**UNCLASSIFIED**

**AD NUMBER**

**AD845172**

**NEW LIMITATION CHANGE**

**TO**

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

**FROM**

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 29 Nov 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.

**AUTHORITY**

OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980
IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (5 Dec 68) FOR OT UT 684144

10 December 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, Period Ending 31 October 1968

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
DISTRIBUTION NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT (ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DEC 30 1968
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY PACIFIC
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96558

GPOP-DT

29 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ USARPAC for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-85 (R1)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

Omitted per paragraph 12a(1)(d), AR 525-15.

(Significant historical data is included in the monthly
publication, "Highlights of USARPAC Activities" distributed
to DA under separate cover.)

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations,
Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations.

(1) Unit Publications.

(a) OBSERVATION. Twenty-two magazines for units in
Vietnam, most of which are Army, are presently being printed
by commercial printing firms in Tokyo and Okinawa. The cur-
crent costs, involving non-appropriated funds, is approxi-
mately $325,000 per annum - all of which is gold loss. More
publications are being planned.

(b) EVALUATION. Not only is there gold loss for print-
ing, as indicated above, but a number of information office
personnel are placed on TDY in the vicinity of the printing
facilities to insure that these publications are of high
level journalistic quality. It is estimated that travel
funds are approximately $200,000 annually. In commenting
on a GAO recommendation for establishment of a Pacific Stars
and Stripes satellite printing plant in Vietnam (Cam Ranh Bay), MACV has recommended that consideration be given to building a US Government printing facility in Vietnam and is currently conducting a study to determine the feasibility of establishing such an in-country facility.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That DA maintain cognizance over this situation and if construction of a US Government printing facility in Vietnam is recommended, that the recommendation be supported.

(2) Contractual Sentry Dog Services in Oversea Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION. Programming of U.S. dogs and handlers into oversea areas involves a four to six month lead time and prior construction of kennels.

(b) EVALUATION. A Gold Flow Staff Study cost analysis showed conclusively that an in-country source, if available, would reduce the required lead time and be less costly. A contract for such services was recently negotiated in Thailand. Preliminary results indicate that security has been significantly enhanced in the areas in which the service is being rendered.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That DA consider conducting a feasibility study to determine if contracting for sentry dog services in overseas areas should be incorporated into DA policy.

c. Training. None
d. Intelligence.


(a) OBSERVATION. In an Operational Report of Lessons Learned, a major headquarters in Vietnam recommended that 1:100,000 scale maps be developed for maneuver battalions deploying over wide areas of operation. The need for this nonstandard scale was justified on the basis that the standard 1:50,000 scale maps, four of these covering the equivalent area of one 1:100,000 map sheet, constituted a bulky load and the detail on the standard 1:250,000 scale maps was inadequate for maneuver battalion use. Upon validation of this requirement by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 89 maps, scale 1:100,000 series L607, were
produced and distributed to troop units in Vietnam. Feedback from Vietnam since distribution of the 1:100,000 scale maps revealed that these maps were being widely used as situation maps, as staff planning maps, and by forward air controllers, pilots, armor and artillery units.

(b) EVALUATION. CINCPAC directed that a followup questionnaire be sent to Vietnam for the purpose of evaluating the L&O? 1:100,000 maps. The questionnaire was designed to determine if the map series satisfied requirements and to elicit user comments for the purpose of enhancing the value of this type map. The response from the users positively established the value of this scale map in support of combat operations. Many of the comments obtained by this questionnaire are being incorporated in the current revision of the map sheets. This mapping project is an outstanding example of quick response to an urgent combat need and continued effort to furnish combat elements with a more useful map based upon comments furnished by the users in the field.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That commanders and staff officers at all echelons be made aware of their responsibility for evaluating and submitting comments on the usefulness of map products.

(2) Contractual Assistance for Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) Development.

(a) OBSERVATION. Statements of Work (SOW) outlining the scope of contractual assistance to IDHS development take two forms: (1) a technical and detailed ADP terminology version, and (2) a concise legal terminology version.

(b) EVALUATION.

Prior to entering into negotiations for contractor assistance, IDHS activities must submit to DIA for validation a proposed SOW. The purpose of this action is to insure that the scope of the proposed work is consistent with DOD-IDHS long range planning and compatible with developmental areas of other IDHS activities. The latter requirement, to be properly evaluated, requires extensive
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ USARPAC for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

and in-depth documentation, usually in the technical terminology normally associated with ADP.

This same SOW is usually not acceptable for contractual purposes since it contains extraneous material and is not written in the clear and concise legal terminology associated with contracts negotiated under the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR); therefore, a rewrite is required.

