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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 10 SEP 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Attn: FOR-OT-UT, Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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</tbody>
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**AUTHORITY**

| ago, d/a ltr, 29 apr 1980 |

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A), Period Ending 30 April 1969

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]
ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

1. Section I, Operations: Significant Activities
   a. Command Section.
      (1) Significant Personnel Assignments: LTC Reed W. Patchen assumed the duties of S4 Officer on 18 Mar 69. LTC James A. Morsey assumed command of the 24th Trans Bn on 16 Mar 69. CW3 Clyde Warner was assigned as Harbor Pilot on 15 Feb 69. CPT John W. Hale was reassigned from CO, HHC 124th Trans Comd to Amph Craft Officer, 24th Trans Bn on 20 Mar 69. CPT James L. Fenstemacher assumed the duties of S2 Officer on 3 Mar 69. LTC John H. Littlefield was reassigned from S4 Officer to Deputy Commander, 124th Trans Comd on 18 Mar 69. LTC Keith S. Kelly was reassigned from CO, 24th Trans Bn to the S3 Officer, 124th Trans Comd on 19 Mar 69. Major Louis V. Page was reassigned from Special Assistant to the Deputy Commander to Cargo Accounting Officer, 124th Trans Comd on 13 Mar 69. COL H. R. Del Mar assumed command of 124th Trans Comd 21 Apr 69.
      (2) Changes in Unit Assignments: During the reporting period, there were no changes in unit assignments or locations for units assigned to HQ 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A).
      (3) Distinguished Visitors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG Kim Y II</td>
<td>100th Log Comd, ROKA</td>
<td>1 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Harold D'Androsia</td>
<td>San Francisco GAO Regional Office</td>
<td>5 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Ralph E. Haines</td>
<td>CG, USARPAC</td>
<td>16 Feb 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Frank T. Milden</td>
<td>DCG, USARV</td>
<td>13 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG J. D. Crowley</td>
<td>CINCPAC, JT Trans Bd.</td>
<td>24 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVCA CRK-TC-CO
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (R)

NAME ORGANIZATION DATE
BG W. Siedel FFORCEV, ARTY 24 Mar 69
MG L. B. Ramsey DCG, 1st Log Comd 21 Apr 69
BG Verne L. Bowers AGofS, Pers, USARV 25 Apr 69
MG George L. Mabrav Chief of Staff, USARV 25 Apr 69

(4) Activities at Phan Rang Outport:

(a) The Phan Rang Outport, documented by the 613th Transportation Detachment (CGO UIC DTM) with discharging carried out by Pacific Alaska Columbia Inc., discharged the following amounts for the quarter beginning 1 February through 30 April 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>S/T DISCHARGED</th>
<th>BARGES DISCHARGED</th>
<th>LSTs DISCHARGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>11,232</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>10,117</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>10,392</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly total</td>
<td>31,741</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: LSTs Discharged includes LCUs, LSMs and JUD PAGE

(b) During the quarter covering 1 February to 30 April 1969 the biggest problem concerning documentation and operation of the outport has been the inaccurate manifests received with cargo from Cam Ranh Bay. Approximately 85 per cent of all manifests received, including ammunition and general cargo, are inaccurate. This creates such discrepancies as destination of cargo and number and amount awaiting clearance through the port.

(c) Also during this quarter some difficulties have been encountered in trying to reconcile TCMDs that have been forwarded to the various consignees in this area. It is an extremely difficult task trying to explain to the various consignees the importance of TCMD reconciliation. The Phan Rang L3A Commander has proven to be of great assistance in contacting and explaining this problem to the various consignees.

(d) During the month of February, a great deal of cargo handling and administrative work normally done by AB&Ts Vietnamese employees had to be done by American and TCH personnel due to the TET Holiday season. All barges and vessels during this time were worked and normal turn around times were maintained.

