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13 November 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Colonel George G. Tucker, Jr.,
Senior Advisor, Quang Nam and An Giang Province, 12 Jan 71 -
11 Jul 72 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) 2 July 1971.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Colonel George G. Tucker, Jr.,
subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
FIRST REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
CIVIL OPERATIONS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT
QUANG NAM PROVINCE, TEAM 15
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

MACFR-QNA-PSA

9 June 1972

SUBJECT: Completion of Tour Report
(RGS: MACV CORDS 174.01)

HEADQUARTERS
MACV
ATTN: MACCORDS (AC of S, CORDS)

Attached is completion of Tour Report submitted by Colonel George G.
Tucker Jr, PSA Quang Nam Province.

GEORGE G. TUCKER, JR
COL, ADA
Province Senior Advisor

DAFD-OTT
72B013
Inclosure
Name: GEORGE G. TUCKER JR.
Grade: Colonel
SSAN: 579-24-7436
Branch of Service: Army
Province: Quang Nam and An Giang.
Inclusive dates of tour: 12 January 1971 - 11 July 1972
Expected reassignment date: 11 July 1972
Previous tour in Vietnam: 11 April 1965 - 10 April 1966
Assignment on previous Vietnam tour: Plans officer, Military Assistance Program Directorate, Hq MACV.
CTR, TUCKER, GEORGE C. JR, USA Quang Nam

SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position? Twenty three years Military Service with a previous tour in Viet Nam.

2. What training did you have for this position? Thirty three weeks training, including language training, at the Foreign Service Institute during 1970. Additionally a nine week psychological operation's course in 1965 prior to my first tour.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position? I am not convinced that the amount of language training offered during the FSA course is necessary. The time is insufficient for fluency and the availability of interpreters has made fluency in Vietnamese unnecessary. I do believe that considerably more depth in country programs would have been useful.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position? Not less than eighteen months.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? By and large support has been satisfactory.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? None insofar as US support is concerned. By and large, all VN programs suffer from late support. The single most significant program suffering from lack of VN support is the Return to Village program. This includes a lack of official support as well as financial support. It is my belief that the RTV program with its associated expansion in security, offers the most promising hope for increased pacification in Quang Nam Province.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? Established field reports together with spot reporting adequately provide for reporting appropriate information. The reduction and consolidation of report requirements over the past year and a half have somewhat lessened the burden on the reduced province team, however, teams are still plagued by requests for one time reports that are becoming more difficult to satisfy.
8. Do the MACORDS management information system field reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification programs? In general, present reports provide a reasonable measurement of progress. I do feel somewhat apprehensive about those reports that are being turned over to the Vietnamese - specifically the RES and TFES. There are indications that pressure from the top is coloring the validity of the reports.

9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? No comment.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:
   1. Village Self Development
   2. Social Welfare
   3. Land Reform

11. The most effective paramilitary forces are:
   1. FRU
   2. Field Police
   3. PSDF with limited effectiveness.

12. The most successful pacification programs are:
   1. Return to Village - with or without tangible government support
   2. Village Self Development
   3. Peoples Information

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:
   1. Territorial Security
   2. Social Welfare - Return to Village
   3. Village Self Development

14. The least successful pacification programs are:
   1. Phung Hoang
   2. Land Reform
   3. PSDF
15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. Land Reform

2. Youth Programs

16. The rural people are aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making. Considerable improvement in the information program is evidenced over the past several months not only by the VIS but through efforts of the Province Chief. Both the VIS Chief and the Province Chief have spent many hours personally visiting the rural areas to insure that the people are informed. The efforts on the part of village and hamlet officials, however, leave much to be desired.

