NEW LIMITATION CHANGE

TO
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; Oct 1967. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Asst. Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Attn: FOR-OT-RD, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (27 Feb 68) FOR OT RD 674034 1 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), Period Ending 31 October 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by
USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in
accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and cor-
corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of
receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure
appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current
operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army War College
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School

Copies furnished
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Defense Documentation Center
CO, 1st Signal Brigade

MAR 25 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65) (WDMAAA)

TO: See Distribution

In compliance with AR 1-19, the following report is submitted:

SECTION I

Significant Organizational or Unit Activities: During the period of this report, the 1st Signal Brigade continued the installation, operation and maintenance of communications-electronics facilities in support of US and Free World Forces in the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand; and the operation and installation of long haul communication facilities in the Brigade's area of responsibility. The Brigade was operational throughout the period.

1. On 6 August, General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, United States Army, visited this headquarters. He received an update type briefing and reviewed future goals of this command.

2. On 10 August, the 327th Signal Company (Radio Relay UHF) arrived. It was stationed at Long Binh, and assigned to 37th Signal Battalion, 2nd Signal Group.

3. General Order 294, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), dated 12 August 1967, assigned HHD, 44th Signal Battalion; Packets one and two, 221st Signal Company (Pictorial); 69th Signal Battalion, 593rd Signal Company (Comm Cen Op), 580th Signal Company (Const), 49th Signal Detachment (Crypto Type B), 213th Signal Detachment (Crypto Type B), 446th Signal Detachment (Crypto Type A), 455th Signal Detachment (Crypto Type B) and the 706th Signal Detachment (Crypto Type C) to the 160th Signal Group, effective 15 August 1967. In addition, the 518th Signal Company was relieved from the 2nd Signal Group and assigned to the 21st Signal Group effective 8 August 1967.

4. On 23 August, Rear Admiral J.R. Wadleigh, USN, Assistant Deputy Director, Defense Communications System, Operations, visited this headquarters. He received an orientation briefing on the Brigade's mission and unit deployment.


6. On 28 September, the 324th Signal Company (VHF) arrived. It was stationed at Long Binh, and assigned to 36th Signal Battalion, 2nd Signal Group.

7. On 30 September, Lieutenant General Harold W. Grant, USAF, (Ret); Director, Telecommunication Policy, Department of Defense, received a 1st Signal Brigade briefing and visited various Brigade units and isolated signal sites.

8. On 9 October, the Brigade headquarters began moving from Saigon to Long Binh Post. The move was scheduled over a six day period to allow for continuous operations. Approximately 400 personnel and 150 tons of equipment were moved. The Brigade Headquarters closed Long Binh at 151630H October 1967.

9. On 30 October, Messrs Paul J. Mohr and Edward N. Pennypacker; Assistant Director and member, respectively, Survey and Investigation Staff, House Appropriations Committee, House of Representatives, visited 1st Signal Brigade Headquarters.

10. During October, six Troposcatter Signal Detachments arrived in-country to complete the Brigade build-up for this quarter.

11. The 327th Signal Company's arrival and the reassignment of the 518th Signal Company completed the planned realignment of tropo and microwave assets in RVN. The 327th has responsibility for all tropo/microwave systems in the III and IV CTZ, relieving the 362d and 518th Signal companies of this responsibility. The 518th has responsibility for all microwave systems and the 362d has responsibility for all troposcatter systems in the II CTZ. The 337th Signal Company has the responsibility for both troposcatter and microwave systems in the I CTZ.
S~SCCVOP_NH
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65)
(WDMAAA)

12. COMUSMACV has requested that Brigade transfer its attached
Signal units from Task Force OREGON to the Americal Division. Action
has been initiated through Headquarters, USASTRATCOM, to transfer HHD,
509th Signal Battalion; Company A, 36th Signal Battalion, and Company D,
459th Signal Battalion to the Americal Division.

13. The internal organization of Brigade headquarters is shown at
Inclosure 1.

14. As of 31 October, the Brigade morning report strength was 19,588.
Breakdown of units is shown at Inclosure 2.

15. Battalion areas of responsibilities are shown at Inclosure 3.

16. During this reporting period, the Brigade was assigned one new
group commander and underwent an extensive change of battalion commanders.
Many commanders completed their foreign service tours, while others were
moved to staff positions as part of the Brigade commander's program to
provide deserving officers with opportunities to command battalions in
SEA. Command changes are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NEW CO</th>
<th>OLD CO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>160th Sig Gp</td>
<td>COL Blaine O. Vogt</td>
<td>LTC Clarence J. Schlafer (Acting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th Sig Bn</td>
<td>LTC Jerry Davis, Jr.</td>
<td>LTC Kenneth R. Symmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39th Sig Bn</td>
<td>LTC John H. Grady</td>
<td>LTC William C. Stephens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Sig Bn</td>
<td>LTC Marcus C. Jordan</td>
<td>LTC Jesse Wang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Sig Bn</td>
<td>LTC Francis W. White, Jr.</td>
<td>LTC William J. Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th Sig Bn</td>
<td>LTC Henry W. Hill</td>
<td>LTC Walter G. Ellis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>509th Sig Bn</td>
<td>LTC James V. Bailey</td>
<td>MAJ David E. Goode (Acting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang Sig Bn</td>
<td>LTC Eugene A. Woodson</td>
<td>LTC Thomas C. Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL Bn Thai</td>
<td>LTC Robert G. Chamberlin</td>
<td>LTC Vannah E. Van Horn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65) (WDMAA)

17. During this reporting period, nine new officers were assigned key positions in Brigade headquarters; duty assignments and predecessors are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>ORIGINAL OFFICER</th>
<th>REPLACEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dir, Operations</td>
<td>VACANT</td>
<td>COL August J. Sabel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, CSMA</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL David C. Baatz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, TNC *</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Jesse Wang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTC David L. Lawrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Gabriel W. Marnoch, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ Libert Y. Nakatsukasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec of Gen Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>CPT Edward R. Baldwin, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td>1LT Daniel Foley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO, HHC</td>
<td></td>
<td>1LT Patrick E. Dustin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Now designated Southeast Asia Telephone Management Agency (SEATELM.), Operations Directorate.

