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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 11 Jun 1980
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Briefing Program

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1. Reference: AR 1-26, 4 November 1966, subject as above.

2. Transmitted herewith is the debriefing report of Brigadier General S. H. Matheson, former Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, USARV.

3. The contents of this report and the opinions expressed therein should not be interpreted as reflecting the official opinion or view of the Department of the Army or any Army command, installation or agency.

4. Because of technical difficulties, maps (Figs. B-1 through B-7) mentioned in the debriefing report have not been reproduced.

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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program

TO: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. During the period of my command, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division participated in nine major operations while making eleven major moves of the entire brigade in three of the four Corps Tactical Zones in Vietnam.

2. The annexes record the methods of operation and lessons learned of a Separate Airborne Brigade employed as a theater reserve in a counterinsurgency environment. The annexes have been assembled into primary areas of staff interest.

3. The report should be of primary interest for use in the US Army School System.

S. H. MATHESON
Brigadier General, USA
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ANNEX A ........................................ Personnel
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1. PERSONNEL TURBULENCE: During the past year personnel turbulence has continued to be a major problem area. In addition to high casualty rates during short periods of time, R&R's and extensions all reduce the Brigade's effective strength. The 1st Brigade averages 140 men per month who are unavailable due to special leave. Four hundred men per month go on R&R and are unavailable an average of 12 days due to the location of the Brigade and available transportation from the operational area to the base camp.

2. ADMINISTRATION: Although the Brigade is in a tactical posture at all times except during brief stand-downs, the administrative requirements do not decrease proportionately. This requires each battalion and company to keep an executive officer with an administrative staff at the Brigade Forward CP element.

3. MORALE: Troopers assigned to the 1st Brigade often spend 40-65 days in the area of operation without a stand-down or break. Meals consist of C rations or LRRF rations. Clean or new uniforms or boots are furnished to troops when possible, although the jungle fatigues are normally a critical item due to overall in-country shortage. Mail is delivered on daily basis, to the battalion fire bases, and on resupply days, to the companies (every five days). During Brigade moves, an average of every 30 days, troopers go 3-6 days without mail.

4. RED CROSS: A Red Cross representative remains with the Brigade forward element and at the base camp location, providing effective emergency Red Cross coverage.

5. AG PERSONNEL SERVICES: AG support is obtained through the company forward CP element, co-located with the Brigade forward tactical CP. AG teams travel to the operational areas on a monthly basis, or more often as required, for records checks, and general personnel services assistance.

6. FINANCE: The Finance Officer brings the payroll to the tactical area of operation, where unit Class A Agents pick up their payrolls. The Finance Officer often functions as a Class A Agent, when the tactical situation dictates. Often, troopers are paid 3-4 days late because of the tactical situation.

7. CHAPLAIN: The Chaplain Section effectively provides religious coverage on a weekly basis to all units assigned and attached to the Brigade. The section includes Protestant and Catholic Chaplains. The Jewish personnel in the Brigade were granted permission to attend the Jewish High Holy Days. One Chaplain meets all casualties brought to the Brigade Clearing Station. Chaplains make frequent hospital visits and distribute writing materials, magazines, and other supplies to the wounded. The Chaplain Section is used as a listening post for morale problems which are immediately brought to the attention of the Commander.

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Annex A
8. **HOSPITAL LIASON:** The Brigade has assigned one noncommissioned officer to in country hospitals treating Brigade casualties. His duties include providing the wounded with PX items, and personal services such as writing letters for those who are unable.
UNIT AND BRIGADE LEVEL MEDICAL SERVICE

1. Employment of Infantry Battalion aid stations and Brigade Medical personnel.

   a. Battalion aid stations are normally employed to provide a limited treatment capability at the battalion tactical command post and a treatment/resupply capability at battalion base camp locations. The aid station group in the battalion base camp performs the doctrinal administrative function for the battalion, i.e., preparation of medical records and reports, sanitation/preventive medicine inspections, and medical personnel management.

   b. The battalion surgeon is employed out of the Battalion TAC CP. At this location he is immediately available to the commander to advise him on medical matters as they pertain to the tactical situation. He also spends time with the forward line companies, battalion base camp aid station, and the brigade medical company.

   c. Brigade medical personnel perform classical duties at the medical company. They also assist Army level medical elements during periods of patient overloads.

   d. Unit Level Medical Service. Five (5) medical corpsmen are routinely employed with each rifle company size element, one with each of the rifle platoons and one with the company CP. One corpsman is employed with the battalion mortar element, and three (3) to four (4) corpsmen with the reconnaissance elements. The 32 enlisted man Medical Platoon authorization breakout is as indicated below:

   | Company Aidman | 15 |
   | Mortar Element | 1  |
   | Aid Station Group | 7  |
   | Recon Element | 4  |
   | CP Element | 5  |

2. Casualty Evacuation and Air Ambulance Support.

   a. Battle field casualties are evacuated to that level of medical service which is capable of performing those procedures necessary to prolong life and prevent the loss of limb. However, at times the proximity of the brigade medical company to an Army level hospital makes it impractical to evacuate casualties to the brigade medical company. In this regard, each case must be judged separately and no rigid policy is currently in existence. On the other hand, routine medical patients are normally evacuated to the brigade medical company. The medical officer at this location determines the patient status and makes dispositions as appropriate.
b. Air ambulances are not normally attached to the brigade. Generally
air ambulances are placed in direct support of the brigade; the number of ships
being dependent on the operational requirements. One to two ships are routinely
in direct support of brigade operations.

3. Medical Supply. Medical supplies are drawn from area support platoons of
the 32d Medical Depot. The Brigade Medical Supply Officer (BMSO) draws sufficient
levels of supplies for issue to brigade units. In some instances, under emergency
situations, medical supplies have been drawn from Army level hospitals located in
the vicinity of the brigade medical company. An informal system of resupplying
between battalion medical platoons/sections and the BMSO is presently in effect.
Request for medical supplies from the BMSO to supporting agencies is accomplished
on a formal basis utilizing DA Form 2765-1.

4. Malaria. Despite aggressive campaigns to stamp out this disease, our per-
sonnel still lead the list in total malaria cases in Vietnam. The Brigade is unique
in that the battalions are constantly in the field with only 4-6 day stand-downs
at intervals of 2 to 3 weeks. Under these conditions, personal protective measures
are extremely difficult to employ. The extent of the operational area as well as
the tactical situation precludes effective spraying. Being constantly on the move
decreases efficiency of unit protective measures such as eliminating standing water.
Also being in close proximity to the enemy keeps brigade personnel near a reservoir
of infection. The chloroquine-primaquine weekly tablets and dapsone tablets
are monitored by roster through command channels. Mosquito nets are employed by
all personnel in base camp areas and by those personnel in the area of operation
who can feasibly do so.

5. Field Sanitation. The standard field sanitation procedures still prove
to be quite adequate in our current environment. The burn-out latrine has been
adopted almost universally here. Care and emphasis should be given to screening
of unit mess facilities, and control of local purchase ice, food stuffs, and bev-
erages.

6. Hospital Liaison Personnel. The Brigade routinely locates noncommission
officer liaison personal with in each of the major medical facilities that service
the brigade. These personnel assist in insuring that the necessary continuity is
maintained in the following areas: management of patient pay activities; distrib-
ution and forwarding of mails; advising commanders and the brigade casualty sec-
tion of changes in medical status for hospitalized personnel; coordinating special-
ity clinic appointments and maintaining accurate patient admission and disposi-
tion information.

