MILITARY FORCE AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

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INVESTIGATION OF FLUX PINNING AND CRITICAL CURRENT DENSITIES IN Type II SUPERCONDUCTORS


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38

superconductors, current, density, critical, Type II, magnetization, flux, microstructural, metallurgical, multifilamentary, grain, features

The main purpose of this work was to develop and employ new metallurgical techniques for determining the microstructural features controlling the critical current of Type II superconductors. Another purpose was to study the critical current in thin films by magnetization measurements. Magnetization could only be measured with the magnetic field normal to the film surface. From the data both the critical current density and magnetic flux pinning force as a function of field were calculated. The...
study in Appendix I identifies dislocation cell boundaries as the prominent microstructural feature of commercial multifilamentary superconductors. This feature is correlated with critical current and guidelines are provided for critical current enhancement in commercial conductors. The report in Appendix II describes a new technique for measuring grain size and thicknesses of the thin layers on the order of .5 µm which occur in the fabrication of Nb₃Sn by diffusion reactions. The correlation of the present results with those obtained using conventional thinning techniques is very good. The method is rapid and inexpensive compared to competing techniques and will be useful in new conductor development.
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The study, "Military Force as a Political Instrument Since the Second World War", is intended to examine the ways, and the effectiveness with which, the United States and the Soviet Union have employed their armed forces, short of actual violence, during the period 1946-1975. In essence, the study is designed to illuminate the interconnections between demonstrative displays of military force and the success or failure of foreign policy in the postwar period. As the threat of direct conflict between the superpowers has receded, the consequences of changes in the size and character of military inventories, the deployment of military units, and the use of military force for demonstrative purposes, have attained new prominence. This two-year study -- founded on empirical analysis of the perhaps 300 incidents since 1945 in which either the United States or the USSR has utilized its armed forces, without significant violence, in support of foreign policy objectives -- is intended to address the effectiveness of military force in these roles and to draw implications for U.S. foreign policy and the structure of U.S. armed forces.

As of 31 July 1975, the study had been underway for nine months. This period has been devoted to necessary steps preliminary to analysis: (a) concepts have been described, terms defined, and methodologies specified; (b) data describing each incident, their diplomatic and political contexts, and their outcomes have been collected and are now being recorded in machine-readable form; (c) eight pairs of incidents have been selected for more detailed investigation and arrangements made with specialists to carry out these case studies; (d) three topics have been selected for special sub-analyses, and research initiated on them -- "Soviet Conceptions and Applications of Military Force", "The Political Uses of Military Force in the Mediterranean Region", and "The Political Consequences of the Use of Military Units for Disaster Relief and Other Humanitarian Purposes".
Military Force as a Political Instrument Since the Second World War

Military force is one instrument available to nations for coping with their external environments. Generally, we think of military force either as a latent capability or as a manifest instrument for engaging in violence. This "either-or" dichotomy obscures the fact that military force also is used regularly as an instrument for achieving diverse objectives in situations where a contest of force does not actually take place. It is well understood that military force can be manifested flexibly in terms of differing weaponry and levels of violence. It is not so well understood that military force can be used flexibly to achieve objectives without the necessity of having to engage in violence. When the armed forces are used in such a manner, it may be termed a political use of military power. In recent years, this function of military power has taken on increasing importance. As the threat of direct conflict between the superpowers has tended to recede, there has been renewed awareness that military force may be used without violence -- in peacetime and during crises -- to influence the foreign policy choices of decision-makers in other states.

Along with this awareness, however, has come questions: When is military power an effective foreign policy instrument? What kinds of forces can most appropriately be used to this end? How should they be used? Can their use be counterproductive in some situations? To what extent should the potential use of military force in political roles influence the design of weapons or force structure? These and other questions are the subject of some dispute in the national security community. Yet there is a formidable body of experience concerning these uses of military force. The United States and the other great powers have used military force for limited political purposes on numerous occasions since World War II. Consequently there is an empirical information base which can be analyzed in trying to answer these questions.

