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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL)
APO 96307

AVCA TC-11-C0

15 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

THRU: Commanding Officer
4th Transportation Command
ATTN: AVCA-TC-GL
APO 96307

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TO: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA-TC-GL
APO 96307

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVCA-DH
APO 96307

Commanding General
United States Army, Pacific
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United States Army
ATTN: AVCA-DH
APO 96538

Commanding General
Headquarters Department of the Army
ATTN: ACSFOR
Washington, D.C. 20310

Section 1 - Significant Organizational Activities

Among the more significant activities during the report period which
affected battalion operations was the loss of its six (6) truck companies.
The truck companies listed below were transferred from this battalion
effective 10 May 1966 by General Order 31, Headquarters 1st Logistical
Command, and ultimately assigned to the 48th truck group. All records
pertaining to the truck companies were forwarded to the gaining parent
organization.

1 - 62nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck)
2 - 120th Transportation Company (Light Truck)
3 - 163rd Transportation Company (Light Truck)
4 - 534th Transportation Company (Medium Truck)
5 - 670th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) (Comp)

The 556th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) (Petroleum) was
transferred to the 64th Quartermaster Battalion.
AVCA TO-11-C0
15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1966 (RG3 CSPOR-65)

With the loss of its truck companies the battalion resumed a primary
mission of terminal service, with its two terminal service companies and
one medium boat company. The battalion continued in its mission of
supervising operation of the ammunition barge sites at Cogido, Bu Long,
Binh Trieu, Cau Binh Leoi and the sub-port of Vung Tau as well as providing
personnel to the 4th Transportation Command for operation of the Saigon
Army Terminal, the Army Air Freight activity at Tan Son Nhut, the am-
munition vessel discharge at Nha Be and the ammunition barge discharge
site at Thanh Tuy Ha.

During the period 25 - 31 May, battalion headquarters moved from its
tent encampment at Long Binh to office and billet spaces as tenants in the
4th Transportation Command's Le Lai Hotel, Saigon.

The 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) continued to
provide 30,000 man-hours per month to the 4th Transportation Command in
the form of cargo checkers and supervisors for the operation of Saigon
Army Terminal, Army Air Freight at Tan Son Nhut, the Nha Be vessel dis-
charge activity and the Thanh Tuy Ha barge discharge site. The 124th
also continued its direct supervision of the ammunition barge discharge
sites at Cogido, Bu Long, Binh Trieu and Cau Binh Leoi. At the barge
sites mentioned, stevedoring, port clearance vehicles, and ME and MHE
operators are provided to some extent, under a US contract with the
Central Navigation and Trading Company S.A. of Japan. Under terms of
the contract, the contractor is required to provide barges to receive
ammunition discharged from ships at Nha Be; tugs to move barges to
ammunition barge discharge sites; stevedores; cargo handling gear; and
cranes and forklifts with operators for barge discharge at sites; plus
sufficient trucks with drivers to transport ammunition to first destination.
The contract also contains provisions for handling both backload of am-
munition and discharge and backload of general cargo through the ammunition
barge sites. Other contract provisions include the right of the US Army
to supplement the contractor's work force and equipment with US military
personnel, equipment and trucks when, in the opinion of the Army, the
contractor has failed to meet operating requirements. In actual practice,
the 124th provides TOE cranes and forklifts with operators at all sites
because the contractor has not yet obtained sufficient equipment. The
40th Transportation Truck Group provides military trucks, to offset con-
tractor shortages, when tactical commitments permit. The 4th Trans Comd
provides commercial trucks from Seeland Corporation.

Between 19 - 24 May the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Ser-
vice) consolidated personnel both from the MEM Villa at Saigon Fort and
from the Le Lai Hotel by moving into the newly-constructed Truc-Giang
Hotel on Le Van Linh street, Saigon. In the new hotel the 117th en-
countered problems with an inadequate water supply and distribution
system and lacked an auxiliary generator as back-up for the city-supplied
electricity. Installation of a water reservoir and pump solved the water
problem. A 75KW generator was obtained 15 June to provide electrical
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

Power as needed. As sole tenant of the hotel the 117th assumed the responsibility of providing for its own physical security. Guard watch towers were erected and outside lighting installed.

