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Translated from the original French version.

by

The Geographic Section of the PTED
(Ground Forces, Far East)

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Note: "Guerrilla" was apparently a periodic publication, issued to give information to all ranks on the latest tricks of the Vietminh (VM) and means for overcoming them.

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The last issue of "GUERRILLA" was somewhat severe. Some old servicemen, whose duration in the rank and file, is commensurate to the length of their beards, found it somewhat exaggerated to speak of "rampart crawfish" and that it was explained to them how a post should be built. It is alright, it can turn out to be useful sometimes; then there are the "mong-sie ba-to's".

Today GUERRILLA resumes its usual aspect.

It explains to you the fast tricks devised by our enemy, and forewarns you against them.

Traps and mines are more and more in use in Tonkin and in Annam. These are dirty tricks. They can be overcome, however, if their mechanism is thoroughly learned, if a strict discipline is observed and the commander's instructions closely obeyed.

Traps and mines are somewhat the weapons of resentment and despair. The enemy who uses them confesses his weakness and cowardice.

In fact, for the Viet-Nam mass, Uncle Ho's goatee has lost much of its prestige, so true it is that the eyes at last perceive the light.

Is it then the end of the nightmare? Will peace and safety return to the quiet "nha-que" in this new year placed by our Vietnam friends under
the sign of the Buffalo, the emblem of Bucolic tranquility and of fertile activity?

No longer do we believe in Santa Claus! Our sacrifices, however, have not been in vain and the progress obtained is immense; so much so, that the end of the way which we still have to cover seems to be short.

Already our influence becomes constantly wider; roads are opened, trust is expressed by a smile on the face of the village "nhos" or by the zeal of the ploughman in opening furrows in his rice fields.

Despite the mines, traps, sabotage, and other dirty tricks, the time has come to place the word Pacification as the title of our mission, and to meditate upon the remark of Lyautey, a man who knew:

"When, capturing a haunt, one thinks most of all of the market to be set up there soon, one captures it in quite a different mood".

Pacification

Please, think about this little story: one morning Toto Baroud on waking discovers with horror bugs in his bed. Throwing back sheets and blankets, he found in blank dismay "dai dois" of bugs, "trung-doans" of bugs, solidly entrenched in the hollow recesses of the spring mattress and of the boards. Toto did not think long. He threw bed and spring mattress into the fire. That night he lay down on the ground. The bugs from the skirting-boards invaded him, followed by cockroaches and other unclean insects. He was unable to sleep. The following day he packed up and went and slept under a tent.

Jack the Shrewd, in the neighboring room, discovered also the bugs. He took some kerosene, carefully and patiently cleaned the bedstead and the
spring mattress from the hidden bug nests, and washed the skirting-boards and the floor with cresyl. The night after he slept peacefully and the nights after just as well. The bugs, disgusted, gave up.

This is the way you must do with the Viet-minh bugs: Clean the country from this dirty brood, yet save, preserve, improve what is worth keeping.

This is what "Pacify" means: it is the title of our mission.

We are not here to wage a war against a people, but to restore, in an allied country, the order disturbed by bands of pillaging rebels full of hatred.

The military action is only one of the means to promote Pacification.

The great majority of the population of this country is asking only for one thing: to work in peace. It is terrorized by the rebels and must not fear the arrival of the French forces. You must do everything so that the population will welcome you as liberators and not as oppressors.

Combat is only the first phase of pacification. Once the rebels are eliminated, your pacifier role really begins: it is there a long and exacting labor which requires perseverance and patience.

A region to be pacified can be compared to a gravely ill person who must be restored to health, and who requires attention and constant devotion. No negligence is permissible.

For the inhabitants who trust you, you must act as the ambassadors of a strong, but just and liberal country.

A skillful behavior is far more vexing for the rebels who boast of ideology, than brutal acts. Here is a proof of it; listen:
I. - After a punitive action on the French part

"This rude and barbarous action will give the French no advantage. On the contrary, it leads them into a way deprived of any outlet".

(Excerpt from a letter recovered in Cochinchina on the dead body of a rebel).

II. - After a successful action conducted with discrimination

"The soldiers were divided into three groups; they went around the market and distributed tracts, but without violence or damage against the population.

"We must acknowledge that the behavior of these soldiers was quite suitable during this operation. No doubt the aim of the order, in this case, is to attract the population, which we immediately warned against this new French tactic".

(Excerpt of a report of the V. M. Executive Committee of the Baria Province dated October 10th -- captured document).

III. - Circular Letter from the V. M. Security:

Nam Bo Police Vietnam Democratic Republic
Gia Định Province Independence - Liberty - Happiness

COMMUNIQUÉ

To all the Police Services of the Province, concerning the strategy of the enemy.

In order to prolong their military action, the French and their servants amplify the political action.

They try now to gain back the population

-- By liberating the noninteresting inhabitants or V. M. agents and advising them to go back to their peaceful daily work;

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
-- By walking through the villages and hamlets and entertaining friendly relationships with the inhabitants;
-- By playing with the children and giving them keepsakes;
-- By distributing medicines among the inhabitants;
-- By carrying out propaganda against our government in order to attract the population to themselves;
-- By allowing the terrorized inhabitants of the other regions to come and find a refuge around their posts, etc....

For lack of reflection, the inhabitants believe that the enemy acts kindly to them, and they come back around the posts.

A certain number of inhabitants, not only do not assist us, but betray us and inform the enemy against us, because they consider that the presence of our agents and their activity are harmful to their safety. Our agents encountered difficulties in their activities because they can no longer infiltrate the mass of the population. Thus, this peace created around the posts chase us away from the enemy and the population comes back to them.

All the police services are requested to seek the means possible to resist to this strategy of the enemy, harmful to our interests.

Gia Dinh, October 25, 1948
The Chief of the Province Police
(Signature and seal)

This document shows the results that might be expected from a humane and understanding pacifying policy. The rebel understands that very well and sees in it the surest obstacle to his influence.