This study is meant to describe these past incidents, to analyze their consequences, and to assess the utility of military force as a political instrument. It focuses particularly upon the uses of military force as a political instrument by the United States and the Soviet Union during the years 1946-75. The focus is not exclusively on bilateral relations between these two nations, however. The study also considers incidents in which only one of the superpowers is involved.

The goals of the study are to determine:

a) The ways and contexts in which the United States and the Soviet Union have used military force as a political instrument.

b) The objectives of the two nations in these incidents.

c) The effectiveness of military force when it is used in this role; or, more precisely, the variables that determine the effectiveness of military force as a political instrument.
d) The consequences, long-term and short-term, that tend to follow these uses of military force.

To these ends, five specific tasks are to be undertaken.

First, we will prepare a comprehensive and detailed description of all incidents meeting the definitional criteria for consideration as a "political" use of military force. This task involves rigorous definition of the concept, specification of relevant variables, and exhaustive search of official and unofficial source material. Descriptive statistics will be used to present an analysis of trends in: the frequency with which the superpowers employ their armed forces in this fashion, the ways in which the armed forces are used, the types of situations in which they are used, the organizational process through which demonstrative use of the military is made apparent to target states and coordinated with diplomatic initiatives, the consequences of these actions for behavior of the target nations and interested third parties, and most importantly -- the consequences of political uses of military force for the satisfaction of the superpowers' own interests.

Second, an aggregate -- and partially quantitative -- analysis, aimed at examining the question of effectiveness will be carried out. When is military power, used without violence, an effective foreign policy instrument? What kinds of forces can most appropriately be used to this end? How are these forces best used in the context of other instruments of foreign policy? Can their use be counterproductive in some situations?

Third, will be an in-depth investigation of the mechanisms determining the effectiveness of military force as a political instrument. In this regard, case studies, designed to demonstrate the impact of particular variables which appear -- on the basis of preliminary aggregate analysis -- to be the most important, will be prepared. All the case studies, which are to be prepared by specialists, will address a uniform set of questions and thus will provide a comparable series of detailed investigations.

Fourth, sub-analyses of particular aspects of the general topic will be attempted. These investigations will focus on the usefulness of particular types of military force for political ends and on the potential usefulness of demonstrative use of military force in particular situations.

Finally, findings of the three forms of analysis -- aggregate, case studies, and topical sub-analyses -- will be combined and conclusions drawn pertaining to the central questions of the study: How has military force been used by superpowers, short of actual violence, to attain foreign policy objectives? How effective has military force been in these roles? What do these findings imply for the structure of U.S. military forces?

As of 31 July 1975, the study had been underway for nine months of an expected two-year lifetime. Progress on the study to date can be described in four categories: concepts and methodology, aggregate analysis, case studies, and topical sub-analyses. Each is discussed below.
Concepts and Methodology

Essentially, the study focuses on the use of military force as an instrument of suasion. By suasion, we mean simply the inducement of desirable behavior in the absence of a violent contest. A distinction is made in the analysis between the actual use of military force as an instrument of suasion and the perception of such use. We are very much interested in perceptions of, and reactions to, actual uses of military force as an instrument of suasion. We are not concerned with perceptions of and consequent reactions to imagined uses. In concentrating upon the intended use of military force the focus is upon the intent of members of the National Security Council in the United States and the members of the Politburo in the Soviet Union.

A first task of the study has been to catalogue the universe of incidents in which military force has been used as an instrument of suasion. In order to do this, it is postulated that such uses of military force may be imputed on the basis of one of the following four signals: a verbal statement by an actor that it is using military force to exercise suasion; the employment of military force demonstratively at a level low enough so that it communicates a political objective rather than an engagement in a contest of force; the deployment of military force in such a way that it may be inferred that an actor is seeking to exercise suasion; a change in the type or disposition of the armed forces that an actor procures and maintains.

In order to determine the ways in which a state might use military force to exercise suasion upon a target, it has been useful to develop a model concerning an actor's objectives as they are related to a target's behavior. Insofar as the U.S. and the USSR do decide to use military force as an instrument of suasion, it is suggested that the way in which military force will be used will be a function of three variables: the degree of specificity of the behavior of concern, the desirability and apparentness of this behavior, and the overall relationship of the target to the actor.