17. It is presently difficult to assess whether or not the people are more or less committed to the GVN than when I assumed my job. Prior to the initiation of the current NVA offensive, there was evidence that there was increasing commitment to the GVN. There is continuing evidence of increased commitment in spite of the current situation. Development programs, particularly RTV, are continuing despite the fact funds for this program have not been received. I consider this a sign of confidence in the government and its capability to provide security.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and development of Vietnam? I believe the plan to be adequate, however, guidance is invariably tardy requiring hurried implementation resulting in poor coordination between the many government agencies. Even after the plan is finalised and ready for implementation, programs suffer late initiation due to late receipt of assets.

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately explained to you and your counterpart? Yes, however, such is not the case for other province officials. Generally, guidance is late in coming requiring submission of province plans without complete understanding on the part of province officials.
CTR, TUCKER, GEORGE G. JR, PSA Quang Nam

SECTION III
FUNCTIONAL AREAS

TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

1. **RF/PF**: As free world forces drew down the Regional/Popular forces have become the main fighting force in the province during my tour. Although plagued with the perennial problems of insufficient leaders, lack of heavy equipment, and minimal support, these forces have proved themselves capable of successfully engaging NVA line Battalions at a very favorable kill ratio. There have been several cases where PF units have checked and held NVA Battalions while air and artillery decimated them.

   There have also been instances of both RF and PF counter attacks with outstanding results. There are still three significant problems remaining in the RF/PF area: First, insufficient leadership in both officer/NCO ranks; Second, too large a share of RF units remain in a semi-static role; Third, RF/PF forces enjoy too low a priority for air and logistical support in view of their increased responsibilities in this Province.

   Actions have already started to create more RF mobile striking forces. These need to be vigorously supported.

2. **PS/DF**: Interest and command emphasis continue to lag in this most critical area. Many of the PSDF are not fully trusted as witnessed by the withdrawal of weapons from a large numbers of PSDF during Tet this last year. No improvement will be seen in PSDF as long as it receives its current level of emphasis and support.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

1. **National Police**: In the past 14 months the National Police have expanded their manpower to near optimum strength. Moreover, that man-power has been assigned in a manner so that the most policemen were assigned to the places where most police services were required and during the times that those services were most needed. Concurrently, Administrative, managerial and supervisory reorganizations and training have started to develop a knowledgeable and effective cadre upon which to build a competent and successful Police department. Although slow in its development, esprit-de-corps is gradually becoming noticeable and a feeling of unit pride beginning to be felt. Many new and modern Police programs and techniques have been introduced which, upon maturation and proper training will produce a model police agency.

   In order to improve the Police service the following steps are recommended.
1. Manpower - Recruiting requirements are going to have to become more selective. Future Policemen will have to be smarter, better educated, in better health and psychologically more adaptable.

2. Advancement - Promotion is going to have only one criteria - merit. Politics is scarcely the method by which to choose supervisory personnel.

3. Any contemplation of a capable department is going to have to come to grips with the reality that the present low pay and abominable living conditions are what is basically wrong with the police. If you talk about corruption, laziness, inefficiency, dishonesty, disinterest or any of the myriad faults that can be found with the Police as a whole or with groups or individuals - you are talking basically of substandard working and living conditions. When the GVN decides that a man with a wife and three children is worth more than $26 a month - the GVN will start to get some decent policemen and good departments.

Some improvements have been made in the Police force during my tour and recently the assignment of a new Police Chief may bring more. Certainly, the climate with the Province Chief is better. Enough competent leaders will be a problem for some time to come. There is, however, a noticeable increase in Police presence in most areas of the Province. Several corrupt and inefficient Police leaders have been replaced with desirable results.

In the long-term future the police forces will become increasingly important in the Pacification effort. Continued emphasis in this critical area is mandatory.

2. National Police Field Force: Until about 7 months ago, the NPPF was a force to be reckoned with in name only. These last few months have shown a great improvement both in attitude and capabilities. The improvement has been a direct result of continued emphasis by the Province Chief and Police Chief in the area of operations. NPPF forces have been planning and executing their own operations - all over the Province on a weekly basis. In addition, they have participated in many combined operations with RF/PF forces, Phung Hoang, - Province and District Intelligence forces, and the PRU. Co-ordination and co-operation have been outstanding. While this high level of activity is fairly recent, it shows promise of continuing and contributing materially to the pacification effort.

