<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>UNCLASSIFIED</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AD NUMBER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD848648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIMITATION CHANGES</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TO:**

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**FROM:**

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors;
Administrative/Operational Use; 06 NOV 1968.
Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (Army), Attn: FOR-OT-UT, Washington, DC 20310.

**AUTHORITY**

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

**THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1968

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
   US Continental Army Command
   US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
   US Army War College
   US Army Command and General Staff College
   US Army Ordnance School
   US Army Quartermaster School
   US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
   Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
   Deputy Chiefs of Staff
   Chief of Engineers
   Chief of Research and Development

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
DISTRIBUTION NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT
(ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR 65)

THRU: Commanding Officer
48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)
APO U.S. Forces 96491

Commanding General
United States Army Support Command, Saigon
APO U.S. Forces 96491

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. COMMAND


b. Inspections. (See Inclosure 2)

2. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

a. During this report period nine officers arrived in the command and thirteen departed, representing 20.8% and 32.3% respectively of the authorized strength. Of the thirteen departures, five were unit commanders, and one was a key staff officer.

Inclosure

Protective marking cancelled when separated from inclosure.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOH 65)

b. Shortage of MOS qualified personnel has developed into a problem area affecting efficiency in battalion and subordinate unit operations. Action has been taken to train personnel to fill critical vacancies through a new On-the-job (OJT) training program to fill the void, in hopes that "school trained" personnel are forthcoming. As of the end of the report period, this organization was short the following MOS qualified personnel in skilled MOS fields:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>% of Authorized Short</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63B</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64A &amp; B</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71B</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76Y</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>943</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. In addition to the above personnel shortages, subordinate units are short experienced noncommissioned officers to fill leadership positions. Primary shortages exist at the platoon and squad level, and are currently being filled by Acting Sergeants.

d. In accordance with "draw down" instructions received from higher headquarters, this organization has had subordinate company line platoons reduced by approximately 4.5 platoons. The 87th Transportation Company (Light Truck) has been reduced by 2.5 line platoons, the 151st Transportation Company (Light Truck) by one line platoon and the 261st Transportation Company (Light Truck) (5 Ton) by one line platoon. Personnel available in line platoons affected by the reduction were transferred to fill shortages existing in the remaining subordinate units assigned to this organization. Excess personnel not assigned to fill shortages within the battalion, were reassigned within the group to fill vacancies created by activation of a Quartermaster Company (Reefer).

e. In addition to the incentive programs reported in last quarter's report on the areas of safety and maintenance, a "Best Company of the Month" incentive award program was initiated during this report period. Each subordinate unit receives a thorough inspection, approximating a combination AGI and CMII type of inspection, conducted by the battalion headquarters once each month. Results in all areas inspected are scored and the highest scoring unit is designated the "Best Company of the Month". The winning unit is presented an appropriate plaque, and other privileges consistent with operational requirements.

f. During the report period, this battalion suffered the following personnel losses, casualties and missing as a result of an ambush conducted on a truck convoy:
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFUK 65)

(1) Killed in Action: 3.
(2) Wounded in Action: 4.
(3) Missing in Action: 2.

(4) Awards and decorations earned by members of the battalion during this report period include:

(1) Purple Hearts - 7.
(2) Bronze Star for Valor - 2.
(3) Bronze Star for Service - 5.
(4) Army Commendation Medal for Valor - 8.
(6) Safe Driving Awards - 165.

h. On 1 October 1968, a vehicle safety check verification system was implemented to increase emphasis on motor vehicle safety at the platoon and squad level. Safety inspection verification forms are authenticated by the responsible squad leader, assistant platoon sergeant, or platoon sergeant before a driver is given dispatch authorization. The system is more successful than was originally contemplated and has produced the desired results, (keeping the "dogs" off the road).

