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SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AG
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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On 1 August 1969 CPT James M. Starling assumed command of the 402nd Transportation Company (TT).

On 2 August 1969, The Asbury Victory was moored at Cat Lai Buoy three. The buoys were out of alignment, but this was the only available berth. The Protective marking is excluded from automatic termination (Para 18, AR 345-15).
malalignment of the buoy was compounded by a 12 - 14 knot tidal current running
abeam of the vessel, causing an extreme strain on the mooring lines. Five
lines were used both fore and aft to secure the vessel. At approximately 2235
hrs, 2 Aug, the ship broke loose from the stern (upriver) buoy and swung around
with the outgoing tide. The ship was swung back and secured with six lines
aboard the stern (upriver) buoy. At approximately 0310 hrs, 3 Aug, the stern
lines parted again and the ship swung with the outgoing tide. The CO 11th Crew En
recommended that the vessel master move downriver and drop anchor, however the vessel
master would not move the ship without a pilot. The vessel swung with the tide
until 0800, 4 Aug when the pilot arrived. It took approximately 1½ hrs to
unfoul the ship’s anchor from the buoy chain and an additional 3 hr to move
downriver to a safe anchorage.

On 5 August 1969, the A&T tug Seminole arrived in Cat Lai Harbor with barge
BC6681, loaded with 421 short tons of ammunition. The tug boat did not check
in with operations personnel but merely left the barge at the buoy. Operations
personnel saw the barge being left and went to investigate. Upon arrival at
the location, it was discovered that the barge was listing to one side, that
the barge was not secured, and that all the cargo had shifted. The list was
due to a hole in the barge. The barge was placed alongside of hatch No. 3
of the Asbury Victory, and the cargo was cross-loaded onto another barge. The
operation required two stevedore gangs, employed at extra labor rates, and took
41 hrs and 45 min to complete. This cross-loading also caused delay in the
discharge of the Asbury Victory. The water was pumped out of BC6681, bringing
the hole above the water line until the barge could be repaired.

On 7 August 1969, the downriver buoy at Cat Lai was raised and repaired. This
buoy had sunk on 31 July 69 immediately after the Occidental Victory had been
secured to it. A five inch hole was discovered in the top of the buoy which
had apparently been caused by a sharp object, disproving the theory that it
had been punctured by a tugboat.

On 7 August 1969, the 1099th Transportation Company (MB) brought its deadline
rate down to zero when a 3 ton vehicle was returned from field maintenance.

On 7 August 1969, the LCM 8195 was turned over to Harbor Craft Company (Provi-
sional) for use as a floating barge repair facility.

On 11 August 1969, the 402nd Transportation Company (TT) received its annual 1st
Log CMMI. The company was rated unsatisfactory with a 66% overall score.

On 12 August 1969, at approximately 0200 hrs, two (2) 107mm rockets were fired
into Cat Lai Harbor. One round landed harmlessly in the water; however the
second round hit the Kimbro Victory, which was berthed at Cat Lai one. The
round pierced the ship and exploded inside hatch four. Which was empty. Other
hatches were loaded with ammunition. Major Abernathy, CMAC Arty, examined the

2

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vessel, compared information with reports from flash observation towers, and
determined that the rocket was fired from a patch of nipa palm approximately
100 - 200 meters from the east wall of the Cat Lai Compound. Maj Thuong,
Sensitive Area Commander at Cat Lai, called a security meeting on 14 August
1969 and the situation was discussed. It was decided that the nipa palm
should be burned or cut down from the area where the rockets were fired. This
has since been accomplished.

On 12 August 1969, four LCM-3s returned to Cat Lai from a supply mission to
the 277th Supply and Service Battalion located at Try Ninh. Each boat hauled
a 12 ton S&P trailer loaded with cargo. This was the second commitment to
this area for boats from the 1099th Transportation Company (MB). There were
no enemy contacts during either trip.

The dolphins at Alpha Pier Cogido Barge Site, were completed on 14 August 1969
and the pier was immediately put into use.

On 15 August 1969, the Cogido Barge Site received several small arms rounds.
These caused a temporary halt in operations.

On 19 August 1969, a class on marihuana and drugs was given to 35 officers and
key NCOs of the 11th Trans Bn (Tml) by a CID team. Graphic demonstrations by
the CID experts gave the interested audience a clearer picture of the hazards
of various narcotics. Major areas of discussion included legal search, source
and effects of marihuana, and recent marihuana rulings by the Military Court
of Appeals.

