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**FROM:**
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**AUTHORITY**
AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1969

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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AVCA QN-TTU-CO

11 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-1)

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, ATTN: AVCA QN-GO-H, APO 96238

Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O, APO 96284

Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

Commanding General, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, DC. 20310

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. The 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) engaged in mission and non-mission operations for 89 days from 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969. During this reporting period the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) continued to be composed of the units listed in inclosure #1. Principle missions assigned to the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) during the period were:

      (1) To provide personnel and equipment to supervise and to discharge cargo from ships calling at US Army Port, Qui Nhon. These missions were accomplished during the reporting period essentially as follows (See tonnage figures, inclosure #2):

         (a) Freeze and chill cargo was discharged by the 285th Transportation Company which is a Civilianized Terminal Service Company.

         (b) Sealand container ships were discharged by the 264th Transportation Company (TS).

         (c) Ammunition and general cargo were discharged from shallow draft vessels at the LST Beach by the 264th Transportation Company (TS).
(2) To provide security to include protection of cargo within the US Army Port, Qui Nhon, and the Outport at Vung Ro Bay. These missions were performed by all 394th Transportation units which daily provided 260 security personnel, or 22% of the total personnel assigned to the Battalion.

(3) To provide necessary personnel and equipment to supervise and operate the LST Beach and Can Dock, US Army Port of Qui Nhon, where shallow draft vessels are loaded and discharged with ammunition and general cargo. These missions were assigned to the 264th Transportation Company (TS).

(4) To provide necessary personnel and equipment to supervise and operate the Intransit Storage Yard, Port Dunnage Yard, and Break Bulk Point (BBP), US Army Port of Qui Nhon. These missions were assigned to the 285th Transportation Company (TS).

(5) To provide necessary personnel and equipment to supervise the four berth Delong Pier, US Army Port of Qui Nhon. This mission was assigned to the 287th Transportation Company (Terminal Service).

(6) To provide necessary personnel and equipment to supervise and operate the US Army Port, Qui Nhon, Outport at Vung Ro Bay, Republic of Vietnam. This mission was assigned to the 854th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) located at Vung Ro Bay.

(7) To provide necessary personnel and equipment to support US Army Port, Qui Nhon, requirements for lighterage, towing, refueling, heavy lift, and coastal line haul by LCU or LCM-VIII. These missions were assigned to the 1098th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) and its assigned Transportation Detachments. See inclosure #1.

(8) The combined capabilities of the 264th, 285th and 854th Transportation Companies (TS) equated to 56% of their rated capability over the 89 day period. (See tonnage figures at inclosure #2.)

b. During the reporting period, there were four organizational changes to the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal):

(1) In accordance with General Orders number 150, Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238, dated 5 February 1969, the 387th Transportation Company (Terminal Service Civilianized) was placed on temporary tour of duty with United States Army Depot, Qui Nhon, APO 96238, for a 90-day period. This duty was subsequently extended until 30 June 1969. 80 enlisted personnel performed a multitude of warehousing and stock control functions at the depot while 250 Vietnamese Local Nationals worked at clearing fields of fire, constructing and improving security fencing, and miscellaneous details.
(2) General Orders number 350, Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238, dated 21 March 1969, amended paragraph 1, General Orders number 972, Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238, dated 25 November 1968, or attaching Detachment #1, United States Army Marine Maintenance Vietnam (Provisional), to Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command for Article 15 authority and efficiency reports in addition to the earlier attachment for rations, quarters, administration and other necessary logistical support. 5th Transportation Command subsequently attached Detachment #1 to the 1093th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) for all functions listed above. The 1093th Transportation Company is the only marine watercraft unit in Qui Nhon area supported by Detachment #1.

(3) In accordance with General Orders number 249, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384, dated 14 April 1969, the First Shore Platoon, 264th Transportation Company was detached from 80th General Support Group, United States Army Support Command, Danang, where the unit provided personnel to operate US Army Air cargo terminals at Danang, Chu Lai, Dong Ha, Sa Huynh, Phu Bai and Quang Tri. The platoon was returned to US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238, with one officer, but less all enlisted personnel and all equipment effective 5 April 1969.

