Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies only; Test and Evaluation; 10 APR 1972. Other requests shall be referred to Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Attn: DAFD-OTT, Washington, DC 20310.

ago ltr, 29 Apr 1980
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 22d Replacement Bn, 90th Replacement Bn, Period Ending 31 Oct 71

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, they have been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command

Commandants
US Army Adjutant General School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army (DWSA)
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
(Continued on page 2)
2. Section 2: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) Observation: Beginning on 14 June 1971, this battalion was tasked with the responsibility to develop a program of identifying personnel who were heroin users/abusers. The battalion was advised that the program would commence on 20 June. On 16 June the battalion was informed the program would start on 18 June.

(a) Evaluation: The time allotted to implement a program of this magnitude was insufficient. Consequently, the Urine Collection Facility (UCF) was not completed by 18 June and the initial samples were collected in a temporary facility located in a tent on an unused helicopter pad, something less than desirable especially for the welfare of the soldier.
SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 90th Replacement Battalion
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS, CSFOR-65 (R2)

(b) Recommendation: To properly implement a drug program of this magnitude, sufficient time should be allowed to plan the operation. In addition, staff planners should continually advise and consult with the operators to insure an effective program.

(2) Observation: The lack of publicity and the precipitous implementation of urine testing caused many soldiers to become apprehensive. To convince them the drug program was designed to assist, the battalion permanent party overtly demonstrated humane understanding to all transient personnel. When the first positive urine sample results were received from the 9th Med Lab, the notification method was undetermined because of a lack of experience factors. On 19 June, detected heroin users were called out in a morning formation. Afterwards, information received from soldiers who had experimented with drugs revealed that they would have attempted to incite a riot if they had been detected as heroin users and called individually from a formation.

(a) Evaluation: Fear of embarrassment before their peers and fear of being held in country past their DEROS were causes of the soldiers' statements on an attempted riot. The battalion could not prevent heroin users from being held past DEROS, but would change its manner of informing the men. Each member of the permanent party was instructed to treat heroin users as sick men in need of care. Hence, notification was on a personal basis: that is, the users are now called to the orderly room and informed individually by an NCO or an officer. This genuine attempt at humane treatment and understanding has paid dividends. It has been discovered that many of the users soon relieved at having being detected. Their attitude changed from pugnaciousness to "all I want to do is get off this stuff and go home clean." Because of this attitude change, the battalion began to include in the DEROS initial briefing a statement that if an individual knows he's positive he can turn himself in and get medical treatment started earlier. To date approximately 37% of all positives have turned themselves in at the completion of the briefing.

(b) Recommendations: A sincere effort by permanent party personnel to treat people with understanding and without harrassment, blame or red tape shows that the battalion cares enough to help the soldiers. This, along with a sincere effort to make available all possible information concerning the program, caused a successful implementation of the program.

(3) Observation: Initially black soldiers demonstrated a persecution complex. They believed they were the only ones detected as users
of heroin. Consequently, one leader was able to get sufficient followers to believe that the system was designed to specifically detect the black soldier. This resulted in about thirty black soldiers taking over one complete barracks so that they could make plans in an attempt to incite a riot when and if their urine sample was proven to be positive. Information received indicated that although they had experimented with drugs, most were not addicts. However, the results of their urine samples indicated that 50% were, in fact, users. The confirmed positives were sent to the drug treatment center without incident. Their primary concern was that no one during their year's tour took any time to understand their problems or why they experimented with drugs.

(a) Evaluation: Black soldiers detected as heroin users wanted help, however, they lacked trust in any Caucasian. The humane treatment to all transients regardless of race increased trust and ultimately resolved a major portion of the problem.

(b) Recommendation: The task taken as spelled out in (2)(b) above will work with the majority of people. However, a certain percentage of incorrigibles will not cooperate. With these personnel force must sometimes be used.

(4) Observation: The drug identification program necessitated administrative procedures to prevent heroin users from being manifested on CONUS bound aircraft.

(a) Evaluation: The procedure requires that no one be allowed to initiate any processing until he can present evidence of having taken the urinalysis. This evidence is exclusively available from the Urine Collection Facility. Once given his sample, he returns to in-processing with a stamped copy of his orders. From this order, a punched card is prepared which is utilized in manifesting the individual on an aircraft. The card is kept in a "no status" file until the urinalysis results is received. If the man is classified as a drug user, his card is withdrawn and he is transported to the Drug Treatment Center at Long Binh. If he is cleared, his card is placed in a "cleared" file from which all manifesting is done by a 1005 card processor. All manifests are double checked against cleared orders to preclude errors.

