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AUTHORITY
AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980
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AGDA (M) (10 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 701074 17 June 1970


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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
DISTRIBUTION: NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT (ARMY) ATTN: FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65 R2)

1. Operations: Significant activities

   a. General: The reporting quarter saw increased emphasis placed upon pacification in addition to continued support of tactical operations. To enable the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion to effectively fulfill its mission requirements additional field teams were authorized from among 4th PSYOP Group assets. Currently in support of II Field Force, Vietnam, and its 15 brigade size OPCON units are a total of 34 field teams. On 1 December 1969, the battalion was reorganized in accordance with General Order 668, Headquarters US Army, Pacific, and MTOE 33-500G. Improvements have been made in the personnel and equipment structure; however, a Department of Army approved and published TOE has not been received to implement these improvements. A proposed organizational breakout allowing mission accomplishment, security, and flexibility has been prepared and staffed and is attached as Inclosure 1. On 4 December 1969, the 6th PSYOP Battalion successfully underwent the US Army, Vietnam, Annual General Inspection with no unsatisfactory ratings. Extensive preparations are underway in view of the imminent Command Maintenance Management Inspection. In an effort to insure a successful pacification program Operation "Tune-In" was launched in mid January. Although a basic principle of PSYOP "Tune-In" was designed to learn more about the hopes and aspirations of the Vietnamese people. A letter of instruction for this operation is attached as Inclosure 2.

   b. Operational and Production Totals:

      (1) Leaflet Requests: 751

      (2) Leaflets Printed: 71,839,050

      (3) Leaflets Disseminated: 313,127,500
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65 R2)

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

   a. Personnel. None.

   b. Intelligence. None.

   c. Operations.

   (1) Cooperation with Civilian PSTOP Agencies.

      (a) OBSERVATION: Coordination with civil agencies frequently uncovers areas which are exploitable for PSTOP purposes, particularly areas in the field of pacification.

      (b) EVALUATION: Field team leaders are finding that coordination and mutual cooperation with agencies such as VIS and APA/PSTOP are paying dividends in their pacification operations. These agencies are in a position to suggest themes, provide supplemental films and related equipment and to act as a go-between between the field team leader and higher supporting or supported agencies.

      (c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that field team personnel be encouraged to visit these PSTOP agencies and enlist their assistance. The field team member should also be encouraged to offer his advice and assistance in order to cement better working relationships.

   (2) Improper Conduct of Allied Forces Personnel.

      (a) OBSERVATION: While supporting cordon and search operations in Thuan Tien and Sao Nam hamlets, Long Khanh province, the HE team leader learned, through face-to-face communication with the populace, that Allied Forces personnel conducting the search were involved in several cases of theft. The team leader immediately informed the appropriate higher authority who stopped the thefts.

      (b) EVALUATION: Information gathered through face-to-face communication and channeled through appropriate channels for immediate and effective action can eliminate resentment and sing from improper conduct of Allied Forces personnel.
Such incidents, if allowed to continue unchecked, could result in loss of cooperation, and even distrust of the Allies by the villagers in such an operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That field units be alerted for instances of misconduct on the part of troops participating in cordon operations and to immediately report such misconduct to proper authorities.

(3) Importance of Specific "Gestures" and Regular "Features".

(a) OBSERVATION: The regular arrival of a sound truck can be eagerly awaited by villagers if specific benefits are anticipated. For instance, a volleyball set can be carried for children to play with during the team's scheduled visits. The children will quickly flock to the truck upon its arrival. Additionally, gestures of a community-service nature such as building small bridges can provide villagers with a permanent reminder of US friendliness.

(b) EVALUATION: Specific gestures and regular features by HE teams markedly increase villagers feelings of welcome and friendship toward the team and inhabitants are more likely to relay intelligence information. Good turns by teams remain in evidence after departure of the team and continue to improve public relations even in their absence.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All PSTOP teams, especially HE, be constantly alert for opportunities to improve American-Vietnamese relations, and take necessary action whenever possible.

(4) Friendship with ARVN.

(a) OBSERVATION: In view of both existing tensions between American and ARVN troops and the process of Vietnamization, PSTOP teams are particularly well suited to measures of cooperation and friendship. Recently, a Kit Carson Scout attached to a supported unit was scheduled for release due to a foot injury. A battalion PSTOP team offered to take him along on its missions, since he could help the team safeguard its equipment even though he could not walk. Such measures suggest to both ARVN's and villagers that Americans care for their allies and friends.

