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**TO:**
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**FROM:**
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**AUTHORITY**
AGO ltr 11 Jun 1980

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1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) 2 July 1971.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Colonel Arthur D. Moreland, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as a result of subject report should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.


BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: 

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
HEADQUARTERS
ADVISORY TEAM 55 (Kien Giang Province)
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO 96215

MACDR-55/SA 1 August 1972

SUBJECT: AFRIS-Province Advisor Completion of Tour Report
(RCS: MACCORDS 174-03) COL ARTHUR D. MORELAND, 101-22-8887

THRU: DEPCORDS
Delta Regional Assistance Command
APO 96215

TO: Headquarters
Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: MACCORDS, (AC of S, CORDS)
APO 96222

1. Attached is the Province Advisor's Completion of Tour Report completed by the undersigned for the period 19 March 1971 through 15 August 1972.

2. To provide "food for thought" and areas for possible discussions during the exit briefing the following statement is forwarded.

Assignment as Province Senior Advisor of Kien Giang Province has been a tremendously challenging and rewarding experience. Rarely is an Army Officer given such a broad span of responsibilities. I am a strong proponent of the Country Team concept which can work and will work once the representatives of our various governmental agencies make their mind up to it. There has been a drastic change in this advisory team since my arrival with the number of US in Province dropping from 600 to 50, and the advisory team from 190 to 30. In many aspects today we are doing more advising, less administering to the needs of a large team and are more and more dependent on the Vietnamese for information. It has been extremely heartening to see the Vietnamese continue to make measurable progress across the entire spectrum of our civil/military pacification efforts despite the incursion of the current NVA offensive. Although the people and their families are living increasingly better, more must be done to assist them in identifying with their government. The quality of the PSDF and the effectiveness of Village/Hamlet Administration must be improved. Major reforms in their educational system starting at the Saigon level have to be made. In this large and wealthiest province in the Delta we have over 50,000 school age children not being educated.

DAFD-OTT
72B026
Inclosure
MACDR-55/SA
1 August 1972
SUBJECT: AFRIS-Province Advisor Completion of Tour Report
(RCS: MACCORDS 174-03) COL ARTHUR D. MORELAND, 101-22-8387

for lack of school teachers; i.e., the provincial capital has 2.3 school teachers per classroom but within the province we have 56 classrooms without any teachers. If the Vietnamese are not careful they could very well win the war only to lose it due to the corrupt practices endemic to their society.

Of considerable concern to me is the fact that 40% of this advisory team will rotate this month with few replacements immediately projected. Lieutenants in Major's slots and PFC's in Senior Sergeant's slots does not provide the quality requisite to a small advisory team during this critical period. I am pleased to note that I will be succeeded by LTC (P) Edward Metzner who served as Province Senior Advisor of this Province on a previous tour. This tour being my first as an advisor has been a particularly rewarding one as it has provided me with a deep appreciation for the Vietnamese people and their culture. Theirs is an extremely complex and diverse society. They have made great strides and hopefully they will attain an acceptable peace. I have been very impressed with the dedication and professionalism displayed on all levels by the members of the CORDS Team both civilian and military. The assistance, courtesies and fine support provided has been sincerely appreciated. On my level I could not have been provided throughout the entire tour with a finer group of District Senior Advisors and Province Development Officers. I salute you and wish the CORDS effort continued success in this most important venture.

ARTHUR D. MORELAND
Colonel, Infantry
Province Senior Advisor
SECTION I

NAME: MORELAND, ARTHUR D.

GRADE: Colonel

SSAN: 101-22-8387

BRANCH OF SERVICE: Infantry

PROVINCE: Kien Giang

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 19 March 1971 - 15 August 1972

EXPECTED RESASSIGNMENT DATE: 15 August 1972

PREVIOUS TOUR(S) IN VIETNAM (DATES - INCLUSIVE) 19 June 1966-4 January 1968

ASSIGNMENT OF PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR(S): MACV J3 - Force Development (10 months); CO 2ND BN, 47th INF (MECH), 9th INF DIV (8 months).
SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?

Twenty years experience as a Combat Areas Army Officer, college and
graduate civil schooling, attendance at a variety of military schools to include
the Command and General Staff College and previous tours in Vietnam.

2. What training did you have for this position?

Thirty-nine weeks at the Vietnam Training Center, Foreign Service Institute.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?

More training in the civil aspects of our pacification program to include
more in depth briefings on arrival in Saigon.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?

18 months with an option to extend for 6 months.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies.

Support from Saigon and Region was generally more than satisfactory. The
exception to the rule was generally occasioned by the reduction in force and
support assets.

6. a) Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming?

VIS and Sorghum

b. Were there any programs that were especially successful because support
was readily available? Which ones?

Land Reform and Social Welfare

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide
a means for reporting all information of present and future value?
If not, what changes would your recommend?

See reports and analysis directorate section. Unfortunately, there seems
to be a proclivity towards "one time" reports becoming a semi-permanent feature.

8. Do the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements
set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification
programs?

As well as can be expected considering that we have 44 different provinces
with 44 different requirements.
9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

Instructions were generally clear with minor exceptions. As with any staff in a fast moving situation clarity can be lost due to an inadequate coordination on either the CORDS or DRAC's side of the the house. MG Cushman's implement instructions on his drug offensive were extremely difficult to implement due to their being written primarily for US units not Province Advisory Teams.

