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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
391TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL)
APO US FORCES 96238

AVLC-QUI-391H-00

6 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 RCS CSPO-28 (RL)

TO: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, ATTN:
AVLC QN-30 (Historian), APO US Forces 96238
Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVLC-GO-0,
APO US Forces 96307
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVG, APO
US Forces 96307
Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii, APO US Forces 96557
Asst Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D. C. 20310

IN TURN

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. The 391th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) continued to be
commanded by Lt Col Norman L. Kirby during this period. However, there was
a major change in organizational structure. General Order 11, Headquarters
1st Logistical Command, dated 17 January 1966, released the battalion from
command and operational control of the 4th Transportation Command and assigned
it to the newly organized US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon. The purpose of
the move was to decentralize operations to the area command level.

The battalion was tasked to discharge 60,000 S/T that month as its part of
the effort to reduce the shipping backlog in Vietnam. In response, the
battalion moved 59,151 S/T. It was accomplished primarily by dynamic
leadership within the highly motivated units. The entire battalion re-
ceived laudatory letters from senior officers for this superior effort.
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3. Overall during this report period, the battalion discharged 200,328 S/T; 180,887 L/T; 396,961 M/T from 72 ships and 57 LSTs. This record was accomplished despite a critical shortage of MHE and the loss of experienced personnel through rotation.

4. The following units arrived in the command during this period:
   a. 74th, 81th, 86th, 87th Transportation Detachments (Reefer).
   b. 522d Transportation Platoon (BARG).
   c. 514th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) (TDX from Okinawa).
   d. 97th Transportation Detachment (Liquid Barge).

5. The 116th, 285th and 514th Transportation Companies are PCS here from Okinawa. They are essential to the battalion mission. Accordingly, a request for PCS was submitted during January 1966. A favorable decision will enable the battalion to continue its present operation.

6. The battalion was allocated 12 cargo barges (BC) for lighterage during January. After study, it was determined that only 3 of the 12 BCs could be employed profitably. At the battalion request, the 1st Logistical Command diverted 9 BCs to other ports in the Republic of Vietnam.

7. The 60 ton floating crane (BD) had lacked a safe haven anchorage ever since its arrival at Qui Nhon. A previous BD was lost during bad weather for lack of an anchorage. After higher command emphasis was placed on this project, a safe haven anchorage was completed on 10 February 1966. In addition, the anchorage for reefer barges was also improved during February.

8. Cargo discharge was hampered by lack of MHE. A high deadline existed because of a critical repair parts shortage at field maintenance level. Available MHE was shifted among units to meet requirements. There was a drastic improvement in MHE availability during April as a result of special supply and repair arrangements by supporting maintenance agencies.

9. During this period, the use of the Roll-on, Roll-off (RO-RO) concept was considered for use at Qui Nhon. However, the idea was discarded because of the notable lack of success in discharging RO-RO vessels here. The unprotected harbor and the daily high winds preclude the use of the RO-RO concept unless delays and reduced safety margins are acceptable.
10. The Y-66 tanker assigned to this port has been at Cam Ranh Bay since 7 January 1966, awaiting a marine survey. The survey was necessary to evaluate the need for shipyard repairs. As of 30 April 1966, there still has been no decision concerning the disposition of the Y-66. In the meantime the vessel remains at Cam Ranh Bay where it is used occasionally, consistent with safe operation.

11. The battalion's cargo discharge capability was reduced by 25% on 1 April 1966. The 119th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) was placed TCS to Nha Trang for 60 days to perform within the depot there. The decision to move the unit was made during a slack period in deep draft shipping at Qui Nhon. However, a shipping backlog is now developing which requires a review of this decision.

12. Civil disturbances at Da Nang during April 1966 isolated US military installations particularly the important Air Force base there. Resupply was difficult since roadblocks prevented entry and exit to these installations. Several installations could be supplied with minimum risk by water routes and short land trips. Consequently, the 34th Transportation Company (Light Amphibian) was dispatched TCS there on 11 April 1966. The LARC-V amphibians were used to excellent advantage. They supported the US Navy and US Air Force with uninterrupted logistical support. This mission is expected to terminate in early May 1966.