At the start of the report period the battalion utilized personnel of the 124th Transportation Company to operate the following ammunition barge discharge sites:

1. Cogido
2. Bau Long
3. Cau Binh Loi
4. Binh Trieu
5. Thanh Tuy Ha

On 23 May the site at Cau Binh Loi was closed for repairs. The site is still closed. It is located across the Saigon River from Binh Trieu. Instead of repairing and reopening the single-crane, one-barge site at Cau Binh Loi, plans have been proposed for the expansion of Binh Trieu site by adding two additional crane points. This plan, if adopted, will result in good utilization of personnel and equipment. Both Binh Trieu and Cau Binh Loi, until the latter closed, handled ammunition for the Vietnamese Air Force located at Tan Son Nhut air base, and for the Vietnamese Army which operates a nearby ARVN depot. On 28 June a temporary site for the discharge of general cargo barges was opened at Tan Dau. The site is located on a branch of the Saigon River approximately one (1) mile outside of the city of Saigon and ½ mile off Highway 4A. The site was opened as an adjunct to Saigon Port general cargo discharge capability. Its use is expected to continue until December 1966 when it is anticipated that a new general cargo discharge facility, now under construction, will become operational. On 20 July 1966 the battalion was given the mission of operating the entire ammunition vessel and barge discharge system. On 20 July the battalion took over operational control of the Ammunition Branch from the 4th Transportation Command. The significance of this additional responsibility is that the battalion is now able to coordinate, internally, all phases of ammunition handling, from the scheduling of vessels to notification of consignees. The battalion is also responsible for the control and utilization of all barges used in the ammunition system. At the start of the report period the system was operating with a total of 54 barges which represented a total tonnage capacity of a one-time lift of 18,650 short tons. On 1 May 3,300 tons of the lift capacity was unavailable due to repairs being required on contractor barges. As of the end of July, 83 barges, representing 32,000 tons lift capability, are utilized in the ammunition system. Of the 83 barges on hand, 12 are US owned BC barges, 29 are leased barges and 42 are contractor-provided. 4,600 tons of contractor barge capacity is unavailable due to repair work.

During the report period the contract for services of Central Navigation and Trading Company S.A. of Japan was renewed in the form of a letter contract. The formal contract is due to be negotiated in August. All matters pertaining to contractual obligations are handled by a local CMW
representative. The Chief, Ammunition Branch, is ordering officer for contractor services. The most significant change in the renewed contract is the inclusion of a price reduction schedule which decreases payments to the contractor when services required of him are performed or furnished by the US Army. The contractor is paid on the basis of long tons or measurement tons (whichever brings him the greater revenue) of cargo transported and handled from the end of the ship's gear to first consignee. Elements involved in these tasks are barges, barge tow boats, longshoremen, cranes and truck transport. Payment to the contractor is reduced for the task elements which he does not provide and which are provided by the US Army.

In June, two US Coast Guard Ammunition Safety Inspection teams arrived in Vietnam. One of these teams has been operating at the Nha Be discharge site, as well as making periodic visits to the other discharge sites. Their main purpose was to assist and advise in safety matters in ammunition vessel discharge operations. Their assistance and advice not only in the areas of safety, but in the overall operation, has been immeasurable. The experience and knowledge of the assigned individuals has enabled the operation to improve in effectiveness and efficiency, and their presence will continue to have rewarding effects on the operation.

During the period 1–14 July the ammunition system had in actual use a relatively constant supply of barges rated at 27,000 tons capacity. The discharge workload at Nha Be during this period was normal. It determined that operating three deep-draft vessels and one LST, plus meeting the additional backloading commitments, the ammunition system could satisfactorily operate with a capacity of 27,000 rated tons of barges in actual use (repair items excluded). However, the movement capability and the resulting turnaround of barges are directly related. Deficiencies in movement or discharge would definitely hinder the operation. As stated previously, the entire operation operated relatively without problems and the capacity of barges was sufficient.