ANSWER QUESTIONS 10-15 BY GIVING AN ORDER OF PRIORITY.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:

1. RDC
2. Public Safety
3. Chieu Hoi

11. The most effective para military forces are:

1. APT
2. NPF
3. PRU

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

1. RF/PF
2. LTT
3. National Police

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. RF/PF
2. LTT
3. National Police

14. The least successful pacification programs are:

1. Education
2. VIS
3. Rural Development Credit Program under VSD
15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. Hydraulic services
2. Economic services
3. PTT - Communications services

16. The rural people are (XXXXX) aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making. If not, how can they be informed?

17. The people, as you know them, are (more) (XXXX) committed to the than when you assumed your job. Why?

This is reflected in the improving HES (43rd Province to 27th), PAAS Surveys, general rise of the economy, and increasing viability of the government with exceptions on the lower levels. Government officials are of a higher caliber, are identifying more with the people, and are more responsive to their needs.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam? (Yes) (NB) If no, what change in the plan should be made?

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart? (XXXX) (No) If not, how can this be accomplished?

Unfortunately, the plan arrived in province late resulting in a crash effort to respond to a short suspense date. However, the province plan is more than adequate, weak areas are being strengthened, and the Province Chief on a monthly basis makes a detailed review of programs with all of his Service and District Chiefs.
Territorial Security Directorate

Territorial forces have made a significant contribution to the pacification effort in this province in the past eighteen months. The measure of success of the territorial forces is in the maintenance of the secure and in the upgrading of the insecure to the secure. By this yardstick, their accomplishments have been such as to allow for a close, mutually-supporting relationship between the territorial forces and the populace. This relationship was never more apparent than during the offensive launched by the enemy on the night of 6-7 April. Though the enemy expected a general uprising of the people in support of their invasion, they, in fact, found the reverse to be true. The people supported the territorial forces by reporting enemy locations and routes of movement, weapons, caches, and when known, future plans. This positive response on the part of the people during this crisis is particularly noteworthy as it reflects the trust they have placed in the local forces. The attitude of the people today was not necessarily their attitude eighteen months ago.

Several factors have contributed to the success of the territorial forces in sector. Paramount has been the effectiveness of the Province Chief and District Chiefs in their planning and supervision of operations. Additionally, the increasing utilization of R Battalion/Kien Loi headquarters has unified previously splintered units which had been reporting directly to subsector. The deployment of some 2000 territorial force troops from An Giang to Kien Giang permitted sector to redeploy many of its forces to insecure areas in province (as discussed below). Overall, the operations of the territorial forces were major reason in Kien Giang's rise from 43rd to 27th in the current national ranking.

Perhaps the major achievement of the territorial forces has been their efforts in the two southernmost districts of province - Kien An and Hieu Le. Eighteen months ago, both districts were virtually controlled by the VC. A plan was developed whereby Regional Force companies were to be deployed from the northern districts south to Kien An and Hieu Le. As the forces were deployed, they were tasked to construct a series of outposts throughout the districts to include the dangerous coastal strip. Their performance was magnificent. Not only was it necessary for the units to engage in offensive operations to clear the selected areas but they were then required to perform the physical labors of outpost construction. As each outpost was completed, it would be occupied by elements of an R company or a PL platoon. In turn, this provided security for the area and allowed people to return to locations where they formerly lived but had fled to avoid the VC. During this period, a total of 24 outposts were constructed. That Kien An is not almost totally pacified as of this writing is due to the current enemy offensive which caused temporary suspension of the outpost construction program.

A major failing of the territorial forces lies in their susceptibility to VC proselytizing. Many of the outpost overruns can be attributed to one or more individual PF soldiers from within aiding the enemy prior to and
during an attack on an outpost. Similarly, sector officials are aware that VC proselytizing among RF personnel, though not resulting in outright defection by individuals, can result in soldiers covertly harboring a sympathy to the enemy cause. Accordingly, province makes every effort to rotate companies out of an assigned area of operations after a six month period. This has tended to eliminate proselytizing as a problem area among RF units. Not so, however, with the FF platoons. The majority of the similar Forces remain in the same outpost to which originally assigned. Until district and province recognize that FF units, too, must rotate to different outposts within respective districts, VC proselytizing will continue to be a problem.

Training always taking a backseat to operations, continues to be a shortcoming in the territorial forces. The existing requirement that each unit and headquarters attend Chi Lang NTC for refresher training once every 3 years is desirable but unrealistic due to the turnover of personnel. Unless additional training centers are constructed there would appear to be no lessening in the time frame for unit's attending. Training, generally, is limited to that provided, in-place, by the mobile training teams which travel throughout province. Unfortunately, as was demonstrated during the enemy offensive, training winds up being overtaken by events as the units engage in operations against the enemy forces. This in itself is an evil as far as training is concerned; yet, there is little else that can be done when all units are fully committed and none are available for training, much less a sector reserve.

PSDF: The mission of the People's Self Defense Force is to provide internal security for the populated areas within the hamlets and villages, gather intelligence useful to the armed forces and national police, and actively participate in community development projects. Accordingly, it is necessary that as many people as possible commit themselves physically, psychologically, and politically to the GVN. Although the specific missions of the Combat and Support PSDF differ, it is important that the total number of individuals realized and trained are increased as well as the number of leaders trained. In turn, the overall mission of the PSDF will be accomplished more quickly and efficiently. From March 1971 to 1 August 1972, the PSDF in Kien Giang Province has made substantial gains in many areas. Statistically, there has been an increase in the number of support troops but a slight decrease in the number of combat troops. It is suspected that the latter was due to the reported figures in 1971 which were somewhat inflated to meet the goals set for the VN year ending February 1972.

