will successfully complete the requirements for that degree during the next year, select the response that most accurately describes that degree.)
   a. High school graduate
   b. Some college
   c. College degree (B.S., B.A., or equivalent)
   d. Master's degree
   e. Graduate work beyond Master's degree
6. How much of your active duty military career will have been spent as a student in military/civilian schools or formal training programs as of June 1978?
   a. Less than 2 years
   b. 2 years but less than 4 years
   c. 4 years but less than 6 years
   d. 6 years but less than 8 years
   e. 8 years or more

7. How much time have you served in a combat area (PCS and/or TDY)?
   a. I have never served in a combat area.
   b. Less than 6 months.
   c. 6 months to a year.
   d. More than a year, but less than 2 years
   e. 2 years or more.

8. What best describes your supervisory experience?
   a. Supervising officers and enlisted personnel.
   b. Supervising only officers.
   c. Supervising only enlisted personnel.
   d. None

9. How much supervisory experience have you had?
   a. None
   b. Less than 2 years.
   c. 2 to 4 years.
   d. 5 to 6 years.
   e. Over 6 years.

10. Have you ever served as an Admiral/General's aide?
    a. Yes.
    b. No.

11. To which rank do you realistically aspire?
    a. 0-4
    b. 0-5
    c. 0-6
    d. 0-7
    e. 0-8 or higher.
12. Which of the following most accurately describes your situation?

a. I was born a U.S. citizen, both of my parents were born U.S. citizens, and all of my grandparents were born U.S. citizens.

b. I was born a U.S. citizen, both of my parents were born U.S. citizens, but at least one of my grandparents was not born a U.S. citizen.

c. I was born a U.S. citizen, but at least one of my parents was not born a U.S. citizen.

d. I was not born a U.S. citizen.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

13. Which of the following best describes the area in which you were raised?

a. Farm, ranch, or rural home.

b. Town or community less than 2,500 people.

c. Small city (2,500 to 50,000).

d. A city (2,500 to 50,000) which was part of a large metropolitan area (1 million or over).

e. City over 50,000.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

14. a. A city over 50,000, which was part of a large metropolitan area (1 million or over).

b. Military installation(s).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

15. Which of the following statements most accurately describes your family's military heritage?

a. At least one of my grandparents pursued a military career.

b. One of my parents pursued (or is pursuing) a military career.

c. Both a and b above.

d. One of my grandparents and/or one of my parents served in the military, but did not pursue a military career.

d. None of the above.

16. My father:

a. Was (or is) a career military officer.

b. Was (or is) a career enlisted man.

c. Served as a non-career military officer.

d. Served as a non-career enlisted man.

e. Had no military experience.

A-3
Select the one response that describes the principal occupation of your family's primary wage earner during your formative years (i.e., until you were 18 years old).

17. a. Military
   b. Farm owner
   c. Unskilled worker (e.g., truck driver, farm laborer)
   d. Skilled worker (e.g., foreman, craftsman)
   e. Clerical, sales, or GS-8 and below.

18. a. Manager, official, or GS-9 or above.
   b. Professional - doctor or lawyer
   c. Professional - teacher or minister.
   d. Professional - scientist or engineer.
   e. Other

19. Based on your parents' income, their social standards, and their general standard of living, in which of the following environments do you feel you were raised?
   a. Upper class
   b. Upper-middle class
   c. Lower-middle class
   d. Upper-lower class
   e. Lower-lower class

20. How would you describe your domestic political orientation?
   a. Conservative
   b. Somewhat conservative
   c. Middle-of-the-road
   d. Somewhat liberal
   e. Liberal

21. Has NWC or NCSC changed your domestic political orientation?
   a. Yes, I am considerably more conservative.
   b. Yes, I am slightly more conservative.
   c. No change.
   d. Yes, I am slightly more liberal.
   e. Yes, I am considerably more liberal.
Select the one answer in the following 20 (4 sets) which best describes your religious preference.