In order to improve future field Police operations, the following steps are recommended.

1. Manpower - Chronically short (about 25%) Manpower strength must be upgraded and kept at authorized strength.

2. Duties - Too many Field Police assigned in the heavily populated areas and too many on static guard duty or performing other than field Police function.
3. The concept of platoon assignment at the District level should be changed as the war winds down. Except on combined operations, the Field Police now work independently of the traffic and order Police. Plans should now be started to integrate all forces at the village level so that all the Police work all the time and work together.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE

1. Village Self Development: Although central government funding of the Village Self Development program is due to be wound up at the end of this year, the investment still to be channeled by the program is considerable. As our role involves monitoring the execution of village projects already approved, the community development section must be more active in spot reporting their management, construction, province acceptance and, finally, usefulness to the people when completed. Such reporting should make possible identifying patterns of misdirected execution which, taken together, undermine the success of the program and should be pressed to the attention of the Province Chief and the appropriate persons at the Pacification and Development Council level.

As our role may still involve offering advice on planning, a concerted effort must be made by the development division and the senior advisor to achieve first priority for optimal usage of projects already completed. The program is not a success because "X" number of VSD projects have been completed in "X" number of villages, but because projects are being used to create a significantly better quality of life for the greatest number of local people. Where this priority points to using funds for repairing damaged projects, completing those not finished with funds already provided, or supplying personnel, staffing, or other missing features required for maximum usage, every effort should be made to persuade province officials to act accordingly, given certain unavoidable requirements placed on usage of VSD funds. Similarly, some effort must be made to encourage careful village selection of projects. The role of PD cadre is critical in assuring that, on the one hand, a dispensary or information station if built will be maximally useful and more so than other possibilities, and that, on the other hand, if useful, a project is not rejected simply because the country people do not understand how it will help their families.

The importance of adequately informing, and perhaps training, village officials to understand the procedures and the possibilities of the funding must continue to be emphasized. Almost invariably mobile teams have encountered some misunderstanding among local officials which had led to missing an opportunity the village planners had wanted; if they had only known. While the performance of the development and administration PDATs has been very good, the brief nature of their visits and extensive demands for follow-up prevent their being adequate as the only vehicle for informing and training about VSD.
A significant and useful shift of emphasis occurred in the program during the past year; from grant to incentive-loan support of income producing projects. The aim is to make VSD almost self-supporting on a revolving fund, with repaid loans providing the next cycle's financing. In addition the new emphasis coincides with the CULD plan's efforts to make localities and the people more self-reliant. Increasingly the Agricultural Development Bank has been able to provide matching funding to the KORD and village contributions on such loan-type projects as an incentive to encourage the shift. Most loans are to be liberal short term ones without material collateral and village rural credit committees act on the applications, thus supposedly bringing the funds within reach of most farmers. The fact is, however, that often a dilemma remains. How to balance the banking need for assurance of repayment on time (necessary for the revolving nature of the program) and the development need to assure the broadest possible distribution of loans to the neediest (who may not be the best secured risks). As the basic purpose of the program is development, we should be alert to at least keep the balance from tipping to the former pressure.

A significant factor in the breakdown or delayed completion of projects, especially Category Two technical projects, has been lack of adequate technical dossiers. These are to be prepared by the concerned province service chiefs under the coordination of the Pacification and Development Council with that of final approval of Category Two projects. With coordination there should be no lack of adequate technical preparation. At province level, we should more easily be able to continually spotlight the fault.

In our own house the training of competent Vietnamese successor to the VSD advisor must be pursued more systematically.