18. Significant organizational activities that occurred within each directorate and staff office are detailed below:

a. Personnel Directorate:

(1) During this period, the directorate strength increased from 39 to 59 with the addition of the Information Office and the Office of Chaplain. The directorate breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LTC</th>
<th>Maj</th>
<th>CPT</th>
<th>LT</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>E9</th>
<th>E8</th>
<th>E7</th>
<th>E6</th>
<th>E5</th>
<th>E4-E2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nims</td>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>Alligood</td>
<td>Foley</td>
<td>Mehaffey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayton</td>
<td>Sherman</td>
<td>Shryock</td>
<td>Bates</td>
<td>Finch</td>
<td>Matula</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 59
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASIGLITCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65) (WDMAAA)

(2) During the quarter, Brigade processed 3591 incoming and 3924 outgoing enlisted personnel as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Last Qtr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bde Hq (incl 194th MP Co)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Sig Gp, 450</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Sig Gp, 2431</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Sig Gp, 185</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160th Sig Gp, 200</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCG, 304, 124</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>1542</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>1115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) For the quarter, enlisted promotion allocations were distributed and utilized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>L9</th>
<th>E8</th>
<th>E7</th>
<th>E6</th>
<th>E5</th>
<th>L6</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Last Quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bde Hq (incl 194th MP Co)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Sig Gp, 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>1236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Sig Gp, 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>1398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Sig Gp, 0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160th Sig Gp, 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg Comm Gp, 0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>703</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>2949</td>
<td>4554</td>
<td>3704</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) During the quarter, 3384 air space allocations were utilized by the command for RVN personnel rotating upon completion of foreign service tours:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Last Quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bde Hq (incl 194th MP Co)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Sig Gp, 371</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Sig Gp, 495</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160th Sig Gp, 178</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg Comm Gp, 109</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>535</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1208</td>
<td>1018</td>
<td>1158</td>
<td>3384</td>
<td>3184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATOM), (RCS CSFOR-65)

(5) During this period, the following awards were approved for this command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>LAST QUARTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) As of 31 Oct, the assigned strengths for the Brigade Headquarters and 194th MP Company are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion/Company</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>D/B</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>LAST QUARTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bde Hq</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>194th MP Co</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Sixty-five releases were forwarded to news media during the quarter, compared with 36 for the previous quarter. A breakdown of press releases follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>LAST QUARTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) During the quarter, 1,956 home town news releases were forwarded to the Home Town News Center, more than doubling the previous quarter's total of 911. Of these, thirty-nine releases were sent directly to 80 newspapers during the quarter. The monthly breakdown of HTNRs is below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>LAST QUARTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>416</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USSTRONICOM), (ACJ CSFOR-65)

(9) In August, the Information Office published the first issue of The Communicator, a mimeographed Brigade newspaper. Distribution is based on one copy per five individuals.

(10) Brigade headquarters personnel continued their support of the Men Than Gia Orphanage, Saigon. Over 500 pounds of food and clothing were distributed to the children. In addition, English classes were conducted frequently for the orphanage's nuns and girls of high school age.

b. Operations Directorate

(1) Command Readiness

(a) During October 1967, additional teletype facilities were installed at Brigade headquarters. This new teletype system connects the Command Readiness Division of the Operations Directorate with the Regional Communications Group's Systems Control Center and the Army Communications Operations Center. The availability of direct communication channels has greatly facilitated exchange of information between the Operations Directorate and the above mentioned activities.

(2) Terminal Division

(a) During this quarter, fixed dial central offices were installed at New M.CV (2000 lines), Long Binh (3000 lines), Di an (1000 lines), and Soc Trang (400 lines). The salient advantage of the new dial central offices in addition to the manual to dial conversion, is that dial to dial service among Long Binh, Tiger, New M.CV, and Tan Son Nhut is now available.

(b) The cutover of fixed dial telephone exchanges released tactical dial switchboards for redeployment to Plantation (IIFV, AN/TTC-28), Bearcat (9th Inf Div, AN/TTC-28), and Cam Ranh Bay Navy (F-36).

(c) The long distance (LD) common user system was expanded and improved by the installation of a modified AN/TTC-9 at Da Nang. This improvement has increased the Da Nang LD switching capability to 135 trunks.

(d) In September, the 14th Inventory Control Center's (ICC) data terminal was moved from Saigon to Long Binh. This move was pre-planned and made in conjunction with the 14th ICC's relocation to Long Binh. The move was accomplished without interruption of service.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, Ist Signal Brigade (USSTR.TOCN), (RCS CSFOR-65) (WDMC-64)  

(e) On 26 September, the New Uj.iRV communications center was activated. This activation resulted in the deactivation of the US-RV communications center in Saigon and necessitated activation of the Saigon Army Area Communications Center on 3 October to support Army units in the Saigon/Cholon area which do not have dedicated communications centers.

(3) Systems Division

(a) On 17 September, a defective parametric amplifier was replaced with a traveling wave tube in the AN/MSC-44 satellite terminal. This action restored the MSC-44 to service after 31 consecutive days of downtime. Contact was immediately established with other stations in the Philippines and Thailand, and subsequently, with its Hawaii terminal. Since repair, this satellite terminal system has performed its assigned role in the Vietnam to CONUS telephone network.

(b) On 2 October, a DCS quality, 12 channel AN/TRC-24 system was activated on Phu Quoc Island, between An Thoi and Duong Dong. This system provides both voice and teletype communications from Phu Quoc Island to the South Vietnam mainland.

(c) On 16 October, the VHF system between Ca Mau and Bac Lieu was upgraded to 24, DCS quality channels. This was accomplished by replacing Ca Mau's original AN/TRC-24 equipment with AN/GRC-50 equipment and installing a relay at Gia Ria. The system's upgrading increased the channel capacity and improved quality.

(d) During Vice President Humphrey's visit to Vietnam, a special communications network consisting of a switchboard, a limited temporary outside plant and associated local telephone, long distant trunks and a single sideband net was installed. This system was utilized extensively by the Vice President and his party in the Saigon area and in other areas of Vietnam, to include his visit aboard the USS Benewah, at Vung Tau.

(e) In consonance with the DCA Worldwide HF Utilization and Improvement Plan, a new trunk, 76UB01, was installed between Asmara and Bang Pla on 25 September. This trunk replaced the Bang Pla to Peshawar trunk which was deactivated on 28 September. This change-over provides a reliable westward outlet for (Southeast Asia) SEA traffic.
SJJCTJ.L.CT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65)

(f) On 21 August, installation of an AN/TSC-45 transportable technical control facility was completed at Vung Chua Mountain. This installation upgrades the technical control facility at this key nodal point.

(g) On 17 September, the cutover from an old technical control facility, consisting of an AN/MSQ-73 and a "White Whale" technical control van, to another AN/MSQ-73 was completed at Cam Ranh Bay. This action was required because the replaced control facility interfered with the signal path of an IVCS system between Cam Ranh Bay and Ph'y Line. At the same time, this cutover provides a significant upgrade of technical control facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.

(h) On 17 September, tropo system (77UTlY), was upgraded to provide 48 channels between Tan Son Nhut and Can Tho. This system's successful activation provides the increased channel capability necessary for future needs between the delta region and Saigon.

(i) The Chu Lai to Cu Lao Re Island UHF system (77UH2X), was deactivated on 24 October. This is the first of five VHF systems to be deactivated at Cu Lao Re Island. Deactivation is necessary because of troop and equipment resupply problems and the minimal living conditions at Cu Lao Re Island.