Night work at Thanh Tuy Ha barge discharge site (the ARVN Base Depot) was implemented on 7 July. However, the contractor who operates the site has only partially succeeded to date in providing sufficient personnel to conduct a two-shift, around-the-clock operation. While building up his work force the contractor has agreed to conduct around-the-clock operations every other day. To insure realization of the increased tonnage expected to result from around-the-clock operations the battalion will station a second military supervisor at Thanh Tuy Ha in August.

On the first of May the Vung Tau sub-port operation was being conducted exclusively by military personnel using military equipment. However, because of the increased tonnage projected to be handled at Vung Tau, the Alaskan Barge and Transport Company (AB&T) was given contract responsibilities for cargo discharge, backload and port clearance.
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The 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) continues to provide supervisory personnel and cargo checkers for the Vung Tau operation.

On 1 June the battalion assumed responsibility for operation of the Vung Tau sub-port and Vung Tau OIC Captain Robert L. McAllister was attached to the battalion.

During the report period the following ammunition tonnage was discharged from vessels, at Nha Be, and from barges, at the barge sites:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>9971 ST</td>
<td>42654 ST</td>
<td>43904 ST</td>
<td>95629 ST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu Long</td>
<td>2196</td>
<td>9506</td>
<td>7880</td>
<td>19682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cogido</td>
<td>9454</td>
<td>21101</td>
<td>17188</td>
<td>47743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Trieu</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>6016</td>
<td>7940</td>
<td>14554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cau Binh Lc.</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>CLOSED</td>
<td>FOR REPAIRS</td>
<td>1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Than Tuy Ha</td>
<td>2327</td>
<td>4490</td>
<td>9947</td>
<td>16764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>26757</td>
<td>83767</td>
<td>76859</td>
<td>289340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The combined discharge and backload tonnage for Vung Tau was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>23980 ST</td>
<td>39157 ST</td>
<td>23568 ST</td>
<td>86605 ST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General cargo discharged at Thu Duc since it began operations 28 June was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thu Duc</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>171 ST</td>
<td>3616 ST</td>
<td>3787 ST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ammunition received in-country during June and July greatly exceeded that received in May. Each of the ammunition barge discharge sites greatly increased their tonnage discharge over May's performance. The significant increase in tonnage discharged at Cogido in June was accomplished by increasing site discharge facilities by two (2) crane operating points. The Cogido crane point construction was completed on 16 June and increased Cogido's crane points from four (4) to six (6). The strong command emphasis placed on expeditious forwarding of ammunition resulted in the battalion being given a high priority for the military trucks used to provide port clearance of the ammunition barge sites.

On 25 July the responsibility for operation of the Thu Duc general cargo barge discharge site was assumed by the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service), relieving the 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service). A two-shift, 24-hour day operation of the site was then initiated producing an appreciable increase in the tonnage discharged. The 117th Trans Co is also taking excellent advantage of the personnel training opportunities afforded at the Thu Duc site.
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On 26 May the advance party of the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) arrived in Vietnam. On 7 June the main body arrived aboard the USNS Gordon. The 329th was attached to the battalion effective 4 June and stationed at Vung Tau. The 329th performs a combat support and combat service support mission between Vung Tau sub-port, Me Tho, Can Tho, Saigon Army Terminal and the Cogido ammunition barge discharge site.

Increasing terrorist activities in the vicinity of battalion areas of operation has, at times, caused a cessation of operations. The barge site at Buu Long is located within an ARVN training center compound approximately two road miles from the back gate of Binh Hoa air base. There are approximately 130 ARVN soldiers undergoing training in the Buu Long compound. During the periods between ARVN training cycles there are approximately 30 ARVN cadre there. They provide some site protection. On 18 July however, the ARVN commander who is responsible for Binh Hoa security ordered Buu Long to cease night shift operations until 22 July because of anticipated VC activity.