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Inclusion
(e) The need for increased harbor security was demonstrated on March 29, 1969. At 2100 hours a barge loaded with napalm was discovered adrift south of the sunken barge pier. A LARC V was dispatched and the LARC V towed the barge off the beach to the Winquatt, the AB&T tugboat, which towed the barge to the barge pier. A search of the barge showed that it had been pilfered of a large amount of dunnage and lashing gear, but no napalm was missing. It would have been extremely easy for the enemy to place the explosive charge aboard the barge rather than to pilfer the dunnage. After this incident the outport was furnished flares and concussion grenades to be used in the patrolling of the harbor area. Better security could be provided by some type of Naval patrol vessel, rather than an US Army LARC V.

(f) On 20 April 1969, five Wittenburg trucks and five 30 ton trailers were added to the four 8 ton trucks and two 20 ton trailers that AB&T had already for port and beach clearance. At this time the 564th Trans Plt was relieved of the majority of the hauling responsibilities.

(g) All during the month of April AB&T repaired damages to the north side of the pier facility. During the high seas on 2 April to 4 April an Army barge which was secured to the pier facility, caused considerable damage to the canals, dolphins, and rigging of the pier facility. These repairs were carried out during days when cargo was not being discharged.

(h) Another case of poor harbor defense was made apparent on 25 April 1969. At approximately 0200 hours the tug Winquatt observed movement of individuals around BC 6281. The tug notified the Port Captain who in turn notified the 613th Trans Detachment. A LARC was dispatched with six personnel of the 613th Trans Det. to investigate this report. The LARC fired numerous flares around the barge and the immediate area. A search of the barge indicated that persons unknown had pilfered two boxes of flexible drive shafts and one box of rocket launchers. Increased patrolling by the LARC has discouraged further pilferages, but increased security in the harbor is needed.

(5) Activities at Nha Trang Outport.

(a) During the reporting period the Nha Trang Outport discharged a total of 42,272 S/T and 126,816 M/T of cargo, while it outloaded 38,415 S/T and 115,245 M/T. The monthly breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D/C</td>
<td>O/L</td>
<td>D/C</td>
<td>O/L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/T</td>
<td>14,889</td>
<td>16,876</td>
<td>10,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/T</td>
<td>44,667</td>
<td>50,628</td>
<td>31,521</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclosure
(b) This cargo was discharged and outloaded in 23 deep draft vessels, 65 shallow draft vessels and 71 barges. The monthly breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deep Draft</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barge</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) A total of 4,650 ROKA troops were embarked and 3,725 debarked during the quarter. The monthly figures including number of troop ships are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Troop Ships</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embarked</td>
<td>1568</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debarked</td>
<td>1218</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) There were two mortar attacks, one during February which hit Camp McDermott and one during April which hit a Vietnamese training camp. Neither one affected the Outport operations.

b. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline:

(1) Promotions made in the command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LTC</th>
<th>Maj</th>
<th>CPT</th>
<th>LIE</th>
<th>CW3</th>
<th>E9</th>
<th>E8</th>
<th>E7</th>
<th>E6</th>
<th>E5</th>
<th>E4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The following awards were recommended and received:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recommended</th>
<th>Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEBRUARY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCOM</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

MARCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recommended</th>
<th>Received</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCOM</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS w/&quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APRIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recommended</th>
<th>Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCOM</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS w/&quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Disciplinary and judicial actions: The following actions occurred or were completed during the reporting period:
   (a) Crimes against persons or property: 12
   (b) Miscellaneous and military offenses: 43
   (c) Traffic offenses: 55
   (d) Article 15's: 138
   (e) Summary Court Martials: 4
   (f) Special Court Martials: 10
   (g) General Court Martials: 0
   (h) The three most common offenses were: SPEEDING, OFF LIMITS, and ASSAULT.

(4) Public Information Activities: During the reporting period a total of 404 Hometown News Releases were submitted, and 0 radio tape interviews were conducted for dissemination to hometown radio stations.