(4) Southeast Asia Telephone Management Agency (SEA-TELMa)

(a) 1st Sig Bde General Order 259, dated 12 August 1967, redesignated the Saigon/Cholon Telephone Management Center (SCTMC) as SEA-TELMa.

(b) SEA-TELMa's responsibilities include:


2. Accumulating data on dial telephone exchange (DTE) and manual switchboards scheduled for conversion.

(c) During this report period, on-the-spot monitoring was conducted on DTE cutovers at the 9th Infantry Base camp, II FFV Headquarters and Can Tho. The Cholon dial exchange was terminated and its subscribers absorbed by the Tiger exchange. Pre-cutover visits were made to the F-36, 100 line PABA at the Cam Ranh Bay Navy Complex and other DTE locations.
SCCVOP-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USSTRATCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65)

(d) A representative MTOE was developed for telephone management offices (TMOs) at Signal group headquarters and distributed to group TMOs for use as a guide in developing and justifying the TMO portions of MTOEs.

c. Intelligence and Security Office

(1) Three additional platoon leaders were assigned to the 194th MP Company during this reporting period. These assignments will improve control and supervision over the company's personnel who are guarding isolated Signal sites throughout Vietnam. In addition, this additional officer strength will reduce considerably the geographical area of responsibility previously assigned company platoon leaders.

(2) Recent publications:

(a) SCCVR 380-4, Physical Security, supersedes an earlier edition and provides guidance on the use of personnel assigned to 194th MP Company (PS).

(b) SCCVR 380-8, Unsolicited Correspondence, supersedes an earlier edition and provides up-to-date guidance on procedures for handling this type material.

(c) SCCVR 380-11, Reporting and Investigating Significant Incidents, supersedes an earlier edition and provides the latest guidance concerning reporting and investigating procedures for significant incidents in the Brigade.

(d) SCCVR 380-2CO, Armed Forces Censorship, supersedes an earlier edition and provides general guidance on censorship procedures.

(3) During the quarter, 75 operational and five new Signal sites were inspected. These inspections revealed significant improvement in completed revetments, bunker reinforcement and individual attitudes toward building more and better defensive fortifications.

(4) 1st Signal Brigade personnel experienced 71 enemy incidents, including 40 mortar attacks, during this reporting period. The recent RVN national elections contributed to this significant increase over the previous quarter's total.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USSTRATCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65) (WDWL-)

(5) On 12 October, the Nha Trang MSC-46 satellite communications site was hit by mortar and small arms fire. The protective cover was struck and a section was deflated. Continuous communications were maintained throughout the attack.

(6) On 24 - 25 October, a semi-annual counterintelligence inspection of the Brigade Headquarters was conducted by USARV G2. Only minor deficiencies were reported and some were corrected on the spot.

(7) In addition to the Signal sites inspected this quarter, security inspections were conducted at five Signal battalions and one Signal group headquarters. Each headquarters was found to be satisfactory.

e. Logistics Directorate

(1) During this reporting period, frequent visits were made to Brigade units to determine the condition of materiel readiness, observe maintenance management practices and procedures, and give necessary technical assistance. These visits have resulted in an overall improvement of all areas inspected. Brigade logistics personnel will continue these visits.

(2) Throughout the Brigade, the control of PLL zero balances continues as a major problem. Inexperienced supply personnel, continuous realignment of equipment configurations, poor procedures in follow-up requisitioning and a noticeable lack of urgency are the primary reasons for the high rate of zero balances.

f. Plans and Programs Directorate

(1) On 31 October, the Brigade's Organization and Mission Letter was updated and republished. The document provides information on current and programmed Brigade organizations and other force development planning dates.

(2) During August and September, a Joint USA Combat Developments Command (USACDC)-USSTRATCOM Liaison Team visited all Brigade Signal battalions and other communications-electronics (C-E) oriented agencies. These visits provided the team firsthand information on new concepts and C-E doctrine that are being developed in Vietnam. When applicable, these new concepts will be incorporated into the Theater Army Communications Systems (TACS-75) study of communications-electronics, which USACDC is responsible for developing.
Recently, the Brigade's Buddy System Program was discussed between Brigadier General Van Harlingen, CG 1st Signal Brigade, and COL Tiey, ARVN Signal Officer. Because of this discussion, closer relationships have developed between Brigade and ARVN Signal Units. The program is based on joint participation in communications projects; particularly in the areas of Signal training, operations, and logistical assistance. The original program has been expanded from two "model" projects in the Saigon area to a total of 25 Brigade Signal companies now interacting with corresponding sized ARVN units. The language barrier remains the major problem in this well received program.

Prior to 15 August, the 69th Signal Battalion provided C-E support for the Saigon/Cholon/Long Binh area. The 69th Signal Battalion's companies were organized to provide a specific service (i.e., Co A, Comm Cen; Co B, UHF/CAR; Co C, HF/RATT; 580th Sig Co, Signal Construction; 593d Sig Co, Tel Ops). In October 1966, the development of the Long Binh military complex necessitated that C-E support be provided for Long Binh Post, and the 69th Signal Battalion was tasked to provide this support. Long Binh is 27KM from the 69th's home station at Tan Son Nhut AFB, Saigon. Because of this distance, it was necessary to station detachments at Long Binh Post from each company of the 69th Signal Battalion. Command and Control problems resulted, and the decision was made to form two Signal battalions from the assets of the 1,870 man 69th Signal Battalion. This reorganization was accomplished on 15 August 1967. Headquarters Detachment, 44th Signal Battalion gained Company B and Company C, 69th Signal Battalion, and the 580th Signal Company. The new battalion's mission is to provide C-E support for the Long Binh complex, including USARV Headquarters. The 69th Signal Battalion retained Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Company A, and the 593rd Signal Company for support of the Saigon/Cholon area. Both battalions are assigned to the 160th Signal Group. Because the companies had been organized to perform specific functions, unbalanced battalions resulted and cross attachments became necessary. Assignment, promotion and control problems then developed, but these were anticipated. On 3 August 1967, a message was sent to USSTRATEUCOM requesting permission to reorganize the 160th Signal Group. The question of whether the GOLF series TOE could be modified was settled on 28 August when the Brigade Chief of Staff briefed BG Matthews of ACSFOR, DA and obtained permission to use the GOLF series TOE. This was confirmed by USSTRATEUCOM on 15 September. Authorization documents reflecting sufficient personnel and their necessary skills were prepared to provide balanced battalions. Further, HHD, 160th Signal Group, was enlarged from 72 to 190 spaces and two additional Signal Companies were requested for activation. The documentation was sent to USARV for review and space action on 20 September. On 23 September, the documents were returned to Brigade for additional information. A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis (QQA) is required for each unit.
involved in the transaction. To insure that each document was forwarded to HQ, USARV error free and with sufficient justification for personnel and equipment, the original documents were returned to the units involved for correction. The corrected documents will be submitted to Headquarters, USARV for space action and then be hand-carried to Headquarters, USARV.