(b) EVALUATION: Conscientious display of friendship with Vietnamese military and civilians is very effective "PSTOP of the Deed" and has a major bearing upon the opinion in which villagers hold the team.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all teams actively seek opportunities for joint cooperation and personnel friendship with allied counterparts.
(5) **Inserting a "PSYOP Rally Force" Into an Area.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The lack of immediate results of the Da Klia operation seems to have been due to alerting the enemy to our plans in time for them to take countermeasures.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The gradual build-up of the PSYOP effort in the area, climaxing by the "Rally Force" moving into the area, setting up a perimeter, and broadcasting rally appeals, would theoretically be ideal for a group of people who might be hesitant, but would be able to rally. This was not quite the case with this group; whereas these people might be somewhat hesitant to rally because they fear the ARVN and allies, they are not able to rally at their discretion due to the few guards with them. The guards were probably cognizant of exactly what was taking place and increased their vigilance over the people, making escape very difficult.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** When the attempt is made to induce such a group to rally, there must be two conditions met: first, they must be predisposed to rally, and second, they must be given the opportunity. The first goal must be carefully accomplished in order not to give away your intentions and alert the enemy, thereby decreasing chances of creating the second condition. Surprise is an almost mandatory ingredient to an effort which would allow the people an opportunity to rally. The actions necessary to create both situations will vary with conditions of the target audience.

(6) **US Units Providing Assets for Army of the Republic of Vietnam PSYOP.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Whether it be due to unresponsiveness of their own PSYOP support or due to just not wanting to bother with conducting their own program, certain Army of the Republic of Vietnam units are relying heavily on US units for PSYOP support. Moreover, commanders of the US units are showing a propensity to provide support to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam PSYOP programs, whether it is requested or not.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Because the Army of the Republic of Vietnam units and US units in question are sharing an area of operation, the American commanders feel that they are partly responsible for the PSYOP program in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam portion of the area of operation. However, in view of the goal of Vietnamization of the war effort, we are hurting ourselves by not allowing the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to rely upon their own assets for developing material to suit their own needs.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** A command policy from II Field Force, Vietnam or higher level be issued regarding US support of Army of the Republic of Vietnam PSYOP programs.
AVGM-6C
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65 R2)

(7) Local Image of the PSYOP Team (Tune-In)

(a) OBSERVATION: While asking questions of local villagers for PSYOP feedback purposes, field teams have occasionally discovered that a particular practice of theirs was resented for some reason not apparent to the team... loud broadcasts at a certain corner irritates an old person on the block with an ear ailment, a certain family resents posters being affixed to a certain tree for superstitious reasons, etc.

(b) EVALUATION: Villagers are too timid or polite to complain initially if a team creates a wrong impression for some reason. If team members ask for indication on how they may improve their activities, villagers may be more open in their reactions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the field teams develop the habit of asking for on-the-spot critiques from persons in regularly-visited areas.

d. Organisation. None.
e. Training. None.
f. Logistics. None.
g. Communications.

(1) Panel Mounted Control Box for Vehicular Mounted Loudspeaker System.

(a) OBSERVATION: The remote control box for the vehicular mounted loudspeaker system is frequently in the way of both passengers and equipment when not mounted. The installation of the control box on the truck dash panel has provided an extremely accessible location and yet is out of the way.

(b) EVALUATION: Frequently feedback develops or other mechanical situations occur requiring constant adjustments to the set. With the remote control box in this position, the driver can easily control the loudspeaker system. The suggested modification can be accomplished within a few minutes and requires only a drill and two bolts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each field team evaluate their own system and consider the suggested modification.

h. Material. None.
i. Other. None.
AVCOM-6C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65 R2)

2 Incl

D. W. ALBERTSON
MAJ, FA
Acting Commander

Incl 1 wd HQ, DA
1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion.

2. Reference item concerning Cooperation with Civilian PSYOP Agencies, page 2, paragraph 2c(1); concur. As the redeployment program frees more of our field teams from tactical unit support, increasing liaison and support can be provided to the provinces to place the emphasis on pacification and rural development.

3. Reference item concerning Improper Conduct of Allied Forces Personnel, page 2, paragraph 2c(2); concur. Such occurrences do much to destroy US/FWMAF image and, further, could seriously effect the credibility of any future PSYOP campaigns. In addition, such actions on the part of allied soldiers are good propaganda tools for the enemy.

4. Reference item concerning the Importance of Specific "Gestures" and Regular "Features", page 3, paragraph 2c(3); concur. Such attempts to establish rapport are the very heart of a successful face-to-face campaign.

5. Reference item concerning Friendship with ARVN, page 3, paragraph 2c(4); concur. The HE team is ideal for presenting propaganda on a person-to-person basis in consolidation operations. One of the basic rules to assist the propagandist, involved in face-to-face communication, to achieve the sense of identification necessary is the stress on areas of agreement that exist.

6. Reference item concerning Inserting a "PSYOP Rally Force" Into an Area, page 4, paragraph 2c(5); concur. Similar attempts by other units to establish mobile rallying points have also been unsuccessful.

