WOMEN IN THE ARMY STUDY

PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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The Final Report
of the
Women in the Army Study Group

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THE DEPARTMENT OF ARMY
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The Women in the Army Study Group was established by the DCSPER as an ad hoc group to revalidate the Army's program for women. This report reviews current and planned policy on the utilization of women in the Army. In this regard, eleven distinct areas are discussed in separate chapters with conclusions and recommendations provided concerning each.
The Women in the Army Study Group was established in January 1976 by the DCSPER as an ad hoc group to revalidate the Army's program for women. The charter for the study is at Appendix A. The Group consisted of three full time personnel management analysts who were assisted on a part time basis by personnel managers from ODCSPER and MILPERCEN within their areas of expertise. The appreciation of the Study Group is expressed to the many agencies who participated in the preparation of the report to include technical, administrative and clerical assistance.
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CHAPTER 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. PURPOSE

The Women in the Army Study Group was directed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to accomplish the following task:

"To revalidate the program for the expanded utilization of women in the Army to assure that it provides for full and effective employment and is consistent with the current and future needs of the Army."

The need for the study effort became evident for several reasons. One of the primary ones was the reports from the field indicated that significant problems were developing from current personnel management concepts relating to the rapidly expanding women's programs. Another reason was the need to update the methodology for establishing strength objectives. As a final point, there was a need to isolate the key areas which require study or data development, review the various policy decisions made during the past three years in light of current data and experience, and initiate new or revised policies resulting from the analysis.

II. METHODOLOGY

The plan for the study effort consisted of three phases. Phase I was an analysis by the study group of the problem. This resulted in the identification of eleven distinct areas for review, investigation, or survey. Responsibility for each area was either undertaken by
the study group or farmed out to appropriate agencies to be accomplished under study group monitorship (see Appendix A). Approval of concept papers initiated Phase II—the research effort. During this period, overall direction was maintained through the medium of monthly In-Process Reviews. Phase II entailed the writing and staffing of separate reports on each area and the final compilation of the report by the Study Group. During this phase, the need for a methodology for determining requirements for non-prior service women accessions was identified and this task was accomplished.

III. CONTENTS OF THE REPORT
The report consists of eleven chapters—each with its own objective, discussion, conclusions, and recommendations. Consistency in the basic approach was maintained through the guidance of the Study Group. The primary thrust of the effort concerns women in the Women's Army Corps as this was the target for the expansion plan. Generally, the report reviews worldwide utilization of women in the armies, both past and present, examines the technical base of women's programs and pertinent policies, discusses ongoing efforts in the training field, and summarizes the results of surveys and research efforts.

IV. SYNOPSIS OF MAJOR TASKS (See Annex A)
V. SUMMARY

The initial task took a look at worldwide utilization of women in armies of major industrial nations. The results revealed that no country studied uses women in a direct combat role, although some have in the past. The US Army has the greatest female strength and a wider range of job opportunities than any other country considered. There is a need to publicize the limited role of women in other armies and the US Army leadership in this area.

In the area of programming, a review of the Women Officer Strength Model (WOSM) and the Women's Enlisted Expansion Model (WEEM) indicated both were basically sound approaches to establishing female skill requirements. However, in establishing strength goals both programs need to take into consideration additional management information currently under development or revision. This includes maximum female content in TOE units, dual specialty designation for officers, Enlisted Force Management Plan guidelines, the impact of pregnancy/sole parent dependency policies, and Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) available to women.

In order to facilitate the above, several initiatives are ongoing or have been completed. As part of the study effort, a new methodology for establishing non-prior service accession requirements for enlisted women was developed capable of incorporating personnel policy and force structure considerations. Data were gathered on pregnancy/sole parent dependency problems and this resulted in a recommendation to the Office of the Secretary of Defense that
the policy be reestablished in which the Army determines the disposition of pregnant servicewomen. In this area, a need for continuing data collection was identified. New procedures and criteria, including both combat and management considerations, were recommended for the closing and opening of MOS to female occupancy. A revised closure list, based on combat exclusion and management considerations, is recommended. The Officers Dual Specialty Allocation System (ODSAS) Model, currently nearing completion, will permit analysis of male/female career interfaces. As a final point, the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences has been tasked to validate maximum female content levels recommended by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

In the area of training, women officers receive training on a par with males. They receive the same basic and career officer courses as men and can compete for higher level schooling. On the other hand, while enlisted women are required to attain the same level of skill performance as males, they do not receive the same basic entry training. In order to remedy this, TRADOC is conducting a test of a common core Basic Initial Entry Training program in September 1976. (NOTE: A similar deficiency in units was eliminated in June 1976 by permitting women to participate in all weapons training less hand grenades). It has also been noted in the field that, in some instances, enlisted women were unable to perform in the full range of tasks relating to their jobs. This shortcoming is being addressed by TRADOC in conjunction with the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS).
program by the establishment of necessary standards in each MOS. Measurement methods will then be developed by the Surgeon General to screen potential accessions.

A general review of physiological factors relating to military performance reveals that a clear differential exists between males and females strongly in favor of males. This is a significant point which cannot be over-emphasized when considering the military potential of women. In the psychological and sociological area it was found that only limited work had been done in the context of military situations and that studies are needed on primary groups and on the effects of combat stress on women.

A survey of major commanders indicates general satisfaction with the performance of women but identifies a need to set minimum physical standards for all personnel in each MOS. They view the current pregnancy/sole parent dependency policies as having a negative effect but most desire more data before arriving at final conclusions. The restriction of women from Category I units is considered appropriate, but most commanders believe women should be permitted forward of the brigade rear boundary in order to perform their jobs.

Surveys of Army personnel show men generally favor expanded utilization of women but are much more conservative than women. There is general opposition to the utilization of women in the direct combat role (this
is also reflected in limited samplings of the civilian community). The belief that men do better jobs than women is so wide spread that it could affect actual unit capabilities. The need for additional survey efforts was firmly established.

As an overview, several conclusions can be made. First, a considerable void remains with regard to establishing a sound data base to support the decision making process. It is apparent that attention has been focused on this problem and multiple efforts are currently ongoing throughout the Army to resolve the most pressing issues.

Second, the basic premise on which Army policy is founded—exclusion of women from direct combat roles—is a sound one. This point is supported throughout the study. It is clear that the original intent of Congress and, by extension, the intent of the American people, was that women perform in combatant roles. The opinion of the Army's most experienced lead support this position as do surveys of Army personnel and of the civilian community. Exclusion of women from direct combat is also justified by the physical limitations of women vis-a-vis men and it is probably not by chance that other armies in the world do not employ women in this role. This finding is further supported by the recent report of the Defense Manpower Commission to the President and the Congress which stated that the prohibition regarding assignment of women to combat roles should continue. The Commission also aptly summarized the consensus of the major commanders by stating:
A major concern regarding their utilization is the impact of military women on the ability of the armed forces to carry out their missions. Optimum utilization of women in a way that will not adversely affect mission capability is the objective, rather than maximum assignment of women to all areas.

Third, it is felt that while there is considerable work left to do, the Army is on the right track. The current plan for women is acceptable and will not lead to an organization which will be ineffective in time of war. The initiatives recommended in the study will provide direction to the Army's efforts for continued refinement of the program for utilization of women in the Army.
ANNEX A

SYNOPSIS OF MAJOR TASKS

A. Utilization of Women in Armies: Past and Present (Chapter 2)

Problem. To review the historical basis for women's use in armies in peace and in war and to describe that use.

Discussion. No nation encountered in this study uses women in a direct combat role, although some have in the past. This is attributed to tradition as well as practical reasons related to physiology and privacy between the sexes.

Conclusions. The US Army has greater female strength and a wider range of job opportunities for women than any of the other countries studied. The will of Congress has been interpreted as restricting women from combat roles; however, the term combat has been ill-defined.

Recommendations.

That a more precise definition of the term combat be developed for application in defining, refining the role of women in the Army.

That the Army make the internal and external public aware of its rationale for continued exclusion from a direct combat role, i.e., it is a national policy as evidenced by the views of Congress during various hearings on bills affecting the WAC and its predecessor organization, the WAAC.

B. Review of WEEM Model (Chapter 3)

Problem. To review and revalidate Women's Enlisted Expansion Model (WEEM).
Discussion. WEEM determines, for the purpose of recruitment, the maximum number of females possible for each MOS consistent with total active Army strength authorizations and male combat requirements. Available women positions identified by this process are phased to the entry level MOS and training requirements computed manually so as not to exceed the total requirements for each MOS.

Conclusions. WEEM uses legally defensible operational criteria and provides a time-phased, viable career for women. The computation of female training requirements can be automated by the application of the Personnel Inventory Analysis (PIA II) System.

Recommendations.
That WEEM continue to establish the maximum female content by MOS and grade to assure a balanced distribution of the female force within the guidelines established by Department of the Army.

That entry level training requirements be computed by the Personnel Inventory Analysis (PIA II) System as soon as PIA II is operational at the 3-digit MOS and grade level.

C. Review of MOS Open/Closed to Women (Chapter 4)

Problem. To review and revalidate MOS open and closed to enlisted women to insure that legally supportable operational criteria are used in the decision process and that the results are valid job positions for women in consonance with the needs of the Army.
Discussion. Based on national policy restricting the use of women in the combat role, the Army has implemented policies precluding the assignment of women servicemembers to combat units and combat/close combat support skills. Aside from skills closed due to national policy, there are other skills in which the Army cannot offer women a viable career for various reasons such as career progression and maintaining a rotation base.

Conclusions. That all MOS should be reviewed to determine if they should be closed due to national policy or for management considerations, and that this list of closed MOS should be reviewed on a regular basis.

That reasons for closure of MOS to female occupancy must be clearly stated for each closed MOS and that the list of closed MOS be published in appropriate publications.

That the criteria for closing MOS to female occupancy require clarification.

Recommendations.

Criteria for closure of MOS to female occupancy be established as follows:

- Permanent closure due to national policy:
  -- Skills designed for direct involvement in combat or making a direct contribution to the act of inflicting casualties or equipment damage on the enemy.
-- Skills designed primarily for utilization in areas where close combat operations would occur.

- Temporary closure for management reasons--any skill in which women cannot be afforded a manageable and viable career.

MILPERCEN, in coordination with the Army staff and TRADOC, will determine which skills should be opened/closed to female occupancy. This will be done on a semi-annual basis.

Those skills closed permanently should be published in Chapter 4, AR 611-201, and the skills closed for management purposes should be published and disseminated, as necessary, to accomplish management functions.

D. Methodology for a Parametric Approach to Determining Non-Prior Service Accessions for Enlisted Women (Chapter 5)

Problem. To develop a system capable of establishing the female non-prior service (NPS) annual accession requirement based on personnel policy and force structure considerations.

Discussion. The proposed system accepts the following inputs: WEEM/PIA output, authorization data, combat exclusion policy, reenlistment and promotion policies, deployment policies, total trained female requirements, the Enlisted Force Management Plan, and policies regarding maximum female content in types of units. The system outputs annual female accession requirements.
Conclusions. The proposed system is parametric in nature and can readily be adapted to reflect changes in management policies or force structure. The validity of the variables used in the parametric analysis has not been completely established especially with regard to unit ceilings (both TOE and TDA), reenlistment and promotion policies, and readiness and deployability considerations.

Recommendations.
That the parametric system outlined above be used to establish the NPS female accessions required and as an analytical tool for examining the probable impact of changes in management policies or force structure.

That efforts to validate input variables be expedited.

E. Review of Women Officer Policies and Programs (Chapter 6)

Problem. To review and revalidate women officer policies and programs dealing with requirements, branching and training to insure that legally defensible criteria are used in the decision process and that the results are viable and manageable careers for women in consonance with the needs of the Army.

Discussion.
The Women Officer Strength Model (WOSM) is utilized to establish the number of women officers the Army can use. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has recommended TOE unit maximum female officer content and this is being reviewed by the major commands (MACOM) and will be validated by the Army Research Institute.
Training has been reviewed to insure equitability.

Conclusions. The WOSM applies Army policy in a legally defensible methodology to determine the women officer content for the Army.

Army training is designed to provide the same background and education for men and women officers.

Recommendations.

Continue to use WOSM to analyze Army force structure to establish permissible women officer content.

Review and revise the Army women officer program as part of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) as changes occur in force structure, loss projections, and availability of potential women officers.

Continue to insure that men and women officers have the same training and assignment opportunities consistent with Army policy of no direct combat roles for women.

F. Review of Pregnancy/Sole Parent Dependency Policies (Chapter 7)

Problem. To determine the impact of pregnancy/sole parent dependency policies.

Discussion. Pregnant women are causing difficulties in the effective conduct of unit training because of their limited ability to participate in field training. The loss of women due to pregnancy/parenthood is normally on a short notice basis and as such leaves insufficient lead time to requisition replacements. These short notice losses are creating unit
deployability and readiness problems. Based on data covering the period June 1975 through May 1976, the Army can expect to have at least 2100 women (based on a total force, enlisted and officer, of 55,000) in a non-deployable status because of pregnancy and the effective service of nearly 900 will be lost as a result of full-term pregnancy. Approximately 40% of the women who give birth leave the service after the birth or postnatal leave.

Conclusions. The greatest impact of the current pregnancy separation policy is on readiness, deployability and mission accomplishment. The adverse effects of the current policy strongly support returning the retention option to the Army. Data collection efforts must be improved with regard to pregnancy and sole parenthood cases.

Recommendations.

The Army continue its efforts to reverse the current DOD pregnancy separation policy.

Parameters be developed for use in reviewing individual requests for retention in the event the current pregnancy separation policy is reversed.

Improved data collection procedures be established for both pregnancy and sole parent cases; that this data be reviewed on a regular basis to determine the need for policy changes.
G. Review of Basic Training and Special Training (Chapter 8)

Problem. Review Basic Training (BT) and special training programs to validate policies with regard to women.

Discussion. Current Army policies require the same level of performance from females as from males to include MOS and unit duties. However, women do not receive the same basic entry training and presently are restricted from participating in Ranger training.

Conclusion. Basic entry training for women does not teach them the essential combat skills for full participation in Category II/III units. The Basic Initial Entry Training (BIET) test, scheduled for September 1976 by Training and Doctrine Command, will provide insights on a revised program. Current policies on special training (Ranger, mountain, cold weather, jungle warfare, Recondo, airborne) which restrict women only from Ranger training are valid.

Recommendation.
That the Army staff continue to monitor the BIET field test, analyze test results and make appropriate recommendations for consideration by the Secretary of the Army.

H. Review of MOS Training (Chapter 9)

Problem. Review and evaluate Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training to determine if a requirement exists to establish physical and operational standards and to develop measurement methods.
Discussion. Reports from the field and by investigatory agencies (General Accounting Office, Department of Army Inspector General) indicate that some women are unable to perform the full range of tasks due to lack of physical capabilities. A review of MOS training, its relationship to field operating requirements, and the establishment of necessary standards for males and females are essential.

The Training and Doctrine Command has proposed a phased approach to this problem. First, each MOS must be reconfigured in accordance with the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS). Next, attrition data must be gathered on each MOS course to identify critical areas. Then, Individual Training Plans (ITPs) must be developed on each MOS. These, in turn, will be provided to The Surgeon General to serve as a basis for developing measurement methods.

Conclusions.
The scope of this task is extensive and is best accomplished on a phased basis as an integral part of the EPMS development program.

The Surgeon General requires the ITPs in order to develop measurement methods.

Recommendation.
That the TRADOC concept be approved and monitored to completion by the Army Staff.
I. **Attitudinal Surveys (Chapter 10)**

**Problem.** To survey the attitudes and opinions of a broad spectrum of military personnel concerning utilization of women in the Army.

**Discussion.** Numerous surveys have been conducted in the past three years. Results of the surveys are summarized in six categories: combat, command/leadership, pregnancy/parenthood, job performance, training and miscellaneous. The Air Force conducted an extensive attitudinal survey of Air Force women, their supervisors and their peers in September 1975. A Gallup Poll indicates that the American public feels that men perform better than women in the traditional skills such as policeman, mechanic, truck driver and fireman.

**Conclusions.** Army men seem to generally favor the expanded utilization of women in the Army but they are much more conservative than Army women. There is general opposition to the utilization of women in the direct combat role. The belief that men do a better job is so widespread that it could affect actual unit capabilities. Additional survey efforts are warranted.

**Recommendations.**

That the Army Research Institute (ARI) continue current efforts to complete development of an Army attitudinal survey as quickly as possible.

That ARI be tasked to coordinate with the Air Force to determine if the results of its survey have any application or usefulness to the Army.
That consideration be given to expanding the attitude scale already
developed by ARI or that additional scales be developed, in order to
measure more of the changes in attitudinal factors associated with
utilization of women in the Army.

That any future Army surveys referring to the utilization of women
specifically define what is intended by the terms as used in that
particular survey.

J. Survey of Major Commands (Chapter 11)

Problem. To determine the views, ideas and experience of the leaders
of the Major Army Commands (MACOMs) and their subordinate commanders
with regard to the utilization of women in the Army.

Discussion. Each of the MACOM Commanders was requested to provide
his views on a number of issues already designated for study, as well
as any suggestions or recommendations with respect to the policies governing
the utilization of women. The responses were analyzed on an individual
and collective basis with a view toward extracting unique suggestions
as well as determining where general consensus exists.

Conclusions. MACOM Commanders are generally satisfied with women's
performance but are concerned over setting minimum physical standards
for all personnel in each MOS. There is an inequitable distribution of
additional duties. The current pregnancy/solo parenthood policies are

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having a negative effect, but more data are needed. Time lost due to
pregnancy may be a significant problem in skills where appearance in
uniform is a prerequisite to performance in the skill. Some additional
training is required for women in some areas. Women are being accepted
in leadership roles. The restriction of women from Category I units
is appropriate; however, women should not be restricted from going
forward of the brigade rear boundary in order to accomplish the
normal functions of their MOS.

Recommendations.
That the TRADOC EPMS effort to develop Individual Training Plans (ITP)
for each MOS continue and that the ITP be furnished to the Surgeon General
for scientific analysis and development of measurement methods. (See
Chapter 9).

That Army policy regarding the performance of additional duties be
established essentially as follows, "that soldiers will not be excused
from the performance of unit additional duties solely on the basis of sex.
Commanders should, as always, excuse personnel on an individual basis, who
in their judgement, are either physically incapable of performing particular
duties or for whom duties are considered inappropriate for reasons of sex."

That ODCSPER take necessary action to develop essential management information
collection procedures and to develop requisite management information displays
on pregnancy and sole parenthood cases, and that the data base be monitored on a regular basis to determine appropriate policy changes.

That TRADOC continue to review BCT and Special Training Programs to validate policies with regard to women, with emphasis in the areas of weapons, tactics, physical training and field training.

That a policy be established that qualified female personnel may be utilized by their commanders to accomplish the unit mission without regard to geographical boundaries on the battlefield (as long as basic combat exclusion policies are not violated) and that this policy be published in appropriate regulations.

K. Review of Physiological, Psychological and Sociological Factors (Chapter 12)

Problem. To review physiological, psychological and sociological factors which impact on the utilization of women.

Discussion. The Army has only recently begun extensive investigations in the area. The introduction of women into the United States Military Academy (USMA) and increased numbers of women in the force structure in non-traditional jobs have generated multiple requirements for factual information on which to base decisions. Significant research programs are ongoing within several Army agencies which will provide considerable data within the near timeframe.
Conclusions. There are more unknowns than knowns on the effect of women in units and many of the questions must be answered before any significant changes are made to current policies and programs.

A clear differential currently exists between the militarily relevant physical capabilities of males and females strongly in favor of males. It is also noted that the full potential of women has not been established and that considerable improvement can be made in the physical fitness program for women.

There is a requirement for observational studies on primary groups consisting of males and females and on the effects of combat stress.

Recommendation.
That research on the performance capabilities and limitations of women soldiers and on psychological/sociological factors receive continued emphasis and be expedited, where feasible.
## CHAPTER 2

Utilization of Women in Armies: Past and Present

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V. DOD Female Objectives
I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

To review the historical basis for women's use in armies in peace and in war and to describe that use.

II. BACKGROUND

The issue of a woman's role in organized armies has surfaced quite frequently in recent times; yet, more often than not, conclusions reflecting historical or current use have been clouded with misunderstanding and bias. It has been commonplace to hear that "this nation or that one uses women in combat--why is the United States Army behind the times?" Thus, while explaining the Army position on the role of women in the volunteer Army, it has also been necessary to provide information regarding women's roles in other countries. In the latter area, data has been incomplete.

There has been the general feeling that most armies restrict the employment of women to a limited range of skills and that for a great many reasons largely buried in tradition, women have only served as combatants in isolated cases.

By reviewing the history of Army women in the United States and in other countries, several facts could emerge, all of which might provide experience factors weighing for or against the employment of women in additional roles.
In general, the study limits itself to women serving in highly developed industrialized nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. Some work has been done to study the utilization of women as a function of the degree of industrialization; however, there does not appear to be a significant correlation. There is a relationship established, however, between the degree of utilization of women and the political system and form of military organization of the country concerned (Goldman, 1976). She concluded that multi-party political systems (effective democratic system) in contrast to one-party systems make more extensive use of women in the military. The multi-party nations are those which have the greatest tendency to revert to an all-volunteer force in lieu of conscription. Because Israel's use of women is often discussed, its situation was also reviewed.

Where women's place in combat has been an issue with a particular country that topic has been examined. With Soviet Bloc nations this was difficult. First, because of a paucity of information and second, because of the difficulty of separating fact from fiction.

Pertaining directly to the United States' employment of women in the Army and in combat, our history has also been reviewed to include an analysis of the United States Congress view toward women in combat services as expressed in hearings on all major bills related to the formation and continuation of the Women's Army Corps. Posing a problem to discussing combat is the lack of a definition of the term with respect to WAC utilization. It means different things to different
people.

This is not a study to justify a continuation of "we do it this way because we always have or because someone else does." It is to provide more information than has existed previously on just what women do—and have done—in armies and why.

III. METHODOLOGY

Primarily this report is based on a literature review. Histories of women's participation in various armies, congressional publications, official Army records and historical documents from the Defense Intelligence Agency, periodicals and journals have been reviewed. Additionally, discussions have been held with members of the Brookings Institution, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Chief of Military History, the US Army Nurse Corps, the USO, the American Red Cross, and allied forces.

The study addresses itself to WAC personnel only and not to women in the medical departments.

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

It is a simple fact that no nation encountered in this study currently uses women in a direct combat role, although national circumstances have in the past compelled the use of women in such roles. Women have performed in organized and guerrilla warfare and little evidence is available to suggest that they cannot perform as direct combatants if that is what is required.
Women have performed in combat, combat support, and combat service support in various regions of the world and they have done well. In spite of this, all countries which were taken into account in this study have limited a woman's role in national defense in peacetime situations. There may be deeply ingrained sociological factors which have throughout history limited women's participation in warfare but there is, at least in recent times, much to suggest that not only tradition but often practical factors have been at play, many of which relate to physiology and the long accepted concept of privacy between the sexes.

In wartime women have been used extensively; however, it is clear that women have been considered as a resource which would offset the loss of men in industry and which would make a larger number of men available for combat services. Nazi Germany, the USSR and Great Britain, using conscription of females, made the greatest use of women in World War II.

V. CONCLUSIONS

By a wide margin the United States Army is more liberal in its current use of women than any other of the countries studied. The United States Army has a greater female strength than other armies (strength of women in Israel's army is unknown) and a much wider array of opportunities (See Annex V).
The United States is the only nation studied where the use of women is more nearly based on providing equal opportunity than using them as an auxiliary type organization or augmentation to a male Army.

No nation studied uses or foresees using women in a direct combat role, under normal circumstances, including the Soviet Union and Israel. For national survival, however, a nation would use all available personnel to survive.

Women have been used successfully in combat in organized combat units and in guerrilla warfare by a number of nations. The most extensive wartime use of women, to include a combat role, was in the Soviet Union in World War II. Israeli women were only used in direct combat in the 1948 war.

The United States has never officially sanctioned or used women in combat roles. Congressional documents from 1942-1948 clearly indicate that this position was the will of Congress when the WAC was established. No other Congressional debate of women in combat was discovered which alters this view.

Women are not limited from combat service by virtue of innate group characteristics such as excess emotionalism, inability to withstand stress and the like. The physical requirements for combat are unknown, or at least poorly defined. Exclusion is primarily based on historical custom and tradition.
United States Army women were used quite successfully as noncombatants in combat theaters in World War II.

Leaders of the women's services of NATO in 1973 expressed opposition to the use of women in combat except in cases of national survival.

The term combat is ill-defined and subject to a large variety of individual interpretations with respect to WAC expansion.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Army arrive at a more precise definition of the term combat for application in defining and refining the role of women in the Army.

That the Army make the internal and external public aware of its rationale for continued exclusion of women from a direct combat role, i.e., it is a national policy as evidenced by the views of Congress expressed during various hearings on bills affecting the WAC and its predecessor organization the WAAC.
ANNEX A

WOMEN IN THE US ARMY THROUGH WW II

Like so many other nations, the United States can cite a number of women who have been involved in military activities which predate the formal integration of women into military forces. It is fair to say, however, that prior to the twentieth century women's participation in military activity was atypical.

Deborah Sampson, a product of Massachusetts, disguised herself as a man in order to join the Continental Army. She served three years with the Fourth Massachusetts Regiment as Robert Shurtleff and was wounded on more than one occasion but only had her ruse discovered when she contracted an illness. Discovering this, George Washington discharged her, although she did receive a pension. (Laffin, 1967)

Well known in many circles, Molly Pitcher--real name Mary Hays--served with her husband during the Revolutionary War tending to the wounded. When her husband was wounded she assumed his duties firing the cannon. She received praise for her actions in stemming a British advance and also was given compensation for her duty. (Laffin, 1967)

The story is the same for all wars in early American history. A few women participated but the fact remains that women were never an organized part of the Army until the formation of the Army Nurse Corps in 1901. Prior to this time, a woman had to disguise her sex if she were intent on serving in the US military forces.
In the 1800's, the excellence of women as nurses was a fact and Civil War experiences reflected the shortcomings of not having a "unified nursing corps with official status." (Treadwell, 1953) However, opposition to women in the military delayed the formation of such a unit until 1901. Even at this time, however, the Nurse Corps was not an integral part of the Army but rather in an auxiliary-type status. Many benefits to include retirement were denied women in the Army Nurse Corps.

It was fairly well established in the early 1900's that it would take a national emergency to resolve the question of women's course in the military. The issue was not called into serious question during World War I, although it is likely that it would have arisen had the war continued.

There were, however, instances of women's utilization by the US Army in World War I. In the European theater, based on a request by General John J. Pershing, women with civilian contracts with benefits similar to women in the Army Nurse Corps were used as telephone operators. The Army's position on the issue was typical of a memo from the Chief of Staff to the Adjutant General in 1918. The War Department was not yet convinced of "the desirability or feasibility of making this most radical departure in the conduct of our military affairs." (Treadwell, 1953)

Separate corps made attempts to gain approval for organized bodies of women to perform military service. The Quartermaster General favored
the formation of a "Women's Auxiliary Quartermaster Corps." Similar functional organizations were proposed by the Inspector General, the Chief of Engineers, Operations Branch of the General Staff, and the Chief of Ordnance. (Treadwell, 1953) The Army was not ready; all were disapproved.

The Navy Department had fewer hangups. Almost 13,000 women enlisted in the Navy as "Yeomanettes" for service with the Navy and as "Marinettes" for service with the Marines. These women were the first in our military history to have full military status. The question of women in the military died with the end of the war. A 1918 memo to the Chief of Staff closed the book on the topic stating "In view of the present military situation it is believed no longer desirable that arrangements be made to form military organizations composed of women. . . A continuation of the war would have required the United States in completing its program for the year 1919 to make a much more extended use of women. . . to replace men sent overseas or men shifted to heavy work which men alone can do." (Treadwell, 1953)

In the period between the World Wars, it is safe to say there was a lot of discussing but little acting.

World War II brought the emergency which would cause policymakers and legislators to cast aside preconceived notions in favor of pragmatism after years of debate. The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps was
established on 14 May 1942. This did not occur, however, before a great deal of heated debate surfaced in the months prior to the bill's passage. An analysis of this debate is given at Annex C.

WAC In World War II

The documentary evidence from World War II is sufficient to show that American women can serve in a wide range of environments and duties. It is interesting that many of the same fears regarding the use of women in World War II which were dispelled by virtue of their performance have surfaced again today. Reduction in men's efficiency caused by their concern over women's safety, perceived inability of women to cope with stress, ad infinitum were discussed in World War II before women were deployed to the active theaters, but the evidence shows that women could cope as well as men.

European Theater

At the end of the war, over 8,000 women were assigned to the European Theater. Because the use of women in a combat area was untested, the Army initially moved with caution, perhaps even reluctance, but the results were summed up by many of our leaders. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, European Commander, informed the War Department: "During the time I have had Wacs under my command they have met every test and task assigned them. I have seen them at work in... England, France, and at Army installations throughout the European Theater. Their contributions in efficiency, skill, spirit and determination are immeasurable." (U.S. Forces, European Theater, 1945)
The Air Corps Summary was likewise positive: "Wacs proved much less of a problem than had been envisaged". . "It was found that Wacs could live under conditions substantially the same as those of male personnel". . Perhaps the greatest achievement of Wacs was their triumph over the prejudices of the male military mind. The half-amused, half-scornful attitude of some officers in responsible positions was not justified by the performance of the Wacs. A balanced judgement would find that the Wacs have been deserving of any extra time and effort which might have had to be expended on them because of their sex." (Treadwell, 1953)

It was after considerable debate that women were deployed from England to the continent following the Normandy Invasion but their performance was high. It was reported that in the last eight months of the war, women followed closely behind the fighting forces with living conditions much the same as those of men.

As human behavior research has indicated for many years, in the case of men and women the motivating factors are more important than the hygienic factors in providing high morale. Army history reflects that in the European Theater of Operations women's feeling that they were important in the war effort produced their impressive performance.

Interesting statistics came from Europe. The WAC attrition rate was the same as noncombat men (1/2 of 1%). Time lost due to non-battle hospitalization was lower for women than men (2.2% compared with 2.5%). Women developed psychological disorders less frequently than men.
Venereal disease was one-sixth that of men. The WAC pregnancy rate was negligible. WAC disciplinary rates were much lower than men. WAC appearance was reported as exemplary and it was concluded that supervision at the WAC detachment level was more thorough and constant than among males. (Treadwell, 1953)

Notable differences exist between World War II conditions and today's. Women today serve in a much wider range of skills and are integrated into almost all of their unit activities. In World War II in Europe, about 35% of the enlisted women were stenographers and typists, 26% were clerks, 22% were in communications. A relatively small percentage were in other skills, e.g., medical, mechanics, draftsmen, interpreters, photography. Image had some bearing on job assignment which it does not have in 1976. About 100 Wacs who were assigned as mechanics in the Air Service Command performed their work in a "highly satisfactory" manner yet they were transferred to desk jobs because it was considered unfeminine to wear overalls.

Most skills requested by the Theater of Operations of the War Department were in the clerical area. There was no War Department restriction on women in many other skill areas but the European Theater of Operations did not respond to the WAC Staff Director's attempts to interest agencies in using Wacs in other than in predominantly clerical work. There were 628 Army specialties available in World War II of which 406 were noncombatant and could be filled by women.

Subsequent to the end of hostilities in Europe in World War II, a
board was established by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations (17 June 1945) with the mission "to prepare a factual and annotated report on the Women's Army Corps in the European Theater of Operations, and recommendations." (U.S. Forces, European Theater, 1945)

The recommendations made by this board were far-reaching and, in many cases, ahead of their time. Many of them were never acted on but the major recommendations warrant repeating in this study for they were based on conclusions drawn from the most extensive use of Army women in U.S. history.

**General Recommendations**

a. ...provide for the inclusion of women as an integral part of the various branches, arms, and services of the peacetime Regular Army and Reserve Corps in job categories for which they are qualified. ...

b. The elimination of the use of the title "Women's Army Corps" and the absorption of the units and individuals in the branches, arms, and services of the overall military establishment.

c. Establishment of an office or staff sections for women's affairs on all staff levels of the military establishment.

d. Assignment of female staff and administrative officer specialists to those sections, agencies, and commands which are primarily responsible for the planning and policymaking relating to the administration and utilization of all military personnel.

e. The procurement of personnel on a voluntary basis during time
of peace, and under provisions of a selective service system during an emergency, in job categories and strengths consistent with the authorized overall strength and needs of the military establishment, to assure the maintenance of a balanced force.

f. Equalization of authorized grades and promotion requirements for male and female officers.

g. Extensive joint training in staff, administrative, operational, and command functions for male and female officers by arm, branch or force in which they are commissioned.

h. Inclusion of women in any program adopted for basic training of officer candidates.

i. Reserve Officers Training Corps program for women.

j. Removal of all restrictions on utilization of female military personnel in time of an emergency other than:

(1) Individual qualification for job performance.

