MILITARY PARTNERSHIP LESSONS LEARNED FROM BASE CLOSURE AND TRANSITION IN IRAQ

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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14 February 2013
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Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Carolyn Patrick is a U.S. Air Force officer assigned to the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL. In 1991 she graduated from San Diego State University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Psychology and was commissioned in the U.S. Air Force through the ROTC program. She received her Master of Arts degree in Social Psychology from Arizona State University in 1996. She has served as a behavioral scientist, inspector general, manpower and personnel officer. She is a graduated squadron commander and has deployed three times in support of Operation Northern Watch, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn. During the transition of Joint Base Balad to the Iraqi Air Force in 2011 she was dual-hatted as the 332 Expeditionary Mission Support Group Deputy Commander and the Base Transition Officer.
Abstract

This paper reviews lessons learned from the transition of Joint Base Balad by the U.S. Air Force to the Iraqi Air Force in 2011. Complications encountered during the transition included: Political uncertainty regarding the future of the military mission in Iraq; limited partnerships with the Iraqi military; and unity of effort issues regarding strategic security between USF-I and the 332 Air Expeditionary Wing. These issues resulted in a diminished ability to form strong Iraqi partnerships at Balad which would have assisted in establishing better long and short term security in the region. The author proposes in the absence of a strong Iraqi Air Force unit to partner with, U.S. Forces could have established partnerships with host nation contractors. Some of the benefits of hiring host nation contractors to provide base operating support would have been increased cooperation by demonstrating the benefits of U.S. presence; decreased cost; and increased opportunity to conduct population-centric counterinsurgency operations.
Introduction

As the U.S. transitioned to stability operations in Iraq, the mission dictated a focus on improving host nation security to allow the Iraqis to maintain internal order and regional peace after the U.S. departure. The major threat to security during this time was insurgent activity and sectarian violence. Building the support of the local population through integration and counterinsurgency operations (COIN) was a critical component to improving the security situation in Iraq, and along with Host-Nation partnering it was used successfully in many parts of Iraq. This paper will review lessons learned from the transition of Joint Base Balad to the Iraqi Air Force. Although the transition was successful and no lives were lost at Balad in the year leading up to the transition, better utilization of host-nation partnering and COIN tactics would have significantly improved the potential for lasting regional and local security.

The ability to form strong host nation partnerships at Balad was handicapped by several factors. The U.S. had become intolerant of unnecessary casualties in Iraq resulting in a general aversion to risk and increased security concerns regarding Iraqis on Balad. Political uncertainty concerning the size, composition and mission of the military stay-behind force led to unfocused planning and lack of departure credibility. The Iraqi Air Force was not fully formed and the contingent stationed at Balad was not sufficient to assume control of such a large base. The lack of unity of command between the U.S. Air Force and Army resulted in fragmented unity of effort regarding employment of COIN tactics to improve the potential for long-term security in Iraq.

Some of these issues were political and could not have been influenced by the warfighter, however this paper will explain their effects on the base transition and explore what security benefits may have gained by employing host-nation contractors to conduct base operating support functions earlier in the transition. Employing host-nation contractors would have
increased security risk from insider attacks, but would have enabled interaction with local nationals critical to establishing long-term relationships and lasting security. Other potential benefits include increased cooperation from the host nation by demonstrating the benefits of U.S. occupation, decreased cost and increased opportunity to conduct population-centric counter-insurgency operations to improve short and long term security in this region.

A Joint Staff analysis of lessons from the past decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan identified how failure to plan and resource strategic and operational transitions endangered accomplishment of the overall mission. Many of the lessons learned in the withdrawal and security transition from Iraq will apply to the upcoming transition in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, there will be no military victory or surrender ceremony when we leave. Whether our efforts in these wars were a success or failure will not be immediately known. However, one initial measure of success will be how we leave. A responsible transition will provide the foundation for these countries to manage their own security, economic growth and political stability.