The site at Binh Trieu is also protected by ARVN. On 16 June, ARVN advised that Binh Trieu was suspected to come under mortar attack. The night shift was cancelled at a loss of twelve operating hours. On 10 July (0230) bubbles and an unknown swimmer were noted near the ammo barges being discharged at Binh Trieu. ARVN and US UDT teams checked barges and the surrounding water area, clearing the site for resumption of operations at 0000 hours the following morning.

Cogido site was forced to stop shipping ammunition to the 3rd Ordnance Battalion ASP on 5 June for four hours because the ASP was receiving hostile fire. On 10 July two Vietnamese river patrol boats were sunk by mines in the vicinity of Cogido which halted movement of barges to that site. The following morning after being cleared by US Navy, operations were resumed.

On 27 July an all day fire fight was conducted in the vicinity of the ammunition vessels at Nha Be. Because of this the change of shift had to be accomplished with site personnel traveling by water to and from work instead of by highway. The seven miles of road between the 124th Trans billets area and their work site at Nha Be is not secure between the hours of 1900 and 0600. This restricts arrangements for change of shift and presents a potential loss of vessel discharge time.

On 12 July, while onroute from Vung Tau to Can Tho on a cargo mission, the crew of LCU 1508 (329th Trans Co) observed four (4) mortar rounds explode, in succession, approximately 200 yards to the stern. The mission continued without ill effect.

At 1350 hours, 28 July, a US Army tug moving three loaded ammunition
barges on the Dong Nai River from Nha Be to Cogido observed several mortar rounds explode approximately 200 yards off her forward bow. There was no effect on tug or barges.

The effect of friendly tactical operations on the ammunition discharge mission of the battalion is a reduction in barge site clearance capability. Tactical operations require the same military vehicles as are required to move munitions. Contractor civilian vehicles are not available in numbers sufficient to overcome shortages of military trucks. Lack of military vehicles presents another problem in that no civilian vehicles are permitted into the Bien Hoa air base. As a result of this restriction, Buu Long barge site can only be utilized when military trucks are available.

No traffic is permitted on the river at Nha Be from 1900 hours to dawn. Ammunition vessel discharge is conducted at Nha Be 24 hours a day. The restriction against water traffic at night is a physical security measure. Its effect on operations is that prior to 1900 all partially loaded barges at ship side must be replaced by sufficient empty barges to permit vessel discharge throughout the night.

One effect of weather on operations is that civilian laborers will not work during periods of heavy rain. This effects both battalion personnel at Nha Be and the barge discharge sites, and the ammunition consignees who also utilize local nationals as laborers.

Tidal changes effect operations at Buu Long barge site. During low tide barges cannot be shifted at the pier. As a result of this restriction a fully-laden barge must be shifted to the pier before low tide even though a partially loaded barge is at the pier being worked. If a full barge is not moved into the pier before low tide, the barge being worked will complete discharge prior to the time that the tidal stage will permit another full barge to be moved to the pier.

While utilization of local nationals as longshoremen releases military personnel for supervisory roles, this does produce some detrimental operational effects. As an example - on their paydays, local national truck drivers and longshoremen may take a holiday without giving notice. Military personnel are then used to the maximum extent of availability on such occasions.

Because of the mainly supervisory role of personnel employed in the operation of barge sites, terminal service companies have been required to retrain longshoremen, signalmen and winch operators for duties as vessel supercargoes, cargo checkers, site supervisors and crane operators. Training is successfully done on forecast of needs basis. During the month of July the battalion conducted a weapons-firing program in which 200 personnel fired the M-14; 126 the M-60 and 60 the M-79 for familiarization.

In order to improve the operating efficiency of the battalion,
SOP's covering the administration and operations were revised to meet mission changes which occurred during the quarter. Listed below are policy directives and regulations published by the battalion during the report period.

**POLICY DIRECTIVES:**

- 22-66 6 May 66 Command Information Program
- 23-66 16 May 66 Battalion Pass and Leave Policy
- 24-66 18 May 66 Battalion Courtesy Patrol
- 26-66 10 Jul 66 Alcoholic Beverages
- 27-66 1 Aug 66 Carrying of Individual Military Weapons
- 28-66 29 Jul 66 Known or Suspected Terrorist Activities.