The IDHS field activity rewrite of the DIA validated SOW to meet local Contracting Officer criteria carries with it the inherent danger of modifying the scope of work to be performed by the contractor. There is no system of checks and balances to insure that both versions of the SOW adequately reflect the end results desired and could result in payment for services or products which were never intended.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That consideration be given to amending the provisions of Section VII E (Project and Contract Management) of the DIA/ARMY IDHS Management Plan, August 1965, to reflect requirement for the one-time submission of the "legal" SOW and that the "technical" SOW take the form of supplemental data in support and clarification of each article of the legal document. Concurrent review and approval of these documents by interested echelons of command would offset the lead time required for separate submissions and would permit the one-time negotiation of required trade-offs, if any.

(3) Accounting for Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF).

(a) OBSERVATION. Since March 1965, the 500th Military Intelligence Group has appointed 19 ICF Class A custodians. Of this total, only two had prior experience or training in financial accounting or bookkeeping. Based on comments of several of the custodians, only four hours of instruction, limited to preparation of subvouchers (DD Form 1167) and use of Statements of Agent Officer's Account (DD Form 1081), were included in their course at the Intelligence School.

(b) EVALUATION. The 500th MI Group has had to divert manhours and funds towards the training of ICF Class A custodians. Experience factors show that about 2 weeks of supervised training is required to prepare an untrained
officer to assume the duties and responsibilities of a custodian. This training time required at operational level could be greatly reduced if military personnel assigned to the 500th MI Group possessed more knowledge of fundamental accounting principles and procedures.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That consideration be given to including a course in fundamental accounting principles and procedures in the curriculum of the U. S. Army Intelligence School.

e. Logistics.

(1) Expedited Computations for Reinforcement Divisions Level.

(a) OBSERVATION.

As an important element of T-day planning, the need was recognized for the most complete, accurate and current requirements data for USARPAC materiel requirements. In this connection it was determined that a need existed for immediate computation of requirements for the reinforcement divisions support level for the reason that existing requirements data is neither current nor complete.

A USARPAC position was presented to DA with a recommendation that requirements data be computed by USAMC at the earliest possible time and provided to this headquarters. DA released appropriate instructions requiring computation of this level of supply as a matter of priority.

(b) EVALUATION. Improvement in the USARPAC total stockage position during implementation of T-day plans will be attainable to a greater degree through this action.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the need be emphasized, in connection with T-day planning, for the earliest possible recomputation of USARPAC D-day strength war reserve level requirements.

(2) Depot Maintenance of Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION. Army aircraft normally do not require depot (5th echelon) maintenance except to correct damages caused by crashes and other than fair wear and tear, and for special modifications beyond the standard military maintenance
GPOP-DT 29 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ USARPAC for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

capability. In 1965 it became apparent that the introduction of large numbers of new and complex aircraft into RVN and the growing inability to sustain an adequate supply of seasoned, experienced aircraft mechanics in USARV necessitated a change in the aircraft maintenance support concept. During this same time, other USARPAC commands were faced with the task of supporting their aircraft fleet, which in many cases included older and out of production aircraft, with a priority for parts and maintenance personnel below that enjoyed by USARV.

(b) EVALUATION. After considerable study by USARV and USAMC, DA in 1966 initiated a program, in support of USARV, to return aircraft to CONUS for depot level maintenance processing. This program, which is known as "aircraft cyclic depot maintenance," restores the aircraft to a high degree of serviceability and the aircraft is returned to USARV. This program assures a continuous flow of aircraft in a serviceable and safe operational condition to the operating command on a cyclic basis; thereby, relieving the operator from a substantial maintenance problem. The availability of funds has limited USARPAC participation in this maintenance program to USARV aircraft. However, in August 1968, DA and USAMC were requested by this headquarters to consider including some USARPAC aircraft outside USARV in the FY 69 depot maintenance program to upgrade serviceability standards of aircraft. A resulting program for input of 44 OH-23G and 33 U-6A aircraft was approved. Initial input of 10 OH-23G's from USAEIGHT to Sharpe Army Depot for cyclic depot maintenance was completed in October 1968. An additional input of aircraft to Sharpe Army Depot during November 1968 is underway as follows:

- 4 U-6A aircraft from USAEIGHT
- 2 OH-23G aircraft from USARHAW
- 1 OH-23G aircraft from USARYIS
- 1 OH-23G aircraft from USARSUPHTAI

All aircraft input to this program will be returned to the using command in four months time. A low level of resistance was encountered in USARPAC commands since replacement (float) aircraft are not available to offset the temporary loss of assets to the using commands. This resistance was overcome for the initial input since the advantage of receiving rejuvenated aircraft will most certainly offset the temporary and partial loss of assets.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ USARPAC for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That efforts continue by DA and
USAMC to schedule older USARPAC aircraft, outside RVN, for
CONUS cyclic depot maintenance within program and fund
limitations as a means to upgrade aircraft serviceability
standards and reliability.