**Transition of Joint Base Balad**

Joint Base Balad was one of 341 U.S. bases to close or transition to the Government of Iraq between 2009 and 2011. As the second largest base in Iraq and a logistical hub supplying all Northern Iraq, Balad was one of the last bases to transition. At its peak, Balad housed over 35,000 personnel, and along with many other bases had been identified by the Government of Iraq as essential to Iraqi security. Prior to the war the base was known as al Bakr Air Base and upon our departure it was returned to the Iraqi Air Force. The Iraqi Air Force was much smaller in 2011 than it had been in the early 1990s and it consisted mostly of transport and rotary wing
aircraft. Only a small Iraqi Air Force unit and no Iraqi aircraft were posted at Balad prior to the transition. Although Iraq was working to acquire aircraft to assist in the defense of their country, they would not be there for several years. This was different than many of the larger bases which partnered with active Iraqi Army (IA) units who were a critical component in providing security after the U.S. departure. Ultimately an IA unit would end up defending the perimeter at Balad due to the inability of the Iraqi Air Force to employ, train and station their own security forces at Balad.

Another factor that distinguished Balad from other bases in Iraq was that the Base Operating Support-Integration (BOS-I) was delegated to an Air Force unit. There were twelve comparably large bases identified to transition in 2011. Ten of these bases had Army BOS-I, one had Navy BOS-I and Balad had Air Force BOS-I. The Army once held the BOS-I role at Balad, however CENTCOM shifted responsibility to the Air Force to gain synergy since the Air Force also held Senior Airfield Authority (SAA) responsibilities. When the base flying mission ended toward the end of 2011 unity of effort issues began to emerge. For example, the Air Force Base Mayor and the Army Battle Space Owner had a fundamental disagreement on when the Iraqi Bazaar should be shut down. The Mayor was concerned about security on the base and meeting transition timelines. The Battle Space owner was concerned about the impact to his COIN campaign. Although this was a minor issue and was resolved locally, it demonstrated a difference in mind-set regarding risk-acceptance and security. The Air Force leadership at Balad wanted to close the Bazaar because of the known criminal activity by Bazaar employees and risk to U.S. Forces from the Iraqis transiting the base. The Battle Space Owner was more concerned with the strategic security gains from incentivizing the local Iraqi Sheiks who were allowed to
sell their goods at the bazaar in exchange for their cooperation and for not allowing indirect fire attacks from their neighborhoods.

At other bases Army units conducting base transition efforts reported through their division headquarters to the Commander of U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I). Headquarters USF-I was responsible for synchronizing the movement of US troops, contractors and equipment and also coordinating transition efforts with the Government of Iraq. The 332 Air Expeditionary Wing (332 AEW) was responsible for transitioning Balad, but was operationally aligned through the 9th Air Expeditionary Task Force-Iraq (9 AETF-I) which reported to USAFCENT and not USF-I. The Iraq Train and Advise Mission – Air Force (ITAM-AF) contingent at Balad reported through the 321st Air Expeditionary Wing also aligned under 9 AETF-I. The ITAM-AF team arrived just prior to the Iraqi Air Force unit at Balad and acted as a liaison between the Iraqi Air Force and the 332 AEW for transition issues. In absence the unity of command, USF-I oversaw the transition of Balad through weekly video-teleconferences and data collection.\(^9\) The 332 AEW met all reporting and transition deadlines, however progress in getting more Iraqi military personnel to Balad to ensure a smooth transition was slow. Some friction also developed as the need to balance the USF-I requirements to keep the logistical hub operating to the last minute conflicted with Balad’s requirement to drawdown personnel and equipment to meet transition timelines.

Without a full Iraqi unit to partner with at Balad, the 332 AEW faced some unique challenges. The U.S. had good intentions to turn over a completely functional air base to the Iraqi Air Force. However, the reality was Balad had much more infrastructure and technology than the Iraqi Government could sustain. The base infrastructure was similar to a small city with two power plants, two sewage treatment plants, two water purification plants, two runways and
all the air traffic control equipment and facilities that go along with them, four municipal waste and one medical waste incinerators, multiple dining facilities/kitchens, a large hospital and over 7,000 other facilities all spread out over 6,400 acres.\textsuperscript{10} When the Government of Iraq took ownership of Balad, it was evident there was no way the Iraqi Air Force contingent which numbered fewer than 100 men would be able to maintain and operate such a massive base. The smallest dining facility was extremely oversized for their population, the living quarters were inadequate for family living or Iraqi soldier living, the central power and sewer plants were beyond the technological capacity for the Iraqi Air Force contingent to sustain, and because of the USF-I mandate, no water purification systems could be left behind for Iraqi use.\textsuperscript{11}

