

# The Future of Privatized Warfare

A Monograph

by

Major Eric M. Peterson  
United States Air Force



School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2016

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>				<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 26-05-2016		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> SAMS Monograph		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> JUN 2015 – MAY 2016	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>  The Future of Privatized Warfare				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b>  Eric M. Peterson, Major, U.S. Air Force				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				<b>8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> This monograph explores the phenomenon of privatized warfare (mercenarism) in its historical and contemporary contexts in order to explain its resurgence and anticipate its future in the United States. Current literature is nearly devoid of theoretical explanations for the recent growth of private military companies (PMCs). This study fills this void by defining the logic of privatized warfare, those dynamics which impel a nation-state's reliance on mercenaries rather than its own citizens. It explores the political, social, ideological, and environmental factors that transformed the nation-state and the conduct of warfare across time. This analysis is broken into three periods: end of the feudal period to the French Revolution when mercenarism was dominant; the French Revolution to the second half of the 20 <sup>th</sup> Century (approx. 1990) when mercenarism was delegitimized and subsequently declined; and the current period which has seen a resurgence in the form of PMCs. Within each phase of privatized warfare, complex systems theory is used to explain the set of internal and external dynamics that constrained and influenced the state with respect to employing mercenaries or its own citizens in external coercion. Some key dynamics include the state-society and citizen-military relationships, social norms, character of war, and the autonomy of the nation-state within the international system.  This methodology highlights the important patterns and parallels that exists between the history of the nation-state and the current dynamics of the United States. In fact, the emerging nature of the United States resembles the states in the era when mercenarism was dominant while diverging from the phase of its decline. These correlations indicate that privatized warfare will continue to expand. This monograph illustrates that the use of mercenaries is not a historical anomaly but its normal state. The recent growth of PMCs is not an aberration due to the context of recent wars. Therefore, the regular military must not shirk this challenge to its existing paradigm in which the citizen-military dominates. It must acknowledge the future presence of privatized warfare and seamlessly blend its evolving forms into its theories of warfare and operating concepts.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Privatized Warfare, Private Military Companies, PMCs, State-Society Relationship, Evolution of the Nation-State and Warfare					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b>	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b>	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b>			<b>19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b>
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	82	

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: Major Eric M. Peterson

Monograph Title: The Future of Privatized Warfare

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Monograph Director  
Jeffrey J. Kubiak, PhD

\_\_\_\_\_, Seminar Leader  
Randall S. Hoffman, LtCol

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies  
Henry A. Arnold III, COL, IN

Accepted this 26<sup>th</sup> day of May 2016 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

## **Abstract**

The Future of Privatized Warfare, by Major Eric M. Peterson, United States Air Force, 82 pages.

This monograph explores the phenomenon of privatized warfare (mercenarism) in its historical and contemporary contexts in order to explain its resurgence and anticipate its future in the United States. Current literature is nearly devoid of theoretical explanations for the recent growth of private military companies (PMCs). This study fills this void by defining the logic of privatized warfare, those dynamics which impel a nation-state's reliance on mercenaries rather than its own citizens. It explores the political, social, ideological, and environmental factors that transformed the nation-state and the conduct of warfare across time. This analysis is broken into three periods: end of the feudal period to the French Revolution when mercenarism was dominant; the French Revolution to the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (approx. 1990) when mercenarism was delegitimized and subsequently declined; and the current period which has seen a resurgence in the form of PMCs. Within each phase of privatized warfare, complex systems theory is used to explain the set of internal and external dynamics that constrained and influenced the state with respect to employing mercenaries or its own citizens in external coercion. Some key dynamics include the state-society and citizen-military relationships, social norms, character of war, and the autonomy of the nation-state within the international system.

This methodology highlights the important patterns and parallels that exists between the history of the nation-state and the current dynamics of the United States. In fact, the emerging nature of the United States resembles the states in the era when mercenarism was dominant while diverging from the phase of its decline. These correlations indicate that privatized warfare will continue to expand. This monograph illustrates that the use of mercenaries is not a historical anomaly but its normal state. The recent growth of PMCs is not an aberration due to the context of recent wars. Therefore, the regular military must not shirk this challenge to its existing paradigm in which the citizen-military dominates. It must acknowledge the future presence of privatized warfare and seamlessly blend its evolving forms into its theories of warfare and operating concepts.

## Contents

Acknowledgments .....	vi
Acronyms .....	vii
Figures .....	viii
Section 1: Introduction .....	1
The Evolution of Mercenarism.....	6
Section 2: Mercenarism’s Dominance.....	14
State .....	14
Society.....	17
External .....	19
Summary .....	20
Section 3: Mercenarism’s Decline.....	22
State.....	23
Society.....	26
External .....	32
Summary .....	35
Section 4: Mercenarism’s Resurgence .....	37
A Changing Environment.....	39
Rise of Neoliberalism.....	40
Globalization .....	43
End of the Cold War.....	45
The Emerging System .....	48
State.....	48
Society.....	52
External .....	57

Summary .....	59
Comparative Analysis and Prognosis of the Future .....	61
Section 5: Implications for the Future .....	63
Section 6: Conclusion.....	65
Bibliography .....	68

## **Acknowledgments**

I would like to thank several people for their valuable support in preparing this monograph. Dr. Jeffrey Kubiak took interest in my topic and his guidance was instrumental to scoping my research and vectoring my thrust into lift. Colonel Lee Gentile provided vital writing expertise, helping me fine tune my argument. I would also like to thank Dr. Alice Butler-Smith for her guidance and honest feedback on my research. Thank you to my children, for ensuring that I strove for balance during the countless hours of research and writing. Most importantly, I thank my wife, Meredith, for her unwavering loyalty, patience, and encouragement.

## **Acronyms**

PMC	Private Military Company
PSC	Private Security Company
PMSC	Private Military and Security Company
UN	United Nations
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
AVF	All-Volunteer Force

## Figures

1	Nation-State Construct.....	5
2	Nature of Nation-State-Pre French Revolution.....	22
3	Nature of Nation-State-Post French Revolution .....	37
4	Ratio of Contractors to Military Personnel .....	39
5	Changing Environment - Globalization, Neoliberalism, and End of Cold War .....	48
6	Emergent Nature of Nation-State (United States).....	61
7	Comparative Analysis Across Time .....	63

## Section 1: Introduction

The United States dependence on privatized warfare is an emergent trend. In fact, the number of private military contractors often exceeded the number of US military personnel in both Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> From 1990 through 2014, the United States saw a meteoric rise in its use of private contractors. In the first Gulf War, the US military used only 10,000 private contractors (1:58 ratio) in support roles. However, by 2011, the United States employed 262,000 contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan (1:1 ratio).<sup>2</sup> Simultaneously, the demarcation between military and private functions has been blurred as well. In fact, the military no longer has the capability or capacity to perform many tasks that were formerly part of its core functions.<sup>3</sup> Private military companies (PMCs) are executing security and combat support tasks that were once considered the monopolies of state militaries. In the first Gulf War and then again in Bosnia, PMCs fulfilled only support roles like base support and sustainment. In contrast, nearly seventeen percent of private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan performed security related functions.<sup>4</sup> Blackwater, a renowned PMC, carried weapons, utilized helicopters, and engaged in firefights in its security mission.<sup>5</sup> While civilian contractors have assisted the military for hundreds of years, they are now becoming ubiquitous and encroaching on traditional combat duties.

---

<sup>1</sup> Laura Dickinson, *Outsourcing War & Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs* (Yale University Press, 2011), 37; Elke Krahnmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 205.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce E. Stanley, *Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy* (University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 8, 50, 57.

<sup>3</sup> US General Accounting Office, *Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans*, GAO-03-695 (Washington DC, June 2003), 6-9.

<sup>4</sup> Stanley, *Outsourcing Security*, 140, 109. Private security contractors perform non-support functions and nearly all are armed.

<sup>5</sup> Deborah D. Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 21.

While the use of non-state or private actors as a means of coercion is novel for the United States, it is not a historical anomaly. One of the most consistent patterns across time has been the use by the state of soldiers for hire, mercenaries, who serve purely for compensation and without a higher sense of duty to a nation-state's cause. Mercenary warfare flourished in Europe during the middle ages and early modern period.<sup>6</sup> Ancient Egypt, Persia, and Rome all employed mercenaries.<sup>7</sup> Rome's progression from citizen-militias to professional soldiers, then a mixed professional-mercenary force, before transforming into self-contained mercenary units provides a potential model for the United States own future.<sup>8</sup>

Should the US military be concerned with the rapid growth in PMCs? Extant trends including new political, social, and external dynamics seemingly favor the use of privatized warfare. If these patterns endure, the United States reliance on private firms will continue to expand. Is the citizen-military's dominance in external coercion coming to an end?

This monograph seeks to answer these questions and ultimately determine: does the contemporary nature of the United States indicate the continued escalation of privatized warfare and the degeneration of the citizen-military? The purpose is to determine if the recent expansion in PMCs implies a reversal in the collective mix between public and private armed forces. To anticipate its future, this paper aims to understand the logic of privatized warfare, those dynamics which influence a nation-state's use or disuse of mercenaries.

The phenomenon of privatized warfare (mercenarism) and the nation-state are

---

<sup>6</sup> Carlos Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security: A Guide to the Issues* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 13; The middle ages spans from approximately the 5<sup>th</sup> century to the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The early modern period begins in the 15<sup>th</sup> century and ends in the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. This period includes the Renaissance and Enlightenment in Europe.

<sup>7</sup> Alan Axelrod, *Mercenaries: A Guide to Private Armies and Private Military Companies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2014), 9-21.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

fundamentally linked. As Carl von Clausewitz accurately described, war is an extension of state politics.<sup>9</sup> The decision to use a PMC or any other form of privatized warfare in lieu of a citizen-military is a subset of these politics. While a nation-state's political actors ultimately determine the means of war, this decision does not occur in a vacuum. It is affected by the internal and external dynamics of the nation-state in which these actors exist. Internal dynamics stem from the interactions and relationships between a nation-state's government and its people. Social, ideological, and political factors often create discord between the state and society and impact the government's ability to extract the resources needed for war. Furthermore, the nation-state is also influenced by external conditions as part of a larger international system. For example, central decision-makers are affected by the external security environment and the autonomy of their nation-state. These dynamics constrain, influence, and even compel the use of privatized warfare. Their union results in Clausewitz's "prevailing conditions" and "nature of states and societies" that govern war.<sup>10</sup> Michael Howard explains, "As states change their nature, so will their policy change, and so will their wars."<sup>11</sup>

This paper utilizes complex systems theory to examine and then model the nation-state's nature across three periods and associated phases in the evolution of mercenarism (see Figure 1 below). These phases include the end of the feudal period to the French Revolution when mercenary warfare was dominant; the French Revolution to the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (approx. 1990) when it was delegitimized and subsequently declined; and the contemporary period which has seen a resurgence in the form of PMCs. This construct provides a lens to examine and frame the internal and external dynamics affecting the employment of mercenaries

---

<sup>9</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans., Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 84.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 586.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 76.

in each of these phases. Within this construct, the state (government) and society (citizens) collectively make up the nation-state's internal dynamics. The external environment is an aggregate of those dynamics outside of the nation-state that influence its politics. In order to compare the different systems and understand the shifts in the use of privatized warfare, the same components or dynamics are examined across all three time periods. Important state components include the distribution of power, the structure of government, access to resources, and perceived advantages of privatized warfare. Societal dynamics include norms, ideology, national identity, and the citizen-state and citizen-military relationships. Critical external components include state autonomy, the security environment, technology, and the character of war. These dynamics, representing the state, society, and the external environment, all affected the state's employment of privatized warfare distinctly in each phase of mercenarism. Much of the available literature on mercenarism uses select components to explain the decline of privatized warfare after the French Revolution or justify its dominance during the middle ages. Additionally, these studies diverge between society-centric (social) and state-centric (political) explanations for the use or disuse of privatized warfare. This discord provides a good method of studying the state-society relationship from opposite ends, because realists and neorealists advance political and material explanations while constructivists champion the role of cultural influences like norms and ideas. This paper asserts that mercenarism is both a political and social phenomenon. Therefore, generating a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon necessitates an examination of factors from both sides. Neil Harrison supports this approach: "In a complex system, many factors symbiotically cause an effect. Theorists should look to the evolution of the system, not to individual events, for causes of observed effects."<sup>12</sup> Mercenarism cannot be understood by a linear formula. Individual factors like


---

<sup>12</sup> Neil E. Harrison, *Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006), 13.

the character of war, the type of governance, prevailing norms, and even supply-demand cannot explain the “politics” underpinning the use of mercenaries.<sup>13</sup> Instead, it is the union and interaction between these dynamics that underpin the logic of privatized warfare.

## Construct

- *Decision to use privatized warfare versus citizen-military is ultimately a decision of the nation-state’s central decision makers*
  - *Based on constraints imposed by system*
- **State** (central decision makers)= distribution of power/formal governance structures/access to capital and manpower
- **Society** = norms/ideology/citizen-state relationship/citizen-military relationship
- **External Environment** = character of war/technology/security environment



Black = Privatized Warfare/Mercenarism  
 White = Citizen-Army



Figure 1. Nation-State Construct

Source: Created by Author

There are four important limitations to this paper’s methodology. First, it only

---

<sup>13</sup> Harrison supports this statement, “state behavior emerges from domestic interactions.” Harrison, *Complexity in World Politics*, 30; Because the State-Society relationship is based on human interaction, simplifying the solution to a single variable would be oversimplifying its complexity. Complex systems theory is needed because “Social systems exhibit dynamic patterns analogous to physical, biological, and computational systems.” Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 21.

examines existing trends in the United States. It does not assess the recent surge of privatized warfare in Africa or the United Kingdom. However, the United States is an excellent case study to hypothesize privatized warfare's future because it has the world's most powerful military. Second, the historical analysis of mercenarism was confined to Europe. This potentially limits theoretical explanation of the phenomenon to the western world. Third, privateers, mercantile organizations, and other naval forms of private coercion were not examined because efforts concentrated on land warfare. Lastly, it was not possible to include all of the components that impact the decision to use mercenaries. This paper reflects deliberate choices to include those that illustrated temporal linkages through the different time periods examined. Other components such as economics, industrialization, and urbanization warrant further study.