On the whole the potential of VSD is possibly the greatest means the central government has of winning the confidence and support of the rural population of Vietnam. The past year saw important strides in pacification and development with VSD contributing much; it can contribute more.

The rural credit program has had rather mixed results, on the whole unimpressive. It is closely associated with VSD, as funding made available under the latter program is divided almost entirely at the discretion of the village between village projects and rural credit for loans. Only about thirty of eighty eligible villages committed part of their VSD fund to rural credit and, of all funding available for credit, only sixty-four percent was actually loaned out. We have commented on the dilemma of "banking" needs versus "development" needs for loan programs; the same applies to rural credit. Similarly, our comment on informing and training village officials to understand the procedures and possibilities is applicable.
To the extent that lack of logistic support and personnel for the Agricultural Development Bank contributed to weaken the program, the PDPC should be able to remedy the lack. To the extent that security problems of the current offensive increase fear and the reluctance to risk loans and investments, this development concern, as all others, must wait on some measure of military success.

2. Rural Development Cadre: While the future of the rural development cadrean has been in some doubt ever since the program came completely under Viet-namese direction, we have a commitment to the concept will continue. The impact of these cadre has been useful and, with adequate training of the cadre as well as interest at province and central government levels, it can be more useful.

Under the redeployment of March, 1972, village groups of three to twenty-three cadre are created depending on population and disregarding HES ratios. They are effectively the representatives of the PDPC and responsible to the village chief for the success of development programs, especially VSD and rural credit.

Within our own house again, the training of a Vietnamese to take over from our outgoing RD Cadre advisor requires more attention.

3. Ethnic Minorities: There are only 68 recognized ethnic groups in this province who are wards of the state. They are adequately provided for but no effort is being made to improve their lot.

4. Public Administration/Local Government: The PDAT concerned with administration and finance has been as active as its development counterpart. It has contributed to improving the administrative management capability of local officials, as well as the frequency of contact between province and village officials. Generally, however, the team has concentrated on rather secure villages, primarily along National Highway 1.

In the aftermath of the enemy offensive, the central government froze local governments in place so many scheduled elections were postponed.

No changes were made regarding goals for self-sufficiency set out for 1972, in spite of the extended disruption caused by the enemy offensive. Nevertheless, it is felt that most villages will be able to carry the increased burden of self-financing by the end of the plan year.

Major emphasis will continue on pressuring local governments to fully collect legitimate taxes due to the central government and to become strong proponents of land reform distribution, including communal lands for which villages can be reimbursed for lost revenues.

5. Aid in Kind: No comment.
Most refugees in Quang Nam during the past year had been generated within the province, often even in the district where they now reside, until the current enemy offensive. As a result of the invasion of the northern provinces, people from Quang Tri and Thua Thien constituted about half of the total number which approaches fifteen thousand refugees altogether. The number of these persons from out of province and the decreased security situation caused by enemy offensive activities has temporarily slowed the Return to Village program and necessitated more refugee camp support and resettlement efforts.

The response of the province services has been good both in the past year and in the current response to the offensive. The Flood Relief Committee charged with relieving victims of the typhoon in 1971 also worked hard and well, assisting in making recovery time in this province very short.

That all but five of sixty eight refugee sites from 1965 through March, 1972 had been "localized" is a creditable achievement; it means that the displaced persons were either returned to village or integrated into the local economy of their new area of settlement. However, close scrutiny of the result of localization in fact should continue to be an objective for us, in order to assure that this achievement is not merely the doling out of some roofing tin and money and then forgetting these persons in their new settlement. Integration into a local economy can be extremely difficult and requires ongoing support and encouragement.

Some significant dissatisfaction on the part of veterans with the constructed housing compound provided them outside Hoi An suggests a flat payment for housing may be more effective.