**REGULATIONS:**

- 750-1 14 May 66 Battalion Material Readiness Program
- 385-10 15 May 66 Battalion Safety Program
- 410-1 16 May 66 Battalion Fire Regulation
- 360-2 17 May 66 Unit Orientation of Newly Assigned Personnel
- 750-2 19 May 66 Battalion Maintenance Program
- 360-1 27 May 66 Battalion Sponsorship Program
- 230-1 1 Jun 66 Unit Welfare Fund

During the report period it became necessary to develop and revise existing security plans for all the areas under battalion and subordinate unit control. The HHD, 11th Trans Bn implements the security plan of the 4th Trans Comd at the Lo Lai Hotel. The 124th Trans Gp implements the security plan of TMA at M6M Villa area and the 48th Truck Group at Long Binh.

The 1099th Trans Gp implements the security plan of the 543 QM Gp at Tent Camp "C".

The 329th Trans Gp implements the physical security plan established by the Officer in Charge of Vung Tau sub-port.

Other plans developed during the report period included a plan for the reconstruction and repair of facilities at Cogido and Bau Long. Several movement plans have been initiated for possible use should the battalion be required to move to some location outside of Saigon. In keeping with 1st Logistical Command requirements, the battalion has prepared Standing Operating Procedures for Emergency Operations (SOP for EOP's). In order to be prepared for a work stoppage that could be caused by a strike among civilian stevedores, the battalion maintains a strike contingency plan. Under this plan the battalion is prepared to provide full military hatch ganges including winch operators, signalmen and long-shoremen as needed for operations on vessels at Wha Bo and in the Saigon port. A second portion of the strike contingency plan requires that the
the terminal service companies provide cadre hatch gangs, with longshoremen requirements filled from the personnel replacement input stream.

On 26 July a battalion radio net was established to provide communications between the battalion headquarters, Nha Be, and all the barge discharge sites. Radios employed in the net are AV/PRC-25 and AN/VRC-10. Due to the lack of telephone service and accessibility of the Buu Long, Thu Duc, Nha Be, and Thanh Tuy Ha discharge sites, the establishment of reliable communications with these sites was essential to operations. Installation of telephones at these sites is being programmed. Radios augment the existing telephones at Cogido and Binh Trien. Detailed radio operator encoding training was conducted prior to the radio installation and operation. AN/VRC-10 radios were installed on all operating landing craft and other harbor craft of subordinate units during this reporting period.

All battalion units received satisfactory ratings as a result of their annual Inspector General inspections conducted during the period 1 – 21 June.

Changes of key personnel included the departure on 15 July of the Battalion Executive Officer, Major Curtis J. Johnson, whose replacement, Major Kevin L. Maher, arrived in the battalion 5 July. Major Bruce T. Wright, the Battalion S-3, departed Viet Nam on 8 July and was replaced by Captain Ronald H. Wilbanks, the former Commanding Officer of the 124th Transportation Company. On 8 July Captain Thomas K. Sheldon assumed command of the 124th Transportation Company.

On 25 June Captain John V. Andrews assumed command of the 117th Transportation Company, relieving the departing former commander, First Lieutenant Daniel W. McDonald Jr.

On 15 July the Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command, recommended that the battalion be awarded the Meritorious Unit Citation for its performance in Vietnam from 5 August 1965 to 12 May 1966.

Since the end of the last report period the participation rate in the battalion savings bond program has rose from a low of 70% on 1 May to a high of 86% in June. As of the end of July, participation dropped to 83% due to personnel turnover.

Battalion strength for the months ending May, June, and July are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Off</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The large increase in officer personnel in June was due to the
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
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arrival in June of the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat).

