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AUTHORITY
AGO ltr 11 Jun 1980

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

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DAAG-PAP-A (M) (25 Oct 72) DAFD-OTT

10 November 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: LTC Cecil K. Simmons, Deputy Senior Advisor, Dinh Tuong Province, 6 Dec 70 - 8 Jul 72

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) 2 July 1971.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of LTC Cecil K. Simmons, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as a result of subject report should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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as

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8 July 1972

SUBJECT: Province Advisor's Completion of Tour Report (RCS: MACCORDS 174.01)

HQ MACV
ATTN: MACCORDS (Director for CORDS)
APO 96222

1. Transmitted herewith is the Completion of Tour Report of LTC Cecil K. Simmons, Deputy Province Senior Advisor, Dinh Tuong Province.

2. LTC Simmons will depart My Tho on 3 July and be in Saigon during the period 4-7 July.

[Signature]
WALLACE F. SCHNEE
LTC, AGC
Adjutant

Copy furnished:
DEFCORDS/DRAC
SECTION I

NAME: Cecil K. Simmons

GRADE: Lieutenant Colonel

SSN: 465503580

BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army Infantry

PROVINCE: Dinh Tuong

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 6 December 1970 - 8 July 1972

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 8 July 1972

PREVIOUS TOUR(S) IN VIETNAM (DATES - INCLUSIVE): 6 April 1964 - 5 April 1965

ASSIGNMENT ON PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR(S):

a. 6 April - 12 November 1964: Infantry Battalion Senior Advisor, 2d Bn, 11th Regt, 7th ARVN Div.

b. 13 Nov 64 - 4 Apr 65: Assistant G3 Advisor, 7th ARVN Div.
SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?
   b. Attendance at the Province Senior Advisor's Course, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, Washington, DC, February - October 1970.

2. What training did you have for this position?
   Attendance at the Province Senior Advisor's Course, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, Washington, DC, February - October 1970.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?
   None

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?
   Two years, if family at safehaven post.
   Three years, if family in-country.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies.
   Overall support was satisfactory. However, generator repair, mail and Stars and Stripes receipt gave us daily headaches.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?
   I can not recall any program being delayed because of lack of support. The program that was most successful due to readily available support from higher headquarters (especially DEFCORDS/DRAC) was the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) conducted in Dinh Tuong Province, in three phases, from 2 November 1971 to 6 April 1972. This program resulted in over 174 square kilometers of former VC mini-bases cleared and 18,439 mines/booby-traps neutralized. The APC was temporarily suspended on 7 April 1972 due to the current NVA offensive. However, due to the successes achieved during the APC, the NVA offensive was severely limited; mainly because former haven areas and comms-liaison routes were effectively denied to them.
7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?

Yes.

8. Do the MACORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification programs?

It is difficult to measure pacification progress in terms of statistical requirements (e.g., HES, TFES). The two provinces that come to mind most clearly are Binh Long and Quang Tri. I also know the HES is only a "management tool" but try and explain that to a District or Province Chief. In my opinion the most accurate measure of pacification progress is the objective opinion of the Province Senior Advisor. As everyone knows, his opinions are not formed on the spur of the moment, but are the distillation of all his staff's input and his own observations. Basically this boils down to the Monthly Province Report (RCS: MACORDS 31.OI R3). This highly-readable, short report is the best indicator of pacification progress. Reason: statistics can be interpreted and trends identified and analyzed.

9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

Generally speaking instructions were clear.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:

   a. Land Reform
   b. Social Welfare
   c. Public Works

11. The most effective para military forces are:

    a. National Police/National Police Field Branch
    b. Kit Carson Scouts
    c. Rural Development Cadre

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

    a. RP/PF recruiting
    b. Operations base improvement program
    c. National Police
13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:

   a. RF/PF recruiting
   b. Operations base improvement program
   c. National Police

14. The least successful pacification programs are:

   a. People's Organizations
   b. Youth and Sports

15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:

   a. Food for Peace
   b. Youth and Sports
   c. People's Organizations

16. The rural people (are) aware of the pacification efforts the GVW and US are making. If not, how can they be informed?

   The rural population is aware of the pacification efforts the GVW is making. This is evidenced by the fact that they see concrete examples of their government providing goods and services on a more frequent basis. For example, numerous secondary roads have been reopened to public use for the first time in 15 years. As the roads are opened, markets are built, and the people have a way to exchange their produce for other needed commodities (and eventually luxury items such as TV sets). The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), mentioned earlier, has also demonstrated to the people, and consequently made them more aware, of the GVW's pacification efforts.