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A-4
INTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL:

During the past year the lst Brigade's mission was to engage major concentrations of North Vietnamese Army and Main Force Viet Cong Units wherever they could be located, fixed and destroyed. Since most regimental size units habitually operate out of large base complexes located deep in mountain terrain it was necessary for the lst Brigade to adopt special techniques for the assault and penetration of the base areas. Most of the secret base areas attacked by the lst Brigade had never been explored by Free World Military Forces and in most cases the only intelligence available concerning the areas was derived from patterns and concentrations of various intelligence reports collected over a long period of time.

2. SECRET BASE AREAS:

During the nine major operations conducted in 1967 the Brigade penetrated and explored twelve secret base areas which current intelligence indicated were being utilized by large NVA and Main Force units. Although most of these were occupied by NVA and Main Force units there were several that had not been active for some time. However in all cases there was evidence to justify the designation of the area as a Secret Base complex. Since the areas had not been previously penetrated the findings of the Brigade provided the only reliable information as to the extent of enemy operations within the area. Detail locations and patterns found in the area are in the annexes supporting the brief results on each of the operations. Preprinted base area data designation of the areas, terrain, enemy installations and reported communication routes. The CICV Studies served as a valuable reference that was distributed and used at battalion level.

3. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STUDIES AND PATTERN ANALYSIS:

a. In order to establish the most probable location of enemy forces both in and around secret base areas additional current intelligence was normally required. The previous experience of the lst Brigade indicates that a special study and "Secret" pattern analysis, prepared to support each pending operation was the only reliable method to determine probable courses of enemy action. Prior to each operation in the I, II, and III Corps areas, the area analyst of the Combined Intelligence Center prepared indicators for the six month period immediately preceding the operation. From these special studies the Brigade was able to accurately predict the most likely enemy course of action and in every case where the study was utilized major contacts were developed in predicted areas. Little or no contact was experienced in areas where enemy forces were not indicated. The support from the personnel of the Combined Intelligence Center was outstanding. The rapport established with the area desk officers...
enabled the Brigade to receive answers for specific information which had previously been extremely difficult to obtain.

b. The most useful data provided in the current studies, which the 1st Brigade now utilizes as a standard requirement prior to each new operation, is as follows:

(1) Pattern Analysis and ADP Printouts of all reliable intelligence reports for the past six months period.

(2) Reliable Intelligence Patterns immediately prior to and following friendly operations in the area.

(3) Current Imagery Interpretation Trail Studies not depicted in pre-printed studies, including Comm-Liaison infiltration routes.

(4) Current CICV Order of Battle.

(5) Anti-Aircraft incidents.

(6) Current Red Base patterns.

(7) Recent Enemy Base Camp reports.

c. The two most significant pattern analysis provided by the Combined Intelligence Center were those prepared prior to operations WHEELER and KLAMATH FALLS.

(1) Operation WHEELER: The pattern provided for the operation concerned the movements and reactions of the 2nd NVA Division and its three subordinate regiments as well as the provincial units in QUANG TIN Province. The analysis clearly established the locations of the major forces and their reactions when attacked by FWNAF during three previous operations. During the operation the 1st Brigade was able to predict the movement of the Division and its regiments. During three phases of the operation Brigade units successfully deployed forces to decisively engage the enemy moving in their predicted patterns.

(2) Operation KLAMATH FALLS: The pattern provided by CICV established the movement of Headquarters Military Region 6 for a six month period. Initial operations against the current location of the Headquarters resulted in definite contact, and intelligence indicated the Headquarters was surrounded during the first several days of the operation. Although the enemy was able to avoid major contact he continued to move in previously established patterns. Search and Destroy operations throughout the AO revealed extensive base camps and training facilities all of which were within the previously established pattern.
4. BRIGADE OPERATIONS:

a. Operation GATLING I and II: 1 February 1967 - 15 February 1967:

   (1) The operation was conducted to find and destroy Headquarters Military Region 6 and subordinate military units operating in the area.

   (2) Contact was made with elements of the Headquarters and several extensive base camps and communication facilities were destroyed.

   (3) Results of the Operation:

   (a) Enemy Killed: 27
   (b) Individual Weapons: 17
   (c) Crew Served Weapons: 2


   (1) This operation was conducted in BINH THUAN, NINH THUAN and LAM DONG Provinces involving the penetration of Secret Base Areas 7, 19, 22, 25, and 36 to locate and destroy Main Force units operating in these provinces.

   (2) Contact was made with unidentified elements within the AO and facilities located in the base areas were destroyed.

   (3) Results of the Operation:

   (a) Enemy Killed: 115
   (b) Individual Weapons: 80
   (c) Crew Served Weapons: 0

c. Operation SURRENTER: 30 March 1967 - 29 April 1967:

   (1) This operation was conducted in KIEN HOA, PHU YIN and DaN LOC Provinces with emphasis of the destruction of Main Force units reported to be operating in the area.

   (2) During the operation elements of the 185 NVA Regiment were contacted and extensive base areas were destroyed.

   (3) Results of the Operation:

   (a) Enemy Killed: 72
   (b) Individual Weapons: 55
   (c) Crew Served Weapons: 3

d. Operation MALHEUR I and II: 11 May 1967 - 2 August 1967:

   (1) The operation was directed against element of the 2nd and 3rd
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NVA Divisions that were operating out of Secret Base Areas 124, 123, and 122 indicated in (See Figs. B-1 & B-2)

(2) During the operation the 93rd, 95th and 97th Battalions of the 2nd VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Division were contacted, decisively defeated and driven completely out of QUANG NGAI Province. All these base area complexes were thoroughly searched and destroyed. Camps and logistical facilities shown in the annexes verify the existence of the Secret Base Areas. In one case "Secret" base area 122 was actually found to be located slightly to the south and west of suspected area. Elements of the 38th and 48th Local Force Battalion, and 120th Main Force Montagnard Battalion and the 107th NVA Anti-aircraft Battalion were also contacted.

(3) Results of Operations Phase I and II:

(a) Enemy Killed: 869
(b) Individual Weapons: 295
(c) Crew Served Weapons: 19

e. Operation HOLD RIVER: 2 August 1967 - 13 August 1967:

(1) This Joint Combined operation against enemy forces in western QUANG NGAI and TIN Provinces penetrated Secret Base Areas 118 and 120 (See Fig. B-9. These base areas were not currently being used by major forces and no indications of recent use were observed. Enemy contact was limited to local force and hamlet guerrilla actions.

(2) Results of the Operation:

(a) Enemy Killed: 63
(b) Individual Weapons: 37
(c) Crew Served Weapons: 5

f. Operation BENTON: 13 August 1967 - 29 August 1967:

(1) The operation was directed against Secret Base Area 117 (See Fig. B-4) and elements of the 21st NVA Regiment that were operating in central QUANG TIN Province.

(2) During the operation the 1st Brigade contacted the 11th, 22nd, and 31st Battalion. Previous intelligence reports concerning Secret Base Area 117 were confirmed. Extensive Battalion size training facilities and logistical support complexes operated by Military Region 5 were found and destroyed.

(3) Results of the Operation:

(a) Enemy Killed: 303
(b) Individual Weapons: 123
(c) Crew Served Weapons: 8

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E-4
g. Operation COOK: 1 September 1967 - 9 September 1967:

(1) The operation was conducted to search and destroy Secret Base Area 121 in western QUANG NGOI Province, and to engage enemy forces reported to be concentrating for operations during the National Elections.  (See Fig B-5).