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<td>1 March 1971</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>26,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>71,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August 1972</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>22,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>79,103</td>
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The following organizational figures demonstrates the increase in the numbers the KI, U/F, and DIT teams through 31 March 1972;
The following are the newly organized Combat/Hit and Support inter-team figures which are part of the 1972-1975 Civil Plan. They replace the Hit, Urban/Rural Team, and the Hit Teams.

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<th>MS</th>
<th>Hit</th>
<th>Hit Size</th>
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<td>1 March 1971</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11,408</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 March 1972</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>11,824</td>
<td>224 (13 &quot;A&quot;, 163 &quot;B&quot;, 48 &quot;C&quot;)</td>
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The performance of the PSF has been one of gradual improvement. Though major problem areas exist, as addressed below, the PSF organization continues to strive to attain established goals. They have withstood the pressures of the recent enemy offensives and it is to their credit that few of their number have been casualties or have defected to the other side. Perhaps the success of the PSF in Kien Giang Province can be attributed to the Province Chief. He has taken an active interest in the organization and has given the individuals a pride in themselves which previously they appeared to lack.

Overall the performance of the PSF has been one of gradual improvement. Though major problem areas exist, as addressed below, the PSF organization continues to strive to attain established goals. They have withstood the pressures of the recent enemy offensives and it is to their credit that few of their number have been casualties or have defected to the other side. Perhaps the success of the PSF in Kien Giang Province can be attributed to the Province Chief. He has taken an active interest in the organization and has given the individuals a pride in themselves which previously they appeared to lack. He has identified with them through his leadership the people now understand their mission and future.

Leadership is always a problem at any level and in any Vietnamese organization. In the PSF, however, it is essential that good leaders are selected and trained. Consistent with the guidance provided in the 1972-1975 Civil Plan wherein the PSF is to assume responsibility for security of all "A" and "B" hamlets, it is apparent that without the proper leadership this goal will be difficult, not necessarily to achieve, but to maintain.

Fortunately, Sector officials recognize this problem area and are looking to insure the best people are selected for the positions of responsibility. The poor communications that exist between sector and subsector and subsector and village/hamlet must be improved. The majority of the people are just not being informed. Basically, the problem is one of holding meetings at one level and then failing to disseminate the information down to the next level. One attempt by sector to resolve the situation has been a compilation of bulletins summarizing each meeting at sector and then distributing the bulletins throughout province.

There has been evidence of corruption and inefficiency among PSF in certain villages and hamlets. Efficiency and corruption go hand-in-hand, as one deficiency leads to the other. As a result, the morale and motivation of some of the teams are reduced, thus minimizing the teams effectiveness. The Province Chief has declared war on corruption, however, and it is expected that this problem may solve itself in the near future.
NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE: During the past year the Field Police have recruited an additional 120 men which permitted formation of three additional Platoons. With a total strength of 380 there is now one platoon at each district and one in the city of Rach Gia. With a kill ratio of 20 to 1 against the enemy the Field Police have demonstrated their proficiency in combat.

The primary weakness of Field Police has been their underemployment. There are a significant number of targets, primarily Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) cadre, that are well within the capability of the Field Police to neutralize.

NATIONAL POLICE OPERATIONS: The police have shown a very steady improvement. One measure of this improvement has been the addition of 315 police to bring their present strength to 2314.

There have been many notable successes within the Police Program. The most significant is that the police have assumed total responsibility for security of the city of Rach Gia. The fact that the military and territorial forces have relinquished control to the police is an extremely significant occurrence and a proper measure in economy of force.

The second most significant police success is the apparent absence of corruption. That which has been uncovered within the police was uncovered by the police themselves and appropriately dealt with.

Other successes are that they exceeded their quota by 17% in issuing ID cards to be ranked 1st in the country in this measure of population control. The F-6 Campaign, in which over 300 suspected Viet Cong "legal" cadre of the Political Infrastructure were detained, was prudently and effectively executed by the police. The effectiveness was demonstrated when the 2017 NVA infiltration Group was forced to travel without guides (who had been arrested in the F-6 Campaign) and blundered into a PF outpost. In the ensuing action, 69 NVA were killed.

The drive against narcotics netted the police 330 kilos of opium, 56 kilos of heroin and 57 kilos of marijuana. One seizure of 100 pounds of pure heroin was, at the time, one of the largest hauls in the world. The police have also assumed responsibility for the Phung Hong Program. Since assuming control, the Province has climbed from the 16th ranking province in the country to 4th place.

There are two major weaknesses in the police system. The first weakness is the centralization of authority. All decisions funnel upward to end up on the desk of the Province Chief of Police. His desk is simply not big enough to handle all the decision papers that gravitate upwards. One aspect of this problem is that all personnel appointments and transfers must be approved at Saigon.
The second major weakness is the lack of police jurisdiction over the military. The police are only authorized to detain military whom they witness in the commission of a felony (a crime punishable by more than one year in jail). The military can commit misdemeanors with impunity as the police lack the authority to detain them. The Military Police are charged with insuring the military obey civil and military law. The local citizen cannot understand this distinction and it erodes authority when citizens witness the military committing misdemeanors in the presence of police.