22. a. Jewish
   b. Roman Catholic
   c. Baptist
   d. Presbyterian
   e. Methodist

23. a. Episcopalian
   b. Lutheran
   c. Congregationalist
   d. Mormon (LDS)
   e. Christian Scientist

24. a. Unitarian-Universalist
   b. Church of Christ
   c. Assembly of God
   d. Jehovah's Witnesses
   e. Muslim

25. a. Christian - not specified
   b. Other religion
   c. No religious preference
   d. atheist
   e. agnostic

26. Which of the following best describes your religious interests?
   a. I am a church member and attend services regularly.
   b. I am a church member, but do not attend services regularly.
   c. I am not a church member, but I do attend services regularly.
   d. I am not a church member, and I do not attend services regularly.

27. The military officer's status in U.S. society is:
   a. Rising
   b. Declining
   c. Static - high
   d. Static - low

28. If you had an opportunity to do it over again, would you choose to enter another profession?
   a. Definitely yes
   b. Probably yes
   c. Undecided
   d. Probably no
   e. Definitely no
29. If you had a son, would you want him to have a career as a military officer?
   a. Yes, and I would try to influence him.
   b. Yes, but I would not try to influence him.
   c. Uncertain.
   d. No.
   e. No, and I would discourage him.

30. Which of the following best describes your attitude toward a military career when you first entered the service?
   a. Planned to fulfill my military obligation and get out.
   b. Planned to see what it was like before I made up my mind.
   c. Planned to serve more than one tour but not make it a career.
   d. Planned to make the service a career.
   e. Other.

31. Which one of the following best describes how you feel about the military assignment system?
   a. The formal system allows me to participate adequately in my assignment selection.
   b. Personal contact outside the formal system is helpful in getting my desired assignment.
   c. Personal contact outside the formal system is essential in getting my desired assignment.

32. Frequent changes of duty assignments are essential to career advancement.
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Generally agree
   c. Generally disagree
   d. Strongly disagree

33. Which is the most important for promotion to the flag officer ranks?
   a. Performance
   b. Having had the right jobs at the right time.
   c. Having known the right people at the right time.
   d. Having a sponsor.
   e. Other
34. Do you feel that combat experience should be a criterion for promotion to the flag officer ranks?
   a. Yes, and I have combat experience.
   b. Yes, and I do not have combat experience.
   c. No, and I have combat experience.
   d. No, and I do not have combat experience.
   e. I don't know.

35. Command duty is essential for promotion to the flag officer ranks.
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Generally agree
   c. Generally disagree
   d. Strongly disagree

36. When all other factors are in balance, academy graduates have the advantage for promotion to the flag ranks.
   a. I agree, and I am an academy graduate.
   b. I agree, and I am not an academy graduate.
   c. I disagree, and I am an academy graduate.
   d. I disagree, and I am not an academy graduate.

37. Do you believe that most officers who are promoted to flag rank have a sponsor?
   a. Yes
   b. No
   c. I don't know.

38. Do you believe that you have a sponsor?
   a. Definitely yes.
   b. I'm not sure, but I think so.
   c. I'm not sure, but I don't think so.
   d. Definitely no.

39. With the all-volunteer force, the military will find its membership much more inclined to accept established procedures and organizational goals.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.
40. Which statement below best matches your view concerning the all-volunteer military?
   a. It will be an improvement because it will mean the military can become more professional and elite.
   b. It will be an improvement for other reasons.
   c. It will not be much different from today's military.
   d. It will be worse than today's military because it will not represent a cross section of American society.
   e. It will be worse than today's military for other reasons.

41. In a world without direct U.S. intervention in war, the U.S. services should take on secondary roles such as remedial education programs, engineering projects, ecological, reclamation, highway rescue, etc.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

42. The American military should be unified into one service.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

43. How would you characterize coverage of the military by the news media?
   a. Strongly biased against the military.
   b. Slightly biased against the military.
   c. Fair and objective.
   d. Slightly biased in favor of the military.
   e. Strongly biased in favor of the military.

44. Alienation is the best way to characterize present civilian-military relations.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.
45. Which statement best defines your attitude about civilian control of the military under our current DOD organization?

a. Interferes unacceptably with military requirements and should be diminished.
b. Is a necessary evil; should not be changed.
c. Is a proper constitutional requirement to insure preservation of our democracy and should not be weakened.
d. Does not provide a sufficient check on the military and should be strengthened.