13. Consideration is being given to transferring the 34th Transportation Company (LA) to the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) at Cam Ranh Bay. The primary purpose is to consolidate all the LARC-V resources at the site of the depot maintenance unit until maintenance and supply difficulties were overcome. In the meantime, the LARC-V could be employed profitably there. The final decision on the movement of the LARC-V unit has not been disseminated.

14. The battalion engaged in several special operations during this period. They were:

a. OPERATION BLUELIGHT (16 - 31 January), which saw the Third Brigade of the 25th Division move with personnel and equipment through the port. The operation was successfully handled despite poor weather conditions which slowed cargo discharge.

b. OPERATION ROUNDOUT (11 - 18 April) saw the discharge of the ROK 26th Regiment in record time. Passenger discharge was especially noteworthy since 4,016 troops were brought ashore in seven hours.
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)

15. The 1st Logistical Command entered into a contract with the
Korean Han Jin Transportation Company for both stevedoring and trucking
services. The company is expected to discharge 2000 S/T per day under
military supervision at Qui Nhon. Detailed procedures, work sites, and
other related matters are being worked out.

16. The Director of Transportation, US Army Support Command, Qui
Nhon, started a daily coordinating meeting during March 1966. This meeting
brought together terminal operations, truck representatives, consignees,
and other interested parties to discuss cargo disposition and mutual
problems. This meeting has proven to be an effective management tool.

17. The port construction engineer unit began improvements to LST
Beach during February 1966. Plans call for a 200 foot extension with
lighterage ramps and three LST ramps. In addition, much needed storage
and work areas will be provided. At the current work rate, the present
construction should be completed by 1 August 1966.

18. The battalion must rely exclusively upon its 60 ton floating
crane (BD) for heavy and outsized lifts. Weather frequently delays use
of the BD in the outer harbor. The BD is presently deadlined as a result
of cable damage. Until repairs are made, the port of Qui Nhon cannot
discharge heavy and outsized lifts.

19. The local National Civilian Personnel Program was implemented in
the Battalion during this period. Of a total authorization of 4419 spaces,
325 personnel have been hired to date. These consist of a cross section of
presently authorized military spaces, and include laborers, seamen, harbor-
craft crewmen, marine engineers, carpenters, packers and craters, and
clerical personnel. These personnel are used to augment the units in the
accomplishment of assigned mission.

20. Intensive on-the-job training was accomplished during the period
in order to qualify basic personnel with skills necessary to maintain
operational capability within the units. A total of 199 personnel were
awarded advanced MOS's under this program and 185 are presently undergoing
training. In addition, 27 personnel were retrained out of career fields
into new career fields based upon current Department of the Army list of
shortage MOS's.

21. Replacement system has worked satisfactorily during the reporting
period, with some qualification. A total of 550 gains were recorded as
against 571 losses, a net loss of 21 personnel. It must be emphasized
however, that the majority of gains were basic personnel, and that key
noncommissioned officers and specialist personnel were not received in
sufficient number to counteract the loss of such personnel. This problem
will become more critical during the coming months with the large rotational
losses based upon units completing the normal overseas tour, with resulting
loss of training personnel.

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The Battalion qualified for the award of the Minuteman Flag during the reporting quarter with a participation rate in the Savings Bond Program of 92.6%. Ours was the first major unit in the Qui Nhon area to qualify for such award.

This command has over 150 enlisted personnel due to complete present overseas tour during May 1966. To date, assignment instructions on these personnel have not been received. Such delay imposes a severe morale problem upon the individuals and their families, on the unit concerned and the command in general.

Diversion of personnel with critical MOS's programmed for this command has imposed additional administrative and operational burdens in accomplishing assigned mission. This applies to clerical personnel in general, and specifically to refrigeration specialists, MOS 51L20. For example, three of the four reefer barges referred to in Section I arrived at this station without the refrigeration specialist, the key man of the detachment. Inquiry to former station of these units as to fill action disclosed that these personnel were short shipped, but that requisition action had been initiated. Army Headquarters indicated that personnel had been requested from Department of the Army, and would join the units at destination with port date of on or about 17 January 1966. To date, these personnel have not reported to this command.