Balad had grown in size and complexity throughout the conflict in order to conduct U.S. missions such as maintaining air supremacy, operating the primary aerial port and running the largest logistical hub in Iraq. As the base grew there appeared to be no corresponding coordination with the Government of Iraq on how they would utilize and maintain a base of this size. This lack of military and civilian partnership became problematic in the year leading up to U.S. departure. Since the 332 AEW did not have a clear line of communication to the Government of Iraq through the chain of command, they had to rely on USF-I to coordinate the future of Balad after U.S. departure.

The initial Iraqi Air Force contingent consisted of the Commander and four officers who arrived in March 2011. There were no Iraqi engineers, mechanics, or security personnel the 332 AEW could train to operate and maintain the infrastructure. It also became apparent that the Iraqi Air Force would not be able to secure the base after our departure and the 332 AEW requested assistance from HQ USF-I in identifying an Iraqi Army unit to provide perimeter security upon U.S. departure. Since the 332 AEW did not directly report through USF-I,
coordinating an Iraqi Army unit to secure an Iraqi Air Force base was difficult. Relationships between the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Air Force were almost non-existent and full of mistrust. Although the 332 AEW was responsible for the base transition, they relied solely on USF-I to coordinate the security transition of the base.

Perimeter security was managed by Air Force security forces, however the Army ground forces commander (known as the battle space owner or BSO) controlled the terrain surrounding the installation. The Joint Defense Operations Center and Joint Intelligence Support Element routinely collected information and proactively addressed the ever present threat of Indirect Fire (IDF) attacks. By keeping the IDF attacks at a manageable level the BSO was better able to focus on COIN tasks such as security, economic development and governance. Additionally, the 332 AEW hosted weekly COIN and civil engagement meetings to ensure full support to the BSO from the Army, Air Force and Department of State partners at Balad. These efforts however were not tied to improving the security relationship with the Iraqi Air Force unit who would take ownership of Balad upon our departure. Small wins were accomplished through Army-led COIN activities such as the on-base bazaar with local vendors and inviting local children on base for a day of fun and games with the military personnel. It is significant to note that during the quarterly children’s day events where the U.S. hosted Iraqis on the base, there was never an indirect fire attack despite the fact that Balad averaged six attacks per week.

Another tactic which could have improved cooperation between the U.S. and Iraqi people and possibly reduced the number of indirect fire attacks would have been to partner with the local national population and hire more Iraqi contractors to perform base operating support functions. Balad had the right assets in place to provide oversight and collect intelligence. Base support contracts through U.S. contractors (who hired mainly third country nationals) cost over
$93M in 2011, and a portion of this work would have made a tremendous impact to the local Iraqi community. Iraqis who had been motivated by insurgents to perform IDF attacks for money could have worked on base earning a decent salary and learning a trade. If the U.S. would have hired Iraqis in base operating support roles the GoI would have had a pool of knowledgeable workers to hire from to manage and run essential services after the U.S. departure.

Instead of hiring host nation contractors however, the majority of Base Operating Support functions in Iraq were accomplished by contractors under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, or LOGCAP. The Air Force version of LOGCAP was the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP). AFCAP contracts at Balad employed approximately 2,500 personnel. They provided the following services on Balad:

- Facility Operations and Maintenance
- Morale Welfare and Recreation/Laundry/Billeting
- Non-tactical Vehicle Maintenance (NTV)
- Dining Facilities (DFACs)
- Incinerator and Solid Waste
- Land Mobile Radio
- Shuttle Bus Service
- Material Requisition

As the transition date approached there was a need to reduce the number of personnel on base to facilitate shutting down facilities and services. Contractors required at least 30 days to demobilize and during this time they would no longer provided any services. There were not enough military personnel on Balad to provide all these services during the last 45 days of the transition and it was estimated there would still be as many as 10K personnel living on the base. Although the Air Force was able to scale back on some of the AFCAP personnel through
modifying contracts, they had no oversight on the large contingent of LOGCAP contractors who were supporting Army Logistics missions and were required to be in place until the final days.