The first variable, specificity, relates to the degree of precision or the restrictiveness of the actor's concern with the target's behavior. The actor's concern may be with the general disposition or behavior pattern of the target; or, the actor may be concerned with a single action or a clear-cut set of actions by the target. If military force is used to exercise suasion as a result of a concern with specific rather than diffuse behavior, the signal projected by such a use of military force will be more manifest, clearer, and more direct. By contrast, the more diffuse the behavior of concern is, the less evident, the vaguer, and the more indirect will be the signal.

Second, if the target's behavior is considered in a positive light or is considered desirable, the actor's interest will be for the target to continue to do or continue not to do something. The objective will be to reinforce such behavior. In furtherance of this objective, military force
may be used to support the target so that it continues to do something desirable; or it may be used to deter the target from initiating an undesirable action (or from stopping a desirable action). If the target's behavior is perceived negatively or is considered undesirable, the actor's interest will be to have the target stop some behavior or begin to do something else. The objective will be to modify previous behavior. In this regard, military force may be used in two ways, depending upon the context of the situation. The actor may withdraw or threaten to withdraw military force which has been used previously to support the target in order to deter the latter, or the actor can use military force to coerce the target. If the target's behavior is viewed with question or has not been established, the actor's objective is to ensure that the target is doing, not doing, or will do something. Insofar as the actor does not wish to press the target to manifest some behavior, the actor's interest may be merely to ensure that the target is doing, doing, or will do something. In consequence of the lack of clarity about the target's behavior, the use of military force in such instances frequently will be ambiguous.

In regard to the third dimension, targets may be categorized in terms of whether they are generally supportive of, antagonistic to, or non-aligned with the actor. In general, military force will be used in an operant mode to exercise suasion upon supportive actors and in an aversive mode to exercise suasion upon antagonistic actors. Military force may be used in either mode to exercise suasion upon non-aligned actors. However, the use of military force, and certainly its repeated use in one or the other of these two modes, may have the effect of influencing a non-aligned actor to become either supportive of or antagonistic to the superpower.

The effectiveness of the use of military force as an instrument of suasion relates to an actor's success or failure in inducing desirable behavior on the part of the target of the action. A test of the effectiveness of using military force as an instrument of suasion requires a determination of the relationship between an actor's use of military force and behavior by the target. In order to conclude that a use of military force has not been effective, it is necessary to determine that desirable behavior was not induced. In order to conclude that a use of military force has been effective, it is necessary to determine that a target's behavior is desirable and that this would not be so in the absence of that use of military force. That a target is performing desirable, undesirable, or questionable behavior may be determined by observation.

A determination that a use of military force was a necessary condition for the performance of desirable behavior or the existence of a positive disposition requires the identification of those factors underlying that conduct. It is possible to develop an analytic framework and, perhaps, even a model of the more important elements entering into the calculus of a target leader in response to a superpower demand, accompanied or not by the use of military force.
In making a choice to perform or not to perform desirable behavior in the presence or in the absence of military force, a target will seek to determine: the gains and costs of that particular behavior; the weights or significance of those individual gains and costs; and the probabilities that those individual gains and costs will become manifest. For military force to be considered effective, it must alter the target's calculation of its gains and costs in performing desirable behavior so that behavior is performed which would not have been performed in the absence of such a use of force. Such a use of military force might affect a calculation by altering the target's perceptions of the gains and costs relevant in a calculus, and/or the probabilities of their occurrence.