(5) The TDA for the Communications Systems Engineering and Management Agency (CSEA) was forwarded to USARV on 18 July for review and space transfer action. 76 spaces from HHC, 39th Signal Battalion, and 86 spaces from the Communications-Electronics Engineering and Installation Center (CEEIC) were transferred to CSEA. USARV returned the document on 17 September and transmittal was made to USSTRATCOM on 27 October. Pending final approval by Department of The Army, The IWGSE Engineering and Management office and the CEEIC have been combined provisionally, to organize CSEA. If the TDA is approved as submitted, CSEA will be authorized 162 military and 44 civilian personnel.

(6) On 9 October, the 1st Signal Brigade MTOE/MTDA and unit summary sheets were approved by the Department of The Army with instructions to update and submit each document during the period 15 Nov through 31 Dec 1967. Representatives from each Signal group were briefed at this headquarters on updating instructions and a tentative document submission schedule.

(7) On 20 May, Headquarters, USARV directed the 1st Logistical Command and 1st Signal Brigade to combine their COMSEC logistics resources and form a COMSEC Logistics Support Center (CSLSC) under the 1st Signal Brigade. Assets of the 706th Signal Detachment; 49th Signal Detachment; 213th Signal Detachment; 445th Signal Detachment; 446th Signal Detachment; 455th Signal Detachment; Crypto Equipment Section; 972nd Signal Supply and Maintenance Battalion; Crypto Repair Section; HHC, 53d GS Group; and the Crypto Repair Section HHC, 80th GS Group were combined to form a CSLSC MTOE, with 211 spaces authorized. This document was approved by USARV on 6 August and forwarded to HQ, USSTRATCOM on 8 August. Pending Department of the Army approval, units composing the CSLSC are attached to the 706th Signal Detachment to support all US Army non-divisional elements in RVN. The 1st Logistical Command has not prepared the MTOE deleting the crypto assets of their three units (972d, 53d, and 80th). A delay is expected in the approval of the CSLSC MTOE as TADS requires that all MTOEs in a transaction involving the loss and gain of spaces be at DA at the same time.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65) (WDMA)

g. Adjutant General

(1) During the past three months, the overall Brigade R&R utilization rate was 84.3% (August 86.5%, September 86%, and October 81%). The utilization rate reached a peak of 91.5% during June 1967.

(2) There were a total of 39 reportable casualties during the quarter (4-KHA, 21-WHA, 8-NHAD, 2-NHA/ILL, and 4-NHA/INJ). Of this total, 7 reportable casualties were from the Nha Trang area and 7 from the Quang Ngai area.

h. Comptroller

(1) The following departures and arrivals in the Office of the Comptroller are significant:

(a) Departed:
   1. MAJ Robert B Adams - Comptroller
   2. LTC Maurice Castille - Interim Comptroller

(b) Arrived:
   1. LTC David L. Lawrence - Comptroller
   2. MAJ William J. Nelson - Budget Officer
   3. SFC J-7 Jesse Thomas - NCOIC

(2) Arrangements were made with USASTRATCOM to provide an interim comptroller for the 29th Signal Group between the departure of Mr. Harper and the arrival of Mr. Southerland (approximately 30 days). This interim measure insured professional competence in this functional area.

(3) Brigadier General Clarence Beck, USARPAC Comptroller, visited the 1st Signal Brigade and received briefings from the Operations Directorate and the Comptroller's Office.
(4) During the reporting period, the Brigade Comptroller visited USASTRATCOM, USARPAC, USARV, USARSUPTHAI, 29th Signal Group and USASTRATCOM-PAC. The purpose of the visit was to coordinate Brigade recommended changes to the basic letter assigning communications-electronics responsibilities in SEA. The changes were applicable to three areas of interest:

(a) Class IV Projects

(b) Post, camp and station communications

(c) Transfer of LN spaces from USARV/USARSUPTHAI to the 1st Signal Brigade.

(5) During the final coordination at USARPAC/STRATCOM-PAC, it was decided that all desired actions could be accomplished without a change to the basic letter. Instead, USARPAC (with USASTRATCOM concurrence) sent an instructional message to USARV/USARSUPTHAI providing policy guidance in funding responsibilities between USASTRATCOM/1st Signal Brigade and USARPAC/USARV/USARSUPTHAI with regard to Class IV projects and post, camp and station communications. Additionally, USARPAC approved the USARV initiated request to transfer 1,012 local nationals to Brigade and forwarded the request to DA. USASTRATCOM was provided Brigade comments and recommendations for developing a reply to DA. Brigade's position is that the number of LN spaces and amount of accompanying funds are appropriate for the remainder of FY 68 and that USASTRATCOM should concur in the transfer. The transfer of 417 LN spaces from USARSUPTHAI to the 29th Signal Group was not resolved. USARSUPTHAI and USARPAC concurred in the transfer of 273 spaces, but a subsequent non-concurrence of USARSUPTHAI to 29th Signal Group's request for 144 spaces resulted in the matter being sent to USARPAC for decision. The 144 spaces were not clearly identified and the 29th Signal Group was tasked to identify and justify these spaces before requesting their transfer.

1. Engineer

(1) On 8 August, the Brigade received a special order of construction materials that had been requisitioned from the 1st Logistical Command in February 1967. Non-standard construction materials were included in this order which are peculiar to Signal facility construction.

(2) On 26 October 1967, the USARV AC/S, C-E requested that Brigade suspend all DCO construction at Dong Tam, Phu Tai, and Dong Ba Thin pending final disposition of these sites.
J. Inspector General

(1) During the period 1 August to 31 October 1967, the Inspector General inspected the following:

(a) 43d Signal Battalion
(b) 194th MP Security Company, 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM)
(c) 69th Signal Battalion
(d) 2d Signal Group
(e) 86th Signal Battalion
(f) 327th Signal Company (Radio Relay)
(g) Long Lines Signal Battalion, Thailand
(h) 379th Signal Battalion
(i) Bangkok Signal Battalion (USASTRATCOM) (Prov)
(j) Hq, 29th Signal Group

k. Office of the Judge Advocate

(1) Unit visits have shown that many units are not sufficiently acquainted with regulations governing the use of ration cards. Units have been reminded that the applicable regulations must be brought to the attention of all personnel.

(2) A monthly legal assistance circuit has been initiated to ensure that all Brigade personnel receive legal assistance. The program involves a morale factor and must be actively pursued.