3. OPERATIONS.

a. During the report quarter ending 31 October 1968, the truck companies attached to this battalion were engaged in air terminal, navigation head, and port clearance providing combat and combat service support for the entire 92 days.

b. Motor transport performance summary for the period is indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TONS</th>
<th>MILES*</th>
<th>TON MILES</th>
<th>PAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>44,348</td>
<td>499,857</td>
<td>1,207,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>46,435</td>
<td>450,629</td>
<td>1,383,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>40,976</td>
<td>669,288</td>
<td>1,398,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131,759</td>
<td>1,619,771</td>
<td>3,989,396</td>
<td>28,177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes loaded and empty mileage.

c. Tonnage transported by this battalion increased from 119,882 ton reflected in the previous report, to 131,759 ton for this report period. Although the battalion lost and gained movement capability through the results of line platoon draw down losses and arrival of a USAR truck unit respectively, the increase of 11,867 tons is nearly equal to the amount of tonnage transported by the new Composite Vehicle tested and utilized by the battalion since 21 August 1968.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSPGR 65)

d. On 21 August 1968, a 5 Ton Truck (Cargo), a Dolly Converter, and a 12 Ton Semitrailer (S&P) were married together and tested for over the road operation as a high capacity cargo carrier. The test and operational performance of the Composite Vehicle combination has been extremely successful, as indicated by the performance data indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPOSITES USED</th>
<th>TONS</th>
<th>MILES</th>
<th>TON MILES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4,320</td>
<td>42,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>13,747</td>
<td>146,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>34,798*</td>
<td>227,393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mileage increase over September resulted from maximizing utilization on Line Haul to realize full advantage of high carrying capacity.

e. During the report period, both the draw down action affecting 4.5 truck platoons and added command emphasis on vehicle inspection and maintenance reduced the overall task vehicle availability within the battalion. The combined actions resulted in eighty-one trucks (62 - 2½ Ton and 19 - 5 Ton), being classified for salvage or rebuild, and lateral transfer of ten trucks to other units within the group to fill equipment shortages.

f. Also during the report period, additional movement capability was gained when the 319th Transportation Company (Lt Trk - 5 Ton), a USAR unit called to active duty, arrived in country and became operational. Although the unit had been reorganized prior to deployment and arrived minus one platoon, movement capability gained by its arrival offset approximately two thirds (2/3) of the movement capability lost due to Draw Down actions.

g. On 12 August, this battalion completed the movement of approximately 5,000 combat-equipped Royal Thai Army troops and 2,975 tons of unit impediments from port of debarkation to their assigned base camp. On 15 August, 1,740 Royal Thai Army troops were transported on a night convoy move from their base camp, to port of embarkation for their departure from the Republic of Viet Nam. These final moves signaled the completion of Operation Condor II which was supported entirely by this battalion, and was completed without accident or incident.

h. Throughout this report period, this battalion was also heavily committed on unit moves to the Delta (IV Corps Zone). As a result of initial problems associated with base development encountered by units being supported, vehicles were very often not offloaded in time to join return convoys. Loss of vehicles to meet the following days movement requirements, resulting from overnight holds at unit movement destinations in the Delta during this report period, is equivalent to 523 vehicle days.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR 65)

1. The Air Terminal (formerly the Army Air Terminal) clearance mission at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon was successfully supported during the period by the battalion utilizing the ten marine corps dropside trucks and ten regular 2½ Ton cargo trucks on a 24 hour basis. On 1 October, the Army was relieved of mission responsibility for operation of the Army Air Terminal, by the 8th Aerial Port (USAF). Performance for the quarter is indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trucks</th>
<th>Tons</th>
<th>Average load</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>3,861</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>4,153</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>3,757</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,923</td>
<td>11,771</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J. On 28 September, ammunition discharge operations supporting the U.S. and Vietnamese Air Force at Bien Hoa Air Base were transferred from the Buu Long barge site to the new Bien Hoa barge site. The new site initially commenced operation as a two crane site, as construction continued to provide two additional crane pads. New Bien Hoa site is approximately two miles closer to the ammunition supply point on the air base, and a new road has been constructed to provide direct access between the two locations. Utilization of the site is currently restricted to daylight hours only, due to air base security restrictions on travel through, and around the base perimeter during the hours of darkness. Ammunition input to the new site has been sporadic since its opening, therefore truck clearance has not been required on a daily basis. The previously utilized Buu Long site was a one crane site, and has been returned to ARVN authorities.