Recommendations for improvement within the police area:

a. Additional province level advisory effort be placed on getting the Police Chief to delegate authority to his primary or trustworthy subordinates.

b. National level Police Command delegate authority to the Province to make intra-province transfers and appointments, to include the specific authority to appoint District Police Chiefs.

c. The National Executive Branch should take such action as will give the police complete civil authority over the military, to include the right to detain, arrest, and prosecute in civil court all military guilty of misdemeanors and felonies.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTIVES

VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT: The Village Self-Development program has encountered many problems during its implementation; however, for the most part, difficulties occurring in village programs were met and resolved. Now, these solutions are being utilized in more recently pacified villages where the same patterns have occurred. In some districts, projects have been poorly constructed; funds stolen or misused; and some, completed projects have never been used because they were not correctly programmed. Where an effort is made to obtain maximum participation of the population, these faults usually solve themselves. There are indications that in the more sophisticated villages the recognition of the necessity to continue development, without National funds, has caused them to actively pursue new revenue sources in order to further village development. With the 1972 program just getting underway, some villages have selected a number of projects which can only be termed trivial in spite of the guidance given them by RD Cadre and PNC.

1971 saw 36,797,116 VVN allocated for the VSU Program. A little over twenty-six million was used to complete 146 projects and; better than fourteen million was loaned under the RD Credit program to 720 persons in thirty-one villages. The 1972 fund will be 34,950,000 VVN, with the majority spent for public use projects. There have been 117 projects proposed thus far in 1972, and another eight projects carried over from 1971.

RD CADRE: VVN emphasis upon local community development resulted in the 1972 plan to place RD Cadre in village teams under the supervision of Village Chiefs. Accordingly, by May 1972 Kien Chûn's 521 Cadre were operating to assist Village Chiefs in community development in all 40 villages.
Certain problems are present in this redeployment, as some Village Chiefs persist in utilizing the KD Cadre in a security role rather than in their new capacity as development specialists. A new technique was tried out in March 1972, when KD Cadre became the key elements in 16 teams comprised of cadres from several ministries dispatched to serve in selected villages for three months in a co-operative effort to improve local government.

ETHNIC Minorities: In the past year and a half the lot of the individual Cambodian in this province has not changed appreciably. However, there has been a marked change in the GVW's responsiveness to their collective needs. While the government officially views the Cambodians as full fledged citizens, whose rights are to be protected, the Cambodian Service Chief views his role as a custodian of Cambodian cultural heritage. Consequently, his meager resources have been divided between GVW programs of assisting the Cambodian assimilation into Vietnamese society and his own programs of preserving the Cambodian cultural identity. The advisory effort has been directed towards the development of a more active Cambodian leadership, both by greater participation in hamlet and village affairs, and by acceptance of all Cambodian slots in the Province High School and the Vinh Long Normal School. The advisory team also assisted the training of twenty Cambodian monks, who will instruct children outside of normal school hours in Cambodian institutions and cultural ways.

With the current effort to meet draft quotas, the Cambodian Peace has been particularly plagued by friction. There has also been friction developing over the governments attempt to enlist the younger monks.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Local government is receiving more and more emphasis. Although a good deal of time and effort has gone into preparing local officials for their added responsibilities, there is still a great deal to be done. The most inefficient villages continue to be those with the most questionable security. Consequently, officials are often elected for reasons other than their administrative skills. The more knowledgeable men in the village will not accept such vulnerable positions. For this reason, the villages weak in security are usually weak in administration. With the advent of more sophisticated programs, officials of mediocre abilities will not be able to comprehend programs without a great deal of guidance and assistance. One position which has become particularly critical in 1972 is the Finance/Tax Commissioner. The job requires a self-starter who can learn rapidly and begin the implementation of these programs. Advisory effort will be devoted to identifying problem areas which may arise in the local government apparatus from the new pressures brought upon it. The number of officials trained at HCM/Vung Tau has dropped drastically compared to previous years. 305 were trained in 1971, but only sixty-eight have trained there in 1972. Province training, as of 1 August 1972, stands at 669; while the training for all of 1971 only numbered 734 officials. Even with the progress made in training, the province coverage for village vacancies is hovering at 10%, with the least secure village having the most unfilled positions.

AID IN KIND: In 1971, a system was devised at Province level whereby the majority of monthly aid allotments would be apportioned to various advisory elements, including district teams, on the basis of both past spending and projected budgetary requirements. This insured an equitable distri-
bution of resources, and enabled Team 55 to provide support to a wide range of GVN programs simultaneously. In the second quarter of 1972, our Province allocation was raised by 405,000 piasters to a total of 2,085,000 per quarter, largely due to the fact that Kien Giang had consistently spent 100% of previous allocations and had received approval for more regional AID fund expenditures than any other province in the Delta.

Besides the monthly AID allotments to advisor elements such as Hung Hoang supplies, Police station construction, VIS support, and miscellaneous USA expenditures, the funds were spent on diverse pacification efforts. Examples of the latter would be: assistance in the construction or repair of boat docks, market places, schools, and foot bridges; medicines for distribution on med-caps; poster materials for various services; repair of ministry equipment; reward money; youth & sports activities; and help in support of teacher training courses for HU Cadre and Cambodian monks.