May all, rank and file, learn from it.
SABOTAGES -- TRAPS -- MINES

You know the trick of the "Bully". He does not attack you straight forward, because he does not like to be boxed. Thus, he prefers to play some "dirty tricks" quietly. It can be very irritating when it is not expected. It is better to be warned. In the following pages, we shall speak to you successively of the organization and of the instructions of the sabotagers and rebels, and we shall explain to you some of their recent tricks, such as mines, traps, and artifices of war.

Chapter I. V. M. Instructions Concerning Sabotage

This is a process frequently used by the rebels and by the entire terrorist organization.

The following document captured by our forces will give you an idea of the aims desired; which is to harm us in our economic and political potential.

Some of our counter-terrorism troops, set up in different sectors, can draw inspiration from this document in order to carry to the very core of the rebel organization this insecurity so much feared by it.

The multiplicity of the objectives requires from our forces a special vigilance and a complete respect for the security rules and instructions emitted.

THE V. M's FIND IT DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN AMMUNITIONS.
DO NOT GIVE THEM YOUR CASES. IF POSSIBLE, RECOVER THEM AFTER COMBATS.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SABOTAGING

(according to a captured document)

ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES

1. The number of agents in each sabotage group must be low
2. Sabotage must be conducted on a constant basis in order to constitute a harassing activity
3. Secret must be kept absolutely
4. The carrying out of a sabotage act must be rapid and simple.

OBJECTIVES AND TYPES OF DESTRUCTION

The objectives must be vital enemy organizations; they can be military, administrative, economic.

For instance: plants, mines, arsenals, lines of communication, vehicles, dockyards, plantations, depots, etc....

ELECTRIC PLANTS

In order to destroy: magnetos, alternators, turbines
introduce a handful of sand or simply finely cut hair

For boilers: Introduce an explosive (melinite for instance) into the coal used in feeding the boiler. The explosive must have its fuse.

Other process: Obtain a copper chain with weights at its two ends. Seek the wires leaving the plant to distribute the current. Throw the chain so as to wind it around the wires and cause a short-circuit.

WATER WORKS: The sensitive points to be aimed at are: water towers, feeding pipes, filters, turbines, pumps, tanks.
MINING INSTALLATIONS:

They possess also auxiliary plants which can be attacked -- as well as depots, foundries, wells and pits, cranes, small wagons and locomotives, etc.

WORKSHOPS:

They contain many specialized machines easy to sabotage.

DEPOTS, STORES:

They contain stocks of raw material which can easily be burnt down by the following process: Put phosphorous in a damp cloth; as soon as the cloth will be dry, the phosphorous will burn. Put some potassium chlorate mixed with antimony sulfide into a bottle. Then introduce a small rubber flask containing sulfuric acid. Once the rubber is completely corroded by the acid, the mixture will explode and catch fire.

ROADS:

Different cuttings and destruction of bridges and others by explosives (See "GUERRILLA" No. 2).

RAILROADS:

Unbolt the rails, take off the sleepers, or better use explosives, select places where repairs will be most difficult (crossing, level-crossing, tunnel, switching point). One can also dig a large pit under the railroad, and camouflage it carefully; when the train passes, the railroad sinks, and the train runs off the rails.

-- Blow the bridges (iron, concrete) or burn them (wood).

AUTOMOBILE VEHICLES:

Put sugar into the gasoline or if no sugar is available, put papur or cotton cut in small pieces. For the gas-producing vehicles, put explosives in the coal. Sand can also be introduced into the cylinders.
AIRPLANES:

Destroy the controlling instruments by means of explosives. Half-cut the wires of the elevators and of the rudders. They will yield in flight.

BOATS:

The best is to use a delay mine placed at a vital point: machines, ammunition rooms, fuel rooms, hold, rudders, etc....

WIRELESS POSTS:

They are very fragile, hence easily destroyed (grenade).

TELEPHONE:

Destroy the wires, posts, insulators. Rather than cutting the wires easy to replace, attach one end of a copper wire to the telephone wire and stick the other end into the ground; camouflage the wire itself against the post. Thus, the failure is more difficult to detect for the enemy.

PORTS:

The main objectives are the warships, merchant vessels, depots, means of transport, lighthouses, light buoys, cranes, etc....

AERODROMES:

There are many sensitive points: Taking-off areas, sheds and aircrafts, bomb depots, warehouses, radio installations, vehicles, etc....

There may be something theoretical and bookish in this document, since the rebel is better at plagiarizing than at writing out a first-hand text.
CHAPTER 2: SABOTAGING THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION

Frequently, the rebels attack our lines of communication, especially the bridges in order to isolate the main centers and to prevent, or interfere with, the afflux of fresh supplies.

For this purpose, they have organized specialized units, whose technicians unfortunately are sometimes engineers who were trained before 1940 in our own institutes; hence, the scientific conditions of effective destruction can be applied. Fortunately for us, the execution fails in many respects, especially because of the restricted availability of explosives.

In order to possess effective sabotage units, the rebels have organized the so-called "Engineering" units, whose training is rather thorough.

Here is an example of the sabotage instructions spread by the so-called high-falutin "Engineering Service":

"In sabotaging the lines of communication, the cutting of roads requires an important labor rather than any special technique.

Destroying bridges requires few men, but some material and an effective technique.

The following means will help and guide you in your work:

I. WOODEN BRIDGES

The simplest way is to burn them; use inflammable materials, such as straw, gasoline or rubber (in the South).

II. CONCRETE BRIDGES

a. Without supporting piers

We shall indicate two methods.

GUERRILLA COMBATS ARE CONDUCTED ON SHORT DISTANCES
AND BY SURPRISE. SHOOT WELL. BUT QUICK!
With the pickaxe make a notch on the surface of the bridge, following the line A-B in order to create a low resistance area. Place the explosives: bombs, 75-shells or mines. After the explosion, the bridge will be ruptured along the line A-B.

**B. Location of the explosive charge.**

**Figure 1:** Make a notch as explained in Figure 1. Use explosives to destroy one of the concrete abutments. The bridge will fall and will be ruptured along the line A-B.

a. Abutment of the bridge after the explosion.

**REMARK:** The line A-B must not be cut along the center of the bridge but at 2/3 of the bridge length.

b. With supporting piers

Dig under the two ends of the bridge in order to eliminate the supporting point on the banks (Figure 3).

Make a notch along the line A-B.