(b) Recommendation: This system has proved successful but presents an extremely heavy administrative burden on the battalion drug control center. If US Army DROS personnel were port called to the replacement battalion, a complete automated system could be implemented. Knowing who would arrive on a specific date would allow pre-punched cards to be used both in battalion and the Medical Lab. This would eliminate the need for
manipulation of five sets of orders on each man under the present system.

(5) Observation: Initially drug users would attempt, in numerous ways, to substitute urine other than their own at the Urine Collection Facility (UCF). In addition, heroin was also being brought into the compound for use after the urine test.

(a) Evaluation: The compound was declared closed to all personnel other than permanent party and personnel passing through the battalion. Once a man reports to the battalion, he is not allowed to leave the compound except for an emergency. The entire compound is surrounded by a triple row of concertina wire with only two entrance/exit points. Both these entrance/exit points are guarded by KP's. To further reduce the flow of contraband, additional KP's were employed and shakedown booths were erected at the single entrance through which DEROS personnel are allowed to enter the compound. All enlisted DEROS personnel must submit to a complete shakedown of baggage and person. This procedure has significantly reduced drug use and urine substitution has ceased with the confiscation of bottles, tubes, plastic bags and other devices.

(b) Recommendation: Shakedown of DEROS personnel is mandatory to preclude contraband from entering the compound. Restriction to the compound is necessary to insure drug free environment after urinalysis test is administered. The shakedown procedure has appreciably reduced the amount of contraband picked up by customs here and at Travis Air Force Base.

(6) Observation: The institution of shakedown procedures has caused people to go into withdrawal in the battalion.

(a) Evaluation: Initially DEROS personnel arriving at the battalion would throw away or place heroin in the amnesty box at the front gate. Because of the driving force not to remain in Vietnam beyond DEROS, the men would attempt "cold turkey" while "hiding" on the compound. The majority of troops attempting this either became physically ill or attempted to go thru the urine to "get a hit." Those who became physically ill were immediately seen by the battalion doctor and transported to the drug treatment center. Many have been caught attempting to go ABDL. Of those who succeed, most return or are returned and sent to the drug treatment center.

(b) Recommendation: It is necessary to restrict access to the battalion compound to reduce flow of drugs. A doctor must be available within the compound on a 24 hour a day basis to assist those who go into drug
withdrawal. Thirdly, a shakedown of all DEROS personnel reduces contraband entering the compound.

(7) Observation: The program began on 18 June was directed at DEROS personnel only. Between 15 August and 1 October, the program was expanded to 14 day leave, R&R, 7 day leave and 7x7 personnel. These personnel process through the 178th Replacement Company at Camp Alpha, Tan Son Nhut.

(a) Evaluation: In many cases the man processing through Camp Alpha has expended a large amount of money to travel on leave. Therefore, reporting times were changed so that he received his medical clearance prior to flight time. For example, personnel from the Saigon, Long Binh, Bien Hoa areas could report NST 24 hours prior to scheduled departure, while all others could report NST 48 hours. Finally, all personnel were required to report NLT 1200 hours the day prior to scheduled departure. However, due to the difficulty soldiers encounter in intra-country travel, many still report late to the R&R Center. A lab was opened at Alpha to allow for rapid results from the test. The opening of the lab plus publicity as to the test has precluded anyone from missing his leave or R&R flight.

(b) Recommendation: That units make every effort to have people report to Alpha on time for testing and the lab continue to provide service to R&R and leave personnel with the top priority now afforded.

c. Training: None
d. Intelligence: None
e. Logistics: None
f. Organization: None
g. Other: None

WILLIAM E. CAMPBELL
LTC, AG
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 90th Replacement Battalion
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS, CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

HQ DA(DAFD), Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 90th Replacement Battalion and concurs.

2. Additional comments follow:

   The comment that the time allotted to implement the urinalysis program was insufficient is moot. Additional time would have been desirable; however, the Presidential directive required immediate implementation and the program was implemented on the specified date. Moreover, there was extensive and continuous coordination between members of the USARV Staff and the battalion staff in the period between notification and implementation.

   The comment that a port-call system would enhance the efficiency of the urinalysis program is valid. Present and projected Keystone drawdowns preclude implementation of such a system at this time; however, a system is under study for implementation when force levels are stabilized.

   Entry shakedown procedures are in operation at all replacement facilities processing DEROS personnel.