**REFUGEE DIRECTORATE**

**WAR VICTIMS:** The problem of refugees, or war victims as they are now called, has existed in Kien Giang for many years. Though there are large numbers of war victims in the delta, they are less destitute than those from other areas due to the general availability of Lao sites. Families who are forced to relocate in Kien Giang usually move in with friends or relatives and share their land plot, or find a vacant plot of their own. During the recent U-dinh campaign, the number of refugees on the resettlement roles remained relatively constant, but the number of return-to-Village (kTV) refugees increased sharply. In 1971, there were 37 resettlement sites listing 9,012 persons, of the end of the year, 2,533 persons received their benefits and another 1,759 persons were awaiting the release of cash in lieu of tin roofing.

The number of persons in kTV status was much larger and demanded most of the Social Welfare Service attention. There were 83 kTV sites in 1971, listing some seventy-five thousand people. Thirty-one thousand were completely compensated by Lao, while another 10,805 received partial payments; the remaining 32,686 persons were not paid because of a delay in the carryover of funds from 1971 to 1972. In addition to the 43,391 persons awaiting kTV benefits, there were an estimated twenty-seven thousand persons in kTV status who were as yet unsurveyed by the SWS. Because of the current enemy offensive, it is no longer clear how many persons remain at these unsurveyed sites.

Since the end of April, Social Welfare Service resources have been directed toward relief of fifteen thousand war victims generated by the current enemy offensive. However, only about nine thousand needed the temporary assistance of the SWS while the others preferred to live with friends or relatives. In addition to temporary relief, ten million piasters in war victim payments was paid to 4,777 war victims in 1971 alone.

The whole advisory effort in the field of refugee relief was greatly assisted by support and expertise of the Regional and National War Victims Directorate. WD's ability to respond quickly to Provincial request and brief about meaningful changes in the Ministry of Social Welfare's programs was an invaluable advisory asset.
In 1971, the S&S focused on construction of schools, wells, dispensaries, and education projects for resettlement sites in Kien An District. Training courses for refugees and war victims were conducted in Rach Gia City in 1971, and continued this year. In 1972, the emphasis was to reactivate the poor people's kitchen, solicit private contributions for temporary relief of war victims and reinstitute Food-for-Peace programs in several orphanages and the Chieu Hoi Center. The better part of the S&S 1972 program was cancelled when the Ministry began recalling the funds earmarked for the U-dinh Forest sites. Although six or seven million piasters will be salvaged, the remainder of the forty million piasters originally allocated for the U-dinh has already been channeled into refugee relief programs in the North.

CHIEU HOI: The 1971 total of 2309 ralliers gave Kien Giang the highest rating in the nation in terms of the success of its Chieu Hoi program. It was for this reason that the Prime Minister and Chieu Hoi Minister visited Rach Gia in January to preside over a ceremony inaugurating the 1972 nation wide Mother's Heart campaign.

Kien Giang's success was owed largely to military and psychological operations carried out in the U-dinh Forest area, from which emerged 85% of the hoi chanh rallies in the province. Company-size offensives and excellent psywar support by ROSTA helped maintain the program's momentum.

One area in need of improvement involves the timely exploitation of intelligence derived from hoi chanh debriefings. In the past, much useful information on current VCI locations and activities have simply been filed away due to a lack of cooperation between intelligence analysts and military staff section chiefs. One hopeful sign is the fact that a platoon of the Second Propaganda Team was recently placed under the control of the province Thung Hoang Committee. This arrangement empowers the AJ to conduct Thung Hoang operations to capture or neutralize any VCI targeted by hoi Chanh intelligence information. If the system works out, we will have a ready reaction force capable of quickly responding to any information which the Chieu Hoi Center provides to Thung Hoang.

Reports and Analysis Directorate

Report Requirements: Despite the efforts of the Assistant BEACOS, DRAC, to decrease the quantity of reports required by higher headquarters, the number of reports remains overburdening. With the execution of Advisory Team personnel the compilation of so many reports is such an encumbrance that it significantly detracts from advisory time with counterparts. Some recurring reports were eliminated, but an ensuing avalanche of one-time, short fuse Civil/Pacification reports continued to be received. With the force reduction drawdown the flood of reports are unlikely to be completed as accurately or professionally as possible. During phasing down, as the amount of voluminous paper shuffling created by the inordinate number of reports increases, the amount of advisory time appreciably decreases. In essence, the advisory effort takes on the sinister aspect of being simply a monitoring agency for higher headquarters rather than an advising team.
Essentially, report feedback seems quite accurate for at least the mid-month Pacification Profile Update. Receiving a copy of all Province reports is quite helpful for it presents an overview of the regional situation. However, the passage of intelligence reports amongst provinces remains to be a critical problem.

**PHONG DUC VIENT**

**PHONG NGA:** The Phung Hoang Program in Dien Giang has shown substantial improvement over the last two years. The 40% improvement in number of Viet-Cong Infrastructure (VCI) neutralized reflects the rise in neutralizations from 593 (Mar 1970 to Mar 1971) to 638 (Mar 1971 to Mar 1972).

The 638 VCI neutralized represents a very credible effort within the Province. The most desirable form of neutralization, the chieu hoi, accounted for 486 VCI. The greatest bulk of these chieu hoi came from the contested areas in the U-Minh Forest. The Provincial Security Committee sentenced 151 VCI to detention for periods of one year or more. The least desirable neutralization was correctly the lowest with VCI killed constituting only 146 of the total 838.