Use explosives to destroy the piers. The bridge will fall and be ruptured.

**III. IRON BRIDGE**

a. A one-span bridge (Figure 4)

Cut along line A-B with melinite, or destroy one of the abutments supporting the bridge.

b. A multi-arch bridge (Figure 5)

Destroy the intermediary piers, by placing the explosives as indicated in Figure 5. Further on, the stonework piers must be entirely destroyed, otherwise the enemy might easily use them to set up a new bridge.
1. Pratiquer une entaille à la pioche sur la surface du pont, suivant la ligne A - B (fig. 2) pour former une ligne de moindre résistance - Placer alors les explosifs : bombes, obus de 75 ou mines. Après l'explosion, le pont sera rompu suivant la ligne A - B.

2. COQUE DE PONT APRÈS L'EXPLOSION

1. Pratiquer la même entaille. Détruire par explosifs l'une des deux culées en béton. Le pont tombera et se trouvera rompu suivant la ligne A - B (fig. 2).

NOTE : La ligne A - B ne doit pas être brisée au milieu du pont, mais aux deux tiers de sa longueur.
III - PONT EN FER.

1) - D'une seule portée (fig. 4) —
Couper suivant la ligne A - B à l'aide de scies à vide
détacher l'une des culées sur lesquelles repose le pont.

2) - À plusieurs arches (fig. 5) —
Détacher les piles intermédiaires. Pour cela, placer les explosifs de la façon indiquée sur la figure. Il faut procéder ensuite à l'explosion complète des piles de maçonnerie, sinon elles pourront être facilement utilisées par l'ennemi pour rétablir le pont.
INSTRUCTIONS

The post chiefs entrusted with the protection of an important structure will do well to check several times by day or night the state of the construction. Thus, they will prevent the unfortunate occurrence of the Hanoi boy at the Doumer bridge, who failed to notice the presence of a ladder left hanging on the river when the coolies, who worked on the bridge, went home.

ROAD SABOTAGE

Types of road cuts performed by the V. M's.

CHAPTER III. MINES AND TRAPS

The Viet-Minh always display much imagination, especially as regards traps. Their imagination is quite suitable in expanding the economic war.

New tricks are detected day after day.

Here are some of the more recent ones. No doubt you discovered some during operations. Please inform us, so your experience might be useful for your comrades.

GRENADE TRAPS

1. Into the hollow piece of a bamboo cane a grenade is introduced until it is slightly wedged by one of the knots. A cord is attached at one end to the fuse-pin and is fixed at the other end inside the hollow piece of the bamboo cane. When someone lifts the cane, the grenade slides because of its own weight, the cord holds back the fuse-pin and the trap explodes (Figure 6).

2. The grenade is placed in a hole dug in the road. The end of the traction cord is fixed to a board pressing on a spiral spring under the
1/- Dans un tronçon de bambou femelle est glissée une grenade légèrement coincée par un nœud du bambou. Un cordon est attaché par un bout à la gouillle et fixé par l'autre bout à l'intérieur du tronçon. Quand on soulève ce dernier, la grenade glisse sous l'effet de son propre poids, le cordon relâche la gouillle et le piège explode. (Fig. 5)
weight of a rock. If someone displaces the rock, the spring relaxes and
explosion occurs. If pressure is put on the rock, percussion takes place
through the compression of a fuse (Figure 7).

---

DO NOT USE THE GRENADES WHICH YOU FIND ON THE GROUND.

3. The traction cord is connected with the igniter and fixed to the opposite edge of the hole which is camouflaged by a piece of matting covered with gravel.

Two grenades can also be placed opposite to each other and connected together by the traction cord (Figure 8, b. gravel)

4. The grenade is inserted head down into the hollow piece of a bamboo cane section. The grenade is fixed there by some wire not shown in the picture. The traction cord is connected with a transversal bar through two circular apertures in the cane section. Two sticks rest on the bar and come into contact with the paving stones of the road.

If a man walks on the paving stones, the resulting pressure causes the sticks to sink and press the transversal bar which pulls the igniting cord (Figure 9).

5. Even a pineapple was found provided with a grenade.

TRAPPING PROCESS (TONKIN)

A hole incompletely filled on the road is prolonged downward by a small passage out of which a cord extends as if a traction-controlled mine were present.

The first reaction is to pull the cord toward the mine so as to neutralize it.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2/- La grenade est déposée dans un trou creusé sur la route. L'extrémité du fil de traction est fixée à une planche qui maintient comprimé un ressort spirale, par le poids d'un gros caillou. Si l'on déplace le caillou, le ressort se détend et provoque l'explosion. Si l'on appuie sur le caillou, la percussion a lieu par écrasement d'une armoire. (Fig. 7)

3/- Le fil de traction est relié à l'allumeur et fixé sur le bord opposé de l'excavation qui est camouflée à l'aide d'un morceau de natté recouverte elle-même de gravier.

Une variante consiste à mettre deux grenades l'une en face de l'autre, reliées entre elles par le fil de traction. (Fig. 8)

4/- La grenade est placée, la tête en bas, dans une galerie formée par un tube de bambou. Elle est fixée à cette galerie par un système d'attache en fil de fer (non représenté). Le fil de traction est relié à une barre transversale passée en travers de deux orifices circulaires de la galerie. Deux baguettes reposent sur la barre et viennent au contact des dalles qui forment le revêtement du chemin.

L'action de pression faite par les briques par le passage d'un homme produit l'affaissement des baguettes qui entraînent dans leur mouvement vers le bas, la barre transversale, laquelle exerce une traction sur le fil de prise à feu. (Fig. 9)
The cord, however, is connected at its other hand with a grenade which explodes when traction is exerted (Figure 10).

**INFERNAL MACHINES (TONKIN)**

An explosive device was discovered in a streetcar at Hanoi. It consisted of a "Thermos" flask containing a shell of average size connected by an electric wire with an igniting device consisting of dry cells and of an alarm clock. By turning, at the set time, the key of the ringing system was to cause a wire to wind and, by traction, to release the potential energy of the cells, thus creating a spark to lighten the detonator of the projectile.

Another time, still in a Hanoi streetcar, two travelers ignited a basket containing straw soaked with kerosene, and took to flight.