With the improvement in logistics and availability of spare parts, a marked improvement has been noted in support received from Direct Support Maintenance Units, with resulting decrease in deadlined items of equipment. In isolated instances however, some equipment is still on deadline in excess of one hundred days, particularly in those instances where old equipment is being utilized and parts are not presently in the supply system. In addition, a civilian forklift repair team from Philco Corporation became operational and is providing material assistance in this field.

A series of battalion roadside spot check inspections for vehicles of units assigned this command has been initiated in an effort to improve vehicle maintenance. In addition, a series of classes have been initiated on proper way to maintain log books for vehicle operators within the battalion.

During the quarter many critical major items were placed on requisition in excess of authorized allowances. In addition, some items previously requested are beginning to arrive. All this equipment was requested to supplement existing TOE's which had proven inadequate to properly perform unit missions in RVN. Some examples of these TOE inadequacies are:
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a. Lack of Electric forklifts for working in holds of ammo ships.
b. Lack of Battery Chargers to recharge electric forklift batteries.
c. Lack of sufficient $\frac{1}{4}$ ton vehicles for proper liaison and coordination between unit, battalion and higher headquarters.
d. Lack of sufficient 20 Ton "A frame type" cranes required for vessel maintenance. One Medium Boat unit was deployed to RVN without this vital piece of equipment.

28. Receipt of additional equipment is beginning to cause a problem in maintenance. Unit areas and authorized personnel are insufficient to satisfy the maintenance workload. For example, the following items have been justified in excess of authorized allowances, requested and are just now beginning to arrive.

a. 62 each additional forklifts of various types and models.
b. 12 each additional 10 ton cranes.

Existing unit maintenance areas are far too small to adequately support this additional equipment. Also, unit maintenance personnel are insufficient in quantity to adequately support the additional workload.

29. Intensive use of field ranges by several units of the battalion resulted in rapid depletion of unit PLL. This situation was caused primarily by the increased workload placed on unit mess equipment. The seven mess facilities in the battalion are feeding approximately 400 persons over and above authorized strength. The field range repair parts situation was critical during the period.

30. All throughout the reporting period a problem continued to exist caused by inadequate or insufficient generators. This situation is somewhat relieved; however, the improvement is slight, and still not sufficient to adequately sustain operations and administrative equipment in unit areas.

31. A distinctive unit insignia was approved for the battalion during the reporting quarter. This was accomplished under the provisions of AR 670-5 which now authorizes such insignia for flexible type organizations. It is described as follows:

On a circular gold colored metal and brick red enamel device 1 1/8 inches in height overall, a gold wheel with 8 spokes extending beyond the felly and terminating in arrowheads. Above in base a gold metal scroll bearing the motto in black enamel "Competence Proven."
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1966 RCS CSFP-28 (R1)

The symbolism of the distinctive insignia is as follows:

Brick red and gold are the colors used for transportation. The wheel symbolizes movement and the arrows radiating from the hub of the wheel suggest swiftness of purpose and further allude to the points of the compass and the world-wide mission of the organization.

SECTION II

COMMANDERS RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PERSONNEL: a. Positive command action is necessary in order to alleviate present delays in receipt of assignment instructions by enlisted personnel of the command. This should include improvement of procedures of handling of such instructions once received in Vietnam. In this respect it has been noted that a delay of from 3 to 4 weeks elapses from date of Department of the Army instructions to date of receipt by this headquarters.

b. Diversion of personnel, while recognized as a valid management tool to fill existing critical and unexpected shortages, must be kept to a minimum consistent with such requirements. To fill one unit, at the expense of another, which does in fact have a valid requisition and requirement for such personnel can only result in continued operational and administrative problems all the way back to Department of the Army since there is no recourse to the affected unit but to attempt to fill the vacancy from existing resources and/or to continue to reflect shortage in MOS's involved.