K. At approximately 1200 hours on 25 August 1968, a logistical resupply convoy enroute from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh on route QL 22, was ambushed by a sizeable North Vietnamese Army (NVA) force approximately 6 kilometers Northwest of Go Dau Ha near the 25th Infantry Division's Check Point 182 (XT 356333). Fifty-one vehicles out of the 81-vehicle convoy, traveling with a 50 meter interval between vehicles, were caught in the "Kill Zone". Of the 11 vehicles and 16 personnel involved in the resupply mission from this battalion, 9 vehicles and 13 personnel were caught in the "Kill Zone" (remaining personnel were in march unit 1, which was not caught in the ambush.) The ambush site was bordered by a large rubber tree plantation that extended to within 20 meters of the road, and provided excellent cover and concealment for the ambush force. As indicated in paragraph 2f, the convoy element from this battalion sustained substantial personnel losses and casualties. Equipment losses are indicated in paragraph 6b. As a result of this ambush and the losses sustained by the convoy elements caught in the "Kill Zone", vehicle security guard requirements were drastically increased from 1 for every 5 vehicles, to 1 per vehicle for convoys traveling within the 25th Infantry Division area of operations. As indicated in paragraph 1,
SECTION II, this increase in vehicle security guard requirements has resulted in a degradation of the overall operating efficiency of this battalion in the administrative, logistical, and maintenance areas.

4. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION.


b. On 15 August 1968, all attached Light and Medium truck companies were reorganized under TOE 55-17G and 55-18G respectively by Headquarters, United States Army Pacific General Order 376, dated 2 August 1968.

c. The 319th Transportation Company (Lt Trk - 5 Ton), minus (-) one truck platoon was attached to this battalion effective 26 September 1968. The 319th is a U.S. Army Reserve unit called to active duty at Fort Lee, Va., on 13 May 1968. Pre-Vietnam deployment training was conducted at Fort Lee, and the unit commenced deployment on 7 September 1968. The main body of the unit arrived on 26 September 1968, and the equipment arrived on 11 October 1968. On 15 October 1968, the unit was committed on its first motor transport support mission, and has since been employed on local haul, port clearance and line haul operations daily.

d. Three attached subordinate units of this command have been reorganized as a result of reduction in military space authorization in accordance with Draw Down instructions.

(1) The 87th Transportation Company (Light Truck) has been reduced to a reduced strength headquarter section, with one platoon (-) consisting of 26 task drivers.

(2) The 151st Transportation Company (Light Truck) has been reduced by one complete truck platoon.

(3) The 261st Transportation Company (Light Truck) (5 Ton) has been reduced by one complete truck platoon.

e. As of the end of the report period, Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE's) for each of this battalion's attached task units, have been prepared and are being finalized for submission. Requested modifications include the addition of three 5 Ton trucks with mounted radios and machine guns, and four (4) M79 grenade launchers, to each subordinate unit's TOE. This additional equipment is required to comply with convoy control and defense requirements established by combat elements supported by this organization. In addition, MTOE for the Transportation Company (Lt Trk - 5 Ton) includes authorization request for twenty (20) dolly converters and forty (40) semitrailers. This request is justified by the highly successful
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR 65)

results of a Test and Evaluation conducted by this organization during the report period on the feasibility of utilizing a 5 Ton cargo truck with dolly converter and semitrailer attached, as a combination high capacity cargo carrying vehicle.