17. The people, as you know them, are committed to the GVW than when you assumed your job. Why?

   The people are more committed to the GVW now because of the following reasons:

   a. Extension of territorial security over most of the province, especially in the three eastern districts.

   b. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign's successes in clearing former VC mini-bases thereby effectively denying large areas to the VC/NVA.

   c. The effective employment of program such as land reform and return-to-village payments.

   d. The extensive upgrading of the secondary road network throughout the province.

   - 4 -
e. A concerned, willingness to become involved attitude of GVN officials at all levels.

f. They want to be on the winning side.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam? (Yes) ☑️ If no, what change in the plan should be made?

Yes. I have had an opportunity to read the 1970 plan and become intimately involved in advising and assisting in the preparation of the 1971 and 1972-75 plans. Most of the goals were met in 1971. And, if 85-90% of the goals are met in 1972, and the succeeding years of the current plan, there will be definite gains in the overall developmental process in Vietnam.

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart? (Yes) ☑️ If not, how can this be accomplished?

Generally yes. There was a delay getting concrete guidance to prepare the 72-75 plan. The '72 year started on March 1st but definitive guidance was not received until May. Hopefully the current concept of preparing a multi-year plan will alleviate the extremely short-time frame the province had to prepare the 1971 plan and to a lesser degree the current plan.

SECTION III

TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

RF/PF: Three significant areas are called to mind concerning RF/PF. First, RF/PF recruiting (including special campaigns) have been so startlingly successful (especially of late) that both RF and PF units are approaching 95% of authorized strength (including trainees). This is due in large part to the efforts of the Province Chief, the District Chiefs, the Unit Commanders and civilian government officials. The aforementioned individuals have also stressed the morale and esprit de corps of individuals and units thereby inspiring the units onto greater tactical successes.

Second, there are now over 20 mobile RF companies in the province (out of a total of 65). These mobile units are not restricted to any one single district but are employed province-wide. This alone has contributed, in several cases, to a significant victory being attained over the VC/NVA.

Third, the overall combat effectiveness of the RF/PF is absolutely remarkable. Day after day, night after night, these units are on combat operations. And to those critics who think they won't fight I say "go to the hospitals and see for yourself".
Finally, I have observed over a period of 18 months, an almost revolutionary change in the territorial forces. It is a soldier's delight to see them effectively use airpower and artillery fire combined with maneuver to destroy the enemy. Years ago this was ARVN's mission, now it is accomplished by RF/PF units.

PSDF: Basically all goals of the PSDF program have been met. The strength of the program, in my estimation, is a commitment on the part of an individual to become involved, in some way, in support of his country. In Dinh Tuong (including My Tho City), over 47,000 combat and over 106,000 support PSDF have been organized and 17,600 weapons issued. That amounts to 153,000 people out of 607,000 (total population) that have stepped forward to serve. How effective is the program? I don't know for sure; but I do know that if these 153,000 people were not committed to the GVN, a certain percentage would be committed to some other movement.

Presently, the PSDF situation is in somewhat of a "dither" and will not be settled down until the current draft laws are well established and enforced.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

National Police Field Branch: NPFB platoons are deployed in each of the seven districts. Significantly during one campaign (the X.23 campaign directed against the VCI) several NPFB platoons were employed in Sam Giang District. The operation lasted about one month and produced very good results. Overall all the NPFB units are performing well.

National Police Operations: A very bright spot in this province, due mainly to a very competent, aggressive Province Police Chief. Strength hovers around 3000 (3136 authorized). Police now operate in all villages and My Tho City. Their operations are characterized by a professional dedication to duty that is highly commendable.

High points:

1. Fifty-four police are assigned to the traffic control section and are assigned to control traffic in the heavy traffic areas of My Tho City.

2. There are 43 policemen assigned to "beat" patrols in My Tho City. They patrol regular "beats".

3. Combined patrols (NP, QCs ,RF/PF/PSDF) have been employed effectively throughout the province to assist in maintaining law and order.