The straw concealed a mine which failed to explode.

"GUERRILLA"

SHOULD NOT BE RELINQUISHED IN THE BOTTOM OF A DRAWER. PASS IT AROUND. IT SHOULD BE READ BY AS MANY PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE.

**EXPLOSIVE CIGARETTE LIGHTERS (COCHINCHINA AND TONKIN)**

Be careful with the cigarette lighters and fountain pens which you happen to find. The Death Volunteers use some provided with incendiary or explosive systems.

Figure 11 shows a model of a cigarette lighter of this type.
La première réaction de celui qui la découvre est de tirer le fil vers la mine pour permettre de la neutraliser.

Mais le fil est relié par son autre extrémité à une grenade qui explode lorsqu'on exerce cette traction. (fig. 10)

Son apparence extérieure ne diffère en rien d'un briquet ordinaire. Mais à l'intérieur, le tube porte-mèche est remplacé par deux petits tubes en cuivre accolés, contenant, l'un de la poudre noire tamisée, l'autre une mèche en coton imprégnée de pulvérin de poudre noire. Une extrémité de la mèche fait saillie hors du boîtier comme un briquet normal. L'autre extrémité est recourbée et introduite dans la partie inférieure du premier tube, au contact de la poudre noire comprimée.

L'intérieur du boîtier est plein de nélimite pulvérulente. Une couche de résine obture la partie inférieure du boîtier. Le fonctionnement est à peu près instantané.

On peut reconnaître ce genre de briquet par les caractéristiques suivantes :

- La partie visible de la mèche est entourée d'un petit écu de papier paraffiné qui sert à maintenir la poudre noire.
- La partie inférieure du boîtier montre la couche de résine jaune-brun retenant la nélimite. (fig. 11)
a. Thin paper case  
b. Melinite powder charge 
c. Tube containing the black powder charge  
d. Resin layer (on the melinite)  
e. Cotton fuse  
f. Tube containing the fuse (1)  

(1) In the tube containing the fuse, the void is filled by fine black powder.

The cigarette lighter described looks just like any normal device of this kind. Inside, however, the tube containing the fuse wick is replaced by two small copper tubes one against the other, one containing some compressed black powder, the other housing a cotton fuse impregnated with black priming powder. One end of the fuse protrudes outside the case as with a normal cigarette lighter. The other end is bent back and introduced into the lower part of the first tube, in contact with the compressed black powder.

The inside of the case is filled with melinite powder. A resin layer seals the lower part of the case. The operation is more or less instantaneous.

This type of cigarette lighter is recognizable by the following characteristics:

-- The visible part of the fuse (wick) is surrounded by a case in paraffined paper to hold the black powder.

-- The lower part of the cigarette lighter case exhibits the yellow-brown resin layer holding the melinite (Figure 11).
BAMBOO CANE CAN BE USED IN AN INFINITE NUMBER OF WAYS. LEARN TO IDENTIFY THEM.

TRAP HOLDER (COCHINCHINA)

The double door of a house is left ajar, and nothing seems to prevent the operation of the two panels. A thin thread fixed to one panel is connected with the fuse-pin of a grenade attached to the other panel. The least pressure causes a tension of the thread and pulls the pin out, causing the grenade to explode instantaneously. Darkness in the house prevents the thread from being seen. As a rule, the grenade is located half-way up, hence it is all the more dangerous. This trapping process was used on several occasions by the rebels in Tonkin.

To neutralize the grenade, just throw at a certain distance a brick or a heavy object against the door. The explosion is immediate.

ELECTRICALLY PRIMED MINE

This mine model of simple design is manufactured in the Viet-Minh arsenals (Figure 12: a. shutting bolt b. electrical detonator c. dynamite shot d. cast iron body).

TWO-IGNITER ANTIVEHICLE MINE (TONKIN, ANNAM)

The mine weighs about 5 kgs and consists of a body with two igniters, and of a traction igniting system.

It contains a 2.5 kgs black powder charge.
MINE À AMORÇAGE ÉLECTRIQUE

Ce modèle de mine, de construction simple, est fabriqué dans les ateliers d'armement Viêt-Minh. (Figs. 19, 20)
The two traction fuse-pins form one piece together. When pulled by the wire, they release the firing pins which strike the corresponding primers (Figure 13).

**Figure 13:** Two-igniter antivehicle mine, of local fabrication

a. Longitudinal cross-section
b. Body of the primer plug
c. Relay charge (local composition)
d. Black powder charge
e. Stem of the firing pin
f. Safety pin location
g. Firing pin
h. Fuse (case cap 7.62 Russian).

**POST CHIEF AT A SENSITIVE POINT**
(WAREHOUSE, BRIDGE, AERODROME, ETC....) CHECK AND SEE WHETHER ALL SECURITY MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN; VERIFICATION SHOULD BE CONDUCTED FREQUENTLY, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT).

**MINE-LAYER GROUPS (Tonkin-Annam)**

The rebel organization possesses specialized groups of mine layers. Each group consists of five men:  
1 Group Chief  
2 Soldiers specialized in mine-laying  
2 Soldiers for protection.

With its submachineguns and grenades, the group possesses six flat mines, with all the tools and material necessary to implement them.
MINE ANTI-VEHICULE V.H. à 2 ALLUMEURS de fabrication locale

HEMI-COupe LONGITUDINALE

- Fig. 19 -
V. M. ARMAMENT

We have spoken frequently of the local fabrications. Usually, occidental armament is copied. We give further below information concerning certain V. M. materials captured by our forces and studied by our Ordnance Services.

**Figure 14:** AUTOMATIC GROUND MINE

---

WHEN LAYING AN AMBUSH
BE CAREFUL ABOUT THE TRACES BEHIND YOU

---

**Figure 15:** GROUND MINE

a. Igniter, automatic, traction or electric
b. Picric acid (powder)
c. Melted picric acid or T.N.T.
d. Detonator
$\phi =$ Diameter

**Figure 16:** THE 37 mm GUN, LOCAL TYPE

Two models of this gun, made in the V. M. arsenals, were recovered in Tonkin.

a. Bead (foresight)
b. Smooth tube (1 m 40 approximately)
c. Back sight
d. Breach
e. Handle
f. Priming cord
g. Tripod
Fig. 14  TYPE DE MINE

LORSQUE VOUS TENEREZ UNE ENBUCADE,
PRESERZ GARDE AUX TRACES QUE VOUS LAISSEZ DERRIERE VOUS

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LE CANON DE 37 M/A TYPE LOCAL :

Ce canon (voir Fig. 10), dont deux modèles ont été récupérés au TONKIN, est fabriqué dans les ateliers d'armement V.H.