(3) The implementation of Brigade Claims Regulation 27-20, promulgated 13 July 1967, has resulted in more thorough and faster investigations of incidents which may give rise to claims against the government UP AR 27-28. This regulation provides closer supervision of the Brigade claims program.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65)

1. Headquarters Commandant

In October, the Brigade Headquarters' contract for the lease of commercial vehicles expired. All civilian vehicles were replaced with military vehicles. This changeover will result in annual savings of $103,500.
PART I - Observations

a. Personnel

Personnel Training

Item: Timely training on new equipment.

Discussion: Timely programming of new equipment training is essential to efficient performance of the assigned communications mission. Premature or late training impairs operation and maintenance of new equipment in the theater and creates major training problems. Operations and logistics staff elements of USARV must be consulted by Brigade staff training elements to determine the date of arrival, destination and programmed concept of employment for new equipment.

Observation: Coordination must be established to determine timely dates for NET teams to conduct instruction, determine the location for the instruction, task a host unit to provide facilities, and program class quotas.

b. Operations:

Direct Teletype Circuit

Item: Direct teletype circuits have been established between the Brigade Operations Directorate and selected subordinate facilities.

Discussion: During the past quarter, it became increasingly difficult to collect technical data relating to Brigade circuit and systems status. This information is needed on a real time basis and relying upon the common user telephone did not fulfill the requirement. Direct teletype circuits were installed to the principal input sources: Systems Control, Regional Communications Group, and Army Communications Operations Center. Another circuit is being installed to Command Communications Control Center Agency (CCCCA), Thailand.
Observation: These circuits have made vital information available by direct communication on an immediate basis and record copy is produced of all information passed between terminals. As a result, the daily command briefing presents current circuit and system status information and the Director of Operations has an improved management tool.

Dial to Dial Circuits

Item: Dial to Dial Circuits over Tactical Carrier AN/TCC-7

Discussion: During the past three months, several attempts have been made to establish dial to dial circuits over radio systems AN/TRC-24 and AN/GHC-50, using AN/TCC-7 carrier derived channels. These attempts have been unsuccessful because the system's instability causes single frequency tones to vary beyond the operational levels of the standard single frequency signaling unit.

Observation: The AN/TRC-24 or AN/GHC-50 with AN/TCC-7 carrier cannot be satisfactorily utilized to establish dial to dial or single frequency circuits.

Dial to Manual Trunks

Item: Dial to Manual - AN/TTC-28

Discussion: The tactical dial central office AN/TTC-28 has dial to dial and ringdown trunk units. In several instances, a requirement has existed to extend dial service to an AN/MTC-9 or AN/TTC-7. To meet this requirement, combination trunk units (one way automatic, one way ringdown) were locally obtained and installed in the AN/TTC-28.

Observation: When deploying the AN/TTC-28, it should be recognized that the AN/TTC-28 can interface with manual switchboards only on a ringdown basis. Combination trunk units must be installed in the AN/TTC-28 to provide the normal dial service associated with the AN/MTC-9, AN/MTC-1, or AN/TTC-7 switchboards.

World-wide Routing Indicators for Teletype Traffic

Item: Promulgation of World-wide Routing Indicators

Discussion: The RVN tactical situation has prevented the "normal" deployment of division and brigade sized units. The established lines of communications are not geometrically developed and a combination of
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USSTRATCOM), (RCS CPOR-65) (WMMAAA)

Communication means exists between headquarters. Because of this, there has been a continued de-emphasis of theater routing indicators and a heavy reliance on world-wide routing indicators. The long haul trunking is accomplished via the major relay stations (DCS), using world-wide routine indicators. Local distribution is accomplished by Area Communications Centers (AACC) using world-wide routing indicators. Each AACC is a refiling point for connected tactical units, except the headquarters of field forces which also have world-wide routing indicators assigned. This system is responsive to both out-of-country and in-country long haul and local traffic, as required by major command headquarters. The shortcoming is not the routing indicator arrangement, but rather the promulgation of additions, changes and deletions. The frequent movement of tactical units and major unit headquarters has caused many misrouted and, consequently, delayed messages. The Fleet Operations Control Center Pacific routing indicator printout of changes is an excellent tool but it is not responsive enough to the requirements of this area.

Observation: A more responsive world-wide routing indicator dissemination scheme is required. Allocating blocks of routing indicators to a central and responsive agency in SEA is a suggested solution. Under this concept, routing indicators would be assigned locally and dissemination accomplished through pre-determined AIGs, at the same time the change to ACP 117 is forwarded.

Activation of NARC

Item: Activation of NARC Nha Trang on 5 August 1967

Discussion: The activation of the Non-Automatic Relay Center (NARC) at Nha Trang was a major accomplishment. The efficient manner in which this relay was activated was due mainly to lessons learned in the previous year of data operations. During this first quarter of operation, 5,028,898 cards were passed through Nha Trang NARC with minimum difficulties. Cutover of data circuits previously homed on Phu Lam NARC went smoothly and was coordinated jointly with DCA-San, Regional Communications Group and subscribers in the Nha Trang area. A pre-cutover itinerary was published well in advance, allowing all subscriber terminals to be fully prepared for cutover. Anticipated problem areas, e.g., inadequate equipment on site, at both NARC and subscriber, were corrected prior to cutover dates. At the USASTRATCOM PAC AUTODIN Coordination meeting in Hawaii, it was decided the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII)
SCCVOI-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), (ACS CSFOR-65)
(WDNIADA)

Modification would be installed on two UNIVAC 1004's, one at Phu Lam,
the other at Nha Trang. A temporary circuit was activated between Phu Lam
and Nha Trang to perform necessary tests on ASCII Equipment prior to
utilization in other Southeast Asia areas. Upon completion of testing and
acceptance, this ASCII circuit was re-homed to DAU Clark for test prior
to activation. A modification Program is now in progress to convert all
UNIVAC 1004's to ASCII code capability.

Observation: Detailed planning and close coordination must be
accomplished by all concerned prior to the initiation of any positive
actions concerning the cut over.

Pleiku - An Khe Troposcatter System

Item: Installation of Pleiku - An Khe Troposcatter System

Discussion: As a result of IWCS link activations, two troposcatter
radio sets, AN/TRC-132's, were made available to replace four marginal
VHF systems between Pleiku and An Khe. On 12 July, the 21st Signal Group
was tasked to install the system. Equipment was airlifted into place on
18 July and all 48 channels were reported for channelization on 29 July 1967.

Observation: Four marginal VHF systems were effectively replaced by
a single high-quality troposcatter system.

Army Area Communications System

Item: Installation of Army Area Communications System in II CTZ

Discussion: In mid September, the CO, 21st Signal Group, anticipated
the increased requirements to support I FFV in the II CTZ and submitted an
Army Area Communications System plan to Brigade. This plan called for
Nha Trang to be linked with Cam Ranh Bay, Ban Me Thout, Pleiku, An Khe,
Qui Nhon, Phan Rang, and Phan Thiet. Transportable troposcatter and micro-
wave radio equipment was required to install the system. In response to
requirements by IFFV to support Operation Phoenix, a troposcatter system
(Pr'Line - Phan Thiet) was installed almost immediately. This was followed
by a microwave system from Pr'Line to Nha Trang via Cam Ranh Bay and Hon
Tre Island early in October.