### **The Evolution of Mercenarism**

The evolution of mercenarism includes three discrete phases in the use of privatized warfare: dominance, decline, and resurgence. These shifts in the employment of privatized warfare occurred as a result of changes in the nature of the nation-state. The evolving nature of a nation-state is a product of changes in the variables both internal and as well as external to the state. While the use of mercenaries was common throughout antiquity, the end of the feudal period in Europe serves as the origin for understanding the evolution of mercenarism and the nation-state. The end of the feudal period symbolizes the advent of both central governments and territorial distinction.<sup>14</sup> With the steady decline of the feudal obligation system, the reliance on

---

<sup>14</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 587; Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 91.

individual mercenaries steadily rose.<sup>15</sup> This transition was driven by changes in warfare that elevated infantry skills and demanded more disciplined soldiers.<sup>16</sup> With an increase in the scale and length of war, feudal levies could not fulfill manpower requirements because knights avoided long-term service and refused to fight in distant battles.<sup>17</sup> Lastly, social changes were also important because subjects refused to fight for anything but financial rewards.<sup>18</sup>

Around 1400, states turned to mercenary companies because paying individual mercenaries became administratively and cost prohibitive as the scale of war grew.<sup>19</sup> These companies, which could be as large as a corps or a whole army, were hired based on their military specialties whether cavalry, infantry, or pike.<sup>20</sup> This system was favored because the administrative and organizational burdens resided with the contractor (enterpriser). While initially the costs associated with recruiting, salary, and equipment were contractual, the state eventually relied on the enterpriser through private creditors to offset these costs.<sup>21</sup> The enterpriser was now

---

<sup>15</sup> Christopher Allmand, "New Weapons, New Tactics 1300-1500," in *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, ed. Geoffrey Parker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 103.

<sup>16</sup> Michael Mallett, "Mercenaries" in *Medieval Warfare: A History*, ed. Maurice Keen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 212-213.

<sup>17</sup> Sarah V. Percy, "The Changing Character of Private Force," in *The Changing Character of War*, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 267.

<sup>18</sup> Allmand, "New Weapons, New Tactics 1300-1500," 103.

<sup>19</sup> Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1992), 29, 184-187.

<sup>20</sup> P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 22, 28; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 64.

<sup>21</sup> David Parrott, "From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies: War, State, and Society in Western Europe, 1600-1700," in *European Warfare: 1350-1750*, eds. Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 74-75.

responsible for taxing the local populace in order to support his units and pay his creditors back.<sup>22</sup> This period is best understood as a time when “people bought and sold military manpower like a commodity on the global market.”<sup>23</sup> In fact, warfare became so commercialized that enterprisers subcontracted with each other.<sup>24</sup> The danger with this system was that it multiplied the number of stakeholders because the enterpriser was reliant on external financiers. The creditors expected to get reimbursed as campaigns progressed, which led to conflicting interests between the state, enterpriser, and other stakeholders.<sup>25</sup> It should be evident that the contemporary era of contracting PMCs resembles this period of contracting mercenary companies. History also raises the concern that the next stage of privatized warfare might resort to the use of private creditors to finance military endeavors.

In the 1700s, privatized warfare evolved to the point that states would raise their own armies but then sell them to other countries for their use.<sup>26</sup> This was largely prevalent in the German states as evident with the British use of the Hessians in the American Revolutionary War. The formation of state armies simultaneously reduced the dependence on mercenary companies. Mercenary companies did not disappear and were still extensively used, but were subordinated and contained within state administered and financed armies.<sup>27</sup> While states had more control, they still expected their officers, who bought their positions, to use their own

---

<sup>22</sup> Parker, *The Military Revolution*, 66.

<sup>23</sup> Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3.

<sup>24</sup> Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim, “Then Was Then and Now is Now: An Overview of Change and continuity in Late-Medieval and Early-Modern Warfare,” in *European Warfare: 1350-1750*, ed. Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 16.

<sup>25</sup> Parrott, “From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies,” 75.

<sup>26</sup> Tallett and Trim, “Then Was Then and Now is Now,” 16.

<sup>27</sup> Parrott, “From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies,” 77.

resources to “recruit, equip, and feed their men.”<sup>28</sup> While state armies were preferred by virtue of their loyalty and lower costs per soldier, they required a lengthy mobilization time for recruitment and training and a cumbersome administrative apparatus.<sup>29</sup>

The French Revolution instigated the transition from mercenarism’s dominance to its ensuing decline.<sup>30</sup> While this diminution did not occur simultaneously across Europe, the overall trajectory of privatized warfare spiraled downward. The French Revolution served as a catalyst for both political and social transformation, fundamentally changing the nation-state and uprooting old conceptions of warfare in the process. It was a contingent event that led to the delegitimation of mercenary use.<sup>31</sup> Behind these changes were Enlightenment philosophies that challenged preexisting ideas of the proper functions and relationships between state and society. They fueled new conceptions of sovereignty, citizenship, equality, and warfare.<sup>32</sup> These motifs first found traction in the United States and then reached their apogee in the revolutionary fervor of France. France’s Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) strengthened the idea of popular sovereignty, called for the abolition of divine rights, and emboldened the natural rights of its citizens.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, it called for the creation of a public army in order to protect these

---

<sup>28</sup> Tallett and Trim, “Then Was Then and Now is Now,” 16.

<sup>29</sup> Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West,” 518.

<sup>30</sup> Most literature regards the French Revolution as the impetus for the decline in privatized warfare. See Deborah Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War,” *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 41; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 31; Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall, 1993): 82, accessed October 30, 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539098>,” 92; Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 27-29; Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns*, chapter 4.

<sup>31</sup> Kevin A. O’Brien, “What Should and What Should Not Be Regulated,” in *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*, ed. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 35.

<sup>32</sup> Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies,” 44.

<sup>33</sup> Merriman, *A History of Modern Europe*, 468; See *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, 26

liberties. Much like the US Declaration of Independence, these novel ideas implied a different relationship between the state and citizen. R.R. Palmer, a distinguished historian, explains that the French Revolution engendered “the nationalizing of public opinion and closer relations between governments and governed.”<sup>34</sup> As a result, society had a larger role in determining the use of force and a distinguishable gap emerged between public and private.<sup>35</sup>

The French Revolution was instrumental to the decline of mercenarism because it recast the nature of the nation-state. It fomented the shift of loyalty and the control of violence to the central state. The French Revolution eventually led to the conception that the state should have a monopoly of violence. Nationalism and cultural cohesion became tenets of the state which led to a national identity that was not demarcated by geographic boundaries and a ruler. The social contract reduced the separation between citizen and soldier because citizenship became interlinked with military service. Lastly, a norm developed against mercenaries because they challenged the sovereignty of the state and were not loyal to the national cause. A citizen-army was acknowledged as the preeminent military instrument and conscription was used as a tool for mobilization. The French Revolution’s major changes—democracy (popular sovereignty), the state’s achieving a monopoly on the use of violence, nationalism, social contract, universal conscription, and anti-mercenary norm—serve as the foundation for understanding the changes in the evolution of mercenarism. These changes along with the concurrent growth of the nation-state itself were catalysts for mercenarism’s decline. While the use of private means never fully disappeared, its explicit use by nation-states was largely delegitimized.

The citizen-army remained the state’s primary coercive means for nearly two-hundred

---

August 1789 (France), Article 3.

<sup>34</sup> R.R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 95.

<sup>35</sup> Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 24.

years, but the recent growth in PMCs symbolizes a new phase in the evolution of mercenarism. Although their corporate structure subdues this linkage, they are a contemporary manifestation of the same phenomenon that has existed for thousands of years. PMCs can be broadly defined as “corporate bodies specializing in provisions of military skills to governments” including “training, planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operation support, and technical skills.”<sup>36</sup> This description is inclusive of other labels like private security companies (PSCs) and private military and security companies (PMSCs).<sup>37</sup> The idea that PMCs represent a “modern reincarnation” of mercenary warfare is supported by the United Nations (UN).<sup>38</sup> This correlation was recently highlighted by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries: “The new modalities of mercenarism point at an emergent and very flourishing industry of military and private security companies that respond to a commercial logic in search of the maximum profit. Traditional mercenaries are being absorbed by the private military security companies.”<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> Tim Spicer, *Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and War and the Sandline Affair* (Edinburgh and London: Mainstream Publishing, 1999), 15. Quoted in Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 60; Operation support in this definition includes direct combat support.

<sup>37</sup> For the purpose of this paper, these other categories are merged under the aegis of PMCs. The reason for this aggregation is that most private companies providing military services are diversified and violate any typology. Additionally, growth in all three types offer similar evidence for increased privatization. The greatest distinction is the degree to which they intrude into the nation-state’s monopoly of force. PSCs signify the greatest challenge; over 90 percent of their employees carried weapons and provided combat functions that were formerly off-limits in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congressional Research Service, *The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress*, by Moshe Schwartz, May 13, 2011, 2, 6.

<sup>38</sup> Sarah Percy, “Morality and Regulation,” in *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*, eds. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 25; Both the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly associate PMCs to mercenaries.

<sup>39</sup> UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, “Mercenaries, Private Military and Security Companies and International Law,” by Jose L. Gomez del Prado, accessed September 23, 2015, [https://law.wisc.edu/gls/documents/gomez\\_del\\_prado\\_paper.doc](https://law.wisc.edu/gls/documents/gomez_del_prado_paper.doc), 33.

A comparison of PMCs to past forms of privatized warfare further strengthens this linkage. There are many similarities between modern PMCs and mercenary companies, which dominated warfare from the 1400s through the 1700s.<sup>40</sup> Structurally, they both blend a composite of individual mercenaries into a hierarchical organization. Additionally, they are both driven by profit and this motivation is replicated at the individual level. The organizational members each have sole responsibility for their decision to fight and are not motivated by a group dynamic.<sup>41</sup> This implies that they have a free choice, unlike a citizen-soldier who has a duty and obligation to fight.

PMCs and mercenary companies also have a low attachment to a cause and greater independence from a nation-state. They do not swear allegiance to the US constitution and their duties are stipulated by a contract. According to Anthony Mockler, this temporary loyalty is how a true mercenary can be identified.<sup>42</sup> PMCs and mercenary companies hire employees based on company interests and capabilities. This decision is not based on nationality or loyalty to a nation-state. As such, PMCs are often transnational and include contractors that are not party to a conflict. In fact, foreign contractors from lower income countries including Bosnia, Ukraine, Chile, and others made up the largest portion of private contractors in Iraq.<sup>43</sup> Mercenary

---

<sup>40</sup> Sarah Percy uses the key elements of motivation and control to link PMCs and mercenary companies in her book, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*. In fact, she uses these same elements to differentiate the various expressions of force from mercenaries to guerilla fighters.

<sup>41</sup> Sarah V. Percy, "This Gun's for Hire: A New Look at an Old Issue," *International Journal* 58, no. 4 (Autumn, 2003): 726, accessed August 8, 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203894>.

<sup>42</sup> Anthony Mockler, *The Mercenaries* (New York: MacMillan, 1969), 20.

<sup>43</sup> Krahnmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 216; PMCs not only hire individuals from all over the world but are increasingly consolidating and buying other firms to become more diversified or increase their market share. One of the largest, Armor Holdings, owns subsidiaries in Russia, the United States, and Great Britain. This indicates the competing interests that is involved with employing PMCs. See P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise*

companies, like PMCs today, were largely made up of foreigners and this why many modern definitions include this component as part of the definition.<sup>44</sup>

Furthermore, PMCs and mercenary companies are indirectly controlled through contract agreements that stipulate the services that the companies will provide, the time period, and the compensation for their work. Because of the contract terms, states have a lower degree of control. This contrasts with citizen-militaries that are organized directly under state authority and where the state exercises a much higher degree of control.<sup>45</sup> Sarah Percy, author of *Mercenaries: the History of a Norm in International Relations*, links PMCs and mercenary companies to the same spectrum of mercenarism because they share a small amount of control and motivation for a cause which stands in contrast with national soldiers who have the highest amount of control and a strong attachment to a cause.<sup>46</sup>

The emergence of PMCs represents a *potential* inflection point in the conduct of warfare. This resurgence could be anomalous or indicative of warfare's future. In order to solve this dilemma, the logic of privatized warfare must be understood. This necessitates identifying and understanding the factors that underpin the major phases of mercenarism (dominance, decline, and resurgence). Accordingly, these phases are examined separately (sections 2 - 4) in order to explain the dynamics which shaped them. A better understanding of the larger phenomenon is

---

*of the Privatized Military Industry*, 84.

<sup>44</sup> While most modern definitions include a foreign component, this relegates the phenomenon to a contemporary understanding. It was not until the French Revolution that national identity and whether a soldier was 'foreign' became important. This typology would omit one of the most studied mercenary elements in history, the condottieri, whom after the 15<sup>th</sup> century would not be considered foreign in today's terms but were a significant part of privatized warfare. See Percy, *Mercenaries*, 52; Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 13; Michael Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy* (Totowa: NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1974), 257.

<sup>45</sup> Mockler, *The Mercenaries*, 44-45.

<sup>46</sup> Percy, *Mercenaries*, 59.

possible by juxtaposing the first two phases, because they were divergent in their level of privatized warfare. This logic can then be applied to the contemporary United States and test whether the recent use of PMCs was an aberration. This is accomplished by comparing the nature of the United States to historical “models” in order to extract any correlations and patterns. A good gauge of continued expansion of privatized warfare would be strong parallels to the period before the French Revolution when mercenarism was dominant and divergence with the period of decline.

## **Section 2: Mercenarism’s Dominance**

The evolution of mercenarism illustrates that there are two divergent sides to the logic of privatized warfare: a side that promotes the use of mercenaries and one that impedes their use. However, these sides are not equally balanced as for most of history mercenarism dominated warfare. From the end of the feudal period to the French Revolution, the pendulum swung clearly to the side favoring mercenaries. The interaction and relationship between the state and society led to a mixture of factors that hindered the employment of citizen-armies. An examination of this period helps elucidate the factors that drive a nation-state’s employment of mercenaries rather than its own citizens. Additionally, it provides a model for later evaluation of contemporary dynamics. The set of state, societal, and external dynamics existent during mercenarism’s dominance serves as a foundation for understanding the first side of the logic of privatized warfare.