   All replacement activities processing DEROS personnel have a restricted access system in operation. A doctor is on the compound or immediately available in all cases.

   e. Reference item concerning "Operations," paragraph 2b(7), page 5.
   Continuous publicity concerning reporting times has been exercised through various media. There is no significant problem in this area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J. L. CHILDRESS
CPT AGC
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL
GPOP-FD (6 Nov '71) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 90th Replacement Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MAR
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 22d Replacement Battalion, AFO # 392, Period Ending 31 October 1971

SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PERSONNEL:
   a. R&R PARTICIPANTS

      (1) OBSERVATION: Personnel are still reporting with unnecessary administrative problems (i.e. only one copy of orders, no shot record, no commander's certificate, insufficient funds, incorrect information on orders, out-dated ID cards, no civilian clothing or Class A uniform, and no health certificate for Australia R&R).

      (2) EVALUATION: This problem has been addressed in every operational report, in several R&R Center Newsletters and at every R&R conference. Major commands are not taking an interest in correction of these deficiencies. These deficiencies increase the processing time for flights and inconvenience the R&R participant. Questioning of R&R transients reveals that they are not aware of the requirements.

      (3) RECOMMENDATIONS: An active program should be conducted by major commands to inform the individual participant before he reaches the R&R Center of the administrative requirements of the R&R program.

   b. ISSUANCE OF MTA'S

      (1) OBSERVATION: Personnel continue to arrive at the 22d Replacement Battalion without a Military Transportation Authorization (MTA).

      (2) EVALUATION: Issuance of MTA's by units is a requirement for clearance prior to departure from individuals unit.

      (3) RECOMMENDATIONS: Command emphasis be placed on units to issue MTA's prior to individual's departure.

   c. ARRIVAL OF UNDER-AGE PERSONNEL

      (1) OBSERVATION: During the last quarter personnel who have not reached their eighteenth birthday arrived at the 544th Replacement Company for further assignment in RVN. Interviews with these personnel indicate that in all cases they realized they were not eligible for service in RVN, and had made attempts to bring this to the attention of appropriate authority. At their prior unit and the CONUS replacement operation through which they processed. At least one individual was told by replacement operations personnel that this administrative error would be solved when he reached RVN.

      (2) EVALUATION: Sufficient emphasis has not been placed upon insuring that personnel under the age of eighteen do not leave CONUS bound for RVN.

      (3) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend CONUS replacement operations screen personnel ID cards to prevent those under age eighteen from leaving the replacement center.

DAFD-OTT
712139
Incl 2
d. **ARRIVAL OF PERSONNEL WITHOUT ID CARDS**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** Replacement personnel continue to arrive from CONUS without ID cards or application for same. Interviews with these personnel indicate that in many cases they have been instructed by their last duty station and/or by CONUS replacement operations that this personnel action should be completed upon arrival in RVN.

(2) **EVALUATION:** Shipping personnel who do not bear appropriate identification is hazardous for both CONUS and RVN replacement operations. Without appropriate identification neither operation can insure that only authorized personnel are being shipped to and are arriving in RVN.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** Recommend personnel receiving orders for PCS to RVN not be authorized to clear their duty station without presenting appropriate identification. Recommend CONUS replacement operations maintain unidentified personnel in a hold status until appropriate identification can be provided; and further not allow unidentified personnel to board aircraft until this requirement is met.

e. **ARRIVAL OF PERSONNEL WITHOUT RECORDS**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** Personnel are still arriving at RVN replacement operations without personnel records.

(2) **EVALUATION:** Investigation has revealed that in most cases those personnel without records have recently received an Article 15. Their records have been taken from them prior to shipment. Records are then mailed to RVN at a later date. Since the vast majority of those personnel entering RVN arrive without an ultimate assignment, personnel records are an absolute necessity. Those records allow USARV assignment teams to effect the best possible manpower utilization throughout Vietnam and are a vital part of the inprocessing and assignment operations in RVN replacement units.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** Recommend records of personnel receiving disciplinary action be carried by a courier aboard the same aircraft transporting the offenders. The records can then be delivered to replacement operation personnel for appropriate action.

f. **ARRIVAL OF PERSONNEL WHOSE RECORDS AND ORDERS ARE IN BAGGAGE**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** Personnel continue to arrive at RVN replacement operations with records and orders secured in personal baggage. All personnel arriving in RVN are separated from their baggage from the time they enter the aircraft in CONUS until the completion of all inprocessing in RVN. These records are required for replacement inprocessing procedures.