(2) Secret Base Area 121 was penetrated and searched. The base area was found to be void of active base camps although several old facilities were located and destroyed. There were no large enemy forces operating in the area. Contact was made with personnel from QUANG NGOI Provincial Headquarters which had a base camp in the area. The 38th Local Force Battalion was also contacted in the eastern side of the SONG VE Valley.

(3) Results of the Operation:

(a) Enemy Killed: 54
(b) Individual Weapons: 11
(c) Crew Served Weapons: 2

h. Operation WHEELER: 11 September 1967 - 25 November 1967:

(1) This was the largest and one of the most significant operations ever conducted by the 1st Brigade since it deployed in Vietnam. Operations were conducted to defeat the 2nd NVA Division and drive it out of QUANG TIN Province. (See Fig. B-6).

(2) During the operation the 1st Brigade again contacted the 40th and 60th Battalions of the 1st VC Regiment, the 11th, 22nd and 31st Battalions of the 21st Regiment and Support and Security elements of Headquarters, 2nd NVA Division. Extensive base camp facilities utilized by these units were destroyed and at the end of the operation the Division Headquarters and the two regiments contacted had completely withdrawn from the area of operations which they had controlled for over two years.

(3) Results of the Operation:

(a) Enemy Killed: 1105
(b) Individual Weapons: 186
(c) Crew Served Weapons: 34

i. Operation KLAMATH FALLS: 1 December 1967 - 8 January 1968:

(1) This operation was conducted to destroy Headquarters Military Region 6, to find, fix and destroy the 145th, 186, and 840th Main Force Battalions and the 462nd Local Force Battalion and their base camp areas. (See Fig B-7).

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(2) During the operation contact was made with personnel from Headquarters HR 6. The 186th Main Force and 482nd Local Force Battalions were located and engaged with medium contact resulting. Although the 840th and 115th were not specifically identified, elements of the 1st Brigade did have squad size contacts in the area where they were reported to be operating. During the operation there were seventeen battalion size, twenty-one company size, and fourteen platoon size base camps located and destroyed.

(3) Results of the Operation:

(a) Enemy Killed: 156
(b) Individual Weapons: 75
(c) Crew Served Weapons: 3
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BRIGADE OPERATIONS

A. OPERATION GATLING I 5 February 1967 - 5 February 1967

(1) Operation Gatling I, conducted in LAN DONG Province northwest of BAO LOC, consisted of a two battalion airmobile raid following a B-52 strike against a suspected high level political conference by Headquarters Military Region VI via TAN DJIRAN (IT990896) to capture key personnel, documents and equipment.

(2) Task Organization

1-327 Inf
2-502 Inf
2-320 Aty
Co B, 5th SPG
5 MIke Force Companies
2 CIDG Companies

(3) Results:

(a) Enemy killed          2
(b) Individual weapons captured       2
(c) Crew served weapons captured   None

B. OPERATION GATLING II 5 February 1967 - 15 February 1967

(1) Operation Gatling II was conducted in BINH TUY Province (northwest of PHAN THIET) against units of Headquarters Military Region VI. Aggressive search and destroy operations were conducted by all units. No significant contact was made with enemy force. Several large rice caches, base camp areas and communications equipment were discovered and destroyed or evacuated for intelligence exploitation.

(2) Task Organization

1-327 Inf
2-502 Inf
2-320 Aty (-)
2-7 Cav (-)

(3) Results of the operation

(a) Enemy killed          25
(b) Individual weapons captured       17
(c) Crew served weapons captured   None
C. **OPERATION FARRUGUT** 26 January 1967 - 23 March 1967

(1) Operation FARRUGUT was conducted in BINH THU'N, NINH THU'N and L.N DONG Provinces to search out and destroy enemy units and installations and to clear the area adjacent to National Route 1 between PHAN THIET and PH'N RANG. This operation consisted of search and destroy operations against secret Base Areas 7, 19, 22, 25 and 36. The operation was characterized by small unit action and sporadic contact with small forces.

(2) Task Organization

- 1-327 Inf
- 2-327 Inf
- 2-502 Inf
- 2-320 Arty
- 4th Troop 8th Cavalry

(3) Results of the operation

(a) Enemy killed 115
(b) Individual weapons captured 80
(c) Crew served weapons captured None

D. **OPERATION SUMMERHILL** 30 March 1967 - 29 April 1967

(1) This operation was conducted in KHANH HOA, PHU YEN and DARLAC Provinces. The initial brigade mission was to conduct search and destroy operations in the HABOI base area and BUON MI GA area. The mission was later amended to include search and destroy operations in the HON BA area and establishment of positions on critical terrain along Route 21 between KHANH DOUNG and DUC MY to secure the highway for daily logistical convoys.

(2) Task Organization

- 1-327 Inf
- 2-327 Inf
- 2-502 Inf
- 2-320 Arty
- B/1-30 Arty (155)
- B/3-18 Arty (8"SP) (GS reinf)
- A/4-60 Arty (M42, M55) (AWSP)

(3) Results of the operation

(a) Enemy killed 72
(b) Individual weapons captured 54
(c) Crew served weapons captured 3
E. OPERATION MALHEUR I & II 1 May 1967 - 2 August 1967

(1) The mission of the brigade during Operation MALHEUR was as a part of Task Force Oregon, to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces in southern I CTZ. Areas of interest were west, southwest and northwest of DUC PHO. The operation, conducted in QUANG NGOI Province, was accomplished in two phases. Phase I commenced on 11 May 1967 with two battalions air assaulting into base area 124 immediately west of DUC PHO. The third battalion air assaulted into blocking positions east of base area 124. Search and destroy operations continued in this general area for approximately one month. One battalion was extracted and reinserted into base area 123 on 3 June 1967 immediately following a B-52 strike. Upon completion of this action the remaining battalions were extracted and inserted northeast and northwest of base area 123 which is astride the SONG THA CAU and SONG V'? Valleys. At the request of the province officials the brigade evacuated the civilian population from these areas. At the conclusion of these activities the brigades attention turned to the SONG NW Valley to the southwest. This initiated MALHEUR II and was characterized by search and destroy and cordon and search of VC/NVA controlled villages and hamlets and the evacuation of local personnel at the request of province officials. After the evacuation of the civilian population intensified search and destroy operations supported by B-52 strikes were initiated in the area of operations to destroy the remaining forces of the 21st and 3d NVA Division.

(2) Task organization

1-327 Inf
2-327 Inf
2-502 Inf
2-320 Arty
5th SPG
3 CIDG Companies

(3) Results of the operation

(a) Enemy killed 869
(b) Individual weapons captured 295
(c) Crew served weapons captured 19

F. OPERATION HOOD RIVER 2 August 1967 - 13 August 1967

(1) Operation HOOD RIVER was a combined US, ARVN, ROK and CIDG operation conducted in QUANG NGOI and QUANG TIN Provinces. It consisted of a four pronged attack against Secret Base Area 171. Two battalions of the 2d ARVN Div conducted an overland assault west from QUANG NGOI into the AO; two battalions of ARVN Rangers conducted airmobile assults onto the high ground south of the base area and commenced S&D operations north; two battalions of the ROK Marine Brigade conducted an overland assault southwest toward the base area from positions northwest of QUANG NGOI. Two battalions of the brigade air assaulted into the high ground west of the base area and commenced S&D operations.
east. The 1-327 conducted S&D operations 10 kilometers south of base area 121 concentrating on likely egress routes. The CIDG companies occupied blocking positions to the south in the southeastern portion of the brigade AO.