A disappointing failure occurred in the termination of the school lunch program in which it was attempted to bring very strictly controlled Food For Peace assistance into wider application in province. The recommendation of the advisory team for a limited experimental program was changed into one covering too many schools and too many bakers, with the result that the high degree of monitoring required by the strict regulations of PL 480 could not be handled. Better coordination on the part of region advisors and the team would have helped, but it may be questionable whether the sharply limited staff of our present team can be expected to perform the amount of monitoring required to satisfy the congressional demands embodied in the law. Before such a program is reconsidered, a basic evaluation of what it contributes versus what it costs in personnel hours must be made.
CHIEU-HOI DIRECTORATE

Chieu Hoi Program: The Chieu Hoi program is one of the better programs in the province. The Chieu Hoi Service Chief is an extremely competent individual and is a hard worker. Although there were only 89 Hoi Chanhs during the 1971 CIDP Plan Year, the program was active and enjoyed excellent PSYOP support. The Armed Propaganda Team (APT) personnel who operated in direct support of the Chieu Hoi Program usually performed in an outstanding manner. In some instances, APT personnel attached to District Intelligence Control Centers (DIOCCs) were not too active. Reportedly there was a reluctance to use them in operations because of their former VC status. There were 75 Hoi Chanhs during the first three months of the 1972 CIDP Plan Year. This is attributed in part to careful explanations to the people of GVN Instruction 3096, 29 October 1971, which was directed toward low level VCI. Hard living conditions and a desire to rejoin their families were the major reasons for rallying. Radio broadcasts and face-to-face communications were the most effective media. The Province Chieu Hoi Service is Vietnamized; however, its continued success is dependent upon the current Chieu Hoi Service Chief, there is no depth at the Province level.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

1. Report Requirements: With the reduction in reporting requirements over the past year and a half, the work load does not place an undue burden on the present ranking level of the team.

2. Report Feedback: By and large, feedback on recurring reports is excellent. Such is not the case for special reports in that virtually no feedback is received.

PHOENIX DIRECTORATE

Phung Hoang: During the early part of my tour Phung Hoang was an operation in name only despite heavy advisor emphasis. - During the last three months, due to emphasis by the Province Chief, Phung Hoang operations have increased significantly. Soon, the Phung Hoang operation will be under the direct supervision of the National Police. It remains to be seen whether or not this will bring improvement. As long as the Province Chief takes a personal interest in the program, operations will continue.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

1. Public Health: Although the efforts of province medical personnel, both military and civilian, have been outstanding, there is still no systematically coordinated health care system capable of meeting basic needs right down to the hamlet level. The province hospital is able to meet the demands placed on it, but district dispensaries are short of personnel and more critically short of medical supplies. There are difficulties yet in coordinating transport of supplies in regular sufficient quantities, but more
significantly the province medical staff complains that Saigon simply does not supply enough consistently. This supply has, however, increased markedly after the enemy offensive to cope with increased patient loads, although some basic supplies such as cotton and bandages are still deficient.

Training for health cadre (two months) and rural midwives (twelve months) is now conducted at a province training center in the Hoi An Hospital. These long lead-in times require better coordination for projects which are planned and built without trained staffing available at completion, causing the project to lie inactive for some time.

The three sanitary hamlets established last year continue with good success. Efforts to establish three more this year have met reluctance to see facilities built and money used which may be wasted by Vietcong attack.

Transport for evacuation of civilian casualties particularly to the central hospital in Hoi An continues to be a serious problem.

2. Education: Although construction of schools has been among the most important of VSD projects, a shortage of teachers generally and in specific locations with particular problems has continued to be a problem, though the general aspect is less serious.

Significant accomplishments were the assumption of control by MOE of the school for the blind and a former military school. Yet the lack of coordination by a single office has continued to prevent a cohesive system of education and administrative improvement from emerging. Social Welfare, Central Province and Development Council, VSD, Province Council and the Ministry of Education all have a hand in the pot. Such specific problems as lack of coordinating the timing of construction with personnel staffing result. We should press a recommendation that one official, such as the service chief for education, be charged with coordinating the entirety.