(2) **EVALUATION:** Personnel being shipped are not being notified with sufficient emphasis that they must hand-carry their records and orders to RVN.
(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** Recommend greater emphasis be placed on hand carrying records and orders at CONUS replacement operations. Recommend replacements show operations personnel that they have records and orders on their person before baggage may be turned in for loading aboard aircraft.

g. **PERSONAL APPEARANCE:**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** Personnel arrive at the 22d Replacement Battalion, for return to CONUS, in improper uniforms, needing haircuts and shaves, mustaches not properly trimmed, and sideburns longer than prescribed in army regulations.

(2) **EVALUATION:** Many commanders do not enforce uniform and personal appearance regulations. This creates a burden on the cadre of the battalion because of the numerous uniform and appearance deficiencies which must be corrected prior to departure for CONUS.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** That command emphasis be placed on unit commanders to insure that personnel meet the uniform and personal appearance standards required by proper regulation prior to departure from units.

h. **DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM:**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** A new program called "Gangplank" was instituted whereby personnel must take a second urine test during the final phase of outprocessing prior to boarding CONUS-bound aircraft because there was evidence that personnel were using drugs between the time of their first urine test and the time they were scheduled to depart Vietnam.

(2) **EVALUATION:** There are several theories on who could smuggle in opiates: permanent party personnel, local hire Vietnamese and Chinese Nationals, civilian contractors, military and civilian traffic for property disposal yard, Korean units and visitors claiming official status. A security guard force of trained personnel have not been available in the past to thoroughly check all traffic entering or departing this compound. A team from USAVR Provost Marshal's Office visited this Battalion Headquarters on 15 October 1971, to gather information which might provide better physical security to this compound, primarily to reduce or stop flow of drugs to transient personnel. This visit coincided with the earlier movement of the 127th MP Company which has the primary mission of supporting the Drug Treatment Center, C&I. The 127th MP Company's secondary mission is to assure discipline, law, and order on the 22d Replacement Battalion compound. This unit should greatly assist in this mission and help the drug control problem.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** That USAVR conduct a detailed physical security inspection to ascertain proper method of controlling avenues of drug input to this unit's area. Further recommend that 127th MP Company strength be increased to assume gate guard operations, which would act as strong deterrent to input of drugs on the battalion compound.
31 October 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 22d Replacement Battalion, APO 96392, Period Ending 31 October 1971

2. INTELLIGENCE: None

3. OPERATIONS: None

4. ORGANIZATION: None

5. TRAINING: None

6. LOGISTICS: None

7. COMMUNICATIONS: None

8. MATERIAL: None

9. OTHER: None

Copies furnished:
Dir repl Ops, HQ USARV
AVHDO-DO (31 October 1971) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 22d Replacement Battalion, APO 96392, Period Ending 31 October 1971

Headquarters, United States Arm Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

HQ, DA (DAFD), Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 22d Replacement Battalion and concurs.

2. Additional comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "R&R PARTICIPANTS," paragraph 1a, page 1. Continuous publicity concerning these matters has been exercised through various media to include commander's notes and the AG newsletter. Analysis reveals that the majority of R&R participants are aware of requirements and do comply prior to arrival at R&R centers.

   b. Reference item concerning "ISSUANCE OF ITAS," paragraph 1b, page 1. This matter has also been addressed through the media described above. Additionally, those units identified as deficient in this area have been directed to take corrective action.

   c. Reference item concerning "ARRIVAL OF UNDER-AGE PERSONNEL," paragraph 1c, page 1. This comment is valid and informal coordination with DA reveals that that headquarters is aware of the problem and attempting to correct it.

   d. Reference item concerning "ARRIVAL OF PERSONNEL WHOSE RECORDS AND ORDERS ARE IN BAGGAGE," paragraph 1f, page 2. Recommend that DA reiterate emphasis on corrective measures to be taken at CONUS Replacement Centers.

   e. Reference item concerning "PERSONAL APPEARANCE," paragraph 1g, page 3. Continuous emphasis has been placed on personal appearance through the media of commander's conferences and various directives on the subject. Nevertheless, procedures are in effect at all replacement activities to insure attainment of proper standards prior to departure for CONUS.

   f. Reference item concerning "DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM," paragraph 1h, page 3. HQ USARV has conducted a detailed physical security survey of the 22d Replacement Battalion's compound. Recommendations contained in the report have been or are in process of being implemented. The 127th MP Company assumed gate guard operations in November 1971.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CP, AG

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL
GPOP-FD (31 Oct 71) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ 22d
Replacement Battalion, Period Ending 31 October
1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MAH
1LT. AGC
Asst AD
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 22d Replacement Bn, 90th Replacement Bn, Period Ending 31 October 71.(U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations

CO, 22d Replacement Bn, 90th Replacement Bn