5. INTELLIGENCE. None

6. LOGISTICS.

a. During the month of October an equipment serviceability and classification program was initiated to identify task vehicles for administrative storage in conjunction with line platoon draw down. As a result of this inspection, 81 vehicles were classified as unserviceable/repairable, or uneconomically repairable. Nineteen 5 Ton cargo trucks and sixty-two 2½ Ton Cargo trucks were lost from the operational vehicle fleet under this program.

b. During the ambush on the convoy to Tay Ninh on 25 August 1968, one ½ Ton truck with AN/VRC 46 radio was destroyed; one 5 Ton cargo truck was destroyed; one rifle, M16A1 was lost; 1 pistol, caliber 45 was lost; and six 5 Ton truck tractors were damaged.

c. New vehicles received during this report period to replace shortages within the vehicle fleet included twenty-six 2½ Ton cargo trucks, six 5 Ton cargo trucks, and twelve 5 Ton truck tractors.

d. Concentrated emphasis on vehicle inspection and maintenance, increases in accumulative vehicle mileages, and shortages of qualified maintenance and supply personnel have contributed to an increase in deadline percentage for this report period. Vehicle deadline percentage has increased by approximately 2% per month for the months of August, September, and October.

e. As of the end of this report period, 28% of the assigned 5 Ton cargo trucks were in support maintenance. This percentage of non-available 5 Ton cargo trucks coupled with existing shortages was compensated for by utilizing twenty 2½ Ton cargo trucks issued to the 261st Transportation Company (Lt Trk - 5 Ton).

f. During the period 8 - 14 October 1968, the U.S. Army Vietnam Readiness Assistance Team visited the battalion. The team provided assistance and guidance to all attached units and the battalion staff for improving the overall Logistic Readiness Program.

7. OTHER.

Test and Evaluation of Composite Vehicle. On 21 August 1968, this organization conducted the initial over the road operational test of a combination vehicle consisting of a 5 Ton cargo truck towing a dolly converter.
with 12 Ton stake and platform semitrailer attached (Composite Vehicle). During the test, both tandem and single axle dolly converters were evaluated. The initial over the road test involved the local delivery of 20 tons of cargo over a good, but relatively hilly, test route to Bearcat. The initial test run was successful and confirmed the operational compatibility of the three Composite Vehicle components. Subsequent to the initial test, additional dolly converters were obtained and the Composite Vehicle was employed for operational field testing. Tests were conducted to evaluate performance of the Composite Vehicle when employed on motor transport missions supporting port and beach clearance, local hauls, and line hauls. Although the 60 foot length of the combination vehicle posed some maneuverability problems initially, most problems were overcome as drivers gained experience in handling the rig and new techniques of vehicle employment were developed. Techniques of employment developed and tested included utilization of the vehicle as a fixed unit (truck and semitrailer remain together throughout transport mission); utilization as a fixed unit cargo carrier with trailer exchange at destination; utilization of the truck component as a cargo carrier with dolly converter only attached on a forward move, to effect pickup and return of a semitrailer from destination; and utilization of the truck for cargo delivery and as a prime mover to effect concurrent shuttle of loaded trailers from a barge site to an offload site. Employment of 5 Ton truck tractor as an assist vehicle was also tested to reduce maneuverability time consumed to effect precise semitrailer spotting alongside loading cranes in a barge site clearance operation. Cargo carrying capability of the Composite Vehicle represents a significant increase over the capability of standard cargo carrying vehicles currently employed in the motor transport system.

Included in the test and evaluation was a detailed maintainability review and analysis. Data extracted from The Army Equipment Records System (TARS) records pertinent to the vehicles utilized during the test period does not reflect any adverse component failure or maintainability information for the period 21 August through 10 October 1968. Utilization of the Composite Vehicle by this organization during the operational field testing period has resulted in extremely significant direct and indirect savings in the number of vehicles and personnel employed to meet tonnage movement requirements. Evaluation of test results and demonstrated performance of the Composite Vehicle attests to the feasibility of its use in the motor transport system within this operating area (III & IV Corps Zone, RVN). (See paragraph 2, Section II.)