46. If top military leaders disagreed with the constraints in Vietnam, they should have resigned.

a. Strongly agree.
b. Generally agree.
c. Generally disagree.
d. Strongly disagree.

47. The American military is more isolated from society as a result of the Vietnam experience.

a. Strongly agree.
b. Generally agree.
c. Generally disagree.
d. Strongly disagree.

48. The values of discipline, sacrifice, and patriotism are found more in the U.S. military than in U.S. society in general.

a. Strongly agree.
b. Generally agree.
c. Generally disagree.
d. Strongly disagree.

49. It is possible to incorporate in military men and in military institutions the potential for combat and for peacekeeping and arms control.

a. Strongly agree.
b. Generally agree.
c. Generally disagree.
d. Strongly disagree.

50. Too often our military system rewards those who succeed without being certain that the task was done in an honest and forthright manner.

a. Strongly agree.
b. Generally agree.
c. Generally disagree.
d. Strongly disagree.
51. I can be a success in the military without compromising my integrity.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

52. Almost every job can be made more stimulating, interesting, and challenging.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

53. A military supervisor may be personally friendly with subordinates yet retain order and discipline.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

54. Many lower ranking personnel do not use much imagination and ingenuity in their jobs.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

55. The average person will do only what is demanded of him.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

56. Additional pay is one of the most effective methods of improving job performance.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

57. A senior manager or commander loses prestige and authority by admitting to an error or a bad decision.
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Generally agree
   c. Generally disagree
   d. Strongly disagree
58. Allowing subordinates to set performance standards often results in sub-par standards.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

59. Most persons do not want to accept responsibility.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

60. Individual recognition is a key factor in employee motivation.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

61. Most workers need an occasional "swift kick" to produce maximum effort.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

62. A supervisor cannot expect an individual to be as enthusiastic about his job as he is about his leisure activities.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.

63. Compliance with orders from higher headquarters is an essential requirement for a professional military officer.
   a. Strongly agree.
   b. Generally agree.
   c. Generally disagree.
   d. Strongly disagree.
SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS

Please mark the answers to the following questions on this sheet. Do not use the scanner sheet. More than one answer may apply. After you have completed answering all questions, detach this sheet from the questionnaire and return it with the scanner sheet. You may discard the remainder of the questionnaire.

Have you been promoted "below the zone?" (Since this sheet will not be attached to the scanner sheet, it is necessary to ask this question again).

______ No, I have never been promoted "below the zone."
______ Yes, to 0-3.
______ Yes, to 0-4.
______ Yes, to 0-5.

Do you have instructor experience in any of the following schools?

______ Yes, a service academy.
______ Yes, a PME school.
______ Yes, a college ROTC.
______ Yes, a technical training school.
______ No.

In which state(s) or foreign country did you spend most of your formative years (0-18)?

If you are married, in which state(s) or foreign country did your spouse spend most of her (his) formative years (0-18)?

In which state did you receive your Bachelor's degree?

USE THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS SHEET FOR ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION.
AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP INTO THE 1980s

* * * * * *

This questionnaire supports ACSC student research designed to analyze future Air Force leadership. Your responses will be kept anonymous; your participation in the survey is voluntary but critical to our study.

Select only one answer to each question. Use only a number 1 pencil on the scanner sheet. We suggest that you first mark your responses on the questionnaire itself and then transfer your answers to the scanner sheet. If you do not wish to answer a particular question, please insure that the answer spaces next to that question number are left blank.

We appreciate your cooperation.
1. Have you ever been promoted "below-the-zone?"
   A. Yes - one time.
   B. Yes - twice to successive ranks.
   C. Yes - twice, but not to successive ranks.
   D. Yes - three times.
   E. No.

2. Are you rated?
   A. Yes - a pilot.
   B. Yes - a navigator.
   C. No.

3. What is your current rank?
   A. Captain.
   B. Major.
   C. Lt Colonel.
   D. Colonel.

4. What was your highest level of education when you first entered military service? (If you had a break in service, indicate your highest level of education at the time of latest entry into service.)
   A. High school graduate.
   B. Some college.
   C. College degree (B.S., B.A., or equivalent).
   D. Master's degree.
   E. Graduate work beyond Master's degree.