Out of necessity, the 332 AEW turned to the Regional Contracting Command to establish Local National (LN) contracts for essential services to “bridge” from cessation of AFCAP contracts to when the last U.S. units departed. The Mayor’s cell established local national bridge contracts for the following services in the final two months of operations:

- Porta John cleaning and servicing
- Solid Waste Collection/Incinerator Operations
- Black/Gray Water treatment
- Water delivery (for showers, commodes, laundry, etc.)

Balad had existing LN contracts for the NTV fuel station, fuel delivery, wash rack and generator/tower maintenance scheduled to run through the end of mission.

It is difficult to directly compare the costs for AFCAP to LN contracts due to the decreasing number of base personnel requiring support and the differences in the way the contracts were written. In all cases, the local national contracts were less expensive than the AFCAP contract and the contractors did not live on Balad, thus they did not require the same level of support (feeding, housing, etc.). One contract where direct comparisons can be drawn was the Incinerator/Solid Waste disposal contract. Although the number of personnel on Balad dramatically declined in the last two months, the amount of trash did not. Demobilizing units produced significantly more trash than steady state operations thus keeping the trash stream steady almost up until the last day. The average AFCAP price per month for this service was $590K and the LN contract price per month was $334K. In all cases it was significantly cheaper to hire LNs to do this work. Unfortunately, the LN bridge contractor was technologically
challenged to keep the incinerators running properly and due to the short terms of the contract was not motivated to invest in the expertise required. For these reasons, U.S. personnel were heavily tasked to assist the contractor in managing the large amounts of waste which continued to accumulate throughout the end of mission. Given a longer period of performance, the contractor would have been motivated and able to get skilled and trained incinerator operators.

The Iraqi companies who took over these responsibilities had significant difficulties at first due to the rapid handoff from AFCAP contractors and poor condition of the government equipment they were given to operate. The entire base experienced overnight mission degradation when the AFCAP contracts ended abruptly on 1 October 2011. Although this appears to be inconsistent with a recommendation to hire more LN contractors, the mission degradation could have been averted if the LN contractors would have been hired at the beginning of the transition period instead of the end. The poor condition of the equipment when the LN contractors inherited it was a direct result of the Balad transition team scaling back the number of contractors four months prior to the transition. For example, the NTV maintenance contract was terminated on 1 August in an effort to reduce the number of non-essential contractors on base. If the U.S. would have converted to LN contracts instead of terminating the contract we would have achieved the desired results of reducing the number of contractors living on base and maintaining an NTV maintenance capability.

Although the LN contractors did not have to be housed or fed on base, requiring them to transition on and off the base through the entry control points (ECPs) created an increased security risk. The risk of insider attacks must be weighed alongside the benefits of partnering with the host nation. All Iraqi contractors had to go through biometric screening at the ECPs to verify identity and provide watch list information. Toward the end of mission this equipment
was demobilized as were personnel trained to conduct security interviews. This raised the risk of taking on new or unvetted LN contractors. In the final weeks Iraqi contractors were not allowed to bring on new employees because the base was unable to adequately screen them. This would not have been a problem if the contractors had been vetted earlier in the transition.

The risk of insider attacks was one of the primary reasons Balad did not employ more LN contractors. By avoiding this risk the U.S. lost the potential benefits of additional population-centric COIN opportunities to improve long and short term security. Employing LN contractors in place of U.S. contractors would have increased our departure flexibility by having fewer personnel to redeploy. Finally, by providing this work to Iraqi contractors instead of third country nationals, the U.S. could have improved the local economy, thus demonstrating a benefit of the U.S. occupation.