SECTION II

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PERSONNEL.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFCR 65)

a. ITEM. The increase in personnel requirements imposed on Transportation elements of the command to provide added convoy defense greatly reduces the efficiency of subordinate units attached to this organization.

b. OBSERVATION. The occurrence of the ambush on a logistical resupply convoy enroute to Tay Ninh on 25 August 1968, and losses of personnel and equipment resulting from that ambush caused an immediate change of "Shotgun" (assistant driver) policy. The new policy resulted in an increase of 4 additional personnel per 5 vehicles traveling in logistical resupply convoys within the 25th Infantry Division area of operations. As an example of the impact on personnel requirements, of the total tonnage moved by units of this organization during the month of October 1968, 43.8% was moved to destinations in the 25th Infantry Division area. A total of 692 vehicles were employed and 1,384 personnel were utilized to man each vehicle, to comply with the 1 per vehicle "shotgun" policy. Only 692 drivers are actually required to move the cargo to destination, however, an additional 692 personnel were utilized to provide convoy defense. Each task unit attached to this organization is authorized 2 drivers per vehicle by TOE. Actual number of drivers assigned to a unit can be expected to average 90% of authorized strength, or 108 out of the total of 120 drivers authorized. Current actual driver utilization requirements dictate that 40-50% of the available drivers be utilized for night loading of vehicles scheduled to depart on the next day's resupply convoy. As a result, a balance of 54-64 drivers remain for the day operation, not considering approximately 10% non-availability to allow for sick call, quarters, guard, R&R, etc., or an additional non-availability caused by driver conversion to Acting Sergeant to fill authorized noncommissioned officer vacancies. In actuality, driver availability for vehicle operation may range from 45 to 55 drivers for convoy operations. The additional personnel required to comply with convoy security and defense policies must be committed from another unit creating a hardship on that unit, or from the unit's headquarters, supply, mess, and maintenance sections. Either alternative is undesirable and results in a loss of efficiency in unit operations. The latter alternative drastically reduces a TOE unit's capability to accomplish essential administrative, supply, and maintenance functions. This problem area has been submitted to higher headquarters.

c. EVALUATION. Limited relief was obtained on 2 November 1968, when "shotgun" requirements for logistical resupply convoys operating in the 25th Infantry Division area was readjusted to 1 "Shotgun" for every other vehicle in the convoy. However, a 1 shotgun per vehicle requirement still exists for logistical resupply convoys traveling to Phouc Vinh through the 1st Infantry Division area, or to Long Giao through the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment area. Evaluation of current operational conditions (considering driver assets available to operate on a two shift, 24 hours a day basis) and movement requirements to accomplish resupply to divisional areas indicates that transportation elements should be responsible for individual defense and not for defense or security.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR 65)

Combat elements are responsible for route clearance and security, and should be responsible for convoy security and defense.

d. RECOMMENDATION. That motor transport personnel be responsible for individual defense and personnel requirements to provide convoy defense be eliminated.

2. OPERATIONS.

a. ITEM. Analysis of driver/vehicle productivity resulting from utilization of low capacity vehicles to transport cargo indicated a need to develop a means of increasing productivity within the limits of available personnel and vehicular resources.

b. OBSERVATION. Average load performance of the 2½ Ton cargo truck and 5 Ton cargo truck ranges from 2.5 to 4 tons per truck and 3 to 7.0 tons per truck respectively. As an indication of the number of these low cargo carrying capacity trucks required to transport a given amount of tonnage, 68 2½ Ton cargo trucks were utilized to move 243 tons of cargo and 536 5 Ton cargo trucks were utilized to move 3,490 tons of cargo in the line haul system during the month of September 1968. Actual average load performance of the 2½ and 5 Ton cargo trucks employed in the line haul system for that month was 3.6 and 6.5 tons per vehicle trip respectively. On 21 August 1968, a 5 Ton cargo truck with dolly converter and semitrailer attached (the Composite Vehicle) was employed on its first cargo carrying mission. Initial feasibility tests and subsequent operational field tests of the Composite Vehicle on port and beach, local haul, and line haul missions were very successful.