(2) Task Organization

1-327 Inf
2-327 Inf
2-502 Inf
2-320 Arty
5th SFG
• 2 MIKE Force Companies
2 CIDG Companies from HA THANH

(3) Results of the operation

(a) Enemy killed 63
(b) Individual weapons captured 37
(c) Crew served weapons captured 6

G. OPERATION LAKE 6 July 1967 - 12 July 1967

(1) Operation LAKE was a one battalion task force operation conducted in QUANG NOAI Province. The battalion task force was deployed in the SA HUYNH area to provide security for engineer road opening operations to be conducted on National Route 1 from DIEN TRUONG south to SA HUYNH. In addition the task force conducted search and destroy and cordon operations in the area to destroy the VC infrastructure and VC/NVA forces in the area.

(2) Task organization

1-327 Inf (-)
A/2-17 Cav
1/2-69 Armor (3/25 Inf Div)
1/A/326 Engr
3 Scn Dog Tm

(3) Results of the operation

(a) Enemy killed 6
(b) Individual weapons captured 6
(c) Crew served weapons captured None

H. OPERATION BENTON 13 August 1967 to 29 August 1967

(1) This operation was conducted in QUANG TIN Province. Contacts with large size enemy forces (platoon or larger) occurred frequently during the

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early stages of the operation. All contacts occurred late in the afternoon and lasted into the night when the enemy broke contact and withdrew. As the operation progressed contact with larger forces declined as did the enemy's will to stand and fight.

(2) Task organization

1-327 Inf
2-327 Inf
2-502 Inf
2-320 Arty
5th SFG
2 Mike Force Companies

(3) Results of the operation

(a) Enemy killed 303
(b) Individual weapons captured 123
(c) Crew served weapons captured 8


(1) This operation, conducted in QUANG TIN Province was conducted to destroy the 2d NVA Division and drive it out of QUANG TIN Province. To accomplish this mission the brigade air assaulted its three battalions into an AO west of TAM KY. One battalion blocked enemy egress routes to the west while the remaining two attacked from the northeast and southeast. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry (3/25 Inf Div) was placed OPCON to the bde to exploit intelligence during the initial stages of the operation. One Camp Strike Force operating in direct support of the brigade screened likely enemy egress routes to the southwest of the brigade AO.

(2) Task organization

1-327 Inf
2-327 Inf
2-502 Inf
2-320 Arty
1-14 Inf (3/25 Inf Div)
5th SFG
1-Camp Strike Force

(3) Results of the operation

(a) Enemy killed 1105
(b) Individual weapons captured 186
(c) Crew served weapons 34

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J. OPERATION KLANUTH FALLS 1 December 1967 - 8 January 1968

(1) This operation, conducted in LAM DONG, D'NH THUAN and KINH THUAN Provinces, was a search and destroy operation to find, fix and destroy HQ NR-6, the 145th, 186th and 360th Mainforce Battalions and the 482d Local Force Battalion and to open National Highway 1 from PHAN RANG to the II/III Corps boundary in coordination with the 23d ARVN Div. To accomplish this mission the brigade, on 30 November 1967, assaulted the 3-506 Inf into an area of operation vic SONG MAO (east of the AO for the brigade main effort). On D-Day two battalions air assaulted into the northeastern and northwestern portions of this AO and commenced S&D operations generally oriented south. 2-7 Cav (1ACD), OPCOM to the brigade, and the remaining battalion of the brigade air assaulted into the southern portion of the AO blocking enemy egress routes to the south.

(2) Task organization

1-327 Inf
2-327 Inf
2-502 Inf
2-320 Arty
2-7 Cav (1st ACD)
LRRP Plt I FFORCEV

(3) Results of the operation

(a) Enemy killed 150
(b) Individual weapons captured 75
(c) Crew served weapons captured 3

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C-6

16
Decentralized Control

The brigade normally employed the technique of decentralized control. Guidance given to the battalion commander was broad and general and usually consisted of a direction in which the battalion would conduct search and destroy operations in its assigned area of operation. Based on this guidance, battalion commanders normally selected multiple company size landing zones for use in the assault. Companies were given their own areas of operations with sufficient guidance to coordinate their operations. Commanders were free to adjust their movements to the terrain and enemy.

To accomplish its assigned search and destroy mission and to effectively defeat the guerrilla in his environment, the brigade developed semi-guerrilla methods of operations. The tactics and techniques employed were designed to offset the advantages the guerrilla has when operating in his environment. However, once contact was established with the enemy, the cloak of the semi-guerrilla was removed and all available firepower was placed on the enemy.

The brigade maneuvered freely throughout its area of operation, cross attached units and frequently changed boundaries to rapidly react to enemy movement and contacts. Some of the tactics and techniques employed are discussed:

1. Saturation patrolling: Because of the very nature of the enemy, specific or "hard" intelligence of the enemy's disposition, strength and methods of operation is difficult to obtain. Normally only the general location (several grid squares) of an enemy unit is known. To locate the enemy, all units of the brigade conducted extensive saturation patrolling. Companies were air assaulted into multiple landing zones and, once on the ground, patrolled on three or four axes with a platoon size force on each axis. All platoons remained within supporting distance of each other (normally thirty minutes marching time). As the platoons searched along their axes, they periodically sent squad or fire team size patrols to the flanks. By employing this technique, large areas were searched, the enemy's capability to determine the size and direction of movement of the unit in his area was reduced, and maximum flexibility was achieved to reinforce units in contact, and to attack or encircle an enemy when contact was established.

2. Ambushes: With a search and destroy mission assigned, units of the brigade seldom moved at night unless there was a specific operational requirement. Movement through the jungle and detailed search of an area at night proved difficult. To deny the enemy complete freedom of movement at night, units frequently ambushed trails found during the day, and if none were found, lines of drift such as stream beds and ridgelines were ambushed. Periodically, when well used trails were located during the day, units would immediately ambush the trail for one or two hours. If enemy movement was not detected, units continued in their search.

3. Stay behind patrols: The enemy frequently returns to the battle area or to known bivouac sites of US units. To exploit this tendency, units of the brigade positioned platoons or larger size units in concealed positions. An immediate reaction force was designed to reinforce the stay behind patrol.
SUBJECT: Decentralized Control (Cont)

if necessary. The length of time the patrol remained behind depended on the higher unit's method of operation, mission, terrain and size of the stay behind patrol.

4. Raids: When specific or "hard" intelligence was received, raids were planned and executed using air mobility whenever possible.

5. Large areas of operation: Permission to operate in a given area must be obtained from GVN authorities, which fact at times tends to compromise the location of the area of operations to the enemy. If the area of operations requested from GVN authorities is barely large enough for the brigade, then the enemy can best dispose his forces to evade or attack friendly forces. To overcome this possibility, the brigade routinely obtained areas of operations several times the size immediately needed for a given operation. The enemy had less chance to predict the maneuver plan of the brigade, which fact increased the brigade's successes. As a bonus, initial acquisition of large areas of operations permitted the brigade to freely range over large areas in response to the tactical situation without a requirement for further coordination with GVN authorities.

6. Deployment with 3-5 days rations: To allow companies to fade into the jungle and assume a semi-guerrilla posture, all units deployed with 3-5 days rations and, at times, seven days rations. This technique prevented the unit's location from being compromised by daily helicopter resupply flights. Except on scheduled resupply days helicopters were allowed to land at a unit's location only for emergency reasons.