The Iraqis living near Balad did not benefit from the U.S. occupation and our departure credibility was low. This was a prevalent theme in Iraq as identified by General George Casey, Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq from 2004-2007 in his book, *Strategic Reflections*. Despite our best efforts to improve the Iraqi view of the coalition, much of the population still viewed it as an occupation force, and while there was a clear understanding at the governmental level that we intended to leave, there was apprehension at the local level that we were in Iraq to stay. We needed to demonstrate that we had a plan to leave.\(^{16}\)

Our lack of clear departure credibility could have been partially to blame for the continued insurgent resistance. Research indicates an occupation is likely to generate less opposition when the occupying power makes a credible guarantee that it will withdraw and return control to an indigenous government in a timely manner.\(^{17}\) David Edelstein studied historical examples of occupations and judged whether they failed or succeeded based on
weighing the costs (in both duration and number of troops required) against whether or not the occupation accomplished what it was tasked to do. He found there were three significant predictors of successful occupations: the occupying country must overcome the perception that they are a military conqueror; convince the occupied population that the occupation will improve their lives; and assure them they will regain sovereignty relatively soon. As described below, none of these factors were present at Balad.

In 2008 Iraqi and American policy makers agreed all US troops would depart Iraq in 2011, but by December of 2010, there were few at Balad who believed this would actually happen. Throughout 2011 the U.S. and Iraq negotiated about leaving a reduced contingent of military trainers in Iraq through 2012. It was not until October of 2011, when Iraq refused to give immunity to U.S. troops, and President Obama announced all the remaining 39,000 troops in Iraq would be home for the holidays, that the reality of our departure sank in. If U.S. military personnel did not believe we were really going to leave for most of 2011, the Iraqis probably did not believe we would leave either.

The Iraqis around Balad expressed their resistance in the form of insurgent activity and attacks on the base. Although the area surrounding Balad looked like a peaceful farming community from the air, over 275 rocket and mortar attacks were fired at Balad from January – November 2011. These attacks had operational impacts such as damaging the airfield, facilities, and endangering personnel on the base. As we approached the transition there was a risk of more strategic impacts if the insurgents were able to make it appear their attacks were driving us out of Iraq. Additionally, Balad became more vulnerable to attack as sensors, defense equipment and emergency response personnel redeployed. For this reason our departure date was not releasable to anyone without a security clearance and a need to know.
Edelstein found one successful approach for establishing credibility was to make withdrawal contingent on behavior of the host country. This tactic was used during the Allied occupation of Italy. As Allies moved from South to North they gave increasing control of southern Italy back to local citizens. The conditions set by the Allies for returning control were cooperation in the defascistization of Italian society and the absence of resistance to advancing Allied troops. There were no deadlines set and the Allies proved their credibility by granting self-governance in response for cooperation.\textsuperscript{19} Conditions-based transitions had been used successfully in Iraq when transferring security responsibility in each of the provinces.\textsuperscript{20} However, this same strategy was not used in the overall final transition of bases from U.S. to Iraqi control. The U.S. returned sovereignty to the Government of Iraq in 2004 and both countries agreed the U.S. would depart in 2011. The U.S. delayed irreversible transition decisions until October of 2011 when it became apparent the Government of Iraq would not allow U.S. troops to remain. This delay prevented employment of a conditions-based withdrawal which negatively impacted our departure credibility and transition planning.

Ultimately the Balad transition entailed redeployment of over 170 military units and 75 contract companies. Contracts for DFACs, laundry, fitness centers, shuttle buses, facility and vehicle maintenance all ended on 1 October 2011 and these functions were taken on by the remaining military personnel. Personnel were tasked on 12+ hour shifts to keep basic services going while demobilizing and transporting equipment and personnel out of theater. The U.S. transferred 7,364 facilities/structures and $400 million dollars of property to the Government of Iraq. The major challenge during this transition was trying to shut down the base and inventory all the equipment being transferred while simultaneously providing base operating support for the remaining 10K personnel in the 30 days prior to U.S. departure. The lack of a timely
decision from U.S. policy makers compressed the planning timeline creating innumerable challenges in redeploying personnel, equipment and making wise contracting decisions.