(2) Individual physical strength and endurance.

(3) Priority of need.

(4) Reasonable safety.

k. That the level of utilization of women in the military establishment during a period of emergency be determined only by their job
qualifications and the scope and location of warfare, and not by combat organizational levels, such as regiment, division or corps.

1. Emphasis on the continued use of female personnel in administrative, clerical, and technical skills, and the expansion of their use in the fields of mechanical and medical skills, special types of combat, and special service units.

m. Revision of the International Rules of Land Warfare to provide adequate rules governing the accommodation, feeding, and employment of both officer and enlisted female personnel.

n. Mobilization under the selective service system in a time of emergency of all female American personnel required for duty in the military establishment. . . .

Army Women in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA)

Army women were late in coming to the SWPA and their entrance to that area came from a refusal by the Australians to let civilian women leave Australia with the northward attacking forces. Again, debate ensued concerning the use of women in this area, but eventually the SWPA was authorized 4,000 women. The first women arrived in Australia in May 1944 to prepare for movement to their first forward location at Port Moresby, New Guinea. From here women were successively moved to other forward locations. This was in opposition to the policy which had previously applied to Army nurses.
The theater had formerly only used nurses in rear areas. General Douglas MacArthur provided the rationale for women serving in forward areas living in many cases under very primitive conditions. He said, "I moved my Waos forward early after occupation of recaptured territory because they were needed and they were soldiers in the same manner that my men were soldiers. Furthermore, if I had not moved my Waos when I did, I would have had mutiny... as they were so eager to carry on where needed." (Treadwell, 1953)

General MacArthur's words were heeded. Women served in many locations in New Guinea and the Philippines. Many went to the Philippines some 30 days after the landing of the first combat troops and the first plane load to Leyte was welcomed by strafing by Japanese aircraft. In spite of very harsh conditions which prompted second thoughts regarding the deployment of women to the area, women wanted to remain and were allowed to. In general, women's morale was higher in the more forward areas despite the decrease in the quality of living. Army women reached Manila four days after organized resistance ended even though fighting continued in the outskirts of the city. Eventually, almost 5,000 WACs were in Manila.

Records show that about 70% of Waos in the SWPA were working in administrative areas with the remainder scattered in other areas including motor transportation, communications, and intelligence.

It would be difficult to compare men and women's performance but the
evidence shows that women performed well in probably the most primitive conditions ever faced by WAC personnel.

Late in their employment in the SWPA, the evacuation rate for WAC personnel was inordinately high but the evidence suggests that this was caused by factors beyond their control such as poor supply, long working hours (longer than men in same skills), and extremely rigid control over their activities--24 hours a day, no recreation areas and in some cases inferior commanders. Conditions were considered bad enough that the War Department initiated an investigation of morale, health, and living conditions of WAC personnel in the SWPA. The war ended without a satisfactory report. The first reply to the War Department was simply a copy of a press release. The second received after a sharp reply by the War Department only contained two items of a critical nature: Christmas presents didn't arrive on time and eight Wacs had been killed in a plane crash.

Notwithstanding the problems in the theater, after action comments indicated success. General Douglas MacArthur, General Wilhelm Styer, Commanding General of the Army Forces in the Western Pacific, and General George C. Kenney, Commander of the Far East Air Forces, all agreed that Wacs had served well. There were also those who felt Wacs should not have been used in the SWPA--for example, the G-1 of the US Army Far East Forces indicated that "the hardships, isolation, and privation of jungle theaters were jobs for men." (Treadwell, 1953)
Women served in other areas in World War II--China, Burma, North Africa, etc., but, in effect, the results were the same. Women performed well. They presented some problems new to male commanders, but their generally outstanding performance justified their use.
ANNEX B

WAC PERSONNEL IN KOREA AND VIETNAM

Between 1947 and 1956 few WAC personnel served in Korea. A WAC Detachment had been requested in 1952 but the request was disapproved based upon a shortage of WAC personnel worldwide.

WAC personnel--officers and enlisted--served in Vietnam beginning in 1965. It is estimated that the total number of WAC personnel who served in the RVN War between 1965 and 1975 was 500. (Office of the Chief of Military History, 1976)

Department of the Army originally requested volunteers in the 71C MOS, stenographer, in the summer of 1965 in the grade of E-5 or above. By March 1966, ten officers, three warrant officers, and sixteen enlisted women were assigned there. Originally, the women were not assigned to a WAC Detachment; however, in April 1966, the USARPAC Commander in Chief requested a WAC Detachment be activated in Saigon. By December, the unit was staffed with WAC cadre. Later a second WAC Detachment was activated in Long Binh. In April 1967, women were serving in two MOS--71B and 71C in grades E-3--E-5. (Office Director WAC, 1966, 1967)

By June 1969, WAC personnel were serving with MACV Headquarters and US Army Headquarters Area Command (USAHAC) in Saigon and at USARV Headquarters in Long Binh. Approximately 160 were on station at that time. Throughout the Vietnam conflict only WAC volunteers were sent to these two locations. A policy change in May 1969 prohibited married women from being assigned to Vietnam. (Office Director WAC, 1969)

2-B-1
WAC personnel were used almost exclusively in the Saigon-Long Binh area. Enlisted women were throughout the period of their service in the RVN only assigned in clerical, administrative and secretarial duties.

Hostile fire pay was awarded WAC personnel in Vietnam. No casualties were incurred.
ANNEX C

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONGRESSIONAL VIEW OF WOMEN IN COMBAT

The United States Army has maintained in recent years that it is the will of Congress that women not be introduced into a direct combat role. This view is substantiated by a review of the legislative histories of the statutes establishing the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps and the Women's Army Corps. Three areas of legislation that were reviewed indicate that Congress did not intend that women were to be assigned to combatant positions.

The original bill to establish the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps--HR 6293--was discussed in detail by the House and Senate Military Affairs Committee in January and February 1942. Additionally, the Senate introduced a bill to establish the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps--S2240 --also resulted in hearings on all aspects of military service for women.

In both pieces of legislation establishing the WAAC it was explicit that women were to be in "...noncombatant service with the Army of the US." -(U.S. House of Representatives, 1942). Witnesses from the War Department unanimously supported the War Department position. Additionally, it is apparent that the majority of committee members wanted it clear that combat service was not envisioned.

Typical of testimony given before the House Committee was that of Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, Public Relations Director, War Department--later to become Colonel Hobby, first WAAC Director--"As you know in the terms of this bill, it is not contemplated to use these women
In combat service." -(U.S. House of Representatives, 1942)

In hearings before the Senate Committee on the House bill, testimony and discussion of the combat issue were even more intense. Senator Mon C. Wallgren first brought up the subject asking BG John H. Hilldring, ACofS G1, War Department, if women could be assigned to combat units. General Hilldring replied "No sir, they cannot be assigned to combat units nor to combat duty outside their units." - (U.S. Senate, 1942).

General Hilldring made an interesting point at this time relative to how the Army views its responsibilities to Congress. One could argue that his words are still true: "As you know when we get legislation from the Congress we confine ourselves not only to the language of the law or the opinion of the JAG but also to statements we make before the committees to Congress in passing the legislation. That is just as binding on us, in the execution of the law, as if it were written into the law." -(U.S. Senate, 1942). All statements to the members of Congress were that we would not allow women in combat.

Late in General Hilldring's testimony he indicated that it was not anticipated that there would be manpower shortages (to fill combat spaces) at least through 1943. He further states in response to whether women could be used in tactical units under certain circumstances that "we do not have to utilize women in any combatant units for some time to come." -(U.S. Senate, 1943). The situation in WW II, in fact, never reached the point that consideration was given to using women in combat, yet the possibility was not ruled out albeit remote.
In subsequent hearings on the Senate version of the bill, the following points were made:

--The Army was not short of men.

--The War Department did not advocate the use of women in combat duty.

--The WAAC would not serve in the Army but with the Army (in 1943 the Army reversed its position on this matter arguing that it had really always supported women in the Army; however, they supported the auxiliary status originally because they wanted a bill that would pass quickly and there was some opposition to regular status for women).

--Women could, legally, be assigned to any geographic area involuntarily.

--WAAC members would have the Geneva Convention entitlements regarding prisoners of war.

The House and Senate both passed bills which clearly stated the non-combatant status of the WAAC. The bill was signed into law as Public Law 554 on 15 May 1942.

The issue of women in combat did not surface in the Congress again until 1943 when the fallacies of having women serving with the Army instead of in it became apparent. Notwithstanding this, however, the WAAC had grown to over 31,000 women in less than a year and women were being assigned to foreign theaters.
A number of bills were introduced to make women a regular part of the Army in the spring of 1943. Women's morale had suffered by not being a bona fide part of the Army. There were also many practical problems—e.g., WAAC members were not eligible for GI insurance or veterans benefits.

Basically, all of the bills introduced were the same except Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers' bill removed the term "auxiliary" from WAAC. There were other variations in the various versions of the bill regarding how long the WAC would remain in existence but they all envisioned the WAC as a wartime activity.

Both the testimony of witnesses and the comments by members of Congress leave little doubt that even for the WAC combat was not intended. However, it is noteworthy that in the new legislation the word "noncombatant" was removed and no mention was given as to the "combat" or "noncombat" status of women. It is clear in the testimony that the problem was one of defining combat in such a way so as not to restrict the value of women.

Mr. Forest A. Harness, a committee member, quizzed Colonel Hobby, the WAC Director, on the subject. Colonel Hobby states that "It is not the intention to send women into the trenches... Obviously the law says that this is not a combat corps." (U.S. House of Representatives, 1943) Mr. Harness states "That is right and it was never the intent of Congress that the WAAC should be used as combat troops."
Brigadier General M. G. White, the ACofS, G-1, War Department, gave perhaps the most compelling explanation of why the Army opposed women in combat but still did not want to use the term "combat service" or "noncombat" in the legislation. Senator John J. Sparkman asked General White if the combat service exclusion was still in effect and if it would be repealed by the new act. General White replied "Yes sir" and went on to explain: (U.S. Senate, 1943; 30)

"However Mr. Sparkman, I hope you will trust the War Department when we state that we do not plan to arm these women and put them into battle. If you are attempting to define 'combat service' we have tried to do it. When we wrote the report on this bill, we tried to work out some definition that would be satisfactorily clear as to what was intended and we finally gave up on it and said, 'Let us get the bill as it is and ask Congress to trust us.' When we sent WAAC's to North Africa, there was a little question in the minds of a great many people in the War Department whether that was prohibited by law. I am still not sure whether or not it is. We decided that Army Headquarters or Allied Forces Headquarters back at Algiers, and duty there in an administrative capacity or in communications was not combat service.

"I think you will agree with us. We have observed what the British have done with their ATS. They have used the ATS in their antiaircraft artillery around London. They do not fire or load guns. They
do not man machine guns. They do man the instruments—the height finders and direction finders. They do a lot right there in the battery position. Whether or not that is combat service, I do not know. I guess you could so construe it.

"We have experimented to be perfectly frank with you right here in the District of Columbia. We took a Coast Artillery battery off of position and placed it somewhere else and put some WAAC's on it to see how they would get along with the instruments. They did a lot better than men. They learned faster and did a much better job of it. We were simply experimenting from a training standpoint to see what the possibilities were. Whether or not that would be classified as combat service, I do not know. It is hard to draw lines as to what is combat service. But we have no intention of sending them up to the front lines."

Finally, the legislative history of S 1641, a bill to establish the Women's Army Corps in the Regular Army in 1948 was reviewed. Although little mention was made of the nature of duties intended for the WAC—combat versus noncombat—it seems likely that because the nature of the bill was merely to give the WAC permanence in the Army, earlier understandings and limitations regarding the exclusion from combat were understood and accepted. (U.S. Senate & House of Representatives, 1947) Additionally, in committee the skills in which a woman could be employed were displayed. None of these involved combat duties. Moreover, this legislation did establish the restriction on women serving aboard combat vessels and aircraft in the Navy and Air Force.
DEFINITION OF COMBAT

 Perhaps the greatest complication involved in discussing a woman's role in the Army in view of the historical tendency to preclude or to limit their military role is defining what the term "combat" entails. While most—if not all—nations restrict women from direct combat, few have defined exactly what they mean by the term in order that there can be a common understanding.

 In the expansion of the Women's Army Corps in the 1970's, a definition can be implied based upon those areas in which a WAC's participation is excluded yet there is no explicit definition. She cannot be in a combat arm or MOS or assigned to a Category I unit, a unit which inflicts casualties to the enemy force. She can, though, be assigned to a combat zone and she is expected to be qualified to defend herself and her unit.

 Thus it is necessary to distinguish between "combat" and a "combat zone." Being in a combat zone does not necessarily imply taking a direct part in offensive operations but it certainly subjects the individual in a wartime situation to the dangers of combat activities. While the question of the "safety" of the woman soldier may still arise, the US Army is at a point where the question is moot. Women are assigned to numerous units which would undoubtedly be in combat zones in wartime.

 Few casualties were inflicted on Army women in World War II because
in most cases their assignment density was light, they were normally outside the range of enemy weapons, and air superiority was usually in favor of the U.S. In a future war it is quite likely that because of new utilization and assignment patterns and the range of missiles and free-over-the-ground rockets, the depth to which casualties would be experienced has been greatly increased. In view of this fact and Army policies, women would probably become casualties at the same rate as men who are assigned to Category II and III units.

The Army restricts women from Category I units which, in effect, precludes their use in offensive combat operations. It is ironic because while an exception rather than rule, some "combat" units may, in fact, be farther to the rear than units in which women are eligible to serve, e.g., Pershing missile units. This is undoubtedly the case with some Air Defense units as well. In essence, the Army's combat exclusion precludes women from positions where they could intentionally inflict casualties on an enemy force except while defending themselves or their unit.
ANNEX E

ARMY WOMEN IN NATO COUNTRIES

General

Two facts are clear with respect to the utilization of women in the armies of the NATO countries. Women are not used in an active direct combat role nor do there appear to be plans for them to be used in such a role. Also, it is plain that the US Army has gone much further than our allies in equalizing opportunities for Army women. An article recently appearing in the British magazine The Economist conceded this point (The Economist, 1976). The author stated "Of the five countries described in this article"..." only the United States seems to be moving toward equality. The others have no plans to do so; indeed, have plans not to."

At the NATO Conference of Senior Service Women Officers of the Alliance held in Brussels in November 1972, the issue of women in a combat role was discussed at length. There had been concern expressed because it seemed that women's exclusion from a combat role was a breach of the NATO articles on the "Convention on the Political Rights of Women." Article III states that "Women shall be entitled to hold public office and to exercise all public functions, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination." A discussion of this topic headed by the Netherlands representative centered on the fact that Western society does not accept the idea that women should perform combatant duties. At the conclusion of discussion--and the convention--28 representatives of women's services of the NATO countries adopted the following resolution:
Resolution 3. They agree that women should have the opportunity to serve in all job specialties. However, women should not be utilized in a combat role unless the national situation requires it. (NATO Conference of Senior Service Women Officers of the Alliance, 1973)

Of the NATO Countries, nine utilize women in their armies—Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, and Belgium. The Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal have none or few women in their armies. (Greece does have women in the nursing profession and the Federal Republic of Germany has recently commissioned five female doctors.)

Information regarding the use of women in the Armies of Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, Turkey, and Belgium was drawn from the NATO Conference of Senior Women's Services held in Brussels in 1973 and London in 1975.
ANNEX F

BRITISH WOMEN IN WORLD WAR II

History

Although British women had been used in World War I in a limited range of duties, it was considered unnecessary to have women in the small peacetime Army which existed between the world wars. However, in 1936 a small organization, the Emergency Services, was formed with the recognition of the War Office and the Air Council. This organization, much like the United States Women's Army Corps until 1973, had a mission of providing a nucleus around which a force could be shaped in the event of a national emergency.

As the situation worsened in 1937 and 1938, it became clear that an officially constituted service for women was necessary, thus in 1938 the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) was formed by Royal warrant.

Prior to this date two other organizations existed which included women in a military role. The Women's Transport Service, which was formed in 1909 under the name of the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY), was originally involved in medical transport work; however, by 1916 the unit was involved in all types of transport duty. The FANY continued after the formation of the ATS, serving in a variety of roles to include intelligence related duties (Douie, 1950). The second organization, The Women's Legion ran canteens in England.
Early Organization of ATS

Originally the ATS was under the jurisdiction of the County Territorial and Air Force Associations; however, this organization was short-lived.

During 1939, Naval and Air Force functions for women were withdrawn from the ATS with the formation of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) (June 1939) and the Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS) (April 1939). Further, in April 1941 the announcement was made that the Government had decided to grant the ATS and the WAAF full military service. From that date, the members of the ATS had the status of members of the Armed Forces of the Crown. With this new status members of the ATS were subject to military discipline (Douie, 1950).

In pay matters, women in the ATS received two-thirds the pay of men rank for rank, and skill for skill.

Selective Service

In December 1941, the National Service Act No. 2 made women subject to conscription; however, one significant difference existed between men and women vis-a-vis conscription: no woman called up for service could be required to use -- or touch -- any lethal weapon without her written consent. The first women conscripts for the ATS (age 20-21) were called up in March 1942. During the three-year period in which conscription was used, 74,000 women were inducted into the Army (Douie, 1950; Birdwell, 1942).
Strength

At the beginning of the war, the ATS was authorized a strength of 25,000 to include 2,000 officers; however, these strength figures burgeoned quickly. In December 1943, for example, there were 212,000 women serving in the Army's ATS (Wadge, 1946).

Duties

Women serving in the Armed Forces released men for other duties -- combat -- almost on a one-for-one basis. Originally only five skills were open for women's participation but this list grew to over 80 skills in a short time.

Duties performed by ATS personnel were noncombatant, and fell into three main categories: motor drivers; clerks; and general duties, which included cooks, orderlies and storewomen. The age limit was 18 to 43 and raised to 50 for veterans of World War I (Cox, 1941).

In 1942, the distribution of job assignments of new recruits was roughly as follows: (Douie, 1950)

- 50% -- Anti-aircraft Artillery Batteries
- 17% -- Drivers
- 10% -- Switchboard and Teletype Operators
- 9% -- Cooks
- 9% -- Domestic Workers
- 5% -- Clerks

Later, their representation in maintenance and repair work increased further. By 1943, 80% of Army driving was done by women. They formed 30% of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, and 60% of the Army Post Office.
At the end of the year, 30,000 women were in finance duties, there were
15,000 drivers, 9,000 in ordnance depots, 7,000 in communications, and
4,000 cooks. One-third of all ATS women — or over 60,000 — were
serving on anti-aircraft artillery gun sites, and large numbers were
engaged as mechanics of various sorts. ATS women took over the operation
of almost all of the searchlight units in the "Home Establishment."

By the end of 1944, the list of jobs performed by women in the ATS
included: armorers, bricklayers, chiropodists, dental technicians,
electrical engineers, gunsmiths, and hairdressers. There were literally
no skills short of combat denied them. The work most closely related to
combat was that of ATS women in anti-aircraft artillery batteries (Cox,
1941; Douie, 1950).

The first "mixed" battery started training in the spring of 1941. Though
forming one team, the duties of the men and women were different. The
women worked as range-finders on precision instruments, and on the
telephones by which this work was checked and controlled. But it was
the men who fired the guns. Men and women got along remarkably well.
The women were quickly regarded as being part of the team. A mixed
battery consisted of 189 men and 229 women including officers.
Originally, female officers only had responsibility for administration
and welfare. However, early in 1943, the first women technical control
officers were used to replace male operational officers on gun sites in
the home command. These women coordinated the attack on enemy aircraft
in coordination with the gun position officers, who gave the order to fire based on information from the technical control officer (Douie, 1950; Cox, 1941; Birdwell, 1942).

Up to the end of 1944, one out of every thirty members of the ATS served abroad. Developments in the war situation then brought about a great extension of their services in overseas theaters. No units of the ATS were sent to Burma (US Wacs served there) or West Africa, and only volunteers went to India or served abroad in mixed anti-aircraft artillery units. The tour of duty was two years, except in India, Ceylon and Washington, where it was 18 months. The women performed much the same duties abroad as they performed in Britain.

Summary

The United Kingdom made extensive use of women in World War II in numerous regular, auxiliary, and voluntary organizations. None of the services used women in a direct combat role although their use as members of anti-aircraft artillery batteries was extensive. Of the 550,000 women who served in the Armed Forces in the United Kingdom in World War II, approximately 1,500 became casualties caused by enemy action (624 KIA, 98 MIA, 744 WIA, 20 POW) (Her Majesty's Statistical Office, 1946, 8-9).
WOMEN IN UNITED KINGDOM WOMEN'S ROYAL ARMY CORPS

General
The Women's Royal Army Corps (WRAC) is the follow-on to the ATS, the Women's Army Organization which served during World War II. There is little doubt that the role of women has changed considerably compared with the very diverse role in which women served during the war. Women comprise about 2.4% of the Army's strength and no major expansion is planned (The Economist, 1976). Women are limited to certain branches and skills, and to certain geographical locations, although there is considerable integration with the men in those areas where they serve. The WRAC is directed by a woman brigadier.

Recently, the United Kingdom passed the Sex Discrimination Act which is designed to further women's rights. Military women, however, are exempt from the provisions of the act.

Organization
In the Regular Army, WRAC companies are responsible for the command and administration of the WRAC personnel supporting military headquarters or units. Where members of the WRAC mainly support one military unit, the WRAC are integrated with that unit, and its headquarters contains a small WRAC element responsible for the administration and discipline of the women (NATO Conference of Senior Service Women Officers of the Alliance, 1973, 1975).
Training and Education

All regular WRAC recruits complete a basic training course of six weeks at the WRAC Center and then proceed to advanced individual training (AIT). Representative of AIT are the following:

Drivers - 8 weeks at 12 Driver Training Regiment RCT
Clerks - 4 weeks at Training Battalion RAOC
Signals - 12 weeks at Training Brigade Royal Signals

Training for increased proficiency in their MOS is organized by units on an "on the job" basis. On the job training may be followed by a short and intensive course at the appropriate training center, immediately prior to the MOS test.

Arms

The WRAC do not carry weapons and are not trained in their use. They are precluded from a combat role.

Non-commissioned Officer Training

Non-commissioned officer training is often arranged by units (particularly with respect to junior ranks), and generally takes the form of a week's special course. NCO's also attend courses at WRAC College, Camberley, to qualify for promotion.

Trades

Women are employed by 17 Arms and Corps in the Army, and in a number of headquarters and other military establishments. Career fields open to women include the following:
Administrative NCO
Analyst (Special Intelligence)
Bandswoman
Clerk
Communications Center Operator
Cook
Data Telegraphist
Driver
Experimental Assistant (Gunnery)
Hairdresser
Kennelmaid
Operator Electronic Warfare
Medical Orderly
Stewardess - Mess
House
Personal

Provost
Personnel Selection Tester
Physical Training Instructor
Postal and Courier Operator
Radar Operator
Recruiter
Regimental Policewoman
Regimental Storewoman
Rider/Groom
Switchboard Operator
Technical Storewoman
Telecommunications Technician
Training Instructor

Deployment

Approximately one quarter of the WRAC is serving overseas. Locations include:

Cyprus
Singapore
Hong Kong
Gibraltar
Germany

At home, the WRAC serves throughout the UK and Northern Ireland.

Officer Training

Candidates selected by the Regular Commissions Board attend the WRAC College, Camberley, Surrey, for a period of training of 8 weeks (short course) or 8 months (long course), according to the age and qualifications of the individual and the type of commission desired.
Officer Courses

A number of Army courses open to male officers are also open to WRAC, for example:

The Army Staff Course
Specialist Signals, Education or Catering Courses to train an officer for employment with the Royal Corps of Signals, Royal Army Educational Corps or Army Catering Corps.

Language Courses
Computer Courses

Officer Training Corps

Women undergraduates at British universities may join the University Officer Training Corps. On obtaining the Certificate of Military Training at the University, these undergraduates become eligible for a direct commission in the WRAC. Most WRAC officers are commissioned for general duties and start their careers in regimental appointments in which they are responsible for the administration and welfare of between 30 and 60 women. Apart from regimental duty predominately administering WRAC personnel, the following types of employment are open to WRAC officers:

Photographic Interpreter
Computer Programmer
Specialist Messing Officer
Recruiting
Personnel Selection
Signals

Suitably qualified officers may attend language courses and qualify as:

Instructors
Interpreters

2-G-4
Officers with appropriate qualifications may be commissioned for duty with the Royal Army Educational Corps or the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. These officers are then employed exclusively by those corps.
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

Service Obligation

The vast majority of servicewomen, like soldiers, enlist on what is known as "the Notice Engagement," which was introduced in 1972. On this engagement, one joins for 22 years (the minimum period for pension) but may terminate one's service at any time provided that:

1. 18 months notice is given.
2. A minimum of 3 years service is completed.

Under previous sorts of engagement, the woman signed on for a specific length of time and was automatically discharged at the end of that time, unless she had taken steps to extend her service. Under the Notice Engagement, the woman automatically continues to serve unless she takes steps to give notice that she wishes to leave. She may choose the date on which to leave, but she must give the required period of notice.

A woman who wishes to leave on marriage or family grounds need not give the full 18 months notice, but must give at least one month. An increasing number of servicewomen are continuing to serve after they are married.

Equal Pay

In 1960, women's rates of pay were approximately 85% of the men's rates. Currently, they receive equal pay. All factors considered, however, their pay is lower than men's because women get only half as big an
"X-factor," which is supposed to compensate for the rigors of military service (The Economist, 1976). Other entitlements are also different. For example, married women are ineligible for the allowances of a married person (this difference was struck down in the United States by a Supreme Court decision).
ANNEX II

WOMEN IN THE ULSTER DEFENSE REGIMENT

General

In April 1970, the Ulster Defense Regiment, a regiment of the British Army, was formed under the command of the Commanding General, Northern Ireland. As terrorism increased with the realization that women were also involved in terrorist activities, it was decided to recruit 715 women to serve in the regiment. Twenty-two of this total are full-time members; the remainder are part-time members.

Women's participation in this regiment is noteworthy because it represents the first time that women have been recruited directly into a British regiment rather than drawn from a separate corps (WRAC). This experiment has been very successful and could well impact on the continuation of separate structures for the women's services. Women in the regiment are equal in most details with the exception that they are not armed.

However, the women do operate in a dangerous environment exposed to terrorist attacks. Female members of the unit have been wounded and killed in carrying out their missions. While not in a direct combat role, they could be exposed to the risks of direct combat.

Duties

The women of the Ulster Defense Regiment are called "Green Finches" because of their high-pitched voices on the radio and are used in the
following duties:

a. Searching females.
b. Accompanying night patrols.
c. Maintaining check point statistics.
d. Operating radios.
e. Working in operations rooms.

Each woman performs duty on the average of two nights a week from 2000-0400 hours. The majority of the duties involve operations at vehicle check points. But also, they participate in border patrol operations serving as searchers, radio operators and clerks. They do not carry arms in performing their duties (The Economist, 1976).

Training

Formal training began in September 1973 when the women were attached to the Ulster Defense Regiment battalions and instructed in search techniques, radio procedures, and clerical and administrative duties. A training team from the Women's Royal Army Corps assisted in training the women in basic military skills.

Present training is reported to be in such skills as radio procedures, map reading, first aid, and anti-ambush. Women attend training camps where they take part in most of the male training to include map reading exercises, helicopter drills, and driver training.

Women do not receive the same pay as men. An article concerning the Ulster Defense Regiment explains that their pay is decreased by that
proportionate amount customarily deducted from servicewomen. This amount probably relates to the X-factor which is less for British women than for men.

Terms of service are from one to three years for women between 18 and 50.

**Officers**

Recruits can receive a recommendation for a commission to attend an officer commissioning course. To date, 13 women have received commissions (2LT to Captain).
ANNEX I

WOMEN IN THE CANADIAN FORCES
(Director, Women Personnel, Canadian Forces, 1976)

Organization
In 1961, the Royal Canadian Air Force, Navy and Army were united into one unified Canadian Armed Force with personnel serving in the sea, land, or air element. This unification included the women. No longer is there a separate Canadian Women's Army Corps.

Employment of Servicewomen Since 1971
In 1971, the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada produced recommendations concerning women in the military which have had a marked effect on the status of the military women. At a meeting of the Canadian Forces Defense Council in July 1971, the Minister of National Defense approved "that there was to be no limitation on the employment of women in the Canadian Forces other than within the primary combat roles, employment at remote locations and sea-going service."

As of 31 January 1976, there were 80,000 personnel in the Canadian Forces, and of this number, 3,384 are women (over 4% of the present total force). The female officer strength is 673, the majority of which are nurses. About 2,700 non-commissioned women range in rank from Private to Master Warrant Officer. Each classification and trade must include a minimum number of men because of the exclusion of women from the combat roles; however, for all trades open to women, recruiting is carried out on the basis of the best applicant for the job regardless of sex.
Women officers may now be employed in 18 of the 27 officer classifications, as listed below:

Aerospace Engineering
Communications and Electronics Engineering
Land Ordnance Engineering
Military Engineering
Dental
Medical
Medical Associate
Nursing
Chaplain

Air Traffic Control
Air Weapons Control
Legal
Logistics
Meteorology
Music
Personnel Development
Personnel Support – Food Services, Recreation, Personnel Administration, Postal, Personnel Information Security

Non-commissioned servicewomen may serve in 62 of the 98 specialities. These are listed below:

Photographic Technician
Air Traffic Controller
Air Traffic Control Assistant
Air Defense Technician
Oceanographic Operator
Radio Operator
Teletype Operator
Communications Operator
Radio Technician
Terminal Equipment Technician
Teletype & Cypher Technician
Communications Technician
Radar Technician
Vehicle Technician
Weapons Technician Land
Ammunition Technician
Electro-Mechanical Technician
Aero Engine Technician
Air Frame Technician
Aviation Technician
Integral Systems Technician
Communications Systems Technician
Radar Systems Technician
Avionics Technician

Construction & Maintenance Technician
Refrigeration & Mechanical Technician
Electrical Generating Systems Technician
Stationary Engineer
Water Sanitation & Pollution Technician
Mechanical Systems Technician
Firefighter
Medical Assistant
Operating Room Assistant
Laboratory Technician
X-ray Technician
Hygiene Technician
Biosciences Technician
Dental Clinical Assistant
Dental Laboratory Technician
Dental Equipment Maintenance Technician
Dental Therapist
Military Policeman
Administrative Clerk
Safety Systems Technician  
Instrument Electrical Technician  
Metals Technician  
Machinist  
Refrigeration Technician  
Weapons Technician (Air)  
Construction Engineering Technician  
Structures Technician  
Plumber Gas Fitter  
Electrician  
Accounting & Finance Clerk  
Physical Education & Recreation Instructor  
Cook  
Steward  
Musician  
Postal Clerk  
Supply Technician  
Traffic Technician  
Transportation Controller  
Mobile Support Equipment Operator

Enlistment Standards

In line with the Royal Commission recommendation on discrimination, a woman must possess the same minimum qualifications as a male applicant:

Between the ages of 17 and 25, a minimum of a Grade 8 education (however, the average education of women recruits is Grade 11 or 3 years of secondary school), meet the medical standards and pass prescribed selection tests. To enter as a commissioned officer, a woman must have a university degree or be a Registered Nurse, and must not have reached her 35th birthday. She must also be medically fit and pass selection tests.

Basic Training

After enlistment, the English speaking servicewoman first reports to the Canadian Forces Recruit School at Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. French speaking recruits proceed to St. Jean, Quebec, for recruit training in their own language followed by English language training as required. The recruit undergoes 11 weeks of basic training. A servicewoman's basic recruit training includes lectures and study in military law,
customs, history and organization, general service knowledge, health and hygiene, physical education, and drilling and marching. Women recruits now receive defensive weapons training and some field training. Women officers, except Nursing Officers, get their basic officer training at Chilliwack, British Columbia. Their curriculum covers much the same topics as for the servicewoman with more emphasis on leadership and management.

Classification/Trade Training
At the end of the 11 weeks basic training, the servicewoman goes on to her classification (officers) and specialty (other ranks) training. This training is slanted more toward the practical than the theoretical approach and is integrated with male classification/specialty training.

University Training
Women may now attend a university at government expense to qualify themselves for professional duties within the forces. Women (approximately 130) attend universities in a number of training programs.

Officer Development Training
Women officers attend Canadian Forces Staff School and Canadian Forces Staff College courses on an integrated basis. They are selected for the training on the same basis as are male officers.
Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Development Training

Senior women NCO's attend the Senior Leadership Training and Chief Warrant Officers Course on an integrated basis. They are selected for the training on the same basis as are senior male NCO's. Junior Leadership Courses have commenced in the Canadian Forces and women are being selected to attend in competition with the men.

Marital Status and Pregnancy

In 1971, a new policy concerning marital status came into effect. Up to that time a woman had to be single in order to be eligible for enlistment and a woman who married while serving had to request permission to remain in the Canadian Forces. Married women, with or without children, may now be enlisted, and serving women who marry are not released unless they voluntarily apply for it.