On 22 August 1969 local national stevedores staged a sit-down strike at 1400
hrs at Cogido. Stated reason for this was that "the work is too dangerous." Negotiations with the group failed to resolve the problem. They were told
to go back to work or they would be fired. Three of the fourteen returned to
work. The rest were informed they would be fired.

On 21 August 1969, the LCM-14 received from two to six AK47 rounds from the
river bank just south of Cat Lai Harbor. There was no damage.

On 1 September 1969, security lights powered by a 5 kw generator were installed
on the island at Cogido. The CO of the 4-2nd TC acted on suggestion of LTC
McLean (4th TC PM) that lights on this small island would substantially improve
the waterfront security at this critical barge site.

On 2 September 1969, Mr Toyama, Saigon Support Command, initiated crane opera-
tions and maintenance classes in the 4-02nd Transportation Company area. This
will result in a sufficient number of crane operators trained, licensed, and
maintenance oriented.

On 3 September 1969, the LCM-14 became stuck on a sandbar in the vicinity of
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

VC Island as it was hauling a load of ammunition from Cat Lai to the Cogido Barge Site. A PBR also got stuck as it tried to extricate the LCM. Adequate security was provided for the crafts and they remained mired in the mud until the tide came in six hours later. The LCM-14 was damaged in efforts to pull it off the bar as a three inch hole was torn in the boat.

On 4 September 1969, the new operations building at Cat Lai was completed and officially accepted by COL Standeback, 4th TC DCO and LTC Shannon, CO 11th Trans Bn, who assisted the DCO in cutting the red ribbon in a Grand Opening Ceremony.

On 5 September 1969, the 402nd Trans Co created a railhead discharge platoon in order to handle the increased rail shipments from Saigon to Ho Nai.

On 5 September 1969, the MHE section of the 402nd Trans Co moved from the company area to the Cogido Barge Site, resulting in better maintenance supervision of MHE at Cogido.

The CO, S2, and S3 of the 11th Trans Bn attended a meeting at Gia Dinh Province HQ on 6 September 1969. The subject of the meeting was the security of Cat Lai and Nha Be. The assemblage consisted of district representatives, sensitive area commanders, advisors, and other interested persons. The main point discussed was that Sensitive Area Commanders are not given the authority to carry out the responsibilities they are charged with. Civilian police, Vietnamese Army, VN Navy, US Army, and US Navy are operating as individual units and are not properly supporting the Sensitive Area Commander. Minutes of the meeting were forwarded to CMAC HQ for consideration and necessary action.

On 7 September 1969, at approximately 2000hrs one Cat Lai based US Sailor was KIA and one was WIA. They had been traveling by jeep on Cat Lai road when they were ambushed by five or six Viet Cong. The ambush had been laid using a claymore mine supported by rockets and small arms. The claymore missed; however they were hit by two RPG rockets, knocking their jeep off the road into a rice paddy. One man was killed outright and the other was shot by the VC, but by playing dead while the enemy took his wallet, he lived through the ambush. Additional sightings of VC along Cat Lai road have caused the battalion to require all US military personnel at Cat Lai traveling on the road to wear a steel pot and flak jacket. Additionally, travel is restricted to daylight hours.

On 8 September 1969, at the Binh Hoa Barge Site, while off loading 250 lb bombs, a 20 ton truck mounted crane toppled from the pier into the river.

At 0215 hours on 8 September 1969, a Vietnamese crewman fell off the ST 2153 while securing a barge to buoy #1 at Cogido. In the search for his body, a helicopter hit some power lines and fell into the river resulting in the loss of another life.
AVCA SGN TC X3 S3
1 November 1969

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(Terminal) Period Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

On 8 September 1969, the 33rd Ranger Battalion (Vietnamese) encountered a VC
force of 5 soldiers in the area where a US Jeep was ambushed on 7 September.
One VC was killed and four escaped. One AK-47 and two R-40 rocket launchers
were captured. Map of ambush plan was found.

On 9 September 1969, eight VC with weapons were spotted 2500 meters from the
Cat Lai Compound. A sweep of the area resulted in negative contact.

On 15 September 1969, the new Cat Lai Dumbage Pier was officially accepted by
MAJ McBurney, 11th Trans Bn XO, from CPT Seidel, 404th Engineer Company
(Port Construction).