2. LOGISTICS: a. It is recommended that a careful study be made of Army equipment, particularly MHE and engineer equipment such as generators. In some cases there are many items of equipment on hand in the Army inventory which parallel each other in jobs to be performed, i.e. Truck, forklift, 6,000 lb rough terrain and truck, forklift, 10,000 lb rough terrain; generator 5 KW and generator 3 KW. Although the larger capacity equipment costs more, in many cases savings may be realized by having only the one item of equipment, which can handle the gamut of jobs to be done, in the inventory. This would facilitate repair of the items because of a standardization of equipment resulting in smaller inventories of repair parts and decrease deadlines by making possible the interchangeability of parts in order to meet combat requirements faced here in RVN.

b. A smaller inventory of repair parts would increase availability of parts in the supply system. One major problem in RVN is the inability of direct support maintenance units to return unserviceable equipment to a serviceable condition. This is caused by insufficient repair parts, or
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inability to make maximum use of controlled canabilisation because of non-standardised equipment. Because of this situation units are faced with high deadline rates which hampers the rated mission of the organization. To further demonstrate the state of maintenance, give an example of non-standardization, and to point out the need for action on this recommendation, is the situation which exists in this command. This battalion has on hand 66 forklifts composed of 10 various makes and models. Of these, 33 are in field maintenance. 18 for over three months.

LESSONS LEARNED

INTRANSIT CARGO STORAGE

1. Item: Limited intransit cargo storage at Qui Nhon.

Discussion: Limited beach estate requires a maximum beach clearance effort. Closing of the Pleiku road and transshipment requirements handicap cargo reception capability by causing congestion.

Observation: Limited transshipment should be made through Qui Nhon port.

BACKLOADING DEEP DRAFT VESSELS IN QUI NHON HARBOR

2. Item: Backloading and transshipment aboard deep draft vessels.

Discussion: Qui Nhon terminal operations are subject to heavy swells and other adverse weather. Backloading deep draft vessels under these conditions using lighterage is time consuming, resulting in shipping delays.

Observation: Intercoastal backloading from Qui Nhon should be limited to the BDL Page and LST traffic.

RO/RO SHIPS

3. Item: Use of RO/RO ships at Qui Nhon.

Discussion: Experience with deep draft RO/RO ships at Qui Nhon has been entirely unsatisfactory due to lack of fixed facilities and weather conditions.

Observation: Use of deep draft RO/RO ships at Qui Nhon should be limited until such time as fixed facilities are available. Instead, LST's and the BDL Page should be the primary RO/RO vessels for Qui Nhon.
4. **Item**: Discharge of refrigeration ships.

**Discussion**: Refrigeration ships continue to discharge relatively small amounts of cargo at Qui Nhon despite adequate stevedore and lighterage. Limited ability to receive this type of cargo is the restricting factor.

**Observation**: Close coordination and supervision by both QM and TC agencies is required to insure adequate discharge of refrigeration ships. This battalion regularly augments with both personnel and equipment when refrigeration ships are being worked in order to increase amount of cargo discharged.

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5. **Item**: Use of Line Haul Trucks for Beach Clearance.

**Discussion**: Truck line haul directly from the beach to inland consignee is ideal, provided line haul trucks are readily available. Delay in truck arrival causes reduced lighterage turn-around and/or double handling by stevedore personnel.

**Observation**: Careful coordination of cargo discharge and line haul truck availability is essential for effective beach clearance.

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6. **Item**: Items requested in excess of Authorized Allowances.

**Discussion**: Inadequacies in unit TOL's caused a great amount of delay in cargo operations, and hampered proper, timely maintenance of vessels. Electric forklifts are an absolute necessity in unloading ammo ships. In addition, it should be remembered that battery chargers are required for use with electric forklifts. Some ammo ships have the facility to recharge forklift batteries on the vessel; however, this is not true in all cases, resulting in the forklift becoming useless from lack of charging equipment. Sufficient forklifts and chargers have been requested and are beginning to arrive. In addition, lack of sufficient 20 Ton "A frame type" cranes seriously effected the maintenance program of one medium boat company. The unit was directed to deploy to RVN without this item. The situation was partially eliminated by combining the vessel maintenance facilities of two medium boat companies; however, should the two units be separated for any reason, one unit will be without a facility to lift floating craft onto the beach for maintenance. The 20 Ton cranes have been placed on request.
Observation: A critical review of all unit TOE's should be accomplished periodically. Specifically, units in CONUS should consider such important major items as facilities for off-loading all types of supplies and equipment from all types of vessels, while considering a lack of permanent port facilities.