4. The police have an effective narcotics suppression campaign in effect. The policeman's greatest problem - controlling ARVN soldiers. ("I'm in the Army, buddy, no one fools with me").
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE

Village Self-Development. To gauge the effectiveness of VSD one has to examine the goals of the program. They are: motivate the people, promote a democratic spirit in rural areas, cause village officials to plan and manage VSD funds and projects and encourage village officials to communicate with the population and publicize the status of VSD. In large part these goals have been met. Essentially, then, VSD has provided an excellent means for developing the capability and responsiveness of village officials to meet the needs and aspirations of the rural population. Progress in 1971 was 185 projects approved at a cost of 40,014,255$VN (this included 37 classrooms currently being used by 4,000 students - two classes per day).

RD Cadre. Overall a very effective program. Dinh Tuong is authorized 691 and has 456 assigned. Significantly, they have assisted in the administration and organization of 33 village and 97 hamlet elections. Additionally, they are now providing support in the VSD, Phung Hoang, Village/Hamlet officials training and People's Information programs. Presently they are not allowed to recruit new members. However new directives are forthcoming that should clarify the RD situation.

Ethnic Minorities. Not applicable.

Local Government. Local government officials continue to display improvement. Overall they are a stabilizing influence on the local population. They have performed extremely well in recruiting campaigns, VSD and Phung Hoang. The training and re-training courses they have attended have begun to show a cumulative effect. I predict their continued improvement and an increase in their performance and acceptance of responsibility.

Assistance in Kind. A bright spot in our overall advisory effort. Never doled out as a gift but used on high-impact projects. The funds were used to construct bridges, village/hamlet offices and classrooms, just to name a few. Due primarily to Team 66's intelligent use of AID the monthly quota was increased two times since January 1972 alone.

REFUGEE DIRECTORATE

Refugee. We were never faced with a refugee problem during my tenure. However, the province officials (and advisors) have plans that could be implemented if the problem ever arose.

Social Welfare. This province is very fortunate in having an outstanding Social Welfare Service Chief. He travels extensively throughout the province, coordinates with district officials and has the interests of the people at heart. Some of the accomplishments since January 1972:

1. Twenty-two RTV projects approved.
2. 35,256,000$VN paid to RTV families (total amount approved 37,513,000$VN).
3. 179 War Victim families were paid 2,169,800$VN.
4. The War Veterans' housing project was completed.

Overall a very effective program.
CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

Chieu Hoi. The Hoi Chanh rallying rate has fallen drastically since the NVA offensive started in April. However, the program continues to provide a valuable source of information (former VC). In 1971 605 rallied to the GV and to date 133 have rallied. Of late, Chieu Hoi activities have focused on the "Mother's Heart" Campaign and the goals as outlined in the COLD Plan. The APTs have been used effectively (normally coordinated by the DIOCCs) across the province. Additionally the Chieu Hoi Center has been greatly improved.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

Report Requirements. No comment.

Report Feedback. No comment.

PHUNG HOANG DIRECTORATE

Phung Hoang. Soon to be completely under the sponsorship of the National Police, this program should pick up steam. Considering all, it has progressed remarkably well. It is not an American program, as some claim, but a GV program, and will work only so long as it is viewed from that point of view. Significantly, since January there have been 327 VCI neutralizations; 29 of these were province- and district-level cadre. There have been numerous other special campaigns that have netted good VCI results - F.6 campaign (451 people detained; 100 of these sentenced to six month terms or more), and the X.23 campaign (64 VCI neutralizations). The program should continue to show steady improvement under the direction of the National Police. The program still needs advisory effort and I feel that the Public Safety Advisor must become more involved in the program.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Public Health. Innumerable maternities and dispensaries have been built province wide. There has not always been a trained mid-wife or a public health worker available to immediately staff the installation. But some individual always is found to run it, until the trained personnel take over. The province hospital has made tremendous strides in the support it provides the population (the PHILCONV has made significant accomplishments in this area also). For example, the new TB clinic was opened in April 1972. The admissions/disposition building was completed in February 1972 - eliminating, over-crowding. Both projects received advisory support.