The 332 AEW goal was to get all people and equipment out safely and meet the basic USF-I requirements for base transition. Strategic security goals were not paramount, so population-centric COIN principles like bringing on more LN contractors were not considered. The U.S. chose not to employ a conditions-based withdrawal throughout Iraq to gain operational flexibility to stay if given the opportunity. Based on the continued IDF attacks up until the final days at Balad, one can assume the local Iraqis did not see any benefit to the U.S. occupation in that region.

**Recommendation**

Our efforts to transition Balad to the Iraqi Air Force would have been in vain if they were not able to maintain security of the base after our departure. In the absence of a more robust Iraqi Air Force unit to partner with, we could have improved the likelihood of enduring security by transitioning to local national contractors at least six months prior to our departure. This would have assisted the U.S. with a smoother transition, and enabled additional population-centric COIN tactics to enhance long term security and partnership with the Iraqis. To ensure unity of effort throughout Iraq, such a transition plan could have been included as a requirement in the USF-I Base Transition Smart Book.22

By transitioning from U.S. to LN contracts six months prior to departure we could have reduced the number of redeploying personnel thereby increasing our operational flexibility to depart as soon as the conditions were right. The more people we had living on the base, the longer it took to depart. Only one unit on base was able to self-redeploy (drive-out); the remainder all needed to fly out which drove the requirement to keep the airfield running until the
last day. Roughly one-quarter of the population on Balad six months prior to departure was contractors. These contractors also had facilities and equipment they had to transport off the base. Contractors who waited until the last 30 days to transport their equipment encountered rogue Iraqi Army blockades designed to confiscate equipment before it could be sold or sent out of the country. By moving their redeployment up to T-120 days these issues would have been lessened.

Another benefit of employing LN contractors would have been an expansion of population-centric COIN tactics to integrate civilian and military efforts. Increased interaction with local Iraqis would have enabled U.S. Forces to address the root cause of insurgent attacks against the base. The local population would have benefited economically and received job training in how to provide and maintain essential services. As the Iraqis realized the benefits of the U.S. presence, perhaps they would have been more apt to invite us to stay and continue our partnerships to improve security.

Although the main reason we did not employ more LN contractors was our aversion to the risk of insider attacks, another reason was we had grown accustomed to a level of service and reliability that the Iraqis were not able to provide. During indefinite operations this was understandable; however as the focus shifted from stabilization to transition we should have begun a gradual reduction in our expectations of service. By hiring LN contracts at least six months prior to the transition the quality of service would have been lower, but it would have been more in-line with what was sustainable after we departed. As indicated in the COIN manual, when the U.S. is supporting a host nation long-term success requires establishing viable host nation leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant U.S. support.23
Conclusion

Three persistent problems that affected base transition efforts at Balad and throughout Iraq were opposition to U.S. forces who were viewed as an occupying force, lack of solid partnership relationships with military units, and lack of credibility in the U.S. intent to depart and return control of the military bases to the government of Iraq. To overcome the perception of the U.S. as a military conqueror and convince the occupied population their lives would be improved by the occupation we must integrate better with the local nationals living near our large bases. One way to do this is to hire local nationals instead of third country nationals to provide essential services. While it may not be practical for long term or enduring operations, the benefits during transition outweigh the security risk. Hiring local contractors to perform this work will increase cooperation from the host nation by demonstrating the benefits of U.S. presence, and provide additional opportunities for population-centric counter-insurgency operations.
End Notes

1 George W. Casey, Strategic Reflections, October 2012, p 105-108.
2 Ibid, p 152
16 George W. Casey, Strategic Reflections, October 2012, p 54.
20 George W. Casey, Strategic Reflections, October 2012, p 76. “We worked hard to find the right conditions that would serve as a forcing function for the Iraqis to increase their capabilities and yet still be attainable. We intended for all transfers to be conditions-based and therefore did not set a timetable for the transitions. There were no provinces ready for transfer in 2005, and we did not get our first chance to implement the process until the summer of 2006 when
Muthanna Province in southern Iraq became the first Iraqi province to assume responsibility for its security.”


Bibliography