During the first six months of 1971 the Provincial Security Committee was convicting 83% of the people appearing before it to detention of one year or more. During the last half of the year the rate fell to 20% convictions. The reduced conviction rate represents the effects of Circular 1042 dated 2 August which liberalized the an Tri procedures. The Circular required the appearance of the suspect before the Committee. The appearance, hitherto not permitted, evoked a great deal of sympathy with the Committee members and also gave the suspect the opportunity to revoke any confessions that may have been made. A portion of the drop may also be attributed to reduced quality of evidence presented to the Provincial Security Committee.

The neutralizations were primarily among the village and hamlet level VCI. During the calendar year 1971 there were 939 VCI neutralized with their positions at the following levels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COVUN</th>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>VILLAGE</th>
<th>HAMLET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>431</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

While the main thrust of the Phung Hoang Program was to neutralization of important VCI cadre at the higher levels, the neutralization of VCI at village and hamlet level must have serious effects. The village and hamlet VCI are the working level and their absence must be keenly felt.

The declining rate of suspects sentenced has been mirrored by a similar decline in the number of VCI captured. The number of suspects captured was at a high in March of 1971 with 53 captured that month. The number of suspects captured has fallen lower each month with March of 1972 showing only 9 captured.

In summary, even with the downward trend in captures and sentences, this period has shown a 20% increase in neutralizations over the preceding year. The enemy initiatives now being felt (April 1972) are emphasizing the
significance of the support the VCI lends to the Viet Cong military and will strengthen the support given the Phung Hoang program by participating agencies.

The major impediment to success in the Phung Hoang Program has been the lack of specific targeting. Specific targeting is the process of selecting a specific VCI by name for neutralization and then concentrating all available resources until the individual is killed, captured, or callously.

The ingredients most often missing from the cycle of specific targeting are intelligence collection and operations against the target. It is axiomatic that a good operation cannot be run against a target without good intelligence.

Intelligence collection has been poor for several reasons:

a. The Police Operations Center (POC) has not requested intelligence be collected against the targeted individual.

b. When requested, the collection agencies often provide no reply, a reply which does not meet the suspense, or a reply that states no information is available.

Operations against targeted VCI are most often lacking because:

a. The POC does not know where the target will be at any particular time.

b. The target is in a secure area protected by NVA or heavily armed local forces, or

c. The target lives in another province or district than the one of the targeting POC.

Recommendations for improving the performance of the Phung Hoang Program consist of placing command emphasis on the specific targeting. The first barrier has already been breached by the directive from NVA, that requires the Province to neutralize 50 VCI and then names the 50. Previous quotas have always been met although the neutralizations were for the most part random and NVA would accept any VCI neutralized as credit toward the quota.

In order to centralize the command emphasis and minimize the time required by the District and Province Chiefs to provide the emphasis, I recommend the construction of a Target dossier for each of the VCI required to be neutralized. Thus, each district would be required to maintain four to seven dossiers, which is their quota for a three month time period.

The Target dossier would consist of:

a. A Summary of Information (SFI) which lists the date and location the target was sighted with a brief summary of his activity.
b. A Target Overlay (TO) which plots each sighting and is keyed back to the S&I.

c. A copy of each Information Request (IR) on the target that remains to be answered as well as copies of post lists with the replies received.

d. A copy of each operations order that directs a reaction force against the target.

The second recommendation is that the Target Dossiers be presented at the weekly Phoenix Committee meeting which is attended by the chiefs of all participating agencies as well as the District or Province Chief. The meeting should be a place for decisions. The District Chief can insure that intelligence has been requested and that appropriate replies received. He can further insure that adequate operational forces are committed in the event the Police reaction forces are inadequate to meet the forces protecting the target. In the event cross border operations are required the District Chief can direct such coordination to be made that will accomplish the requirements.

It must be recognized that intelligence will rarely pinpoint the present or future location of the target. While there will be opportunities to exploit such intelligence the bulk of the intelligence will be one to three days in the past. Fast areas of operations, likely routes of travel, resting spots, homes of relatives or girl friends, all derived from past intelligence reports provide locations for ambushes or operations that give increased probability of engaging the target.

In short, the time the District Chief or Province Chief can devote to current emphasis is very limited. The available time should be spent in directing actions or making decisions that will neutralize the target. The use of the Target Dossier at the Phoenix weekly meeting will minimize the time required and maximize the decision-making ability since all chiefs are assembled for one purpose.

**AGENCY FOR INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENT**

**PUBLIC HEALTH:** Kien Giang Province has a population of approximately 500,000 and has three hospitals. These hospitals are located in the Kien District town, Phu Quoc Island and Nhach City. In addition, there are eight Maternity-Infirmary-Dispensaries, 41 Maternity-Dispensaries, and nine Dispensaries in the province.

The Kien Giang hospital in the Province Capital of Nhach City is considered one of the best in the Delta. It consists of 19 separate buildings and is staffed with nine military and four civilian doctors and has adequate facilities to give in-patient and out-patient clinical attention. There are fifteen private doctors and three private maternities in Nhach City.

In 1972, the GVN allocated $5 million to construct a Maternity-Dispensary in Kien Le District and family planning clinics on Phu Quoc Island and in three district towns.
It should be noted, as stated by previous mission members, but even more so in 1972, that "the Vietnamese are capable of caring for their own people." They are doing well with the facilities and resources available to them. Still problems remain where districts' efforts are hampered by insufficient medical supplies, inadequate electricity, water, and honest and well-paid personnel.