5. What is your highest level of education NOW? (If you are presently working on a degree, and have reason to assume that you will successfully complete the requirements for that degree during the next year, select the response that most accurately describes that degree.)
   A. High school graduate.
   B. Some college.
   C. College degree (B.S., B.A., or equivalent).
   D. Master's degree.
   E. Graduate work beyond Master's degree.
6. How much of your active duty military career will have been spent as a student in military/civilian schools or formal training programs as of June 1974?

A. Less than 2 years.
B. 2 years but less than 4 years.
C. 4 years but less than 6 years.
D. 6 years but less than 8 years.
E. 8 years or more.

7. How much time have you served in a combat area (PCS and/or TDY)?

A. I have never served in a combat area.
B. Less than 6 months.
C. 6 months to a year.
D. More than a year, but less than 2 years.
E. 2 years or more.

8. While serving in a combat area, what was your primary duty?

A. I have never served in a combat area.
B. Aircrew.
C. Aircrew and staff officer.
D. Staff officer or other non-aircrew duty.
E. Commander.

9. Which best describes your supervisory experience?

A. Missile or aircraft crew commander.
B. Supervising officers and airmen.
C. Supervising only officers.
D. Supervising only airmen.
E. None.

10. How much supervisory experience have you had?

A. None.
B. Less than 2 years.
C. 2 to 4 years.
D. 5 to 6 years.
E. Over 6 years.
11. Have you ever served as a general's aide?
   A. Yes.
   B. No.

12. To which rank do you realistically aspire?
   A. Major.
   B. Lt Colonel.
   C. Colonel.
   D. Brig General.
   E. Maj General or higher.

13. Which of the following most accurately describes your situation?
   A. I was born a U.S. citizen, both of my parents were born U.S. citizens, and all of my grandparents were born U.S. citizens.
   B. I was born a U.S. citizen, both of my parents were born U.S. citizens, but at least one of my grandparents was not born a U.S. citizen.
   C. I was born a U.S. citizen, but at least one of my parents was not born a U.S. citizen.
   D. I was not born a U.S. citizen.

14. Which of the following best describes the area in which you were raised?
   A. Farm, ranch, or rural home.
   B. Town or community less than 2500 people.
   C. Small city (2500 to 50,000).
   D. A city (2500 to 50,000) which was part of a large metropolitan area (1 million or over).
   E. City over 50,000

15. A. A city over 50,000 which was part of a large metropolitan area (1 million or over).
   B. Military installation(s).

16. Which of the following statements most accurately describes your family's military heritage?
   A. At least one of my grandparents pursued a military career.
B. One of my parents pursued (or is pursing) a military career.
C. Both A and B above.
D. One of my grandparents and/or one of my parents served in the military, but did not pursue a military career.
E. None of the above.

17. My father:
A. Was (or is) a career military officer.
B. Was (or is) a career enlisted man.
C. Served as a non-career military officer.
D. Served as a non-career enlisted man.
E. Had no military experience.

Select the one response that describes the principal occupation of your family's primary wage earner during your formative years (i.e., until you were 18 years old).

18. A. Military.
B. Farm owner.
C. Unskilled worker (e.g., truck driver, farm laborer).
D. Skilled worker (e.g., foreman, craftsman).
E. Clerical, sales, or GS-8 and below.

19. A. Manager, official, or GS-9 and above.
B. Professional - doctor or lawyer.
C. Professional - teacher or minister
D. Professional - scientist or engineer.
E. Other.

20. Based on your parents' income, their social standards, and their general standard of living, in which of the following environments do you feel you were raised:
A. Upper class.
B. Upper-middle class.
C. Lower-middle class.
D. Upper-lower class.
E. Lower-lower class.

21. How would you describe your domestic political orientation?
A. Conservative.
B. Somewhat conservative.
C. Middle-of-the-road.
D. Somewhat liberal.
E. Liberal
22. Has AWC or ACSC changed your domestic political orientation?

A. Yes, I am considerably more conservative.
B. Yes, I am slightly more conservative.
C. No change.
D. Yes, I am slightly more liberal.
E. Yes, I am considerably more liberal.