Observation: With ample advance notice, Army Area Communications
Systems covering long distances can be installed to provide support for
Field Force combat operations.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USArmy, TCOM), (RCS CFSOR-65) (WDMGAA)

New Troposcatter Systems

Item: Performance of Path Studies and Site Surveys for New Troposcatter Systems

Discussion: During this quarter, considerable difficulty was experienced in the installation of a 48 channel troposcatter system from Tan Son Nhut to Can Tho. Initial planning for this system was made by the Air Force because the system was originally planned to be an Air Force system. During June 1967, the decision was made that 1st Signal Brigade would install, operate, and maintain this system. Deployment of men and equipment began late in July and the system was reported for channelization on 7 August. On 8 August, as a result of a 1st Signal Brigade reorganization, another organization assumed responsibility for this system. A few days later, it was discovered that the system was marginal. Investigation showed that the marginal quality was due primarily to inadequate foreground clearance at Can Tho. The radio equipment was unsatisfactory because of a bad transmitter and receiver and the air conditioner was inoperative. Corrective action was initiated in a piecemeal fashion causing continued delays. Finally, a thorough analysis was made to determine the action required to bring the system to peak performance. Corrective action was taken to raise the height of the antennas to clear foreground obstacles and the radio equipment was brought to peak condition. With this action, the system became fully operational as a good quality system on 15 September. An analysis of the problems associated with the delays in this system's activation leads to the following conclusions:

(1) An adequate site survey would have indicated the requirement for additional antenna height and in sufficient time to obtain a rigid waveguide and install antennas at the proper height.

(2) The radio terminal equipment was not in satisfactory condition when deployed. Responsible unit should have had the terminal 100% operational before deployment.

(3) Initial corrective action was in a piecemeal fashion and inadequate. Bold action was required from the start to insure operation of the system.

Observation: Prior to the deployment of troposcatter equipment, detailed site surveys are required to select space, check foreground clearance, check power requirements, determine exact antenna requirements, etc. Further, diligent corrective action must be taken. Prior to deployment, equipment must be checked to insure that all components are 100% operational.
SOP for Changeover to Plug Supervision

Item: Uncoordinated changeovers to plug supervision of ring-down trunks result in unnecessary outages.

Discussion: An increasing number of ring-down trunks are being converted to plug supervision for better service to the subscriber and to reduce the operator monitoring requirement. Coordination is critical when two switchboards, two frames, two technical controls and any number of radio links are involved.

Observation: SEA-TELX systems practices must be developed in cooperation with operating units to minimize circuit outages associated with changeovers to plug supervision.

Interim Maintenance Measures for Dial Telephone Exchanges (DTEx)

Item: Eventual deterioration can be expected in the performance of DTEx unless maintenance and routines are increased.

Discussion: Lack of maintenance results in a reduced level of DTEx performance. Insufficient maintenance stems from shortages of trained personnel. Dial central office equipment training cannot be conducted on a crash basis by in-country schools.

Observation: Stopgap measures to improve DTEx maintenance and routines would include a concentrated block of instruction presented to small groups of personnel who have a background in wire system operations or electronics. An O&M contract for operation and maintenance support by civilian contractors would complete the interim solution until instruction in CONUS service schools can be modified to meet current requirements.

d. CSFPR

Logistics Support Plan, AUTODIN

Item: Responsibility for organizational, direct and general support maintenance

Discussion: Department of the Army published the AUTODIN Overseas Logistic Support Plan on 31 Aug 67. The plan states that maintenance for
the AUTODIN System will follow the standard organizational, direct support, general support and depot level maintenance. A representative from USAFRPAC has stated that the operating unit for the AUTODIN terminals, the 1st Signal Brigade, will be authorized organizational and direct support maintenance. The 1st Logistical Command will be charged with general support maintenance. With the exception of three Mode V teletype terminals, the 1st Signal Brigade will operate all of the AUTODIN terminals in SEA. As the Brigade will essentially be the sole customer for general support maintenance, it is logical to make the Brigade responsible for general support maintenance vice the 1st Logistical Command.

Observation: During the Pacific Area AUTODIN Conference held in October 1967, it was agreed to change tasking for general support maintenance. The 1st Signal Brigade and 1st Logistical Command representatives presented the USARRV position "that USASTRATCOM elements be authorized on-site general support maintenance for AUTODIN peculiar equipment". The USAFRPAC representative will present proposed changes to the logistics support panel. This will give unit commanders authority to perform all necessary maintenance on-site.

Physical Security

Item: Site security in the Delta

Discussion: In several cases, equipment and supplies arrived at proposed INCS sites in the Delta before construction workers and/or security personnel. This situation led to additional transportation costs when equipment had to be back-hauled to secure locations and to construction delays when shipments were halted.

Observation: Security plans which are concurred in by security personnel and contractor personnel as soon as expected date of delivery of equipment is established will reduce costs and delays in site construction.

TOE Signal Units Fixed Station Responsibilities

Item: Support of Fixed Communications Facilities

Discussion: Due to the very large and complex communications requirements within SEA, TOE Signal units have been augmented and modified to perform a relatively fixed station mission. Large division
base camps, support commands, and major headquarters require communications in quantities and of a type which a tactical Signal unit cannot provide. Facilities such as dial telephone exchanges (DTE), fixed communication centers and AUTODIN terminals are required. Each time a new fixed plant facility is established within an area, a TOL unit is augmented with personnel to operate this facility through the submission of an MTOE. These modifications reduce the unit’s mobility and create problems in administration and accountability of equipment. In addition, because of the relatively fixed role of these base camps and the intense heat, experience has shown that equipment will function more efficiently if removed from truck mounted shelters and installed in air-conditioned buildings. This again creates accountability problems because of the separation of component equipment from the basic shelter configuration. Units must leave the fixed plant facilities and operating personnel in place when relocating to meet tactical requirements. This results in a fragmentation of the unit and creates problems of command support.

Observations: Personnel support should be provided by TDA units for fixed plant facilities. A TDA can be prepared for each type facility, such as a 1000-line DCO or a 2000-line DCO. As new fixed plant projects are completed, the proper TDA structure could be developed to provide for its operation. These TDA organizations would be similar to TOE 11-500 teams and could be attached to the nearest unit for support or several TDA teams could be combined to form a composite company. This would eliminate the continuous requirement for the submission of MTOEs each time there is an addition or change to the basic mission of a TOE unit. TDA structures can be prepared to provide the radio and carrier support in the fixed facility. Equipment could be listed by components or OA groups under TDA, thus eliminating the accounting problem for shelters and components which are not required in this type of operation. This would allow TOE units to re-install equipment in the shelters and maintain the required mobility.

f. Intelligence:

IWCS Security

Item: Security measures for IWCS Sites in the IV CTZ

Discussion: While inspecting the IWCS sites under construction in the IV CTZ, excessive pilferage was found at one site location. This problem resulted from the absence of security lighting and protective fencing; these security measures were not planned until the final construction phases.
Observation: It is necessary to provide security lighting and protective fencing during the initial stages of construction of IWCS sites.