c. EVALUATION. Results of a complete Test and Evaluation project indicate that utilization of the Composite Vehicle is mechanically and operationally feasible within this organization's motor transport area of operations in the III and IV Corps Zone, Republic of Vietnam. The economical advantages of Composite Vehicle utilization are clearly demonstrated in a comparison of vehicle average load performance. During the month of September 1968, 158 trips with the Composite Vehicle resulted in the line haul movement of 2,852 tons of cargo. Average load performance of the Composite Vehicle for the period was 18.0 tons per vehicle trip as opposed to the 3.6 and 6.5 tons per vehicle trip for the 2½ Ton and 5 Ton cargo trucks. Based on average load performance, Composite Vehicle utilization in lieu of 2½ and 5 Ton cargo truck utilization results in a direct driver and vehicle savings of 4 drivers and 4 2½ Ton trucks or 2 drivers and two 5 Ton trucks per 18 tons of cargo transported. Results of the Composite Vehicle Test and Evaluation project indicates that the addition of 20 dolly converters and 40 semitrailers to the TOE of the Transportation Company (Lt Trk – 5 Ton), would increase the unit's movement capability by an amount equal to the addition of two complete TOE Platoons.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR 65)

4. RECOMMENDATION. That MTCE requesting authorization approval of the addition of 20 dolly converters and 40 semitrailers for each of the three Transportation Companies (Lt Trk - 5 Ton) attached to this organization be approved.

3. TRAINING. None.

4. INTELLIGENCE. None.

5. LOGISTICS.

a. ITEM. Transportation Company (Truck) TOE authorization of 7 Ton trucks with radio and machine gun mounted is inadequate to comply with convoy march unit control vehicle requirements.

b. OBSERVATION. Since the Tay Ninh ambush on 25 August 1968, control vehicle requirements for march unit control within the 25th Infantry Division area of operations exceeds the TOE authorization. Each Transportation Company (Truck) is authorized one 7 Ton truck per truck platoon (20 vehicles). Convoy march units within the 25th Infantry Division area of operations are limited to a maximum of 15 task vehicles, and 7 Ton truck control vehicles are required at both the front and rear of each march unit. Compliance with control vehicle requirements is currently being accomplished by utilizing every available 7 Ton truck within each unit, to include the 7 Ton truck authorized in the maintenance section and the Commanding Officer's 7 Ton truck authorized in the company headquarters. To resolve the 7 Ton truck shortage, MTCE's have been prepared for each transportation truck company attached to this organization requesting authorization approval for 1 additional 7 Ton truck with radio and machine gun for each line platoon.

c. EVALUATION. Actions taken to comply with control vehicle requirements have not been satisfactory since denial of 7 Ton truck use to the unit maintenance section and the Commanding Officer has an extremely detrimental effect on unit operations and efficiency. Approval of MTCE request for 1 additional 7 Ton truck per line platoon will solve the problem.

d. RECOMMENDATION. The MTCE requests for additional 7 Ton trucks with radio and machine gun mounted be approved.

6. ORGANIZATION. None.

7. OTHER. None.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR 65)

(EVASION AND ESCAPE)

1. SITUATION. On or about 1200 hrs 25 August 1968 a logistical resupply convoy from the 48th Group Transportation (MT) was proceeding to Tay Ninh, RVN when it was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force about 6 - 7 miles from Go Dau Ha, RVN. Upon initial contact the convoy was stopped and drivers and shotguns quickly dismounted and assumed defensive positions to defend their valuable cargo and themselves. SGT E-5 William E. Adrian, NCOIC, and SP4 Ralph J. Tooley, a shotgunner from the 86th Trans Co, were in the above ambush and were forced by overwhelming enemy odds to withdraw from their defensive positions.

2. EVASION AND ESCAPE ACTIONS TAKEN. SGT Adrian and SP4 Tooley withdrew to a houch off the left side of the road. The enemy forces continued to advance so SGT Adrian & SP4 Tooley split up to evade the enemy. SP4 Tooley and SGT Adrian left the houch to withdraw further. SP4 Tooley entered another houch and took cover in a dug out cellaret underneath the houch and remained there until the enemy forces had cleared the village. He, then, joined a portion of the convoy vehicles that were able to move and proceeded to Tay Ninh, RVN.

SGT Adrian left the houch and ran through the back of the village with enemy forces pursuing. He leaped over a small dike in a rice paddy and continued to crawl along this dike until he found a culvert which he crawled in and covered himself with mud. SGT Adrian remained concealed as enemy forces were combing the area trying to find him. SGT Adrian remained in the culvert for approximately 73 hours until he was rescued by friendly forces.