23-25. Select the one answer in the following 20 (4 sets) which best describes your religious preference.

A. Jewish.
B. Roman Catholic.
C. Baptist.
D. Presbyterian.
E. Methodist.
F. Episcopalian.
G. Lutheran.
H. Congregationalist.
I. Mormon (LDS).
J. Christian Scientist.
K. Unitarian-Universalist.
L. Church of Christ.
M. Assembly of God.
N. Jehovah's Witnesses.
O. Muslim.
P. Christian - not specified.
Q. Other religion.
R. No religious preference.
S. Atheist.
T. Agnostic.

26-28. Which of the following best describes your religious interests?

A. I am a church member and attend services regularly.
B. I am a church member, but do not attend services regularly.
C. I am not a church member, but I do attend services regularly.
D. I am not a church member, and I do not attend services regularly.

28. The Air Force officer's status in U.S. society is:

A. Rising.
B. Declining.
C. Static - high.
D. Static - low.
29. If you had an opportunity to do it over again, would you choose to enter another profession?
   A. Definitely yes.
   B. Probably yes.
   C. Undecided.
   D. Probably no.
   E. Definitely no.

30. If you had a son, would you want him to have a career as a military officer?
   A. Yes, and I would try to influence him.
   B. Yes, but I would not try to influence him.
   C. Uncertain.
   D. No.
   E. No, and I would discourage him.

31. Which of the following best describes your attitude toward an Air Force career when you first entered the Air Force?
   A. Planned to fulfill my military obligation and get out.
   B. Planned to see what it was like before I made up my mind.
   C. Planned to serve more than one tour but not make a career.
   D. Planned to make the Air Force a career.
   E. Other.

32. Which one of the following best describes how you feel about the Air Force assignment system?
   A. The formal system (Form 90 and Career Development Monitor) allows me to participate adequately in my assignment selection.
   B. Personal contact outside the formal system is helpful in getting my desired assignment.
   C. Personal contact outside the formal system is essential in getting my desired assignment.
   D. The formal system does not allow me to participate adequately in the assignment process.

33. Frequent changes of duty assignments are essential to career advancement.
   A. Strongly agree
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.
34. Which is the most important for promotion to the general officer ranks?

A. Performance.
B. Having had the right jobs at the right time.
C. Having known the right people at the right time.
D. Having a sponsor.
E. Other.

35. Do you feel that combat experience should be a criterion for promotion to the general officer ranks?

A. Yes, and I have combat experience.
B. Yes, and I do not have combat experience.
C. No, and I have combat experience.
D. No, and I do not have combat experience.
E. I don't know.

36. Command duty is essential for promotion to the general officer ranks.

A. Strongly agree.
B. Generally agree.
C. Generally disagree.
D. Strongly disagree.

37. When all other factors are in balance, academy graduates have the advantage for promotion to the general ranks.

A. I agree, and I am an academy graduate.
B. I agree, and I am not an academy graduate.
C. I disagree, and I am an academy graduate.
D. I disagree, and I am not an academy graduate.

38. Do you believe that most officers who are promoted to general have a sponsor?

A. Yes.
B. No.
C. I don't know.

39. Do you believe that you have a sponsor?

A. Definitely yes.
B. I'm not sure, but I think so.
C. I'm not sure, but I don't think so.
D. Definitely no.
40. With the advent of the all-volunteer force, the military will find its membership much more inclined to accept established procedures and organizational goals.

A. Strongly agree.
B. Generally agree.
C. Generally disagree.
D. Strongly disagree.

Which statement below best matches your view concerning the all-volunteer military?

A. It will be an improvement because it will mean the military can become more professional and elite.
B. It will be an improvement for other reasons.
C. It will not be much different from today's military.
D. It will be worse than today's military because it will not represent a cross section of American society.
E. It will be worse than today's military for other reasons.

42. In a world without direct U.S. intervention in war, the U.S. Air Force should take on secondary roles such as remedial education programs, engineering projects, ecological reclamation, highway rescue, etc.