In addition, the Canadian Forces have reacted to the Royal Commission and the Federal Labor Laws and have instituted maternity benefits for the serving woman. Pregnancy doesn't necessarily mean a release from the Canadian Forces as it has in the past. A woman must accept up to 15 weeks leave without pay, while she has her child, but she receives full medical coverage and unemployment insurance benefits during this period.
Terms of Service

Terms of service are exactly the same for men and women. Officers join for a career tour, that is, theoretically until they retire. Other ranks join for an initial 5-year engagement, then sign on for the remainder of the service until retirement. Release is available on request.

Discipline

Women in the Canadian Forces are subject to the same military disciplinary code and regulations as men.

Pay

Women receive equal pay for equal responsibilities, and are entitled to pension or gratuities when released on the same basis as the men.
ANNEX J

WOMEN IN THE FRENCH ARMY
(NATO Women's Service Directors Conference, 1973, 1975)

An Act passed in July 1972 on the general status of the French Armed Forces integrated women with the same status as men. There was considerable use of women during World War II in much the same capacity as the U.S. WAC. However, their special status in certain areas was made clear in a decree of March 1973. Differences which are recognized are:

a. Women cannot rise higher than brigadier (0-7). The first woman was appointed to this rank in April 1976.

b. Women are not admitted to certain corps, e.g., Air Corps.

c. Branches open to them are confined to office work, communications, data processing, air traffic control, and medical.

d. Military schools, e.g., Military Academy is not open to women.

e. Age limit differences between men and women on active duty.

Detailed data on many aspects of women's services was lacking.

Conditions of Service

Women are not subject to the compulsory one-year military service which applies to men. In this regard they are not eligible to receive a "bounty" for voluntary enlistment.

Pay and Allowances

Pay is the same for men and women. Married officers and NCO's, if they are the head of the family, have the same entitlements as men.
Discipline

Women are subject to the same disciplinary code as men. They are not permitted to perform guard duty or "local garrison duties" although they may serve as duty officers.

Terms of Service

Since 1972, a program has existed for a voluntary service of one year. It is reported that there are few volunteers. Women NCO's serve under contract for 5 years and then are allowed to revert to career status. Officers can serve until they reach their age limit or a minimum of 25 years before eligible for retirement.
ANNEX K

WOMEN IN THE BELGIAN ARMY
(NATO Women's Service Directors Conference, 1975)

Women are new to Belgium's Army. As of 1975, there were only about 400 enlisted women serving in the Army in a limited number of skills. Women receive the same training as men -- 2 months of basic training and 1-3 months advanced individual training. Their weapons training with individual weapons is for defense only.

At the present there are no female officers or NCO's, although in November 1975, it was estimated that there would be a parliamentary bill introduced to allow officers and NCO's by July 1976.
ANNEX L

WOMEN IN THE TURKISH ARMY

There is a scarcity of information relating to women in the Turkish Armed Forces and available information shows that there are 100 female officers serving in the Turkish Armed Forces. No enlisted women serve in the Turkish Army.

Officers are used in communications, ordnance, supply, "welfare," and medical branches at the headquarters level. There is one female officer who is a fighter pilot although women are no longer trained in aviation.
WOMEN IN THE DANISH ARMY

Approximately 6,500 women serve in the Danish Women's Army Corps, the largest of the women's services in Denmark. The Women's Army Corps exists as a separate Corps within the Home Guard (a national guard type organization) and their personnel are placed at the disposal of the Armed Services.

Organization

The Danish Women's Army Corps is organized into military units throughout the country. The Director of the WAC is a member of the Joint Command of the Home Guard with the title of "inspector." At lower echelons of the Home Guard, the WAC units are led by female officers with small staffs. Most women in the Danish Women's Services are not full-time active duty personnel. The strength of the "full-time employed personnel" depends on Army requirements. Only in the event of war do all the members of the WAC serve as military personnel with the same obligations and rights as male personnel.

Women are recruited by the Women's Services supported by the Army and the Home Guard.

Training

Training is a joint responsibility between the Armed Services, the Home Guard and the Women's Services. Members receive basic training followed by advanced training in one of the skill areas open to them. Basic
training and the training of NCO's and officers is the responsibility of the WAC Director and conducted by members of the WAC. Some officers (few) have attended officers' courses with male personnel.

Recruits receive theory and practice in the use of arms during basic training. As in the case of US Army women, this training is provided to train them in the use of arms in case of an emergency.

Skills
The primary skill areas open to women are traditional in nature and do not include combat specialties. They include:

- Secretarial
- Accounting
- Supply
- Air Traffic Control
- Communications
- Logistics
- Nuclear, Biological & Chemical
- Transportation
- Nursing
- Catering

Conditions of Service
Women enter as privates and are required to:

a. Be between 18-35 (18-50 for mobilization reserve).
b. Physically fit.
c. Pass a psychological aptitude test.
d. Be a Danish citizen.

Married and unmarried women are accepted with or without dependents.

Since 1959, there has existed a special arrangement whereby the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Defense provide for the care of children of women serving with the Armed Services and the Home Guard in...
the event of mobilization.

Regular Service

Only since 1971, have women been admitted as regular members of the Army on the same conditions as those affecting male personnel. In 1973, only 105 women were regular members -- as opposed to Home Guard -- of the Army. These women have received the same training -- to include combat training -- as male personnel. In this category, basic training is of three months duration and advanced training is 12 months. Women serve in "control and reporting," communications, administration, and supply.

Perhaps changes will be forthcoming which affect the women's services. From comments in 1973, it was noted that the Danish Women's Services are facing many problems. At this time, it was felt advisable to continue a separation between women in the active forces and women in the Home Guard. In 1975, it was reported that a committee was set up by the Ministry of Defense to discuss women's service and changes were projected for the 1977 time frame.
ANNEX N

WOMEN IN THE NORWEGIAN ARMY

In peacetime women are not considered members of the Armed Services. Rather, they serve as civilians or as voluntary reserves who do part-time service. The woman, however, has an option as to whether she will serve in the event of a mobilization. Those that agree to serve during mobilization receive uniforms which they are allowed to wear during exercises, training courses and for ceremonial purposes. When wearing the uniform the woman has full military status.

Organization

Women serve as volunteers and are not subject to conscription. Service is with the Army or the Home Guard. In the latter there is a Director of Women's Services.

Training

Basic training is compulsory for those women who volunteer for mobilization. Training is conducted by the service concerned or the Home Guard commissioned officer and NCO's receive a four-week training course with periodic one-week refresher courses. Men command training courses with some women as second-in-command.

Basic training is separate from male BT and weapons training is provided.

Future Outlook

A Gallop Poll conducted in October 1975 in Norway, may portend some
changes for the future. Seventy percent of the Norwegians polled agreed with women as military personnel in the Armed Services and fifty-three percent believed women should be conscripted.

A bill currently before parliament would make a number of basic changes in women's service:

-- Nearly full integration of women in the Armed Forces.
-- Limit women's service to a non-combat role with organizational and job exclusions.
-- Continue voluntary service.

The current organization of civilian volunteers would continue under the control of the Home Guard with women serving in their local communities. This service would continue as one for which there is no obligation to serve during periods of mobilization.

Other changes which may occur as a result of the bill under consideration are:

-- Women serve as volunteers in peace and war.
-- Women will cause no increase in TOE authorizations.
-- Equal rank and pay provisions.
-- Equal obligation and promotion.
-- Special provisions for pregnant regular officers. Women in the "short-time" category will in all likelihood not be retained on active duty if pregnant.
-- Provisions for separate treatment and evaluation of female personnel because of different training requirements.

-- Selective conscription if voluntary service fails.

-- Equal education and integrated training. Women excluded from Artillery, Cavalry, Armor and Air Branches.

-- AIT conducted with men.

-- Weapons training provided in order that women be capable of participating in defense.

-- Women who receive military training in peacetime will be obliged to serve in wartime.

-- Numerical requirements:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peacetime:</th>
<th>3,500 Officers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,200 EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime:</td>
<td>20,000 Officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60,000 EW</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX O

WOMEN IN THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE (IDF)

General
That Israeli women are combat soldiers is a misconception on the part of many elements of American society. Notwithstanding the ban on women in a direct combat role (women did serve in combat positions in the 1948 war), women are an important -- and necessary part of the IDF serving in the Chen (Charm). Looking at Israel, however, one cannot ignore a fact which does not apply to any of the other nations which this study considered. The Israeli Armed Forces suffer manpower shortages at a time when they are involved in a conflict with many of their neighbors. Understanding this, the necessity for certain Israeli policies regarding women soldiers becomes clear.

Israel, regardless of perception, conscripts and utilizes women to offset manpower shortages. Feminist groups have little impact in Israel, where policies are designed to ensure national survival. Restrictive policies toward women are not a reflection of physical or emotional inferiority, but rather, in the Israeli eyes, a pragmatic necessity brought on by marriage and childbearing realities.

Service Obligation
Israeli women, as in the case of Israeli men, are subject to conscription and they may serve in the regular as well as the reserve service. Women do receive some differential treatment with respect to conscription
not afforded male soldiers (Dickerson, 1974). The length of regular service for men is 36 months, whereas, it is 24 months for women. The age requirement for men and women, regular and reserve service is as depicted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>18-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>18-26</td>
<td>18-38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marriage and pregnancy are not automatic disqualification for regular service, although women may be discharged by virtue of marriage if hardship is shown and they may be discharged for reason of pregnancy upon request. Additionally, exemption from military service exists for women for reasons of conscience or religious convictions.

**Training**

Women are generally assigned into skills where little or no specialized training is required. Basic training is four weeks in length after which most women report to their units to begin work (Dickerson, 1974). It is generally expected that the woman will learn her specific duties on the job.

The philosophy behind less extensive training for women than men is highly pragmatic. In the IDF view it is uneconomical to provide extensive, expensive training to conscripts who have relatively short terms of service and who are likely to be lost because of marriage or
motherhood. Women who go beyond compulsory service to the regular service also are not afforded extensive training (Dickerson, 1974).

Women are provided weapons training during basic training to provide them a self-defense and guard duty capability.

Utilization
Women may serve in approximately 80 skill areas -- most of which in conventional terms would be designated "traditional." Most women are involved in clerical, administrative, communications, and medical duties. Beyond this, they serve in some nontraditional roles such as parachute packing and gate guards (serve with men) (Dickerson, 1974).

In roles which transcend purely military duties women may augment the civil police, serve in kibbutzim, the Fighting Pioneer Youth, or as teachers in various schools.

Female officers serve as commanders of female units and have administrative and service duties.

Assignment Policies
Israeli women, contrasted with WAC personnel, may be assigned to combat units in groups of seven or more commanded by an Israeli female officer. Women are assigned to brigade level and the commander has the prerogative to assign them to lower echelons. Assignment to combat units is voluntary, although most women rarely refuse duty with such units.
Women are temporarily withdrawn from combat units moving to contact "until the situation is stabilized." Units subjected to frequent indirect fire and shelling also temporarily evacuate a portion of the assigned women; nurses and signal specialists remain with the unit.

According to the Director of the Chen, evacuation policies are not an admission of a higher premium on the woman's life than that of the man's. It is rather a policy to save as many lives as possible. It is reported that women serving in combat units have no higher incidence of "emotional reaction" than men.

Strength

Strength figures are classified and unavailable.
ANNEX P

WOMEN IN THE WARSAW PACT ARMIES

Information regarding the employment and utilization of women in Warsaw Pact Armies is scant, nevertheless, women are generally used in roles which we consider traditional. Comparing the status and role of women in the US Army versus women in Warsaw Pact Armies, there is little doubt that in all areas -- from numerical strength to utilization concepts -- the US Army is more concerned with concepts of equal opportunity.

From the data available, it appears that women are used to give some modicum of truth to the premise that individuals, regardless of sex, enjoy equal status in the Communist states -- depending on the state, nothing could be further from the truth. They are used in much the same manner as in West European nations. Women are generally used in small numbers in tasks and for duties which release men for service in other skill areas.

Notwithstanding, the varied role of women in the Soviet Army in World War II, and in partisan activities such as in Yugoslavia, no evidence suggests that contemporary thought views women as direct combatants. Service in a combat role would no doubt be linked to the degree of national emergency; however, as in the case of the conscious exclusion of British women in World War II from a combat role at a time when British people's survival was at stake, this decision is not made lightly. In spite of differing political ideologies between the East and West, there
is still commonality in the status of women and their employment in relatively small numbers and limited roles in most of the Armies considered in this review.

One sees exceptions to generalities and such is the case with Warsaw Pact Armies. For example, even though women's service is quite limited in the Bulgarian Army, there is reportedly a female general officer.
During World War II, women were an important part of the Soviet Armed Forces reaching a strength of about one million of a total military strength of 12 million. Although women were used in combat and combat related assignments, their most important contribution was that of releasing men from the rear services for participation at the front. Based on Soviet accounts, women were allowed to bear arms because of their determination to play an active role in the defense of motherland.

Combat Utilization

Three women's aviation regiments were formed in the fall of 1941. These regiments were:

a. 125th Bomber Regiment which served at the battles of Stalingrad, Byelorussia, the Baltic and East Prussia.

b. 586th Air Defense Fighter Interceptor Regiment which supported units from the Volga River to Vienna.

c. 588th Bomber Regiment which served from the Kuban Region to Berlin. Other combat aviation units had women assigned, but the above were those solely "manned" by female personnel.

Soviet women also served with combat units in tank crews and machine gun detachments and as snipers. Numbers or units of assignments were not available.
The Central Committee of the Komsomol established a Sniper School for women in 1942 and reportedly trained some 1,300 women in this role. Individuals were cited with as many as 300 "kills." Female snipers on the Byelorussian Front reportedly killed an entire Germany Company in a one-month period and were credited with killing a total of 5,000 German soldiers.

It is known that some of the more skilled snipers served as instructors in sniper schools.
ANNEX R

WOMEN IN THE SOVIET ARMY - CURRENT
(DIA, 1976)

In conjunction with International Women's Year, an article in Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) stated, "Socialism has basically changed the status of women in society and secured her equality or rights in all spheres of political and social life." One certainly would not sense this from women's status in the Soviet Army for in actuality chauvinism runs rampant.

General

In spite of claims to the contrary, women in the Soviet Union are not afforded equal status with Soviet men. This is not only true within civilian life, but also within the military. Women generally serve in medical, administrative, and communications skills in what is for all practical purposes an auxiliary status. They are definitely not integrated into the Army on the same basis as men.

Legal Status

The Soviet Union utilizes a universal military service system as defined in a 1967 law. All males are required to serve; however, women enjoy a special status.

"Women 19 to 40 years of age who have medical or specialized training can be taken into military service in peacetime, recruited for refresher training periods or admitted as volunteers for active duty. In wartime
women can be drafted into the USSR Armed Forces by decision of the USSR
Council of Ministers to perform auxiliary or specialized service."

Selection Qualifications

a. Unmarried and without children.

b. Age 19-25.

c. Physically fit.

d. Minimum of 8 years of education.

Preference in selection is given to those women possessing a usable skill.
Women are selected in numbers and skills specified by the military dis-
trict headquarters. Additionally, they receive duty assignments from
these headquarters and receive training at their duty stations. If an
individual has a special civilian skill, she is assigned directly to
duties without training.

Women, as opposed to men, enter as regular personnel and enjoy many more
living comforts and a higher status than male conscripts. They receive
salaries competitive with those paid in the civilian sector and are
given 30 to 45 days leave each year. Their terms of service are for two
years. Subsequent to completion of the first tour women may reenlist or
revert to a reserve status.

Enlisted women are promoted under the same procedures as male regular
service personnel. However, the number and levels of assignment for
women are limited in comparison to what is available for men. For advancement, this distribution is important because positions determine rank and pay.

**Discipline**

Servicewomen are not subject to certain punishment such as restrictions to the unit areas, assignment to extra details or arrest and confinement. Also, they are not assigned to disciplinary battalions. According to the Code of Disciplinary Punishment of the USSR Armed Forces, women may be disciplined in the following manner:

a. Admonition
b. Reprimand
c. Deprivation of the "expert" insignia.
d. Reduction in military rank.
e. Reduction in military rank and transfer to a lower level assignment.

**Assignment Restrictions**

a. Women are not allowed to attend military schools and academies in order to become officers (This is the primary source of commissions for men).
b. Women are not assigned to guard duties except for internal details in women's barracks.
c. Women cannot serve aboard combat vessels or planes.
d. Women cannot serve in certain military specialties (probably
combat and combat related).

e. Pregnant women are involuntarily released from active duty.

Training

Little information is available reflecting specific training policies for women although it does appear that training, in many instances, is conducted at the unit level. Also, if the individual has a useable skill, the individual steps directly into a unit. Additionally, an order from the Minister of Defense stipulates that classes in political, combat, and physical training and in the study of Armed Forces regulations are arranged and conducted separately for women service personnel.

Housing

Women service personnel are quartered in a separate "dormitory area" specially set aside for them or in a barracks. Based on the duties performed by female service personnel, unit commanders may allow women to live off post. Quarters allowance is not paid if they choose to live off post.

Utilization

Little detailed information is available regarding specific patterns of utilization, although it is reported that women serve in an auxiliary role, primarily in medical, administrative, communications, and other support roles.
ANNEX S

WOMEN IN THE EAST GERMAN (GDR) ARMY

General

Women serve in the East German Army in accordance with the Defense Obligation Law written in 1962. While the numerical strength of the women's contingent is unknown, their participation does appear to be minimal and their employment is in the "traditional" skills. No evidence suggests that women are used or intended for use in a combat role. In fact, their service from all respects follows the traditional line.

Condition of Service

Under the 1962 law, women between the ages of 18 and 50 who are militarily fit for service may be conscripted if a state of emergency exists. In normal times, women may volunteer for service in two categories. Women may volunteer as short-term soldiers (Soldaten auf Seit) for which they incur a three-year service obligation, or they may volunteer as regulars (Seruf Soldaten). The term of service for a "regular" is longer -- 10 years. Officers may serve up to 25 years, although there are provisions for "limited periods of service which involve lesser service periods.

Reserve Status

Women completing duty retain their rank in the reserves. Until age 50, they are subject to recall. If the situation dictates, female reservists can be called up for up to 2 years.
Utilization

Women are typically assigned to so-called traditional positions as staff assistants and specialists on major staffs, district headquarters, sub-district headquarters, and with border troops. Women are active in administrative areas (clerks, secretaries, and stenographers), communications (telephone and radio operators, teletypists, courier service and long distance operators).

Women also serve in medical duties. It appears that most female officers -- there are very few -- serve as specialists such as doctors or interpreters.

Training

There is not an officer training program for women and they are not eligible to attend the Military Academy in Dresden.

Enlisted training may be as long as six months in the communication skills; however, it has been reported that in the administrative skills, it is necessary to possess a related civilian occupation, thus training in some areas may be quite short or non-existent.

Routine training is provided once a week and includes political instruction, first aid, military regulations, weapons familiarization and firing exercises and sports. Weapons training involves small arms and it is likely that nuclear, biological and chemical warfare training is also provided for female personnel.
Rank and Promotions

Limited service personnel may obtain the rank of staff sergeant in the case of enlisted personnel and captain if an officer. Career enlisted women may attain the rank of master sergeant. Regular officers may attain higher ranks.

Pay and Allowances

Women receive the same pay as male soldiers with the pay system based on grade, position and length of service. Clothing, rations and housing are without cost to the individual and women receive 90 marks yearly to purchase lingerie.

Enlisted women live in dormitory type arrangements. Leave is at a rate of 15 days per year and increases based on length of service. Enlisted women are subject to certain curfew restrictions until they attain the NCO rank.
ANNEX T

WOMEN IN OTHER WARSAW PACT ARMIES

Romania

Women are used in the Romanian Armed Forces in accordance with laws stemming from 1972. Their laws stipulate the "holy duty" of every Romanian citizen, male and female, to defend the motherland.

At the university level in a number of cities, military training is a required course. Women completing these courses become officers and apparently assist in further training.

It appears that women are used in a semi-auxiliary status in a limited number of skills. Training includes weapons training, yet no information suggests a combat role for women.

Women are subject to conscription in Romania and probably serve 9 months. Information available suggests that Romania views women as valuable in the reserve forces to be used in the event of national emergency.

Czechoslovakia

Women may serve in the Czechoslovakian Army. They must be between 18 and 20, and "suitable" for military service. Enlisted training is provided at special training bases and training is reported to require one year. Subsequent to training, women soldiers are promoted to sergeant and required to serve three years. After 3 years they may go to the reserves or continue as professional soldiers.
Women are normally assigned to staffs or large units in cities. There is not a separate Corp for women, but they are apparently assigned directly to units. No information indicates a combat role for women.
ANNEX U

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Volume 88, Part 2. HR 6293 to establish the Women's Army Corps, 17 March 1942.

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Volume 88, Part 3. HR 6293 to establish a WAAC for service with the Army of the United States. 12 May 1942.

Report Literature


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Periodical Articles


Books


## ANNEX V

### DOD Female Objectives

(DOD MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REVIEW - FY 1977)

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* Officer, WO, EM
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I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Review and revalidation of the logic of the Woman's Enlisted Expansion Model (WEEM).

II. BACKGROUND
A. Reason for Revalidation
To insure that WEEM uses legally defensible, operational criteria and provides a time-phased, viable and manageable career for women.

B. WEEM Purpose
WEEM determines for the purpose of recruitment, the maximum number of females possible for each MOS consistent with total Active Army strength authorizations and male combat requirements. WEEM develops the maximum female content by 3-digit MOS and grade to assure a balanced distribution of the female force within the US Army.

C. Training Requirements
WEEM computes available female positions for each MOS by subtracting the projected women content from the maximum women content. Available positions are phased to the entry level MOS and training requirements computed manually so as not to exceed the total requirements for each MOS.

III. METHODOLOGY
A complete review of current regulations pertaining to grade distribution, promotion policies and tour length has been conducted. Policies
and assumptions governing the usage of WEEM have been compiled and examined for validity.

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

A. Policies/Assumptions

Recruit as many females as possible consistent with total strength authorizations and male combat requirements.

WAC expansion is based on a conceptual approach.

Equal opportunity for male/female or justification provided for necessary difference; i.e., skill areas available to women.

Women will not be used in a combat role.

Three basic factors for each MOS are considered; interchangeable spaces, career progression and rotation equity. Career progression considers assignment, grade ratio and promotion.

MOS (3-digit) requirements are pyramidal in shape to determine promotion requirements.

B. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Study

TRADOC Study as reviewed by MACOMs determined the maximum number of females that can be assigned to CAT II and III TOE units without degrading unit effectiveness. The interchangeable spaces by 3-digit MOS and grade applied in the computation of WEEM are developed by ODCSPER based on TRADOC criteria.
C. Army Regulations Pertaining to WAC Utilization and Identification Techniques

C1, AR 310-49 - The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS);
Appendix B, paragraph B-10, WAC Positions.

C52, AR 600-200 - Enlisted Personnel Management System; Chapter 3, Section III, paragraph 3-11.

C5, AR 611-201 - Enlisted Career Management Fields; Chapter 4, MOS Not Available for WAC Personnel.

D. Army Regulations Pertaining to Tour Lengths and Definitions of Unit Category

AR 614-30 - Oversea Service; Chapter 1, paragraph 1-4, Policies.

AR 310-25 - Dictionary of United States Army Terms; Unit Categories (page 290-291).

E. Entry Level Training Requirements

The application of the Personnel Inventory Analysis (PIA II) System is mandatory for long-range female projections, consideration of advancement through the grades or movement between MOS along indicated lines of progression.

To utilize the maximum female content computed by WEEM, PIA II has to be developed in its 3-digit MOS and grade capacity. At the present time PIA is operational only at the 4-digit MOS level.
The Personnel Information Systems Directorate (PERSINSD) has been tasked to test and place this portion of PIA into operation. PERSINSD scheduled completion of the task for ME January 1977.

F. Managing Female Ceilings and Training Requirements by Career Management Fields (CMF)

Training in some cases takes place at approximately six training schools in a CMF. Schools require projected female input figures for programming of housing.

The Recruit Quota System (REQUEST) has no capability at this time to list training spaces available by CMF. Program changes to the system are needed to depict female training spaces by CMF. Changes include a check against individual MOS ceilings to avoid overfill of one MOS even though a CMF has vacant spaces.

Operational criteria of WEEM requires use of factors based upon individual MOS not CMF. To manage females by CMF would not be reflective of specific characteristics of MOS.

G. Impact of Women on the CONUS Tour Length

The rotation requirement between CONUS and overseas service is governed by AR 614-30, which states that personnel will be afforded a minimum of 12 months and a maximum of 36 months in CONUS. Present Department of the Army policy is to provide equal rotation opportunity for male and female. WEEM develops as one of its features a rotation requirement for
each MOS and grade. During this process WEEM also computes a CONUS tour length which will permit females in the MOS if possible. As a result, 14 MOS are currently identified as being below a 12 months CONUS tour length in some or all of their authorized grades. Training requirements are not computed for MOS not meeting all desired WEEM parameters.

H. Methodology Woman's Enlisted Expansion Model (WEEM)

Data Base - Supplied by the Army Management Systems Support Agency (USAMSSA) in form of a magnetic tape on a monthly basis. The proponent for this input is ODCSPER. All information on the tape except for the factored interchangeable spaces is extracted from the Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) as provided by ODCSOPS. The tape contains by MOS and grade (1) the basic authorized strength with distribution breakouts by long, short and CONUS tours (2) the combat strength distribution breakouts by long, short and CONUS tours (3) the basic number of interchangeable spaces with distribution breakouts by long, short and CONUS tours and (4) the number of interchangeable spaces factored based on guidelines established by the TRADOC Study as supplied by ODCSPER, with breakouts by long, short and CONUS tours. For the schematic of WEEM input see Figure IV.H.1; the data flow charts are Figure IV.H.2 thru 4; the WEEM Computation Format is Figure IV.H.5.

Simulation - Each grade is processed separately by MOS from the data base until all MOS desired are completed.

Step I. - To determine authorizations available for females non-combat
WOMAN'S ENLISTED EXPANSION MODEL (WEEM)

DATA BASE

FIGURE IV H.2

START

INITIALIZE MODEL

INPUT MCS

G EO  

B

INPUT WW AUTH

WW CBT AUTH

CBT DIST

INTER-CHANGEABLE SPACES

CURRENT STRENGTH

MGMT FACTOR

1

3-8
IMPROVED ROTATION COMPUTATION FOR WEEH

FIGURE IV H.4
WEEM COMPUTATION FORMAT
FIGURE IV.H.5

I  TOTAL REQUIRED (TQ)
    ENTERED
II  COMBAT REQUIRED (CR)
    ENTERED
III  NON-COMBAT REQUIRED (NCR)
    TQ - CR = NCR
IV  COMBAT RATIO
    CR / TQ = COMBAT RATIO
V  MALE NON-COMBAT REQUIRED (MNCR)
    MAXIMUM OF:
    PROMOTION REQUIREMENT
    ROTATION REQUIREMENT
    MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENT
VI  PROMOTION REQUIREMENT (PR)
    ENTERED
VII  ROTATION REQUIREMENT (RR)
     ENTERED
VIII  MANAGEMENT FACTOR (MF)
     ENTERED
IX  MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENT (MR)
    NCR X MF = MR
X  THEORETICAL WOMEN CONTENT (TWC)
    NCR - MNCR = TWC
XI  FACTORED INTERCHANGEABLE SPACES (FIS)
    ENTERED
XII  MAX WOMEN CONTENT (MWC)
    MWC = MINIMUM OF TWC OR FIS
XIII  GRADE SPACE RATIO (GSR)
     APPLICATION
XIV  CURRENT WAC CONTENT (CWC)
     ENTERED
XV  WOMEN POSITIONS AVAILABLE (WPA)
    MWC - CWC = WPA
authorizations are developed by subtracting combat authorizations from total authorizations.

Step 2 - Promotion opportunity for combat/non-combat males is provided by first computing a combat ratio. This is accomplished by dividing the combat authorizations by the total authorizations. The highest combat ratio is then multiplied by the total authorizations providing the combat promotion requirement. The promotion requirement is determined by subtracting the combat promotion requirement from combat authorizations.

Step 3 - The rotation requirement computation was developed to compute the number of women a grade could contain and provide equal rotation opportunity for male and female. To accomplish this the rotation distribution is checked by each theater to insure possible movement of combat personnel. If movement is possible and combat positions do not exist in a theater, an adjusted combat space is calculated to provide movement of all personnel. For example, an adjusted combat space would be generated as follows:

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The adjusted combat space is a ratio of long tour to CONUS positions.

3-12
then multiplied by the combat CONUS positions. Once the grade has movement potential, the number of females the grade can support and have an acceptable CONUS tour is computed. A mean CONUS tour length of 24 months is used with a minimum CONUS tour length of 12 months. Exceptional cases are considered individually.

**Step 4** - The actual rotation requirement is determined by computing the spaces open to women by subtracting the supportable number of women from the non-combat authorizations. Then, compute the combat adjustment by subtracting the combat authorizations from the adjusted combat. The rotation requirement will be the sum of the spaces open to women and the combat adjustment, in cases where spaces open to women exceed the non-combat authorization the latter is the rotation requirement.

**Step 5** - To insure male career development, a management requirement is determined by multiplying the non-combat requirements by the assignment consideration.

**Step 6** - Male non-combat requirements are determined by using the maximum requirement computed as a result of Step 2 thru 5.

**Step 7** - The theoretical content for women is calculated by subtracting the male non-combat requirement from the non-combat requirement.

**Step 8** - Interchangeable spaces are compared to the theoretical calculation of the female content to insure that a greater number of women are not reflected in a particular grade than those developed by ODCSPER.
The maximum female content is determined by taking the minimum of the theoretical or interchangeable spaces.

**Step 9** - A grade space ratio is then computed to insure an aging process that permits normal career progression for females in the MOS. This ratio is computed by dividing the total required force spaces at the highest MOS grade level by the total required spaces at the next lower grade level. The female content at this grade level would then be divided by the ratio to establish the maximum woman content at the next lower grade. This step is repeated at each level down to the lowest grade.

**Step 10** - In those cases where a grade reflects a maximum woman content of less than the grade space ratio each grade is resteped. This reverse grade space ratio (ratios derived in reverse order starting at the lowest grade and working up to the highest grade) is used to restructure the maximum woman content into the same proportion as the total strength authorizations. An example of the reverse grade space ratio is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>MAXIMUM WOMAN CONTENT</th>
<th>RATIO</th>
<th>ADJ MAXIMUM WOMAN CONTENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(\frac{20}{30} = .667)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(\frac{10}{20} = .5)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-14
The maximum woman content for grade 5 is equal to the maximum woman content for grade 4 multiplied by the ratio derived from dividing the strength of grade 5 by grade 4. The process is repeated for each grade.

Step 11 - Total female positions available are computed by subtracting the current woman content from the maximum women content.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The Woman's Enlisted Expansion Model (WEEM) bases its computations on a manager's decision process. It develops the enlisted female maximum content of population in any MOS as determined by the total female ceiling for the US Army. For this purpose the WEEM logic as reviewed is valid and legally defensible.

There is no advantage over the present system to managing female ceiling and training requirements by CMF.

The female content of MOS reflecting a CONUS tour length below 12 months based on females in the MOS should be kept at zero since a future change in number of authorizations and distribution of authorizations can alter rotation requirements.

Application of the Personnel Inventory Analysis (PIA II) system is mandatory for entry level training requirements if advancement through the grades or movement between MOS is to be considered.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Maximum Female Content

That WHEM continue to establish the maximum female content by MOS and grade to assure a balanced distribution of the female force within the guidelines established by Department of the Army.

B. Entry Level Training Requirements

That entry level training requirements be computed by the Personnel Inventory Analysis (PIA II) System as soon as PIA II is operational at the 3-digit MOS and grade level.
CHAPTER 4
Review of MOS Open/Closed to Women

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<tr>
<td>SECTION VI. RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>4-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

To review and revalidate MOS open and closed to enlisted women to insure that legally supportable operational criteria are used in the decision process and that the results are valid job positions for women in consonance with the needs of the Army.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Objectives

To determine operational criteria for opening or closing enlisted MOS to female occupancy.

To determine operational criteria for establishing the minimum number of potential job positions required within an MOS to maintain a viable career for women.

B. Discussion

At the present time the Army lists 35 MOS in Chapter 4, AR 611-201, which are closed to women because they "are associated with combat or close combat support."

A recently released GAO report entitled "Job Opportunities for Women in the Military: Progress and Problems" recommended in part that the Services,

Reevaluate all specialties to identify those that can be really opened to women, considering specialties that (1) must be restricted to men because all authorized positions are required by combat or combat-related units and (2) involve primarily combat vessels.
At the outset of this study effort, MILPERCEN was tasked to develop criteria for opening/closing MOS to female occupancy in accordance with the above objectives and to conduct an evaluation of all MOS based on those criteria to determine which skills should be opened or closed. MILPERCEN accomplished that task and determined that one previously closed MOS should be opened and a total of sixty-seven MOS’s should be closed. In the staffing process of the MILPERCEN effort, it became apparent that some deeply ingrained philosophical differences existed on the Department of the Army staff and that resolution would be required before a consensus could be reached.