On 16 September 1969, a young Vietnamese was shot in the leg as he attempted
to steal lumber from a train at Ho Nai Railhead. The youth failed to halt or
heed warning calls and shots. Efforts are being made to improve conditions
at this civilian railhead. The US area will be fenced off.

On 17 September 1969, the 11th Trans Bn obtained clearance to test fire weapons
on VC Island. An LCM-8 was dispatched and twenty-three (23) new personnel
fired their weapons for familiarization.

Thunderstorms hit the 402nd Transportation Company (TT) on 23 September 1969.
Two buildings were damaged but no one was injured.

A Vietnamese railway engineer was shot at Ho Nai Railhead on 25 September 1969
after he failed to heed warning calls and shots. He was stealing Budweiser
Beer. Efforts are being increased to provide better security for the site
and thus prevent further incidents.

On 26 September 1969, a Swimmer Sapper Class was conducted at Cat Lai by LT
COMDR Costello, 1st Log FM office. The highlight of the class was a demonstra-
tion in which a sapper, completely undetected, tied a false charge to the
barge carrying local dignitaries.

At approximately 2300 hrs, 26 September 1969, the Clarksburg Victory broke
loose from the stern (upriver) mooring buoy of Cat Lai Two, five lines having
parted for no apparent reason. The ship swung around on the bow (downriver)
mooring buoy and the anchor was dropped to prevent losing the ship should the
bow lines have parted. The ship was swinging around with the incoming tide
and was resecured early in the morning on 27 September. At 0945, 27 September
the ship broke loose again from the stern buoy. It appeared that the up-
river buoy was pulled from its location but it is not known whether it hap-
pened the first or the second time the ship broke loose. The ship was moved
to a location downstream of Cat Lai Four at 1500 hours, 27 September and was
worked while swinging from the hook with no further incidents.

On 3 October 1969, the long awaited and much needed water barge arrived at

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Cat Lai. Previously the only source of water supply for the 11th Transportation Battalion had been a 5,000 gallon tanker.

10 pallet jacks were received at Cat Lai on 3 October 1969. These will be used in areas on ships where electric forklifts cannot maneuver.

On 3 October 1969, there was another vehicle shot at on Cat Lai road. One round went through the windshield of a track belonging to the 402nd Transportation Company. Another round was fired at the rear of the vehicle as it sped by.

On 3 October 1969, two LCM-8s of the 1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) were committed for riverine insertion extraction operations with 3rd ARVN Ranger Units conducting sweeps on VC Island.

The ammunition handling system advanced one step towards automation on 3 October 1969 with the use of preprinted tally forms.

On 4 October 1969, an ARVN 2½ ton truck was destroyed and one ARVN received a wound in his chest, the results of an ambush on Cat Lai road.

From 6 through 10 October 1969, HHD, 124th Trans Co (TS), and 1099th Trans Co (MB) were inspected by the Inspector General, US Army Support Command, Saigon. All three companies passed the AGI with flying colors.

On 6 October 1969, a survey was held at Cat Lai to determine if sentry dogs could be used in Cat Lai Harbor to bolster security. Recommendation was that dogs could not be used effectively on barges because of the danger of moving around with a trainer. Sentry dog must be on a leash.

Another vehicle was fired at on Cat Lai road on 7 October. This time it was a Navy vehicle. No damage or injuries resulted.

On 9 October 1969, the ST 2109 was ambushed on the Dong Nai river as it was pulling the daily ammunition tow from Cat Lai to Cogido barge site. Two rocket rounds hit the vessel and five soldiers were injured. Two hours after the ambush, two VC surrendered to US soldiers. They voluntarily turned in one M-14 rifle.

On 14 October 1969, the three hour defensive driving course was completed. 175 men participated and were trained, the total number eligible.

There was a strike by drivers of Peril Trucking Company on 15 and 16 October 1969. This caused a delay in cargo movement at the Ho Nai Railhead where these trucks are utilized.

On 17 October 1969, the 402nd Transportation Company (TT) passed the 1st Log
On 21 October 1969, HHD 11th Transportation Battalion (Tnl) passed the 1st Log CMHI reinspection in maintenance management with a score of 93.

On 22 October 1969, the 1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) supported various infantry units by providing transportation in the winding waterways of the Mekong Delta. Units supported were the 1st Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Division, 3rd ARVN Ranger Group, 5th ARVN Ranger Group, 6th ARVN Ranger Group, and Thu Duc Regional Forces.