(5) Civic Actions: Support rendered to assigned villages was hampered somewhat due to the TET Offensive and lack of transportation in HHC 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A). MEDCAP teams under the direction of CPT Matthew Gooding, 7th Med Disp, Cam Ranh Bay, continued to make visits.
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to Thung Nhat, Vinh Cam and Hoc Gia. Doctors from the 4th Med Disp (Vet), Cam Ranh Bay, are continuing their treatment of the animals in these assigned villages also. Civic action team from the 10th Trans Bn continues to bring building materials out to Vinh Cam, and has completed the construction of a church and a bell tower. 10th Trans Bn also sponsored an Easter party for the children in the village. From building materials supplied by HHC 124th Trans Comd, a total of three dispensaries have been constructed in Hoc Gia, Cam Son and Vinh Cam.

(6) R&R:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ALLOCATED</th>
<th>UTILIZED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the month of March, HQ, USARV sponsored the One Millionth R&R Participant to Hawaii and the 100,000th R&R Participant to Australia Programs, in which both representatives selected from the 124th Trans Comd won the USASUPCOM-CRB nomination to appear before the 1st Log Comd Selection Board. Allocations for Penang were cut out due to insufficient applicants.

(7) Safety:

(a) Total number of initial accident reports: 33

(b) Total number of reportable accidents by type:

(1) Personal Injury: 10
(2) Motor Vehicle: 20
(3) Fatalities: 0
(4) Local National: 1

(5) Property Damage: $14,684.00 (estimate)

(c) Mileage and Mandays:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>Miles</th>
<th>Mandays</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>327,622</td>
<td>47,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>234,976</td>
<td>18,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>268,408</td>
<td>33,258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(d) The most common accidents were PERSONAL INJURY, and MOTOR VEHICLE accidents due to carelessness and rear-end collisions.

(8) Reenlistment Program:

(a) February:

RA 1st Term Eligible - 7  Enl - 1  Per Cent 14.2%
Career Reenlist Eligible - 10  Enl - 9  Per Cent 90%
AUS Eligible - 6  Enl - 0  Per Cent 0%
TOTAL: Eligible - 34  Enl - 10  Per Cent 29.4%

(b) March:

RA 1st Term Eligible - 20  Enl - 1  Per Cent 5%
Career Reenlist Eligible - 7  Enl - 7  Per Cent 100%
AUS Eligible - 26  Enl - 1  Per Cent 4%
TOTAL: Eligible - 54  Enl - 9  Per Cent 16.6%

(c) April:

RA 1st Term Eligible - 18  Enl - 4  Per Cent 22.2%
Career Reenlist Eligible - 6  Enl - 5  Per Cent 83.3%
AUS Eligible - 19  Enl - 0  Per Cent 0%
TOTAL: Eligible - 42  Enl - 9  Per Cent 21.2%

(9) Extensions of Foreign Service Tour executed during this quarter as follows:

(a) Under 90 days: 81

(b) Six months: 43

(10) Rocket Attack on 124th Transportation Command pier area: At 2300 hours, 3 Mar 69, the enemy launched a rocket attack on the Cam Ranh Bay peninsula, with several rounds landing in the pier area of this command. Two rounds landed in vicinity of 35th Engr Gp, four rounds impacted east of Bay Shore Drive near Piers 3 and 4, one round impacted on Pier 1, killing one Vietnamese security guard and wounding one 124th Trans Comd soldier, who subsequently died, and destroying one M54 5 ton truck. An estimated three rounds landed short of the peninsula off Pier 1, and estimated four rounds landed in the water approximately 700 meters south of the Ammo Pier.
2. Section II, Lessons Learned.

a. Operations:

(1) Reducing vessel turnaround time:

(a) Observation: The key to reducing vessel turnaround time is to insure a steady flow of cargo to or away from the pier.

(b) Evaluation: A steady flow of cargo is accomplished through the staging of cargo in staging areas adjacent to the piers. Cargo is cleared from the pier and stored in the staging areas and is shipped out as trucks are available. For outloading vessels, the cargo scheduled for outload is staged in the staging area. When the outload begins, cargo is called forward as needed.