(3) Maintenance Management in a Theater of Operations
Under "Limited War Conditions."

(a) OBSERVATION.

Prior to 1967, depot maintenance management was totally
decentralized to major subordinate commands in USARPAC.

Due to the limited availability of resources, criti-
cality of certain items of equipment in the Army inventory,
and rapidly changing requirements, it became necessary at
the beginning of 1967 to initiate intensive management of
selected major and secondary items. This was accomplished
through Closed Loop Support; an integrated technique for
planning, programming and executing those supply and main-
tenance functions necessary to maintain equipment in the
field at authorized levels and in acceptable operating
condition.

Beginning in November 1967, it was found that similar
planning was necessary for non-Closed Loop items to deter-
mine requirements that could be satisfied from maintenance
sources; this combined with Closed Loop made maintenance
support responsive to supply. To accomplish this, USARPAC
directed work groups meet twice annually with representati-
tives of each major subordinate command.

Centralized management of maintenance programming and
retrograde planning is necessary also because of the
operation of offshore depot maintenance facilities in
Okinawa and Japan that support other customers including
MAP. Centralized direction provides for the coordination
required.

Repair parts support continues to be inadequate and
causes major slippage in the maintenance program. To a
lesser degree, the timely availability of reparables through retrograde is a problem.

(b) EVALUATION. The following fundamental actions are necessary for successful execution of a depot maintenance program under "limited war conditions" as experienced in USARPAC:

Intensified management on a Closed Loop Support and Project Officer basis is required at various command echelons to:

Determine and maintain data on authorizations and on hand asset positions, including serviceables and unserviceables.

Determine and maintain up-to-date information on the age/condition of the population of items under control and the rate at which the equipment population is accumulating hours/miles as a basis for forecasting maintenance candidates.

Control the distribution of serviceables and retrograde of unserviceables in keeping with command priorities and unit readiness requirements.

Control in-country General Support programs and forecast quantities of reparables to be evacuated to offshore depot maintenance facilities.

Coordinate program development and monitor program execution at Theater Army level; provide input for program development and coordinate program execution at subordinate command level.

Forecast requirements for maintenance capability and facilities, repair parts and transportation to insure timely delivery of unserviceables and repaired items.

In some instances, it is necessary to establish Direct Exchange Control Points at General Support Unit level, bypassing the overseas depot system, to control the issue and turn-in of critical items. Where items pass through
GPOP-DT 29 November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ USARPAC for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

a depot, direct exchange procedures are required to insure
generation of retrograde. The quantity of retrograde in
most cases is a direct function of serviceable input for
issue.

Close coordination between supply and maintenance
functions in-theater and in CONUS is required for success-
ful support to the field with a limited pipeline. Mainte-
nance turnaround time and the size of the depot repair
cycle float must be kept to a minimum, i.e., not exceeding
90 days.

Techniques for intensive management have been developed
historically on an ad hoc basis rather than being a part of
Army approved doctrine and procedure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That consideration be given to
formalizing intensive management procedures and techniques,
based on USARPAC experience, as they pertain to depot
maintenance management. When formalized, the subject
matter should be considered for presentation at appropriate
Army service schools.

(4) Management of Medical Materiel.

(a) OBSERVATION. Effective and efficient management
of medical materiel cannot be accomplished by fragmentizing
the responsibilities for technical supervision and the
management of medical materiel between staff agencies of a
headquarters.

(b) EVALUATION. The responsibilities for technical
supervision and management of medical materiel were split
between two agencies of HQ USARPAC from 1963 until 1 January
1968. Physical relocation of the personnel performing
these missions was accomplished in May 1968. The lack of
cohesive management during a span of almost five years,
which included a tremendous expansion of medical facilities
throughout the command, greatly limited the responsiveness
of the medical materiel system to rapidly changing opera-
tions.
(c) RECOMMENDATION. That consideration be given to assigning the Office of the Surgeon of a command headquarters the responsibility for the technical supervision and management of medical materiel so that the Surgeon can fulfill his responsibilities to the commander for the health and welfare of the command.

(5) Debarment and Suspension of Contractors.