The battalion’s attached medical detachment treated 1,055 Vietnamese during this reporting period. This is one of our major ways of establishing good relations with the Vietnamese people. However, on 15 October the doctor assigned to the detachment was reassigned. This leaves the 11th Battalion without the services of a MD.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Personnel Utilization.

(a) OBSERVATION: Recent personnel turnover has resulted in overages in some MOSs and shortages in other MOSs. To maintain mission efficiency, personnel have had to be cross-trained or trained on-the-job to fill shortage areas. Selection of those personnel for cross-training or on-the-job training has included personal, informal interviews and subsequent placement in accordance with individual desires to the maximum extent possible. These personal interviews coupled with frequent visits to job sites have shown that most of these personnel perform best in job areas they have requested.

(b) EVALUATION: In maintaining mission efficiency, individual desires are an important consideration when, because of MOS imbalances, personnel must be trained on-the-job or cross-trained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Commanders conduct personal, informal interviews and assign personnel in accordance with individual desires when MOS imbalance situations exist.

(2) Enlisted Promotions Versus Morale.

(a) OBSERVATION: Enlisted promotions to E4 and E5 prior to 31 August 1969 were extremely sparse. During September and October 1969, there were enough allocations made available to promote all personnel to the grades of
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

E4 and E5 that were eligible and recommended. Prior to the influx of these allocations, morale had dropped to a very low state, job performance began to deteriorate, and a "don't care" attitude was emerging. After the promotion of deserving individuals in September there was an immediate change in attitude and job performance, and morale increased. Promotions received in October produced the same results, but, to a greater degree.

(b) EVALUATION: Morale is directly affected by lack of promotions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken to insure a steady flow of promotion allocations rather than a long period with none and then a large number.

b. Intelligence. None.

c. Operations.

(1) Sinking of Buoys in Cat Lai Harbor.

(a) OBSERVATION: On 31 July 1969, a buoy located in the southern end of Cat Lai Harbor sank. The buoy, typical of the type used at Cat Lai, was hollow and it sank after being punctured by a sharp object.

(b) EVALUATION: Raising and repairing sunk buoys is time consuming and very expensive.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All buoys should be filled with styrofoam so that they will not sink when punctured.

(2) Use of Kenner Ski Barges.

(a) LCM-6s are being used in Cat Lai Harbor at night to provide security for buoys and ammunition laden barges. This practice became necessary due to the increase in sapper activities and the fact that the 11th Transportation Battalion (TnflL) did not have any other floating craft to use for security. Adequate MT support could not be obtained. Recently two Kenner Ski Barges have been acquired and have replaced three LCM-6s in the harbor. These barges are highly mobile and are highly effective when used in harbor patrols.

(b) EVALUATION: Kenner Ski Barges can be successfully utilized on harbor patrols.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Kenner Ski Barges should be used whenever possible to replace floating craft that are being used to provide security for harbors in the Republic of Vietnam.

(3) Well Deck Barges.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

(a) OBSERVATION: During the monsoon season, well deck barges fill with rainwater and become liabilities. US Coast Guard requirements are such that well deck barges may not be loaded with ammunition if water in them will touch the cargo. Electric forklifts cannot be used in these barges because the exposure to water causes loss of traction and shorting of electrical components. Considerable man-hours and tug boat time are lost trying to pump out the water. Ammunition is still subject to damage even if these barges are loaded when dry as the next rain will usually fill the wells to a point where the bottom layer of cargo is resting in water.

(b) EVALUATION: Well barges are impractical and expensive for ammunition and other cargo subject to water damage in monsoon areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That flat deck barges be used for ammunition and other cargo subject to water damage.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training.

(1) Swimming Ability.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many personnel of this unit working on or near the river were unable to swim. Mandatory swimming lessons were recently begun to train nonswimmers with the ultimate goal being prevention of drowning accidents. The lessons are well received by the majority of those personnel participating as they realize this ability could save their lives in the future.

(b) EVALUATION: Swimming ability is important and can be taught with relative ease to most nonswimmers if properly presented.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All personnel who work on or near the water be given swimming tests and nonswimmers be given lessons.

f. Logistics.

g. Communications. None.

h. Material. None.

i. Other.

(1) Bunker Construction.