C'EST LA PREMIERE RAFALE QUI PAIE LE PLUS
NE FAITES PAS COMME À FONTENAY
TIREZ LES PREMIERS !
IT IS THE FIRST BURST OF GUN FIRE THAT PAYS
MOST. DO NOT DO LIKE AT FONTEIGNY. SHOOT FIRST!

This gun has a smooth tube; it releases one shot at a time. The
projectile resembles a buck shot sporting cartridge.

Figure 17: a. Wax
       b. Brass case
       c. 60 Lead shrapnels
       d. Black powder.

Percussion is obtained by pulling a cord (from afar!).

It is supposed to have a 100 m range approximately; the remaining
kinetic energy of the projectile makes it possible for it at that distance to
go through a 2 cm thick board of teakwood.

When the shot is released, the weapon jumps and recoils considerably
since it has no brake, like our old 80 mountain-gun. A thick cloud of blue
smoke is produced which reveals the location of the gun because of its narrow
range.

A low mobility gun, this weapon is used mostly for ambushes.

50 MM PROJECTILE OF LOCAL FABRICATION, TONKIN

It is used in the Japanese 50 mortar and in the 50 V. M. mortar of
local fabrication (type Reibel).

It weighs 825 grams.

The body of the projectile is fragmented externally and contains a
100 gr black powder charge.

The combustion time is supposed to last from 6 to 8 seconds; the
range is 200 m. (Figure 18).
C'est une arme à canon lisse qui tire coup par coup un projectile genre cartouche de chasse à chevrotines (voir fig. 17).
PROJECTILE DE 50 mm VIET-MINH

AMORCE A PERCUSSION
BOUCHON PORTE AMORCE
TUBE EN CARTON
CHARGE DE PoudRE NOIRE
TUBE FUSANT
CORPS DU PROJECTILE
POUDRE NOIRE
FRAGMENTATION EXTERIEURE
BOUCHON DE REMPLISSAGE

COUPE A.B.
VUE EXTERIEURE

Fig. 18
Figure 18: Viet-Minh 50 mm Projectile

a. Percussion cap
b. Primer holder plug
c. Cardboard tube
d. Black powder charge
e. Fusing tube
f. Body of the projectile
g. Black powder
h. External fragmentation
i. Filling plug
j. A. B. Cross-section
k. External view.

DESCRIPTION OF A "SHELL SHOOTING DEVICE"

It consists of three parts:

1. A base plate of hard wood, with a square hole in its center, to receive the gun support.

2. A gun consisting -- of a cylindrical wood piece supporting the gun and squared at its back part in order to lodge into the base plate; -- a cast iron gun with a hole to receive the fuse (wick) which ignites the powder contained.
3. A projectile 65 mm in diameter with a capped fuse, whose cap alone penetrates into the gun. Four sheet metal fins cover the gun. The range is supposed to be 200 m approximately.

**Figure 19: Shell Shooter**

A. In firing position
   a. Shell
   b. Fins
   c. Gun
   d. Gun support
   e. Base plate
   (Shooting angle 45°)

B. Gun
   a. Gun
   b. Gun support.

---

**WHEN LAYING AN AMBUSH**

BE CAREFUL ABOUT THE TRACES YOU LEAVE BEHIND

IF YOU LOVE LIFE, DO NOT WASTE THE CARTRIDGE

---

**STILL ANOTHER DEVICE MADE BY THE VIET (COCHINCHINA)**

This entire weapon, no doubt, has nothing in common with your arms. Yet it can be very deadly, for it is not required to shoot frequently or with precision; in fact, it is always used at short distances.
1/ Une plaque de base en bois dur percée en son milieu d'un trou carré destiné à recevoir le support du canon.

2/ Un canon qui comprend lui-même :
   - une pièce de bois cylindrique qui supporte le canon et qui est séparée de sa partie postérieure de façon à pouvoir être incorporée dans la plaque de base ;
   - un canon, en fonte percé d'un trou destiné à recevoir la poudre qui enflamme la poudre qu'il contient.

3/ Un projectile de 65 m/m de diamètre à fûte d'ogive, dont le culot seul pénétre dans le canon. Un épanouissement en toile à quatre allètes recouvre le canon.

La portée serait d'environ 200 mètres. (fig. 19)

LORSQUE VOUS TENEZ UNE EMBUSCADE,
PRENEZ GARDE AUX TRACES QUE VOUS LAISSEZ DERRIÈRE VOUS
SI VOUS AIMEZ LA VIE, NE GASPILEZ PAS VOS CARTOUCHES
Often, it all resembles the blunderbusses of the bandits of Calabria. It looks rather comical, yet do not draw too close to it --- if the firer is awkward!

V. M. STRATAGEMS

SOLE CHAPTER: DIFFERENT TRICKS AND STRATAGEMS

V. M. Stratagems

The rebels do not care about the War laws, and this is normal since they are rebels, trouble instigators who do not base their activity on a legal or moral organization.

Disguise in French Uniform

The deserter, new Viet Namian Z ... disguised in French Second-Lieutenant, penetrates easily into the post followed by his entire group. The sentry presents arms. A group of soldiers who are playing cards leaves the game and comes and greets the newcomers.

After a moment, however, the people of the post suspect us and take their guard. Ours open fire. The others fire back. The reserve section starts an attack and comes and reinforces the storming group.

We hear the rumble of engines. Fearing the fresh supply of troops, we set the post on fire and withdraw.
The group which we had left back on the road in order to INTERCEPT THE ARRIVAL OF FRESH ENEMY SUPPLY did not fulfill its mission well.

(According to a document captured from a rebel).