### **State**

During the era of mercenarism’s dominance, decentralized governance (indirect control) and inability to access resources were major stimulants for privatized warfare. These interdependent components induced a dependence on mercenary warfare because they restricted

the central state's ability to gather the requisite means of war from society.<sup>47</sup> The state must be able to collect local resources and distribute these effectively through administrative structures. However, power in medieval Europe was widely dispersed due to the power of intermediaries and local elites. In fact, this internal conflict was the primary source of medieval wars. This distribution of power also enabled these intermediaries to make demands on the sovereign for the conduct of wars.<sup>48</sup> Because of the weakness of the central state and requirement to negotiate with various elites, control of resources remained at the local level. In medieval Europe, the problem was not the depletion of resources. Instead, rulers were unable to extract the money, manpower, and material they needed as a result of the discord between society and the state.<sup>49</sup> Although these resources existed, rulers could not access them because of political constraints. Jan Glete points out that the "limits of medieval and early modern warfare are political rather than economic."<sup>50</sup> While some rulers were able to expand their power and their access to capital, this balance was always tenuous as too much coercion led to insurrection.<sup>51</sup> Prussia is an example of how this problem engendered a reliance on mercenaries. The country was divided into Cantons and then further subdivided into companies to create a national recruiting system. However, Dierk Walter explains that national power was too anemic and unable to stop Canton leaders from exempting entire professions and even cities because these leaders viewed military service as unproductive. These measures at the local level forced the state

---

<sup>47</sup> Tallett and Trim, "Then Was Then and Now is Now," 15. This argument is also made by Charles Tilly, David Parrott, and numerous others in their works.

<sup>48</sup> Jan Glete, "Warfare, Entrepreneurship, and the Fiscal-Military State," in *European Warfare: 1350-1750*, eds. Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 302; Tallett and Trim, "Then Was Then and Now is Now," 15.

<sup>49</sup> Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns*, 21.

<sup>50</sup> Glete, "Warfare, Entrepreneurship, and the Fiscal-Military State," 301.

<sup>51</sup> Tallett and Trim, "Then Was Then and Now is Now," 17-18.

to abandon this system of recruiting because of its ineffectiveness.<sup>52</sup> As a result of these limitations, the state could not construct a citizen-army, thus reinforcing its dependence on mercenaries.

The absence of bureaucratic mechanisms to administer and finance a citizen-army was a further impetus for the dominance of privatized warfare during this period. Until the state could develop an effective system of administration for recruiting, organizing, and paying an army while simultaneously taxing society efficiently, a permanent citizen-army was elusive. While numerous authors like Machiavelli and Justus Lipius decried the use of mercenaries, their appeals for the creation of a citizen-army were considered unfeasible by rulers throughout Europe.<sup>53</sup> States simply did not have the centralized administrative structure for anything other than a mercenary army. Privatized warfare was the most effective means for sovereigns to generate and employ an army due to the inadequacy of state bureaucracy.<sup>54</sup>

Additionally, privatized warfare provided political and economic advantages that incentivized mercenarism. It simultaneously allowed rulers to remove intermediaries and generate a capable military force quickly. A mercenary-army was more costs effective than a citizen-army because it could be assembled and disbanded on demand.<sup>55</sup> At the same time, it freed regular citizens from military duty. This was important because there was very little surplus labor in the

---

<sup>52</sup> Dierk Walter, "Meeting the French Challenge: Conscription in Prussia, 1807-1825," in *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?* eds. Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, and Harold D. Blanton (New York: Routledge, 2009), 26-27.

<sup>53</sup> Olaf van Nimwegan, "The Transformation of Army Organization in Early-Modern Western Europe: 1500-1789," in *European Warfare: 1350-1750*, eds. Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 160-161.

<sup>54</sup> David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 317.

<sup>55</sup> John A. Lynn, "The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800-2000," *The International History Review* 18, no. 3 (August 1996): 518, accessed August 9, 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40107494>.

economy to remove wage earners and put them in military service. For example, Frederick the Great believed he could not afford to use his subjects in the army because of the substantial loss in tax basis.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, King Frederick William I declared that using his own citizens would lead to total ruin because tax returns would be “reduced to less than a third” and “prices will fall.”<sup>57</sup> While rulers understood that using civilians could increase motivation, the economic concern overrode this benefit. In summary, mercenaries were prevalent because they were the cheapest option during an era when European rulers faced existential threats yet had little access to capital and minimal bureaucratic structures.

## Society

Before the French Revolution, the disjointed relationship between citizens and the state fueled the use of privatized warfare. Because of this rift, the people resisted both military service and war taxation. This lack of societal participation led to wars that were fought “without the people.”<sup>58</sup> Further severing society and the state was the lack of democratic ideals including the idea of popular sovereignty. The monarch had full control of the military without regarding the people’s desires. Clausewitz describes this broken relationship, “war thus became solely the concern of the government to the extent that governments parted company with their people and behaved as if they were themselves the state.”<sup>59</sup>

The lack of nationalism during this period exacerbated the gap between citizen and the

---

<sup>56</sup> Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978), 17.

<sup>57</sup> Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 9.

<sup>58</sup> Pascal Vennesson, “War Without the People,” in *The Changing Character of War*, ed. Hew Strachan and Sybille Scheipers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 241.

<sup>59</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 589.

state. Nationalism was virtually non-existent before the French Revolution.<sup>60</sup> As a consequence, the nation-state had little identity outside its elites and represented little more than a “geographical expression.”<sup>61</sup> This deficiency made recruiting and motivating a citizen-army difficult. Also, it bolstered and reaffirmed sub-state loyalties and ethnic ties. There was little attachment to the central state as citizens were more loyal to their local communities. In fact, arming the local populace usually led to rebellion and even insurrection against other forces that sovereigns hired.<sup>62</sup> These problems amplified rulers’ preferences for mercenary units over local militias. Militias, which were nearly the only non-mercenary unit in early modern Europe, were reserved for emergencies because of their allegiance to the local community.

The citizen-military divide was an additional catalyst for privatized warfare. During the period of mercenarism’s dominance, there was nothing tying citizenship to the military. In fact, the preponderate norm was that the military was for professionals and not regular citizens. Society viewed military service as wasteful, especially in wealthier areas.<sup>63</sup> There was a belief that the best use of a citizen was not in war but in the economy. Michael Howard explains, “wars were the king’s war. The role of the good citizen was to pay his taxes, and sound political economy dictated that he should be left alone to make money out which to pay those taxes. He was required neither to participate in making the decision out of which wars arose nor to take part in them once they broke out...”<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>60</sup> Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” 82; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 116; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 28.

<sup>61</sup> Mockler, *Mercenaries*, 15.

<sup>62</sup> Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 19.

<sup>63</sup> Erkki Holmila, “The History of Private Violence,” *Estonian National Defense College Proceedings* 15 (2012): 51, accessed 1 September 2015, [http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA\\_Toimetised\\_15\\_2\\_Holmila.pdf](http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_15_2_Holmila.pdf).

<sup>64</sup> Howard, *War in European History*, 73.

## External

The character of war also favored the use of mercenaries over citizens during this period. Because quality was more important than quantity, this increased demand for mercenaries as they had proven themselves more effective than unskilled citizen soldiers. In medieval warfare, economies of scale did not exist; a skilled force could defeat a much larger but less proficient military. This was true because “only the front ranks were able to combat the opposing force so that as long as the lines remained unbroken the number of men actually wielding their weapons on each side at any given instant was roughly equal.”<sup>65</sup> This meant that individual capability and discipline often determined the outcome versus sheer mass. Warfare at that time was also highly specialized, which created a distinct disadvantage for citizen forces. They did not have the expertise, training, nor time to master weapons. On the other hand, mercenaries ability to effectively wield training-intensive weapons like the crossbow or longbow made them a vital commodity.<sup>66</sup> Michael Mallett posits that “it was the growing sophistication of war which created the mercenary.”<sup>67</sup>

Path dependency was a further stimulus for mercenarism. Because of the battlefield success of mercenary companies, this model for warfare was emulated by rival states.<sup>68</sup> The Swiss Pikemen and German Landsknecht were the most copied. After the Swiss Pikemen defeated Austrian heavy cavalry at Sempach (1386), they became a recruited commodity across

---

<sup>65</sup> David A. Latzko, “The Market for Mercenaries,” (Conference Presentation Transcript, Wilkes University, Wilkes-Barre, PA), accessed 29 August 2015, <http://www.personal.psu.edu/~dx131/research/presentations/mercenary.html>.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Mallett, “Mercenaries,” 210.

<sup>68</sup> See Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 25; Mallett, “Mercenaries”; Nimwegan, “The Transformation of Army Organization in Early-Modern Western Europe,” 159.

Europe. This standard was further strengthened after they defeated Charles the Bold ninety years later (1476-1477).<sup>69</sup> Olaf Nimwegan points out that the Landsknecht were modeled after the Swiss once Maximilian I of Habsburg realized that infantry would become preeminent.<sup>70</sup> The Landsknecht proved a formidable mercenary force due to their discipline and use of combined weapons (pike, sword, halberds). They defeated the Frisian army that had a ten-to-one advantage as a result of their superior training.

### Summary

...the maintenance of wholly state-recruited and state-administered military force is an anomalous development over the broad course of European history.

—David Parrott, *The Business of War*

From the end of the feudal period to the French Revolution, the nation-state heavily relied on privatized warfare. Non-state actors were prevalent and challenged the autonomy of the nation-state. During this era, the nation-state was little more than a territorial expression and defined by its ruler. Citizenship was ill-defined, demarcated by borders and not a larger national identity. A defining characteristic was the detachment between the government and its citizens. Internal dynamics such as decentralized governance (indirect control), lack of access to resources, ineffective bureaucratic mechanisms, and the political and economic advantages of using mercenaries compelled the state to rely on private armies. Simultaneously, social dynamics including the detachment between citizens and the military; the gap between citizens and the state; the lack of democratic ideals; and absence of nationalist identity (nationalism) fomented the use of mercenaries. External dynamics including the character of war—highly specialized and

---

<sup>69</sup> Mallett, “Mercenaries,” 227.

<sup>70</sup> Nimwegan, “The Transformation of Army Organization in Early-Modern Western Europe,” 162-163.

quality-centric—also favored privatized war. The established paradigm and the success of mercenary companies (path dependency) was also an important external component.

The fusion of these dynamics generated a discordant relationship between the state and society. The state lacked the ability to both control and extract resources and manpower from society. A citizen-army was not feasible because rulers lacked the access and bureaucratic apparatus needed to fund and organize it. Meanwhile, there were no social forces against the state's employment of mercenaries. In fact, both social and external dynamics favored the use of mercenaries. Mercenaries were viewed as an acceptable means of coercion because a strong anti-mercenary norm did not exist to inhibit their employment though some elites were against the practice (Machiavelli). The state viewed citizens as a better tool in the economy than in the military owing to the lack of trust and problems with extracting resources. Furthermore, there was a lack of ideology and normative beliefs to tie citizens to the central state and the military. Consequently, a citizen's identity and loyalty did not extend far beyond ethnic ties and the local level. At the same time, society viewed the military as a dynastic tool and not something they had control over nor linked to some higher calling of citizenship. The state had a significant degree of independence in the employment of external coercion but was constrained by a host of internal and external dynamics from utilizing its citizens. The outcome was that military force was a commodity in an open market between states and non-state actors.

## Nature of Nation-State Pre-French Revolution




Figure 2. Nature of Nation-State-Pre French Revolution

Source: Created by Author

### Section 3: Mercenarism's Decline

Suddenly war again became the business of the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens... The people became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into balance. The resources and efforts now available for use surpassed all conventional limits...

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

The examination of the first phase—mercenarism's dominance—illuminated those factors which encouraged the employment of mercenaries and encumbered the use of citizens. The second phase, mercenarism's decline, defines the opposing side of privatized warfare. It

highlights the important changes which led to an anti-mercenary norm and the preeminence of the citizen-army. This phase of mercenarism spans from the French Revolution to the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (approx. 1990). The French Revolution led to a transformation of governance and a closer state-society relationship. The “nation in arms” became a reality from an amalgamation of ideological, social, and political upheaval. Massive citizen-armies first displaced mercenary armies as the dominant form during the Napoleonic wars.<sup>71</sup> Through the interactions and relationships between the state, society, and external environment privatized warfare was delegitimized. While no one component is explanatory or causal, their interaction led to mercenarism’s decline.

#### State

A necessary precondition for the decline of mercenarism was the actual growth of the nation-state. It was only after that nation-state became the dominant social organization that non-state actors, including mercenary companies, could be delegitimized by social and ideological changes. This entailed the strengthening of state power through centralization (indirect to direct control), the creation of effective state administration, and permanent standing armies. Anthony Mockler adds, “it was only with the growth of the nation-state in Europe that mercenary soldiering has become disreputable.”<sup>72</sup>

The evolutionary growth of the nation-state in Europe led to increased centralization, increased access to resources, and effective bureaucratic mechanisms for both administering and financing a citizen-army. This argument is the central thesis of Charles Tilly’s book, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*. In the interest of making war, the central state consolidated its

---

<sup>71</sup> Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War,” 119.

<sup>72</sup> Mockler, *The Mercenaries*, 14.

power by progressively removing internal rivals. These elites had formerly blocked or reduced the state's ability to access the required resources. Tilly explains that as the central state removed these rivals, this further increased the involvement of the central state in all things from production, distribution, and adjudication of disputes.<sup>73</sup> The synergistic effect was the creation of a much larger state apparatus to administer these processes and ultimately more effective bureaucratic mechanisms to extract resources from society. While this transition furnished stronger state control over the money, manpower, and material it needed, it also resulted in stronger citizen rights, increased privileges, and a larger social infrastructure. However, Tilly points out that the transition to direct control was incomplete before the French Revolution because the layer of intermediaries were still too strong and further involvement in society meant a larger state apparatus the state could not afford. The French Revolution served as the catalyst to remove these rivals and complete the transition to direct rule across Europe. By leveraging Enlightenment ideals as motive, the state removed the layers of nobles and priests that stood between the central government and society. This process fixed the inability to administer and extract the capital needed to fund large citizen armies. The French government became the "model of centralized government that other states emulated" while it also imposed this model on those countries it conquered.<sup>74</sup> Because this model proved most effective in Europe (victorious in war) it became copied elsewhere.

Another important development of the nation-state was the creation of standing armies because it increased the power of the central state. It gave rulers access to new resources outside of the state, provided security to its people and their business interest, and most importantly,

---

<sup>73</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 104, 190.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

facilitated the extraction of internal resources to wage war.<sup>75</sup> Charles Louis XIV (France, late 17<sup>th</sup> Century) created Europe's first permanent standing army after he imposed permanent taxes to pay for his army.<sup>76</sup> Clausewitz explains, "Louis XIV, may be regarded as the point in history when the standing army...reached maturity."<sup>77</sup> However, these original standing armies were largely mercenary. With the transition to standing armies, the central state could enforce taxation because of its loyalty to the central state and not local elites.<sup>78</sup> The permanent standing army did not develop until states became powerful enough to extract the capital needed to maintain them.