(c) Recommendation: The staging areas provide a buffer between the inability of the shipper to ship or receive cargo at a fast enough rate to allow continuous discharge/outload and the inability of the stevedore unit to maintain a fast enough rate of discharge/outload to insure maximum utilization of truck assets. Further reductions in turnaround time could be realized by construction of additional staging areas and improvement of existing ones. A hardstand should be constructed by Piers 2 and 3. The cost of construction would be saved in a short time in reducing turnaround time.

(2) Recurring Problems Hindering Rail Activities:

(a) Observation: Several problems continue to hinder rail operations.

(b) Evaluation: Lack of available cars is the principle limiting factor. In an effort to alleviate the problem, TMA initiated Operation Flying Flatcar. Since cars often wait several days after being loaded/unloaded, the number of cars that in the system cannot be fully utilized. Enemy activity also accounts for a good deal of lost time. During this period, the tracks both north and south of Cam Ranh Bay were blown on a number of occasions, causing delay in shipping loaded cars and receiving empty cars. The likelihood of pilferage on rail shipments greatly restricts the type of cargo that can be shipped. This presents a problem when there are low cargo backlogs for the destinations served by rail and the choice of cargo is limited. Cargo is further limited by the consignee's ability to receive. Since there are no assets at railheads to offload and deliver cargo, the consignee must have this capability.

(c) Recommendations: If more efficient and productive rail operations are desired, capabilities to receive and transship cargo must be developed at all railheads, and more adequate security must be provided for the rail shipments.
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15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A), for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

(3) Operation Flying Flatcar:

(a) Observation: During the first operation it was found that flying cranes cannot adequately spot rail cars on a standard size barge. For the second operation, an LST hull with a crawler crane was used instead of a barge. Rail cars were spotted on the bow of the LST hull and repositioned by the crawler crane.

(b) Evaluation: The use of an LST hull with a crawler crane proved highly successful. The LSTs hull size meant that twice as many cars could be loaded, and with the crawler crane these cars could be positioned exactly as desired.

(c) Recommendation: That the LST hull with crawler crane or similar facilities be utilized for future operations of this nature.

(4) MILVAN Operation:

(a) Observation: In June, the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) will be assuming responsibility for MILVAN operations in the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command area. It is most likely that no additional personnel or equipment will be provided to perform this mission.

(b) Evaluation: In order to start the pilot operation efficiently, all necessary planning and construction should be completed prior to the arrival of the first vans. To date, only the model for one control form has arrived; the others are still being developed. The draft MILVAN regulation is due from 1st Log Comd early in May. Construction of the MILVAN marshalling yard has not yet begun.

(c) Recommendation: That action be taken at all levels to expedite preparations for MILVAN operations.

(5) Waiver of Quantity-Distance Safety Standards:

(a) Observations: The waiver of Quantity-Distance Safety Standards for South Beach was returned disapproved. This was due partly to the fact that the original request, made in 1967, was based on an unrealistic figure of net explosive weight to be handled in the South Beach area.

(b) Evaluation: The request was submitted with an explanation that the increased weights being requested were based on a more realistic total net explosive weight and did not represent an increase in ammunition operations at the congested South Beach area.
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(c) Recommendation: The lesson learned is that estimates of weights of explosives handled at ammunition facilities should be carefully made, based on realistic appraisal of operational needs.

(6) Shipments Arriving Past Required Delivery Date:

(a) Observation: In the past, the transportation system has received criticism for shipments arriving past Required Delivery Date (RDD). On 31 Mar 69, the Movements Control Center (MCC) requested all shippers put the requisitioner's RDD in Block 13 of the Transportation Control and Movement Document (TCMD) in place of the Time Required for Delivery (TRPD).

(b) Evaluation: On 15 Apr 69, MCC initiated a study on the time required for the supply system to process a requisition prior to shipment. On all offerings made on 22 Feb 69, the average processing time for Depot was 57 days. Since the maximum allowed in the Order Showtime (OST) is 21 days, a majority of these offerings were past RDD when offered to the transportation system. Based upon all available information, the transportation system is responsible for less than 1% of all cargo arriving past RDD.