MAINTENANCE FACILITIES

7. Item: Unit Maintenance Facilities.

Discussion: Unit Maintenance facilities are becoming over-burdened due to lack of personnel, area and equipment to handle the items requested in excess of authorized allowance. There is presently a plan to combine unit maintenance facilities in one central location under direct control of the battalion maintenance officer. All MHE, Power equipment, wheeled vehicles, etc., will be separated into sub-sections utilizing available maintenance personnel in each location. This plan is expected to result in an improved maintenance program. In addition, maintenance buildings have been requested and approved for construction in the near future.

Observation: Units and organizations should continually review maintenance procedures and facilities, and take appropriate measures for improvement.

FIELD RANGE

8. Item: Repair Parts for Field Ranges.

Discussion: Intensive use of field ranges by several units of the battalion resulted in rapid depletion of unit PLL. Units were unable to replenish the PLL. Field ranges were becoming inoperative from extended periods of operation. Redistribution of assets within the battalion returned a portion of the field ranges to operation. All required repair parts are on valid requests.

Observation: Units departing CONUS for extended field operations should be permitted to carry an initial PLL greater than that currently authorized for field ranges.

POWER SUPPLY

9. Item: Insufficient power supply.

Discussion: The 5 KW generators authorized by TOE's are of insufficient power to carry the load required to support a terminal operation of the magnitude at Qui Nhon. 10 and 15 KW generators are on request but have not arrived as of this date.
Observation: 10 KW generators should be substituted in all TOE's of transportation terminal service and boat units. Past experiences have proven that 5 KW generators are of little or no value for sustained operations, because of a high deadline rate. The larger generator should have an engine capable of sustained operation, such as diesel and produce enough wattage not to over-tax the capabilities of the machine.

NORMAN L. KIRBY
Lt Col, TC
Commanding
AVLC-QN-2 (6 May 66)
1st Ind
SUBJ: Operational report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1966 RDC 0949-28 (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUANTON, AFC US FORCES 96238
12 May 1966

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, Attn: AVLC-QN-2, AFC US Forces 96307

1. The 394th Transportation Battalion (TMSLAM) Operational Report on Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1966 is hereewith forwarded in accordance with 1st Log. Regulation 870-2.

2. Concur with Commander's recommendations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CHARLES L. NASH
Captain, QMC
Acting Adjutant General
AVLC GO-H (7 May 66) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966, RCS CSGPO-28(RI)

HEADQUARTERS, 1st Logistical Command, APO US Forces 96307 27 MAY 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon,
ATTN: AVLQ-GN-GO, APO US Forces 96238

Returned for comment regarding problems cited by the commander, in
the basic report. Your reply should include actions taken or contemplated
to resolve these problems requiring corrective action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. C. RICE
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: GO-H, APO US Forces 96307

1. Returned with comment is the Operational Report on Lessons Learned prepared by the 394th Transportation Battalion (TERMINAL).

2. Problem areas cited by the Commander in the report are referenced below with appropriate comment:

a. Para 5: This paragraph states that approval of PCS for the 116th, 285th and 544th Transportation Companies would enable the battalion to continue its present operation.

Comment: As per 1st LOG General Order No. 103, dated 26 May 1966, the 116th and 285th Transportation Companies were assigned to the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon. The 544th Transportation Company’s TOS to the Command was extended. The original request of the 394th Transportation Battalion, with slight modification, was thus approved.

However, the transfer of the 116th Transportation Company to Can Ranh Bay in June 1966 did temporarily reduce the beach clearance capability of the 394th Transportation Battalion. It is anticipated that this reduction will soon be offset as the Han Jin Company gradually assumes port clearance responsibilities.

b. Para 10: The substance of this paragraph is that the Y-66 tanker assigned to Qui Nhon port is still awaiting a marine survey as of 30 April 1966.