**EDUCATION**

Although some successes have occurred in the education field, its most noteworthy characteristic seems to be its ability to just endure. The education system seems to have stagnated rather than progressed. A few glimmers of hope in the field of education can be attributed to areas the Ministry has not assumed responsibility for. Specifically, the Ministry of Education no longer involves itself in school construction and classroom repair. It is in these areas, where Villages assume responsibility, that education success has been made. In those fields where the Ministry maintains its jurisdiction, such as teacher training, teacher hiring, and teacher placement, there has been almost no progress over the past two years. In 1971, no teacher training courses were held. Only eight of the 22 authorized daily-hire teachers actually began teaching and not only was there an increase of fewer than 10 teachers over the previous school year, little effort was spent in reopening the schools in newly pacified areas. In 1972, the Ministry decided to use 66 positions to promote lower-paid teachers presently employed. Of the 66 remaining slots, none will be filled before the third or fourth month of the school year. It is very indicative, they will be not recruited before 1973. Although there was a refresher course this year, there will be no training for the 66 new teachers, nor for the 30 Red Cadremen and 40 Red soldiers drafted as teachers this year.

The field of secondary education has required far less direct advisory attention. This is attributable to at least two sources; the better qualified and higher selectivity of High School teachers, and the more overt intervention of parents in the school's management. The Pilot Comprehensive High School Project was completed with a minimal number of problems. Considering the sophistication and newness of the idea, it remains to be seen whether the new courses and classrooms will be utilized as conceived.

**PUBLIC WORKS**

Much success has been realized in road building. Especially notable are the roads LĐ #5A and LĐ #5K which link Gia Xi and adjacent Provinces. The upgrading accomplished on these routes have made them usable all-weather roads. Also notable is the work on roads such as LĐ #3 which enhance the travel from the district towns to the provincial capital. Various culverts and related road improvement projects have also been completed to upgrade the road network.

Bridges have and continue to present a constant problem. The repair of enemy destroyed bridges is a costly and time consuming operation. The most significant bridge project undertaken has been the NGUYỄN TRỌNG ĐỨC bridge, costing approximately 45 million piasters. Work was begun on the bridge in July 1971, and completed in May 1972.
Problem areas are many, with the major problem being lack of equipment and maintenance. The territorial size of this province tends to hamper construction and equipment movement is very time consuming. Additional equipment would alleviate this problem greatly. The maintenance of equipment is poor, with lack of repair parts being the major cause. Often parts must be secured from Saigon, which means excess down time for the piece of equipment.

**Example Development and Domestic Production:** There has been a noticeable improvement in the past eighteen months. This province exports a great number of commodities such as, rice, fish, meac mam, pepper, charcoal, tram wood, salt and lime. Rice production has risen steadily with the reclamation of large tracts of land, the planting of improved varieties and double cropping. Even with the severe restrictions imposed on the coastal fishing grounds, the province provides 45% of the Saigon market needs. Besides the export of fresh and salt water fish to Saigon and other Delta provinces, Kien Giang Province exports shrimp to Thailand. The one significant element of the fishing industry has been the area of fish processing. Although the traditional fish preserving methods have increased with fish production, more new techniques have been developed. Moreover, the small advancements in the field of fish processing have not met with any degree of success.

Black pepper production has decreased by almost 50% since 1968. However, the loss of production has been matched by a corresponding rise in the price. There is more than enough interest in the cultivation of pepper, but areas best suited for its development do not possess adequate security.

Salt production is of marginal value because of its low grade; however, it is an important ingredient in the preservation of fish. It also offers a source of income in areas where the soil condition does not permit agriculture or industrial production.

The lime industry is located in the northern part of the province, and is used mostly for cement. A small cottage industry has been established using lime for various uses. Even after several false starts, the production of agricultural lime has not gotten off the ground.

The income producing products have improved the overall economic position of the province. This can be readily seen in building construction, technical improvements of fishing boats, mechanization in agriculture, enlargement of businesses, warehouses, and ice plants.

**Implementation:** From the implementation of the Land-to-the-Famer program in mid-1970, Kien Giang Province has continued to expand the application/distribution process into newly pacified areas. Although the program stalled briefly in mid-1971, the program made up for lost time when a new Province Land Affairs Chief was appointed. The new chief first devoted himself to improving the operation of the Province Office, and a streamlining of the processing procedures. Primarily because of this initial emphasis, the number of applications rejected for errors has been sharply reduced, compensation dossiers are no longer delayed, and a corresponding increase in the amount of paperwork is processed each month. The 1970 and 1971 LIFF province goals were exceeded, and with only three months into this year, the service has two-fifths of the work completed. This was accomplished with increased pressure from enemy units in many areas where LIFF is most active.
Domestic Production: See Economic Development

Labor: Khanh Chai's military recruitment requirements leave a general shortage of manpower in the Province. The fact that more skilled laborers are needed is indicated by the slow and inefficient manner in which many jobs are accomplished. The diverse employment opportunities for unskilled labor in and around the city of Khanh Chai guarantees a low rate of unemployment and a fairly constant daily-average-wage. The demands of the fishing and agriculture industries on the labor force seem to have more of a negative effect on other areas of industry and commerce than any other single cause. There are numerous labor unions and associations, mostly in Khanh Chai City and two confederations of labor organizations. Although there have been attempts to involve unions in the political process, little success has been achieved since most political activity is motivated by a few leaders rather than the general membership. The labor force itself possesses some semi-skilled and skilled labor, almost all of which were trained by serving some sort of apprenticeship in their particular field. This is especially true in the fishing industry, in which about fifteen percent of the population is involved. Vocational training courses are offered by at least three institutions—Social Welfare Service, the technical high school, and Nguyen Trung Truc High School. Most learning, however, continues to come from on-the-job-training.