(c) Recommendation: That higher headquarters closely monitor Material Release Orders (MRO) RDDs in order to determine whether responsibility lies with the supply or transportation system when RDDs are missed.

(7) Report of Shipment Program:

(a) Observation: The full potential of Report of Shipment Program (REPSHIP) cannot be realized at this time due to inadequate telephone facilities. In order for REPSHIP to be effective, the consignee must be notified 48 hours prior to the arrival of his shipment if at all possible.

(b) Evaluation: On 1 Feb 69, Movements Control Center (MCC) initiated their REPSHIP on a full-time basis. This program has two main parts.

1. A tissue copy of all TCMDs offered to the MCC for movement to other support command areas is forwarded to the MCC of the receiving Support Command. The receiving support command MCC then notifies the consignee that his cargo has been offered to the transportation system for shipment.

2. It is the responsibility of the MCC to notify all inter and intra-complex consignees of shipments coming to their respective areas. Due to the limited number of truck lines and relative inaccessibility of

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(RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

various units in the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, advance notice is almost impossible. Short of a "hotline" to all Logistical Support Activities within the support command, the REPSHIP will not reach its full potential until adequate communications are established.

(c) Recommendation: Special telephone lines be installed between each of the support command MCCs.

(8) Reconciliation Rate:

(a) Observation: In the past, reconciliation rate of TCMDs from the pier to first destination consignee was about 40%.

(b) Evaluation: In an effort to raise the rate, warning letters were sent out to the consignees requesting return of missing Copy #2 of TCMDs, but were met with little, if any, success. When liaison visits were made by this branch to the consignee in question, it was ascertained that the consignee was more than willing to cooperate if they were afforded an explanation of the necessity of returning TCMD reconciliation Copy #2 to Port Documentation. Liaison visits and classes are an effective method of guaranteeing that written instructions are understood and carried out. In most instances, one liaison visit, based on mutual understanding, and educational classes can accomplish more than a large amount of administrative instructions and telephonic requests in raising the TCMD reconciliation rate.

(c) Recommendation: That aggressive follow-up action on the part of documentation sections to raise the TCMD reconciliation rate consist of, in addition to correspondence, liaison visits and educational classes to all customers and stevedore units. In every instance, lack of understanding is the basis for the low reconciliation rate.

(9) Relocation of Backload Section:

(a) Observation: Many problems in outloading deep draft vessels arise as a result of inadequate communication between the various sections involved in outloading vessels.

(b) Evaluation: In order to achieve closer coordination between these sections the Deep Draft Backload Section of Port Documentation was moved into the Terminal Branch Office. This has resulted in better communications and more accurate manifests.

(c) Recommendation: Because of the vehicle and personnel shortage, it has been found that the best way to insure adequate coordination is through physical proximity of the coordinating elements.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

(10) Relocation of Terminal Branch Shallow Draft Section:

(a) Observation: Terminal Branch is responsible for publishing and releasing load lists for LCUs and barges. Many problems were caused by lack of proper communications.

(b) Evaluation: By relocating the personnel and equipment necessary to perform this function to South Beach, closer coordination with the unload/discharge operation was achieved.

(c) Recommendation: Operations are enhanced by co-locating elements with related responsibilities. This has resulted in quicker reaction time and lower turnaround times for shallow draft vessels.

(11) Road Side Spot Checks:

(a) Observation: That the percentage of vehicles failing to pass the Roadside Spot Checks set up by 1st Log Comd and the 69th Maintenance Bn was exceptionally high, reflecting many correctable discrepancies.

(b) Evaluation: Any vehicle worthy enough to be dispatched for service should meet the standards of maintenance and safety required to obtain a passing score on a Roadside Spot Check.

(c) Recommendation: A strictly enforced motor stabling program is a must to insure thorough operator maintenance and proper posting of DA Form 2408-14 will eliminate the majority of discrepancies reflecting higher scores during these inspections.

(12) Equipment Deadline:

(a) Observation: The failure of Depot to fill priority requisitions has added several days of deadline time to equipment in many cases.