III. METHODOLOGY

The basic approach used was to determine exactly what philosophical differences existed in this area and the basic reasons for those differences. Once the differences were identified, to determine acceptable criteria for opening/closing enlisted MOS to female occupancy and the best method for applying those criteria. Every effort was made to take full advantage of the previous MILPERCEN results.

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

A. General

Currently there are two statutes, Section 6015 and 8549 of Title 10, USC, which pertain to utilization of women in combat. Section 6015 precludes the Secretary of the Navy from assigning women to duty in aircraft engaged
in combat missions, or on Navy vessels other than hospital ships and trans-
ports. Section 8549 precludes the Secretary of the Air Force from
assigning women to aircraft engaged in combat missions. Additionally,
as indicated in Chapter 2, the legislative history of the statutes which
established the Women's Army Corps leaves little doubt that the Congress
did not intend for women in the WAC to be placed in combat.

From the foregoing, it is clear that national policy is opposed to the
utilization of women in the combat role. Difficulty arises, however,
when one attempts to determine a clear-cut, universally acceptable,
definition of the term "combat." Such a definition simply does not
exist, therefore, the Army has been required to establish implementing
policies based on its interpretation of national policy.

The basic Army approach to implementing this policy has been to restrict
the assignment of women servicemembers from areas where the probability
of being involved in direct combat is the greatest. To accomplish this
the Army has established policies to preclude women from being assigned
to combat units (basically units designed to inflict casualties or equip-
ment damage on the enemy) and combat/close combat support skills.

B. Reasons for Closing Skills

As discussed above, many skills must be closed to female occupancy
on the basis of national policy. Notwithstanding the lack of a universally
accepted definition of the term "combat", the purpose of closing combat/close
combat support skills is clear and generally accepted on the basis of the national policy. Once a skill is determined to be in this category and is closed, there is no reason for it to be removed from the list of closed skills unless the duties of the MOS are changed, removing it from the combat/close combat support category, or unless there is a change in the national policy. At Annex A is a list of skills which fall into the combat/close combat support category. There are additional skills which may be in this category, primarily in the maintenance and repair fields; however, additional information is required on the precise nature of the duties and employment of each skill. On the other hand, there appears to be no reason to retain MOS 31G, Tactical Communications Chief, closed to female occupancy.

Further review of the MOS structure indicates that in addition to the skills closed for combat/close combat support reasons, there are additional skills in which women may perform duties; however, they cannot achieve a viable and/or manageable career. Therefore, it is appropriate to close these skills, at least on a temporary basis, for personnel management considerations. Many of these management considerations have been identified and incorporated as parameters in the Women's Enlisted Expansion Model (WEEK) which is discussed in Chapter 3. Examples of factors which might cause an MOS to be closed for management considerations are: lack of an appropriate authorization structure to support normal career progression; lack of a sufficient rotation base which would
be further eroded for males by assignment of females to the skill; and inadequate distribution of female and interchangeable spaces to provide appropriate assignment within the skill, e.g., only female interchangeable spaces authorized in an MOS at one location, whereas male spaces in the same MOS are located in worldwide units.

From these factors it can be seen that opening or closing an MOS to female occupancy goes well beyond merely insuring there are a prescribed number of positions available for women to occupy in the MOS. For this reason the personnel managers must be deeply involved in the decision process. At Annex B is a list of skills which should be temporarily closed. Specific reasons for closure are indicated. This list is based on the June 1976 WEEM.

V. CONCLUSIONS
That all enlisted MOS should be reviewed to determine if they should be closed due to national policy or for management considerations, and that this list of closed MOS should be reviewed on a regular basis.

That reasons for closure of MOS to female occupancy must be clearly stated for each closed MOS and that the list of closed MOS be published in appropriate publications.

That the criteria for closing MOS to female occupancy require clarification.
VI. RECOMMENDATION

Criteria for closure of MOS to female occupancy should be established as follows:

- Permanent closure due to national policy:
  -- Skills designed for direct involvement in combat or making a direct contribution to the act of inflicting casualties or equipment damage on the enemy.
  -- Skills designed primarily for utilization in areas where close combat operations would occur.

Temporary closure for management considerations—any skill in which women cannot be afforded a manageable and viable career.

MILPERCEN, in coordination with the DA staff and TRADOC, will determine which skills should be opened/closed to female occupancy. This will be done on a semi-annual basis.

Those skills closed permanently should be published in Chapter 4, AR 611-201, and the skills closed for management purposes should be published and disseminated, as necessary, to accomplish management functions.

That MILPERCEN take action to close the MOS listed in Annexes A and B in accordance with the preceding recommendations.
ANNEX A

Combat/Combat Support Skills*

11B Infantryman
11C Infantry Indirect Fire Crewman
11D Armor Reconnaissance Specialist
11E Armor Crewman
11Z Maneuver Combat Arms Sergeant
12B Combat Engineer
12C Bridge Specialist
12D Powered Bridge Specialist
12E Atomic Demolition Munition Specialist
12F Combat Engineer Tracked Vehicle Crewman
12Z Combat Engineer Senior Sergeant
13B Field Artillery Crewman
13E Field Artillery Cannon Operations/Fire Direction Assistant
**13W Field Artillery Target Acquisition Senior Sergeant
**13Y Cannon/ Missile Senior Sergeant
13Z Field Artillery Cannon Senior Sergeant
15B Sergeant Missile Crewman
15D Lance Missile Crewman
15E Pershing Missile Crewman
15F Honest John Rocket Crewman
15J Lance/Honest John Operations/Fire Direction Assistant
**16B Hercules Missile Crewman
**16C Hercules Fire Control Crewman
**16D Hawk Missile Crewman
**16E Hawk Fire Control Crewman
16F Light Air Defense Artillery Crewman
16P Chaparral Crewman
16R Vulcan Crewman
17K Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman
54C Smoke and Flame Specialist
82C Artillery Surveyor

* Based on existing MOS as of Change 6, AR 611-201.

** Do not appear on current list of cloned MOS in AR 611-201.
## ANNEX B

Skills for Temporary Closing Based on Management Considerations*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16J</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Radar Crewman</td>
<td>Rotation Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21G</td>
<td>Pershing Electronics Material Specialist</td>
<td>Rotation Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24C</td>
<td>Improved Hawk Firing Section Mechanic</td>
<td>Rotation Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24E</td>
<td>Improved Hawk Fire Control Mechanic</td>
<td>Rotation Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24G</td>
<td>Improved Hawk Information Coordination</td>
<td>Rotation Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Mechanic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24N</td>
<td>Chaparral System Mechanic</td>
<td>No Entry Level Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24P</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Radar Mechanic</td>
<td>Rotation Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24U</td>
<td>Hercules Electronics Mechanic</td>
<td>Rotation Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25J</td>
<td>Operations Central Repairman</td>
<td>Career Progression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31D</td>
<td>Pershing Communications Specialist</td>
<td>Career Progression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45P</td>
<td>Sheridan Turret Mechanic</td>
<td>Rotation Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45R</td>
<td>Missile Tank Turret Mechanic</td>
<td>Rotation Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62H</td>
<td>Concrete Paving Equipment Operator</td>
<td>No Entry Level Positions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on existing MOS as of Change 6, AR 611-201.
CHAPTER 5

Methodology for a Parametric Approach to Determining Non-Prior Service Assessments for Enlisted Women

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I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

To develop a system capable of determining the non-prior service (NPS) accession requirement for enlisted women in active Army and of analyzing the probable impact of changes in management policies or force structure.

II. BACKGROUND

The Army's quantitative program for enlisted women has always been based on two premises: that the primary mission of the Army is combat and that our nation at this time in history does not support the use of women in direct combat roles. Accordingly, a minimum number of men are required to maintain a state of constant combat readiness. Because of statutory personnel ceilings, there is a corresponding maximum number of women the Army can assimilate and utilize in any given period.

Prior to August 1972, enlisted women were assigned to TDA units with only 185 out of 482 MOS's open to them. In August 1972, Secretary of the Army Froehlke approved a plan that doubled the rate at which women were to be enlisted into the Army. This plan opened to women Category II and Category III TOE units as well as TDA's. As a result all MOS's except for 48 were opened to women. The plan was, in some respects, a cautious one as the Army had no recent experience in integrating a large number of women into its predominantly male force. Problems were anticipated by many experienced commanders and personnel managers in such areas as recruitment, training, housing, clothing, and properly utilizing such a rapid and large increase in the number of women.
By 1973, the rapid increase of identifiable jobs for women, the success in female recruiting, and the increasing desire of women to remain in the service made it apparent that the 1972 plan underestimated the Army's ability to attract and utilize women. A new plan was developed and approved in October 1973. This called for an increase in the strength of enlisted women to 50,400 by the end of FY 79.

In July 1972, there were only 19,000 positions that were coded as interchangeable or female only. In conjunction with the initial WAC expansion program, a concerted effort was undertaken to identify additional interchangeable positions. In July 1973, when the second WAC expansion plan was formulated, there were 53,600 jobs suitable for women. The number of jobs was the limiting factor in most skills and hence was the predominant factor behind the increased goal of 50,400. The Women's Enlisted Expansion Model (WEEM) was also developed in 1974 and was used to validate the new goal. In 1974, there were 48 MOS's associated with combat and close combat support closed to women. (Currently the list contains 35 MOS's due to changes and consolidations among the MOS's).

III. METHODOLOGY

Current policies, plans, programs, and regulations were reviewed and analyzed with the view of accurately quantifying relevant parameters. Existing input data, management models, and management plans were integrated into a parametric system. The proposed system integrates the following considerations:
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

A. Basic Philosophy

The proposed system is a parametric system that will allow the Army to determine the impact of policy or force structure changes on accession requirements for enlisted women. For a given set of parameters it will allow personnel managers to determine the non-prior service (NPS) accession requirement to support the women's enlisted force (while satisfying management considerations). It quantifies the implications of policies, plans, programs, and regulations.

B. Assumptions

The Army must be organized, maintained, and trained in peacetime to perform its wartime combat mission.

The Enlisted Force Management Plan (EFMP) is applied equally to men and women and that year group strength will be controlled to the appropriate male/female mix.
The Army should maximize the opportunities for enlisted women within existing policy constraints.

The Army will manage the distribution of enlisted women to insure that it is equitable among units.

C. **Authorizations Data**

The Army's approved authorizations are found in the personnel portion of the structure and composition system (PERSACS). This data base is maintained by the US Army Management System Support Agency at Headquarters, Department of the Army. The PERSACS reflects both current and future authorizations and is composed of an aggregation of individual unit documents. For each unit, the authorizations by grade and MOS, interchangeable positions, unit TOE, and unit location can be determined. Long lead time personnel programs must be based on projected force structure requirements. The example in this study uses the authorizations as of 30 September 1979.

D. **Combat Exclusion**

Enlisted Women are currently excluded from 35 combat MOS's (Chapter 4, AR 611-201, Change 5). Chapter 4 of this study analyzes MOS's open and closed and the implications of changes in the status of MOS's.

Enlisted women are allowed to serve in Category II, Category III, and TDA units. Only Category I units are currently closed to women (Change 52,
AR 600-200 paragraph 3-11). The unit category is found in paragraph 5 section 1 of all basic TOE documents, i.e., the TOE determines the unit category (Glossary, Appendix).

As of 30 September 1979 the PERSACS shows the following breakout of units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category I TOE Units</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category II and III TOE Units</td>
<td>1381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDA Units</td>
<td>1140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3267</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the provisions of AR 600-200 the Army could assign women to 2603 of these 3374 units.

E. Interchangeable Positions

A position within a unit should be designated as interchangeable when it is determined by the commander that the job could be performed by either a man or a women both in garrison and in the field. It does not address how many of the interchangeable positions in a unit could be filled by women at one time. It primarily serves to provide flexibility in distribution.

The unit commander determines which positions within the unit are to be designated male only, female only, or interchangeable. In the past, all positions were considered as male only unless the commander designated them as female or interchangeable. Recently, the Army has changed its procedure so that all positions in MOS's open to enlisted women in
Category II and III TOE units and TDA units will be considered as interchangeable unless the commanders submit justification for male only or female only designation to Department of the Army and the request is approved. This procedure will tend to increase the number of interchangeable positions while minimizing the variation among similar units.

F. Unit Considerations

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), at the request of Department of the Army, analyzed all Category II and III TOE units to determine the maximum number of enlisted women that could be assigned to each unit without diminishing its mission capability. The determination of specific percentages was governed by the following considerations:

The closer to the line of contact a unit habitually operates the lower should be the maximum permissible female fill. Forward units are more apt to be called upon to engage in combat even though that is not their primary mission. A relatively low female fill in these units is quite consistent with current policy that the Army does not intend that female soldiers engage in direct combat. Other reasons include physical demands placed on these units by virtue of the need to displace often and to prepare defensive positions.
Units which require a higher proportion of demanding physical work and activity on the part of its soldiers should have a lower percentage of female fill. Consideration was also given to the method of employment (i.e., remote location, unit dispersion, etc) of typical units. With all considerations in mind, the following general grouping with ascending percentages of female fill were identified:

- Combat support. Tasks generally heavier in nature, isolated operations, unit dispersion, frequent displacements.
- Logistical support. Physically demanding, less frequent displacements.
- Administrative support. Least physically demanding, infrequent displacements.

Category II and III TOE units considered in this study, except for CONUS unique units, are subject to deployment to combat theaters where adverse, dangerous and uncertain conditions exist. For this reason TRADOC felt it prudent to set a maximum limit of 45% female in such units believing that in all cases the male content should be over half. This limitation could later be modified by the theater commander for selective units if he felt it unduly restrictive in light of his local situation on an MOS by MOS basis.

The above considerations resulted in fixing the following percentages on maximum female fill of Category II and III TOE units: (See Figure IV F):

- Units which habitually operate forward of the brigade rear boundary--0%.
- Units operating between division and brigade rear boundaries--10%.
- Units operating between corps and division rear boundary—15% to 30% depending on type unit.
- Units operating behind corps rear boundary (COMZ)—25% to 45% depending on type unit.
- CONUS unique units—25% to 50% depending on type unit.

The results of applying these limits to all TOE's were reviewed and, in some instances, modified by the Major Commands (MACOM's). As a representative sample of TOE units is in the process of being field tested under operational conditions by the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, these limits are not yet considered as validated input. The MACOM's were also asked to comment regarding the maximum percentage of enlisted women that could be assigned to their respective TDA units.

G. Distribution of Enlisted Women

Inherent with notion of unit ceilings of enlisted women is the requirement to insure an equitable distribution of women throughout the Army. Without distribution controls starting at the time of enlistment, the Army will find units that have a significant number of enlisted women assigned while similar units have few enlisted women. Accordingly, Department of the Army has sent to the field a distribution plan for enlisted women assets. This effort requires close monitorship and modification, as required.

H. Women's Enlisted Expansion Model (WEEM)

WEEM is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this study. WEEM helps insure
Percentage of Maximum Female Fill for Category II, AFIT Units

- Forward edge of the battle area
- Brigade Rear Boundary
- Division Rear Boundary
- Corps Rear Boundary
- Communications Zone (COMZ)

CONUS (Continental United States) UNIQUE
25-50%
equity among men and women in terms of career progression and rotation to overseas areas. It develops the maximum number of positions for women by grade and MOS to assure a balanced distribution of enlisted women within the Army incorporating all factors with the important exceptions of the required overhead account and Enlisted Force Management Plan (EFMP) considerations.

I. Reconstructed Force
Trained individuals consist of transients, patients, prisoners, and students. This overhead account is required to support those positions for women identified by WEEM. The reconstructed force consists of WEEM output plus trained individuals. In addition, trainees (or untrained individuals) are required to support the total trained force so that trained women are available as close as possible to the time losses occur to the trained force.

J. Enlisted Force Management Plan
The Enlisted Force Management Plan (EFMP) expresses in qualitative and quantitative terms the long-range goals and objectives which the Army desires for the personnel management of soldiers. EFMP orients the Army's management policies and practices to include greater emphasis on personnel management goals in order to achieve higher retention of trained quality soldiers, reduction in the annual NPS accession requirements for high quality selectivity, relatively stable annual NPS accession requirements, and a much more rewarding career for all soldiers.
Some significant features of EFMP are the requirement for year-group management of the enlisted force and an objective grade structure that accommodates recent Congressional and DOD constraints. The plan provides the authoritative basis for a detailed examination of management policies and procedures to insure consistency with long range goals and objectives to include providing all soldiers a clear, understandable, and rewarding career in the volunteer Army.

Among the controls envisioned under the Enlisted Force Management Plan are:

- Reenlistment controls, whereby restrictions are placed upon reenlistments by years of service (YOS) excess to the Army's needs. An individual may be offered retraining in an understrength MOS in order to reenlist. If retraining is not accepted, the individual is denied reenlistment.

- Reclassification controls, whereby soldiers are encouraged, and in some cases, required, to be reclassified from an overstrength MOS into one in which there is a shortage.

K. Proposed System for Determining the NPS Requirement to Support the Quantitative Program for Enlisted Women in the Active Army

The proposed system examines the potential force of enlisted women on a grade by grade basis using a six step procedure. (Details in Annexes A and B.)
Step 1. Obtain total enlisted authorizations from the Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS). It is mandatory to consider known major force structure changes. A trade-off must be made between how far ahead to project authorizations for future requirements and the diminishing accuracy of data the further into the future authorizations are projected. The example in this study uses authorizations as of 30 September 1979 because it is the most accurate projection of future requirements that reflects the Army's 16 Division Force.

Step 2. Define authorizations to include only those authorizations in MOS's open to enlisted women and in Category II and III TOE units and TDA units. (2521 units)

Step 3. Apply the unit considerations as developed by TRADOC and reviewed by the MACOMS to each of the 2521 units to which women can be assigned under current Army policy. Each grade within an MOS is filled up to an MOS ceiling which is based on the WEEM Management Requirement (See Chapter 3). The MOS ceiling insures that job positions within an MOS are distributed throughout the Army in every possible unit in order to enhance the career opportunities for the enlisted force. The grade/MOS results are added up for the entire unit and compared to the unit ceilings and if necessary are adjusted downward so that the number of potential positions for enlisted women within a unit does not exceed the ceiling. If the sum of grade/MOS results is less than the unit ceiling, the grade/MOS sum is the number of potential positions for the unit. These results are always rounded up, e.g., 1.15 = 2, to insure that the senior grades with their smaller authorizations are not factored out of the system.

5-12
NOTE: There is an option that allows for consideration of interchangeable positions. Based on the change in the procedure for designating interchangeable positions (Section E) and the fact that valid job positions using interchangeable positions are within 4% of the valid job positions without using interchangeable positions, the option was not used.

Steps 1 thru 3 are accomplished by a computerized routine at the US Army Management System Support Agency (USAMSSA). The results are valid job positions for enlisted women that meet the following considerations:

Combat Exclusions

No MOS within a unit is overloaded

No unit is overloaded

The positions determined to this point do not meet career progression and rotation requirements. These positions are, in essence, the maximum number of enlisted women the Army could use, given the current parameters, if the Army never moved anyone or never promoted anyone. These results form the input to WEEM (See Chapter 3, Section IV-H).

NOTE: The application of Steps 1 thru 3 on the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve portion of PERSACS result in a meaningful start-point for the further analysis of enlisted women in the Reserve Components since the Reserve Components are location dependent and the application of WEEM is not relevant.

Step 4. Apply WEEM. WEEM develops the maximum number of positions for enlisted women by grade and MOS in units to assure a balanced distribution of enlisted women within policy constraints.
Step 5. Reconstruct the force by determining the trained individuals required to support the WEEM output. Current data shows that the following percentages of the total trained force by grade could be expected to be in the trained individuals account (transients, patients, prisoners, and students):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Trained Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E 2-4</td>
<td>8.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 5</td>
<td>4.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 6</td>
<td>3.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 7</td>
<td>3.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 8</td>
<td>4.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 9</td>
<td>3.46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These factors are used to determine the reconstructed force or the total trained assets by grade required to provide the trained assets in units as developed in Step 4.

Step 6. Apply Enlisted Force Management Plan (EFMP). EFMP contains the objective grade structure for the enlisted force (the distribution of grades that Congress and DOD will allow the Army to have at any one time) as well as the objective continuation rates (rate at which the force continues service from one particular year of service to the next). The NPS accession requirement to support a total trained requirement by grade plus the trainees required to support the total force can be determined by applying EFMP parameters to Step 5 results. In the example case the NPS accession requirements determined at the end of Step 6 are as follows:
In order to have jobs available for enlisted women commensurate with their grade, the lowest NPS requirement must be considered as the yearly accession program. This will facilitate year group management. It is obvious that in the example case the choke point exists at Grades E 2-4. NPS accessions required to support any of the top 5 grades would cause the number of enlisted women in Grades E 2-4 to far exceed the requirement in those grades; therefore, the yearly NPS accession program as determined in the example case should be in the range 10,900 — 13,700. (For detailed analysis see Annexes A and B.)

Caveat. The proposed system produces a number that is relevant only in terms of the input parameters. As the parameters change, and they will change, the resulting quantitative program will change. Any attempt to take the results that the proposed system produces at any one time and treat them as an inviolate goal would be a gross error. In view of the inevitability of policy changes, the Army must have the flexibility to modify its quantitative program.

5-15
V. CONCLUSIONS

There is a need for the Army to have a system which reflects its current policies, plans, programs, and regulations in order to determine the impact of force structure and policy changes on the management of enlisted women.

There is a need to insure that the Army distributes its enlisted women in an equitable manner among all units.

The proposed system is parametric in nature and can easily be adapted to reflect changes. The adoption of a system such as this insures that the Army considers the significant aspects of the management of enlisted women in the Army and is consistent in its analysis of the impact of changes.

The Army must continue to collect and document from the field data and senior level opinion on the successes and failures of the program for enlisted women.

The validity of the variables used in the parametric analysis has not been completely established, especially with regard to unit ceilings (both TOE and TDA), reenlistment and promotion policies, and readiness and deployability considerations. See Annex C for detailed requirements.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

That this parametric system be used to establish the NPS female accession requirement and as an analytical tool for examining the probable impact of changes in management policies or force structure.
VALIDATE

That efforts to expedite input variables be expedited.
ANNEX A
FORMULAS

STEP 5

Given the trained requirement in units (WEEM Output) and the trained individual percentages the following formula is used to determine the total trained requirement:

\[
\text{Total Trained Requirement}_i = \frac{\text{WEEM Output}_i}{100 - \text{Trained Individuals}_i}
\]

Where \( i = \) grade

STEP 6

The continuation factor \((K)\) is the number of personnel in the force supported by a single accession. It is determined from the objective continuation rates \((R_k)\) from the following formula:

\[
K = \sum_{j=0}^{n} (\frac{k}{k>0}) R_k
\]

Where \( R_k \) is the continuation rate for the \( k \)th period.

\( K = 4.43971 \) for objective continuation rates contained in the Enlisted Force Management Plan

The NPS accession requirement to support a total trained requirement by grade plus the trainees required to support the total force can be determined by the following formulas:

Grades 2-4 (Includes Trainees)

\[
\text{TTR}_{2-4} = \frac{\text{NPS}_{2-4} = (G_{2-4} \cdot K) - 0.10639K}
\]

Grades 5 thru 9

\[
\text{NPS}_i = \frac{\text{TTR}_i}{G_i \cdot K}
\]

Where:

\( i = \) grade
\( \text{NPS} = \) Non Prior Service Accessions
\( \text{TTR} = \) Total Trained Requirement
\( \text{G} = \) Objective Grade Percentage
\( K = \) Continuation Factor
Steps 1 thru 6 are applied on a grade by grade basis to determine the NPS accessions required to support the specific grade being examined. The resulting NPS accessions may overstate or understate the accessions required to support other grades.

The example uses authorizations data as of September 1979. The formulas used are found in Annex A.

Valid job positions are located in both TOE and TDA units. The unit considerations, for Category II and III TOE units, are those found in the TRADOC study. The MACOM's provided ceilings for those TDA units that they felt confident in limiting. All other units defaulted to 100%. A sensitivity analysis is included on the impact of varying TDA ceilings from 40% to 100% in increments of 10%.

Example Computation:

At 100% TDA ceiling:

\[ \text{Total Trained Requirement}_{2-4} = \frac{29,526}{100 - 8.76} = 32,361 \]

\[ \text{NPS}_{2-4} = \frac{32,361}{(.6388 \times 4.43971) - .10639 \times 4.43971} = 13,691 \]
Grades E 2-4

Trained Individuals Percentage 8.76%
Objective Grade Percentage 63.88%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Valid Job Positions (TOE and TDA)</th>
<th>WEEM Output</th>
<th>Total Trained Requirement to Support Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>27,393</td>
<td>25,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>29,910</td>
<td>28,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>31,590</td>
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<tr>
<td>70% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>32,816</td>
<td>31,427</td>
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<td>33,891</td>
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<td>34,007</td>
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Grade E-5

Trained Individuals Percentage: 4.15%
Objective Grade Percentage: 16.80%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TDA Ceiling</th>
<th>Total Valid Job Positions (TOE and TDA)</th>
<th>WEEM Output</th>
<th>Total Trained Requirement</th>
<th>NPS Requirement to Support Grade</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>17,364</td>
<td>15,213</td>
<td>15,872</td>
<td>21,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>19,805</td>
<td>17,467</td>
<td>18,223</td>
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<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>21,554</td>
<td>18,903</td>
<td>19,721</td>
<td>26,440</td>
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<tr>
<td>70%</td>
<td>23,032</td>
<td>20,103</td>
<td>20,973</td>
<td>28,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80%</td>
<td>23,964</td>
<td>20,711</td>
<td>21,608</td>
<td>28,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90%</td>
<td>24,581</td>
<td>21,069</td>
<td>21,981</td>
<td>29,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>24,773</td>
<td>21,123</td>
<td>22,038</td>
<td>29,547</td>
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</table>
Grade E-6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Valid Job Positions (TOE and TDA)</th>
<th>WETM Output</th>
<th>Total Trained Requirement</th>
<th>NPS Requirement to Support Grade</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>12,705</td>
<td>8,154</td>
<td>8,480</td>
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<td>14,712</td>
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<td>10,492</td>
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<td>18,748</td>
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<td>100% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>18,874</td>
<td>12,826</td>
<td>13,340</td>
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### Grade E-7

<table>
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<th>Total Trained Requirement</th>
<th>NPS Requirement to Support Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9,876</td>
<td>6,090</td>
<td>6,297</td>
<td>21,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>11,655</td>
<td>8,292</td>
<td>8,574</td>
<td>29,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>12,781</td>
<td>9,135</td>
<td>9,446</td>
<td>32,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70%</td>
<td>13,935</td>
<td>10,035</td>
<td>10,376</td>
<td>35,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80%</td>
<td>14,723</td>
<td>10,618</td>
<td>10,979</td>
<td>37,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90%</td>
<td>15,301</td>
<td>11,018</td>
<td>11,393</td>
<td>39,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15,390</td>
<td>11,061</td>
<td>11,437</td>
<td>39,210</td>
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</table>
Grade E-8

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Total Trained Requirement</th>
<th>Requirement to Support Grade</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>19,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>25,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>3,145</td>
<td>2,186</td>
<td>2,278</td>
<td>27,886</td>
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<tr>
<td>70%</td>
<td>3,380</td>
<td>2,367</td>
<td>2,466</td>
<td>30,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80%</td>
<td>3,541</td>
<td>2,506</td>
<td>2,611</td>
<td>31,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90%</td>
<td>3,637</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>2,714</td>
<td>33,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3,694</td>
<td>2,618</td>
<td>2,728</td>
<td>33,394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trained Individuals Percentage 4.03%
Objective Grade Percentage 1.84%
Grade E-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trained Individuals Percentage</th>
<th>Objective Grade Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.46%</td>
<td>.54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Valid Job Positions (TOE and TDA)</th>
<th>WEEM Output</th>
<th>Total Trained Requirement</th>
<th>NPS Requirement to Support Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>15,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>19,229</td>
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<tr>
<td>60% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>20,687</td>
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<tr>
<td>70% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>22,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>23,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>24,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% TDA ceiling</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>24,318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX C

Follow-on Study Requirements

- Physical, strength and stamina requirements by MOS.

- Procedures for test of physical, strength and stamina requirements prior to enlistment.

- Deployability of female force content in context of current pregnancy and dependency policies.

- TDA unit male/female optimum mix, analogous to that done by TRADOC for TOE units with specific emphasis on the need to replace early combat losses with personnel from TDA units.

- Prerequisite accession and career force reenlistment and promotion policies necessary to maintain optimum balance of male/female content by MOS at each grade level.

- Impact on readiness and early replacement flow, in event of conflict, of the currently authorized female strength in units.

- Attrition by MOS for females from completion of MOS training to end of first term.
# CHAPTER 6

Review of Women Officer Policies and Programs

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<td>6-10</td>
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</table>
I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
To review and revalidate women officer policies and programs dealing with requirements, branching and training to insure that legally defensible criteria are used in the decision process and that the results are viable and manageable careers for women in consonance with the needs of the Army.

II. BACKGROUND
The role of women in society is undergoing significant changes. The role of women in the Army has expanded numerically and in types of jobs available. The Army must insure that the opportunity is provided for those women who wish to serve while still maintaining its capability to defend the nation. Army policy is that we can have up to the number of women officers for whom we can provide valid positions while maintaining our capability to carry out combat missions. The key question is, "How many?" However, whatever the number determined, full and effective utilization of the Army's women officers depends upon their opportunity for professional development.

III. METHODOLOGY
The policies governing the determination of the number of women officers the Army can have were reviewed. The Women Officer Strength Model (WOSM) logic and model parameters were reviewed and actions initiated to update where necessary. Army policy for training of women officers was reviewed and actions in progress in support of the policy were noted.
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

A. Policies

Equal opportunity for men/women or justification provided for necessary difference. No direct combat role for women. The weight of public opinion, as reflected in congressional legislation, has been that women should not serve in direct combat positions. U.S. Code specifically applies a combat constraint for women in the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. The same prohibition is inferred for the Army.

B. Women Officer Strength Model (WOSM)

The WOSM has been developed to analyze the Army officer force structure to determine the number of women officers the Army can have based on the above stated policies. Any position which is coded interchangeable or women only is a position which a woman can fill. However, the Army does not plan to have women officers filling all of those positions. An appropriate number of noncombat positions must be reserved for male officers serving in combat positions to provide for promotion equity, rotation equity, and professional development opportunity. At the same time a viable career progression must be maintained for women officers in each specialty in which they may serve. The WOSM excludes Category 1 units and combat arms specialty positions; provides equity in promotions, rotation, and professional development for men and women; considers interchangeable and women only positions; and considers maximum acceptable women officer fill constraints in applicable units. The end result is the maximum number of women officers for whom the Army can provide 6-3
valid positions while maintaining our capability to carry out combat missions.

**Category I units** by the nature of their mission involving the direct combat role are excluded from fill by women officers.

**Officer specialties** which involve the direct combat role are not open to women. These specialties are 11 (Infantry), 12 (Armor), 13 (Field Artillery), and 14 (Air Defense Artillery). Specialty 21 (Engineer) is excluded in Category I units to cover the Specialty Skill Identifier 21A (Combat Engineer). All other specialties and specialty skill identifiers in non-Category I units are open to women if the position is not identified male only for cogent reasons as set forth in AR 570-4.

**Positions in units** are designated and documented as interchangeable unless specifically limited to male or female occupancy under criteria precluding women from the direct combat role or insuring personal privacy of individuals. AR 570-4, dated 17 November 1975, directs implementation of this policy with instructions which mandate designation of unit positions as interchangeable unless the position is unequivocally male or female. All documents are scheduled to be updated by 31 July 1976.

**Promotion equity** is insured by reserving enough noncombat force structure spaces for male officers so that male and female officers will have the same statistical promotion opportunity given the assumption of equal
quality distribution among the populations of male officers and female officers.

**Rotation equity** is determined by computing the number of women each grade could contain and provide equal rotation opportunity for men and women. To accomplish this the rotation distribution is checked by theater and sufficient spaces in addition to combat spaces are blocked off for men to insure the same rotation pattern for men and women.

**Professional development equity** is substantially guaranteed by insuring promotion and rotation equity. If the opportunity for various assignments by type and location, as well as the opportunity to be available for schooling such as officer career course, command and general staff college and senior service college is available by the operation of the rotation equity consideration, and an equal statistical opportunity for promotion has been included, then an equal opportunity for professional development exists. The effect of dual specialty designation has not been addressed yet. Following completion of the Officer Dual Specialty Allocation System (ODSAS) Model, scheduled for late summer 1976, the impact of dual specialty designation can be analyzed.