3. Public Works: Within the limitations of their own engineering capacity, province public works officials effectively established priorities and pursued them. Projects of the past year were completed by the end of the plan year and planning for the current year was begun in timely fashion.

The primary tasks have been repair of sabotaged bridges, culverts and roads, with emphasis on the following routes: National Highway 1; Route 538, from Highway 1 to Hoi An; Route 535, from Highway 1 to Que Son; Route 540 in Hieu Duc and Dai Loc districts.

The significant lines of communication remaining out of general use due to insecurity are Route 7, from Dien Ban to Thuong Duc (a vital east-west communication) and Route 13 C from Hoi An to Marble Mountain (Danang).
Very little has been accomplished in land clearing, both as a result of security conditions and the decreased engineering capability caused by withdrawal of U.S. Army units.

4. Agriculture/Land Reform: The past year was generally successful for crop production, with the province holding its own on the balance of native versus imported rice supplies. Production increased and newer IR rice formed an increased proportion of the total. The animal husbandry program was not so successful and suffered adversely from several causes, including the autumn typhoon and changes in the VSD program relating to livestock raising projects. Fisheries production increased well over its goal.

Prices rose but not nearly as much as the previous year in farm products and non food items. The prices of processed foods, entirely imported, rose considerably more than the previous year.

The province Model Farm completed several significant projects and sold demonstration crops equal to about one third the value of grants to the farm. Consideration should be given to whether the "availability" of the farm to village officials, and perhaps farmers in general, can be increased: for example, through owning branches, disbursing more and diversified experimental seed crops or plots through the province and encouraging more tours of the farm itself.

Results in land reform in this region generally have been less impressive than in the delta region of Vietnam and this province is no exception. Promotion of distributing land titles to the tiller has met with reluctance and resistance which is not unique to private owners and officials but true of tenants as well. Information programs will have to be designed to treat land use patterns and attitudes, as they have developed in Central Vietnam and emphasize especially the groundlessness of certain fears on the part of village officials and of tenants. Ownership without harassment or retaliation for the tenant and reimbursement to villages distributing title to lands from which villages were drawing particular revenues are two of the most important reassurances needed.

5. Youth Affairs: Despite the continuing efforts of our advisor, the service chief concerned with promoting programs for young people cannot be motivated and is not sufficiently interested to pursue actively what he puts on paper.

JOINT UNITED STATES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

Psychological Operations: Psychological Operations in the province have suffered from the lack of a gravitating force to sustain them. The major operators include the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), the Sector S-5, the Sector Political Warfare (POLWAR) Company, and the POLWAR element of the National Police. During the past year there has been a gradual improvement in cooperation among these agencies as well as among other supported and supporting agencies. The Province VIS Chief exhibited outstanding initiative after hostilities began on 30 March 1972. The Sector S-5 and
the Sector POLMAR Company have responded well with PSYOP and Civic action following enemy action. The Quang Nam People's Information Committee resumed operations in May 1972 which gave impetus to PSYOP/Information programs. The potential of VIS PSYOP/Information programs is unlimited. The possibilities are recognized by the Vietnamese, but motivation is frustrated by lack of means. Ingenuity could be applied to a greater extent were materials with which to improvise more readily available. Tactical PSYOP at Province level has been hindered by lack of equipment and low priority, versus that of the ARVN, of loudspeaker and leaflet support by higher headquarters. Increased funding and material support for VIS and POLMAR at province level would greatly assist their operations.

George F. Tucker, Jr.
COL, ADA
Province Senior Advisor
### Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel George G. Tucker Jr.) - Senior Advisor, Province Quang Nam and An Giang - Inclusive Dates 12 January 1971 - 11 July 1972

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Colonel George G. Tucker Jr.

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<th>9b. Other Report No(s) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N/A)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. Distribution Statement</th>
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<tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. Supplementary Notes</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. Sponsoring Military Activity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DA, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
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