(4) In accordance with General Orders number 434, Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Qui Mhon, APO 96238, dated 14 April 1969, 540th Transportation Detachment (BARC) was relieved from attachment for all purposes to the 1098th Transportation Company (MB) and attached to Tuy Hoa Detachment (Provisional), 593rd General Support Group for rations, quarters, administration, and necessary logistical support with an effective date 4 January 1969. Operational control was delegated to the Commanding Officer, Qui Nhon Outport of Vung Ro Bay. UCMJ authority remains with Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command. The 540th Transportation Detachment will be assigned to Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (TMl) for administration.

c. The following personnel were assigned key duty positions during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>APO</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OWEN, Merrill</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>061499</td>
<td>16 Feb 69</td>
<td>CO, 394th Trans Bn (TMl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTBURN, Robert</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>05225119</td>
<td>23 Feb 69</td>
<td>CO, 285th Trans Co (TS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROELICH, Robert</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>05244428</td>
<td>23 Apr 69</td>
<td>CO, 854th Trans Co (TS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALONSON, Robert</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>05244283</td>
<td>18 Mar 69</td>
<td>CO, 387th Trans Co (TS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOTON, Lawrence</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>05244078</td>
<td>4 Apr 69</td>
<td>CO, 264th Trans Co (TS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUTCHER, Edward J.</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>05258187</td>
<td>5 Apr 69</td>
<td>OIC, Det #1, MMAV</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-1)

KELLEY, Thomas 1LT 05257198 4 Feb 69 CO, 854th Trans Co (TS)

PIERCE, Donald SGM RA15268400 27 Apr 69 CSM, 394th Trans Bn (Tel)

d. Two 394th Transportation Battalion terminal service companies were civilianized under Program 5/6. On 31 March 1969, the 285th and 387th Transportation Companies (TS) completed hiring 100% of their Vietnamese Local National personnel as authorized by United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, Civilian Personnel Voucher, US enlisted personnel in the lower ranks and skills were deleted from the unit’s manpower authorization and replaced by Vietnamese Local National personnel at the rate of 1½ Local Nationals per each US enlisted man deleted. The personnel authorizations are:

```
UNIT                      OFFICER  ENLISTED  CIVILIANS
Standard TO&E terminal service company   6       323       0
Civilized terminal service company       6       113       316
```

e. The 119th Transportation Company (TS) remains at Qui Nhon with one officer and two enlisted personnel assigned. Unit TO&E property has been hand receipted to other units of the 394th Transportation Battalion, or turned in through supply channels. The unit performed no mission during the reporting period.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: None.

b. Operations:

(1) Landing Craft Mechanized, Mark-VIII:

(a) Observation: On 5 April 1969, LCM-VIII, hull number 8242, was abandoned while enroute from US Army Port Qui Nhon, RVN, to the Port of Sa Huynh, a distance of sixty miles, loaded with ammunition.

1. The LCM lost power on one bank of engines in 14 foot high seas causing the LCM to lose directional control. A wave breaking over the bow tore off the ramp, snapping safety chains in the process.

2. An accompanying LCM attempted to tow the damaged LCM stern to and parted lines each time because of the high seas.

3. After the crew salvaged the firing mechanism of the .50 caliber machine gun, LCM 8242 was abandoned and permitted to wash ashore.

Page 4
Because the location of the LCM was reported inaccurately, a tactical unit was unable to secure the LCM, and prior to the arrival of a salvage team the next day, the enemy possibly salvaged usable munitions, the AN/VRC-46, and .50 cal. machine gun (less firing mechanism).

(b) Evaluation:

1. The two LCM's were not provided with adequate weather data prior to departure, or with updated information while enroute.

2. The momentum of the falling ramp snapped the slack safety chains. If the safety chains had been taut with the use of load binders or turnbuckles, the additional support may have prevented the ramp dogs and the ramp cable from breaking.