**Maximum Women Officer Fill.** Analysis of the TOE or TDA of a given unit may indicate that each officer position in the unit could be filled by a woman officer. However, if all of the officers assigned to the unit were women, the unit's capability to perform its assigned missions may be impaired. Therefore, based on the mission and area of employment of
a unit there may be a maximum percentage of the officers assigned who should be women.

C. **Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Evaluation**

TRADOC was tasked to make a doctrinal evaluation of active Army and Reserve Component Category II and Category III TOE units to determine the maximum number of women officers who can be assigned to a unit at any one time and have that unit maintain its capability to perform its assigned missions.

The TRADOC evaluation of TOE units was completed in June 1976. The primary consideration which TRADOC used in the development of maximum numbers of women who can be assigned to particular units at any one time was: the closer to the line of contact a unit habitually operates, the lower should be the maximum permissible women officer fill. This TRADOC developed concept is based upon the combat constraint policy and is consistent with guidelines resulting from a parallel TRADOC study pertaining to enlisted women.

The TRADOC evaluation of TOE's will be reviewed by the major commands which will also evaluate their own TDA units for maximum permissible women officer content. The major command comments and TDA evaluations will be completed in the fall of 1976. While the major command review is in progress, The Army Research Institute will initiate the design of an officer unit test program to validate the TRADOC evaluation. It is
planned that the officer test will be conducted in a parallel time frame with the enlisted unit test now being developed.

D. **Women Officer Training**

The Army goal is for women officers to have the same background and training as their male contemporaries so that they may serve effectively and competitively with their peers.

**Source of Commission.** The Army is taking action to have sources of women officers more closely aligned with those for male officers.

The United States Military Academy will admit women for the first time this summer for graduation in 1980. Plans have been made to admit up to 100 women cadets. Men and women cadets will receive the same training except for minimum essential adjustments necessary due to physiological differences between men and women.

The Direct Appointment Program for women line officers is being replaced by the ROTC as our major source of women line officers just as it is for male line officers.

ROTC training for men and women cadets, including summer camp, is the same except for minimum essential adjustments necessary due to physiological differences between men and women.

Officer Candidate School will be integrated at Fort Benning in October 1976 with the same training for men and women except for variations required by physiological differences.
Professional Military Education. Women officers attend basic officer courses and career officer courses appropriate for their specialties according to the same criteria and standards as male officers. Women officers are eligible for and compete for selection to command and general staff college and senior service college under the same rules as their male counterparts.

E. Women Officer Program Through FY 81 Based on WOSM. The women officer program is based on analysis of the Army force structure by the WOSM.

Line Officers. The WOSM analysis indicates that the Army can accommodate approximately 5600 women line officers. The Army plans to increase to that number by the late 1980's with an annual accession rate of 650 women line officers.

Special Branch Officers. The maximum number of women officers who can be accommodated is not the deciding factor. Rather, the key is that the individual, man or woman, possess the requisite professional qualifications for commissioning in the branch concerned. The number of women special branch officers, except for the Army Nurse Corps and Army Medical Specialist Corps, is small, but is increasing as the number of women lawyers, clergy, and medical professionals in our society increases.

The current program is shown below:
### TOTAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78</th>
<th>FY 79</th>
<th>FY 80</th>
<th>FY 81</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Losses</td>
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<td>375</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>1255</td>
<td>1261</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>1369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Strength</td>
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<td>4884</td>
<td>5359</td>
<td>5727</td>
<td>6131</td>
<td>6599</td>
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### LINE (OPMD Managed Officers)

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<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78</th>
<th>FY 79</th>
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<th>FY 81</th>
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<td>89</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>259</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gains</td>
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<td>170</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>650</td>
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<td>End Strength</td>
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<td>1768</td>
<td>2186</td>
<td>2512</td>
<td>2841</td>
<td>3232</td>
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</table>

### V. CONCLUSIONS

The Women Officer Strength Model (WOSM) applies Army policy in a legally defensible methodology to determine the women officer content for the Army.

Application of the results of the TRADOC evaluation as a parameter of the WOSM will probably require some adjustment in the Army women officer program.

Army training is designed to provide the same background and education for men and women officers.

The number of women officers is increasing in a phased orderly program.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Continue to use WOSM to analyze Army force structure to establish permissible women officer content.

Review and revise the Army women officer program as part of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) as changes occur in force structure, loss projections, and availability of potential women officers.

Continue to insure that men and women officers have the same training and assignment opportunities consistent with Army policy of no direct combat role for women.
CHAPTER 7
Review of Pregnancy/Sole Parent Dependency Policies

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I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

To collect and analyze data on the impact of the current pregnancy/sole parent dependency policies on field operations of units, readiness and deployability.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Objectives

To measure the extent to which the current pregnancy/sole parent dependency policies affect field operations, readiness and deployability.

To determine the effect of the pregnancy/sole parent dependency policy on female loss rates.

B. History

Prior to October 1970, the Services were permitted to involuntarily discharge pregnant servicewomen; however, at that time Department of Defense directed that pregnant women could be retained based on a case-by-case review. In April 1971, the Army implemented this policy for married women and in December 1973 the policy was expanded to allow pregnant servicewomen to request retention on active duty regardless of marital status. In September 1974, the involuntary separation of officers for pregnancy or parenthood was discontinued. The following April, Department of Defense directed that involuntary separations be discontinued for enlisted women also. The Army's request that implementation be postponed
was denied; however, Department of Defense agreed to reevaluate the policy after a year's experience. The experience data has been forwarded to DOD with a request that the old policy of involuntary separations for pregnant women be reinstated.

III. METHODOLOGY

Regulations governing pregnancy, parenthood, extreme family problems, separation because of dependency or hardship, and leave during prenatal and postpartum care were reviewed to insure that these policies are equitable for both women and men, as applicable.

Comments were requested from Major Army Commands (MACOMs) regarding the impact of the current pregnancy/parenthood policy on field training, morale and discipline, assignment, utilization, personnel problems, readiness, deployability and mission accomplishment. Additionally, the MACOMs were requested to determine if service members with dependents, particularly sole parents, both male and female, are adversely affecting unit readiness and mission accomplishment.

The MACOMs were also requested to provide pertinent data which would reflect the results of implementing the Department of Defense policy changes. These and other related data on this subject were analyzed.
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

A. Current Policies - Pregnancy

Subject to one exception, servicewomen who become pregnant after entry on active duty are retained unless they request discharge. Under the Trainee Discharge Program (TDP), a woman in a training status who becomes pregnant after entry on active duty will be involuntarily discharged if it is determined that full participation in the training program cannot be continued because of her physical condition. When it is determined that a servicewoman was pregnant prior to entry on active duty, she is discharged involuntarily.

Pregnant servicewomen are required to wear civilian maternity clothes obtained at their own expense.

Pregnant servicewomen must continue to perform duties during the prenatal period until such time as continued performance is no longer considered feasible by their physicians. They are then placed on sick-in-quarters status, normally not to exceed four weeks. Convalescent leave, normally not to exceed six weeks, is authorized during the postpartum period.

Pregnant servicewomen are not eligible for overseas assignments, either as individual replacements or as members of a deploying unit.

B. Comments from MACOMs on Pregnancy

Numerous comments from the MACOMs indicate that the presence of pregnant
servicewomen is having a disruptive effect on the continuity of unit and individual training. Servicewomen in the mid to advanced stages of pregnancy are exempt from Nuclear, Biological and Chemical training and cannot accomplish annual weapons qualifications. Often pregnant women must be exempted from unit field training due to factors such as the lack of access to appropriate medical support, the need for special diets, the necessity to wear maternity clothing, and the likelihood of increased accident exposure for both parent and unborn child.

The MACOM comments also reflect an adverse impact on morale, caused by the retention of the pregnant servicewomen. In many cases, resentment toward the pregnant servicewoman develops among those soldiers who must perform all or part of her official and extra duties during her pregnancy related absences. Additionally, male personnel become disgruntled over assignment or reassignment to less than desirable locations (remote sites, etc) to accommodate the assignment of pregnant servicewomen. Some soldiers have expressed the belief that pregnant servicewomen receive preferential treatment concerning duty hours, duty assignments, inspections and sick call. Frequently this is true, as many pregnant servicewomen must be transferred to less physically demanding duties during the term of pregnancy, thus creating personnel turbulence and decreasing operational efficiency. In the medical field, unless certain precautions and limitations are taken, pregnant women cannot be assigned to contagious disease wards or radiology functions, again creating more personnel turbulence and staffing difficulties.
The most significant impact reported by the MACOMs is in the area of unit readiness, deployability and mission accomplishment. By policy, pregnant servicewomen are not deployable to overseas areas; however, they must still be applied against unit TOE/TDA positions, thus prohibiting requisitions for replacements. If such a unit is required to deploy, it would be forced to depart at less than full strength or with late arrivals who have not been properly integrated into its functions. During a recent emergency relief mission to Guatemala, one field hospital reported that had all its personnel been required by the mission, 14 out of 64 (14%) women assigned would have been nondeployable due to pregnancy.

One of the key problems caused by the change in the pregnancy policy is that the option for discharge, and the timing thereof, has shifted from the commander to the individual. This places the commander in the uncertain position of having potential personnel losses in his unit, but not knowing when they will occur, thereby not being able to requisition timely replacements.

Mission effectiveness has been affected in two ways by pregnant servicewomen. First, the pregnant servicewomen often cannot perform her normal full share of duties because of her physical condition and secondly, during the period of pregnancy and recovery, the servicewomen must be totally away from her assigned job for considerable periods of time. Such losses of manpower in smaller units or activities are especially critical in the proper accomplishment of the unit mission.
Examples of this problem have been reported in the clerical and cooking skills. Units cannot easily compensate for lengthy periods of lost time because of the specialized skills involved and low number of personnel authorized in these MOS.

C. Analysis of data on pregnancy

Based on data submitted by the MACOMs for FY 75, at any one time, approximately 3.8% of the women on active duty will be pregnant with the intention of going to term or through postnatal convalescent leave, and, as such, are nondeployable. Those women who go to full term, including convalescent leave, will be nondeployable for approximately 8.5 months or 71% of a year. Reports indicate that on the average, 105 days (29% of a year) are lost from the job for each pregnancy carried to full term. This exceeds by 35 days the 70 days (4 weeks prenatal, 6 weeks postpartum) provided by Department of Defense policy. Approximately 40% of those servicewomen who deliver children are separated from the Army at their request after birth of the child or postnatal leave. Further analysis of the data submitted by the MACOMs is at Annex A.

For a force of 55,000 women, these data indicate that approximately 2100 would be known to be pregnant or in postpartum leave, and as such are nondeployable, at any one time. Of the 2100, nearly 900 would be absent from their job at any one time and over 800 would leave the Army voluntarily after the birth or postpartum leave.
A survey of officers conducted by the Army Medical Specialist Corps indicated that the average number of days lost by women for medical reasons was nearly doubled when days lost due to pregnancy were included.

D. Current Policies - Sole Parenthood

Sole parents, male and female, may apply for discharge under hardship when they cannot fulfill their military obligations without neglecting their child/children.

E. Comments from MACOMs on Sole Parenthood

Sole parents often cannot perform duties during irregular hours and must be afforded preferential working hours. Frequently work schedules must be adjusted for those sole parents who cannot reasonably care for dependent children and perform rotating shift work. This adversely affects morale among those members who must shoulder the added burden of increased shift duty.

Sole parents must arrange for child care, housing and transportation.

In most locales, the added expense of maintaining a household is beyond the financial capabilities of the younger sole parent. This is a major problem, especially in Alaska, Panama and Hawaii.

Sole parents generally do not have the flexibility to meet many service requirements and need considerable advance warning prior to extended absences.
such as TDY and field exercises. One major command indicated sole parents often must be reassigned when the mission of the unit is performed in a TDY status and the service member cannot go TDY.

Some commands report that only minor problems, which are resolved on an individual basis, have been encountered in relation to sole parents. Other commands, however, report that serious problems exist when significant numbers of sole parents are assigned to a unit. Generally, the number of instances where individuals are requesting deletion from duty rosters, overseas assignment orders, and for hardship discharges relating to dependency problems has increased. This increase is not limited to females.

Indications are that the number of sole parents serving in the Army is increasing, at least partially due to the change in the pregnancy separation policy. As this population increases, so does the potential for larger numbers of unforecast separations due to hardship and dependency.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The greatest impact of the current pregnancy separation policy is on readiness, deployability and mission accomplishment because critical organizational positions in many years are occupied by women who are pregnant but unable to fully perform in their MOS for periods of three months and longer.
The current pregnancy separation policy contributes to turbulence and adversely affects unit readiness, efficiency, and morale. This strongly supports returning the retention option to the Army.

Data must continue to be collected on pregnancy cases in order to support policy development.

There is a requirement to establish a means of identifying and tracking sole parents in order to anticipate and manage hardship and dependency losses and develop supporting data for decisions affecting current policy.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army continue its efforts to reverse the current DOD pregnancy separation policy.

Parameters be developed for use in reviewing individual requests for retention in the event the current pregnancy separation policy is reversed.

Improved data collection procedures be established for both pregnancy and sole parent cases; that this data be reviewed on a regular basis to determine the need for policy changes.
ANNEX A

Statistical Analysis of Pregnancy

Based on data provided by major Army commanders for periods Jun - Dec 75 and Jan - May 76.

-- Those pregnancies that are terminated in abortions result in:

* Average hospitalization of 4.8 days.

* Europe averages 12 days lost time and Korea averages 10 days lost time due to evacuation policies.

* Lost time approximates minor illness.

-- Approximately 5.4% of the women on active duty in FY 75 were pregnant and intended to go to term or did deliver a child.

-- At any one time, approximately 3.8% of the women on active duty will be pregnant with the intention of going to term or through postnatal convalescent leave, and as such are nondeployable.

* Assumes 2 months to confirm pregnancy and 1 1/2 months postnatal leave.

-- Approximately 40% of those women delivering children are separated from the Army at their request after the birth or after postnatal leave.

-- DOD policy allows 4 weeks leave prior to delivery and 6 weeks leave after delivery.

* Reports from the field reveal that the actual lost time prior to delivery exceeds the 28 days when hospital appointments, morning sickness, etc, are included.

* Total lost time prior to delivery varies from 40 to 87 days, depending upon commands. The average is 63.6 days.

-- On the average, every pregnancy carried to term causes at least 105 days of lost time from the job.

* This amounts to 29% of a year.
-- On the average, every pregnancy carried to term causes the individual to be nondeployable at least 8 1/2 months or 71% of a year.

-- For a force of 55,000 women (officers and enlisted), 2,100 would be nondeployable because of pregnancy at any one time.

  ° 1500 would be temporarily nondeployable.

  ° 800 would never become deployable. (They would be discharged).

-- Of the 2100, approximately 900 would be completely off their job due to pregnancy reasons, at any one time.

-- When measured as a percentage of the average female strength of reporting commands during the reported periods, the number of women who remained on active duty during pregnancy rose from 1881 (5.2%) in Jun - Dec 75 to 2590 (6.6%) in Jan - May 76, a shorter period by two months.
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I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Review Basic Training (BT) and special training programs to validate policies with regard to women.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Objectives.

To review the BT program to determine if the same core curriculum, augmented as required to meet specific male (BCT) and female (BT) needs, can be used in the BCT and BT programs of instruction.

To review special training programs (Ranger, mountain cold weather, jungle warfare, Recondo and Airborne) to insure validity of female attendance policies.

B. Overview.

A major goal of the US Army is Combat Readiness. The contemporary international situation and the anticipated lethality and depth of the modern battlefield establish a continuing need for the Army to assess its capability to fight across the spectrum of conflict. The expanded employment of women in the Army since 1972 requires an analysis of the current individual and collective training programs to insure their compatibility with the goal of combat readiness. Of particular concern is the adequacy of training for women
in order to prepare them to contribute effectively
to mission accomplishment on the modern battlefield
in Category II and III units. This includes both the
performance standards required for specific MOS com-
petency and the capability to provide for both indi-
vidual and unit defense.

C. Individual Training Plan (ITP).
The basic purpose of the Army school system is to
prepare individuals to perform those duties which
they may be called upon to execute in time of war or
in peace. This preparation continues in the unit
environment and completes the individual and collective
training cycle. The assessment, therefore, of the
adequacy of entry training for women must be founded
on an ITP which encompasses not only basic training,
but also advanced individual training (AIT) and super-
visied on-the-job training and evaluation in units (Annex
A). The systems approach to training development is
product-oriented and begins with job analysis. This
process determines the tasks that must be mastered,
the selection of the training site (in units or in
institutions), the development of tests and training
materials, and the conduct of training. Performance
standards for MOS competency and physical standards
for individuals to perform their assigned duties
commensurate with unit readiness requirements are
determined (See chapter 9 for expanded discussion of MOS training) by this process.

D. Basic Entry Training (BET).
The objective of BET is to begin the conversion of the trainee from a civilian status to a soldier and to teach discipline, esprit and certain basic combat skills while strengthening the individual mentally and physically. Follow-on AIT reinforces these skills and adds the instruction necessary for a soldier to perform a specific job at skill level 1 in units.

Entry level training is not the panacea for all essential soldier knowledge. Several modes (as discussed in II B) contribute to the adequacy of soldier qualification for duty in units. Supervised on-the-job training, non-resident training programs, Training Extention Courses (TEC), unit training, soldiers manuals and self study.

III. METHODOLOGY
A. General.
The Basic Combat Training (BCT) course of instruction (COI) for male soldiers currently provides the amount and degree of training considered to be the minimum essential for the development of the critical skills necessary for entry level male soldiers. The performance of male soldiers (individually and collectively),
having been given this training, has been supportive of the goal of readiness. Accordingly, the review of Basic Training (BT) for women has focused on the feasibility of applying the core curriculum of BCT for men to the basic training for women, augmented as required to meet specific male and female needs. The ultimate goal is to train female soldiers to equal proficiency at the same skill level as their male counterparts.

B. Comparison of Current BCT and BT Programs

Comparison of the current BCT and BT programs revealed that each curriculum contained approximately 320 hours of formal instruction. The functional categories of training include:

School of the Soldier.

Physical Training.

Weapons Training.

Tactical Training.

Performance Testing and Evaluation

While the number of hours/weeks of training is similar, differences exist in the subject areas of weapons and tactical training. Men receive approximately 143
hours of rifle marksmanship, other weapons training and offensive and defensive tactics. Women receive approximately 72 hours of rifle marksmanship and defensive field orientation training. Due to the disparity in weapons and tactical training, the adequacy of women's preparation for combat contingencies is questionable.

C. Approach to the Problem.
The approach to the problem used in this study was first to seek Chief of Staff, Army concurrence for the conduct of a field test of a general core curriculum applicable to the BCT of male and BT of female personnel, augmented as required to meet specific male and female needs. Approval was granted on 29 March 1976. (Annex B) The second step was to translate this issue into an action tasking for TRADOC. The third step to the approach was to consider the adequacy of the training of female soldiers already in the force (in units).

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
A. Identification of Sub-Tasks.
The TRADOC began development of a general core BCT/BT program of instruction in September 1975. The POI contains offensive and defensive tactical training and weapons training; currently limited to FCT, with
CSA approval for the conduct of a field test, the following sub-tasks were identified and provided to TRADOC for execution:

Continue to develop/staff Test Edition - BT POI 21-114 with a view toward application of the core curriculum to the BCT of male and Basic Training (BT) of female soldiers, augmented as required to meet specific male (BCT) and female (BT) needs.

Initiate a field test of the general core POI, augmented as required to meet specific male (BCT)/female (BT) needs, with non-prior service male and female accessions NLT 1st Quarter FY 77. Because of potential public sensitivity to this issue and for the purposes of this test, male and female trainees must be assigned to separate training organizations.

Furnish a cost-benefit analysis of the results of field testing POI 21-114 to DAPE-MPT by end 3d Quarter FY 77. Should full implementation be recommended, resource implications will be required.

B. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Concept.
A field test of the Basic Initial Entry Training (BIET) program will be conducted at Fort Jackson during the September-December 1976 time frame. The current
BCT program will be the test vehicle and approximately 880 male and 880 female trainees will comprise the test population. The purpose, objectives, and scope of the field test are reflected below:

**Purpose.** To evaluate the relative capabilities of male and female entry level soldiers to meet the skill standards identified for BIET, (Less those assessments into One Station Unit Training (OSUT)).

**Objectives:**

**Objective 1:** To measure the qualitative performance of men and women against the BIET Program.

**Objective 2:** To compare the performance levels achieved by men and women soldiers.

**Objective 3:** To identify the need for modifications, if any, to the BIET Program.

**Scope.** Trainees will be segregated by sex and assigned in equal numbers to separate training companies. Identical training and evaluation will be given to each company in the test population. Cadre will be balanced in education, sex, length of service, experience and grade. Male and female cadre proportions will be maintained among and between test companies. The
test will run for approximately twelve weeks at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Test results will assess the capabilities and limitations of male and female trainees to pass established standards for BIET.

**Milestones:**
Planning meeting to develop the purpose, objectives and scope of the field test - 19-21 May 76

Develop test design - 7-18 Jun 76

Review and approve test design - 21-22 Jun 76

Review and approve detailed plan of execution - 10 Jul 76

Begin pre-test activities and open test directorate at Fort Jackson - 15 Aug 76

Test - Sep-Dec 76

Review and approve test report - 18 Mar 77

Forward test report to HQDA - 15 Apr 77

C. **Training of Female Soldiers in Units.**
In response to a FORSCOM inquiry concerning weapons training policy for female soldiers, major Army Commands (MACOM) were requested to review and comment on the supportability, to include resource impact, of a proposed policy which would provide field commanders
authority for female personnel assigned to category II and III units to participate in all unit weapons (less hand grenades) training required for male personnel assigned to those units. MACOM responses supported adoption of such a policy and confirmed the ability to conduct the training. No adverse resource impact is anticipated. Accordingly, a staff recommendation for adoption of the aforementioned policy was made to the Secretary of the Army (SA). SA approval was granted and the MACOM so informed on 30 June 1976.

D. Second Objective of Task #8, Review of Special Training Programs.

Initial analysis of women's participation in functional training programs, to include flight, airborne, Ranger, mountain cold weather, jungle warfare and recondo was initially conducted during the "Admission of Women to USMA" study (June 1975). The findings of that study were approved by VCSA in September 1975 (Annex C).

Conclusions of that report were:

Participation by women in airborne, flight, jungle warfare, and mountain cold weather training is consistent with their potential for receiving combat support/service support MOS assignments. Jungle and mountain cold weather training is essentially
environmental training applicable to all soldiers. Female soldiers currently participate in this training.
Adoption of a position/policy other than that currently practiced throughout the Army could be construed as discriminatory.

Participation by women in Ranger training is not consistent with the prohibition against their assignment to combat arms MOS. Further, Ranger training presents unique physiological, performance standards and resource considerations. It is designed to tax the capabilities of participating students to the maximum using physical standards designed for light weapons infantrymen. Resources required for the conduct of Ranger training are dollar/manpower intensive. The maximum cost effective use of these scarce resources, e.g., class capability, is highly desirable. Considering the limited number of classes per year and student capacities, participation by female soldiers would decrease male participation proportionately. This would have an adverse impact on the Army's capability to satisfy requirements for Ranger trained personnel in combat arms tactical units.

The propriety of female soldiers' participation in Recondo training has been considered to be in consonance with the Army policy of decentralized training. Many
commanders at all echelons have taken steps to inject imaginative, innovative, challenging and adventurous aspects into their overall unit training programs. Recondo training is being conducted to afford soldiers and their units an opportunity to participate in mission related training which builds unit integrity by developing self-reliance, physical abilities, mental stamina, leadership and incentives for excellence. The application of Recondo training within units is limited only by the imagination and ingenuity of the commander and the resources placed at his disposal. This training is not standardized or funded as a separate category of training by HQDA. In view of Army policy with respect to the conduct of unit training, female participation in Recondo training should remain a command prerogative.

V. CONCLUSION
The review of the adequacy of basic training and other functional training programs for female soldiers remains in its infancy. The inadequacy of their preparation in the essential combat skills necessary for effective participation in Category II/III units has been acknowledged and positive steps taken to address the problem. Objective data resulting from the BIET field test and other ongoing TRADOC research efforts on

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physical fitness training programs for men and women will provide the basis for ultimate decisions regarding training programs for women. To draw further conclusions at this juncture would be purely speculative.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

That the DA Staff continue to monitor the BIET field test, analyze test results and make appropriate recommendations for consideration by the Secretary of the Army.
MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Entry Training for Male and Female Soldiers--DECISION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To obtain CSA approval to field test a general core program of instruction (POI) applicable for Basic Combat Training (BCT) and Basic Training (BT).

DISCUSSION:

1. As part of the Women in the Army Study effort, current policy prescribing entry training POIs for women soldiers is being reviewed. Essential concern is whether BT provides basic skills required by women in performing their expanded role in the Army. Discussion and summary at TAB A.

2. After CSA visit to Fort McClellan in September 1975, TRADOC developed a general BT curricula core applicable to BCT and BT. This POI includes offensive and defensive tactical training and weapons training currently limited to BCT. Current policy only permits "defensive" training in BT. TRADOC is prepared to field test the expanded BT POI beginning 1 September 1976.

3. General core for BCT/BT may be a sensitive issue:
   - May be perceived as a departure from cultural tradition of not using women as fighting soldiers (media coverage can be expected).
   - Perception that general core POI will lead to lessening of standards.
   - Field testing of core POI designed to insure maintenance of standards and appropriate provision for physiological differences of men and women.

4. This action has been coordinated with OASA(W&RA), DAAR, NGB, DAMO, DAIM, DPE-DW, DAJA, DASC and OCLL who concur in the action.

ALTERNATIVE: Continue BT exclusive of tactical and expanded weapons training.

RECOMMENDATION: That TRADOC field test a general core POI applicable to BCT of male and BT of female personnel, augmented as required to meet specific male (BCT) and female (BT) needs, using NPS ascensions.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:

APPROVED CSA WITH COMMENT:
"Inform CINFO so he can stay on top of this."

Approved 8-MAR-76

1 Inc1 as

MAJ Parry/54061/23 Mar 76

Typed by: J. Gray
Expanded Discussion/Summary

1. General. As part of the Women in the Army study effort, current policy prescribing Basic Training programs of instruction (POI) for women soldiers is being reviewed.

- Essential concern is whether BT provides the basic skills required by women in performing their expanded role in Army.

- Comparison of BT and Basic Combat Training (BCT) reveals differences in weapons, tactical training, and subjects related to specific male/female requirements.

  * Men receive 143 hours of rifle marksmanship, other weapons, plus offensive and defensive tactics.
  
  * Women receive 72 hours of rifle marksmanship (M-16A 1 only) and field orientation training.

  * To extent practicable BCT/BT POI's and hours of instruction have been optimized in other subject areas.

2. After CSA visit to Fort McClellan in September 1975, TRADOC developed a general core BCT/BT POI. For the following reasons it is deemed prudent to field test this POI:

- Lethality and depth of modern battlefield and fact that 384 of 419 Army MOS are open to women with assignment opportunity to Category II and III units.

  * Due to anticipated fluid nature of modern battlefield, Combat Support/Service Support units will be vulnerable to attack.

  * DA has publicly stated that women will participate in personal and unit defense. No adverse public reaction has been experienced concerning this policy.

  * Adequacy of women training for combat contingencies is questionable.

  * Women do not receive training in full range of weapons authorized Category II and III units, or tactical and psychological preparation required for unit defense.

  * Lesser training policy may be culpably deficient.

3. General Core BT/BCT program may be sensitive issue.

- May be perceived as a departure from cultural tradition of not using women as fighting soldiers.
- Media coverage can be expected.

- Perception that general core POI will lead to a lessening of standards/toughness (preparation of soldiers for duty in units).

- Field testing/validation designed to insure maintenance of standards.

- General core BT/BCT POI will have no impact on one station unit training (OSUT) combat arms MOS 11B, 11C, 13B, 11D, 11E, 12B, 16P. It will provide insights for OSUT for MOS 36C, 95B, and 95C.

4. TRADOC currently addressing subsets of training required to field test general core BT/BCT POI.

- Conducting test of machine gun training for female soldiers.

- Will initiate testing a new Basic rifle marksmanship program for Army wide application 1 April - 1 July 1976.

- Prepared to test complete general core BT/BCT POI 1 September 1976.

- Test to be conducted in separate BCT and BT BNS. No integration of male and female trainees/units is envisioned.

RECOMMENDATION: That TRADOC field test a general core POI applicable to BCT of male and BT of female personnel, augmented as required to meet specific male (BCT) and female (BT) needs, using NPS accessions.
MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: United States Military Academy Precommissioning Training - DECISION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To determine training policy applicable for USMA cadets.

DISCUSSION:
1. It is anticipated that women will attend USMA beginning the summer of 1976.

2. Defense Procurement Authorization Bill will require the "same training for men and women cadets except for adjustments required because of physiological differences." Secretary of the Army guidance requires the same training to include offensive combat and continues restriction against assignment to combat arms.

3. Current Army policy - women soldiers receive defensive training only.

   a. Participation by women in motivational training, less Ranger is consistent with their potential for combat support/combat service support MOS assignments. Jungle/Northern Warfare training is essentially environmental and applicable to all soldiers.
   b. Female participation in Ranger training is not consistent with policy which precludes assignment to combat arms.

5. Re bayonet, pugil, recondo, weapons training, guard duty, bivouacs, marches and parades.
   a. Law requires elimination of distinctive male/female oriented training. USMA visualizes minimum modification to required training consistent with physiological differences.
DAPE-MPT
SUBJECT: United States Military Academy Precommissioning Training - DECISION MEMORANDUM

6. Guard duty/bivouacs, marches, parades - women now participate in Army units/training centers.

6. Other precommissioning and active duty training programs will be reviewed separately for application of policy approved for USMA.

7. USMA manpower implications are being addressed separately.

8. This action has been coordinated with OASA(MSRA), OCLL, DAAR, NGB, DAHO, DAJA, DAIO, DASC, DAPC, ODWAC, FORSCOM, USMA who concur in the action.

ALTERNATIVES:
1. USMA women cadets participate in all cadet training programs.

2. Exclusion of USMA female cadets from cadet participation in active duty training designed solely for combat arms.

3. Phased implementation of female cadet participation as in the ROTC program.

RECOMMENDATION:
That USMA women cadets participate in individual and collective offensive and defensive training on the same basis as their male counterparts with exceptions limited to those germane to physiological differences only. Standards for participation and successful completion of Airborne, Flight, Northern and Jungle Warfare training will be the same as for active Army students. Women cadets will be excluded from attending active Army courses that are limited to combat arms NOS, e.g., Ranger School.

INCL (TAB A) Expanded Discussion

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3 OCT 1975

Major Perry/54061
Typed by Mrs. Russo

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8-C-2
CHAPTER 9
Review of MOS Training

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9-1
I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Review and evaluate Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) training to determine if a requirement exists to establish physical and operational standards and to develop measurement methods.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Women in the Army (WITA) Study Group Objectives

To review MOS training to determine if:

Personnel are being attrited for physical (physiological/strength/stamina) causes.

Training presented has a high degree of correlation with operational requirements.

To survey the MACOM to determine their assessment of the adequacy of MOS training and to identify critical operational requirements for inclusion in the training program.

To establish standards, as required.

To coordinate with the Surgeon General on measurement methods, where physical standards are involved.

B. Task Interface with the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS). In 1973, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the US Army Military
Personnel Center (MILPERCLN) were chartered, in partnership, to develop a new Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) for the Army. The overall objective of the new EPMS is to increase readiness by improving the management of the enlisted force. The resulting EPMS endeavor provides the basis for logical career progression through integration of enlisted training, evaluation, classification and promotion into a single, well coordinated system. Consistent within this framework, five plateaus (Skill Levels 1-5) of training have been established. A salient feature of EPMS is that the soldier must qualify at the next higher skill level before being eligible for promotion to the next higher grade. Completion of the first level, Basic Combat Training/Advanced Individual Training (BCT/AIT), provides the soldier with the foundation of professional/technical knowledge required to perform in a unit at the first duty station. Upon this basis, additional training received in units qualifies the soldier at skill level 1. The four subsequent levels of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) (Primary, Basic, Advanced and Senior) are designed to prepare soldiers to assume duty positions at the next higher skill level and thus enhance their professional skills. (Annex A).
The TRADOC's primary role in EPMS Implementation is to design, produce, validate and administer the training and evaluation programs that are the substance of the revised MOS (structure) classification and progression systems. TRADOC, capitalizing on proven training methodology, is accomplishing this role through a five step development process:

**Determination of training requirements.** A comprehensive study of each MOS will define it in terms of critical tasks performed by incumbents in each duty position at each skill level. The selection of critical tasks will be a highly disciplined process intended to constrain training to those tasks with a high combat/job payoff. Available training resources must be used to train the critical tasks to mastery and to provide refresher training as may be required to maintain mastery.

**Selection of training site.** The site for administering training for a given task will be selected on the basis of efficiency, effectiveness, and cost. Self study and supervised on-the-job training strategies will be effected when feasible because of the relatively low cost compared to institutional training. Institutional courses will be used for those tasks impractical for
for training through extension training methods because of their nature or because their inclusion in extension programs would overburden the unit or the individual soldier.