Youth Affairs: This government function is undergoing a resurgence of interest in 1971, under the leadership of a new Service Chief. The 1971 program was characterized by liberal donations of All funds, and a generally lethargic attitude on the part of the community. There is an intricate structure of youth organizations in Province, most of which are sponsored by the various religious organizations. Other than some formal representative gatherings, however, little coordination and cooperation between these groups has been accomplished. Some improvement was noted after the recent enemy offensive, when youth groups began gathering relief contributions, aiding in the refugee centers, and assisting in home reconstruction. There is a strong indication of community support for such groups, especially in the field of organized sports. The Chinese Community, in particular, remains a relatively untapped source of potential support, although they have contributed in the past to youth and sports activities. Unfortunately this minority group was forced into a passive role by political intrigues several years ago.

Public Administration: All of the 40 villages and 205 hamlets in the Province have held elections. There are seven additional hamlets waiting for approval from Saigon to hold elections; three in Dien Khanh District, two in Dien An District, one in Dien Tan District and one in Dien Le District. All elections have been temporarily postponed by Saigon since May because of poor security in some areas.

Presently, there are eight villages with 100% fiscal self-sufficiency, 12 with 50% and nine with 25%. However, some villages were not able to pay all their officials in FY 1971.
In 1971, there were 304 village and hamlet officials trained at Vung Tau and 743 at province level. In 1972, Gen. Vang's goal for Training Village and Hamlet Officials is 349 at the Vung Tau Training Center, and 1,100 locally, thus far 60 officials have received training at Vung Tau and 331 have received in-province training. In May of this year, training at Vung Tau was postponed due to the incursion from North Vietnam.

For future planning, the training program at Vung Tau should be reviewed in view of the unfavorable criticisms it received by many Village and Hamlet officials last year. The most frequent complaints were: transportation from province to Vung Tau in an overcrowded open truck, insufficient per diem, and poor living conditions existing at the Training Center.

Psxop: 1971 saw a sharp increase in the ineptitude of operations carried out by the Vietnamese Information Service, as the withdrawal of military funding and support revealed the underlying inefficiency of VIL organization. Structured in an unfortunate simulation of a centralized French bureaucracy, VIL appeared more adept at generating staff conferences and reports than at repairing equipment and maintaining operational control over the widely dispersed, unmotivated, and poorly trained field cadres.

Political warfare, by contrast, registered a steady improvement in 1971 and 1972, as the newly trained Xua. we company and staff acquired their Xua. we equipment and embarked upon a full range and schedule of operations. The cultural drama team visited outposts and villages where they were welcomed by both military and civilian audiences. The Fayvar/Civic action platoon carried out distribution of Catholic Relief clothing in joint operations with the Social Welfare Service and Public Health Service units. Much-needed civic action operations were carried out in the Tan cong Village area, where refugees were encouraged to resettle what had previously been a VC-controlled territory. Xua. we's greater success can be attributed to its smaller, more efficient and mobile organization, and to the fact that military discipline and control made the Xua. we Loc and company responsive to changing tactical situations and sector requirements. VIL, by contrast, tended to remain rather inflexible to requirements passed down by SAG. It is hoped that the 1972 CW/L Plan, which calls for the reorganization of XIL into district mobile information teams, will alleviate the inefficiency and rigidity of the present structure. If the GUGRA District Chiefs can be prodded to provide adequate command emphasis and direction to these teams, a great improvement in Psxop effectiveness will result.

Other:

Miscellaneous: In 1971, a fund of 60,000,000 VND was allocated to construct 150 houses for Disabled Veterans in each City. Only 136 were built because of inflation. Although the contract should have included water and electricity to be installed, these items were omitted. To rate, the houses do not have these essentials. Four water
faucets have been provided outside the housing unit and power lines extended to the site, but no hookup has been made. The Province Chief is aware of these problems and has made a request for additional funds from Saigon which has been denied. Additionally, the area around the housing unit is full of holes. Recently, a child drowned by falling into a moat which surrounds the cluster of units. Presently, there are only 90 families occupying the village on a full-time basis; 35 families have illegal vending stalls located near the bus station and do not live at the housing area. Furthermore, five housing units are being utilized for facilities other than housing, such as, one dormitory, one maternity, one office and two conference rooms. The unauthorized use of these housing units deprives 40 needy disabled Veterans houses in which to live.

The above situation is unfortunate and appears to be beyond the control of the Province Chief to rectify. He is acutely aware of the possibility of an explosive political situation in dealing with dissatisfied war Veterans. For future planning, a survey should be conducted of all Disabled Veterans Villages in country to bring them up to standard before any new programs are initiated. For example, why give up to 60,000 VVN each to several thousand Disabled Veterans as proposed in the 1972 Civilian Plan, when the 1971 housing program for Disabled Veterans in many Provinces, including Bien Giang, is substandard.
1. REPORT TITLE

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11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

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