Rulers were eventually compelled to disarm non-state actors because of the risks of relying on privatized warfare. For example, Albert Wallenstein, a mercenary enterpriser, was nearly successful in creating a mercenary state but was murdered due his refusal to follow the Emperor's orders. At one time, he commanded 45,000 mercenaries in battle and had over 100,000 on his payroll.<sup>79</sup> Due to the "costs and political risks of large-scale mercenary forces," rulers led the transition from private to public forces.<sup>80</sup> Citizen-armies were considered more reliable because of new ideological and normative beliefs that changed the loyalty of people from the local level to the central state. Meanwhile, mercenaries were considered unreliable and costly because of their propensity for pillage. In parallel, the wider acceptance of liberal Enlightenment ideas created the permissive environment to allow both military and political reformers to

---

<sup>75</sup> Steven Gunn, "War and the State in Western Europe, 1350-1600," in *European Warfare: 1350-1750*, eds. Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 18.

<sup>76</sup> Maurice Keen, "The Changing Scene: Guns, Gunpowder, and Permanent Armies," in *Medieval Warfare: A History*, ed. Maurice Keen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 283.

<sup>77</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 588.

<sup>78</sup> Lynn, "The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800-2000," 519.

<sup>79</sup> Parrott, "From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies," 74.

<sup>80</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 82.

transition to a citizen-army.<sup>81</sup> These and other social changes will be examined in the next subsection.

## Society

It may be laid down as a primary position. . . that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes not only a portion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it.

—George Washington

Five important social developments combined to reduce the overall predominance of mercenarism. First, a new conception of sovereignty developed which delegitimized non-state actors and emphasized the state's monopoly of force. Second, a democratic conception of society and a closer relationship between citizens and the military developed. Third, a sense of nationalism and cultural cohesion formed from the advancement of deliberate state measures. Fourth, universal conscription further promoted this national unity. Lastly, an anti-mercenary norm emerged through the synergistic effects of the dynamics above. All of these components served to marginalize private warfare.

An expanded understanding of sovereignty had important repercussions on the legitimacy of privatized warfare. The modern definition of the nation-state—a “human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”—is a derivative of the French Revolution.<sup>82</sup> Elke Krahnemann in *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security* explains that this contemporary understanding originated with the writings of Thomas Hobbes and then Jean-Jacques Rousseau a century later. They both supported a new model of the

---

<sup>81</sup> Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies,” 42.

<sup>82</sup> Max Weber, *Political Writings*, eds. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 310.

nation-state; the state's primary purpose was the provision of security to society while society relinquishes their control of force for this promise. These enlightened thinkers helped define a new state-society relationship, undergirded by democratic ideals which fueled the revolution. Rousseau believed that the control of force "is to be invested in the general will of all citizens" and to ensure this, militaries should be made up of citizens.<sup>83</sup> This novel idea laid the conceptual foundations of the citizen-army.

The notion of the state as the sole arbiter of violence grew in parallel with an expanded understanding of sovereignty. This ultimately changed what it meant to be a "citizen." Because citizens transitioned from subjects to representatives, it meant that states could no longer disregard their actions in other states.<sup>84</sup> Janice Thomson, author of *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns*, highlights that "sovereignty was redefined such that the state not only claimed ultimate authority within its jurisdiction, defined in geographic terms, but accepted responsibility for transborder violence emanating from its territory."<sup>85</sup> This development led every nation-state to expect other states to hold its own people accountable. The United States was first to enact a neutrality law (1794), prohibiting its citizens from fighting in wars in which the country was not a part. Other nation-states soon copied this law. Thomson points out that neutrality laws were a concerted effort by the state to increase its power over its people. As a result, the state gained a monopoly on the decision to use force. Simultaneously, this deterred the former market-type system that favored non-state actors. State control over the means of violence eventually became "institutionalized" and accepted within society.<sup>86</sup> Violence outside of direct state control was considered a threat to sovereignty and restricted. This belief was no longer held by just the state,

---

<sup>83</sup> Krahmman, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 26.

<sup>84</sup> Avant, "From Mercenary to Citizen Armies," 45.

<sup>85</sup> Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns*, 19.

<sup>86</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 17.

but also the people. This process brought control of coercive force further into the public realm. This also illuminates the evolution in the concept of sovereignty and control of force. In fact, nearly every definition of the nation-state today includes the monopolized control of force as the foundational element.

The marriage of society and the military was an important component to the devolution of mercenarism. In the era following the French Revolution, the gap between society and the military was reduced thus making a national army and people's war a possibility.<sup>87</sup> The adoption of democratic ideals and the social contract fundamentally changed the concept of the military. It transformed the military from a dynastic tool to an asset of the nation-state in order to provide security to the "people." Not only did citizens have more rights and power to determine the future of their country, but the whole concept of citizenship changed. Whereas before, military service was largely abhorred and reserved for the professional soldier, it was now considered the duty of each and every citizen.<sup>88</sup> This change in understanding of citizenship was important in improving the ability to recruit and train a fully citizen-army. It also meant that if a state resorted to employing mercenaries, it was considered an aberration of the social contract. The amalgamation of these changes is that demand for mercenaries was reduced. Sarah Percy explains this process:

In the nineteenth century, the great shift away from mercenary use required, in part, new understandings of the relationships between citizen and the state. Once individual citizens were perceived to have a duty to the state (through military service or conscription), states in turn granted citizens further rights in exchange. Once 'citizens' replaced 'soldiers', it was consequently harder to justify the use of mercenaries alongside them on the battlefield.<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup> John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 207.

<sup>88</sup> Parrott, *The Business of War*, 6.

<sup>89</sup> Percy, "The Changing Character of Private Force," 274.

The redrawing of citizenship and sovereignty occurred in parallel with other changes that increased nationalism, an important component to the reduction of mercenary activity.<sup>90</sup> While nationalism bonds society and the state, it only develops from concerted efforts by the state because “nationalists are not born but made—by conditions, circumstances, [and] training.”<sup>91</sup> Leonard Doob highlights that unity and a collective identity within society are not possible if the nation-state does not have distinctiveness in its land, people, and culture.<sup>92</sup> This distinctiveness and national identity is fueled by common language, shared history, the intelligibility of culture and national goals, cultural homogeneity, strong leadership, and a common enemy.<sup>93</sup> Charles Tilly illustrates that the transition to direct control after the French Revolution empowered the central state to create these distinctive features within the economy, education, military, and in ordinary life. He argues that France used nationalism to tie the state and citizen together because a homogeneous population was “more likely to unite against threats.”<sup>94</sup> This was primarily done through compulsory education and military service, and by enforcing a national language.<sup>95</sup> Prussia followed France’s example and used their schools to instill a unique national identity through the teaching of a shared language and history. Prussia’s government replaced religion as the primary focus of instruction with military history and language.<sup>96</sup> The result of these

---

<sup>90</sup> Christopher Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1987), 34.

<sup>91</sup> Boyd C. Shafer, *Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 56.

<sup>92</sup> Leonard W. Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964), 24-46.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 230-262.

<sup>94</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 107.

<sup>95</sup> Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” 81; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 116.

<sup>96</sup> Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” 114-115.

deliberate measures was that “demographic characteristics began to resemble each other within the same state and to differ ever more widely among states.”<sup>97</sup> Nationalism and cultural cohesion are necessary components in a “nation in arms.” Without a strong sense of nationalism, society will oppose the use of conscription, especially in times of peace.<sup>98</sup> Nationalism increases the state’s extraction potential of manpower and resources because it reduces the likelihood of insurrection. Without a sense of national identity and loyalty to the central state, the government’s employment of citizens is dangerous and unreliable as seen in the earlier section.

Universal military service (conscription) was also a vital element in creating national unity and reducing dependence on mercenaries. Conscription gave the nation “the feeling that it owned the army.”<sup>99</sup> It not only increased national unity through forced education and indoctrination, it also drastically increased the state’s ability to regulate the extraction of manpower and taxes directly from the local level. By correcting this problem, the state no longer had to rely on mercenary enterprisers to recruit soldiers. It also simultaneously reduced the market available to mercenary companies while widening the pool for the state. More importantly, universal conscription created a new ideal of the proper form of military organization. Frederick Schneid illustrates, “Napoleon’s conscription system was a remarkable bureaucratic and military achievement that popularized the ideal of citizen-based universal military service, and became the standard for the mobilization of a nation-in-arms that was emulated by the great military powers of nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”<sup>100</sup> France proved

---

<sup>97</sup> Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 116.

<sup>98</sup> Krahnmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 63.

<sup>99</sup> Walter, “Meeting the French Challenge,” 41.

<sup>100</sup> Frederick C. Schneid, “Introduction” In *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?* eds. Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, and Harold D. Blanton (New York: Routledge, 2009), 20.

this type of mobilization with its 700,000 soldiers and success on the battlefield.<sup>101</sup> After its military humiliation against France, Prussia emulated the French model. Before its defeat, Prussia was heavily reliant on mercenaries. While its officers were land owners (Junkers), the rest of its army was mainly peasants because the working class and academia were entirely exempted.<sup>102</sup> After the Tilsit Treaty (1807), the Prussian army transitioned to universal conscription and promotion by merit. Conscription moved from an emergency response to a peacetime tool as well. The symbiotic effects of nationalism and conscription led to a new ideal of citizenship, “service to the Nation was seen in terms of military service, one found personal fulfillment in making ‘the supreme sacrifice’ so that the national cause might triumph.”<sup>103</sup>

In concert, the above components led to the strengthening of an anti-mercenary norm. Sarah Percy, in *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*, elucidates that mercenaries were deemed unethical because they fought for personal gain and they infringed on the state's sovereignty of violence.<sup>104</sup> The overriding concern was that mercenaries were not loyal to the nation but to the leader who commanded them. She expounds that this change developed in conjunction with the development of nationalism and the belief that citizens now had a duty to the state. The combination of societal influences led citizens to question the morality of using privatized warfare. The normative belief was that “fighting for financial, selfish motive rather than out of patriotism or devotion to the national cause would not only make mercenaries poorer soldiers, but would make society itself poorer by ignoring the duty the citizen has to serve the state.”<sup>105</sup> The end result was that citizen-armies were considered the ideal form of military force.

---

<sup>101</sup> Parrott, *The Business of War*, 320.

<sup>102</sup> Walter, “Meeting the French Challenge,” 27.

<sup>103</sup> Michael Howard, “War and the Nation-State,” *Daedalus* 108, no. 4 (Fall 1979): 103, accessed Aug 8, 2015, <http://www.jstor.org.lumen.cgsccarl.com/stable/20024637>

<sup>104</sup> Percy, *Mercenaries*.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 245.

## External

An important external component that shaped the state's preference for citizen-armies over mercenaries was the changing character of warfare from quality-centric to quantity-centric. The migration to this type of warfare is evidenced by the 250 percent growth in Prussian and Austrian armies in the century before the French Revolution.<sup>106</sup> Population growth, imperialism (territorial expansion), and technological improvements were important to this transition.<sup>107</sup> P.W. Singer, in *Corporate Warriors*, highlights that quantity became the defining characteristic of war and new weapons technology enabled militaries to transition to using less specialized and trained citizens.<sup>108</sup> Also, the skill advantage of mercenaries had been reduced by new methods of drill that were developed and employed by state armies. The advent of the musket also minimized the gap between citizens and mercenaries. It was not only cheaper, but it could be learned relatively quick unlike the crossbow and early handguns. Furthermore, these longer range weapons combined with new formations meant that a larger army could create more firepower than a smaller one. David Latzko points out that this was important because the battlefield had become much deeper than just the front ranks.<sup>109</sup> Mass created a distinct advantage to countries that utilized citizen conscription since recruiting mercenaries in such large numbers was nearly impossible. This can be largely explained by the fact that conscription greatly increased the available supply of manpower, thus correspondingly decreasing the wages a mercenary could earn. Mercenaries' profitability had continued to decrease as the scale of war expanded and states

---

<sup>106</sup> Latzko, "The Market for Mercenaries."

<sup>107</sup> Avant, "From Mercenary to Citizen Armies," 45.

<sup>108</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 29-30.

<sup>109</sup> Latzko, "The Market for Mercenaries."

switched to drilled infantry.<sup>110</sup> The end result was a reduction in both the supply and demand of mercenaries.

The industrialization of war also significantly impacted mercenarism. As the scale of war increased, industrialization led to new weapons and better methods of sustaining an army, which was always a major impediment to the expansion of war. The industrialization of war borrowed organizational methods from factories and formalized military structure into discrete parts. This “manner in which men and supplies were organized allowed for a constant flow of materials to the front line.”<sup>111</sup> While industrialization enabled a larger scale of war, it also increased the involvement of the state in providing war materials. David Parrott explains that industrialization “demanded a level of military participation and economic commitment which could no longer be met through adjusting and developing the traditional mechanisms of organizing and waging war.”<sup>112</sup> Private armies were seen as a redundancy in this new system because they lacked the ability to meet the demands for both supplies and manpower. The industrialization of war increased the scale of war at such a rate that it outpaced the ability of privatized means. While continued growth of the state made it the only entity with “huge resources in manpower and production” that could sustain industrialized warfare.<sup>113</sup> Industrialization provided the state the ability to dominate the organization and sustainment of war.

Simultaneously, path dependency was a major impetus for mercenarism’s decline. In fact, Deborah Avant argues that path dependency provides the best explanation for mercenarism’s

---

<sup>110</sup> Herfreid Munkler, “Clausewitz and the Privatization of War,” in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Roth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 225; Latzko, “The Market for Mercenaries.”

<sup>111</sup> Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security*, 42.

<sup>112</sup> Parrott, *The Business of War*, 2.

<sup>113</sup> Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security*, 42.

decline.<sup>114</sup> She believes that French success with a massive citizen military created a new model of warfare that other countries were obliged to emulate. The catalyst for the spread of the citizen-army originated from Prussia's shocking defeat to the French. This provided their reformers the advantage they needed to create a citizen-army and decrease their reliance on mercenaries. Avant highlights that "Prussian defeats during the Napoleonic Wars provided evidence for the belief that citizen-based armies were an effective force in modern warfare and bolstered the arguments made by reformists that armies of citizens ought to fight wars in a modern nation-state."<sup>115</sup> She adds that Prussia's success using a citizen-army further strengthened the citizen-army model. Eventually, even Britain followed suit after suffering embarrassment in the Crimean War. P.W. Singer amplifies the importance of path dependency, "after the victories of French revolutionary forces against the hired professional forces of Austria and Prussia, states realized that they could no longer keep the old, militarily inefficient system, even if it meant turning over some power to the public."<sup>116</sup>

The decline of mercenarism occurred in parallel with the nation-state becoming the dominant actor in the larger international system. Mercenarism is related to the relationship of the nation-state to external agents. As discussed previously, when the nation-state is weak and powerless to extract the capital and manpower it needs for war, military force becomes marketized. Non-state actors like mercenary companies rise to fill this security gap. However, as the nation-state grew strong enough to challenge the market exchange of privatized force, it was able to restrict the supply and demand of mercenaries. The transition from indirect to direct control (centralized governance), the creation of effective bureaucracies that could administer the extraction of resources to wage war, and the creation of standing armies were important

---

<sup>114</sup> Avant, "From Mercenary to Citizen Armies."