Disguised in Tradesmen

A post of the CENTER of ANNAM was attacked by a Viet-Minh detachment. Several of them succeeded in penetrating into the post by posing as harmless tradesmen. Then they pulled out their submachine gun, but the gun was jammed. They took to flight, leaving two of theirs on the ground.

In a Straw-Carrying Cart

A CaoDa post was taken by surprise by about fifteen rebels who had succeeded in entering, hidden as they were in a cart filled with straw.

Inroads of Partisans

A post was almost taken, in Cochinchina, because of the betrayal of a partisan bribed by the rebels and who let them draw close to the post at night, while he was on sentry-duty.

These few examples prove that very simple stratagems can succeed. The bold imagination of the enemy must inspire you with systematic distrust.

Do not let unknown people penetrate into your post.

To Deceive the French

In Tonkin, the following instructions from the V. N. authorities, to deceive the French, were discovered:
"The villages of the zone under French control, which can be used as refuge for the V. M. organizations, must have the benefit of absolute tranquillity in order to gain the confidence of the French authorities. If need be, false documents relative to reprisals to make upon these villages wrongly considered as opposing the V. M. will be drafted for the French.

IN THIS COUNTRY MORE THAN ELSEWHERE

DISTURB THE WOMEN

Then it will finally be possible to let the French believe that these villages are really faithful to the French authorities. These will no longer order patrols, and thus the V. M. organizations will be fully free to settle down in these villages."

Nerve War

A South V. M. Resistance Committee forbids definitely the shooting of cartridges during the day for trial purposes. The cartridges can be tried only during the night and yet as close as possible to the French posts to let the French believe that an attack is being conducted.

Long Sticks With Hooks

During an action in Cochinchina, the V. M.'s succeeded in recovering weapons on a road covered by our fire. For this purpose, they used long bamboo sticks provided with hooks.
A Flag Used As a Trap

In Cochinchina village, our forces found a large Viet-Minh flag set up in the ground. A large number of tracts had been spread near the flag.

One of our men snatched it, causing the explosion of two grenades hidden in the ground in the immediate vicinity. The fuse-pins of the grenades had been connected by a string to the extremity of the pole.

Gasoline-Projecting Motorcycle Pump

During the attack of a post in Cochinchina, the rebels for the first time used a type of motorcycle pump, provided with a water hose which was able to project gasoline at a 20 m distance. The gasoline projected was to be set on fire by shooting incendiary bullets.

The experimentation of this new V. M. trick was soon stopped by the fire of the post. Two Japanese corpses were found near the pump.

Secret Pits (See also "GUERRILLA" No. 6)

These are camouflaged underground shelters where the population takes refuge when our forces attack a village.

Sometimes they are prepared for one individual only, but mostly they can contain quite a group of people.

It is prescribed by the V. M.'s to dig as many shelters of this type as possible, to open passages between them, from house to house and even from village to village, to carefully camouflage the exits in order to prevent discovery on our part, to place traps at the entrances.
Figures 21 and 22 show the model of a shelter discovered in Tonkin, where 35 V. M.'s had taken refuge.

**Figure 21: Section Vue**
- Very thick bamboo hedge
- Aeration holes
- Embankment 1 m 50 x 3 m in width
- Access channel 30 - 40 cm in diameter only
- Water
- Draining trap
- Camouflage of the draining trap

**Figure 22: Bird's Eye-View**
- 2nd Hiding place more important than the first
- 1st Hiding place
- Straw huts
- Yard

**A DIGGING PROCESS OF UNDERGROUND PASSAGES**

The underground shelters are currently connected by communication trenches dug in the following way.

- First, 2.50 m-deep wells, at 1.50 to 2 m distances from each other are dug.
- These wells are then connected together by sapping communication trenches.
- Finally, the wells are stopped and camouflaged at the surface. Communications of this type have been found in Tonkin and Annam (Figure 23, 1st, 2nd, 3rd stage).
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SURPRISE COMPENSATES FOR THE NUMBER

PADDY HIDING-PLACE

A V. M. circular letter indicates how a paddy can be concealed in the ground in order to elude investigation by the French forces.

"Make a circular hole 5 m in diameter and 2 m in depth. Allow it to dry. Spread pulverized quicklime. Mat the bottom and the walls with plaited bamboo. Put the paddy inside half mixed with dry sand. Spread lime and ashes on the surface, then cover everything with a layer of soil and camouflage."

SENTRYs! BE VIGILANT.

Recently in an internment camp of Cochinchina, a rebel succeeded in laying hold by surprise of a submachine gun, and opened fire on the guards, which made it possible for a large number of prisoners to flee.

THE INFORMATION PREPARES THE ACTION

ON IT THE GUERRILLA IS BASED

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

CHAPTER I. TACTICAL PROCESSES OF THE REBELS

The mountainous zone of Upper Tonkin offers an ideally nested haunt to the rebels. The same is true of the frontiers of Laos and Annam. It is by attacking such repairs that our forces can make the bandits' life a burden. The fact is well known to the rebels, hence the precautions and care they take to teach their men mountain operations.

The present document which was captured will show you how the rebels expect to put a check on our activities. To our own units also, especially to the low echelons, it will indicate, on further consideration, some simple methods to spoil the enemy's game.

Note that in the mountainous country, the V. M. rebel does not feel at home and cannot rely on the constant support of the population as he can in the deltaic and coastal zones; furthermore, it is very difficult for him to disguise himself under the unobtrusive appearance of the peasant of the rice fields.

Here is the captured document in question in its integral translation:

"The ruggedness of the ground makes the displacements long and arduous, but promotes unexpected situations for the enemy as well as for us. Liaison is very difficult, hence the French can come and surround us and attack us without a moment's warning.

Therefore, many precautions must be taken.

It is necessary also to remind our men that the inhabitants of the mountain region are rather simple people who always take the side of
the stronger. Hence, only a limited trust is to be put in them, although we should be nice with them so as to win their confidence and in some way bring them to our side.

The first thing to do at the halting place is to place several watching posts around the camp and to study the ground in the vicinity. The watching posts must be established on ELEVATED POINTS or ON HIGH TREES to make observation easier. A place 5 to 6 km backward, where one can fall back in case of surprise attack, must be provided, preferably on a high point.