7. Movement from high to low ground: The preponderance of the brigade's operations were conducted in mountainous terrain. The hitherto accepted method of disposing an enemy by attacking from low ground to "take the high ground" was generally discarded in favor of air assaulting onto mountain tops and attacking down hill. This technique routinely took the enemy by surprise, and also permitted faster friendly movement.

8. Artillery collocated with infantry: To provide immediate responsive and coordinated artillery support to the maneuver battalions, the brigade collocated one direct support artillery battery with each of the infantry battalion tactical command posts.

9. Aviation support: The brigade developed close and efficient relationships with the supporting aviation elements. It was found, and confirmed time and time again, that aviation support was at its best only if the same aviation company habitually supported the brigade, if the same aviators flew the infantry battalion command and control and resupply ships day in and day out. A closely integrated team spirit was fostered, benefiting the brigade and aviation units alike. Conversely, whenever aviation assets were allocated on a general support, or mission basis, or whenever the direct support aviation units were changed, efficiency and effectiveness of aviation support suffered.
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned (Cont)

5. Item: Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC)

(a) Discussion: With the inception and successful utilization of the FADAC, a tendency existed to rely completely on the computer with consequent adverse effects on the firing batteries manual capability.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: Each fire direction center maintains two manual charts, one primary and one check. Additionally, the FADAC is used only every other day to require fire direction centers to use the manual method to maintain a proficient manual capability, and to allow service of the computer.

6. Item: Defense Against Enemy Mortars

(a) Discussion: When resupply of units is required by helicopter, unit locations are compromised by the flights of resupply aircraft into the unit. The enemy in the area of operation frequently employed mortars against units of the brigade, including units which had not displaced from the resupply location.

(b) Recommendation/Solution: Resupply of units was conducted as rapidly as possible and the units then were displaced to a new location. In addition, flights in and out of the unit were minimized in an attempt to decrease the enemy's ability to pinpoint a unit's location.
Recommendations

1. Combat Tracker Teams: The current Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for the 9th Combat Tracker Team authorizes the team ten personnel trained to operate in two five man sections. The size of the team is not sufficient to adequately support a separate airborne brigade with four infantry battalions conducting counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. The very nature of the enemy - elusive, capable of blending into the terrain, difficult to find - requires that US units have the skill readily available to track the enemy once contact is broken. With only two workable sections for four infantry battalions, sufficient assets are not readily available for use when needed. In addition, when personnel of the team become casualties, are on leave or R&R or become sick, the section cannot operate effectively because team integrity is disrupted when one man is absent. It is recommended that the authorized strength of the teams be increased to at least twenty personnel organized into four five man sections. This team size would provide adequate support for the brigade and insure that a minimum of three teams was always operational.

2. Visual Tracking: A major problem in fighting the enemy in Vietnam is finding him in order to fight him. A definite need exists at the rifle platoon level for personnel familiar with and trained in the art of visually tracking the enemy. Many situations arise during operations when several of the enemy are wounded and manage to escape. Blood trails are followed because they are relatively easy to locate, but once the enemy has time to bandage himself, the average rifleman loses the trail of the enemy. A by-product of knowing the principles of tracking is the ability to detect quickly things that are out of place or unusual such as enemy signs used to designate booby traps, mines, punji pits, or other dangers ahead. It is, therefore, recommended that the art of visual tracking be taught to riflemen prior to their arrival in Vietnam.

3. "Daisy Cutters": The "Daisy Cutter" has proved to be an extremely effective bomb for landing zone preparation in advance of assaulting troops and for landing zone construction. It is recommended that this bomb be standard issue in Vietnam to insure adequate supply to fulfill its required use.

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FIRE SUPPORT

1. TACTICAL MOVES: During the period 20 January 1967 through 23 January 1968, employment of the airmobile/airborne artillery was characterized by detailed planning and coordination, aggressive execution, speed of displacement, and operating with minimum personnel and equipment.

The majority of tactical insertions were made by heliborne assaults. Normal sorties for the batteries including 800 rounds of ammo and minimum bunkering material required 18 to 20 CH-47 sorties. When required to move heavy, the sorties were increased to 25 to 30 sorties. These additional sorties were necessary when required to carry additional ammunition and sufficient bunkering material for over heading of all facilities. When medium batteries were attached they were airlifted by CH-47, CH-53 and CH-54. They required an average of 25 CH-47 sorties and 6 CH-53/CH-54 sorties. Even though the majority of moves were by heliborne assault, on occasions firing units did displace by road and sea.

2. LANDING ZONE PREPARATION: Landing Zone Preparations were carried out with maximum surprise and utilization of fire power, including Air Strikes and Gun Ships. The use of napalm was desirable on LZ's to be used as firebases in order to eliminate unnecessary work on occupation, reduce fire hazards and give the unit a better perspective of the terrain. Preparation schedules of fires were employed but time was always reserved for adjustment of artillery in case an area was not covered or was directed to be covered by the infantry battalion commander. Ideally, the fires of medium and heavy artillery would be scheduled while the light batteries were adjusted. Through close coordination between the artillery liaison officer and the lift commander, the artillery fires were lifted 1 minute prior to arrival of the escort gun ships who made passes on the LZ just prior to the insertion of the maneuver elements. Established flight patterns were agreed upon to eliminate any delay or possible aircraft from crossing the gun target line.

3. FIREBASE DEFENSE: Defensive targets were fired in around each firebase by night fall of the first night. Mutually supporting artillery units were employed to provide close-in fires and to eliminate the dependence on one battery. In addition careful consideration was given to providing direct fire in defense of the firebase. Detailed preparation and coordination was made between the infantry and the artillery in the employment of the artillery's direct fire capabilities. The bunkers on the perimeter were constructed with sufficient protection in the rear in case direct fire of the artillery was employed. Pyrotechnic signals (used prior to firing the howitzer in direct fire), were made SOP within the brigade. In addition the infantry was informed of the correct withdrawal signals from the perimeter. Mountainous terrain forced the artillery to occupy positions on the highest terrain features which limited space for howitzers parapets and caused as much as 20 feet variations in height between guns. Although minor gunnery problems resulted, these positions afforded the best security for the firebase while allowing the artillery to accomplish its fire support mission.

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4. **COUNTERMORTAR RADAR**: The AN/MPQ-4A Countermortar Radar was airlifted on numerous occasions by CH-47s and found to be quite suitable for moves of this sort. A Tactical Intelligence Center (formed from the artillery battalion personnel), was located with the radar. It maintained continuous up-to-date plots of all friendly locations, azimuth-range plots of all locations and records of all hostile mortar positions previously determined and engaged. The center proved valuable and as a result the radar section continues to maintain this capability. Collocating with a TAC CP, enables at least one of the firing batteries to use the radar for high burst and impact registrations. This type of registration takes about eight minutes to complete and conserves ammunition. The radar has proven its ability to participate in airborne operations, locate enemy mortars, adjust artillery onto targets, register batteries and even help guide lost aircraft in periods of reduced visibility.

5. **TACTICAL FIRING**: Smoke marking rounds are employed as the first round in a fire mission. Although this caused some loss in time, the added safety factor outweighs the time loss.

Harnessing and Interdiction fires were used more and more as time passed. From captured prisoners and documents, it was revealed that the H & I program helped deny the enemy critical terrain, roads, bridges, fords, campsites as well as being an excellent psychological weapon. The employment of H & I went from map inspection targets to hard intelligence received from higher Headquarters, Brigade S-2, and line elements as they moved.