7. Reference item concerning US Units Providing Assets for Army of the Republic
of Vietnam PSYOP, page 4, paragraph 2c(6); concur. The logistical problems of the POLWAR units will not be solved at the same pace as the improvement and modernization program unless command emphasis is placed on this area. This headquarters will publish command guidance in its next PSYOP Supply Information Letter (no. 6) in February.

8. Reference item concerning Local Image of the PSYOP Team (Tune-In) page 5, paragraph 2c(7); concur. Sensitivity to audience reception is a basic facet of successful face-to-face communication.

9. Reference item concerning Panel Mounted Control Box for Vehicular Mounted Loudspeaker System, page 5, paragraph 2g(1); non-concur. A fixed mounting destroys the intent of the control box. The control box was designed to enable the team to safely control the loudspeaker system several yards away from the actual loudspeaker thus avoiding hostile fire that might be directed against the source of the sound. Even were we to deal solely in pacified areas, effective face-to-face communications cannot be conducted from inside a truck. A bracket device for temporary storage would be acceptable.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copy furnished:
CO, 6th PSYOP Bn
AVFBC-RE-H (15 Feb 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65 R2)

DA, HQ II FFORCEn, APO San Francisco 96266. 3 MAR 1970

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion for the period ending 31 January 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W.C. BARTLE
CPT AGG
Asst AG
AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (RCJ CSFDR-65 R2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 31 MAR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. E. MICHELS
MAJ, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy fum:
HQ, II FFORCEV
6th Psychological Operations Bn

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. Ozark
CPT, AGO
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction for Operation "Tune-In"

1. The conduct of psychological operations in South Vietnam is a means of changing and/or influencing the behavioral patterns of the people of South Vietnam to conform to or believe in the stated policies of the GVN/Allied governments.

2. The main vehicle of influencing the opinions of the people is through the pacification program, the conducting of MEDCAP's, NiteCAP's and various Civic Action projects in order to prove to the people by example that the GVN/Allied governments are actively seeking to better the nation of South Vietnam and bring peace to this country.

3. As part of the pacification program, the role of communicating with the people should not be overlooked. For it is only by communicating with the people of South Vietnam that one can better understand their hopes, aspirations, likes and dislikes. In short, one can better find out what makes a particular person "tick" and, in turn, have the South Vietnamese hold the GVN/Allied personnel in better esteem.

4. For the purpose of better enabling the 6th PSTOP Bn. field teams to communicate with the South Vietnamese people, the 6th PSTOP Bn. has initiated Operation "Tune-In". The purpose of the operation is two-fold: to provide the field team members a vehicle by which they can establish a rapport with the Vietnamese people, and thus become better "Psy-operators"; to see if some PSTOP relevant feedback can be extracted from communicating with the people. However, it should be kept in mind that the building of a rapport with the people takes priority over feedback gained. It is encouraged that only significant data, such as belief that the Americans are withdrawing because they have been defeated should be reported.

5. General guidelines to follow would be:
   a. Observe Vietnamese customs to avoid giving the impression of being arrogant.
   b. Be polite, friendly, and don't force yourself upon the people. Gain their confidence first. Possible play with the children, or allow the interpreter to make initial contact, and then have the people invite you to join them.
   c. Don't take notes during the conversation. This makes a person hesitant, and may tell you only what he thinks you want to hear. Do take notes after the conversation is over, and you have left the village or hamlet. Remember, this is not an interrogation, but an informal "chat".
   d. Avoid asking for criticism about the GVN.
   e. Be interested in what they are saying.

Inclosure 2
f. Conduct conversation in a relaxed atmosphere, such as after movies, during MedCap's, etc.

g. Use VIS or RDC personnel to help. It is their job to know what is going on in a certain hamlet or village.

h. Discuss what you are going to do with the village or hamlet chief before doing it. It is rather offensive if this is not done.

i. Be discreet with your weapon.

6. Enclosed are some suggested questions. They are not to be strictly adhered to, but only used as a guideline. Any other topics which are found to be suitable in communicating with the South Vietnamese people should also be asked.
LIST OF SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

1. How many people in your family?
2. How long have you lived here?
3. How much of Vietnam have you seen? Have you ever been to Hue, Saigon, Vungtau, etc.?
4. Does the market sell as many goods as it did three years ago?
5. Where do you get the building materials for your home?
6. How many languages do you speak?
7. Is VC taxation in this area as bad as it was three years ago?
8. Do you have adequate medical facilities?
9. Does the sound of artillery or helicopters disturb your sleep?
10. How was the rice harvest this year?
11. Tell me something about Vietnamese folklore and legend.
12. Tell me something about the educational system of Vietnam.
13. Tell me something about your local customs.
14. What type of food do you most commonly eat?
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.**

CO, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion

**Report Date:**
15 February 1970

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N/A

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N/A

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701074

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