3. Because the ramp had been lost, the LCM had to be towed stern to, creating excessive strains on inadequate and improperly rigged towing lines. As a result, lines broke during several attempts, and the LCM had to be abandoned because one LCM was inadequate to tow the stricken LCM in high seas.

4. The crews were unable to accurately report the location of the abandoned craft.

5. The LCM utilized AN/VRC-46 radios which have a limited transmission range and could not communicate with origin or destination ports. In addition one of the radios incurred water damage as a result of high seas. SRC-32 AM radios are standard equipment on LCM's providing adequate communications range for the LCM's; however, they were disposed of and the AN/VRC-46 FM radio substituted when replacements could not be obtained for worn out alternators. Low power output generators were used to replace the standard high power output alternators, but the generators could not provide sufficient power to operate the SRC-32.

(c) Recommendations:

1. All missions must be thoroughly briefed on prevailing weather conditions and advised of changes enroute.

2. All LCM's operating in open seas should have ramps tightly secured with additional turnbuckles or load binders as prescribed in TM 55-1905-217-12.

3. LCM missions operating in open waters should travel in groups of not less than three, and two towing bridles as prescribed by TM 55-508, should accompany each mission. Crews must be trained in proper towing procedures.
4. LCM crews (and all vessel crews) should be mentally prepared, trained, and briefed on abandonment procedures which prepare crew members to make prompt critical decisions based upon the enemy situation, weather, terrain, cargo, and communications.

5. Crews operating in open seas on coastal missions must be thoroughly trained in marine navigation and provided with necessary navigational equipment and materials.

6. Water craft operating in open waters on coastal missions must be provided with continuous communications.

7. Water craft operating in open water on coastal missions should report grid coordinates at regular time intervals. Control zones should be established to aid crew members in determining location. Crews should communicate with local tactical operations centers or naval activities each time a control zone is entered or departed.

(2) Lighterage Amphibious Resupply Cargo (LARC-LX), Hull Number 59:

(a) Observation:

1. At 1750 hours, 8 January 1969, the 99-ton LARC-LX 59 broached in a very high surf on a steep, course round granite pebble beach at Phu Hiep, RVN, grid coordinates Q 244382. LARC-LX 59 was enroute from the United States Army Port, Qui Nhon, Outport of Vung Ro Bay, grid coordinates Q 269226, to Tuy Hoa Air Force Base, grid coordinates Q 240388, a distance of about twenty miles when it lost power due to contaminated fuel in a low fuel tank. Accompanying LARC-LX 54 rescued the crew which had been washed overboard, but could not tow LARC-LX 59 off the beach.

2. Salvage efforts were made unsuccessfully on 11 January, but the LARC-LX 59 was not extracted from the beach until 29 March 1969, after several unsuccessful salvage attempts. The final salvage operations were conducted by the United States Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam, APO 96312.

3. While in tow of the Large Tug 1969 enroute to Qui Nhon, LARC-LX 59 sank because salvage pumps were unable to keep it afloat. LARC-LX 59 had been beaten severely for 81 days in the continuous, heavy surf off Phu Hiep and apparently developed undetected fractures of the hull.

(b) Evaluation:

1. The initial failure caused by contaminated fuel could have been precluded by carefully checking the fuel prior to departure.
2. Once LARC-LX 59 was broached, the engine hatch covers were torn off in the surf exposing the engines to salt water which quickly filled the engine compartment. This precluded the salvaging of the LARC-LX under its own power. A subsequent effort to salvage the LARC-LX under its own power was unsuccessful when two replacement engines were installed.

3. By the third day, 11 January 1969, high surf and several tides had $50%$ buried the LARC-LX 59 and deposited sand in both the cargo well and the uncovered engine compartments, greatly complicating subsequent salvage efforts. Before LARC-LX 59 was finally salvaged, sand buried it to the top of the hull and filled the well deck.

4. With conventional towing equipment such as tugboats, LARC-LX's, and bulldozers, moving a 99-ton piece of powerless equipment proved to be exceedingly difficult.