Comment: The Y-66 tanker has been surveyed by marine maintenance personnel from Can Ranh Bay and Okinawa. As soon as she can be scheduled she will be placed in drydock for repair. In the meantime this vessel is being used for short haul of non highly volatile POL products.

c. Para 11: This paragraph surmises that a shipping backlog at Qui Nhon requires the return of the 119th Transportation Company from Nha Trang to Qui Nhon.

Comment: The assumption of beach clearance responsibilities on the part of the Han Jin Company and the projected deployment of two terminal service companies to Qui Nhon in the near future should reduce the current shipping backlog in Qui Nhon.


AVLC-ON-GO-P


d. Para. 18: This paragraph states that the port of Qui Nhon cannot discharge heavy and outsized lifts because of the deadline 60 ton floating crane.

Comment: The 60 ton floating crane (BD) was put back into operation on 16 May 1966. It is realized that operation of the BD in the outer harbor is dependent upon weather conditions. However, as soon as the entrance to the inner harbor of Qui Nhon is dredged, deep draft vessels will be able to enter the inner harbor. The dredging is expected to be completed in December 1966.

e. Para. 21: The effect of the loss of trained noncommissioned officers and specialist personnel is stressed in this paragraph.

Comment: Department of Army has found it necessary to shortship on many requisitions from this theater for specially-trained or highly qualified personnel. [Generally speaking, filler personnel have been supplied to units in these cases and the units must provide the necessary training to utilize these replacements.]

f. Para. 24: This paragraph emphasizes the additional administrative and operational burdens brought upon a unit because of diversion of critical personnel from that unit.

Comment: Higher commands on occasion divert personnel assigned to this command by Department of Army. In most instances this is done only because of existing requirements elsewhere which are considered to be more critical than our need. Authority to divert personnel within elements of a command is inherent to the Commander and is of course traditional in the Army.

g. Para. 28: The need of additional space and personnel to house and to operate maintenance equipment arriving in Qui Nhon is cited in this paragraph.

Comment: Additional equipment cited in para. 28 will not cause an appreciable increase in the work load of support maintenance. It is contemplated that the increase in equipment density will be offset by the increased efficiency of operations made possible by the consolidation of support maintenance activities in the new maintenance complex on approximately 1 September 1966.

Para. 30: The shortage of generators to sustain operations and administrative equipment is expressed in this paragraph.

Comment: A project has been initiated by the Area Engineer for two J-2 Tankers to supply power for the Qui Nhon Area. There are sufficient generators on order to meet the demands of all other areas. It will probably be late fall or winter before all requirements have been met.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

H.S. NEWPORT
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
AVLC GO-H (6 May 66)  4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1966. RCS CSGPO-23(RI)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND, APO 96307

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVC (HIST)
APO 96307

1. Forwards in accordance with AR 525-24 and USARV Circular 870-1.

2. Concur with the comments and recommendations as set forth in basic report and 1st and 3rd indorsements subject to the following comments.

3. Reference paragraph 10: The Y66 tanker is programmed for over-haul in Sasebo, Japan or about 15 August 1966.

4. Reference paragraph 13: The 344th Transportation Company (LARC) was transferred from Qui Nhon to Cam Ranh Bay by Movement Order 28 dated 13 June 1966.

5. Reference paragraph 23: The problem of non receipt of assignment instructions for personnel approaching DEROS is well known at all levels of command. Although the situation is improving, it still is not completely satisfactory. USARV is attempting to implement a system to rectify this problem, which should be operational by the month of August.

6. Reference paragraph 24: The influx of NCO personnel from CONUS has been slow and due to the critical shortage of highly trained personnel who are desired by commanders, the quantity available to meet demands is inadequate. Maximum command supervision is required to train and provide replacements from available resources. The strength of the units under control of the 394th Transportation Battalion is above that of similar units in the command. Projected ninety day losses do not indicate a problem area at this time. Diversion of personnel is made only consistent with operational requirements.