6. **BATTALION FDC**: The Battalion FDC functioned entirely as a tactical rather than technical fire direction center due to the wide dispersion between firing units. The battalion assumed the mission of the countermortar and counterrocket program in the SONG E& Area. In this program the AN/MPQ-4A radar was utilized as well as all artillery and mortar units within the SONG E& Area.

7. **SITUATION**: During the period time covered by this report, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery fired 190,989 rounds and 15,049 missions in support of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

Numerous lessons learned during this period, theory, artillery capabilities, and effective application are now incorporated in the Brigade SOP. The artillery fire support and maneuver elements remain complimentary, in order to give the Brigade the maximum combat power maneuver and fire power.

**LESIONS LEARNED**

1. Splitting medium firing batteries provided few problems, however splitting of light batteries, except for very limited periods, was difficult due to the shortage of FDC personnel and equipment.

2. Firing batteries using the FADC must remain proficient in all aspects of FDC and not rely completely on the computer.

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FIRE SUPPORT
(Continued)

3. Occupation of the highest terrain features proved to be the best tactical position although some effect of the "Beehive" round is lost due to the steep slopes on these type positions.

4. When Landing Zones are covered with tall grass or bamboo, it was found that the use of napalm during the Landing Zone Preparation greatly reduced the amount of work required on occupation and helped eliminate any fire hazards.

5. The establishment of a Tactical Intelligence Center with the AH/PAQ-4A Countermortar Radar proved to be extremely beneficial as it eliminated a great deal of wasted time in locating friendly units and it provided a current enemy mortar status.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Artillery Battalion be given one utility aircraft daily to resupply the firing batteries.

2. An additional fire direction officer be assigned to each firing battery allowing better 24 hour operational capabilities.
ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT

1. COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

During the greater portion of the time, Army aviation assets have been placed in direct support or under the operational control of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. This has resulted in immediately responsive aviation support and has allowed the tactical commanders the greatest amount of flexibility and choice of action. The support rendered has varied from one assault helicopter company (AHC) to an aviation battalion (-) composed of an aviation battalion headquarters, pathfinders, two assault helicopter companies, and one assault support helicopter company (ASHC). These aviation units lived in the field with the ground units along with their attached direct support maintenance detachments. Aviation units which were habitually in direct support or under the brigade operational control were completely responsive to the needs of the brigade. In particular, the ground commanders were able to exploit current intelligence information, and rapid changes in the tactical situation were pursued to the fullest. Aviation assets placed in general support of the brigade were less responsive to the ground commanders due to the fact that the lead time for combat assaults was required to be programmed 5 days in advance and aircraft requests submitted in excess of 24 hours prior to an operation. Rarely did intelligence provide information offering opportunities to locate such an elusive enemy that was compatible with such a rigid system. An example of a typical response in which Army aviation assets in general support on a mission basis provide, is the unit which comes under attack and must wait for over one hour plus flying time, which may be another forty minutes, for gunships to be on station. This is costly in terms of lives and does not provide the timely support required under the circumstances.

2. MANEUVER

The lift capability of one or more AHCs and CH-47 aircraft from an ASHC enable all four battalions to be employed in the area of operation (AO) to conduct search and destroy operations. Infantry battalions could deploy individual rifle companies in aggressive sweeping actions to clear an area because the capability existed to immediately reinforce, extract, or redeploy units to fix the enemy. This airlift capability to air assault any size unit - reconnaissance platoon, rifle company, infantry battalion or to deploy the entire maneuver elements of the brigade - resulted in a highly mobile strike force. This enabled the brigade to effectively conduct operations in an AO many times larger than that of comparable units which were restricted by the lack of responsive aviation support and forced to be tied to their fire base in a static situation.

3. FIRE SUPPORT

The gunships of the AHCs provided an indispensable aerial platform from which suppressive fire support was rendered during combat assaults and to supplement artillery fire in support of units in contact during both day and night.
operations. Gunships immediately responsive to the mission of escorting medical evacuation of critically wounded personnel allowed extraction of wounded by providing armed escort to the unarmed dust off ships while units were still heavily engaged. In addition, a quick reaction team composed of a pair of gunships and a flare ship to fly armed reconnaissance at dusk and dawn around the local area and available during the hours of darkness discouraged the enemy from mortating the brigade headquarters.

4. RESUPPLY

Each maneuver battalion required approximately 18,000 lbs of water, rations, barrier material and ammunition resupply daily. Logistical support of four infantry battalions was accomplished by CH-47 aircraft wholesaling the supplies to each of the fire bases. Each battalion then utilized two UH-1 aircraft daily to retail the bulk of these supplies to their rifle companies. The tactical situation and terrain seldom permitted landing zones larger than for one ship which would accommodate an aircraft larger than a utility helicopter. With the battalion command and control UH-1 aircraft in addition to a utility aircraft placed under battalion control daily all units were kept well supplied to include a steady flow of personnel returning for duty, hot meals, mail, and clean laundry to the line companies which is essential for high morale within a combat unit.

5. AVIATION MAINTENANCE

Aviation assets OPCON to the brigade were capable of living in the field and maintaining their aircraft with the same aircraft availability as those operating from fixed installations. Special consideration to performing certain maintenance during daylight hours was necessary to obtain maximum efficiency and results. Certain pieces of heavier equipment TOE to the AHC are desirable in a lighter configuration that are capable of performing the same mission and would be more readily airlifted in C-130 aircraft. An example of this is the 5-ton wrecker which could be replaced with a 2½-ton truck equipped with a boom. Heavy maintenance vans which were not air transportable required road convey upon deployment of the brigade to a new area and no direct support maintenance could be conducted during these 3-4 day displacement periods. In those areas where aircraft support was provided on a mission basis, if an aircraft developed maintenance problems there was not always a replacement aircraft available and maintenance facilities were not available other than back at the parent aviation unit.

6. POL AND REARMING POINTS

POL and rearming points should be administered by respective personnel trained as pol specialists and armers for an effective operation. These personnel are TOE to aviation units, and are not found in the infantry brigade. Trained POL specialists and armers provide a major contribution to flawless
aviation support. Operations involving aviation units in direct support of the brigade provide these personnel and the brigade did not encounter difficulties; however, there were numerous cases involving aviation in general support that these personnel were not provided. This necessitated that clerk typists be used to operate the rearming points. Heavy ground contact requiring frequent rearming of gunships were hindered by the use of personnel not familiar with aircraft ordnance caused unnecessary delays. In addition, an unskilled soldier uncrating and arming aerial rockets was unable to perform the duties of a trained armorer to trouble shoot and make immediate repairs of malfunctioning weapon systems or faulty ordnance. Operation of fuel pumps, filter systems and dispensing equipment required a POL specialist to preclude similar lengthy delay in aircraft turn around time.

7. LESSONS LEARNED

a. Aviation assets in direct support or under the operational control of a brigade provide the best aviation support to find and fix the type of elusive enemy with which we are faced. General support for basic day to day aviation needs does not meet the requirement of being both immediately available and therefore responsive to the commander.

b. One assault helicopter company and several CH-47 aircraft is the minimum aviation support required to conduct aggressive search and destroy operations. This provides the brigade the necessary assets to conduct intelligence gathering missions, provides for operational requirements to assault maneuver elements, and enables sustained resupply of all units in the field down to company level that have to cut their own helicopter landing zones.

c. Armed gunships and a flare ship on standby alert is necessary to provide continuous 24 hour coverage for medical evacuation by unarmed dust off ships and to provide immediate fire support for units under attack.

d. Heavy equipment in the assault helicopter company and the direct support maintenance detachment TOE to airborne units should be replaced with lighter equipment, and be completely air transportable to provide continuous aviation maintenance support.
logistics

During 1967 the brigade moved eleven times throughout 1st and 2nd Corps Tactical Zones. The concept under which the brigade operated and the frequent air moves required the maintaining of the base camp at Phan Rang. Therefore, the brigade split into the forward element of about 4000 personnel and 1000 to run the base camp.