5. LARC-LX 59 was floated after three weeks of continuous effort by a salvage team. The team was unable to access damage to the underside of the hull which had been resting on the sand. While LARC-LX 59 was in tow by LT 1969, one of the two salvage pumps aboard the LARC-LX 59 failed, and the LARC-LX 59 sank. If the LARC-LX 59 had had power, its bilge pumps would have been invaluable.

6. The LARC-LX ramp is not water tight unless sealed with a pneumatic seal and still requires organic bilge pumps to take care of residual leakage. In the case of LARC-LX 59, the ramp was sealed with masonry cement which cracked away when pounded by wave action while in tow, subsequently flooding the well deck.

(c) Recommendations:

1. All LARC-LX systems must be completely checked prior to undertaking a mission in open seas.

2. Crews must be trained thoroughly in abandonment procedures. Protection of the LARC-LX power systems is of utmost importance in order that only minimum essential repairs will be necessary to restore the power systems which are essential to a subsequent successful salvage operation.

3. All salvage resources must be mobilized immediately because the chances of a successful recovery operation decrease significantly with each additional day's exposure to surf, tides, and sand. All salvage equipment must be thoroughly checked to provide complete reliability.

4. Power and bilge systems must be restored prior to floating a stricken LARC-LX in order to provide mobility, bilge pumps, and a supply of air for the ramp seal.
5. A complete assessment of hull damage must be made prior to moving a LARC-LX into open waters.

(3) Lashing Material and Dunnage Requirements for T-Day Vessel Outloading:

(a) Observation: Existing reference manuals provide no source data to be utilized in planning requirements for lashing materials and dunnage needed to load vessels.

(b) Evaluation: The 394th Transportation Battalion (Tnl) developed the following general planning factors to be utilized for outloading military units and depot supplies:

1. The retrograde cargo mix was assumed to be 25% depot stocks and 75% unit equipment consisting of 25% general cargo and 75% vehicles.

2. The average vessel was assumed to be a C-2 victory ship. The cargo mix for an average victory ship was assumed to range from a load of 150 assorted vehicles to a load of 5,600 S/T of general cargo.

3. In accordance with TM 55-513, standard vehicle lashing materials are 5/8" wire rope, 5/8" clips, 1" shackles and 1" turnbuckles. Additional wire loops are used to increase the strength of a lashing. (Normally, 1/2-ton and 3/4-ton vehicles do not require lashing when stowed below decks.) The standard lashing, costing about $21.00, requires 33 feet 5/8" wire rope, three 5/8" wire rope clips, one 1" shackle and one 1" turnbuckle. The average victory ship fully loaded with an assortment of 150 vehicles would require 600 lashing worth $12,600.

4. Based upon the requirement to outload a large number of victory ships with unknown cargo mixes for individual ships, but in the overall percentages specified by paragraph 1, the following dunnage requirements have been determined for the "average" victory ship:

   a. 1x6 for general cargo 5,500 board feet
   b. 2x12 for general cargo 4,500 board feet
   c. 4x4 for light vehicles 16,000 board feet
   d. 6x6 for medium vehicles 8,000 board feet
   e. 8x8 for heavy equipment 6,000 board feet
   f. 10x10 for tanks 6,000 board feet
   g. Total per ship 46,000 board feet

Note: At a cost of $.11 per board foot, the dunnage cost per ship approximates $5,060.00.
AVCA QN-PTU-GO
11 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RC5 C5SPOR-65) (R-1)

(c) Recommendation: The costs and stockage requirements for materials needed to load a ship, multiplied by the number of ships outloaded by military ports, would merit that appropriate planning figures be developed and incorporated into standard Army reference manuals for the convenience of logisticians, planning agencies, and port activities.

(4) Installation Security:

(a) Observation: United States Army Port, Qui Nhon, provides for its own security from within its personnel resources. The 394th Transportation Battalion provides 260 security personnel daily for seven locations which include:

1. The main port area containing the Delong Pier, Barge Quay, Intransit Storage Yard, Vinnell power ships, Dunnage Yard and intransit storage sites along two miles of causeways.