**Development of performance tests.** A performance test will be developed for each task before the training is developed. Training will then be developed to train the soldier to pass the test. The resultant performance oriented training has been proven to be the most efficient, effective approach to developing competence in most skills required of soldiers. By training to prescribed performance measures for each task, standards for performance of the task are established and maintained Army wide.

**Development of training and Soldiers Manual.** Training for each critical task for a given MOS is developed by the proponent school whether the training site is institutional, unit or self study. Training destined for unit or self study administration is developed in an appropriate media form for distribution to the training site. All training is performance oriented and includes performance evaluation exercises. Skill practice exercises are prepared for highly perishable skills requiring frequent refresher training. All
training is validated on appropriate samples of the target population prior to its adoption to insure that it is both effective and efficient. A Soldier's Manual is developed in five parts for each MOS -- one part for each skill level. This manual lists the critical tasks for each duty position at each skill level. It contains reference to training programs and related training material for each critical task. Performance tests are also provided for each critical task to facilitate the maintenance of proficiency and preparation for the biennial MOS test.

Development and administration of MOS test. The MOS test, called Skill Qualification Test (SQT) under EPMS, is based on the same performance tests developed in step 3 above. The initial performance tests are modified only to the extent necessary to render them administrable Army wide. The SQT is designed to measure a soldier's competence in performing the critical tasks at his/her present and the next higher skill level. He/she must demonstrate competence at the next higher level to qualify for award of the higher skill level, which he/she must be awarded to become eligible for promotion to the related grade. Results of the SQT are provided to the soldier, commanders, and the TRADOC or other training proponent. Test results are analyzed at all levels to determine the
existence of training or evaluation problems which, when found, are then acted upon.

Due to the uniqueness of the undertaking, EPMS implementation is being phased in by career management fields. Five phases are scheduled; each phase is six months long and all phases are scheduled to be completed by October 1977.

Considering the foregoing, the review of MOS training is an extension of TRADOC's ongoing effort to implement training which focuses on critical job tasks appropriate to EPMS skill levels. Further, as is the case with the EPMS, this task applies to both males and females.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. General.

Within the framework of the EPMS discussed in Section II of this report, the TRADOC and Health Services Command (HSC) are developing critical task lists based on individual training plans for each enlisted MOS which systematically integrate and plan all training from entry level through senior schooling. This training is/will be based on critical task analysis applicable to each MOS and will be documented in the appropriate MOS Soldier's Manual. Identified critical tasks will
constitute the basis for the development of specific strength, stamina, sensory, motor skill and operational performance requirements. This effort requires a combined Surgeon General, MACOM analysis. Critical task identification will not consider male or female distinction/accomplishment. Task performance requirements germane to the MOS description are the key.

B. Approach to the Problem.
The approach to the problem used in this study was to (1) facilitate the coordination between the training development commands and the office of the Surgeon General, and (2) identify subtasks for execution by TRADOC.

Study results are to be translated by Office, The Surgeon General into MOS physiological standards. The specific methodology to be employed will be determined by The Surgeon General considering the individual training plans furnished by TRADOC.

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
A. Identification of SubTasks.
The following subtasks were identified and provided to TRADOC for execution:

Gather statistical information on student attrition for each AIT course which will display the cause for

9-8
individual attrition. The objective of this data collection effort is to identify personnel attrited from MOS training due to the inability to perform required tasks. It should not include those personnel who are attrited for disciplinary or motivational reasons unless their release from training can be directly tied to the inability to complete required tasks.

Make comparative analysis of this data with existing course prerequisites to determine if enlistment eligibility standards require change. Separate standards for male and female soldiers should not be established.

B. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Concept.
Statistical information on attrition may be divided into three categories which can be objectively measured. The attrition categories are mental, physical and administrative with each category having an integral number of specific attrition causes. Recognizing that compliance with task 9 will require a significant effort, it is considered feasible to use the dedicated attrition gathering resources to obtain the maximum amount of data possible. The program design will be centered on an ADP program which will allow for various data correlations, comparing attrition with critical tasks in terms of mental, physical or administrative deficiencies. In
order to define the program for TRADOC wide application, a test sample of two to five MOS will be required. It is anticipated that the data gathered will have application in all MOS.

**Milestones:**

Develop the attrition program concept - 30 Jun 76
Develop the detailed plan of execution for pilot program - 30 Jul 76
Implement program - Aug-Dec 76
Complete data analysis for test sample - 30 Jan 77

**Application TRADOC wide:**

EPMS Group I - 30 Mar 77
EPMS Group II - 30 Apr 77
EPMS Group III - 30 May 77
EPMS Group IV - 30 Jun 77
EPMS Group V - 30 Oct 77

Statistical information on attrition provided HQDA - TBD
Modification of course prerequisites - as required

V. CONCLUSIONS

The task of developing statistical information on student attrition for each AIT course will require a continuous effort extending into PY 78.

It is not considered feasible to develop usable attrition data or revised physiological standards.
for a military occupational specialty until it has been reconfigured in accordance with the EPMS. The EPMS program will be fully implemented by October 1977.

Approved Individual Training Plans (ITP) being developed for each MOS will be provided to The Surgeon General as they become available.

That the aforementioned actions will appropriately address the objectives of this study issue.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

That the TRADOC concept be approved and monitored to completion by the DA Staff.
EPMS
NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

COMBAT ARM MOS

USASMA (22 wks)
(US Army Sergeant Major Academy)

Senior NCO Course

Advanced NCO Course (12 wks)

DIV NCOA

Basic NCO Course (4 wks)

Primary NCO Course for Combat Arms (4 wks)

One Station Unit Training (OSUT) (12-14 wks)

**** Functional Courses

Master Gunner Course
TOW/DRAGON

SKILL LEVEL (SL)
E-1 thru E-4

COMBAT SUPPORT MOS

USASMA (22 wks)

Senior Noncommissioned Officer Course

Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (12 wks)

DIV NCOA

Basic Technical Course

Primary Technical Crs

Primary Ldrshp Crs (3 wks)

BCT+AIT (16-20 wks)

*** Functional Courses

Tank Turret Mech Supv Crs
Master Fire Control Mech Crs

ANNEX A

9-A-1
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I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Survey the attitudes and opinions of a broad spectrum of military personnel concerning utilization of women in the Army.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Objectives:

To identify male and female attitudes toward the utilization of female personnel in non-traditional MOS.

To identify constraints on assignments and utilization of female personnel that may result from attitudes of Army personnel and the general public.

To identify adjustment and special problems of women in the Army.

B. Since 1972 the number of enlisted women in the Army has increased nearly four times to well over 40,000 women. The number of women officers has also increased to a lesser degree during this time. The number of skills and specialties which women may enter has also increased. In fact, women may now be assigned to nearly any skill except the combat and close combat support skills. This dramatic shift in policy is causing increasingly larger numbers of women to enter non-traditional skills (vehicle maintenance, ammunition handling, engineering, etc.) previously reserved for male occupancy. Many of the attitudinal factors which impact on the increased utilization of women have gone largely unmeasured.
The identification of specific attitudinal factors which are affecting mission accomplishment and measurement of the magnitude of the impact of these factors provide valuable information to personnel policy makers.

The most extensive survey conducted in the last three years on attitudes towards the utilization of women in the Army was administered in January 1974. This was a limited survey of 724 Army personnel conducted at three CONUS posts for the Army Research Institute (ARI). Although this effort was preliminary in nature, ARI has been able to complete some extensive analysis of portions of these data. Their analyses have resulted in the publication of several research memorandums and professional papers, summaries of which are provided at Appendix C. Their research has also resulted in the development of a seven item scale for measuring attitude changes by comparison of responses obtained at different times. It is anticipated these items will be surveyed on an annual basis. Additionally, ARI plans to test a number of survey instruments in early 1977 which will lead to a survey sampling the entire spectrum of the Army population. Current plans call for this survey to sample such things as: individuals' beliefs in their performance capabilities; observations of how others are performing; the desirability of using women in a variety of duties including direct combat, preparing foxholes, walking guard, etc; what individuals think others will think about women performing those duties; and what effect individuals think assignment of women to such duties may have in areas such as morale, reenlistments and unit effectiveness.
III. METHODOLOGY

The original methodology called for the development of an attitudinal survey to be administered during the timeframe of the study. Review of existing survey materials and data indicated that considerable material was already available covering a large portion of the population and subjects with regard to women in the Army. It was also determined that any such survey effort by the study group would be repetitious of the more expansive effort already programmed by ARI. Based on these facts and the time constraints of the study group, it was determined that more benefit might be gained by consolidating and analyzing existing data as opposed to attempting to conduct a hasty survey of limited potential value.

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

A. General

It was determined from the review of existing survey data that in addition to the previously described ARI effort, much applicable data exists which has been collected by Army activities, other Services and outside agencies. The following findings and discussion are based on the results of surveys conducted by the Army Research Institute (mentioned above), US Army Military Personnel Center Quarterly surveys in 1974 and 1975, the Army War College (student research), the US Navy, the US Air Force, the Naval War College (student research), the US Army Command and General Staff College, the University of Michigan and the Gallup Opinion Index. A summary of the pertinent information available on each of these surveys
is included in the "Background Notes" at Annex A. For convenience in analyzing these various surveys, the data has been consolidated and categorized into six categories:

- Combat
- Command/Leadership
- Pregnancy/Parenthood
- Job Performance
- Training
- Miscellaneous

The list of consolidated questions and the response information is included at the beginning of each section. The specific survey from which a question was extracted, and the question number within the survey can be identified by the abbreviation and number in parenthesis at the beginning of each question. All survey results are presented as percentages except those of the Army War College (AWC) which are presented as numerical means. These means were based on the conversion of an adjectival scale to a numerical scale as shown here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Slightly Agree</td>
<td>Slightly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Combat

1. (MPC 75-16) Women would make just as good front-line soldiers as men if they were given the same training.
2. (ARI) Women would make good front-line combat soldiers if they were properly trained.

OVERALL RESPONSE

* Agree 47.8
Disagree 51.3

3. (AWC-13) Women can, with proper training, successfully perform any role in a combat environment to include that of an Infantry soldier.

Mean response 3.80 3.53 2.89 3.03

4. (MPC 75-22) & (ARI) If women were assigned to combat units, the Army would be:

(MPC 75-22)

More Effective 2.6 6.6 10.8 7.4
Remain Same 35.5 41.0 59.4 64.9
Less Effective 61.9 52.4 29.8 27.7

(ARI)

OVERALL RESPONSE

More Effective 10.1
Remain Same 36.6
Less Effective 53.3

5. (CGSC-6) The American public is not ready to accept the idea of women in combat.

OVERALL RESPONSE

Agree Completely 39
Agree Somewhat 32
Disagree Somewhat 11
Disagree Completely 3

10-6
6. (UMICH) If anyone should bear arms, it should be men rather than women.

OVERALL RESPONSE

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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</table>

7. (ARI) Women should not be expected to serve in military combat on the front line.

OVERALL RESPONSE

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Agree</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

8. (AWC-1) The Army should allow women to volunteer for the combat arms (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery).

OVERALL RESPONSE

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Agree</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>55.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

9. (MPC 75-23) Congress should let women enter combat units.

OVERALL RESPONSE

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<tr>
<td>Overly Restrictive</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Right</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Restrictive Enough</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. (CGSC-1) Current policy restricts the assignment of women in the Army to Category II and III T&E units (units which provide command and control, combat support, and/or combat support to Category I units), and to TDA units, I feel that this policy is:

OVERALL RESPONSE

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overly Restrictive</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Right</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Restrictive Enough</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. (CGSC-2) Current utilization policy does not specifically limit the presence of women in the forward battle areas, although exclusion from
Category I units does this in a general sense. A recent TRADOC study recommended "No women forward of the brigade rear boundary" as a guideline. I feel that this guideline is:

**OVERALL RESPONSE**

- Overly Restrictive: 50
- Just Right: 35
- Not Restrictive Enough: 15

12. (AWC-18) Men desire that women serve in combat roles on the same basis as men.

**MALE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FEMALE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. (NAVY 73) & (NAVY 75) I would want to be with a woman in combat.

**(NAVY 73)**

**OVERALL RESPONSE**

- Agree: 62
- Disagree: 35

**(NAVY 75)**

**OVERALL RESPONSE**

- Agree: 24
- Disagree: 75

* For purposes of clarity responses have been consolidated from more extensive categories such as "strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, slight disagree, etc."

Probably the key question in this series is the one asked by the University of Michigan in 1973 concerning the use of men or women to bear arms. Nearly three quarters of the civilian populace surveyed indicated they agreed that men rather than women should bear arms. That position was supported, although not as strongly, by the military personnel surveyed in 1974 and 1976 (questions 7 and 5 respectively). Notwithstanding the fact that the Michigan Survey is three years old and the military surveys were
somewhat limited in the population surveyed, the results provide evidence that the public is rather strongly opposed to the use of women in fighting on the front lines. Since the term "combat" was somewhat ill-defined in all of these surveys, there is some question as to exactly what degree of combat--offensive, defensive, supporting combat in a non-fighting role, etc--the respondents related to; however, it is clear that the respondents did not favor the idea of women bearing arms or fighting on the front lines.

Questions 1 through 4 deal more with the question of whether or not women can perform in the direct combat role as opposed to the more philosophical aspects discussed above on whether or not women should participate in combat. In those cases where the information available is limited to the "overall response", the majority did not feel women would do well as combat soldiers. However, in those cases where the responses were broken out by male versus female, the males showed much less confidence in the ability of women to perform in combat than do the women in themselves. This difference may have been conditioned by a number of factors such as background and environment but it certainly raises the additional question, "To what extent is the male response affected by previous combat experience and vice versus for the women?"

The only information available in this regard came from the November 1975 MILPERCENT quarterly survey where the response to questions 1 and 4 above indicated that representatives of the combat arms generally tended to be more conservative, i.e., disagreed with women making as
good front-line soldiers and stated the Army would be less effective
with women in combat units, than did their counterparts in combat support
and combat service support skills. Overall, it appears there is a significant
difference between men and women in the perception of what women are
capable of accomplishing. The men and women also disagreed on questions
8 and 9 which dealt more with the women's right to be in combat skills
and units. It is interesting to note that in question 12 the women
disagreed even more strongly than the men with the statement the "Men
desire that women serve in combat roles on the same basis as men," indicating
that the women are well aware of the male objection to their being in
combat.

C. Command/Leadership

1. (MPC 75-15) Women commanders will not get much respect from the
men in their units.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Agree</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (MPC 75-17) Women don't make good bosses at work.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Agree</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (MPC 75-21) If a greater number of women were placed in command
positions, the effectiveness of the Army:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would Increase</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would Decrease</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would Not Change</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>45.1</td>
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</table>

10-10
4. (MPC 74-33) Would you feel as secure in combat with a female commander as you would with a male commander provided both have equal qualifications?

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF EM</td>
<td>OFF EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely Yes</td>
<td>10.8 14.8</td>
<td>37.0 36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably Yes</td>
<td>21.8 27.2</td>
<td>33.3 32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably Not</td>
<td>37.2 30.3</td>
<td>23.4 21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely Not</td>
<td>30.2 27.7</td>
<td>6.3 9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (CGSC-4) Women are generally accepted in enlisted and commissioned leadership roles by: (Select one)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVERALL RESPONSE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men But Not Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women But Not Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Men and Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Men Nor Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. (AWC-5) Women resent being supervised by men.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF EM</td>
<td>OFF EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>4.78 3.91</td>
<td>5.49 4.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. (AWC-6) Women resent being supervised by women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF EM</td>
<td>OFF EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>4.23 3.75</td>
<td>4.65 3.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. (AWC-7) Men resent being supervised by women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF EM</td>
<td>OFF EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>2.95 2.86</td>
<td>3.09 2.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. (AWC-17) Female officers should be permitted to command rifle companies.
10. (NWC-3) Career development patterns for women line officers should be designed to include the possibility of command in shore activities not requiring operational experience, e.g., communications stations, training activities, recruiting stations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. (NWC-3a) Women officers are temperamentally suited for command.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. (NWC-3b) Women officers can give orders as effectively as men.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. (NWC-3c) Women officers are not really line officers and should not be eligible for (line) command billets except those related to the administration of women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. (NWC-3d) Women as a sex as a general rule are not able to stand the stress and the strain related to being a commanding officer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10-12
15. (NWC-3e) Certain necessary personal attributes for commanding officer are in direct conflict with femininity, and therefore women should continue to be excluded from command and key middle management billets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout the command/leadership series of questions the majority of the males, with few exceptions, sided with the majority of the females. Two exceptions were questions 4 and 9. These two questions have one thing in common which distinguished them from the other questions asked—the element of command under direct combat conditions.

Once again, the males seem to have taken a strong stance against women in direct combat and in this case their stance is emphasized even more by their seemingly favorable stand on the other aspects of women in command/leadership roles.

One other exception to the consistency of the male responses occurred on the question regarding what would happen to the effectiveness of the Army if more women were placed in command positions. The reaction to this question was mixed. The women felt the effectiveness of the Army would not change and the majority of the male officers (51.1%) agreed with that position; however, the majority of the enlisted men (54.8%) felt the effectiveness would decrease.
Over 20% of the women surveyed indicated the effectiveness would increase with more women in command, while over 90% of the men felt it would not change or would decrease.

Several questions deal with the acceptance of men and women in leadership roles. The consensus appears to be that women accept men or women as leaders; however, men have some difficulty accepting women in this role. Although men may have difficulty accepting the woman supervisor, it is doubtful this will affect unit effectiveness or mission accomplishment since a large majority in all categories disagreed with the statement that, "Women commanders will not get much respect from the men in their units."

The results of questions asked of naval officers concerning the effectiveness of women in the command role tend to support the various Army surveys. The men were generally favorable toward women in leadership positions and the majority feel they can be effective.

Overall, the men clearly support women in leadership and command positions; however, in all cases their support was not nearly as strong as that of the women, especially the female officers.

D. Pregnancy/Parenthood

1. (MPC 75-24) Army women with small children should not be required to leave military service. (AR's now permit retention of women with small children.)

10-14
2. (MPC 75-25) Giving maternity leave to women in the Army is unfair to men.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Agree</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (CGSC-3) The current pregnancy policy allows pregnant service members to remain on active duty. Please put a check under the word which represents your feeling with regard to this policy for each statement listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>UNCERTAIN</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. It is morally right</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. It is impractical</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. It appropriately fulfills DOD equal opportunity goals</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. It causes excessive lost time in units</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. It causes units to deploy short-handed on FTX's, unit moves, etc</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. It is an appropriate policy which should be continued</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. It is an inappropriate policy which should be rescinded</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (AWC-14) Women should be allowed more liberal exceptions to overseas assignments (peace or war) based on the needs of their dependents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (AWC-15) Women who have dependent children should not be on active duty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most interesting phenomenon of this section occurs in a comparison of the first and last questions; both of which concern whether or not women with small children should be allowed to remain on active duty. In both cases, the women, officer and enlisted, strongly supported the retention policy, as did the male officers; however, the enlisted men displayed decidedly less enthusiasm for this policy. The surveys provide no hint as to the reason for this divergence but it does appear significant in that it occurred in similar proportions in two relatively large but totally separate surveys.

Regarding the fairness of maternity leave, the women gave similar strong support while the male officers dropped back with the enlisted men to provide slightly over a majority support. Only the enlisted women supported a more liberal overseas assignment exception policy based on the needs of dependents. The female officers, perhaps showing their career orientation, were the strongest dissenters on this proposed liberalization. It is possible that career orientation of the female officers may have been an influencing factor in their responses to each of the pregnancy/parenthood questions. Prior to drawing any conclusions from the response to these questions it must be remembered that since these surveys were administered (except the CGSC survey) the pregnancy policy has been changed from involuntary discharge to retention on active duty unless voluntary discharge is requested. The impact of that policy change might significantly alter the responses to these questions if asked again in the future.

10-16
The responses to the CGSC survey in this section were not considered significant since it was basically a small male population which would have had limited experience with the impact of the current pregnancy/parenthood problems and issues.

E. Job Performance

1. (MPC 75-20) The Army’s mission is best carried out ....

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. By men only</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mostly by men with some women in support roles</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Mostly by men with some women in combat as well as support roles</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Equally by men and women</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Mostly by women</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (MPC 75-26) Most Army women are able to perform jobs that require a lot of physical strength.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Agree</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (MPC 74-36) How well do you think women perform their assigned jobs in the Army?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Well</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Well</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Well</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Well At All</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10-17
4. (MPC 74-37) If your MOS was open to both men and women and they received equal MOS training, how do you feel a women would perform on the job in relation to a man?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. The man and woman would perform equally</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The man would perform better than the woman</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The woman would perform better than the man</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The male response to the first question in this section concerning the best male/female mix for carrying out the Army's mission was predictably in favor of the status quo. The majority of women selected the more liberal view that the mission was best carried out "equally by men and women." Of the remaining 30-40% of the female responses, two-thirds chose the more traditional "mostly by men with some women in support roles" as opposed to the more liberal "mostly by men with some women in combat as well as support roles." This creates some question as to what the women respondents read into the "equally by men and women" response. Since so many of the remaining respondents avoided the response which placed women directly in combat the validity of the majority response is questionable.

In evaluating observed performance of women on the job, over 90% in each category of respondents felt the women were doing well. This response must be somewhat tempered by the fact that the specific question was asked in 1974 before women were moving into the non-traditional skills in large numbers. In a question a year later, the men questioned the women's ability...
to handle jobs requiring "a lot of physical strength." The women showed some doubts in their ability with a mixed response to the same question.

F. Training

1. (AWC-3) Arms qualification should be mandatory for all women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF EM</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mean Responses

2. (AWC-8) Physical training for women should be "tougher" than it presently is.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF EM</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean Responses

3. (AWC-9) Basic training for women should be exactly the same as for men.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF EM</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mean Responses

4. (AWC-10) The average woman is qualified at the completion of basic training to complete a 20-mile road march with a pack and rifle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF EM</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mean Responses

5. (AWC-12) Women receive preferential treatment relative to men while undergoing training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF EM</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mean Responses
Evaluation of the first three questions in this section reveals that the men, officers and enlisted, and the female officers were all generally in favor of the proposals (mandatory arms qualification, tougher physical training and common basic training) to the same degree. However, the enlisted women, on whom such proposals would have the greatest impact, were much more negative toward the ideas. The men were convinced that women get preferential treatment while undergoing training; whereas the women gave a mixed response, officers disagreeing with the men and enlisted slightly agreeing.

G. Miscellaneous

1. (MPC 74-32) What is your reaction to the increase in the number of MOS's open to women in the Army?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th></th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Highly In Favor Of It</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Agreeable To It</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Makes No Difference</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Oppose It</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Highly Against It</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (MPC 74-34) How difficult would it be to provide the appropriate amount of privacy when men and women in a unit live in the same area in garrison and in the field?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th></th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Very Easy</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Fairly Easy</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Fairly Difficult</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Very Difficult</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (MPC 74-35) Do you think male or female soldiers with equal qualification have an equal chance for promotion?
a. Yes, men and women have an equal chance
b. No, men have a better chance
c. No, women have a better chance

4. (CGSC-5) Current policy sets a 45% ceiling on the number of women authorized in any unit or organization. I feel that this ceiling is: (Select one)

OVERALL RESPONSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF EM</td>
<td>OFF EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Too High</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Just Right</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Too Low</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (AWC-4) Women should perform all extra duties that their male counterparts perform such as, guard, KP, grass cutting, CQ, etc.

Mean Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF EM</td>
<td>OFF EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. (CGSC-7) Has the assignment of women caused an inequitable distribution of additional duties within units? (Select one)

OVERALL RESPONSE

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. (AWC-2) Physical requirements for entry into all MOS's should be modified to accommodate women.

Mean Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF EM</td>
<td>OFF EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. (AWC-11) If physical standards are reduced to accommodate women, they should also be reduced for men.

Mean Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF EM</td>
<td>OFF EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. (AWC-16) Military wives do not resent their husbands serving with large numbers of female military personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Response</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1974 less than 12% of the Army males surveyed expressed any opposition to the increase in the number of MOS's open to women. This seems to match the 90% who observed that women were performing well in their job in a previous section.

One of the most significant variations in data appears in the third question of this section. Nearly two-thirds of all the men and the enlisted women felt men and women had an equal chance for promotion if qualifications were equal; however, nearly two-thirds of the female officers indicated that they thought the man had a better chance under those circumstances. Unfortunately, there are no other questions available which provide any insight to this strong reaction by female officers, nor is there any indication of whether or not their feelings have changed in this regard in the last two years.

All of the men and the women officers were in solid agreement that women should perform all the extra duties performed by their male counterparts but the enlisted women, again the group where this would impact the greatest, were much less receptive to the idea. Similarly, the enlisted women differed from the other respondents, but to a lesser degree, when they
agreed (1) that physical requirements for entry into MOS's should be modified to accommodate women and (2) that if the standards are reduced for women they should also be reduced for men.

H. Air Force Survey

In September 1975 the US Air Force conducted a rather extensive survey to measure the attitudes, perceptions, and opinions of women in the Air Force, their supervisors, and their male peers. Many of the results of that survey appear to be supportive of the foregoing data.

A summary of the results of the Air Force survey is attached at Annex B. Some of the more notable findings were:

(1) both men and women perceive sex discrimination in varying degrees.

(2) women do encounter some initial negative opinions from male peers and supervisors; however, acceptance improves after a period of time on the job.

(3) women are more satisfied with the Air Force than their male peers.

(4) by a slight majority, supervisors in the non-traditional career fields (NTCF) believe women are not as capable as men; however, they indicate the women learn their jobs well and are motivated to achieve job standards.

(5) a notable percentage of the supervisors indicated they are lenient in their treatment of women and that they are more reluctant to take disciplinary action against females than males.

I. Gallup Poll

The March 1976 issue of The Gallup Opinion Index was "devoted solely
to women and perceptions of their role in society." Although none of the
material covered women in the military specifically, one section on
occupational/professional skills contained information which may provide
some insight as to the national attitudes toward the utilization of
women in non-traditional skills. In conducting the survey the respondents
were handed a card with 19 occupations and professions and asked the
following questions, "Which of these occupations or professions, if any,
do you feel women would be better at than men?" Then they were asked,
"Now which of these, if any, do you think men would be better at than women?"
The response information follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Women Better Than Men</th>
<th>Men Better Than Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banker</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Mechanic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockbroker</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airline Pilot</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Driver</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalminer</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive of Large Corp.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Senator</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary (grade) School</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fireman</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairdresser</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* less than one percent
From the responses relating to such non-traditional fields as auto mechanic, truck driver, police officer and fireman, it appears that reservations concerning the relative ability of women to perform in these skills exists. It is quite possible that these reservations would extend to another such non-traditional occupation—fighting under direct combat conditions.

V. CONCLUSIONS

a. That Army male personnel are much more conservative with regard to the utilization of women in the Army than Army women and that enlisted women are more conservative than women officers on most related issues.

B. The majority of Army men are generally in favor of the expanded utilization of women and the accompanying liberalization of policies; however, they are opposed to the utilization of women in the direct combat role.

C. That varying perceptions, attitudes and opinions do exist among Army personnel to such a degree that further survey efforts are warranted to identify areas requiring command and/or high level staff attention.

D. That the belief that men do a better job is so widespread that it could affect actual unit capabilities.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. That ARI continue current efforts to complete development of an Army attitudinal survey as quickly as possible.
B. That ARI be tasked to coordinate with the Air Force to determine if the results of the survey referred to in paragraph IV have any application or usefulness to the Army.

C. That consideration be given to expanding the attitude scale already developed by ARI or that additional scales be developed, in order to measure more of the changes in attitudinal factors associated with utilization of women in the Army.

D. That any future Army surveys referring to the utilization of women specifically define what is intended by the terms as used in that particular survey.
ANNEX A

SURVEY BACKGROUND NOTES

All survey results are presented as percentages except those of the Army War College (AWC) which are presented as a numerical mean as explained below.

Military Personnel Center (MPC 74 and MPC 75) -

Questions were asked in the November 1974 and November 1975 MILPERCEN Quarterly Surveys respectively. The population surveyed was representative of the population of the entire Army on a worldwide basis.

Command and General Staff College (CGSC)

Questions asked of selected CGSC students, primarily majors, and various permanent party lieutenant colonels and colonels. A total of 117 officers responded to the questionnaire (not all 117 responded to each question): 17 - 06's, 11 - 05's, 70 - 04's, 10 - 03's. The survey data were not broken down by male/female responses. It is probable that most of the respondents were male.

University of Michigan -

Survey in the Detroit area during the Spring, Summer and Fall of 1973 by the Detroit Area Study of the University of Michigan. Between May and October, 576 interviews were conducted in an area including about 85% of the population of the Detroit Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. The respondents were persons eighteen years of age or more, residing in housing units.

Army Research Institute (ARI) -

Survey of 724 Army personnel conducted in January 1974 at Fort Lewis, Madigan General Hospital, Fort Dix and Fort Meade. Survey instrument was an anonymous 174-item questionnaire which was administered to a combined sample of 800 soldiers. Of this sample, 524 (75%) were men and 181 (25%) were women; 401 (56%) were officers and 320 (44%) were enlisted. Basic data are still available at ARI for additional analysis.

Army War College (AWC) -

Survey conducted at six installations by students at the AWC conducting group research. Report on the research was published in May 1975. A total of 801 soldiers were surveyed: 96 male officers, 79 female officers, 339 male enlisted and 287 female enlisted. Responses were based on an adjectival scale which was then converted to numerical scales as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Slightly Agree</td>
<td>Slightly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10-A-1
Results of this survey are presented as numerical means based on the above scale.

(NAVY 1973) -
Survey of 860 respondents from the Navy fleet conducted in 1973.

(NAVY 1975) -
Survey of 888 Navy recruits conducted in 1975.

Naval War College (NWC) -
Attitudinal survey administered from the Naval War College in April 1972. There were two samples. The first consisted of all naval officers enrolled in the College of Naval Command and Staff and in the College of Naval Warfare (303 officers) from which 185 useable responses were obtained. The second sample was one-half of the women line officer population (343) as of April 1972. A random sample of each officer grade was used. A total of 267 useable responses were obtained from the second group.
The Air Force has recently opened many of the traditionally all male career fields to women. A diversity of opinions concerning the effectiveness of women in these career fields suggests that there are dramatic differences in the utilization and acceptance of women in these jobs. To ascertain the existence and magnitude of problems related to the utilization and effectiveness of women in these jobs, surveys and interviews were conducted with supervisors and non-supervisors (women and men) in both the traditional and non-traditional career fields for women. The results revealed that men and women (non-supervisors) in all career fields perceived discrimination toward women. The men felt women were treated better and the women felt their work was judged more harshly. Supervisors, primarily in the industrial career fields, perceive that women are not as capable as men. Supervisors further report that women learn job tasks equally as well as men, progress in upgrade training equally as well as men, require less attention from their on-the-job trainers (OJT) and are equally as motivated.

In 1972, the Air Force opened many of the traditionally all male career fields to women. Since that time, increasing numbers of women have entered these career fields and are presently in training or on the job. Since these career fields have traditionally been all male, there has been significant discussion concerning women's ability to do these jobs, their acceptance by coworkers and supervisors, and their effective utilization. The diversity of opinions regarding the effectiveness of women in these career fields suggests that there are dramatic differences in the utilization and acceptance of these women. Since the Air Force plans to continue assigning women into these fields, it is essential that a method be developed to surface the problem areas, investigate the magnitude, and, if necessary, develop, implement and monitor a program to correct the deficiencies.

METHOD

To measure the attitudes, perceptions, and opinions of the women, their supervisors, and male peers, three teams of two persons each visited five Air Force installations and administered surveys to individuals in selected career fields.
SAMPLE

One thousand five hundred ninety five Air Force men and women from the non-traditional career fields: NTCF (aircraft/missile maintenance, civil engineer, security policy) and traditional career fields: TCF (administration, personnel and supply) participated in this survey. There were 255 women in the NTCF and 218 women in the TCF. The women were in grades E-1 thru E-5; with the largest percentages in grade E-3 (47%). There were 337 male coworkers in the NTCF and 322 male coworkers in the TCF. The coworkers were in grades E-1 thru E-6 with the majority being E-3s and E-4s (33%/31%).

There were 251 supervisors in the NTCF and 212 in the TCF. The supervisors ranged in grades E-5 thru E-9 and were primarily E-5s and E-6s (37%/31%).

With samples of the above cited sizes, sample data are generally within plus or minus .05 of the population parameters at the .95 level of confidence based on the June 1975 census of the selected career field groups surveyed.

APPARATUS

The survey instrument was developed at the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory (AFHRL) at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.