Promotions accomplished during the quarter as compared to allocations were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>3 (NA)</td>
<td>0 (NA)</td>
<td>0 (NA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-8</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
<td>2 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>0 (6)</td>
<td>9 (22)</td>
<td>18 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>20 (18)</td>
<td>23 (0)</td>
<td>2 (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All units of the battalion have succeeded in reducing their monthly Army Motor Vehicle Accident Rate. Monthly AMV accident rates were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TOTAL MILES</th>
<th>RECORDABLE Accidents</th>
<th>REPORTABLE Accidents</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>42689</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>48889</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>50284</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 2 - Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel.

a. Item: NCO turbulence

Discussion: With only rare exceptions, all of the non-commissioned officers who accompanied their units when the units deployed to Vietnam will all rotate at approximately the same time.

Observation: Near the end of their first year in Vietnam, units can expect a loss of continuity in operations as a result of the loss of the majority of its enlisted leaders and supervisors.

2. Operations.

a. Item: Inland waterway movements of 500-ton capacity barges

Discussion: The 1099th Medium Boat Company is required to move 500-ton capacity barges daily in the ammunition distribution system. The unit mission vessel, LCM-8, was not designed for use as a tow boat. The problem encountered was to accomplish the mission of moving barges and still prevent damage to LCM engines and transmissions which is potential to such usage.

Observation: The problem has been largely resolved by utilizing two (2) LCM-8 to move barges. This solution also provides for
ready assistance in the event that one of the two LCM has a mechanical failure.

b. Item: Aircraft recognition of harborcraft.
   Discussion: The 1099th Transportation Company LCM-8 operate on rivers in and around the Saigon area. In these operating waterways the LCM-8 are subject to potential VC ambush. The vessels are equipped with radios which enable them to call for aircraft fire support. However, the problem encountered was how to provide for recognition of particular vessels when the ground to air radio was inoperative.
   Observation: The problem was resolved by painting numbers in black on the orange background of the roof over the vessel wheelhouse.

c. Item: BK barge instability.
   Discussion: On two occasions BK barges loaded properly with ammunition overturned. The acute instability of these barges renders them of little value as cargo transporters.
   Observation: The beam of the BK barges appears to be too narrow to permit useful exploitation of their rated cargo capacity.

d. Item: Discharge of ammunition from vessel wings below deck.
   Discussion: Ammunition vessel discharge rate was observed to be reduced by the requirement to use snatch blocks to move ammunition from the vessel wings to positions under the cargo hook.
   Observation: Vessel discharge rates was reduced by lack of forklifts in the hold. Electric forklifts are now provided to both speed discharge and simultaneously afford maximum protection for cargo during handling.

e. Item: Intransit damage to palletized bag cement.
   Discussion: Over a period of one month when several hundreds of tons of palletized bagged cement were discharged at unit barge site it was noticed that up to 20% of the cement bags handled were damaged beyond use.
   Observation: Lightweight plywood pallets were loaded with one (1) ton of bagged cement. Many were received broken on the barge. In addition, an attempt had been made to protect the cement from rain by covering the stack of bags on the pallet with a thin plastic sheet. This plastic is not well secured and is very easily torn. As a result, many bags of cement are destroyed by rain.

f. Item: Landing craft crew shelters.
   Discussion: As employed in their present mission as barge tow boats, LCM-8 of the 1099th Trans Co are often away from their home station overnight. Some spend several days at one barge site shifting barges between mooring buoys and piers. In these areas there is no troop billet space ashore close to the vessel. A watch is required on the LCM at all times except when in the home station. There is no space below decks suitable for crew rest.
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Observation: In order to provide maximum security for vessel and crew and to obtain maximum utilization of the vessel when dispatched away from home port overnight, it is best to have the crew remain on board. Protection from the elements for crew aboard LCM 8 has been provided by constructing a temporary wooden shelter frame above the after half of the wheel house deck. The top is covered with salvage canvas and has roll down canvas sides.

g. Item: Land transportation of outsized cargoes
   Discussion: Heavy construction work in Vietnam is increasing. Construction calls for steel beams and bridging materials. Receipt of 50'-90' telephone poles is increasing. Trucks for transportation for barge site clearance of long poles and lengthy heavy beams are not always available in the numbers required.
   Observation: Poles and beams of up to 40' length can be safely transported on military 12-ton stake & platform trailers, 50'- poles and beams can also be transported on S&F trailers by connecting the trailer to a 5th wheel dolly adaptor, connecting the dolly to the pintle hook on a 5-ton tractor. This arrangement permits cargo to overhang at both front and rear of the trailer. Commercial contractor equipment is being utilized when available to transport poles and beams whose lengths exceed 50'. Adaptation of standard military equipment is being attempted to resolve this problem.