2. 1098th Transportation Company (MB) compound including one mile of the United States Army Airfield, Qui Nhon, perimeter.

3. 394th Transportation Battalion compound and its adjacent motor pool.

4. Hill 131, an eleven-man observation outpost overlooking the port.

5. RMK and Air Force Submarine Cable Detachment compound south of Qui Nhon.

6. LST Beach and Can Deck.

7. US Army Port Qui Nhon, Outport of Vung Ro Bay, secured by 73-men of the 854th Transportation Company (TS). (As of 30 April 1969, 268 officers and enlisted personnel were assigned.)

(b) Evaluation:

1. The 394th Transportation Battalion has four companies in the Qui Nhon area from which to draw security personnel, one medium boat company, one TO&E terminal service company and two civilianized terminal service companies. The medium boat company, authorized 176 personnel, provides 49 guards daily. Each of the civilianized terminal service companies composed of 113 enlisted cadre personnel provide approximately 20 guards per company because their personnel are required to supervise the 316 Local Nationals employed by each company. Finally, the preponderence of the average 190-man daily guard requirement in the Qui Nhon area is levied upon the TO&E terminal service company which currently provides 99 personnel daily from its current (30 April 1969) duty strength of 596 personnel.
2. Terminal service companies are large organizations (329 officers and enlisted men) with large overheads required to support stevedore operations. The 264th Transportation Company's capability has been dissipated to the extent that it provides 40 men daily for 24-hour IST Beach operations, but has no stevedore capability to perform its primary mission, discharging ships.

(c) Recommendation: Army doctrine relative to the security of combat service support units operating in an insurgency or guerrilla warfare environment should be reviewed in order to provide adequate provisions for security without detracting significantly from unit TO&E mission capabilities.

(5) Sapper Attack, US Army, Qui Nhon, Outport of Vung Ro Bay:

(a) Observation: At 0030 hours, 3 March 1969, sappers attempted to penetrate the two-mile perimeter of Vung Ro Bay Outport which is secured by personnel of the 854th Transportation Company (TS) manning 16 guard posts. The isolated port activity is located at the base of steep, rocky, cave infested, jungle covered mountains on a 3/4-mile beach varying from 0 to 150 meters in depth. A guard at bunker number eight heard a dog (one of many dogs on the perimeter) barking between his position and bunker number seven to his right. He stepped outside the bunker, thought that he saw movement near the perimeter wire, and requested permission from the ICC (Installation Control Center) to fire. Permission was granted, and initial rounds from the guard were returned with small arms fire and B-40 rockets. The fire fight which followed resulted in three friendly wounded and three enemy killed. One enemy was suspected to have penetrated into the installation. Numerous sweeps of the area revealed nothing and the enemy was assumed to have escaped the installation by another route without having made further attempts upon its facilities.

(b) Evaluation:

1. Once the attempted penetration was revealed by the dog, reaction to the threat was immediate and effective.

2. Inadequate lighting, insufficient use of noise making devises, trip flares, and claymore mines, and bunkers constructed with firing ports which provided inadequate observation of the area outside the inner fence permitted the enemy to approach and penetrate the fence before being detected.

3. Inner wire was placed so closely to defensive bunkers that by the time the enemy had reached it, they had passed the fields of observation of both the bunkers in the area.

4. Firing ports in defensive bunkers had not been placed so as to provide mutually supporting fires.

5. All deficiencies were corrected soon after the attack.
S U B J E C T: Operational Report for Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-1)

11 May 1969

(c) Recommendation:

1. Defensive bunkers must be constructed with firing ports adequate to provide interlocking observation and protective fire between bunkers.

2. Protective lighting must illuminate not only the defensive wire, but also cleared zones beyond.

3. Where possible, protective bunkers should be placed inside the protective wire so that interlocking protective fires cross inside the protective wire.

4. Dogs kept on guard posts enhance the guards capability to detect strange personnel approaching a position.

c. Training: None.

d. Intelligence: None.

e. Logistics: Potable Water Trucks:

(1) Observations:

(a) 400 gallon water trailers authorized to terminal service companies under TOW 55-117D are inadequate to support total port requirements for potable and non-potable water.