Concomitant with operationalization of an analytic framework, a comparative analysis can be made of observations regarding that framework's elements with reference to the following paired situations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairing</th>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Military Force Used or Not Used</th>
<th>Desirable Behavior Performed or Not Performed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>(1) Used</td>
<td>Performed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>(2) Used</td>
<td>Not Performed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>(1) Used</td>
<td>Performed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>(3) Not Used</td>
<td>Performed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>(1) Used</td>
<td>Performed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>(4) Not Used</td>
<td>Not Performed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By doing a comparative analysis of situations 1 and 2, the circumstances in which military force is not an effective instrument for exercising suasion might be determined. A comparative analysis of situations 1 and 2, might also allow for a determination of those circumstances in which force may be used effectively. A comparative analysis of situations 1 and 3 might allow us to determine the circumstances in which it is not necessary to use military force as an instrument of suasion. Finally, a comparative analysis of situations 1 and 4 might allow for a determination of the particular utility of using military force. The result of such comparative analyses might be the inducement of an empirically based model of a target calculus in the presence and in the absence of military force being used as an instrument of suasion.

In developing hypotheses related to a target calculus, we postulate that the gains and costs considered by a target are, respectively, the positive and negative consequences of a choice for those matters of concern to the target. The greater the positive and the lesser the negative consequences anticipated as a result of the performance of positive behavior, the more likely the target is to perform that behavior. An important objective is to determine the positive and negative reinforcements that a target anticipates as a result of its performing desirable behavior. Generally speaking, a target's concerns will relate to four strata of a society: the society at large, an elite, a faction, and the leader.
The relative weights placed by a leader upon matters of concern might be identified as a function of the leader's political environment -- i.e., the operational structure of authority and the norms of political action within a society, and the society's socialization values. The operational structure of authority and the norms of political action within a society will determine the security and independence of a leader. We postulate that a leader will be concerned to satisfy personal goals and concerns to the extent that he is not bound by dependency and insecurity upon a faction, an elite, or a society. Concomitantly, a leader will be concerned to satisfy factional, elite, and societal goals and interests insofar as he internalizes them as his own; or, to the degree that the actualization of his goals or the security of his interests and authority are dependent upon the satisfaction of the concerns of these groups. Further, a leader will assume generally that gains and costs to groups which can be attributed to his leadership cannot but reflect upon his interests.

A target's calculus may be influenced by not only the actor's use of military force as an instrument of persuasion and by other behavior (past, present, and anticipated) manifested by the actor, but also by the present and anticipated behavior of third parties in the incident. The likelihood that another actor will become involved in an incident and thus will influence a target's calculus of gains, costs, and their probabilities, will be a function of that actor's capabilities and perceived interests. In interstate relations an actor's influence upon a target's choice will usually be a consequence to the former's behavior functioning as an environmental variable. Much less frequently, an external actor will be able to penetrate a political system and exercise influence within it. Thus, for the most part, an actor's ability to influence directly a target's concerns will be limited to those concerns of the society at large. An actor may exert direct influence upon another society's concerns by manipulating the various instruments of foreign policy that it has at its command. Because our principal interest is in the use of military force as an instrument of persuasion, we are especially concerned to discern the significance of the individual ways in which military force may be used. Another set of capabilities which a target will consider in its calculus are its own capabilities; for viewed from another standpoint, every target also is a dynamic actor with policy instruments of its own available.

Notwithstanding the examination of the various interests and capabilities of each actor in a particular incident, it also is necessary to consider the target's perception of those interests and capabilities. This perception, of course, will be a function of the information made available by actors, the structural collection and presentation of information to the target, and the target's "screens" of ideology, experience, and self-actualization. The availability of information relates to the manifest behavior by actors and to the existence, the prominence, and the clarity of signals that may be perceived. The structural collection and presentation of information will concern those institutions which at any
given time gather and make information available, and which are paid attention to by the target. Finally, the three screens of perception noted will determine the amount of attention a target will give to information received and the target's evaluation of that information.

Finally, it is important to consider for the purposes of this study the significance of "permanent" deployments of military force in the region in which an incident occurs, as well as past usages of the superpowers' military forces in analogous situations. It is also useful to consider previously made verbal and written commitments which might prove relevant to a target's performance of desirable behavior. These three factors seem likely to have a most important effect on target perceptions. In this regard, hypotheses are being examined relating target behavior to: the length of time in which an actor's military forces have been deployed in the region in which an incident occurs; the frequency with which an actor's military forces have been used effectively in the region in an analogous mode; the strength of an actor's previous commitment to a situation complementary to the performance of desirable behavior.