PROCEDURE

The Consolidated Base Personnel Offices (CBPO) on five Air Force installations were notified to assemble, at random, groups of supervisors, coworkers and women from the selected career fields. Three teams, composed of two Air Force personnel, visited two installations each. They administered the surveys, and forwarded the answer sheets to AFHRL. The answer sheets were scanned, and frequency distributions were forwarded to AFMPD for analysis. The data was refined, summarized, and submitted to the Air Force Chief of Staff by the Air Force Leadership and Motivation Division of the Deputy Directorate for Human Resources Development.

RESULTS

The results of the survey showed that the women and their male coworkers in all career fields perceive discrimination. Men more than women perceive sex discrimination. Sixty percent of the men/NTCF and 50% of the men/TCF report that women receive better treatment on the job; 23% of the women/NTCF and 27% of the women/TCF report this to be so. The majority of all groups feel that women are given the same responsibility as men and are utilized the same as men. However, a large percentage of the men in the NTCF feel differently; 42% feel that women in their career fields are given less responsibility, and 41% believe that women are utilized less.
Approximately 18% of the women feel their work is judged more harshly and approximately 14% of the men feel that women's work is judged more leniently. A large majority (71%) of all respondents report that women do encounter negative attitudes on the job in varying degrees because they are women. Approximately 19% (both men and women) in all career fields perceived a lack of acceptance by their supervisors when they first entered the job. However, all groups report that acceptance improved after a period of time on the job.

The women and the men were inconsistent in their report on how men view women. The majority of men and women in all groups report that men view women as professional working women and equal working partners. However, greater than 60% of all groups report that men view women as inferior to men and only working until they can find a husband.

In response to the questions of degree of satisfaction with the Air Force "in general," women in both the NTCF and TCF are more satisfied than are men (85% versus 75%/NTCF and 81% versus 63%/TCF). Women and men are equally satisfied with their career fields (74%/76%/NTCF, 72%/72% respectively TCF).

The women in the TCF are more interested in cross-training from their present career field than are the men and women in the NTCF and men in the TCF. (71% compared to 51% women/NTCF, 54% men/NTCF and 47% men/TCF). The majority (90%) of all respondents feel that women should be in the industrial career fields. When personnel in the NTCF were asked about their desires to work in their career fields prior to entrance, 87% of the men and 56% of the women express they had a desire for these career fields.

Supervisors were queried as to their opinions and attitudes concerning women working in their career fields prior to encountering a woman in the work environment. Twenty-five percent of the supervisors in the TCF and 37% of the supervisors in the NTCF report having a negative attitude about women. Yet after supervising women, the reported negative opinions held by the supervisors in all career fields changed for the better.

A majority of the supervisors in the NTCF believe that women are not as capable as men (51%). Whereas, 9% of the supervisors in the TCF believe that women are not as capable as men. Conversely the majority of all supervisors (NTCF and TCF) report that women learn job tasks equally as well as men, progress as well as men in upgrade training, require less attention from their on-the-job trainers, and are motivated the same or more than men to reach the required standards of job performance.

A notable percentage of supervisors reported a leniency in their treatment of women. One of four supervisors in both career field groups report that they would be more reluctant to take disciplinary action against a
woman than a man. More than half report that they would make allowances for women that they would not make for men. Supervisors in all career fields report they have no preference as to which sex they supervise.

DISCUSSION

The study indicates that sex discrimination is perceived to some degree by all groups of people in all career fields. The data suggests that some supervisors do discriminate based on sex and the non-supervisors (women and men) are aware of this discrimination. The discrimination perceived appears to be paternalism by supervisors toward women. The male non-supervisors view that as leniency and the female non-supervisors view this as harshness. It is significant to note that all opinions and perceptions change for the better as more women are in career fields for a period of time. The Air Force views women as an integral and essential human resource in the United States Air Force. Their morale, effectiveness, and productivity are directly affected by the attitudes of their coworkers and supervisors. Therefore, positive acceptance of women as equal working partners and professionals is essential.
CHAPTER 11
Survey of Major Commands

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<td>A. Sample MACOM Letter</td>
<td>11-A-1</td>
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I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
To determine the views, ideas and experience of the leaders of the Major Army Commands (MACOM's) and their subordinate commanders with regard to the utilization of women in the Army.

II. BACKGROUND
Due to the comprehensive military background of this group of senior Army leaders, and the fact that they are dealing with the current increase in the number of women serving in the Army, it was considered appropriate, and necessary, to solicit their views with regard to the expanded utilization of women in the Army. More specifically, this effort was aimed at determining the Major Commanders' opinions on issues already designated for study, identifying new or potential problem areas which may not have been previously recognized and sampling the attitude of Army troop leaders with regard to the expanded utilization of women in the Army.

III. METHODOLOGY
On 17 March 1976 a personal letter was sent to each of the MACOM Commanders from the DCSPER (copy of letter is at Annex A). This letter described the basic study group effort and requested the personal views of the MACOM Commanders. The commanders were specifically requested to comment on certain assignment policies, plus a list of nine issues being addressed by the study group was provided for any comments the commanders desired to submit. The MACOM responses were analyzed on an individual and collective basis with a view toward extracting unique suggestions as well as determining
where general consensus exists. The results of this analysis are presented in the following section, "Findings and Discussion," as well as in other Chapters where the results have a direct bearing on the specific subject of that chapter.

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Nearly all of the MACOM Commanders addressed each of the nine issues presented in the DCSPER letter. The overall response to each of the issues will be discussed in the same order as presented in the DCSPER letter, followed by the response to the assignment policy questions. The issues, as presented to the MACOM Commanders, and summaries of their responses follow.

A. Are there MOS currently open/closed to women which field experience indicates should be changed? For what reasons? Of the commanders who responded to this question several specifically stated that the combat MOS should remain closed. The overwhelming reaction to the question was that MOS should be awarded on the basis of ability to perform the task. The commanders clearly are concerned over women's demonstrated physical ability in a number of MOS outside those associated with direct combat. (Further information on the commander's comments concerning physical ability can be found in Chapter 12). In this regard, several of the commanders indicated a need to establish physical strength requirements as a prerequisite to qualification for an MOS.
B. In comparison with their male contemporaries, does the quality of performance by female servicemembers vary significantly in any of the non-traditional skills (such as 05F - Radio Teletypewriter Operator, 36C - Telephone Installer and Lineman, 55B - Ammunition Specialist and 63B - Wheel Vehicle Mechanic)? What skills, in what way and why?

There was practically universal agreement among the commanders that women can perform as well as men; however, all but two qualified their statement to indicate the the performance was equal only as long as physical strength was not a factor in performance and/or as long as training was equal.

The following quote from the TRADOC response summarizes the overall responses,

"Evidence indicates that women perform better in some areas, such as those requiring manual dexterity, accomplishment of repetitious tasks, and continued concentration. Women tend to fall behind in those areas which have significant requirements for physical strength and stamina or for which they have not been prepared by training or experience. It is apparent that we must establish clear-cut physical, mental, and performance standards by MOS and insure all soldiers, men and women, measure up to them."

C. Has assignment of females caused an inequitable distribution of additional duties within units? Is it causing male personnel to perform undesirable additional duties (e.g., isolated guard posts) with an increased frequency?

The reaction to this question was somewhat mixed; however, a number of factors were common to several of the commander's comments. Many of the responses indicated that there has been a general hesitancy on the part of male supervisors to assign women to undesirable and/or difficult duties. Pregnancy, lack of training in certain weapons or subjects, and utilization policy restrictions were also identified as contributing to inequitable distribution of duties. Small units with little flexibility
and units with a large percentage of women assigned have difficulty in maintaining equitable distribution. Several commanders expressed the point of view that female soldiers should be required to perform the same additional duties as their male counterparts. Four of the MACOMS indicated there was no problem in the distribution of additional duties.

D. Is the current pregnancy policy, which allows pregnant servicemembers to remain on active duty, causing units to deploy (e.g., FTX's, unit moves, etc.) short handed or suffer from excessive lost time? All but one command responded to this question. The responses ranged from "currently no significant problem" to "a problem which has serious impact on unit mission." The greatest concern centered around the lost time factor and the fact that losses due to pregnancy and/or dependency normally occur with little or no advance warning. This leaves the unit understrength until a replacement can be obtained through normal requisitioning channels. While some commanders indicated that pregnancy is currently only a minor morale problem or irritant, this quote from the TRADOC letter is representative of their overall concern: "Many commanders consider that pregnancy is not a significant problem now, but one which may become serious at some future point as the number of women in uniform increases." One of the most serious problems surfaced in the responses to this question involves the time lost by military police women who become pregnant. Since pregnant female soldiers are not permitted to wear their uniform after the third or fourth month of pregnancy and limited duty restrictions are often
imposed in the second or third month, military police women are often effectively lost from line duty in their units for periods in excess of seven months. The pregnancy issue is covered in greater detail in Chapter 7.

E. Are units suffering excessive lost time due to sole parent dependency problems (males or females)? Are there other problems associated with sole parent dependency (e.g., non-deployable in emergencies)?

The majority of the commanders either indicated sole parent dependency is not currently a problem or did not address the questions; however, several did indicate that it is an irritant and sometimes becomes a morale factor when dealing with TDY, shift work and schedule flexibility. Some commanders indicated that current regulations and directives are adequate in this area; however, others indicated concern over increasing instances of sole parent dependency problems.

F. Does field experience indicate our training is appropriate and adequate for females or are greater variations in training for males and females required?

Most of the MACOM Commanders who responded to this question were generally satisfied with the current skill training; however, several felt there was a definite need to increase and/or improve capabilities of women in four areas: (1) physical training, (2) weapons training, (3) tactical training (offensive and defensive), and (4) field training. These comments were common to the responses from the three major commands which employ the bulk of the Army's tactical forces.
G. Are the different physiological, psychological, and sociological factors between men and women having any effect on individual or unit capabilities? If so, what are the problems and what needs to be done to maximize our capabilities?

The majority of the commanders either did not respond to this question or stated only minor problems had surfaced in this area. A number of the commanders felt the reason for limited difficulties in this area was due to the success of the Army's human relations educational program. There were some remarks indicating this program should be expanded to preclude future problems. General Deane of DARCOM indicated, "mandatory awareness training should be redesigned to address situations faced by Army women. The key to success is alerting individuals of their prejudicial attitudes towards women." Although the specific responses to this question were limited, it must be noted that numerous comments were made elsewhere in the responses relative to the limited physical strength of women and the fact that males have assumed a protective attitude toward women in not assigning them to difficult and unpleasant duties. These other comments also relate to the impact of physiological, sociological and/or psychological factors on individual or unit capabilities. Chapter 12 addresses this topic in greater detail.

H. Are females being accepted in enlisted and commissioned leadership roles by both men and women? If not, what are the reasons and what actions should be taken?
Nearly all of the MACOM commanders indicated that female leaders, noncommissioned and officer, are being accepted in their leadership roles; however, acceptance is often based on demonstrated ability to lead and supervise. While a few commanders felt there was some need for male educational programs or additional leadership training for women, the majority indicated that those minor problems which exist in acceptance of female leaders should disappear in time.

I. Is it appropriate to set maximum limits on females in Category II and III TOE units and TDA organizations? If so are there other major factors which should be considered in addition to proximity of the unit to the FEBA in normal deployment? Is the 45% ceiling on the number of females authorized in any unit or organization realistic?

The responses to this question were so mixed that no meaningful results were obtained. It appears there is confusion in the field as to the basis for determining how many women may be assigned to a unit. The phrasing of this question did not assist in eliminating or clarifying that confusion. Some commanders indicated that they were under the impression that the 45% ceiling was the only ceiling applied to any unit. This is not the case, as a lower ceiling may be placed on a unit for several reasons. For example, the following percentages on maximum female fill of Category II and III TOE units currently apply: units which habitually operate forward of the brigade rear boundary—zero percent; between division and brigade rear boundary—10%; between corps and division rear boundaries—15% to 30% depending on type unit; units operating behind corps rear boundary
(COMMZ)--25% to 45% depending on type unit; (CONUS unique units--25% to
50% depending on type unit). The 45% ceiling is merely a maximum ceiling
for Category II/III units not held to a lower ceiling for some other
reason. Those commanders who indicated that they agreed with setting
maximum limits on the number of women in units were generally in agreement
that the normal unit deployment (proximity to the FEBA) should be the
primary consideration for determining the maximum female limit by unit.

J. Is the current policy restricting the assignment of women to only
Category II/III and TDA units overly restrictive? Not restrictive enough?
What should it be?

Each of the Major Commanders, with the exception of General DePuy of TRADOC
and General Blanchard of USAREUR, indicated that the current policy restricting
the assignment of women to Category II/III units and TDA organizations was
currently realistic or not overly restrictive. General DePuy finds that this
policy "...has achieved widespread acceptance and is an excellent point of
departure, but it may be unduly restrictive." General Blanchard expressed
the opinion that the policy is definitely too restrictive. He stated,
"Positions exist in Category I units that can be filled by women.
Additionally, some Category I units suffer shortages because EW are pre-
dominant in certain MOS." Since sufficient spaces are retained as "Male Only"
in each MOS to fill all Category I spaces, it appears this problem is
being caused by a maldistribution of male and female assets. Two other
commanders who expressed satisfaction with the current policy indicated
that shifts in our society may require changes in that policy in the future.

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K. The current utilization policy does not specifically limit the presence of women in the forward battle areas, although exclusion from Category I units does this in a general sense. No women forward of the brigade rear boundary was used as a guideline in the TRADOC study. Is this appropriate? If not, what are your recommendations?

Only three commanders indicated satisfaction with a policy which would not allow women forward of the brigade rear boundary. The objections of the other commanders generally fall into two categories:

1. Concern that geographical boundaries will be ill-defined and subject to rapid change in future conflicts, thereby causing the policy to become unrealistic in attempts at application.

2. Concern that such a policy will overly restrict the commander's ability to fully use his personnel assets to deal with the tactical situation.

Although it was not made completely clear in this question, it was never the intent in the TRADOC study to totally exclude women from operating forward of the brigade rear boundary. The study did recommend placing increasing limitations on the number of women in units as those units habitually operate closer to the FEBA. One of the primary reasons for this was expressed by General Blanchard,

"Depending on unit mission, female soldiers should not be assigned in such numbers that their inability to defend themselves detracts from the ability of the unit to do its job." and "A unit with a high density of women may experience inordinate difficulty in defending itself on a modern battlefield and may in fact become a special target of enemy forces."
The key factor considered by TRADOC in determining how many women could be in a unit was the potential effect on the ability of the unit to accomplish its primary mission.

V. CONCLUSIONS
A. That the MACOM Commanders are generally satisfied with the skills in which women are serving and with their performance in those skills; however, they are concerned over establishing minimum physical standards for many skills to insure personnel, both male and female, can fully perform in those skills.

B. That there is an inequitable distribution of additional duties among men and women which is caused by the absence of a clearcut Army policy on assignment of women to extra duties and hesitancy on the part of males to assign women to difficult and/or unpleasant duties.

C. That the loss of female personnel due to pregnancy could be a significant problem in skills where appearance in uniform (such as military police) is a prerequisite to performance in the skill because these personnel are lost from their primary duty positions for up to eight months.

D. That the current pregnancy and sole parenthood policies are having a negative effect; however, the full impact will not be completely apparent until the Army has reached its maximum female strength and accurate data are obtained.
E. That women already in the field needed additional training in tactics, weapons, field training and physical training. (Much corrective action has already taken place in these areas).

F. That women are being accepted in leadership roles as commissioned and noncommissioned officers, but not as rapidly as their male counterparts.

G. That the restriction of women from Category I units is appropriate.

H. That it would be inappropriate to establish a policy restricting women from going into areas forward of the brigade rear boundary in order to accomplish the normal functions of their MOS.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. That the TRADOC EPMS effort to develop Individual Training Plans (ITP) for each MOS continue and that the ITP's be furnished to the Surgeon General for scientific analysis and development of measurement methods. (See Chapter 9).

B. That Army policy regarding the performance of additional duties be established essentially as follows, "that soldiers will not be excused from the performance of unit additional duties solely on the basis of sex. Commanders should, as always, excuse personnel on an individual basis, who in their judgement are either physically incapable of performing particular duties or for whom duties are inappropriate for reasons of sex."
C. That ODCSPER take necessary action to develop essential management information collection procedures and to develop requisite management information displays on pregnancy and sole parenthood cases, and that the data base be monitored on a regular basis to determine appropriate policy changes.

D. That TRADOC continue to review BCT and Special Training Programs to validate policies with regard to women, with emphasis in the areas of weapons, tactics, physical training and field training.

E. That a policy be established that qualified female personnel may be utilized by their commanders to accomplish the unit mission without regard to geographical boundaries on the battlefield (as long as basic combat exclusion policies are not violated) and that this policy be published in appropriate regulations.
Dear General Blanchard:

During the past three years significant progress has been made in expanding the opportunities for women in the Army, both Active and Reserve Components. We have increased their numbers in the Active force from around 12,000 in 1972 to over 42,000 at the end of 1975 and similar experience has taken place in the Reserve and National Guard. We expect to have 6,100 women officers and 50,400 enlisted women in the Active force by the end of FY 1979. The rapid buildup and broadened scope of service opportunities indicate a requirement to revalidate the expansion program.

The recent TRADOC analysis of all Category II/III TOE's to establish guidelines for the maximum female content was a major step forward in determining the full potential for utilization of women. Your efforts in responding to our request for comments on the TRADOC analysis are greatly appreciated. We now have good baseline data for strength determinations, however, there are still many issues to be resolved before we can be assured that we have the most effective male-female personnel mix to accomplish the missions of the Army.

Several actions have already been started to look into certain of the issues, but much more needs to be done. In order to tie everything together, and to look into some unexplored areas, I have asked MG Jack Forrest, Director of Military Personnel Management to establish a study group within the DCSPER. The purpose of the study group is to revalidate the program for the expanded utilization of women in the Army, and recommend changes where appropriate, to assure that it provides for full and effective employment and is consistent with the current and future needs of the Army. I expect the study
General George S. Blanchard

group to make a comprehensive report in July, fully realizing that
all of the questions cannot be answered completely at that time.
However, I am confident that considerable progress can be made.

I consider it vital that the study group have the benefit of actual
field experience, therefore I am asking for your personal views (as well
as those of your subordinate commanders, as you deem appropriate) and
those of the other MACOM commanders in conducting this study. In this
regard, I would appreciate your comments concerning your command's
current experience with the women soldiers (officers and enlisted)
already on board, and any suggestions or recommendations with respect
to the policies governing the utilization of women. Of particular
interest is your opinion with respect to the following specific questions:

a. Is the current policy restricting the assignment of women
to only Category II/III and TDA units overly restrictive? Not restrictive
enough? What should it be? (Latest approved Unit Category definitions
are attached at Tab B to Inclosure 1).

b. The current utilization policy does not specifically limit the
presence of women in the forward battle areas, although exclusion from
Category I units does this in a general sense. No women forward of
the brigade rear boundary was used as a guideline in the TRADOC study.
Is this appropriate? If not, what are your recommendations?

At Inclosure 1, I have provided a list of the major issues to be
addressed by the study group. Your headquarters may be contacted
separately on some of the issues by individuals preparing specific
portions of the study. We are orienting both on a wartime/mobilization
situation as well as peacetime realities. You may have some comments
on those ongoing actions. In any event, please do not be restricted
by our orientation nor feel the need for backup data. My primary interest
is in obtaining your personal views based on your experience. This
will help us greatly in the establishment of policy.

Due to the time constraints of the study, I would appreciate receiving
your response by 14 May 1976.

1 Inclosure 1

as


## CHAPTER 4

### MOS NOT AVAILABLE FOR WAC PERSONNEL

All enlisted MOS are available to WAC personnel, except the following which are associated with combat, or close combat support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS Code</th>
<th>MOS Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11B</td>
<td>Infantryman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11C</td>
<td>Indirect Fire Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11D</td>
<td>Armor Reconnaissance Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11E</td>
<td>Armor Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11Z</td>
<td>Maneuver Combat Arms Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12B</td>
<td>Combat Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12C</td>
<td>Bridge Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12D</td>
<td>Powered Bridge Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12E</td>
<td>Atomic Demolition Munition Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12F</td>
<td>Combat Engineer Tracked Vehicle Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12Z</td>
<td>Combat Engineering Senior Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13B</td>
<td>Cannon Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13C</td>
<td>Field Artillery Senior Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15B</td>
<td>SERGEANT Missile Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15D</td>
<td>LANCE Missile Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15E</td>
<td>PERSHING Missile Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15F</td>
<td>HONEST JOHN Rocket Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16L</td>
<td>LANCE/HONEST JOHN Operations/ Fire Direction Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16F</td>
<td>Light Air Defense Artillery Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16P</td>
<td>CHAPARRAL Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16R</td>
<td>Short Range ADA Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17K</td>
<td>Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22N</td>
<td>NIKE-HERCULES Missile-Launcher Repairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22K</td>
<td>HAWK Missile and Launcher Repairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27D</td>
<td>LANCE Missile System Repairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27E</td>
<td>Wire-Guided Missile Systems Repairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27F</td>
<td>CHAPARRAL/VULCAN Air Defense Systems Repairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27G</td>
<td>REDEYE Missile System Repairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27H</td>
<td>SHILLELAGH Missile System Repairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27L</td>
<td>LCSS-Missile Maintenance Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31G</td>
<td>Tactical Communication Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54C</td>
<td>Smoke and Finne Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82C</td>
<td>Field Artillery Surveyor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNIT, CATEGORY (310-25)

UNITS ARE DIVIDED INTO THREE CATEGORIES AS FOLLOWS:


CATEGORY II -- A UNIT, ORGANIZED UNDER TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT, WHOSE MISSION IS PRIMARILY THAT OF PROVIDING COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMBAT SUPPORT, OR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO CATEGORY I UNITS. IT OPERATES IN THE COMBAT ZONE, NORMALLY BETWEEN THE BRIGADE AND CORPS REAR BOUNDARIES.

CATEGORY III -- A UNIT, ORGANIZED UNDER TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT, WHOSE MISSION IS PRIMARILY SERVICE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITS OPERATING IN THE COMBAT AREA AND OPERATING AGENCIES OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE. THE UNIT FUNCTIONS HABITUALLY IN THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE OR ALONG THE LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS LEADING THERETO.
1. Are there MOS currently open/closed to women which field experience indicates should be changed? For what reasons? (Current list of closed MOS is attached at Tab A).

2. In comparison with their male contemporaries, does the quality of performance by female servicemembers vary significantly in any of the non-traditional skills (such as: 05F-Radio Teletypewriter Operator, 36C-Telephone Installer and Lineman, 55B-Ammunition Specialist and 63B-Wheel Vehicle Mechanic)? What skills, in what way and why?

3. Has assignment of females caused an inequitable distribution of additional duties within units? Is it causing male personnel to perform undesirable additional duties (e.g., isolated guard posts) with an increased frequency?

4. Is the current pregnancy policy, which allows pregnant servicemembers to remain on active duty, causing units to deploy (e.g., FTX's, unit moves, etc.) short-handed or suffer from excessive lost time?

5. Are units suffering excessive lost time due to sole parent dependency problems (males or females)? Are there other problems associated with the sole parent dependency (e.g., non-deployable in emergencies)?

6. Does field experience indicate our training is appropriate and adequate for females or are greater variations in training for males and females required?

7. Are the different physiological, psychological, and sociological factors between men and women having any effect on individual or unit capabilities? If so, what are the problems and what needs to be done to maximize our capabilities?

8. Are females being accepted in enlisted and commissioned leadership roles by both men and women? If not, what are the reasons and what actions should be taken?

9. Is it appropriate to set maximum limits on females in Category II and III TOE units and TDA organizations? If so, are there other major factors which should be considered in addition to proximity of the unit to the FDDA in normal deployment? Is the 45% ceiling on the number of females authorized in any unit or organization realistic? (Latest approved Unit Category definitions are at Tab B).
CHAPTER 12
Review of Physiological, Psychological and Sociological Factors

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<td></td>
<td>ANNEX B. Bibliography</td>
<td>12-B-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Review of physiological, psychological and sociological factors.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Objectives

To isolate and identify those physiological, psychological and sociological factors which may have a significant effect on the utilization of women in the Army.

To determine the impact of these factors on the utilization of women in special environments.

B. Historical Development

Commencing in 1972, the Army embarked on an extensive program to expand the utilization of enlisted women within its ranks. Looking back at World War II experience it was obvious that women were capable of performing in many more of the Army's skills than was then permitted. However, at that point in time they were restricted to Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) units.

In order to significantly increase the number of positions available it was necessary to permit assignment of enlisted women to Category II and III units (primarily combat support and service support type organizations). This decision resulted in an objective strength of first 24,000 and, subsequently
of 50,400 to be achieved in FY 79. Category I units (direct combat) and combat and close combat support MOS remained closed. In addition, the number of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) was increased from 185 to 434 out of 482 (now 384 of 419) and the disbandment of the WAC Detachments was encouraged where facilities permitted. This latter action permitted women to be assigned to the units in which they were to be utilized and, as a side effect, frequently resulted in integrated barracks.

The recruitment of increased numbers of women was accomplished in a highly successful manner. The basic training capability of the Army was expanded by the establishment of an additional training brigade for females at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Advanced individual training in the various MOS was accomplished on an integrated basis at the same schools as males with the same training standards.

As the women began to join the units in increasing numbers and in a wide variety of jobs, it soon became apparent that expansion plans had not fully considered all the ramifications. Reports from several sources indicated that the various commands were experiencing difficulty in integrating women into the units on a one-for-one basis. The General Accounting Office in a report to Congress on military job opportunities for women reported that a large number were assigned to specialties with physical...
and operational requirements which apparently limited or precluded their effective performance. This was attributed primarily to the lack of standards for measuring the ability of people to satisfy strength, stamina, and operational performance requirements. In addition, the GAO indicated that training did not always represent field conditions. (GAO, 1976)

The Health Services Command, in comments relating to the Training and Doctrine Command recommendations on the maximum content of women units, clearly pointed out that there is a point of diminishing returns in the use of women. Specific problems were cited with regard to the movement of large numbers of patients under field conditions and with tent and MUST (Medical unit, self-contained, transportable) shelter erection for medical units. Similar observations have also been made in a Department of the Army (DA) Inspector General Report, and as a result of visits to the field by DA staff members.

The indicators cited above highlight a broad range of topics regarding the utilization of women which have never been addressed or only inadequately so. The opening of a large number of MOS and, more importantly, Category II and III units has placed women in a variety of situations for which there is little or no precedent. These range from supervision of all male organizations to tactical training in field environments and, potentially, in defensive combat situations.
The Army's primary role remains a traditional one--ground-combat--and, in the final analysis, it is in this context (as with males) that we must examine the full potential of women. It is noted in The American Soldier that, "In a war (WW II) in which the trend was clearly toward the development of intricate weapons requiring highly specialized skills for their management, ground warfare still required the maximum of physical and emotional endurance." (Stouffer, 1949) This statement remains accurate even today. In The American Enlisted Man, the combat environment in Vietnam is described in the following terms:

In the combat situation, the soldier not only faces the imminent danger of loss of life and, more frightening for most, limb, but also witnesses combat wounds and deaths suffered by "buddies." Moreover, there are the routine physical stresses of combat existence: the weight of the pack, tasteless food, diarrhea, lack of water, leeches, mosquitos, rain, torrid heat, mud, and loss of sleep. In an actual firefight with the enemy the scene is generally of utmost chaos and confusion. Deadening fear intermingles with acts of bravery..." (Moskos, 1970)

It is apparent, then, that the Army must not only meet the challenges of the garrison and field training environment but must also be able to assess the capability of women to perform in a milieu which demands the utmost of each individual, both physically and mentally. In considering this task it is important to recognize that while there are volumes of material on the performance of male soldiers in war we are just beginning to scratch the surface with regard to the expanded role of women in this arena.
III. METHODOLOGY

A. Staff visits were made to the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York and the United States Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. At USMA, ongoing and planned projects were discussed with representatives of the Office of Physical Education, Office of Military Leadership, Directorate of Admissions and Registrar, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Security, Directorate of Institutional Research, and the 2d Regiment. At USMAPS, training progress of female candidates and first-hand experience with an integrated training program was discussed with the school staff. Interviews were also conducted with male and female candidates.

B. Input was requested and received from all major commanders (MACOMS) on the utilization of women (see Chapter 11). In addition, the Office of The Surgeon General and Commanders of the Training and Doctrine Command and the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command provided specific data on physiological, psychological and sociological factors.

C. Conferences were conducted with representatives of the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, Training and Doctrine Command, and the Office of The Surgeon General to discuss in detail their programs.

D. An extensive literature review was conducted and contact was made with numerous agencies to include the United States Air Force, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; President's Commission on Physical Fitness and Sports; National Aeronautical and Space Administration; Natick Laboratories; Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (ARIEM); and the American Alliance for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation (AAHPER) to gather additional materials.

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
A. Physiological

Overview - Review of data available on military relevant physical capabilities of women revealed that no comprehensive body of information collected on a scientific basis existed prior to 1975. Fortunately, as a result of planning for the entrance of women cadets to West Point, the Office of Physical Education, USMA, in conjunction with ARIEM, initiated studies which subsequently provided at least a partial data base on which decisions concerning women in the Army could be made. It is further anticipated that other projects and activities scheduled for this summer (1976) at USMA will make significant contributions to the Army's efforts to assess and make full use of women's potential. These and other significant findings are outlined below.

Major Command Comments - The general consensus based on current experience is that on the average women have less strength and stamina than male
soldiers and a lower level of physical fitness. A sample of pertinent commentary is indicated below:

Forces Command - "...the only substantial difference in the level of skill performance between males and females is that some women experience difficulty in completing tasks which require physical strength."

US Army, Europe - "The quality of performance differences occur primarily in functions that require physical strength and stamina."

Training and Doctrine Command - "Women tend to fall behind in those areas which have significant requirements for physical strength and stamina or for which they have not been prepared by training and experience. It is apparent that we must establish clear-cut physical, mental, and performance standards by MOS and insure all soldiers, men and women, measure up to them."

United States Forces, Korea - "Very few females are physically prepared to hold up under a strenuous PT program even when given adequate time for conditioning. The daily three mile run is almost impossible for most."
Physiological Differences Between Men and Women - An extensive literature search conducted at USMA revealed the following: (Peterson, 1975)

Much of the basis for physical performance dissimilarity between men and women is due to physiological differences.

Because of differences between men and women on anthropometric and body composition measures, men perform far better than women in activities which require strength, speed and power. These differences include:
- women have less bone mass, less muscle component, but more fat than men;
- men have a higher center of gravity, different pelvic structure, wider shoulders, narrower hips, longer legs, and a greater ventilation capacity.

Because of differences between men and women on cardiorespiratory factors, men have a greater potential for endurance that cannot be matched by women. In addition, at submaximal work levels, women have to work much harder to accomplish the same amount of work. For any given submaximal work load, women are always operating at a level closer to their maximum than men and will reach exhaustion sooner.

Women have less tolerance to heat than men. Accordingly, under higher levels of heat condition, a woman has to work relatively harder than a man to achieve similar work loads.
Research suggests that sports activity has little effect on menstruation and that no restriction should be placed on the physical activity of average women at any phase of their cycle.

Project 60 - In order to establish baseline data in regard to incoming female cadets, West Point conducted a comparative test of two types of physical training programs (strength building and exercise) on the performance of sixty 16-18 year old women (local high school athletes). Significant findings were: (Peterson, 1976)

Initial aerobic power, a general indicator of cardiorespiratory fitness, as measured by maximal oxygen uptake ($VO_2$ Max) was high for the subjects (Figure IV.A.1). Post-training results were very good (+10%) for the exercise group and mild (+6%) for the strength group. Post-training results on the Physical Aptitude Examination (PAE) (standard evaluation test for admission to USMA) revealed a high performance level for the subjects vis-a-vis women USMA candidates, however, still significantly below average male cadets (Figure IV.A.2). Degree of improvement was +25.4% for the strength group and +26.4% for the exercise group.

Only 2 or 3 subjects could handle an extended run at an 8:15 pace (per mile) wearing boots.
Project 60A - This was an extension of the original study entitled "Project 60." Project 60A focused on carefully selected segments of training or actions experienced in the course of military training where a question existed pertaining to the ability of women to perform the segments or actions because of physiological differences. Testing consisted of two hours of training to do right shoulder arms and inspection arms with the M14 Rifle; a dummy grenade throw for distance; one hour of bayonet training with the M16 Rifle to evaluate endurance; M16 Rifle, M60 Machine Gun, and caliber .45 pistol firing; and a 12.5 mile foot march which duplicated the most difficult march of the Cadet Basic Training Program. Results indicated no adjustments were required for the right shoulder arms, grenade throw, weapons firing, and foot marches. Slight modification of the M14 Rifle for inspection arms (shortened spring) and use of the M16 Rifle for bayonet practice (USMA, 76).