A. Strongly agree.
B. Generally agree.
C. Generally disagree.
D. Strongly disagree.

43. The American military should be unified into one service.

A. Strongly agree.
B. Generally agree.
C. Generally disagree.
D. Strongly disagree.

44. How would you characterize recent coverage of the military by the news media?

A. Strongly biased against the military.
B. Slightly biased against the military.
C. Fair and objective.
D. Slightly biased in favor of the military.
E. Strongly biased in favor of the military.
45. Alienation is the best way to characterize present civil-military relations.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.

46. Which statement best defines your attitude about civilian control of the military under our current DOD organization?
   A. Interferes unacceptably with military requirements and should be diminished.
   B. Is a necessary evil; should not be changed.
   C. Is a proper constitutional requirement to insure preservation of our democracy and should not be weakened.
   D. Does not provide a sufficient check on the military and should be strengthened.

47. If top Air Force leaders disagreed with the bombing constraints in North Vietnam, they should have resigned.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.

48. The American military is more isolated from society as a result of the Vietnam experience.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.

49. The values of discipline, sacrifice, and patriotism are found more in the U.S. military than in U.S. society in general.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.
50. It is possible to incorporate in military men and in military institutions the potential for combat and for peacekeeping and arms control.

A. Strongly agree.
B. Generally agree.
C. Generally disagree.
D. Strongly disagree.

51. Too often our military system rewards those who succeed without being certain that the task was done in an honest and forthright manner.

A. Strongly agree.
B. Generally agree.
C. Generally disagree.
D. Strongly disagree.

52. I can be a success in the military without compromising my integrity.

A. Strongly agree.
B. Generally agree.
C. Generally disagree.
D. Strongly disagree.

53. Almost every job can be made more stimulating, interesting, and challenging.

A. Strongly agree.
B. Generally agree.
C. Generally disagree.
D. Strongly disagree.

54. A military supervisor may be personally friendly with subordinates yet retain order and discipline.

A. Strongly agree.
B. Generally agree.
C. Generally disagree.
D. Strongly disagree.

55. Many lower ranking personnel do not use much imagination and ingenuity in their jobs.

A. Strongly agree.
B. Generally agree.
C. Generally disagree.
D. Strongly disagree.
56. The average person will do only what is demanded of him.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.

57. Additional pay is one of the most effective methods of improving job performance.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.

58. A senior manager or commander loses prestige and authority by admitting to an error or a bad decision.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.

59. Allowing subordinates to set performance standards often results in sub-par standards.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.

60. Most persons do not want to accept responsibility.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.

61. Individual recognition is a key factor in employee motivation.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.
62. Most workers need an occasional "swift kick" to produce maximum effort.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.

63. A supervisor cannot expect an individual to be as enthusiastic about his job as he is about his leisure activities.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.

64. Compliance with orders from higher headquarters is an essential requirement for a professional Air Force officer.
   A. Strongly agree.
   B. Generally agree.
   C. Generally disagree.
   D. Strongly disagree.
SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS

Please mark the answers to the following questions on this sheet. Do not use the scanner sheet. More than one answer may apply. After you have completed answering all questions, detach this sheet from the questionnaire and return it with the scanner sheet. You may discard the remainder of the questionnaire.

Have you been promoted "below the zone?" (Since this sheet will not be attached to the scanner sheet, it is necessary to ask this question again.)

--- No, I have never been promoted "below the zone."
--- Yes, to Major.
--- Yes, to Lt Col.
--- Yes, to Colonel.

Do you have instructor experience in any of the following schools?

--- Yes, a service academy.
--- Yes a PME school (i.e. SOS, ACSC, AWC, or equivalent).
--- Yes, a college ROTC.
--- Yes, a technical training school.
--- Yes, an Air Training Command Flying school.
--- No.

Navigators should be allowed equal consideration for command of flying units.

--- I agree; I am a navigator.
--- I agree; I am a pilot.
--- I agree; I am non-rated.
--- I disagree; I am a navigator.
--- I disagree; I am a pilot.
--- I disagree; I am non-rated.

In which state(s) or foreign country did you spend most of your formative years (0-18)?

If you are married, in which state(s) or foreign country did your spouse spend most of her (his) formative years (0-18)?

In which state did you receive your Bachelor's degree?

Use the reverse side of this sheet for any comments you may have on the contents of this questionnaire.

Thank you very much for your cooperation!