Education. A most important program and one that has received a great deal of advisory attention. Numerous classrooms have been opened, the Agricultural High School in My Tho has been expanded, the Normal School should open about August 1972 and prospects are still bright for the establishment of the Northern Delta Community College in Minh Tuong. The major problem is the shortage of primary school teachers in the remote parts of the province.
Public Works. Another of the brightest spots in the province. Secondary roads have been reopened to public use for the first time in years. The opening of these roads will have long-lasting effects in the lives of the population. They can now get their produce to market much quicker and they can get lumber, bricks and roofing into the more remote areas much easier to build new homes. Concrete achievements are:

1. A water system in Cai Lay City.
2. An electrical power station in Cai Lay City.
3. Opened the Cho Gao bridge, on TL-24, linking Go Cong to My Tho.
4. An electrical power station in Cho Gao district town.
5. Completion of 99% of the 1971 projects in the P&D budget.
6. Untold, small high-impact projects, too numerous to mention.

Economic Development. The price index has remained relatively steady - it stands at 237 now (222 Jan). With the NVA invasion speculation abounded that hoarding of foodstuffs would take place and that prices would rise. However, these did not occur, prices did not rise which, to my way of thinking, displays considerable faith on the part of the people towards the GVn. Other examples:

1. Since 1 January 2,257 loans were made through the Rural Credit Program, totaling over 53,000,000$Vn.
2. Construction of a new bank (Bank of China) was begun in April. This brings the total for My Tho to five.
3. New businesses are opening every day on the new access highway to the My Thuan ferry site (Giao Duc District). Business sites are expensive (250,000$Vn) but this has not deterred new construction.
4. Private construction province-wide continues at a steady increase.

All of the above display a healthy confidence in the economy.

Land Reform. A very effective program. By June 1972 about 40% of the 1972 goal (20,000 ha.) had been attained. The LRS also compensated landlords to the tune of distributing over 186 million piasters of compensation checks and 1,033 million piasters of compensation bonds.

Domestic Production. As territorial security was expanded domestic production of rice, fruit, vegetables and market animals and foods increased accordingly. Dinh Tuong is primarily an agricultural economy with My Tho and Saigon being the prime markets. Domestic production continues to increase, especially as these markets demand more goods. To illustrate the above points, between January and June 1972 Dinh Tuong completed its goal of 120,000 hectares of harvested rice. Of this total 63,000 ha. was TW and 57,000 ha. was local varieties of rice. Total crop tonnage was 336,370 MT. Also the utilization
of tractors has steadily increased; there are approximately 400 two- and four-wheel tractors now in province. This swing towards mechanization (which will increase production) will continue as rice farmers become more affluent.

Labor. The labor situation in Dinh Tuong is stable. When RMK was phased out of the province there was some fear that surplus labor would abound. But this was not the case. In fact, the Labor Service made a survey of the workers, and most found new jobs almost immediately. Each month the Labor Service conducts vocational training courses in subjects such as mechanics, electronics, etc.

Youth Affairs. Formally a struggling program, until you look beneath the surface and beyond the Youth Affairs Service. Five of the seven districts have their own soccer teams; 3,500 school students have participated in a gymnastics course; there have been courses in soccer, volleyball, table tennis and badmitton; 2,150 youths have received training in judo. This all adds up to inexpensive, low-level, personal attention. Reason: very little money for youth affairs. Additionally, the Girl and Boy Scout programs are very active in the province. Finally, in my estimation, the PSDF (especially the 17 year old and younger members) is an effective adjunct to the Youth program.

Public Administration. Great gains have been made in the area of PMEs (Teams 2 and 3) and in their overall performance. The PMEs have visited numerous village governments and have provided the necessary guidance and assistance to enhance and strengthen local public administration. The establishment of a Province Export tax, a toll bridge in Cho Gao and raising the land taxes will contribute immeasurably to accomplishing self-sufficiency goals throughout the province.

JUSPAO

PSYOP. I prefer to call it the People's Information Programs. It involves PSYOPs, POLWAR, VIS and all other available assets to tell the public what the governments is trying to do for them. Very successful campaigns have been run, for example, the Phung Hoang VCI Exposure Program, Land Reform activities, and numerous special campaigns ("Mother's Heart", "The Rear Supports the Battlefront", and "Dien Hong"). All of these activities have contributed to encouraging popular support for the GVN.

[Signature]
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Lieutenant Colonel Cecil K. Simmons) - Deputy Province Senior Advisor, Dinh Tuong Province - Inclusive Date 6 Dec 1970 - 8 Jul 1972**

**Report Date**

13 October 1972

**Other Report Nos.**

N/A

**Distributing Statement**

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**Sponsoring Military Activity**

DA, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract**

Unspecified