The camp of H ... H ... was attacked successfully by the French, because we had not taken enough precautions. It was situated in a mountainous zone and was surrounded by very dense forests, hence it looked sufficiently protected. The enemy, however, was acquiring daily more and more experience and was using formations quite trained in rock climbing and in long marches through the bush country. Furthermore, it had at its disposal artillery and aviation elements which were able to attack us in the very middle of the forest.

Also, the tactic of the French consisted in turning around our position instead of attacking us directly. Thus, they arrived in our back from the top of the mountain, or fell on our flank along the center of a mountain slope. They found undefended tracks since our attention was directed toward the lower country.

A few months later, by the same tactic, but with more important forces, the enemy attacked the camp of H ... L ... The success this time was small because the experience gained at H ... H ... taught us to improve our defense.
Yet we must conclude that despite all the advantages of the mountainous ground, the enemy manages always to attack us if he wants. Mountain camps cannot be considered as invulnerable points.

Consequently, great precautions must be taken. A triangular arrangement must be assumed for all-side protection. The sections must be at least at 100 m from each other.

Surprise can be prevented by the use of watching posts and frequent patrols. A camp will be installed only after a thorough study of the ground. The keeping of secret is a prime necessity.

The best would be to set up several camps in each region and to move frequently so as the enemy might not become informed of our position.

HOW TO ESCAPE FROM ENCIROCLING POSITIONS
(Method Taught in a Military V. M. School)

1. Attack with all available means a definite point of the encircling position (A).

2. Escape with the entire force from the encircling position (A-B).

3. Once out of the enemy circle, march a few kilometers in a direction (B-C) perpendicular to the preceding one.

4. If the enemy begins pursuit, come back to the initial point where the force was encircled (C-O), (Figure 24).

OBSTACLES AGAINST PARACHUTISTS
(Excerpt From a Military Viet-Minh Review)

1. Use 1.5 m, 3 m and 4 m-high sharp stakes distributed on the ground, as shown in the picture below.

The stakes must be driven in to 0.45 m at least into hard ground, and 0.65 m into soft ground.
POUR SE DÉGAGER DES ENCECLEMENTS.

( Procédé enseigné dans une école militaire V.H.)

1. Attaquer avec tous les moyens dont on dispose un point précis de l'encerclement (A).

2. Se dégager avec toute sa troupe (A-B).

3. Une fois sorti du cercle ennemi, marcher pendant quelques kilomètres dans une direction (B-C) perpendiculaire à la précédente.

4. Si l'ennemi engage la poursuite, se porter au point initial où la troupe a été encerclée (C-D). (Fig. 24)
If wire is available, use it to reinforce the stake by tying and connecting them at 0.50 m from the ground (Figure 25).

YOU MAY BE AWARE OF THE V. M. WAR STRATAGEMS ...
YET ONE FORGETS SO QUICKLY

2. The aerial mines are usual mines fixed at a level of 2 to 5 m on suitable supports. They are electrically controlled, or wire traction is used. The support must be very solid so as not to collapse when a neighboring mine explodes. The following models among others are recommended (Figure 26, 27, 28). (Figure 27: a. Ignition wire; b. Bamboos; c. Suspended mine; d. Enforcing stakes. Figure 28: a. Tree (branches cut); b. Ignition wire).

AMBUSH ON A RIVER

The protection of the fluvial routes acquires a fundamental economic importance in Cochinchina. We give you here the adaptation of a captured Viet-Minh Cr.

The action took place on the Bassac, south of Long-Xuyen, between AP Dong AN and AP My Quoi.

The rebel band, about a company, possesses:
-- a 20 mm gun;
-- a heavy 13 m/m 2 machine gun;
-- six Lewis guns and rifles.

IF LIFE IS DEAR TO YOU DON'T WASTE YOUR CARTRIDGES
Les mines àordines sont des mines ordinaires fixées d'une 
hauteur de 0 à 5 mètres sur des supports convenablement choisis. Elles 
peuvent être commandées par electricité ou par traction à fum. Il 
faut que le support soit très solide pour qu'il ne tombe pas au 
nou de l'explosion d'une mine voisine. Voici quelques modèles 
de supports possibles (fig. 26, 27, 28).

BI VOUS AIMEZ LA VIE, NE GASPILEZ PAS VOS CARTOUCHES
The combat groups and the heavy weapons are arranged on the right bank of the Bassac, as shown in Figure 29. (Conventional signs according to V. M. regulations are used. See "Guerrilla" No. 3).

Three French boats, A, B, C, sail up the Bassac. They have penetrated within the limits of the ambush; the first boat, however, is definitely more advanced than the other two.

---

THE KEEPING OF SECRET IS A PRIME NECESSITY

SECRET = SURPRISE = SUCCESS

---

As soon as the boat "A" reaches the center of the system, the V. M.'s open fire (heavy weapons and groups 3, 4, 5). The firing objectives are distributed as follows:

- 20-gun: rudder and floating line
- 13.2-machine gun: superstructures
- Lewis gun and rifles: enemy personnel and automatic weapons

Groups 1, 2 and 6 remain camouflaged and do not fire.

The first boat sails up to the sand-bank and fires back at the V. M. weapons. Now these weapons shoot at the boats B and C which have arrived in the proximity (Figure 30).

"B" draws alongside and lets an element disembark on the left bank. The V. M. groups then, under our fire, fall back. Groups 3 and 4 go and reinforce 1 and 2; the total formation then concentrates all its fire on "A". Meanwhile, group 5 joins group 6 in an effort to cross the river on canoes prepared in advance.
Dès que le bateau "A" arrive au centre du dispositif, les V.M. ouvrent le feu (armes lourdes et groupes 3, 4, 5). Les objectifs de tir sont répartis comme suit :

- canon de 20 : gouvernail et ligne de flottaison;
- mitrailleuses de 13,2 : superstructures;
- F.M. et fusils : personnel et armes automatiques adverses.

Les groupes 1, 2 et 6 RESTENT CANONIERS ET NE TIRENT PAS.
Their intention is to reach the other bank in order to attack our elements in the rear. Their attempt, however, is frustrated by the "C" fire.