Bunker Construction by Civilian Contractor

Item: Deficient Bunker Construction

Discussion: At various isolated IWCS sites, civilian contractors have built many concrete firing bunkers that are seriously deficient. The bunker deficiencies include lack of mutual fire support between bunkers, limited fields of fire, and undersized firing apertures. Consequently, only a limited defensive capability is provided by bunkers with these deficiencies.

Observation: When defensive fortifications are built by civilian contractors, qualified supervision is necessary to insure tactical adequacy.

Signal Site Weapon Augmentation

Item: 81mm Mortar Requirements

Discussion: Selected isolated Signal sites have been augmented with two 81mm mortars. These augmentations give the site organic indirect fire support and decidedly improves the site's defensive posture. Accelerated mortar crew training has already provided multiple mortar crews at those sites issued mortars.

Observation: All isolated Signal sites should be provided organic indirect fire support.

g. Logistics:

Selected List of Communications Equipment

Item: Inventory and Usage Report of Selected Equipment

Discussion: Special unit inventories, requested to verify data maintained at this headquarters, were usually inaccurate, necessitating contact with the reporting unit to verify figures furnished. Current and accurate figures are most important in facilitating immediate evaluation of Brigade assets for special reports and assistance in satisfying unprogrammed equipment requirements.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRUCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65) (WDNNAA)

Observation: Action has been completed to compile a special list of selected communications equipment. The collected data provides quantity authorized, quantity in operation, quantity held for contingency and quantity held as spares. The list is now being used as a valuable tool for reporting purposes and evaluating Brigade assets.

PLL Zero Balances

Item: PLL Zero Balances

Discussion: It was observed during annual general inspection visits and special assistance visits, that units maintaining PLLs have an unacceptable percentage of items at zero balance. Further investigation revealed that improper computation, lack of timely requisitioning action and inadequate requisition follow-up action were the primary reasons for this condition. The high percentage of zero balances has caused excessive equipment deadline time, thereby adversely affecting the communications mission and placing an undue work load on the Red Ball requisitioning system.

Observation: This situation is being alleviated. The PLL zero balance percentage is steadily decreasing within all Brigade units. Groups are now required to submit a monthly PLL report for all units that maintain PLLs. Upon receipt, the reports are evaluated and the units having the highest zero balance percentages are visited during the subsequent month by Brigade supply representatives. Further, each group has submitted a list of assigned supply personnel, including MOSs, qualifications and backgrounds. This data is evaluated and recommendations relative to personnel training and realignment are proposed by Brigade to the groups.

Special Air Mission Requests

Item: Difficulties Experienced with Special Air Mission of AN/TRC-90s to CONUS

Discussion: During the month of September, Brigade was instructed by USASTRUCOM to ship two AN/TRC-90s to the 11th Signal Group, Ft Huachuca, Arizona for training purposes. The Brigade notified the 21st Signal Group to prepare the AN/TRC-90s for shipment and advised that a special air mission would be arranged by this headquarters. Brigade contacted the USARV 04 and requested a special air mission to move subject cargo to CONUS. On 27 September, a message was received from the Military Airlift Command stating that the Air Force would back-haul the equipment on or about 11 October. On 1 October 1967, the Brigade received word that both AN/TRC-90s, less antennas, departed Da Nang RVN for CONUS on
22 September 1967. The shipping unit delivered the cargo with TCPD (Transportation Control and Movement Document) to the outbound cargo section at Da Nang and told them that this cargo was being shipped to CONUS on a special air mission. Automatically, the Air Force assumed that this was retrograde cargo and shipped it on the first available aircraft. The Air Force did not notify the shipping unit that the cargo had departed.

Observation: When a special air mission is implemented, close coordination must be maintained between Brigade and the shipper at all times. The cargo must not be taken to the aerial port until directed by Brigade.

**Civilian Personnel**

**Item:** Control of Civilian Personnel Spaces

**Discussion:** During a period of fiscal austerity and when cost reduction receives increased emphasis, it is essential that close control be exercised over the manpower resources of the command. Civilian personnel represents a significant portion of the Brigade manpower strength and consume a large percentage of available financial resources. To insure that Brigade activities are accomplished in the most efficient manner, Brigade data on manpower resources must be maintained and continuously updated. Because of the different strength levels maintained by the Brigade (e.g. JCS validated, on-hand, authorized, required, requested, etc.), there has been confusion over, "how many of what should we have?" Budgeting, wage and overtime administration, and civilian manpower reporting have suffered accordingly. A considerable effort has been made to clarify these manpower levels and this effort has been successful to date.

Observation: Close attention must be given to the status of civilian manpower (U.S. civilian and local national) strength levels. Only through scrutiny can effective controls be placed on recruitment, grade structure, and overtime. Planning, operations, personnel, and comptroller offices must work closely together to insure that adequate levels are programmed, justified, obtained, and controlled.

**Financing Special Leave**

**Item:** Financing of Special Leave Program
Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65)

Discussion: The Special Leave Program (SLP) enacted in Public Law 89-735 provides that personnel who extend their tours in Vietnam will, if they request, be provided a non-chargeable 30 day leave and free round-trip transportation to any destination in the free world. While the leave itself is not chargeable to funds administered by the Brigade, the cost of transportation is chargeable to O&M funds for which the Brigade must budget. The Brigade has no control over the total amount of funds which will be obligated for this program. The significance of this fact was not adequately assessed in the preparation of the Command Operating Budget (COB) for FY 63. Only 12% of the projected requirement for the SLP was financed under the Annual Funding Program (AFP). The implications of financing and unfinancing requirements are such that it is often considered that unfinanced requirements can be deferred if funding is not available. Obviously, this is not true in the case of the SLP.

Observation: It is mandatory that non-controllable costs such as the SLP or civilian personnel compensation be financed under the AFP. Failure to do this results in a false portrayal of the command's projected ability to perform its missions within the financial constraints imposed by the AFP.