3. Training and Organization.

a. Item: Cross-training of terminal service company personnel.
   Discussion: Because local civilian labor is utilized in longshoremen work, TOE longshoremen are available for other duties. Given the necessary additional training, they are being employed as site and vessel supervisors, as cargo checkers, and as crane operators.
   Observation: Cross-training of TOE longshoremen for duties described above is highly effective.

b. Item: Radio operator training
   Discussion: Terminal Service companies' TO&E authorizes a communications chief Grade E-5, but no radio operators. The TO&E of a terminal service battalion headquarters has no authorization for radio operators. To perform the battalion mission, a radio communications net is required. Personnel now utilized required training in both basic radio telephone procedures and in the procedures used to encode operational messages prior to their transmission.
   Observation: Terminal service units must be prepared to operate radio nets for command and operational purposes.

c. Item: Familiarization with common weapons
   Discussion: Because some personnel assigned had not fired, for familiarization, the weapons common to their parent units within the past year, a range firing program was conducted at battalion level in June.
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200 personnel fired the M-14, 126 the M-60 and '60 the M-79 for familiarization at an ARVN range in the Saigon area.

Observation: There will be a continuing requirement to conduct familiarization firing for battalion personnel on a semi-annual basis.

4. Intelligence.
   a. Item: Road net intelligence.
      Discussion: In order to obtain accurate and current information regarding conditions affecting the use of the local road net, drivers are debriefed upon their return from trips outside the Saigon metropolitan area. Traffic density, road hazards and other factors affecting road net usability are sought in the driver's debriefing.
      Observation: Although terminal service and boat units do not make extensive use of the road net outside the metropolitan Saigon area, driver debriefing may provide information of value to other highway users.

5. Logistics.
   a. Item: Tent deterioration
      Discussion: The useful life of a tent in this damp area is approximately six (6) months. Mildew causes leaks within three (3) months but repairs can be temporarily effective. After six months' use, repairs are useless to attempt.
      Observation: Tents require replacement after six months' use.

   b. Item: Lighting sets TOWE 55-117D
      Discussion: The 5KW 120V AC generator used to power terminal service company light sets has a short service life possibly because of excessive power drain placed upon it.
      Observation: Terminal service company light sets require more power than can be readily supplied by the authorized 5KW generator. 10 KW generators are being used as substitutes and give satisfactory results.

   c. Item: Sand bags
      Discussion: Laterite is sometimes used as a substitute for sand in filling sand bags.
      Observation: Use of laterite as sand bag fill material had been curtailed as it causes rapid deterioration of the bag. Barricades constructed of laterite-filled sand bags are not stable.

   d. Item: Installation of Asbestos roofing
      Discussion: Corrugated asbestos sheets are commonly used to roof semi-permanent buildings.
      Observation: When using nails to install asbestos roofing, care must be taken as asbestos cracks easily. Large nails make holes which cannot be sealed effectively. Metal hooks, available locally, provide the best means of fastening asbestos roofing to wooden framing.
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Item: Rough terrain forklift tire repair

Discussion: Flat tires on rough terrain forklifts are common occurrences.

Observation: Tire must be removed from wheel to effect a repair. It is difficult to make a lasting repair.

Section 2 Part II Recommendations

1. Recommendation: Where staggered rotation dates among key unit personnel cannot be achieved by changing unit assignments of personnel in Vietnam, commanders and section chiefs should prepare, and continually update, detailed SOP’s and job descriptions covering all key positions. Accurate, complete and detailed files, historical records, journals, and after-action reports can also be of significant value when key personnel depart before a replacement arrives or before the replacement can be thoroughly oriented by his predecessor.