Phan Rang Base Camp

The Support Battalion is charged with the operation of the brigade base camp. This complex houses the administrative, logistical and rear detachments of the maneuver elements of the brigade. It has been found through experience that the maneuver elements and the combat support units neither need nor can they effectively move with all of their TO/E equipment. A large number of vehicles and much equipment which is normally employed in a static situation or in conventional warfare have been left permanently at Phan Rang. Should this equipment ever be needed, it can be flown from the base camp to the forward area. This technique enables the combat and combat support elements to configure themselves to be airlifted by C-130 aircraft and move in a matter of three days.

The Support Battalion maintains at the base camp the base of supplies, the repair parts and the back up maintenance for the entire brigade. This basic load of supplies and repair parts is maintained at a fifteen day level and is used to supplement requirements from the brigade forward.

It has been found that the frequency of moves made by the brigade does not allow for requisitions placed on supply sources in the forward area to be filled thru normal procedures. If the item is not immediately available, the brigade will be gone by the time the due out is filled. The base camp is used to fill requisitions of this nature. It has open accounts at Cam Ranh Bay Depot and furnishes a consistent source of supply for items which have a long requisitioning lead time. These items are requisitioned by elements in the forward area through Phan Rang. The base camp then places the demand on Cam Ranh Bay Depot. When the items arrive they are flown to the requesting unit regardless of its location. The stockage of supplies maintained at Phan Rang is also used to offset the initial impact of moving the brigade into an area which is not prepared to support it and allows the local supply source to build up stockage for our use.

A main consideration in this system is the availability of scheduled C-123 or C-130 aircraft between Phan Rang Air Base and the forward area.

The Forward Area Logistical Concept

Prior to moving into an area of operations, the Brigade S-4 and the Forward Support Element (FSE) Commander arrange for a local source of supply thru 1st Logistical Command. This is normally done by the establishment of a Forward Logistical Area (FSA) unit from 1st Logistical Command. The brigade requirements are presented to the Logistical Command thru the tactical headquarters under which we will be operating.
Advance planning conferences normally will determine the supplies and services that will be furnished to the brigade during an operation by the Logistical Command. Based on this estimate the Support Battalion is tasked to furnish from its assets a Forward Support Element (FSE).

The FSE has the responsibility of furnishing to the brigade complete logistical support. Based on the amount of support that can be obtained from the Forward Support Area Unit, the disposition of the combat elements, and the distance between the forward and rear areas, the FSE will be internally tailored by the Support Battalion. The FSE has had as few as 29 personnel (Operation Klamath Falls) and as many as 218 personnel (Operation Wheeler). Its size depends on the amount of support furnished by outside sources.

The Support Battalion with its FSE has the responsibility of furnishing the brigade with direct support maintenance, all classes of supply, medical service (normally a forward medical company), administrative services to include personnel, finance, postal services, and transportation and movement control. Laundry, bath and graves registration services are not TOE to the brigade and are always furnished by Log Command. The FSE deploys with, and maintains a basic load of supplies and repair parts. It has been found that even with advance planning this brigade is moved on such relatively short notice that the logistical system cannot always respond quickly enough to establish a sufficient supply base at our new location. The brigade has been sustained by this basic load and resupply from base camp during the initial stages of our operations. The FSE resupplies itself from either the Forward Support Area Unit if the items are available or the base camp if they are not.

Since the majority of the brigade's vehicles are left at the base camp, it is necessary to be augmented by a transportation platoon from either the Forward Support Area Unit or the Support Battalion at Than Rang. The former is preferable as it cuts down on air movement requirements. These vehicles are used to support the brigade from a centralized source, the FSE.

**MOVEMENT OF THE BRIGADE TO THE AREA OF OPERATION**

The brigade moves itself from one area of operation to another by either land, air or sea, or by combinations of any of the above. The brigade transportation office is located with the Brigade S-4 office and is responsible for planning and moving the brigade under the staff supervision of the S-4. On receipt of warning orders for air movement the departure and arrival airfields are determined. A type II C-130 capability is required at both ends. The Brigade Air Liaison Officer (TAO) from the Air Force works with the Transportation Officer in securing the airfields, obtaining an Air Force Combat Control Team, determining the number of sorties required and making an estimate of aircraft availability.

Each battalion and separate company maintains current load plans and submits their requirements to the Transportation Officer in the terms of rolling stock, pounds of cargo and passengers. This is converted into total tonnage and sorties by the Brigade Transportation Officer and the TAO.
A request for air movement is requested from the tactical headquarters to which the brigade is operational at the time. The brigade can move completely from one forward base to another with 220 C-130 sorties. The movement time for an all weather, 24 hour airfield is three days. Normally the movement sequence is as follows:

- Advance party
- Jump Command Post
- Engineer Company (-)
- Infantry battalion task forces
- Artillery battalion (-)
- FSE
- Rear Element of brigade headquarters

Exceptions have been made and a task force of one or two battalions and a jump CP have been air assaulted into an area of operation prior to the full brigade movement. This does not reduce the sorties requirement since the task force must be flown to a staging area from the departure airfield. The Support Battalion is tasked to run the departure and arrival airfields. The sea and land moves are planned using the same tonnage figures as for air movement.

CONCLUSIONS

It is necessary to establish a base camp for the brigade. This enables the brigade to configure itself to move rapidly from operation to operation by C-130. The base camp then furnishes a firm source of supply to the forward area.

An FSE is tailored by the Support Battalion to support each operation. It works in conjunction with 1st Logistical Command and the base camp to furnish full support to the brigade forward.

A basic load must be carried by the FSE to offset the Logistical Command's initial response time in stocking a Forward Support Area unit with the brigade's requirements.

As much lead time as possible must be given to 1st Log Command to pre-stock supplies and furnish services for the brigade.

Brigade must constantly purge itself to keep in a light configuration, ready to move. Loading plans must be current and estimates accurate to move efficiently on minimum number of aircraft, vehicles or ships.

The light configuration, the unneeded equipment left at the base camp and use of the FSE, allow the brigade to deploy without being hampered by a large logistical tail. The brigade moves rapidly and "plugs in" to the nearest Logistical Command Area unit for its support and services.
The campaign through the SONG VE Valley is a clear example of Civil Affairs supporting a political-military objective. In this case, the objective was to deny to the enemy the human resources, food production, and shelter afforded him in the SONG VE Valley.

The geography of the SONG VE Valley facilitated the conduct of the operation. The valley runs generally north and south for approximately 15 kilometers with the SONG VE River flowing down the center. The valley is four kilometers at the widest point and one kilometer at the most narrow. It is bordered by rugged jungle covered mountains on both sides with easy access only at the extreme ends. (See Fig. E-1).

On 5 June 1967, the Brigade S-5 was directed to prepare a plan for evacuating the inhabitants of the SONG VE Valley. The evacuation was requested by the QUANG NGAI Province Chief as the government did not have the resources to protect and control the people residing in the valley.