He arrived in Tay Ninh, RVN on 26 August with a mechanized unit that was going from the ambush site.

3. LESSONS LEARNED. In circumstances when a few individuals are being attacked and pursued by overwhelming enemy forces it appears that individuals have a better chance to use their own initiative and utilize hiding places for an individual that could not be utilized by a group (i.e., the cellaret of a houch and the culvert in the rice paddy) for concealment and evasion from the enemy.

ORVIL C. METHENY
LTC, TC
Commanding
ATCA SCM AB CO (6 November 1968) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
(APO Co FOR 65)

DA, Headquarters, 46th Transportation Group (HT), APO US Forces 96491
13 November 1968

TO: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Saigon, ATTN: ACofS, SP60
APO US Forces 96491

1. The Operational Report submitted by Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion, for the period ending 31 October 1968 is considered adequate.

2. With reference to Section II of the Report:

   a. Concur in the recommendation made in paragraph 1d.

   b. Concur in the recommendation made in paragraph 2d. MTOE will be submitted on or about 18 November 1968.

   c. Concur in the recommendation made in paragraph 5d. These items are also being included in the MTOE to be submitted on or about 18 November. A letter requesting a 140 day loan of these items was submitted on 4 October 1968.

   d. Concur in the observations made on Escape and Evasion, Section III.

FRANK B. CASE
Colonel, TC
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFQR-65)


TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO 0
    APO 96384

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, of Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) is forwarded in accordance with para 9, AR 1-19.

2. Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command. A copy of this indorsement has been provided to the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

FREDERICK R. HUCK
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

TEL: IB 2604
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVCA GO-0 (6 Nov 68) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
(RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 16 DEC 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHEC-DST, APO 96375

1. The operational Report - Lessons learned submitted by Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference Section II, para 1. Nonconcur. Hq, II FORSCOM is aware of this problem and has taken action to achieve a solution agreeable to all concerned. As now established this policy requires 1st Logistical Command units in III and IV CTZs to provide for internal convoy security with a minimum of one machine gun, either M-60 or .50 cal, for each five (5) vehicles. Although "shotgunners" are desirable, this requirement has been eliminated. This reduces the additional personnel requirement from four (4) to one (1) for each five (5) vehicles.

   b. Reference Section II, para 2. Concur. The use of dolly converters and semi-trailers attached to 5 ton cargo trucks greatly increases the lift capability of the LT Truck Company (5T). The MTOE for addition of 20 dolly converters and 40 semi-trailers should be approved.

   c. Reference Section II, para 5. This headquarters is currently reviewing convoy security/defense equipment requirements from all support commands for the purpose of constituting a standardized MTOE for truck units. This MTOE will include additional firepower, communications, and vehicular capabilities.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this endorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LEN 2882/6779

LANNY K KELSEY
1LT AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF: USAUSPOOM-SGN
48th Trans Gp
6th Trans Bn

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Protective Marking
Cancelled 15 Dec 71.
This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A.R. GUENTHER
CPT. AGC
ASST. ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy furn:
Hq 1st Log Comd
HQ 6th Trans Bn (Truck)
GPOP-DT (6 Nov 68)  5th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 6th Trans Bn (Trk) for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558              15 JAN 1969

TO:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

                                    C. L. SHORTT
                                    CPT, AGC
                                    Adj AG
INC LUSURE 1 (Organizational Chart) to Report for Quarterly Period Ending October 1968.

** - Unit

- Denotes unit affected by drawdown

\[ \text{Diagram showing organizational structure} \]
1. Command Maintenance Management Inspections. The following units were inspected during the report period and achieved the scores indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MATERIAL</th>
<th>MAINT MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>543rd Trans Co</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151st Trans Co</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Trans Co</td>
<td>94% (2nd Insp)</td>
<td>94% (2nd Insp)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Annual General Inspections. "None"
## Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

**CO, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Refs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 November 1968</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Supplementary Notes**

N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract**

N/A