2. Operations.

a. Recommendation: Saigon Army Terminal should be provided with the required tug boats that would permit release of LCM-8 from the current tow boat mission.

b. Recommendation: That a standard method of identifying a particular small vessel be established and that the method be disseminated to all aviation personnel in-country.

c. Recommendation: That a study be conducted to improve the stability of BK barges.

d. Recommendation: None

e. Recommendation: That strong cement pallets be used to ship bagged cement and that either a waterproof bag be used or a rainproof cover be securely fastened over the entire loaded pallet.

f. Recommendation: None

g. Recommendation: None

3. Training and Organization.

a. Recommendation: Personnel now being trained in the CONUS as longshoremen and signalmen should be cross-trained in basic cargo documentation. Similarly, winch operators should be cross-trained as crane and forklift operators.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
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b. Recommendation: None

c. Recommendation: Vietnam replacement personnel should fire
the M-60 machine gun for familiarization as a part of POR/POM processing.

4. Recommendation: None

5. Logistics:

a. Recommendation: Units moving to Vietnam should bring new
tentage whenever possible. If the unit expects to live in tents for more
than six months, replacements should be requested with allowance made for
delivery lead time.

b. Recommendation: None

c. Recommendation: Whenever possible, sand should be used instead
of laterite as sand bag fill material.

d. Recommendation: None

e. Recommendation: Inner tubes should be made available for
the rough terrain fork lift.

James M Fleming
Major, TC
Commanding
AVCA-TC-GC (16 August 1966)  1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, APO 96307 (19 August 1966)

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND, ATTN: AVCA-GO-0, APO 96307

2. The subject report has been reviewed and is deemed adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Omer E. Pigeon, Jr.
Captain, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
AVGA GO-H (16 August 1966) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1966 (RGS CSFU - 65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTIC COMMAND, APO 96307 29 AUG 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVG-DH

1. Forwarded in accordance with AR 1-19 and USARV Regulation 870-2.

2. Concur with the comments and recommendations of the commander.

3. Reference Section II Part I paragraph 2c and Section II Part II paragraph 2c: An investigation was made into the possibility of modifying the BK barges by military personnel. It was determined that port construction engineers do not have the capability to prefabricate the required structure for modification. Action has been initiated to contract for modification by a commercial firm.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Tel: Lynx 834

[Signature]

Class A. Doyle
Cpt. AGC
Asgt Adjutant General
AVHGC-DH (15 Aug 66) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 25 NOV '66

TO: Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOR-OT,
APO 96258

1. Comments on subject report submitted by the 11th Transportation
Battalion (Terminal) are as follows.

2. Reference Section 2, Part II:

   a. Paragraph 2a, Page 14: On 18 September 1966, the Saigon
   Port Complex received 2 additional 65-foot tugboats. Two 45-foot tug-
   boats were received on 9 September 1966, and three more 65-foot tug-
   boats were received on 2 October 1966. These additions should relieve
   the situation.

   b. Paragraph 2b, Page 14: Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces
   Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) has overall responsibility for small craft mark-
   ings and is aware of the present shortcomings in identification mark-
   ings. Studies in progress are aimed at resolving these shortcomings.

   c. Paragraph 2e, Page 14: Nonconcur. In the absence of mul-
   tiple complaints regarding the quality of pallets used in handling
   bagged cement, it is assumed that damage was the result of improper
   handling. The terminal operator is responsible for adequately pro-
   tecting palletized cement either by tarping or plastic sheeting. Both
   methods are accepted military and commercial procedures.

   d. Paragraph 5c, Page 15: Use of laterite filling in sand-
   bags is not recommended since it packs and hardens when wet and will
   not cushion bullets or metal fragments.

   e. Paragraph 5e, Page 15: Nonconcur. Tire repair kits are
   provided for the rough terrain forklifts.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. R. AUTRY
1st Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
GPOP-OT(15 Aug 66) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 10 DEC 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. HARRISON
Capt, AGC
Asst AQ