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 61.

<sup>116</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 30.

components to this state growth. At the same time, this growth also instigated a new understanding of sovereignty. These dynamics led to the nation-state being regarded as the only legitimate means of force (monopoly of violence) and a new relationship between citizen and state. These normative beliefs provided the state the legitimacy it needed to control the market for force and it also provided the necessary manpower it needed to simultaneously reduce the supply and demand of mercenaries. Erkki Holmila concludes that the “decline and cessation of the use mercenaries began when nation-states became more powerful in both the domestic and international spheres, and also when the nations started taking hold of how state sovereignty and legitimacy lay with the people rather than with the ruler.”<sup>117</sup> The strength of the nation-state in comparison to non-state actors is important. The next section will show how this relationship and the dominance of the state is being challenged once again by non-state entities. The strengthening of the nation-state compared to external agents was an important component to the decline of mercenarism. It is also an important illustration of the complexity of the system and how each component is important to the overall pattern.

## Summary

During this period, the political decisions of states to delegitimize mercenarism and utilize state controlled and organized citizen-militaries stemmed from changes in the nature of the nation-state. In essence, the relationship and interaction between state and society changed. In the first phase of mercenarism, state and society were disconnected from one another. The nation-state system was largely delinked and the military was an instrument of the state, not the “people.” The formation of a “nation-state” fused the state and society, changing the conception

---

<sup>117</sup> Holmila, “The History of Private Violence,” 71.

of the military. Clausewitz explained this emergence as “new political conditions which the French Revolution created both in France and in Europe as a whole, conditions that set in motion new means and new forces.”<sup>118</sup>

This section illustrated many of the conditions that influenced Clausewitz’s “transformation of politics” that delegitimized mercenarism while strengthening the ideal for the citizen-army. These underlying conditions included a transition to stronger state authority with direct control and fewer intermediaries which enabled more effective capital and manpower extraction. More effective bureaucratic mechanisms could support a large citizen-army while simultaneously administering state programs. A new understanding of sovereignty and citizenship evolved to bridge the gaps between society, the state, and the military. The people became participants of war through popular sovereignty, democratic ideals, nationalism, and conscription. The state’s monopolization of force became the key tenets of a state’s sovereignty and legitimacy. A stronger anti-mercenary norm developed from the combination of social and ideological changes above. The success of the French and later the Prussians with a citizen-army led to path dependency and copying by other nation-states. Furthermore, the industrialization of war and the new character of war which favored quantity over quality stymied demand for mercenaries. Lastly, the eventual dominance of the nation-state in its relationship with non-state actors was an important component as well. All of these components were important to changing the internal and external dynamics of the nation-state. They led to a strong state-society relationship in which the use of citizens was deemed as the only acceptable source of military force. Private contractors were considered acceptable only as force enablers. The hiring of mercenaries to fight a nation-state’s wars was deemed unethical and an affront to the new understanding of sovereignty and citizenship. Those variables that formerly constrained and influenced the central decision-makers

---

<sup>118</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 610.

to use privatized means were replaced by new variables that compelled the use of a citizen-military over mercenaries.




Figure 3. Nature of Nation-State-Post French Revolution

Source: Created by Author

#### Section 4: Mercenarism's Resurgence

The recent growth in PMCs is staggering by any measure. The contractor to military ratio in Iraq and Afghanistan was the highest of any US conflict.<sup>119</sup> In March 2011, the Department of

<sup>119</sup> Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, *Contractors' Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq*, Pub. No. 3053, August 2008, 12.

Defense employed 28,000 private security contractors of which 90 percent were armed.<sup>120</sup> This growth has also been coupled with an erosion of their defined roles and functions. In the past, “only civilian and technical functions were contracted out to private firms” but now everything but “core” combat functions are eligible for privatization.<sup>121</sup> However, even the definition of “core” is consistently being narrowed which has led to growth into formerly off-limit roles. Inconsistencies between government regulations in defining core competencies aggravate this problem.<sup>122</sup> These former thresholds were further blurred in Iraq and Afghanistan. Though the United States has relied on contractors since the Revolutionary War, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan marked the first time that private companies performed security functions in either combat or stability operations (see Figure 4 below).<sup>123</sup> Due to the noncontiguous battle space, the distinction between support and combat units narrowed. PMCs operated within the combat zone and were involved in battles with enemy forces. In one notorious example, *Blackwater* defended a Coalition Headquarters from insurgent attack for three hours before being relieved by regular forces.<sup>124</sup> The transcendence of privatized companies is evident with this statement, “A lot of people are calling us private armies – and that’s basically what we are...This is not a security company. This is a paramilitary force.”<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>120</sup> Congressional Research Service, *The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq*, 2,6.

<sup>121</sup> Krahnmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 154.

<sup>122</sup> John C. Campbell, “Outsourcing and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): Contractors on the Battlefield,” (Master’s Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005), 9.

<sup>123</sup> Congressional Research Service, *The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq*, 1.

<sup>124</sup> Krahnmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 221.

<sup>125</sup> Shawn Macomber, “Your not in the Army Now,” *The American Spectator* 37 (November 2004): 28.




Figure 4. Ratio of Contractors to Military Personnel

Source: Data adapted from Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, *Contractors' Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq*, Pub. No. 3053, August 2008, Table 2.

### A Changing Environment

Explaining the resurgence in privatized warfare begins by understanding the history and dynamics which ultimately legitimated their use. Much like the French Revolution, which brought the citizen-army and fusion of state and society, there are important events and phenomena that define the current context. While the contemporary period lacks a contingent event similar to the French Revolution, the combination of the rise of neoliberalism, globalization, and the end of the Cold War has resulted in significant changes to the nation-state. These phenomena created the conditions within the United States for the return to mercenarism.

## Rise of Neoliberalism

The rise of neoliberalism created the antecedent political, ideological, and social changes necessary for the reemergence of mercenarism from the black market in the United States. For nearly 200 years, expressions of republicanism and liberalism dominated political thought in Western democracies.<sup>126</sup> Because these ideologies regarded the citizen-army as the best form of military force, governments opposed the use of privatized warfare.<sup>127</sup> However, the United States pivot toward neoliberalism brought a new understanding of governance that favored privatization.<sup>128</sup> Based on the same ideals as outsourcing initiatives in the business world, neoliberalism advocated that competition between public and private entities would “maximize efficiency and effectiveness.”<sup>129</sup> It was believed that free market exchange is the best way to protect the interests and liberties of citizens.<sup>130</sup> Neoliberal ideology led to the creation of Office of

---

<sup>126</sup> Krahmman, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 33-40. Republicanism advances government centralization (direct control) while liberalism advocates that fragmented governance (indirect control) is better. The actual expression of government and military force was a mix of these ideologies. When facing existential threats, governments shift toward republicanism and during peace, liberalism is more popular.

<sup>127</sup> Nation-states that are still rooted in republicanism like Germany are resistant to privatization even though it faces the same external constraints like a destabilized global security environment. Krahmman, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 276; Germany also still maintains conscription in order to ensure that its military is integrated with society. Krahmman, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 178-185.

<sup>128</sup> Neoliberalism developed in the 1950s from the work of Milton Friedman who later worked on President Reagan’s staff as economic advisor. Neoliberalism advances liberalism ideas but reframes them around capitalism and the foundations of “individual choice and market competition.” Krahmman, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 34, 46.

<sup>129</sup> Deborah C. Kidwell, *Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies*, Global War on Terrorism Paper 12 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 27; Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 9; Yusuf Alabarda and Rafal Lisowiec, “The Private Military Firms: Historical Evolution and Industry Analysis,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 24, accessed October 19, 2015, <http://www.dtic.mil/met-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA473255>.

<sup>130</sup> Krahmman, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 39; Neoliberalism developed in the 1950s from the work of Milton Friedman who later worked on President Reagan’s staff as economic advisor. Krahmman, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*,

Management and Budget Circular A-76 which provided the guidance for conducting competitive and comparative analysis between the public and private sector. This compelled the government to either privatize through contracts or by converting functions that were formerly directly controlled.<sup>131</sup>

The influence of neoliberalism in both business and politics led to a normalization of privatization because people saw outsourcing everywhere.<sup>132</sup> Alan Axelrod in *Mercenaries: A Guide to Private Armies and Private Military Companies* explains that outsourcing was first normalized in the business world in areas like customer support and human resources. He adds that the first stages in security privatization occurred domestically in places like shopping malls and universities.<sup>133</sup> Eventually government buildings and even military bases employed private security. The privatization of external security became just another step in this process. Carlos Ortiz rationalizes that the “neoliberal turn of the world economy has resulted in the widespread adoption of policies favoring private sector participation in spheres of government, including sovereign spheres such as defense and security.”<sup>134</sup>

The normalization of privatization led to a wider acceptance of greater private involvement in domestic and external security. Military privatization was breached with Executive Decision 1971, which encouraged use of host-nation support during conflicts.<sup>135</sup> Elke Krahmhann explains that military privatization ramped up in the 1980s with successive acts (1984 and 1986) that gave defense contractors greater autonomy and power. She points out that Reagan

---

34.

<sup>131</sup> Kidwell, *Public War, Private Fight?*, 28.

<sup>132</sup> Axelrod, *Mercenaries*, 196; Avant, *The Market for Force*, 35.

<sup>133</sup> Axelrod, *Mercenaries*, 197.

<sup>134</sup> Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 4.

<sup>135</sup> Stanley, *Outsourcing Security*, 176.

was the largest proponent of neoliberalism in economics. This provided the impetus for the transition of the United States from a “Republican model of centralized government to the Neoliberal ideal of fragmented and marketized security governance.”<sup>136</sup> The implementation of LOGCAP (Logistics Civil Augmentation Program) in 1992 further strengthened privatization initiatives because it created a streamlined process for using private contractors in place of the military. However, military privatization advanced exponentially under the Clinton administration when Secretary of Defense William Cohen modeled the Department of Defense after private industry.<sup>137</sup> Under his Defense Reform Initiative, military outsourcing was institutionalized. By 1998, the rate of privatization was doubling every year.<sup>138</sup> This progression is evidence for why the recent expansion in PMCs should not be branded as an anomaly simply due to the contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan. The movement towards privatization is a common thread that can be traced from the 1960s through today. The United States’ explosive growth in PMCs is a result of “persistent government pressure on the US armed forces to focus on combat functions and to outsource military and support services to commercial providers.”<sup>139</sup>

The rise of neoliberalism largely explains the United States increased reliance on PMCs and why force is marketized once again. Neoliberalism “shrunk the state,” reversing the centralization and direct control that was a major impetus for mercenarism’s decline.<sup>140</sup> It also eroded many of the social norms against privatized warfare that developed after the French Revolution. The employment of private security in Iraq and Afghanistan is a good example of this

---

<sup>136</sup> Krahmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 75-76.

<sup>137</sup> Dickinson, *Outsourcing War & Peace*, 30.

<sup>138</sup> Yusuf Alabarda and Rafal Lisowiec, “The Private Military Firms,” 24.

<sup>139</sup> Elke Krahmann, “Transitional States in Search of Support: Private Military Companies and Security Sector Reform,” in *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*, eds. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 99.

<sup>140</sup> Krahmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 119.

evolution. Neoliberalism, along with globalization, explains why PMCs are not considered an affront to sovereignty.

## Globalization

Globalization has increased the interconnectedness of states and societies, and redefined the nature of the nation-state. Nick Bisley, in his recent book *Rethinking Globalization*, defines globalization as “the set of social consequences which derive from the increasing rate and speed of interactions of knowledge, people, goods and capital between states and societies.”<sup>141</sup> He explains that globalization is changing both the internal and external dynamics of the nation-state. What is important about the new “system” is that external agents are having an increasingly marked impact and effect on internal dynamics. As a result, the nation-state is more linked to other states and also to non-state actors like the United Nations and multinational companies. Bisley points out that while globalization phenomena have occurred in the past, the scale and impact of the current trend is far greater. Most of the world is connected and intertwined politically, economically, and even socially. The flow of capital, goods, ideas, and information flow exponentially faster, over longer distances, and move freer across formerly restrictive borders. Nation-states are dependent on a global economy. This is illustrated by the rising importance in exports as a percentage of worldwide Gross Domestic Product, rising from 4.6 to 17.2 percent from 1870 to 1998.<sup>142</sup>

Globalization drives nation-states to view global security as synonymous with national security. National security no longer implies the defense of a state’s territory but has morphed

---

<sup>141</sup> Nick Bisley, *Rethinking Globalization* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 6.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

into a new “global security paradigm.”<sup>143</sup> This implies that countries cannot let other parts of the world become havens for terrorists or criminals because of global interdependence. However, this paradigm challenges preconceptions of the social contract and sovereignty, and often generates demand that outpaces the supply of citizen-militaries.<sup>144</sup> Intrastate warfare is now the dominant form of warfare as states fight insurgencies, terrorist organizations, and even criminal organizations.<sup>145</sup> The social contract was based on the state’s role of providing security against other states, but terrorism from non-state actors is the biggest perceived threat in the United States.<sup>146</sup> This evolving security environment challenges preexisting notions of the value of employing the military against non-existential threats.

Globalization is challenging the sovereignty of the nation-state from both above and below. From below, globalization undermines the state’s ability to inculcate a distinctive national identity, degrading the linkage between the state and society. While globalization increases universal awareness, it correspondingly “fosters a cosmopolitan sensibility that weakens the power and capacity of nationalism.”<sup>147</sup> Its fundamental nature increases political, economic, and cultural transactions between nation-states thus decreasing national consciousness and uniformity. The diffusion of cultural elements like cuisine, dress, literature, music, and language is an example of the attack on national identity. At the same time, the liberalization of trade is diluting economic nationalism. E.J. Hobsbawm, author of *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870*, argues that “the role of national economies has been undermined or even brought into question by the

---

<sup>143</sup> Alabarda and Lisowiec, “The Private Military Firms,” 15.

<sup>144</sup> Avant, *The Market for Force*, 32-34.

<sup>145</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 33.

<sup>146</sup> Krahnmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 244.

<sup>147</sup> Bisley, *Rethinking Globalization*, 200.

major transformations in the international or multi-national enterprises of all sizes, and by the corresponding development of international centers and networks of economic transactions which are, for practical purposes, outside the control of state governments.”<sup>148</sup> This subversion of identity at the national level, whether culturally, politically, or economically, is being replaced by stronger attachment to supranational and sub-state identities.