Aggregate Analysis

The most time-consuming task has been the identification of incidents, and the collection of data describing them, their contexts, and their outcomes.

Military command histories and other official documents have been the main sources used to identify incidents. In this regard, the study has been hampered by its lack of access to classified material, but not significantly so. Unofficial sources -- New York Times, Keesing Contemporary Archives, memoirs, etc. -- have been used to fill in the context of the incidents.

It looks now as if the United States has used its military forces in the pursuit of political suasion in approximately 200 incidents between 1946 and 1975. Additionally, there were about 200 cases in which U.S. military forces were used for disaster relief and other humanitarian purposes. These latter uses presumably also resulted in and were partially motivated by, political objectives. They will be treated in a separate sub-analysis.

Data describing the incidents are being placed in machine-readable form to facilitate the application of simple descriptive statistical techniques. A 24-page code schedule has been prepared for this purpose. Each incident will be described by 104 variables, arrayed on 8 data cards. Additionally, time series data on 18 additional variables -- to be used to assess the potential consequences of the political use of force, e.g. trade and aid statistics -- also is being collected. Data preparation should be completed by the end of the current year, and the actual analysis of U.S. incidents then initiated.
It appears that the Soviet Union has employed its military forces for political ends in approximately 60 incidents between 1946 and 1975. These are not sufficient data describing these cases, however, to warrant the same sort of analysis being applied to the U.S. incidents. Consequently, the Soviet use of military force as a political instrument is being treated as a separate topical sub-analysis.

**Case Studies**

The case studies are designed to provide detailed information on the variables determining the effectiveness of military force as a political instrument. Specific topics that will be addressed in each of the case studies include:

- **U.S. behavior**: Objectives of U.S. decision-makers, the manner in which these were communicated to targets, relationships between the use of the military instrument and other foreign policy instruments.

- **Target behavior**: Who the targets (individual decision-makers) were and what were their interests, awareness of U.S. concerns, reasons for conforming or not conforming to U.S. desires.

- **Third party behavior**: How these interventions may have affected the outcome of the incident.

- **Outcomes**: How the incident may have affected: (a) developments within the target state, (b) inter-state relations of concern, (c) target state relations with the United States and with the Soviet Union, (d) U.S. domestic politics, (e) other U.S. foreign relations.

Eight pairs of cases have been selected. Together, the cases illustrate the wide variety of contexts in which the U.S. has made use of its armed forces for political ends. Each pair individually is designed to illustrate the potential utility of military force as a political instrument in a singular situation. Because each case study addresses the same set of questions, thus providing a comparable series of detailed investigations, together they should greatly aid understandings of the phenomena of concern.

The cases (and their investigators) are:

**a)** The June 1967 and October 1973 wars in the Middle East
Lawrence Whetten
University of Southern California

**b)** The Berlin crises of 1958/59 and 1961
Robert M. Slusser
Michigan State University
c) Interventions in the Dominican Republic, 1961 and 1965
   Jerome N. Slater
   State University of New York-Buffalo

d) The Laotian crisis in 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971
   David Hall
   Brown University

   William Quandt
   University of Pennsylvania

f) The seizure of the Pueblo in 1968 and the seizure of the Mayaguez in 1975
   Robert Simmons
   University of Guelph-Ontario

g) The Cyprus crises of 1964 and 1974
   Investigator not yet selected

h) The Yugoslavia crisis of 1951 and the Czech crisis of 1968
   Investigator not yet selected

Case studies will be completed by June 30, 1976.

Topical Sub-analyses

These investigations are designed to supplement the aggregate analyses and case studies for topics of particular interest. They will be carried out by members of the Brookings staff.

Three have been selected and outlined to date:

* The political consequences of the use of military units for disaster relief and other humanitarian purposes;
* Soviet conceptions and applications of military force;
* The political uses of military force in the Mediterranean region.

Additional sub-analyses will probably be undertaken as time and study resources permit.