7. Reference Section II, paragraph 2a: An MHE standardization program is presently underway.

8. Reference Section II, Lessons Learned, Item 1: Transhipment from the port of Qui Nhon is restricted to equipment that must be discharged because of overstow.
AVLC GC-H (6 May 66) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1966. RCS CSGC-28(R1)

9. Reference Section II, Lessons Learned, Item 2: This headquarters
is not aware of intra coastal shipping by deep draft vessels from Qui Nhon. All
transhipments have been made by LST or the BDL Page. Retrograde movement to
CONUS from the port of Qui Nhon should continue to be made on deep draft vessels
precluding the necessity of transhipping to another terminal for outloading
aboard deep draft vessels. It is recognized, however, that during the monsoon
season, transhipping, causing, additional work at another terminal, may be
be necessary to insure return of retrograde cargo.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

GLEN A. DOYLE
Capt, ASC
AVC-DM (6 May 66) 5th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1966 RCS CSQFO-28 (FL)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

THRU: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs with the 394th Transportation Battalion operational report on lessons learned as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

John J. Broster, Capt. AGC

JAMES R. PERRY

[Signature]

Major, AGC

Asst Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 RCS CSGF0-28 (R1) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 8 AUG 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report on Lessons Learned of the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for the period 1 January - 30 April 1966 is forwarded herewith. Although short, this report is considered a good report in which Section II, Recommendations and Lessons Learned, reflects considerable thought and effort.

2. (U) This headquarters notes especially the lst Logistical Command's 2d Indorsement, which returned the basic report to the U.S. Army Support Command Qui Nhon for further comment, and the USASC Qui Nhon's 3d Indorsement, with full comments. This action is completely in accord with instructions recently published by this headquarters.

3. (FOO0) This headquarters has the following specific comments on the basic report:

   a. (U) Section I, paragraph 27c. Lack of sufficient 1/4-ton vehicles for liaison is an internal problem and should be resolved by submission of MTOE to meet the unit's particular requirements.

   b. (FOO0) Section II, paragraphs 2a and 2b. The need to reduce the number of makes and models of equipment in the field is recognized. To this end, standardization programs for the two items of equipment mentioned in paragraph 2, i.e., forklift trucks (MHE) and generators, are presently underway in RVN. The AMC MHE Project Manager made a survey which resulted in the reduction of conventional type forklifts and warehouse tractors from 47 models to 5. Replacement of equipment was divided into two phases each involving approximately 720 pieces of equipment for the 5 models. Phase I was virtually completed as of 15 July 1966, at which time 667 pieces had been shipped. Phase II, which is to fill deploying unit shortages and provide maintenance floats and Class IV stocks, has already commenced. Projected completion date is the 3d Quarter, FY 67. Replacement of the generators, in accordance with the standardization program, has also commenced. There are 2900 pieces of equipment in shipment. Schedule of availability for lst Quarter, FY 67 is 5350, and for 2d Quarter, FY 67 is 4400.

   c. (U) Section II, paragraph 6.

      (1) Ninety-eight electric forklift trucks and 25 battery chargers were shipped to RVN in March 1966 to meet the shortage of electric forklifts and battery chargers.
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(2) On 2 April 1966 a Landing Ship Dock (LSD) was obtained by loan from the U.S. Navy to assist Army marine maintenance personnel in the repair of Army vessels. In addition a 400 ton pontoon type drydock, also obtained from the Navy, was due in RVN on 24 July. This drydock, to be contractor operated, will lift landing craft and small tugs for bottom repairs and painting.

d. (U) Section II, paragraph 7. In April 1966, a pilot maintenance contract was awarded to PHILCO-FORD for the repair of material handling and construction equipment at Qui Nhon. Contract repair will supplement unit maintenance.

e. (U) Section II, paragraph 8. The latest DA guidance is that units will deploy with a 30-day level of PLL items. This HQ has no information regarding a shortage of repair parts for field ranges, and indications are that field range repair parts are located in the RVN. In any case, the USARPAC ICP is handling requisitions for such parts in a normal manner. In part, it appears that one problem involved in this instance is again the failure of logistical headquarters through which the ORLL has passed to critically evaluate the basic reports and to take necessary action. It is believed that the instructions noted in paragraph 2, above, will overcome such problems.

f. (U) Section II, paragraph 9. The increased use of electricity for all purposes lends validity to the recommendation that 10 KW generators be substituted for 5 KW's in the TOEs for transportation terminal service and boat units.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

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D. A. HARRISON
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Asst AG

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