Coordination was immediately undertaken with Province and District officials, local MACV personnel and OCO (Office of Civilian Operations). The Province Chief agreed to furnish three teams from the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit. OCO agreed to furnish three Vietnamese interpreters, supplies for establishing a refugee settlement, and three armed propaganda teams from their CHIEU HOI center. It was also learned that the chiefs of the two villages within the valley were living in exile from the VC in NGHIA HANH and would assist in moving the people. The district capital of NGHIA HANH was selected as the resettlement site and the Province Chief selected separate locations for Vietnamese and Montagnards. It was planned to utilize ARVN vehicles to transport the people from the valley to NGHIA HANH. An engineer survey was begun to determine the amount of repairs necessary to make the roads trafficable. Under this plan consideration was not given to the movement of livestock or food.

On 10 June 1967, the Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, directed that the livestock be evacuated with the people. Plans were adjusted accordingly. A survey of the population and cattle was initiated. Local GVN officials had no information regarding the size of the valley population. An attempt was made to count the cattle by aerial observation but this proved impractical as well as dangerous due to hostile fire. An estimate was finally achieved by counting all of the houses shown on 1:50,000 maps of the area and assuming five inhabitants and one head of cattle per house. Roughly two thousand houses were counted with the resulting estimate of 10,000 inhabitants and 2,000 head of cattle. The cattle estimate was cut to 1,000 head to allow for those that would probably be killed or scattered in the operation.

The engineer survey disclosed that an extensive effort would be needed to repair the road. The population estimate, combined with the transport available and the engineer survey resulted in an unfavorable time estimate for the opera-
tion. To preclude delaying future brigade operations and to minimize the hardships imposed on the refugees, it was decided to make the evacuation by aircraft. Accordingly, aircraft were requested and six CH-47 type aircraft were allocated.

On 15 June, the interpreters and Armed Propaganda teams from OCO, the Province Reconnaissance Unit teams, and the two village chiefs were brought to the brigade base camp. Here they were briefed on their participation in the evacuation which was to move with the battalions and explain to the refugees the reason for resettlement and to assure them that families would not be separated and that shelter and assistance were available to them in NGHIA HANH. They also were to urge the senior family member present to remain with his cattle as they were driven north. These people were invaluable in preventing panic among the inhabitants and pointing out known and suspected VIET CONG.

The tactical plan called for the 1st Battalion (Abn), 327th Infantry to assault into the north end of the SONG VE Valley on 16 June 1967 to block the northern egress routes. On the following day the 2d Battalion (Abn), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Abn), 502d Infantry began cordon and search operations and evacuation of the civilian population from the eastern and western portions of the valley respectively. The brigade LRRP Platoon was inserted behind the two sweep battalions in the south to maintain surveillance of the southern egress routes. (See Fig. E-1). An ARVN infantry Company accompanied the southern battalions to assist in herding cattle. As the sweep progressed, nor.4. problems were encountered with the ARVN company. The ARVN soldiers felt it beneath their dignity to herd cattle and therefore commenced to shoot the animals they found. The company was ordered extracted and US troops assumed the task of herders. (See Fig. E-2).

As the troops swept forward, the homes of the inhabitants were left intact. Normal rules of engagement were followed and no wanton destruction of property was tolerated. Upon completion of the operation, chemical defoliation of the valley was accomplished. (Note: the structures in the valley were later destroyed when it was found that enemy units were utilizing them for shelter after the evacuation).

The refugees were allowed to take with them whatever personal possessions they could carry. As groups were assembled, the CH-47's landed and flew them to NGHIA HANH. Extractions continued up to 23 June 1967 with nearly 100 CH-47 sorties being flown. As the people exited the aircraft they were lined up and counted. A MILHAP Team screened all the refugees and treated them. (See Figs. E-3 and E-4).

On 22 June 1967 a total of 11%6 head of livestock were turned over to GVN control for final movement to NGHIA HANH and return to their owners. Awaiting the refugees in NGHIA HANH were sufficient quantities of bamboo, cement mix, roofing tin, food, and household utensils for them to establish new homes. OCO also provided funds to pay the people for building their new dwellings.
On 24 June 1967 more cattle were discovered. NGHIA HANH could not provide herders and therefore CIDG personnel drove 145 head of cattle into MINH LONG.

Several large caches of rice and salt were discovered in the valley. Wherever practical, these caches were extracted and turned over to GVN authorities. (See Figs. E-5 and E-6).

The final results of the SONG VE Valley operation are as follows:

- Refugees relocated: 8465
- Animals extracted:
  - Cattle: 1149
  - Water buffalo: 192
  - Swine: 66
  - Chickens: 183
  - Ducks: 88
- Food captured:
  - Rice: 79.5 tons
  - Salt: 27.5 tons

A number of lessons were learned, or emphasized, by this operation. The first of these is population movement and control. The decision to move refugees must be a joint US/GVN agreement. The Province Chief must resolve the problem of housing and care of the displaced persons. The method of movement must be carefully analyzed to insure the most practical means is utilized. Experience showed that dwellings and crops should be destroyed to preclude their use by the enemy or act as an incentive for the people to return.

The second lesson concerns food and livestock. How will food caches be handled? Who will extract food caches? How will it be coordinated? The most expedient way of handling this problem is to get NF/PFF or CIDG forces from the District Headquarters in which the food cache was found. These forces can provide limited security at the cache site and provide the labor source to bag the food. If this is not possible, then an attempt should be made to get paramilitary forces from a neighboring district.

If they send forces, then they receive the food cache which is extracted. The means of moving the indigenous forces into the area is by air, or foot, depending on the tactical situation. The food cache is then flown from the point of the find to the particular District Headquarters. Large livestock such as cattle, present a problem of a different sort. There are two ways of handling this particular problem. One way is to allow indigenous forces to herd the cattle through the area to GVN controlled areas. The second method is to use US troops to drive the cattle through the area and then turn them over to GVN authorities. Present at the turn-over should be Province Officials, the District Chief and representatives of the National Police. These GVN officials then have the responsibility of driving the cattle to the refugee camp.
Communications presented the largest single problem. Effective coordination cannot be accomplished without proper communications. Communications between the refugee camp, tactical units, supporting aircraft and the base camp are essential. The lesson learned is that it is desirable to have a single frequency for all units involved. During the operation the only way to maintain contact with all elements concerned was to shift from one frequency to another and by using land lines extensively. The drawback to this was the delay encountered and frequent minor misunderstandings.

Use of Sector/Province and Sub-Sector/District personnel, both indigenous and US forces, was not a difficult problem, but a most important lesson was learned. It was found that assistance from Province level is absolutely essential; and this includes the Province Chief and his advisor. These people can make the wheels turn; and when they are behind a particular project, the project will usually succeed. Also needed to push any particular project along is the assistance of the District Chief and his advisor. The Province Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), serves as the Province Chief's personal reconnaissance unit, and is an effective intelligence unit for the Province. These units are helpful because of their knowledge of the people in a given area, as well as enemy activity.

Next is the OCO (now known as CORDS) representative who, working at the province level, will make sure that needed supplies are obtained and distributed to refugee camps well in advance of the refugees' arrival. Lastly are the PSYOPS teams, interpreters, National Policemen and Hamlet/Village Chiefs. These agencies work directly with the unit and assist in control of the displaced population. Their evacuation assistance proved to be invaluable.

The SONG VE Valley operation was the largest Civil Affairs project ever undertaken by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. It was an overwhelming success and a model for future operations.
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