(a) OBSERVATION. The Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASP.) section 1-605.1, provides that the Secretary or his authorized representative may suspend or debar a firm or individual from doing business with the United States. The authorized representative for the Department of the Army is the Assistant Judge Advocate General for Civil Law (Army Procurement Procedure (APP) 1-601.1). ASPR 1-609.2 places in CINCPAC the responsibility for establishing and maintaining a list of offshore suppliers from whom bids or proposals will not be received. CINCPAC has by letter delegated this authority to CINCUSARPAC. This has in the past been construed as giving CINCUSARPAC the authority to debar and suspend contractors in the Western Pacific area. APP 1-601 through 1-650 makes no mention of this authority and speaks only of the authority of CINCUSARPAC as Head of the Procuring Activity (HPA) to recommend suspension or debarment. APP is specifically made applicable to overseas purchases (APP 1-102).

(b) EVALUATION. The present APP provisions are specific in stating that within the Department of the Army the Assistant Judge Advocate General for Civil Law is the representative of the Secretary. APP also provides guidance for forwarding requests and recommendations for debarment and suspension to DA. APP 1-601.6 requires all correspondence from contractors on matters pertaining to debarment and suspension be forwarded to the Assistant Judge Advocate General for Civil Law for reply. The APP contains no exception for overseas operations and does not mention CINCUSARPAC's authority as delegated by CINCPAC.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ USARPAC for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That DA review the APP for the necessity of giving recognition to the authority of CINCUSARPAC as delegated by CINCPAC.

f. Other.

(1) Saturation of Computer Printing Capability in USARPAC.

(a) OBSERVATION. Increasing demands placed on computers have saturated existing computer printer capabilities in all of the major computer sites in the command. This situation was resulting in critical delays in completion of daily computer cycles.

(b) EVALUATION. The alternative to augment all computers with additional printing equipment was not favorably considered because it would cost more and offered no solution to reduce the daily computer cycle throughput. A study was made during the 1st Quarter, CY 1968, to determine the feasibility of adopting a new technique in computer operation -- that of producing microfilmed data in lieu of paper printouts. The study concluded that this new technology, now referred to as "micromation," will enable computer production of microfilmed output at a speed about seven times faster than the production of computer printout on paper which will significantly reduce daily computer cycle throughput. Projected savings in computer printing time, related efforts, and cost of paper far offset the projected costs of installing the micromation system. The introduction of this new technology further projected significant benefits and advantages to agencies receiving and using microfilmed computer output in lieu of voluminous paper output. A plan to install micromation equipment in nine computer sites in USARPAC was developed and forwarded to DA for approval during the 1st Quarter, CY 1968. DA approval was received in the 2d Quarter, CY 1968, for installation of equipment first in three sites, to be followed by installation in six other sites after an evaluation of the initial installations. Equipment was installed and the micromation
system was implemented in the first three sites during the 3d Quarter, CY 1968. Evaluation to date indicates that the micromation system and the benefits thereof are materializing as planned.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That other major headquarters and agencies experiencing computer printing bottlenecks, and problems of working with and maintaining massive volumes of computer paper output, consider the adoption of the micromation technique in their computer operations to alleviate these problems.

(2) Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funds Obligation.

(a) OBSERVATION. The FY 1968 Prior Year Report submitted to DA on 23 August 1968 reflected actual obligation data of $2.394 billion in direct obligations, $2.5 million for funded reimbursement obligations, and $102.7 million for automatic reimbursement obligations in theater, for a total of $2.499 billion in obligations. Based on total available funding in OMA Appropriation of $2.502 billion, the obligation total represented 99.9% of the Annual Funding Program.

(b) EVALUATION. Sufficient OMA funding was available to satisfy all essential OMA requirements in the theater. The USARPAC Annual Funding Program (AFP) was increased in each quarter during FY 1968. The direct AFP of USARPAC at the end of each quarter was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 1968 QUARTER</th>
<th>AFP AMOUNT ($ Billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>$2.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>$2.312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>$2.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>$2.397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The USARPAC AFP has therefore reflected a net increase of $323 million between 30 September 1967 and 30 June 1968.
While the AFP was sufficient, allocation availability did not keep pace with the Financial Management Plan of the theater. It was not until 16 October 1967 that initial 1st half direct allocation of $857.7 million was received and this represented only 41.3% of the Direct AFP. This amount was $184.1 million short of minimum requirements needed to sustain the essential activities throughout the theater thru December 1967. On 17 November 1967, DA honored this shortage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That DA consider providing sufficient allocation, at the inception of a year and well in advance of each subsequent quarter, in accordance with that requested in the USARPAC Financial Management Plans. This will eliminate the imposition of artificial restraints on mission programs of the Commanders.

RALPH E. HAINES, JR.
General, United States Army
Commander in Chief
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army, Pacific (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific

29 November 1968

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE

** FOR OT UT #

***PAGE #

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT UT #

PAGE #

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT UT #

PAGE #

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT UT #

PAGE #

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT UT #

PAGE #

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT UT#: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.