National sovereignty is also being challenged from above because states must collaborate with other states, transnational organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Globalization challenges the hegemony of the nation-state as the dominant actor within the international system. Multinational companies now “play the most important role in international investment, production, and consumption patterns” and their interests and lobbying power can influence national-level politics.<sup>149</sup> Joseph Nye rationalizes this shift as a diffusion of power from nation-states to non-state actors.<sup>150</sup> Working with non-state actors is common and gaining UN legitimacy is a precursor to any foreign intervention. Much like in medieval and early modern Europe, nation-state sovereignty is contested. In essence, external agents are now having more of an influence on the nation-state and the state-society relationship.

#### End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War led to a new security environment which increased both the supply and demand of mercenaries. Numerous authors assert that a security vacuum resulted from

---

<sup>148</sup> E.J Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 174.

<sup>149</sup> Nick Bisley, *Rethinking Globalization* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 55, 26-27.

<sup>150</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), xv.

the end of the Cold War and PMCs emerged to fill this void.<sup>151</sup> While this is partially explanatory for their reemergence it is important to note that a necessary precondition for the selection of PMCs to fill this security gap was a change in the legitimacy of using privatized warfare. As evidenced above, this occurred as a result of neoliberalism in parallel with the difference between the supply of citizen-militaries compared to the demand for coercive force.<sup>152</sup> While the United States and other militaries downsized, the peace dividend after the Cold War never materialized and the demand for security increased. As a result of defense cuts (nearly 50 percent) and reduced external support from the United States and the Soviet Union, the number of weak states increased and internal strife exploded.<sup>153</sup> In fact, the number of civil wars doubled after the Cold War.<sup>154</sup> These changes forced weak states to turn to private actors because they could no longer rely on external support to fund their citizen-militaries.<sup>155</sup> Furthermore, eroding stability drove NGOs and transnational businesses to rely on private military firms for assistance in providing security in unstable or failed states.<sup>156</sup> Finally, the rise of terrorism and asymmetric threats aggravated the demand for privatized warfare.

The new security environment not only increased the demand side of privatization, but also fulfilled the supply side.<sup>157</sup> The end of the Cold War stimulated the creation of PMCs

---

<sup>151</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 49; Stanley, *Outsourcing Security*, 196; Avant, *The Market for Force*, 35-36; Yusuf Alabarda and Rafal Lisowiec, "The Private Military Firms," 14.

<sup>152</sup> Alabarda and Lisowiec, "The Private Military Firms," 18.

<sup>153</sup> Defense spending was reduced from 28.1 percent in 1987 to 16.4 percent of the budget by 2001. Stanley, *Outsourcing Security*, 34.


<sup>154</sup> Alabarda and Lisowiec, "The Private Military Firms," 16.

<sup>155</sup> Axelrod, *Mercenaries*, 191-193; Avant, *The Market for Force*, 31.

<sup>156</sup> Avant, *The Market for Force*, 31;

<sup>157</sup> See Avant, *The Market for Force*, 8, 30; Axelrod, *Mercenaries*, 191-193; Krahnmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 9.

because massive demobilizations across the world provided cheap labor (with military expertise) and surplus weapons, especially ex-Soviet equipment.<sup>158</sup> This equipment even included advanced weapon systems like helicopters, tanks, and fighter aircraft.<sup>159</sup> The advancement of privatized warfare was further propelled by the fact that this excess equipment and labor reduced the start-up costs for PMCs.<sup>160</sup> The end result of the security vacuum that developed out of the Cold War was that the former citizen-military paradigm was challenged. PMCs provided states a potential solution to the problem of decreasing defense budgets and increasing security demand.



<sup>158</sup> Axelrod, *Mercenaries*, 192-193. Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 4; There were over seven million soldiers released to the labor force. Alabarda and Lisowiec, “The Private Military Firms,” 17.

<sup>159</sup> Alabarda and Lisowiec, “The Private Military Firms,” 19.

<sup>160</sup> Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 50.

Figure 5. Changing Environment - Globalization, Neoliberalism, and End of Cold War

Source: Created by Author

### **The Emerging System**

The influence of globalization, neoliberalism, and the end of the Cold War led to a multitude of changes in the nation-state which are now applying pressure to the current paradigm. These phenomena are shifting the balance of privatized warfare away from the side impeding its use and toward the side promoting it. Numerous other dynamics are instigating this rebalance of warfare. In fact, within the state, society, and also in the external environment, there are many dynamics which now favor the use of privatized warfare. This assertion is undergirded by the fact that these dynamics resemble the phase when mercenarism was dominant. At the same time, there are numerous fault lines in many of the components which influenced the use of citizen-armies after the French Revolution. A combination of social and normative changes is eroding many of the conceptions that fueled the citizen-soldier. Ultimately, the relationship between state and society is once again fracturing. The temporary marriage of state-society instigated by the Enlightenment and the subsequent French Revolution looks to be ending.

#### State

The current dynamics of the state suggest that privatized warfare will continue to expand in the future. There are many similarities in the internal dynamics of the state in relation to the original period of mercenarism. First, as shown above, the adoption of neoliberalism led to government decentralization and indirect control. With the advent of outsourcing and privatization initiatives, these forms of government control were espoused as more efficient and costs effective. Second, the continued growth of the nation-state has precipitated the modern welfare state while concomitantly squeezing capital for defense spending. Third, the state is using

PMCs because they provide both economic and political advantages. They provide an expedient method of lessening democratic control of the military due to waning popular support. All three of these changes are also reversals of important factors that led to mercenarism's decline following the French Revolution.

The continued growth of the nation-state is contributing to the reemergence of mercenarism.<sup>161</sup> The most important development is that states no longer have access to the sufficient capital to meet the demands of the new security environment. The underlying problem is that the continued expansion of the nation-state transformed its major function and expenditure from security to social programs. For most of European history, states solely concentrated on both state-making and war-making. However, this is no longer the case because as states matured and increased their resource extraction it also inextricably spawned larger social infrastructures. The growth of the "welfare state" resembles the difficulty that sovereigns had in the first period of mercenarism.<sup>162</sup> These capital deficiencies have been replicated through the massive expenditures spent on social programs. For example, defense spending has decreased from over 70 percent of the overall federal budget during the Korean War to less than 20 percent in 2007.<sup>163</sup> One of the main reasons for this decrease has been increasing allocations to social programs in the federal budget.<sup>164</sup> From 1979 through 2015, Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security grew from under

---

<sup>161</sup> Charles Tilly explains this process of nation-state growth in his book *Coercion, Capital, and European States*.

<sup>162</sup> A welfare state is a concept of governance in which the state plays a critical role in the social welfare of its citizens, especially those lacking housing, health care, education, and basic provisions. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. "Welfare State," accessed February 28, 2016, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/welfare-state>.

<sup>163</sup> Robert D. Hormats, *The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars* (New York: Times Books, 2007), 288.

<sup>164</sup> Stanley, *Outsourcing Security*, 33.

30 percent of the federal budget to 60 percent.<sup>165</sup> In 2014, these programs were equal to over 14 percent of GDP while defense spending only accounted for 3.8 percent of GDP.<sup>166</sup> This mandatory spending has continued to increase over time, which has put tighter pressures on defense and security spending (Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security).<sup>167</sup>

PMCs have risen to fill this problem because they offer economic advantages. As a result of ballooning personnel costs, private contracts provide three economic incentives. They provide a temporary solution that can be quickly scaled to meet demand and budgetary pressures. At the same time, they free up regular military from any contracted tasks.<sup>168</sup> More importantly, the government does not have to pay veteran's benefits for contractors. Veteran's benefits are the largest long-run cost of America's wars and they are also one that is extremely difficult to account in pre-war estimates.<sup>169</sup> Lastly, the Congressional Budget Office determined that PMCs have comparable wartime costs to a military unit, but offer a peacetime dividend because their contract can be terminated.<sup>170</sup> The combination of all these factors provides a significant long-term costs benefit for the government. Whereas before, the state lacked the ability to extract enough capital for war, it is once again constrained by lack of resources. PMCs provide a costs effective tool to offset the burgeoning strain of welfare programs.

---

<sup>165</sup> Congressional Research Service, *Mandatory Spending Since 1962*, by Mindy R. Levit, Andrew Austin, and Jeffrey M. Stupak, March 18, 2015, 11.

<sup>166</sup> US Office of Budget and Management, *Historical Tables, Table 14.5—Total Government Expenditures by Major Category of Expenditure as Percentages of GDP: 1948–2014*, accessed November 13, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals>.

<sup>167</sup> Hormats, *The Price of Liberty*, 288.

<sup>168</sup> Kidwell, *Public War, Private Fight?*.

<sup>169</sup> Hugh Rockoff, *America Economic Way of War: War and the US Economy from the Spanish-American War to the Persian Gulf War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 11.

<sup>170</sup> Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, *Contractors' Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq*, Pub. No. 3053, August 2008, 14.

In addition to economic advantages, PMCs provide significant political advantages. One of the most important is that they reduce overt US military involvement, which is especially important when popular support wanes. In prolonged conflict, sustaining national will is critical and combat deaths and expended resources are political liabilities. However, mobilizing PMCs reduces this risk because they receive less media attention and oversight.<sup>171</sup> They also allow the executive branch to skirt domestic controls and public consent by reducing the influence of the legislative branch.<sup>172</sup> The legislative branch serves as the people's voice in the United States and exerts considerable authority in the employment of the regular military. However, the use of PMCs increases the executive branch's autonomy in exerting foreign policy and coercive force. Congress has limited budgetary, personnel, and chain-of-command authorities over PMCs in comparison to the US military.<sup>173</sup> It also has a reduced capability to oversee the structure and deployment of PMCs. Furthermore, private contractors provide a work-around to any force caps that Congress enacts. In addition, PMCs provide an alternative source of manpower mobilization. They require a smaller societal mobilization, which decreases the popular support needed and the the long-term budgetary costs.<sup>174</sup> Lastly, they fix the recruiting gap because meeting standards during wartime, both qualitative and quantitative, has been a significant obstacle since the AVF was implemented.<sup>175</sup> In essence, the main advantages of using PMCs is that they reduce the political obstacles in obtaining the money, manpower, and popular support war demands.

---

<sup>171</sup> David Perry, "Purchasing Power: Is Defence Privatization a New Form of Military Mobilization?" (Dissertation, Carleton University), accessed 8 August 2015, <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2011/Perry.pdf>, 17.

<sup>172</sup> Krahmman, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 239.

<sup>173</sup> Avant, *The Market for Force*.

<sup>174</sup> Perry, "Purchasing Power," 16-19.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

The recent use of PMCs for their political and economic expediency reveals other changes in the nation-state. Most importantly, it reveals a wider gap between the state and society. The use of PMCs to overcome a lack of popular support is a significant symptom of this gap. Simultaneously, their use signals an erosion of the value of public opinion and its ability to influence the state's employment of force.<sup>176</sup> Because the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were increasingly unpopular, the growth of PMCs implies stronger state autonomy and a reduction of many of democratic obstacles meant to limit its sovereignty. This also indicates a weakening of the anti-mercenary norm. In the past, the strength of anti-mercenary norms impeded any *explicit* use of mercenaries though similar advantages might have been present.<sup>177</sup> In order to strengthen its own sovereignty, the state had formerly delegitimized mercenarism. However, the recent growth in PMCs indicates that these pressures are evaporating. Because of their perceived advantages and the lack of social inhibitors, PMCs have once again become a rational choice by the state's executives. As a result, the future use of PMCs will not be as constrained as when both state and society viewed privatized warfare as illegitimate. As will be shown in the next subsection, there are not only parallel signs of a growing severance between the state and society, but also the military and society.

## Society

Contemporary societal dynamics indicates that many of the factors that restrained the use of mercenaries are eroding and being replaced by dynamics that favor the use of PMCs. As evident in the previous section, mercenarism did not decline until society formed a closer

---

<sup>176</sup> Avant, *The Market for Force*, 155-156; Percy, "Morality and Regulation," 21.

<sup>177</sup> This argument is advanced fully in Sarah Percy's *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*.

relationship with both the state and the military. However, these relationships are deteriorating as indicated by the progressive decline in society's trust and confidence in the state (government). Public confidence in both Congress and the executive branch has eroded and fell from over 40 percent in 1966 to less than 15 percent in just 30 years.<sup>178</sup> While the French Revolution strengthened anti-mercenary norms, the opposite is now happening because of the influence of neoliberalism. The surge in PMCs illustrates that these norms have evolved and are no longer inhibiting the employment of mercenaries when masked within the context of PMCs. By virtue of these new social paradigms, anti-mercenary norms have been weakened.

There is also a degradation in society's understanding of military duty and citizenship as indicated by the dissolution of the conscription-based military and the adoption of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). This contrasts with the period trailing the French Revolution where citizenship was firmly tied to military service due to the communal acceptance of the social contract. The United States transition to the AVF (along with most of the world) is a clear signal that the strength of the social contract is weakening. A significant indicator was the US military's struggle to meet recruiting goals in Iraq and Afghanistan without changing entrance standards. This erosion is further signified by the government's decision to not only abstain from raising taxes to pay for its recent conflicts, but lower taxes. For the first time in US history, the government resorted solely to borrowing. In the past, raising taxes elucidated the "real" costs of war and spread the burden of war beyond military personnel.

There are numerous other signs of a growing chasm between the military and society.<sup>179</sup> Illuminating this divide is the fact that just one-half of a percent of US citizens served in Iraq or

---

<sup>178</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Who are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 5.

<sup>179</sup> Lynn, "The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West," 543.

Afghanistan.<sup>180</sup> Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense, explicated a source of this problem: “In the absence of a draft that reaches deeply into the ranks of the citizenry, service in the military ... has become something for other people to do.”<sup>181</sup> He declared that military service is spiraling into a cultural and family tradition.<sup>182</sup> In parallel, there is a growing tendency for service members to derive from the same geographic regions and share similar demographics. The military is increasingly reliant on the South and West, especially in rural areas, for recruitment. There is a much higher inclination to serve in these regions than in the Northeast and Midwest. In fact, the south provided 43.8 percent of all new recruits in 2014; yet, represents only 36.3 percent of the eligible population.<sup>183</sup> This is 9.8 percent greater than in 1977.<sup>184</sup> As a proportion of its 18-24 year-old population, the top five states for new enlistments stem from the South (Georgia, Florida, Virginia, Alabama, and South Carolina).<sup>185</sup> Accentuating this problem are the locations and numbers of ROTC host programs. For instance, Alabama, which has a population of five million people, has ten ROTC programs; while Chicago, a much larger population, only has

---

<sup>180</sup> Donna Miles, “Survey Shows Growing Gap Between Civilians, Military,” U.S. Department of Defense News, November 28, 2011, accessed 8 August, 2015, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66253>.