(a) OBSERVATION: Bunker walls erected so that upright braces are on the outside of the boards used for fill retention are considerably stronger and longer lasting than those walls constructed by nailing fill retention boards to the outside of upright braces.

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SUNJET: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

(b) EVALUATION: During heavy rain, the dirt fill used in most bunker walls soaks up considerable water. This water-soaked dirt expands and seriously taxes the holding ability of nails if the fill retention boards are fitted outside the upright braces. When the fill retention boards are nailed on the inside, the upright braces gain considerable additional support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That bunker designs be changed to fit the fill retention boards inside the upright braces.

(2) Vehicle Rusting.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been observed that the floors are rusting out in our 1-ton trucks, utility. There are two reasons for this. First, all vehicles are washed in the Dong Nai River which has a high salt content and secondly, all vehicles have make shift floor mats in them which tend to trap this salt water between the mat and the metal flooring.

(b) EVALUATION: A combination of moisture and salt water causes vehicles to rust.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All floor mats and rugs be removed from military vehicles in high moisture zones.

WILLIAM J. SHANNON
LTC, TC
Commanding
AVCA SGN TC GCPT(31 Oct 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 11th Transportation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, HQ, 4th Transportation Command (Tnl C), APO 96243 17 Nov 69

TO: Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command, Saigon, ATTN: AVCA SGN CO,
APO 96491

1. The Operational Report of the 11th Transportation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) is forwarded in accordance with USARV
Reg 525-15.

2. Section 2, Item a, Para (1), PERSONNEL UTILIZATION: This headquarters is
aware of the MOS problem in each unit, at the present time. Each man is inter-
viewed before any assignment is made. In this way each man is placed in a
position best suited to his abilities. Then, the process of on-the-job training
is started, so as to make each man as efficient as possible in his new MOS. At
the present, and in the future, this headquarters, will place a greater amount
of attention toward the OJT Program, so as to maintain mission efficiency.
This headquarters sees no chance of this problem being resolved in the near
future, due to the great amount of turn-over within RVN.

3. Section 2, Item a, Para (2), ENLISTED PROMOTIONS VERSUS MORALE: This
headquarters understands the direct affect promotions have on morale, but we
have no control over incoming allocations. Allocations are allotted to units
by vacancies within the unit. Also, DA has overall control of promotions, so
as to keep each MOS, per grade, at a given level Army wide.

3. Section 2, Item c, Para (2) - concur.

4. Section 2, Item c, Para (3) - concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: Tiger 3735

MAJ, AGC
Adjutant General

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TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-MH, APO 96384

1. Reference Section 2, paragraph c(1), page 8. NONCONCUR. The cost of modifying all buoys could not be amortized. More attention should be paid to mooring procedures to prevent collision.

2. Reference Section 2, paragraph c(2), page 8. CONCUR with the use of Kenner Ski Barges or Boston Whalers for harbor patrol craft. The use of these smaller craft allows LCM-8s to be utilized for their intended purpose of cargo transport. The 485th Trans Co had insufficient PBRs for security in the Cat Lai Harbor (1-PBR day, 2 PBRs night). The 11th Trans Bn is supplementing this over-all security with Kenner Ski Barges. These craft are excellent for close in security around barges and deep draft ships at anchor.

3. Reference Section 2, paragraph e, page 9. CONCUR. The Civilian Safety Director 4th TO has implemented a program of swimming training and water safety.

4. Reference Section 2, paragraph 1(1), page 9. Unfortunately the construction of bunkers vary widely throughout RVN and their design is mainly based upon the types of construction material available. CONCUR with the use of upright braces on the outside of bunkers. Additionally, units should contact their local engineer to determine the best possible use of materials available.

5. Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command with the above exceptions. A copy of this indorsement has been furnished the originating and 1st Indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LEN 2604

Michael D. Boston
CPT AGC
ASST AG

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AVCA GO-MH (1 Nov 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Transportation Battalion for period ending 31 October 1969 RCS GSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 7 JAN 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC-DST APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 11th Transportation Battalion for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning enlisted promotions versus morale, page 7, paragraph a(2). Concur. However, the even flow of allocations cannot be controlled at this level because allocations are received from HQ, USAHV and are distributed to the SUPCOM's IAW AR 600-200.