Basic Training - This study was conducted by AFIEM to meet two objectives: First, to assess entry level of physical fitness and second, to assess improvement after six weeks. Findings: (Vogel, 1976)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VO2Max (Ml/kg/min)</td>
<td>1st Week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cardiorespiratory fitness, as measured by VO2 max, of males entering the Army can be considered good to excellent by most standards for this age group.
FIGURE IV. A. 1

$VO_2$ Max (Ml/Kg/Min) of Selected Populations

- Deconditioned Aging Individuals
- Untrained College-Age Females
- Untrained College-Age Males
- Trained College-Age Female Athletes
- Trained College-Age Male Athletes
- Highest Recorded Value - Championship Norwegian Skier

12-12
FIGURE IV. A. 2

A Comparison of PAE Scores Between The USMA Female Candidates, Project 60 Group and The Class of 1979, USMA (mean values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMA Female Candidates (N = 470)</td>
<td>162.3</td>
<td>115.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 60 (N = 57)</td>
<td>219.43</td>
<td>85.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class of 1979 (N = 1433)</td>
<td>553.2</td>
<td>74.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*POST TRAINING PERFORMANCE*
The physical training portion of BCT was very effective in improving cardiorespiratory fitness in men as seen by a significant improvement in VO$_2$ max.

No significant improvement in cardiorespiratory fitness of females was found as a result of basic training. This would indicate that the program is insufficiently challenging.

The initial level of fitness of women entering the Army compares favorably with other groups of females studies of comparable age.

**Strength/Work Capacity/Endurance** - Data provided by ARIEM indicates that the strength of females, as a group, is approximately 60% of that of males, as a group. Another study states that the average woman has about 55% of the muscular strength of the average man and about 67% of his endurance capacity. (Watkeys, 1974) Dr. Peterson, USMA, reported that even when size is held constant females are only 80% as strong as males. He further noted that researchers attribute this condition to hormonal changes which occur in males at puberty. Also that one study found that even when females had similar strength training programs, males improved 50% whereas the females only improved 24%. (Peterson, 1976) Figure IV.A.3 gives additional differential data on work capacity.
Work Capacity as a Function of Age, Sex, and Physical Condition (Goldman, 1976)
**Youth Fitness** - Initiated in 1957 by the AAHPER, the Youth Fitness Test has been used to establish national norms. The AAHPER noted, as a result of the 1957 test, that the young people (age group: 10-17) were not as physically fit or vigorous as they should be. A 1965 update showed more improvement, however, the level of physical performance was not encouragingly high.

The results of the 1975 national survey showed that there has been no significant improvement in the fitness of our youth in the last 10 years. Review of the 1975 comparative data between boys and girls shows a significant increase in the rate of improvement of boys starting at around age 11 which leads to a much higher performance level at age 17. (AAHPER, 1976)

**Heat/Cold Stress** - Research by ARIEM indicates that the markedly reduced metabolically active body mass and the disproportionately reduced surface areas of the female add up to a faster cooling rate and a lower skin temperature. For comfort and to prevent injury, they require more clothing insulation, particularly on the extremities. Further, once vasoconstriction has occurred in severe environments, female tolerance time is less. With regard to heat, women have a reduced ability to move heat from the body core to the skin and thus a greater rate of body heat
storage, which reduces their tolerance time. The tolerance time can be increased by acclimation to work in the heat; however, women will always remain at a relative disadvantage. (Burse, 1975)

Physical Training (PT) - TRADOC is currently examining the requirement for physical training in the Army in order to design a more satisfactory program. The purpose of PT program is seen as (1) to enhance combat readiness and (2) to achieve good health and appearance. Consideration will be given to the physiological capabilities of women but the focus will be on accomplishment of the Army mission. This effort will be coordinated with the TRADOC common core Basic Training/Basic Combat Training test and MOS Training review (see Chapters 8 and 9).

MAX WAC Test - ARI is preparing a test plan to assess the effects of varying the percentage (from a baseline established by TRADOC) of female soldiers assigned to representative types of TOE units on the capability of the units to perform their mission under field conditions. Overall unit performance will be the primary measurement criterion. Results are expected in October 1977.

USMA Projects - Projects and activities taking place at USMA this summer (1976) will provide additional information on the performance of women, especially in a military environment. These include:
Project Summertime. This study will examine 30 men and 30 women cadets to compare the level of muscular strength, power, endurance, and cardiorespiratory efficiency and to assess the effect of the cadet basic training program. (Stauffer, 1976)

New Cadet Training. The performance of women cadets participating in the program, which includes drill and ceremonies, field training and physical training, will be analyzed.

B. Psychological/Sociological

Overview - As in the physiological area, there is only limited information available with regard to psychological and sociological factors impacting on the utilization of women. This deficiency and the probable cause is aptly described in Human Relations in the Military:

In the United States, women have been in the military officially for only thirty years. In comparison with men, however, there is a decided paucity of information and data about female military personnel and problems. Since at their peak of participation in the military (1945), women represented only 2 percent of the total forces, there is some reason for the neglect or omission of women from past military analyses. With new emphasis being placed on female recruitment for the military, however, decision-makers find themselves in the position of having to make judgments on the basis of incomplete or nonexistent data. Concerted efforts are being made to remedy this problem.

(Henderson, 1975)

Findings of a recent study at West Point highlight the problem and point up some of the shortcomings of current efforts. An extract of the USMA memorandum indicated:
Serious study of psychological sex differences has only begun and several factors influence the content and direction of current study effort. The change in the role of women in our society is in a rapid state of evolution. Although the American Psychological Association has recently established a distinct division dealing with the study of the psychology of women, the parameters of this specialty have not been clearly established. Too, much of the study effort is focused on the extent of the biological base (glandular, physiological) of differences versus the extent of the cultural base (socialization process) of differences. Distinguishing the importance of the main effects of the biological/cultural etiology of these differences from the interaction effects of the two presents methodological problems that have yet to be satisfactorily resolved. Finally, the value system of the researcher is central to much of the study effort to date. (USMA, 1976)

Review by the Office of the Surgeon General found that there are no systematic studies which have addressed the issue of women in a combat environment. The present state of knowledge was found to be anecdotal and that it would be essential to conduct studies comparing performances of all male groups with all female groups with heterosexual groups under the stress of combat conditions to satisfactorily provide answers to the basic question. Especially noted was that this was an issue that evokes highly emotional "gut-level" responses and that it was necessary
to guard against making responses based on data which has no rational basis. In general, observational studies, rather than opinions, are required.

One measure of the impact of greater numbers of women in units in the field has been the increased submission of Human Resources Need or HRN requests (a descriptive statement of the military problem or condition that forms basis for a research effort) to the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). In 1975, HRNs relating to women amounted to three. In 1976, they increased fivefold to sixteen. Subjects covered the gamut from, "Enlisted Women and Leadership" to "Evaluation of Military Policewomen in Their Performance" and "Evaluation of Assigning Enlisted Women to a Foreign Tour When They Have Dependents." These requests help guide the ARI program of research on the role of Army women.

Significant findings are outlined below.

Major Command Comments - Generally speaking, the major commands indicated that they were not experiencing significant psycho/sociological problems in integrating women into the day-to-day activities of the units. Several attributed this to human resources programs which had educated officers and enlisted personnel on the role of women in the Army and recommended
continuation of this type of training. With respect to women in leadership positions, the consensus was that acceptance was based on the individual's ability to lead and supervise but that there was more of a requirement for females to prove themselves than for males. Another general observation was that male soldiers tend to be "protective" of women and to accord to them the deference common in our society. A sample of pertinent commentary is indicated below.

Forces Command - "Problems which may arise due to the fact that male soldiers are not accustomed to having female leaders will be resolved through time and experience."

US Army, Europe - "Favoritism, unequal treatment, or special privileges hurt both sexes and their unit. The answer is equal opportunity, equal training, equal responsibility, and equal treatment."

Training and Doctrine Command - "...there still exists in some quarters an overly protective attitude on the part of some male supervisors and soldiers which manifests itself in females being excluded from undesirable or odious tasks."

Psychological Sex Differences - Recent investigations at West Point found no clear prescriptive answer to the questions of the nature and
extent of these differences between men and women. However, the USMA
study brought out several points: (USMA, 1976)

Masculinity and femininity are institutionalized in all cultures.

Within the US, many of the psychological sex differences in adult role
functioning are blurred. However, child rearing practices remain that
produce differences in psychological functioning between the sexes,
indicating a discontinuity between the adult roles of each sex as they are
now being defined and the sociolization process that produces these adults.

Psychological Differences:

(1) Relatively well established differences.
   - Verbal measures of intellectual ability - females tend to excel
   - Visual-spatial ability - males tend to excel
   - Mathematical ability - males tend to excel
   - Aggression - Tendency to harm another but not necessarily
     initiativeness or assertiveness - males clearly are more aggressive

(2) Differences not clearly substantiated or clouded by social norms.
   - Tendency to be fearful, anxious - females report these factors
     as influencing their behavior more than males.
   - Competitive behaviors - males tend to overtly demonstrate these
     behaviors to a greater extent than females.

12-22
- Tendency to strive for dominance in a social sense - males appear to strive for dominance more than do females.

- Compliance with authority - females apparently accept authority and authority figures more readily than do males.

- Persevering, enduring, unrelenting behaviors in the face of long hours, hard work, difficult problems - slight differences have been recorded in the favor of young males.

- Tendency to act methodically, conservatively, dependently, conventionally, and easy going - young females tend to demonstrate these behaviors to a slightly greater degree than do young males.

Psychological Factors in a Military Environment:

The female soldier is highly motivated. She is enthusiastic, competitive, interested in performing well, and willing to try in areas traditionally reserved for men. Women come into the Army with expectations of firm discipline, hard and challenging work, and equal treatment but become dissatisfied when they do not find these.

Experience with women in the Army indicates that at least in the short term there are aspects of female soldier behavior that differ to some degree from the behavior of male soldiers. These aspects of behavior are:
Emotion. Females are quicker to release their emotions through crying and are more sensitive to personal criticism than men. This is probably the most significant area of difference between male and female soldiers. The differences are a function of the socialization of men and women, role expectancies, and stereotyping.

Homesickness. This emotional state is not uncommon in men but women manifest it quicker through crying, wanting to "get out", withdrawal, and preoccupation (lack of concentration).

Stress. Women take stress reasonably well; but under very demanding conditions, especially in those areas where they have never learned to cope (such as intense physical exercise—running, marching, calisthenics), they will release their emotions through crying, exhaustion, or possibly some sort of psychosomatic illness.

Attitudes - The effect of attitudes of both women and men as a result of sociological and psychological conditioning have a major impact on the full utilization of women in the Army. A recent literature review (O'Leary, 1974) focused on attitudinal barriers which may interact to inhibit women workers from engaging in the kinds of achievement directed toward behavior necessary to ensure her promotion into managerial positions.
and are fully applicable to the Army environment. Some of the factors involved, such as societal sex role stereotypes (e.g., women belong in the home) and attitudes toward competency in women (e.g., women cannot do men's work), are external to woman herself but may create barriers to her job-related aspirations. Internal factors include fear of failure, low self-esteem and role conflict as well as the perceived consequences and incentives for engaging in achievement-related behaviors.

**Primary Groups** - Morris Janowitz in *Sociology and the Military Establishment* points out the emphasis that social scientists have placed on the role of primary groups in maintaining organizational effectiveness. Primary groups are identified as small social groupings in which social behavior is governed by intimate face-to-face relations. In *The American Enlisted Man*, Moskos states, "If the individual soldier is realistically to improve his survival chances, he must necessarily develop and take part in primary group relations" and "... under the extreme conditions of ground warfare, an individual's survival is directly related to the support—moral, physical, and technical—he can expect from fellow soldiers." The impact of introducing women into this type of situation is virtually unknown and has not been investigated. (See Annex A for a partial listing of pertinent factors involved.) The Office of the Surgeon General expressed major concern that alliances and sexual pairings may occur and that these may be detrimental to the accomplishment of the mission. A general theory was put forth
that effective fighting groups have historically excluded women because sexual pairing within a group disrupts group loyalty and cohesion and distracts the group from its mission. A further opinion expressed was that women will be stressed by pregnancy and childbearing and will not be able to put loyalty to their work, duties, and colleagues before loyalty to their families. The validity of the above expressed theory and opinion has not been tested.

**ARI Activities** - The Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences began to focus attention on research relating to the utilization of women concomitantly with the expansion program. This interest led to the establishment of the Military Careers for Women Work Unit Area. In addition to this dedicated effort, emphasis has been placed on due consideration being accorded to women soldiers in all research projects.

Recently completed projects have primarily addressed attitudes concerning women in various Army jobs and the degree of acceptance. Project synopses are at Appendix C.

The program for FY 77 and the out-years will address factors affecting productivity of women soldiers, women in combat-related roles, effect of the male/female mix on unit performance, women in leadership positions,
changes in attitudes of first term female soldiers, and acquisition of enlisted women.

V. CONCLUSIONS
A. General
With regard to the impact of physiological, psychological and sociological factors, there are more unknowns than knowns on the effect of women in units and many of these questions must be answered before any significant changes are made to current policies and programs.

B. Physiological
A clear differential exists between the military relevant physical capabilities (i.e., strength, speed, power, endurance, and heat and cold tolerance) of males and females strongly in the favor of males. This differential must be a significant factor in considerations pertaining to the utilization of women.

Army physical fitness training for women is not as effective as for males.

The full potential of women has not been clearly established.

There are multiple efforts ongoing at TRADOC, ARI, ARIEM, and USMA which will provide considerable additional data on women's capabilities and provide guidance on adequate training programs.
C. Psychological/Sociological

Only limited information is available with regard to psychological and sociological factors impacting on the utilization of women.

There has been increasing interest in this subject with the introduction of increased numbers of females into the force structure.

Human resources programs have been effective in explaining the role of women in the Army but there is a need for continuing emphasis.

There is a requirement for observational studies on primary groups consisting of males and females and on the effects of combat stress.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Research on the performance capabilities and limitations of women soldiers and on psychological/sociological factors receive continued emphasis and be expedited, where feasible.
ANNEX A

Factors of Combat Stress

1. Threats to life and limb and health.

2. Physical discomfort—from lack of shelter, excessive heat or cold, excessive moisture or dryness, inadequacy of food or water or clothing, from insects and disease; from filth; from injuries or wounds; from long-continued fatigue and lack of sleep.

3. Deprivation of sexual and concomitant social satisfactions.

4. Isolation from accustomed sources of affectional assurance.

5. Loss of comrades, and sight and sound of wounded and dying men.

6. Restriction of personal movement—ranging from the restrictions of military law to the immobility of the soldier pinned down under enemy fire.

7. Continual uncertainty and lack of adequate cognitive orientation.

8. Conflicts of values
   a. between the requirements of duty and the individual's impulses toward safety and comfort
   b. between military duty and obligations to family and dependents at home, to whose well-being the soldier's survival is important
   c. between informal group codes, as of loyalty to comrades, and the formal requirements of the military situation which may sometimes not permit mutual aid
   d. between previously accepted moral codes and combat imperatives.

9. Being treated as a means rather than an end in oneself; seemingly arbitrary and impersonal demands of coercive authority; sense of not counting as an individual.

10. Lack of "privacy"; the incessant demands and petty irritations of close living within the group.

11. Long periods of enforced boredom, mingled with anxiety, between actions.

12. Lack of terminal individual goals; poverty and uncertainly of individual rewards.
ANNEX B

Bibliography


United States Military Academy. "Results of Project 60A." Disposition Form, MACC-CBT, 10 June 1976.

United States Military Academy. "Assimilation of Women Within the Corps of Cadets." Memorandum, MACC-M.


APPENDIX A

TASKING DOCUMENT
1. The DCSPER has tasked the Military Personnel Management Directorate with responsibility for conducting a six month in-house study of women in the Army. The overall purpose of this study is:

"To revalidate the program for the expanded utilization of women in the Army to assure that it provides for full and effective employment and is consistent with the current and future needs of the Army."

2. In order to accomplish this task a Study Group has been organized which will operate under my direct guidance. The study group members are:

   LTC Eugene Fox
   MAJ Franklin Alexander
   MAJ Arthur West
   MAJ Thomas Newell (part-time member)

The study group will be located in Room 2B748 (Phone: 70575/70576/79085).

3. In order to accomplish the above purpose it will be necessary to review current and planned policy on utilization of women in the Army and collect and evaluate additional data required for policy formulation. In this regard, eleven distinct areas have been identified for review, investigation, or survey. It is currently envisioned that each of these areas will constitute a separate chapter—with individual objectives, discussion, conclusions and recommendations—in the final study report. In order to totally accomplish the objectives of the study within the allotted time, agencies outside the study group will be responsible for the completion of particular portions of the study. The study group will provide necessary guidance and assistance to insure continuity of the study in those areas not being directly handled by the study group. A summary of the areas of interest, with outside tasking indicated, is located at Inclosure 1. Additional specific guidance on each area is also located at Inclosure 1.

4. At Inclosure 2 is a milestone chart for completion of the study. Agencies tasked with completion of various portions of the study should plan their efforts to insure completion within the time frames established in Inclosure 2. Each responsible agency is requested to develop a concept paper with respect to its tasks, to include the scope, methodology and milestones, and submit this to the study group NLT 11 February 1976.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:

[Signature]

John F. Forrest
Major General, GS
Director of Military Personnel Management

2 Incl

1840

DA FORM 2496 REQUIRES DOD FORM 85, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 76 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED.  U.S. GPO: 1976-046-0848/0886
Distribution:

DAPE-MPE
DAPE-MFO
DAPE-MPT
DAPE-PB
DAPE-HR
DAFC
TJAG
TSG
DWAC

CF:

DAPE-MPR
### SUMMARY OF WOMEN IN THE ARMY STUDY GROUP TASKS

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Incl 1
TASK #1 - Attitude Survey

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY: Study Group with DAPC assistance

STUDY GROUP POC: Maj Alexander (70575/6)

TASK - To conduct a survey which will sample the attitudes and opinions concerning the utilization of women in the Army from a broad spectrum of military personnel, both active and retired.

OBJECTIVES:

1. To identify male and female attitudes toward the utilization of female personnel in non-traditional MOS.

2. To identify roadblocks to assignments and utilization of female personnel that may exist in attitudes of Army personnel.

3. To identify adjustment and special problems of women in the Army.
TASK #2 - MACOM Study

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - Study Group

STUDY GROUP POC - Maj Alexander (70575/6)

TASK - To solicit the views, ideas and experience of the leaders of the Major Army Commands (MACOM) and their subordinate commanders with regard to the utilization of women in the Army.

OBJECTIVES -

1. To determine if a consensus exists among the senior Army leaders with regard to the utilization of women in the Army.

2. To identify potential problems which may be encountered with expanded utilization of female personnel in the Army based on the experience of senior Army commanders.

3. To determine the attitude of Army troop leaders with regard to the expanded utilization of female personnel in the Army.
TASK #3 - Review of Physiological, Psychological and Sociological Factors

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - Study Group with DAPE-MPO assistance

STUDY GROUP POC - LTC Fox (70575/6)

TASK - To collect and analyze data on the physiological, psychological and sociological factors which may affect the utilization of women in the Army.

OBJECTIVES -

1. To isolate and identify those physiological, psychological and sociological factors which may have a significant effect on the utilization of women in the Army.

2. To determine the impact of these factors on the utilization of women in special environments.
TASK #4 - Review of utilization policies

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - DAPE-DW

STUDY GROUP POC - Maj Newell (72102)

TASK - To collate data which:

a. Details the use of women in combat roles.

b. Identifies major industrialized nations which use women in their armies today and the patterns of their utilization.

OBJECTIVE - To develop a comprehensive body of knowledge relating to women's use in combat and peacetime situations by foreign countries. A complete study of the subject may provide the US Army with additional guidelines which should be considered in developing its policies relating to the utilization of female personnel.
TASK #5 - ARI Activities Interface

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - DAFPE-PB

STUDY GROUP FOC - LTC Fox (70575/6)

TASK - To conduct a review of Army Research Institute (ARI) activities which relate to the utilization of women in the Army.

OBJECTIVE - To insure that ARI activities related to the utilization of women in the Army are addressing the most current problems and properly interface with other ongoing study efforts.
TASK #6 - Review Impact of Pregnancy/Sole Parent Dependency Policies

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - DAPE-MPE with DAPE-PB assistance

STUDY GROUP POC - Maj Alexander (70575/6)

TASK - To collect and analyze data on the impact of the pregnancy/sole parent dependency policies on the readiness, deployability and field operations of units.

OBJECTIVES -

1. To measure the extent to which the current pregnancy/sole parent dependency policies affect readiness, deployability and field operations.

2. To determine the effect of the pregnancy/sole parent dependency policy on female loss rates (DAPE-PB assistance required).
TASK #7 - Review of Women Officer Policies and Programs

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - DAPE-MPO

STUDY GROUP POC - Maj West (70575/6)

TASK - To review and revalidate women officer policies and programs dealing with requirements, branching and training to insure that legally defensible, operational criteria are used in the decision process and that the results are viable and manageable careers for women in consonance with the needs of the Army.

OBJECTIVES -

1. To determine operational criteria for closing or opening an ASI or positions within an ASI.

2. To determine the impact of the dual specialty system on the number of women officers and their career patterns.

3. To revalidate the operational criteria used in the WOSM (Women Officer Strength Model) logic to include the determination of the maximum number of female officers that can be assigned to units without degrading mission capability.

4. To review and revalidate the training of women officers with the goal of full and effective employment consistent with the needs of the Army.

SUGGESTED AREAS OF EXAMINATION -

1. The relationship between the number of women officers and enlisted women that could be assigned to a unit.

2. Determine if there is a difference in utilization ratios for men and women with similar ASI pairings.

3. Examine the ratio between positions in MTOE's and TDA's for women officers.
TASK #8 - Review BCT and Special Training

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - DAPE-MPT

STUDY GROUP POC - LTC Fox (70575/6)

TASK - To review BCT and Special Training programs to validate policies with regard to women.

OBJECTIVES -

1. To review BCT program to determine if BCT and BT can be integrated.

2. To review Special Training programs (Ranger, Mountain Cold Weather, Jungle Warfare, and Airborne) to insure validity of female attendance policies.
TASK #9 - Review MOS Training

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - DAPE-MPT

STUDY GROUP POC - LTC Fox (70575/6)

TASK - To evaluate MOS training to determine if a requirement exists to establish physical and operational standards and to develop measurement methods.

OBJECTIVES -

1. To review MOS training to determine if:
   a. Personnel are being attrited for physical (physiological/strength/stamina) causes.
   b. To ascertain if training presented has a high degree of correlation with operational requirements.

2. To survey the MACOMs to determine their assessment of the adequacy of MOS training and to identify critical operational requirements for inclusion in the training program.

3. To establish standards, as required.

   To coordinate with TSG on measurement methods, where physical standards are involved.
TASK #10 - Review of Women's Enlisted Expansion Model (WEEM)

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - DAPC

STUDY GROUP POC - Maj West (70575/6)

TASK - To review and revalidate the WEEM logic to insure that it uses legally defensible, operational criteria and provides for a time-phased, viable, and manageable career for women.

OBJECTIVES -

1. To revalidate the operational criteria used in the WEEM logic.

2. To examine the validity of the management factors and by unit MOS ceilings that are currently in use.

3. To determine the time-phasing of the maximum number of enlisted women produced by WEEM.

SUGGESTED AREAS FOR EXAMINATION -

1. Grade mismatch within MOS's.

2. Combination of MOS's into CMF's.

3. Maximum allowable change in CONUS tour lengths that should result from women in the MOS.

4. Relationship between MOS management factors and MOS ceilings within units.

5. Time phasing of maximum female content to agree more equitably with promotion policies.
TASK #11 - Review of MOS's.

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - DAPC

STUDY GROUP POC - Maj West (70575/6)

TASK - To review and revalidate MOS's open and closed to women to insure that legally supportable operational criteria are used in the decision process and that the results are viable and manageable job positions for women in consonance with the needs of the Army.

OBJECTIVES -

1. To determine operational criteria for opening or closing MOS or positions within an MOS.

2. To determine operational criteria for the minimum number of potential job positions required to make the MOS a viable and manageable career for women.

SUGGESTED AREAS FOR EXAMINATION -

1. MOS's 27D thru 27Z - currently closed for reasons of combat although there are not authorizations in Category I units.

2. MOS 31G - should it be considered a combat MOS?

3. MOS's where the non-Category I authorizations are predominantly instructors and/or are in the senior grades.
STUDY MILESTONES

19 January 1976 - Study Group formed.
29 January 1976 - Tasking issued to outside agencies.
11 February 1976 - Concept papers due to Study Group.
As Completed - IPR for individual tasks.
27 February 1976 - 1st monthly status report.
31 March 1976 - 2nd monthly status report.
30 April 1976 - 3rd monthly status report.
31 May 1976 - IPR's completed and input submitted to Study Group.
1 June 1976 - Initiate final compilation and staffing of report.
15 July 1976 - Submit final report.

Incl 2

A-15
APPENDIX B

ARMY POLICIES
APPENDIX B

ARMY POLICIES*

ARMY REGULATIONS

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For expediency, Army policies are often announced, or altered, by electronic message. Due to the temporary nature of such messages, no effort has been made to include them therein.
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APPENDIX C

RESEARCH PROJECTS
A PRELIMINARY VERSION OF A SCALE TO MEASURE SEX-ROLE ATTITUDES IN THE ARMY

John C. Woelfel and Joel M. Savell
US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Barry E. Collins and Peter M. Bentler
Contemporary Research, Inc.

This report describes preliminary work toward the construction of a short and a long form of a scale measuring sex-role attitudes in the Army, with as many different attitude dimensions as possible being identified. Each form appears to meet basic criteria for reliability and validity. Certain changes in item wording are indicated, however, and research is in progress to determine the reliability and validity of a slightly modified version of the short form.

ATTITUDES CONCERNING JOB APPROPRIATENESS FOR WOMEN IN THE ARMY (ARI RESEARCH MEMORANDUM 75-3)

Joel M. Savell and John C. Woelfel
US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Barry E. Collins and Peter M. Bentler
Contemporary Research, Inc.

Memorandum is based on data collected in a survey of Army personnel at three widely dispersed posts. The data were collected as part of a larger effort to construct a research instrument that would elicit attitudes concerning the utilization of women in the Army. The questionnaire included a set of items that asked about job appropriateness. Each respondent was presented with a list of 24 jobs and was asked to indicate, for each job, whether he/she did or did not think it was appropriate for women.

Five general conclusions emerged from the data. First, most of the jobs examined in the research were considered appropriate for women by the majority of men and women who took part in the research. Second, proportionately more women than men believed that women were able to handle a wide variety of non-traditional jobs and take an active role in today's Army. Third, proportionately more officers than enlisted endorsed the expansion of women's role. Fourth, of the several groups studied, female officers--more than any of the others--believed in a general and pervasive expansion of the role of women in the military. And fifth, women are likely to be available as candidates for a wide range of noncombat occupations, and male resistance to having women in these positions is likely to be minimal.
ATTRIBUTION OF GENDER-ROLE Egalitarianism to Self and to Others: Some Evidence Regarding Two Kinds of Discrepancy

Joel M. Savell and John C. Woelfel
US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Data from a 1974 sample survey of 800 soldiers are consistent with the hypotheses that (a) individuals are more likely to attribute gender-role egalitarianism to themselves than they are to others and (b) women are less likely to attribute gender-role egalitarianism to men than men themselves are.

Overall, 78% of the respondents attributed the egalitarian position to themselves; but only 64% attributed this position to their friends and only 45% attributed it to the majority of soldiers of their sex.

THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP AND ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN IN COMBAT

David R. Segal, Nora Scott Kinzer and John C. Woelfel
US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Data from a 1973 Detroit Area Study survey indicate that nearly 75% of the respondents are opposed to women in combat. In contrast, two Army surveys show that 50 to 60% of respondents are opposed to women in combat, women as commanders in a combat unit or women as rifle-carrying infantry-persons.

MALE AND FEMALE SOLDIER'S BELIEFS ABOUT THE "APPROPRIATENESS" OF VARIOUS JOBS FOR WOMEN IN THE ARMY*

Joel M. Savell and John C. Woelfel
US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Barry E. Collins and Peter M. Bentler
University of California, Los Angeles

The Army is using more women in more different kinds of jobs than it has at any time since the end of World War II. In January 1974, 721 soldiers selected from three stateside installations were asked whether they thought each of 24 jobs (some traditional, some nontraditional) were appropriate for women. Results were as follows: (1) With one exception ("rifle-carrying infantry foot soldier") all the jobs listed were judged appropriate for
women by the majority of respondents of both sexes. (2) Jobs were judged appropriate more often by the officers than by the enlisted (a difference accounted for by average difference in educational attainment) and (3) (with certain exceptions) more often by the women than by the men (a difference that was greater among those who had been to college than among those who had not). (4) There was no relationship between judgment of job appropriateness and stated intention to leave or stay in the Army.

* This is an expanded version of ARI Research Memorandum 75-3.

HISTORICAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN IN COMBAT

Nora Scott Kinzer
US Army Research Institute

Even though there are sporadic references or journalistic accounts of women as partisans, guerrillas or members of armed forces, there exists no readily available compilation of women's role as combatants. Since women's groups outside the Army and some women within the armed forces are advocating that women be assigned to combat arms units and combat arms MOSs, this issue is of current import.

This paper discusses the current ferment within the United States Army regarding the feasibility of using women in combat arms units; analyzes the history of the United States Army Nurse Corps to illustrate how women react under combat stress situations and presents a broad overview of women's role as combatants in Russia, France, Yugoslavia, Israel and other areas.

This review shows that women are primarily used in the roles of guerilla/partisan or terrorist. The paucity of data reveal a need for further research in this area.

INTERACTING WITH WOMEN: INTERPERSONAL CONTACT AND ACCEPTANCE OF WOMEN IN THE US ARMY

David R. Segal and John C. Woelfel
US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Data was drawn from survey of 721 military members. There was a higher percentage of women tested than that which represents the sample population as a whole. The respondents were asked a series of questions to measure their associations with women and experience with women who worked.
Female soldiers are more likely than male soldiers to have worked with other women, to have had experience with female supervisors, and to have more female friends. All three of these variables have weak but statistically significant relationships to holding contemporary views regarding women’s roles among male soldiers. Only the number of female friends was associated with contemporary sex-role views among female soldiers.

Of these three kinds of contact with women, among male soldiers only the experience with female supervisors was related to perceiving combat infantry roles as appropriate for women, and only the number of female friends was related to perceiving the company commander’s role as appropriate for women. Apparently, while association with women does influence men’s general sex-role attitudes, its impact is weaker on attitudes about the appropriateness of specific traditionally masculine jobs.

Female soldiers with working mothers considered the jobs of infantry soldier and company commander more appropriate for women than did those whose mothers did not work.

**ROTC CADETS: ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN IN THE ARMY**

E. Sue Mohr  
US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

In 1975, as part of a larger research effort, this 7-item questionnaire (a 7-item questionnaire that is a short form of an 18-item questionnaire developed by ARI in 1974) was administered to male and female ROTC cadets attending Advanced Summer Camp. Out of a total of 865 usable questionnaires, 783 were from males and 82 from females. The responses in general indicated that women are less traditional than males. Few differences emerged between white and black attitudes. When differences did surface, blacks appeared to be less traditional in their views. “Significantly more men than women felt that female commanders would not get respect from men in their units and that they would not make as good front line soldiers as males.”

**SOLDIERS’ ATTRIBUTION OF CONTEMPORARY VS TRADITIONAL SEX-ROLE ATTITUDES TO THEMSELVES AND TO OTHERS (ARI RESEARCH MEMORANDUM 75-7)**

Joel M. Savell  
US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences
Barry Collins
Contemporary Research, Inc.

Memorandum is based on data collected in a survey of Army personnel at three widely dispersed posts. The data were collected as part of a larger effort to construct a research instrument that would elicit attitudes concerning the utilization of women in the Army. In general, it was determined that women tend to be more contemporary in their positions while male are more traditional in their approach. There is some evidence that Army personnel may be expected to become more contemporary in their views of utilizing women in the Army in the future.
GLOSSARY

TDA Unit. A military unit required to perform a specific mission (noncombat) for which there is no appropriate table of organization and equipment.

TOE Unit. A military unit organized under a table of organization and equipment which prescribes the normal mission, organizational structure and personnel and equipment requirements.

TOE units are divided into three categories as follows:

Category I Unit. A unit, organized under table of organization and equipment, whose primary mission includes engaging and inflicting casualties and/or equipment damage on the enemy by use of its organic weapons. Category I status is extended to its corresponding headquarters and service companies whose mission is supporting and providing assistance thereto, and to those command and control headquarters habitually operating in the forward portion of the active combat area (forward of the brigade rear boundary). Category I units normally operate in the forward portion of the active combat area, but may, because of the range of their primary weapons and positioning requirements, operate in the division and corps rear areas.

Category II Unit. A unit, organized under table of organization and equipment, whose mission is primarily that of providing command and control, combat support, or combat service support and assistance to Category I units. It operates in the combat zone, normally between the brigade and corps rear boundaries.

Category III Unit. A unit, organized under table of organization and equipment, whose mission is primarily service and assistance of the communications zone. The unit functions habitually in the communications zone or along the lines of communications leading thereto.
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