(b) United States Army Port, Qui Nhon, supports 23 water points within its Qui Nhon facilities and nine water points within its Vung Ro Bay installation. In addition, each of the eight crewed harbor craft must be supported with 800 gallons daily.

(c) US Army Port, Qui Nhon, has converted four of its authorized fuel trucks to haul water.

(2) Evaluation: Standardized modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE's) are being prepared to obtain 1000 gallon water trucks with operators for each terminal service company assigned to the 5th Transportation Command, and for the 1098th Transportation Company (Medium Boat).

(3) Recommendation: Army doctrine relative to provisions for potable and non-potable water support to Army port activities and to other combat service support units deployed to a theater of operations should be reviewed.

f. Organization: None.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS GSFOR-65)(H-1)

4. Other: None.

3. Section 3, DA Survey Information: None.

MERRILL H. OWEN
LTC, TC
Commanding

2 Incl

as
AVCA CH-1100 (11 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period ending 30 April 1969 (AVCS CSPO-65) (R-1)

Ltr. Headquarters, 3rd Transportation Command, APO San Francisco 96238
16 May 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Cui Nhon, ATTN: AVCA CH-63, APO 96238
Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCC GO-0, APO 96284
Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AWGUC-DST, APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPUP-OT APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Tmil) for the quarter ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning LCL VIII, hull number 8242, Section II, page 5, para (c) 1-3. (Already implemented). Concur. All missions must be thoroughly briefed prior to departure, on prevailing weather conditions and advised of changes enroute. LCM's operating in open seas must be secured with additional turnbuckles or load binders. Policy implemented to ensure all LCM's operating in open waters must travel in groups of three, with towing bridles in case of emergencies.

   b. Reference item, concerning LCM-LX, hull number 59, section II, page 7, para (c) 1. (Already implemented). Concur. Crews undergoing additional refresher training to insure proper maintenance checks are conducted and necessary repairs made prior to departure on any open sea mission. Drills emphasis must be place on proper drills for abandonment of watercraft, the accurate reporting of location, and the immediate implemention of salvage procedures to prevent complete loss of equipment.

   JOHN  E. TRAUG
   Colonel, TC
   Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (HCS CSOR-65)(R-1)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA 90-0, APO 96384

1. The Operational Report, Lessons Learned of the 394th Transportation Battalion for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 has been reviewed by this headquarters and the following comments are submitted:

   a. SECTION 2, paragraphs b (1) and b (2): Concur with 1st endorsement. As stated, actions have already been taken to remedy the situation described.

   b. SECTION 2, paragraph b (3): Concur in part. Costs change constantly and vary between theaters. Including the cost in a reference manual is not necessary, though estimates of materials required for loading different types of cargo would be valuable.

   c. SECTION 2, paragraph b (4): Concur. There is a definite need for a review of logistical type unit TOAE's with regard to obtaining adequate security in a guerrilla environment without detracting from the operational mission. Over 2100 personnel are currently used daily in a guard, security or patrol mission for Support Command installations, in the Qui Nhon area alone. Additional weapons have been procured on a 180 day emergency loan basis and a Defense TDA has been submitted.

   d. SECTION 2, paragraph b (5): Concur, except for item c) 4.

      (1) Item (c) 1 - New bunkers are being constructed and old bunkers are being destroyed or remodeled as necessary.

      (2) Item (c) 2 - There have been a total of twenty six (26) additional lights installed around the perimeter.

      (3) Item (c) 3 - This is being determined by the Outport Commander.