<sup>181</sup> Mark Thompson, “An Army Apart: The Widening Military-Civilian Gap,” *Time*, November 10, 2011, Accessed February 28, 2016, <http://nation.time.com/2011/11/10/an-army-apart-the-widening-military-civilian-gap/>.

<sup>182</sup> Robert M. Gates, “Lecture at Duke University on All-Volunteer Force,” (lecture, Duke University, Durham, September 29, 2010), accessed February 28, 2016, <http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1508>.

<sup>183</sup> Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2014*, accessed February 28, 2016, <https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2014/contents/contents.html>, Table B-47.

<sup>184</sup> Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1998*, accessed February 28, 2016, <https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/1998/chapters98.pdf>, 2-23.

<sup>185</sup> Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2014*, Figure 13.

three.<sup>186</sup> At the same time, nearly half of all active duty members (49.2 percent) are stationed in just five states: California, Virginia, Texas, North Carolina, and Georgia.<sup>187</sup> What is distressing about these statistics is that the military no longer represents the country it serves.

In parallel to a growing gap between the military and ordinary citizens, nationalism and cultural cohesion are also declining. After the French Revolution, there was an aggregation of sub-state identities with the formation of a holistic national identity. However, through globalization and the abandonment of deliberate practices of spurring a unique identity, people are returning to ethnic and sub-state ties.<sup>188</sup> This can be seen in recent independence movements such as in Catalonia and Scotland. As illustrated in the previous section, a salient national identity is important to unifying the government and its people and a necessity for a citizen-army. Nationalism increases the state's ability to extract manpower and resources from society to generate a citizen-military. However, deliberate measures by the US government to foster a uniquely "American" identity and homogenize its people have declined. Michael Howard explains that cultural cohesion has eroded because government practices of creating "certain habits of behavior" are "now being widely abandoned."<sup>189</sup> Samuel Huntington, author of *Who are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity*, elucidates that there has been a decline in the teaching of US identity in schools. The common practice of using patriotic history and stories to instill common ideals are being dissolved. Because of the influence of multicultural

---

<sup>186</sup> Robert M. Gates, "Lecture at Duke University on All-Volunteer Force."

<sup>187</sup> Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, *2014 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community*, accessed February 28, 2016, <http://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2014-Demographics-Report.pdf>, 33.

<sup>188</sup> Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, "Introduction: The Changing Character of War," in *The Changing Character of War*, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.

<sup>189</sup> Howard, "War and the Nation-State," 110.

movements, schools are now advocating “diversity rather than unity” and make “little effort to inculcate immigrants in American culture, traditions, customs, and beliefs.”<sup>190</sup> As a result, the United States is increasingly becoming multicultural and multilingual. Outside national identities are becoming increasingly important as a result of failures to assimilate new immigrants.

Huntington highlights that immigrants from Mexico identify more with their previous country than the United States. In fact, loyalty to other nation-states is at its highest level since the American Revolution. The United States’ declining national identity has been further aggravated by the end of the Cold War due to the loss of a visible threat and common enemy to rally around.

The abandonment of conscription in the United States has also hindered nationalism and the state’s ability to extract necessary manpower for war. Conscription was an important instrument for increasing the cultural cohesion of different ethnic groups.<sup>191</sup> However, the transition to the AVF decreased the cohesion of the military. Adrian Lewis explains, “One of the essential elements of the modern nation-state, the citizen-soldier, the dual role of sovereign and subject, no longer exists in the United States.”<sup>192</sup> These trends all reveal the degradation of a distinctive “American” identity. The deterioration of national identity has important inferences for the future of mercenarism because any weakening of nationalism favors the use of privatized means. Since the United States is taking less proactive steps to instill nationalism through education, language, and military training (conscription), it will continue to struggle to meet manpower needs for its citizen-military, especially during times of war. As seen in the previous section, the state will resort to the use of mercenaries when it is unable to meet warfare demands through normal recruiting measures. As the United States goes further away from the use of conscription, both as a tool to meet recruiting needs and as an instrument to increase nationalism,

---

<sup>190</sup> Huntington, *Who are We*, 203.

<sup>191</sup> Lewis, *The American Culture of War*, 368.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 366.

it increases the propensity for the use of privatized warfare in the future.

Emergent social dynamics all point to increased growth in privatized warfare. The symptoms outlined above illustrate that society is once again divorced from war. Michael Howard explains, “War, in short, has once more been denationalized. It has become, as it was in the eighteenth century, an affair of states and no longer of peoples.”<sup>193</sup> The combination of a growing civil-military divide, increasing state-society gap, weakening anti-mercenary norm, and a deterioration of national identity (nationalism) are patterns that parallel the period where mercenarism was dominant. There is a common thread in both periods, military service is once again regarded as a trade for professional soldiers and not regular citizens. In fact, most citizens can now live free of interference from war, either from taxes and compulsory military service. The recent growth of PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan were a result of changing social dynamics that favored the use of privatized warfare. This was not a contextual derivative due to the circumstances in those wars but one that follows a similar pattern in history. Christopher Kinsey provides the implications for the future, “At present, there appear no other social forces on the horizon to dampen this expansion.”<sup>194</sup>

## External

The contemporary character of warfare also favors an escalation in the privatization of war. As a result of technological advances, warfare is increasingly quality-centric and specialized. John Lynn points out that since 1970, destroying an enemy is no longer predicated on having a large military.<sup>195</sup> This change largely parallels the original period where mercenarism was dominant and demand for mercenaries was at a premium due to their military specialties. The US

---

<sup>193</sup> Howard, “War and the Nation-State,” 106.

<sup>194</sup> Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security*, 106.

<sup>195</sup> Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West,” 537.

military's increasing reliance on advanced weapon systems in combat provides additional incentives to contract PMCs. Because the majority of these systems require unique skill-sets and expensive training, it is often deemed more costs effective to privatize their technical support and maintenance. These services were even contracted out within the combat zone in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>196</sup> This evolution has resulted in the US military's complete reliance on contractor support.<sup>197</sup> As the military expands its reliance on advanced weapons, cyber warfare, and unmanned weapon systems including drones and robots, it will have to increasingly blur the line between combatant and non-combatant. The conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated for the first time the messiness in defining the differences between a contractor and a soldier.

The United States reliance on PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan created a new path dependency and implicitly legitimated their future use. After the French Revolution, there was consensus among society and the state that mercenaries were an illegitimate form of external coercion. Nation-states purposely delegitimized their use and passed neutrality laws to prevent their citizens from fighting in foreign conflicts. However, the recent expansion of PMCs has eroded this ideal. In fact, third-country nationals made up the largest portion of PSCs in Iraq (85 percent).<sup>198</sup> The use of foreigners whose nations are not party to a conflict even meets the most contemporary definitions of mercenary. However, the United States defended its use of PMCs even after the United Nations condemned their use and directly linked PMCs to mercenarism. In one case the United States declared, "Accusations that U.S. government-contracted security guards, of whatever nationality, are mercenaries is inaccurate and demeaning to men and women

---

<sup>196</sup> Krahmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 206.

<sup>197</sup> US General Accounting Office, *Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces*, 9.

<sup>198</sup> Congressional Research Service, *The Department of Defense's Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq*, 11.

who put their lives on the line to protect people and facilities every day.”<sup>199</sup>

The United States’ intentional disassociation of PMCs has important implications for many of the components that inhibited the use of privatized warfare in the period following the French Revolution. The reliance on PMCs undermines a state’s sovereignty and its monopoly on violence. After the French Revolution, it was believed that the state should have sole control of violence. While the United States still has a large degree of control of its contracted military companies, it is significantly less than the control exerted over the regular military. The surge of PMCs also weakens the perception of the social contract that helped connect society to the state and the military, which only further widens the gap between society and the state. This path will likely be copied in future conflicts, because of the model of reliance that was designed in Iraq and Afghanistan. As seen from history, path dependency is a strong component to the use of force and the United States newest model is heavily dependent on privatized warfare.

## Summary

The recent expansion of privatized warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan was a result of numerous changes in the internal and external dynamics that influenced the United States’ government. Neoliberalism, globalization, and the end of the Cold War coalesced to create a new environment that challenged the old construct of using citizen-militaries. The end of the Cold War coupled with a new Global Security Paradigm led to excessive military demands, but with deficient means using regular military forces. Because the United States still needed to enact its foreign policy and retain order, this necessitated the use of PMCs to fill this security gap.<sup>200</sup>

---

<sup>199</sup> Alexander G. Higgins, “US Rejects UN Mercenary Report,” *USA Today*, October 17, 2007, accessed October 20, 2015, [http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-17-3392316246\\_x.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-17-3392316246_x.htm).

<sup>200</sup> Avant, *The Market for Force*, 31.

Stemming from changes in social norms, the use of PMCs were considered an acceptable solution to this problem by both the state and society. In only a few decades, neoliberalism redefined daily life in the United States in everything from business to politics. This movement led to a new conception of democratic governance which favored privatization in order to increase government efficiency. Under the guise of neoliberalism and globalization, the general understanding of sovereignty and acceptable military means degenerated to include the use of PMCs. Privatization was normalized over multiple decades and continues to this day with the recent legitimization of PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The normative belief that tied citizenship and military service together (social contract) eroded as indicated by low citizen participation in recent US wars (labor and taxes) and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Similar to the nation-state before the French Revolution, the military is increasingly distinct from the rest of society. American identity and cultural cohesion has been undermined by the cumulative effects of globalization and the declination of state practices to homogenize the population. This has occurred in parallel with new external dynamics that challenge the autonomy of the nation-state and promote the use of mercenaries. As a result of globalization, there has been a diffusion of power to non-state actors like multinational corporations and IGOs. Simultaneously, due to technology improvements, the character of war favors the use of small, specialized, and highly technical military forces. This change has increased dependence on private military companies. Lastly, PMCs offer both political and economic advantages. PMCs offer an expedient solution to using regular military forces, because of their lower long-term costs and political oversight and exposure. There is also a perceived costs-benefit to PMCs especially considering the surge in social costs (Medicare/Medicaid) along with decreasing defense budgets. The cumulative effect of these political, social, and ideological changes has been the resurgence in privatized warfare. The state once again views the use of contracted warriors as an acceptable solution in external coercion.




Figure 6: Emergent Nature of Nation-State (United States)

Source: Created by Author

### Comparative Analysis and Prognosis of the Future

The contemporary nature of the United States illuminates many correlations to the broader scale of history. In fact, emerging trends resemble the period when mercenarism was dominant. The dynamics outlined in this section are similar to those that restrained the use of citizens and compelled the state to use privatized warfare prior to the French Revolution. At the same time, many of the social norms that led to mercenarism's decline are being eroded by new dynamics. These correlations are illustrated in the figure below. Those contemporary factors that are similar to the period prior to the French Revolution are bolded. In addition, the dynamics that have been eroded by emerging trends have been lined through. These correlations and patterns

not only provide the logic for the recent resurgence in privatized warfare, but also serve as the foundation for its prediction. By synthesizing and then comparing United States' contemporary nature to history, reveals that the use of privatized warfare is returning to an equilibrium state. This can be seen in the figure below which highlights that both internal and external dynamics contrast with the era of "people's war" and correspond with the larger part of history where mercenaries dominated. This strong correlation provides the logic and reasoning that privatized warfare will continue to grow and the use of citizen-armies will decrease.<sup>201</sup>

---

<sup>201</sup> This paper has revealed many important dynamics that shape the state's calculus for the type of force it will employ in external coercion. Based on the evolution of mercenarism, factors examined included: the degree of state authority and autonomy; the state's ability to extract capital and manpower from society; the political and economic incentives of privatized warfare; the cohesiveness of citizens (society) to the state and military measured by nationalism and level of democratic and military participation [including the use of conscription]; the pervasiveness of norms against privatized warfare; and the security environment and character of war whether quality-centric or quantity-centric. This is not a linear relationship or formula as the nation-state exists as part of an open system. This same model used to examine the United States could be used to examine other nation-states.

<u>Pre-French Revolution</u>	<u>Post-French Revolution</u>	<u>Emergent</u>
<p><b>State</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Decentralized Governance (Indirect Control)</li> <li>➤ Lack of Access to Resources</li> <li>➤ Minimal Bureaucratic Structure</li> <li>➤ Political and Economic Advantages of Mercenaries</li> </ul>	<p><b>State</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Centralized Governance (Direct Control)</li> <li>➤ Effective Bureaucratic Mechanisms</li> <li>➤ Access to Capital</li> <li>➤ Permanent Standing Army</li> <li>➤ Dangers of Privatized Warfare</li> </ul>	<p><b>State</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Government Privatization Initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Indirect Control</li> </ul> </li> <li>➤ Squeeze on Capital from State Expansion</li> <li>➤ Political and Economic Advantages of PMCs</li> </ul>
<p><b>Society</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Lack of Democratic Ideals</li> <li>➤ Disjointed State-Society Relationship</li> <li>➤ Citizen-Military Disconnect</li> <li>➤ Lack of National Identity</li> </ul>	<p><b>Society</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Democratic Ideals/Popular Sovereignty</li> <li>➤ Citizenship tied to military service <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Civil-military gap reduced</li> </ul> </li> <li>➤ National Identity Formed <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Nationalism</li> </ul> </li> <li>➤ Universal Conscription Utilized</li> <li>➤ Anti-Mercenary Norm Strengthens</li> <li>➤ Sovereignty of State Expanded <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ State Monopoly of Violence</li> <li>➤ Neutrality</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p><b>Society</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Change in Social Norms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Neoliberal conception of governance favoring privatization</li> <li>➤ Normalization of privatization</li> </ul> </li> <li>➤ Weakened anti-mercenary norm</li> <li>➤ Eroding National Identity/Nationalism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Globalization</li> <li>➤ Less deliberate measures</li> </ul> </li> <li>➤ Growing Civil-Military Rift <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ All Volunteer Military</li> <li>➤ Isolation from society</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>External Environment</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ State Autonomy Challenged</li> <li>➤ Path dependency <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Mercenary success</li> </ul> </li> <li>➤ Character of war <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Increased specialization</li> <li>➤ Quality over quantity</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p><b>External Environment</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Nation-State Dominant Actor</li> <li>➤ Path dependency <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Success of citizen-armies</li> </ul> </li> <li>➤ Industrialization of War</li> <li>➤ Character of War <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Decreased specialization</li> <li>➤ Quantity centric</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p><b>External Environment</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Nation-State Autonomy Challenged</li> <li>➤ Global Security Paradigm</li> <li>➤ Security Vacuum</li> <li>➤ Path dependency <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ State legitimization of PMCs in Iraq/Afghanistan</li> </ul> </li> <li>➤ Character of War <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Increased specialization</li> <li>➤ Quality centric</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Figure 7: Comparative Analysis Across Time

Source: Created by Author

## Section 5: Implications for the Future

The expansion and growing reliance on PMCs must not be classified as an anomaly simply because of the character of recent wars. Instead, these developments are indicative of larger trends that should generate expectations of things to come. On 27 November, 2015, the *Los Angeles Times* broke a news article that the US Air Force had recently started using civilian contractors to fly its armed MQ-9 Reaper drones.<sup>202</sup> The article revealed that civilians were

<sup>202</sup> W.J. Hennigan, "Air Force Hires Civilian Drone Pilots for Combat Patrols; Critics Question Legality," *Los Angeles Times*, November 27, 2015, accessed 15 December, 2015,

already controlling two patrols a day (up to 4 drones per patrol) and that the Air Force was planning to expand this to 10 patrols per day by 2019.<sup>203</sup> While these civilian contractors are not allowed to perform the final targeting and firing of missiles, they are an active part of the “kill chain” and represent a significant advancement in the privatization of war. Moreover, using contractors to fly an armed weapon system that is “employed primarily against dynamic execution targets and secondarily as an intelligence collection asset” also divulges the contextual nature of the laws that govern warfare.<sup>204</sup> This controversial use of contracted pilots and the employment of PMCs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates that laws “follow” a nation-states nature, not the other way around. The United States’ extant trends are more enlightening of the future than contemporary laws and regulations. Laws are a social construction (like war and mercenarism) that reflect the accepted norms of the period in which they are written. The argument that regulations will continue to prohibit PMCs from conducting direct combat functions does not accurately reflect history.