   b. Reference item concerning sinking of buoys in Cat Lai harbor, page 8, paragraph c(1). Concur. The concept appears feasible, however some buoys (lighted or sound) have machinery or equipment working spaces within the buoy that would have to be kept clear. This would provide another use for excess styrofoam generated during unpacking operations. However, closer attention to navigation and prevention of damage to buoys should be emphasized. This headquarters sent a message on this subject to all support commands on 8 December 1969 reaffirming the Coast Guard's concern for damaged navigational aids.

   c. Reference item concerning well deck barges, page 8, paragraph c(3). Concur. 11th Trans Bn has undertaken a vigorous program of "Red Lining" barges to purge the ammunition system of the well deck HF and LC type barges. The intent is to place this type barge off hire and retain primarily BC and LO barges for ammunition. This depends on the cargo pack being suitable for open storage. The system is currently using mostly open deck barges and experiencing little difficulty during the dry season. No adverse effects are expected during the monsoon season.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsements.
AVCA GO-MH (1 Nov 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Transportation Battalion for period ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4639

[Signature]

TecI D. STAFFORD
Llt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM, SGN
4th Trans Comd
11th Trans Comd
AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 69) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 11th Transportation Battalion
(Terminal) Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 11th
Transportation Battalion (Terminal) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Enlisted Promotions versus Morale",
page 7, paragraph 2a(2); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3, and 3d Indorsement,
paragraph 2c; concur. This headquarters is aware of direct effect pro-
motions have on morale. However, allocations are determined by the
Department of the Army based on Army wide strength projections. Alloca-
tions received are distributed to the field by this headquarters in
proportion to cumulative vacancies and personnel eligible for promotion.

b. Reference item concerning "Bunker Construction", section II, page
9, paragraph 21(1), and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 4; concur. This is
standard construction practice in RVN. No action by higher headquarters
is required.

c. Reference item concerning "Vehicle Rusting", page 10, paragraph
21(2); concur. Floor mats and rugs may be removed from vehicles when
deemed necessary by the local commander. In addition, the metal floor-
ing of vehicles should be rinsed with fresh water after operation in
or near salt water when practicable.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. E. MICHIELS
MAJ. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
11th Trans Bn
1st Log Comd
GPOP-DT (1 Nov 69) 5th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CShD-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 JAN 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) Organizational Structure

11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal)

- Hq & Hq Det
- 124th Trans Co (TS)
  - 586th Trans Det Maint Sec (JA)
  - 588th Trans Det MHE (HVY) (JE)
  - 592nd Trans Det MHE (HVY) (JE)
- 1099th Trans Co (ME)
  - 259th Trans Det FCM (IB)
- 402nd Trans Co (TT)
  - 262nd Trans Det (JD)
  - 264th Trans Det (JB)
  - 265th Trans Det (JD)
AVCA SGN TC XB S3

1 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) Cargo Movement Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>DISCHARGED</th>
<th>BACKLOADED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
<td>52064 S/T</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52064 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cogido</td>
<td>31839 S/T</td>
<td>172 S/T</td>
<td>32011 S/T</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binh Hoa</td>
<td>6208 S/T</td>
<td>474 S/T</td>
<td>6682 S/T</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS:</td>
<td></td>
<td>90111 S/T</td>
<td>646 S/T</td>
<td>90757 S/T</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
<td>49799 S/T</td>
<td>545 S/T</td>
<td>50344 S/T</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cogido</td>
<td>31038 S/T</td>
<td>1553 S/T</td>
<td>32591 S/T</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binh Hoa</td>
<td>4915 S/T</td>
<td>139 S/T</td>
<td>5054 S/T</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS:</td>
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<td>85752 S/T</td>
<td>2237 S/T</td>
<td>87989 S/T</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Cat Lai</td>
<td>59060 S/T</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59060 S/T</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cogido</td>
<td>37691 S/T</td>
<td>624 S/T</td>
<td>38315 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binh Hoa</td>
<td>5076 S/T</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5076 S/T</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS:</td>
<td></td>
<td>101,827 S/T</td>
<td>624 S/T</td>
<td>102,451 S/T</td>
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<td>GRAND TOTAL:</td>
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<td>277,690 S/T</td>
<td>3507 S/T</td>
<td>281,197 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Incl 2
1 November 1969

SUGGEST: Operational Report—Lessons Learned 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat)

Cargo and Personnel Movement Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>2,788</td>
<td>2,835</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Cargo:</td>
<td>2,158 tons</td>
<td>2,085 tons</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/T Ammunition:</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Transportation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CO, 11th Transportation Battalion