      (4) Item (c) 4 - Non-concurrence on the item is given because utilizing dogs in a stationary role tends to make the animals lax and would decrease their value as sentry dogs. The proper role of the sentry dog is in a moving patrol. This enables the dogs to be more cognizant of their environment and more alert. This headquarters recommends that the dogs be employed as they were originally intended, not in a stationary role.

   e. SECTION 2, paragraph c: This matter requires action at higher headquarters.
AVGA QN-GO-H (ll May 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (HCS CSFOR-65)(R-1)

1. SECTION 3 (DA Survey Information) was not required for this reporting period.

2. The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: QNL 2161

JOSEF J. KRAYNAK
CPT, ASC
Asst Adjutant General
1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning Lashing Material and Dunnage Requirements for T-Day Vessel Outloading, page 8, paragraph 2b(3). Concur, with exception of the number of feet of wire rope per lashing which appears to be excessive. Also, it is not possible to make an accurate comment on the lumber requirements since all the factors were not stated. The comment that reference materials contain no source data is well taken. Recommend that action be taken by higher headquarters to determine such data from experience or detailed computation and that it be included in any future editions of FM 55-513 or FM 101-10-1.

   b. Reference item concerning Installation Security, page 9, paragraph 2b(4). Concur. TOE for units operating in a guerrilla environment should be reviewed by Combat Developments Command with regard to providing for additional security requirements. USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon is currently investigating alternate means of providing the required security force.

   c. Reference item concerning Potable Water Trucks, page 11, paragraph e. Concur. All terminal service companies in 1st Logistical Command are standardized. Once the request from USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon is received, an investigation will be made to determine if the number of water trailers requested is required in all terminal service companies. Upon completion of this investigation, action will be taken to modify the standardized TOE under which terminal service companies are authorized.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous endorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. STAFFORD
Lt. ACC
Asst Adjutant General

TEL: LBN 4839

CF:
USASUPCOM-QNH
5th Trans Comd
394th TC Btn

16
AVHGC-DST (11 May 1969) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational report for Headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for Period ending 30 April 1969 (HCS CSFOR-05) (II-1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 90375 23 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOH-DT, APO 90558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from headquarters, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal).

2. Reference item concerning "Lashing Material and Dunnage Requirements for T-Day Vessel Outloading," section II, page 8, paragraph b(3); concur. The data compiled by the 394th Transportation Battalion is considered valid and is being forwarded by separate correspondence to the US Army Transportation School for evaluation and possible inclusion in future reference manuals. Because costs change constantly and vary between theaters, these estimates are being deleted. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy furn:
394th Trans bn
1st Log Comd
GPOP-DT (11 May 69) 5th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 394th Trans Bn (Term) for Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:
ORGANIZATION

1. 394th Transportation Battalion (terminal), APO 96238, attached and assigned units:

- HHD, 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal)
- 119th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)
- 264th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)
- 585th Transportation Detachment (MIE)
- 285th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)
- 387th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)
- 540th Transportation Detachment (BARC)
- 854th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)
- 1098th Transportation Company (Medium Boat)
- 272nd Transportation Detachment (TUG)
- 274th Transportation Detachment (Barge, cargo)
- 396th Transportation Detachment (Barge, gas)
- 565th Transportation Detachment (TUG)
- 566th Transportation Detachment (TUG)
- 632nd Transportation Detachment (TUG)
- Detachment #1, US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (Provisional) (Attached)

2. With the following exceptions, all 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) units were located at Qui Nhon, Republic of Vietnam:

a. The 540th Transportation Detachment (BARC) is located at Tuy Hoa Army Base, grid coordinates CQ250370.

b. The 854th Transportation Company (TS) is located at Vung Ro Bay, grid coordinates CQ269226.

Inclosure #1
### 394th TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL)

**Tonnage for Period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1969**

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<td>1,109</td>
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|       | TOTALS FOR PERIOD----- | 31,620 | 37,841 | 13,322 | 108,186 |

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**387th Trans Co (TS) was placed TDY to USA Depot, Qui Nhon, effective 5 February 1969 where it remained throughout the reporting period.**

**Inclosure #2**
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 394th Transportation Battalion**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.**

**CO, 394th Transportation Battalion**

**1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY** (Corporate author)
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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**2b. PROJECT NO.**
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**2c. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)**
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**2d. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)**
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**7b. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES**
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**7c. NO. OF REF.S**
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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310