Item: Control and Conservation of Appropriated Funds

Discussion: During drives to reduce federal spending, shortages of mission funds have become the object of critical observation and analysis. In addition, the need for funds' control is a good management tool as well as the punitive measures associated with statutory over-obligation or over-expenditure of appropriated funds; requiring that simple but firm controls be implemented at all echelons of command. Controls on Brigade funds for Vietnam are centralized at Brigade headquarters and distributed by means of a lump sum certification authorization to each of the in-country groups. These authorizations limit how much can be spent and what the funds can be obligated for. Generally, the groups are only authorized to cite funds for TDY travel and emergency leaves, while funds for DA civilians, Special Leave Program and other requirements are centrally controlled at Brigade headquarters. On the other hand, all funds for Thailand go direct to the 29th Signal Group. Due to over decentralization of controls, funds utilization in the first quarter FY 68 came dangerously close to exceeding aggregate dollar limitations. Lack of proper expertise in the groups and battalions was the principal causative factor.
Observation: Decentralization of fund control below Signal group level should be avoided in all cases. First, it is not feasible because they lack properly trained personnel; second, centralization is more efficient at group level in terms of preventing over-obligations, timeliness in compiling data for management and reporting; and finally, specific fund requirements requests can be evaluated more objectively.

Non-Appropriated Funds

Item: Audit of Non-Appropriated Funds

Discussion: Brigade's large number of non-appropriated funds is attributed directly to the wide dispersion of its subordinate elements, and the lack of military and commercial recreational or service activities. For this reason, each isolated unit develops a fund to manage beverage sales, laundry services, etc. In almost all cases, the fund custodian is unfamiliar with accounting procedures and only close supervision, inspection, and frequent audits can prevent gross errors in procedure, loss of assets, and/or dishonest activities. Under these conditions, it is essential that the agency responsible for auditing such activities be manned with an adequate professional staff to perform its audit functions. Additionally, as the number of clubs in Vietnam increases, higher headquarters place greater audit responsibilities on lower levels, while simultaneously increasing the number of required reports covering fund activities.

Observation: The wide dispersion of Signal organizations has resulted in a proliferation of non-appropriated funds. For this headquarters adequately to accomplish its audit responsibility, it is mandatory that these historically evident facts be considered when establishing the organization and manning of the responsible audit activity.

R & R Utilization Rates

Item: Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Penang, Taipei, and Hong Kong were the five least utilized R & R sites for the past quarter.

Discussion: With the exception of Hong Kong, these R & R sites were least utilized the previous quarter, ending 31 July 67. Hong Kong's turmoil has apparently minimized the previous demand. The utilization rates are listed for these sites during the past quarter.
SPEWAP-A

SPECIAL: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (DGA/63), (GCS CSF/4-76)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Allocations Rec'd</th>
<th>Total Used</th>
<th>Utilisation Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1355</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), (RCS CSFCR-65) (MDAUS)

Observation: Commanders should continue to emphasize and encourage personnel to take advantage of the R & R program. While the utilization rate is important, the increased efficiency, performance, and morale are the more important dividends from increased utilization. Additionally, if other major units reflect a comparable utilization rate, a determination should be made as to continuing R & R to these areas.

Brigade Headquarters Company Augmentation

Item: Assignment of SBA-TELMA and ACC to Brigade Headquarters.

Discussion: The current Brigade Headquarters MTOL (IL-3021) has an assigned strength of 246 personnel and 58 vehicles. Presently, the assigned strength is 424 personnel and 83 vehicles, yet no change in authorized support personnel has been made in mess, supply or motor pool operations. The Brigade Headquarters Company lacks the necessary personnel adequately to support the increased administrative load required by the addition of SBA-TELMA and ACC.

Observation: When the Brigade Headquarters personnel strength is increased, it is essential that its Headquarters Company support personnel strength be increased a proportionate amount.

SECTION II

Part II

Recommendations: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN B. MCKINNEY
Colonel, SigC
Deputy Commander

Incl 1 withdrawn, Hqs, DA

JOHN B. MCKINNEY
Colonel, SigC
Deputy Commander

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310
1 - Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, Greely Hall, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613
1 - Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH APO 96375
2 - Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT APO 96452
1 - Commanding General, USASTRATCOM-PAC, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, APO 96557

32
AVHCC-DST
1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), (RCS CSFOR-65) (WDMAAA)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) (WDMAAA).

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning promulgation of world-wide routing indicators, page 19: Concur. Fluid tactical situation has caused delays and misroutings due to inaccurate and untimely routing indicators. Allocating blocks of routing indicators to a central, responsive agency in SEA would alleviate the problem.

   b. Reference item concerning interim maintenance measures for Dial Telephone Exchanges, page 23: Concur. Sophisticated commercial type equipment requires trained maintenance personnel for proper upkeep. In-country schools alone cannot solve the problem. An O&M contract would provide an interim solution to the maintenance problem pending sufficient output of trained maintenance personnel from CONUS schools.

   c. Reference item concerning TOE signal units fixed station responsibilities, page 24: Concur. However, authorization documents for USASTRATCOM are only monitored by USARV. Submission is through USASTRATCOM channels. Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade is cognizant of required procedures related to preparation and submission of TDA and MTOE.

   d. Reference item concerning 81mm mortar requirements, page 26: Concur. However, requirements and related authorizations for USASTRATCOM units are processed through USASTRATCOM channels. USARV responsibility is limited to monitoring submissions.

   e. Reference item concerning financing special leave, page 28: Concur. Non-controllable costs should be included in the financed portion of the AFF.
Reference item concerning control and conservation of appropriated funds, page 29: Concur. Decentralization of lump sum certification authorization should not extend below signal group level. However, the position that this be applied in all cases fails to consider the possibility of special circumstances. For example, it conceivably might be necessary to give lump sum certification authorization to a separate, remote battalion to permit a commander operational flexibility.

3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:  

JOHN V. GETCHELL  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General  

Copies furn:  
HQ, 1st Signal Bde (USASTRATCOM)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 Oct 67 from Hq, 1st Sig Bde (UIC: WDMAAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 13 FEB 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and
forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as
indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Pages 36 through 38:
Decl. 1 withdrawn, Hgo, DA.
See inclusion notation on page 32.
Inclosure 2a Operational Report for the Period Ending 31 October 1967
40
Inclusion 2b Operational report for the period ending 31 October 1967
37th
Chu Lai
509th (OPCON AMERICAN DIVISION)

Pleiku
41st
Qui Nhon

43rd

459th
Nha Trang
Cam Ranh Bay
73rd

86th
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
Cu Chi

36th

40th

Tan Son Nhut
37th

Vung Tau

44th PROVIDES COMMUNICATIONS
SUPPORT TO LONG BINH POST.

52nd

69th PROVIDES COMMUNICATIONS
SUPPORT TO SAIGON/CHOLON AREA.

Inclusion: Operational Report for the Period Ending 31 October 1967
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

CO, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT DATE</th>
<th>NO. OF PAGES</th>
<th>NO. OF REFS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>undated</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.:

N/A

PROJECT NO.:

N/A

OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report):

674034

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT:

N/A

SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY:

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

ABSTRACT:

N/A