(b) That some priority requisitions are not being filled by Depot yet the items requested are known to be on hand. This has been noted through several individual follow-ups to the bin location. In a few instances, the item required was critical to prevent deadline.

(c) Recommendation: Depot Commander be advised when priority requisitions are not filled and it is found out that the item required is actually on hand in the depot.

(13) Trailer Landing Legs:

(a) Observation: That M127 S&F trailer landing legs are buckling
or failing at an excessive rate.

(b) Evaluation: Design strength of the legs should be sufficient under normal conditions to support allowable loads, however, unusual terrain conditions do not permit normal uncoupling and let-down procedures.

(c) Recommendations: That operators be instructed to take every precaution in all operations of landing leg use. Modification of the legs to give stronger support.

b. Training: None
c. Intelligence: None
d. Logistics: None
e. Organization: None
f. Other: None

H. A. DEL MAR
Colonel, TC
Commanding
This headquarters concurs with the Operational Report of the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) with the following exceptions:

1. Reference Section II, paragraph a (1) Concur: Hardstand construction work orders have been submitted and are in USARV for consideration. The hardstand work orders were submitted as a direct result of potential utilization of SUPCOM-CRB facilities in connection with "T" day operations for improved staging areas.

2. Reference Section II, paragraph a (4) Concur: Construction of the MILVAN marshalling yard is absolutely essential to the success of the MILVAN program, scheduled to begin with the introduction of MILVAN into Cam Ranh Bay in July 1969. This operation also ties in closely with "T" day planning. Expedition of MILVAN facilities will materially assist "T" day planning in all phases.

3. Reference Section II, paragraph a (5) Nonconcur: Notwithstanding the error of the original waiver request, the initial waiver (dated 17 Aug 67) was granted with request that construction to prevent necessity for renewal of the waiver be vigorously pursued. In October 1968 after installation of the barge fender system on the face of the Delong Ammunition Pier, and the construction of LST Ramps on the landfill causeway adjacent to the ammunition pier, USARV GH and 1st Log Cmd were verbally requested to take necessary action to remove ammunition handling activities out of the South Beach area. On 1 May 1969, waiver USARV-CR-2-69 for South Beach was approved for a period of 120 days with stipulation that a plan be developed to remove, on a phased basis, all ammunition operations from the South Beach area prior to expiration date of the waiver approval.

4. Reference Section II, paragraph a (6) (b) Nonconcur:

a. A one day sampling is not of sufficient duration to draw a valid statistical conclusion.

b. The term "OST" stands for "Order and Ship Time" not "Order Showtime". The present goal for routine local (domestic) shipments that are in stock is 28 days not 21 days. This consists of 14 days supply processing time and 14 days transportation time. The US Army Depot, Cam Ranh processed an average of 60,266 Material Release Orders (MRO) per month.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 12th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the Period Ending 30 April RGS CSFOR-65 (RL)

during this reporting period. Part of these MRO's were back order releases of items that were not in stock when the requisition was processed initially. If these items were resupplied to the Depot from outside of R'N, the overseas criteria for allowable OST applies rather than the domestic criteria.

c. The Depot Operations Report has been reviewed for this reporting period. The following volume was shipped and on hand awaiting shipment during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TOTAL SHORT TONS SHIPPED</th>
<th>SHORT TONS (EVERY) NOT SHIPPED AT END OF MONTH</th>
<th>SHORT TONS SHIPPED AT END OF MONTH</th>
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<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>64,227.8</td>
<td>29,320.0</td>
<td>34,907.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>58,748.9</td>
<td>15,154.0</td>
<td>43,594.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>56,786.7</td>
<td>31,288.6</td>
<td>25,498.1</td>
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5. Reference Section II, paragraph a (6) (c) Concur: The US Army Depot, Cam Ranh has made steady improvement in requisition processing time since the inception of 3SVN. It is currently working towards the goal of processing within the supply segment of the Order and Ship Time. Neither the supply or the transportation system should be held responsible for the shortcomings of the order. When RD's are missed the responsibility must be assessed based on the specific details of each individual case.