The recent growth in the use of PMCs has generated a rapidly expanding area of scholarly research. However, most literature examines privatized warfare based on a contemporary understanding and condemns the use of PMCs because they erode the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Many conclude that more legislation and regulation is needed to curtail their future use. However, this solution signifies that these authors are clinging to a false paradigm that treats the use of PMCs as an anomaly instead of a return to war’s equilibrium state. This paper has illustrated that the recent growth of private warfare is not a result of temporary conditions but an expression of its evolving nature. Future research needs to

---

<http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-fg-drone-contractor-20151127-story.html>.

<sup>203</sup> Hennigan, “Air Force Hires Civilian Drone Pilots for Combat Patrols; Critics Question Legality.”

<sup>204</sup> US Air Force, “MQ-9 Factsheet,” accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx>.

focus on how to best incorporate private military actors instead of how to obstruct them.

The US military must be the first to acknowledge that privatized warfare must be integrated into its current operating concepts and included in its theories of warfare. The entire Department of Defense was not ready to incorporate private military companies into its operational plans in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the US military's capstone operating concept, Unified Action, the private sector is an essential consideration for achieving unity of effort.<sup>205</sup> This paper illustrates that this integration will be increasingly important in the future. The military services can either continue to challenge the use of PMCs and explain-away their growth as anomalous; or, it can acknowledge that privatized warfare is an emerging aspect of warfare that must be accounted for. It must take the second road and not wait until a crisis propels its advancement into the new paradigm explained in this paper.

## Section 6: Conclusion

Christopher Kinsey, author of *Corporate Soldiers and International Security*, recently declared, "In every respect, private security is now a global phenomenon that is set to grow."<sup>206</sup> This monograph sought to test this claim and others like it by first understanding and explaining the logic of privatized warfare. It examined the dynamics—political, social, ideological, and environmental components—that both explain the evolution of the nation-state and underpin mercenarism's three phases: dominance, decline, resurgence. Mercenarism was analyzed in

---

<sup>205</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), xiii; Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (e.g., the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.

<sup>206</sup> Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security*, 151.

relation to the nation-state in order to understand the political and social transformations which have shaped the trajectory of privatized warfare across a thousand-year span. While privatized warfare and citizen-militaries are both byproducts of a nation-state's politics, this decision and policy formulation does not occur in a vacuum. The resultant mixture of military force is an emergent property, deriving from the complex interactions between a nation-state's political actors (the state), its people (society), and the influences of the larger system in which the nation-state interacts (external environment). Clausewitz wisely asserted that "war and its forms result from ideas, emotions and conditions prevailing at the time."<sup>207</sup> However, history reveals a significant pattern; citizen-militaries are an aberration. While the logic of privatized warfare has two sides, the balance is not equal and the fulcrum is closer to the side promoting the use of mercenaries. For most of history, states have been impelled to use mercenaries due to constraints on their ability to extract the necessary money, manpower, and material for a citizen-military. Yet, for nearly two-hundred years, nation-states collectively controlled the open market for military force and chose to employ their citizens in external coercion. This was only possible through a union of factors that not only restrained the use of privatized warfare, but delegitimized it. During this era of "war with the people," the state-society relationship fused, the citizen-military gap decreased, and the nation-state strengthened its authority and autonomy. Common citizens were linked to the state and the military through nationalism and ideology such as the social contract. However, emergent trends indicate an erosion of these factors that coalesced to constrain the use of private forces and a return to historical equilibrium. In fact, contemporary dynamics are similar in form to the period of mercenarism's dominance. These present trends justify a strong prognosis for the continued escalation of privatized warfare in the United States. The evidence is

---

<sup>207</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 580.

convincing that the current dominion of the citizen-military will not last. Future wars will primarily be fought by private means and the use of citizen-militaries will wane.

## Bibliography

- Alabarda, Yusuf and Rafal Lisowiec. "The Private Military Firms: Historical Evolution and Industry Analysis." Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. Accessed October 19, 2015. <http://www.dtic.mil/met-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA473255>.
- Allmand, Christopher. "New Weapons, New Tactics 1300-1500" in *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*. Edited by Geoffrey Parker. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Avant, Deborah D. "From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War." *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 41-72.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Emerging Market for Private Military Service and the Problems of Regulation," in *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*. Edited by Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Axelrod, Alan. *Mercenaries: A Guide to Private Armies and Private Military Companies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2014.
- Axelrod, Robert and Michael D. Cohen. *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier*. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
- Bear park, Andrew and Sabrina Schulz. "The Future of the Market" in *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*. Edited by Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Bisley, Nick. *Rethinking Globalization*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- Breckinridge, Henry B. "Military Training: Compulsory or Volunteer?" In "Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York." *The Academy of Political Science* 6, no. 4 (July 1916): 12-17. Accessed August 9, 2015. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1193271>.
- Campbell, John C. "Outsourcing and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): Contractors on the Battlefield." Master's Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and Translated by Peter Paret and Michael Howard. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office. *Contractors's Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq*. Pub. No. 3053. August 2008.
- Congressional Research Service. *Mandatory Spending Since 1962*. By Mindy R. Levit, Andrew Austin, and Juffrey M. Stupak. March 18, 2015.

- Congressional Research Service. *The Department of Defense's Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress*. By Moshe Schwartz. May 13, 2011.
- Dickinson, Laura. *Outsourcing War & Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs*. Yale University Press, 2011.
- Doob, Leonard W. *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964.
- Duffy, Christopher. *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason*. New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1987.
- Echevarria II, Antulio J. *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Gates, Robert M. "Lecture at Duke University on All-Volunteer Force." Lecture, Duke University, Durham, September 29, 2010. Accessed February 28, 2016. <http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1508>.
- Glete, Jan. "Warfare, Entrepreneurship, and the Fiscal-Military State," in *European Warfare: 1350-1750*. Edited by Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. *The Real Price of War: How You Pay for the War on Terror*. New York: New York University Press, 2005.
- Gunn, Steven. "War and the State in Western Europe, 1350-1600" in *European Warfare: 1350-1750*. Edited by Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Harrison, Neil E. *Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm*. New York: State University of New York Press, 2006.
- Hobsbawm, E.J. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Holmila, Erkki. "The History of Private Violence" *Estonian National Defense College Proceedings* 15, (2012): 45–74. Accessed 1 September 2015. [http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA\\_Toimetised\\_15\\_2\\_Holmila.pdf](http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_15_2_Holmila.pdf).
- Hormats, Robert D. *The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars*. New York: Times Books, 2007.
- Howard, Michael. "War and the Nation-State." *Daedalus* 108, no 4 (Fall 1979):101-110. Accessed August 8, 2015. <http://www.jstor.org.lumen.cgscarl.com/stable/20024637>.
- . *War in European History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Who are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York:

- Simon and Schuster, 2004.
- Israel, Jonathan. *Revolutionary Ideas: An Intellectual History of the French from the Rights of Man to Robespierre*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. SCRIBD.
- Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013.
- Keen, Maurice. "The Changing Scene: Guns, Gunpowder, and Permanent Armies" in *Medieval Warfare: A History*. Edited by Maurice Keen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Kidwell, Deborah C. *Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies*. Global War on Terrorism Paper 12. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.
- Kinsey, Christopher. *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Krahmann, Elke. *States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Transitional States in Search of Support: Private Military Companies and Security Sector Reform." In *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*. Edited by Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnhardt. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Latzko, David A. "The Market for Mercenaries." Conference Presentation Transcript, Wilkes University, Wilkes-Barre, PA. Accessed 29 August 2015.  
<http://www.personal.psu.edu/~dx131/research/presentations/mercenary.html>.
- Lewis, Adrian R. *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom*. New York: Routledge Press, 2012.
- Lynch, Tony and A.J. Walsh. "The Good Mercenary." *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 8, no. 2 (2000): 133-153.
- Lynn, John A. *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800-2000." *The International History Review* 18, no. 3 (August 1996): 505-545. Accessed August 9, 2015.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40107494>.
- Ortiz, Carlos. *Private Armed Forces and Global Security: A Guide to the Issues*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010.
- Macomber, Shawn. "Your not in the Army Now." *The American Spectator* 37 (November 2004): 26-30.
- Mahoney, James and Dietrich Reuschmeyer, ed. *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

- Mallett, Michael. "Mercenaries" in *Medieval Warfare: A History*. Edited by Maurice Keen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1974.
- Merriman, John. *A History of Modern Europe: From the Renaissance to the Present*. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004.
- Miles, Donna. "Survey Shows Growing Gap Between Civilians, Military," U.S Department of Defense News. November 28, 2011. Accessed 8 August, 2015.  
<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66253>.
- Mill, John Stuart. *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*, Vol. 1. London: John W. Parker.
- Mockler, Anthony. *The Mercenaries*. New York: MacMillan, 1969.
- Munkler, Herfried. "Clausewitz and the Privatization of War," In *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*. Edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Roth. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Nimwegan, Olaf van. "The Transformation of Army Organization in Early-Modern Western Europe: 1500-1789" in *European Warfare: 1350-1750*. Edited by Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Nye Jr., Joseph S. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.
- O'Brien, Kevin A. "What Should and What Should Not Be Regulated." In *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*. Edited by Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. *2014 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community*. Accessed February 28, 2016.  
<http://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2014-Demographics-Report.pdf>.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1998*. Accessed February 28, 2016. <https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/1998/chapters98.pdf>
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2014*. Accessed February 28, 2016. <https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2014/contents/contents.html>.
- Palmer, R.R. "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War," in *The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Edited by Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Parker, Geoffrey. *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-*

1800. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Parrott, David. "From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies: War, State, and Society in Western Europe, 1600-1700," in *European Warfare: 1350-1750*. Edited by Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Had a Distinct Template for a 'Western Way of War' Been Established Before 1800?" In *The Changing Character of War*. Edited by Hew Strachan and Sybylle Scheipers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Pelton, Robert Young. *Licensed To Kill: Hired Guns in The War on Terror*. New York: Crown, 2006.
- Percy, Sarah V. *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Morality and Regulation." In *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*. Edited by Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Changing Character of Private Force." In *The Changing Character of War*. Edited by Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "This Gun's for Hire: A New Look at an Old Issue." *International Journal* 58, no 4 (Autumn 2003): 721-736. Accessed August 8, 2015. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203894>.
- Perry, David. "Purchasing Power: Is Defence Privatization a New Form of Military Mobilization?" PhD diss., Carleton University, 2011. Accessed 8 August, 2015. <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2011/Perry.pdf>.
- Posen, Barry R. "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power" *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 80-124.
- Rockoff, Hugh. *America Economic Way of War: War and the US Economy from the Spanish-American War to the Persian Gulf War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Rothenberg, Gunther E. *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978.
- Schneid, Frederick C. "Introduction" In *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?*. Edited by Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, and Harold D. Blanton. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Shafer, Boyd C. *Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.

- Singer, P.W. *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Spicer, Tim. *Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and War and the Sandline Affair*. Edinburgh and London: Mainstream Publishing, 1999.
- Strachan, Hew. *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983.
- Strachan, Hew and Sibylle Scheipers. "Introduction: The Changing Character of War." In *The Changing Character of War*. Edited by Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Stanley, Bruce E. *Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015.
- Tallett, Frank and D.J.B Trim. "Then Was Then and Now is Now: An Overview of Change and continuity in Late-Medieval and Early-Modern Warfare." In *European Warfare: 1350-1750*. Edited by Frank Tallett and D.J.B Trim. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Thompson, Mark. "An Army Apart: The Widening Military-Civilian Gap." *Time*. November 10, 2011. Accessed February 28, 2016. <http://nation.time.com/2011/11/10/an-army-apart-the-widening-military-civilian-gap/>.
- Thomson, Janice E. *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1990.
- US Air Force. "MQ-9 Factsheet." Accessed December 15, 2015. <http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx>.
- UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries. "Mercenaries, Private Military and Security Companies and International Law." By Jose L. Gomez del Prado, Accessed September 23, 2015. [https://law.wisc.edu/gls/documents/gomez\\_del\\_prado\\_paper.doc](https://law.wisc.edu/gls/documents/gomez_del_prado_paper.doc).
- US General Accounting Office. *Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans*. GAO-03-695. Washington, DC, June 2003.
- US Office of Budget and Management. *Historical Tables, Table 14.5—Total Government Expenditures by Major Category of Expenditure as Percentages of GDP: 1948–2014*. Accessed November 13, 2015. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals>.
- Venesson, Pascal. "War Without the People." In *The Changing Character of War*. Edited by Hew Strachan and Sybylle Scheipers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Walter, Dierk. "Meeting the French Challenge: Conscription in Prussia, 1807-1825" In

*Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?*. Edited by Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, and Harold D. Blanton. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Weber, Max. *Political Writings*. Edited by Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977.