6. Reference Section II, paragraph a (12) Nonconcur: This lesson learned has been stated in generality without specific detail. Units of this organization are not direct Depot customers, but are based on elements of the 69th Maintenance Battalion for Class IX support. It is agreed that the Depot Commander should be advised when priority requisitions are not filled when the item is on hand in the Depot. However, it must be realized that at any time there are several thousand Material Release Orders being processed internally in the Depot. It is possible for stock to still be in an individual bin and the Depot to be at a true zero balance if stock already released has not been pulled for shipment. The organization is being asked to provide specific details regarding this lesson learned for evaluation and corrective action if appropriate.
AVCA CRB-90-0 (15 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the Period Ending 30 April RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

7. Reference Section II, paragraph a (13) (a) Concur: However, "127 should be changed to read "127AIC.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Lee W. Sherrill, Jr.
1Lt, AGC
Asst AG

CF: 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A)
TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969, is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Reducing Vessel Turnaround Time, page 8, paragraph 2a(1). Concur with recommendation and action taken stated in paragraph 1 of 1st Indorsement.

b. Reference item concerning Recurring Problems Hindering Rail Activities, page 8, paragraph 2a(2). Concur. A minimum number of security personnel could protect a large amount of cargo from pilferage. In addition, rail car utilization can be increased if shipments are made within the consignee's capability to receive. Also, when a number of consignees using the same railhead, pool material handling equipment and personnel resources, a more efficient railhead operation results while not over taxing any single receiving agency.

c. Reference item concerning Operation Flying Flatcar, page 9, paragraph 2a(3). Concur. Recommendation will be considered should similar operations be undertaken in the future.

d. Reference item concerning MILVAN Operation, page 9, paragraph 2a(4). Concur. Action is being taken to expedite the MILVAN program. A representative of this headquarters hand carried the MILVAN draft regulation to the field to speed completion of this plan as far as possible.

e. Reference item concerning Waiver of Quantity-Distance Safety Standards. Concur with comments stated in paragraph 3 of 1st Indorsement.

f. Reference item concerning Shipments Arriving Past Required Delivery Date, page 10, paragraph 2a(6). Concur with comments of USASUPCOM, CRB in paragraph 4 of 1st Indorsement. Additionally, MCC's have the responsibility and capability to challenge unrealistic cargo offerings.

g. Reference item concerning Report of Shipment Program, page 10, paragraph 2a(7). Nonconcur, a study was conducted by this headquarters which concluded that the existing communications facilities are adequate.
AVCA GO-MH (15 May 69) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65

h. Reference item concerning Roadside Spot Checks, page 12, paragraph 2a(11). Concur. Motor stables have long been an effective method to insure performance of operator maintenance and identification of equipment discrepancies for repair by equipment mechanics. Motor stables and proper posting of the DA Form 2408-14 are essential parts of a complete motor maintenance program.

i. Reference item concerning Equipment Deadline, page 12, paragraph 2a(12). Nonconcur. The problem as stated has always existed to some extent. Many actions have been initiated to alleviate and relieve the obvious shortcomings of the system. Prime among these corrective actions are: (1) Special inventories are initiated at the depots on direction from USAICCV. (2) Cyclic inventories (Projects Count I, Count II, and Count Always) have done so in the past and will in the future, further purify stock records. (3) On directive from this headquarters, all depots now apply the four man rule to MRO's before they are classed as warehouse denials. Denials are being checked by the warehouse NCOC, the storage Officer, the stock control item clerk, and his branch supervisor.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. STAFFORD
Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

TEL: LBN 4839

CF:
USASUPCOM, CRB
124th TC COMD
AVHGC-DST (15 May 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

C/n: Commander:
124th Trans Comd (Term A)
1st Log Comd
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 124th Transportation Command (Term A) for Period Ending 30 Apr 69, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
ASS. AG
## Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A), Period Ending 30 April 1969

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 April 69.

CO, 124th Transportation Command

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