The night comes. A French ship arrives in support. The Viet Minh's fall back under a considerable fire from all our elements.

REMARKS

Satisfactory ambush system, nevertheless, the V. M.'s acknowledge that they were unable to obtain good results because they neglected taking care of the other bank.

They pretend that they suffered no loss because of a judicious use of the ground and of an excellent camouflage.

Movements and fire were performed with strict discipline and in accordance with the foreseen plan.

CHAPTER II. THE FRENCH TACTIC AS SEEN BY THE V. M.'s

1. During the day, the French remain shut up in their posts. They go out only at night or very early in the morning.

2. Sometimes, they disguise themselves as peasants in order to attack our posts. They are informed by spies among us.

3. To attack a village, preparations are made at night; by day, they open fire on every side. They attack directly, penetrating through the bamboo fences.

4. Many times, the French are dressed in dark blue, whereas the partisans are dressed in khaki, in order to prevent us from distinguishing them.

5. As a rule, the enemy dispatches patrols which perform small attacks in order to determine our forces, 6 or 7 days before the large attack which develops in a pinners-like way.
AND SOME STRATAGEMS

1. Traitors paid by the French and wearing our uniform are instructed by them to verify papers. Any person provided with our papers is immediately arrested.

2. At other times, the French hide themselves in corn fields and dispatch individuals carrying food and fabrics. If these individuals are arrested, the ones who arrest them are arrested in their turn.

Here, it is a Sioux war. You fight rebels to the public order. Counteract their stratagems by more skillful but varied stratagems. They always upset them.

CHAPTER LII. A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK
(Told by Quartermaster-Sergeant G ...)

During a reconnaissance operation performed in the region of H ..., one of our patrols succeeded in capturing an interesting suspect and brought him to the post.

He was interrogated and information was rapidly obtained from him. A rebel committee comprising a F. C. and a TU Ve section was controlling the region. Their chief, who would come to the village of H ... rather frequently, would hide, when our patrols approached, IN AN UNDERGROUND PASSAGE, where also weapons were stored when the TU Ve's, discharged from their service, returned to the rice-fields to work and hid themselves dressed as peaceful peasants.

The suspect confessed that he belonged to the V. M. organization. He consented to act as a guide for us. He promised to lead us to the C. P. of the Committee, then to the underground passage and to show us the house of the TU Ve who distributed the arms.
According to him, the tracks are direct, and despite the rainy season, are usable. Hence the success of the enterprise depends only on an important factor: rapidity. For this reason, I decide to go to the place before daybreak at the head of a large patrol divided in two elements: a small group whose main arm is the PM and consists of 7 carefully selected men, an interpreter and a guide. The objective of this group will be

1. To reach in running the Viet-Minh C.P.
2. To discover the underground passage and the weapons.

The second element well provided with arms will come after and will

1. Come to the rescue of the first group, if need be
2. Bring confusion among the enemy lookout men and to deceive them as regards our movements.

Signals are agreed upon; each one is assigned his own mission.

The following morning, at dawn, the two patrol elements progress silently on the small dikes toward the village of H ... No noise is heard; so far we remain unnoticed. Suddenly, a man posted on the Western outskirts of the village rushes shouting into the thickets. A few seconds afterward, four or five tom-toms resound in the village; they announce our arrival; the alert is given, it is time to charge. We run toward the objective while driving ahead the guide who delays us. Now and then, other sentries or TU Ve's answering the signal of the tom-tom suddenly appear on our track; several are shot down; one of them is made a prisoner. After useless detours which the guide imposes upon us, we reach a large brick house surrounded by straw huts. It is the C. P. of the Committee. It is immediately surrounded and searched. A great disorder reigns inside. We pick up papers on the floor. Obviously, people have taken to flight.
We set the straw-huts on fire, leaving to a later period the searching of the entire house, and we march toward the underground passage. Barely after 100 m, the head rifleman shouts "Careful!" and throws himself to the ground (he had just heard the successive percussion of several grenades). We do the same. At the same instant, 4 grenades explode on the track barely at a few meters from the head rifleman. None is shot. We counterfire immediately. Some TU Ve's entrenched along the track try to take to flight; two are shot down; the others escape. Five grenades which they did not have time to hurl, and one sabre are recovered.

Another enemy element, posted farther and which seems better armed, fires a few shots and rapidly falls back toward the river along the Western outskirt of H...

Arrived near the river, the V. M.'s, after regrouping themselves, open fire from behind the hillocks. Their fire is poor and much too high. The patrol scatters in order to be less vulnerable, and we resume our march, more slowly now.

SURPRISE COMPENSATES FOR NUMBER

At this very moment, the bulk of the patrol left behind us and guided by the rifle fire, arrives running along the river. With its back against the river, the enemy is facing us and is caught laterally by the new-comers. Completely taken by surprise, the Viets leave their shelters;
some remain (dead or wounded) on the ground, while most them try to swim to
the other side despite the strength of the current.

They swim across under the fire of the Lewis guns of our element
in support, whereas our small group reaches the river when a TU Ve group
which has just reached the other bank is taking to flight. Three are shot
down, others immobilized to the ground; some, however, are able to escape.
While some of ours capture those immobilized, we cross the river. The V. M.'s
are made prisoners.

Meanwhile, one of our groups, guided by the scout, discovers the
underground passage. Seven men, but no arms, are hidden there, although 12
grenades are recovered. The C. P. is searched again carefully and destroyed.
The patrol goes back.

SHOOT ONLY WHEN SURE TO IMMOBILIZE THE ENEMY.
FOR EACH CARTRIDGE, THERE MUST BE ONE REBEL LESS

Upon questioning, we learn that one of the prisoners is the chief
of the TU Ve section and that five regulars with them were drawn when
crossing the river.

Thus, 17 rebels, out of whom five regular troops were killed, 12
were made prisoners among whom was the TU Ve Section Chief. We recovered
2 submachineguns, 3 rifles, 17 grenades and one sabre.

THE VIET-MINH IS SHRED.
IS THE SAME NO LONGER TRUE OF YOU?
A FEW TIPS

CHAPTER I. KEEPING THE SECRET

In Cochinchina recently, a post has announced IN CLEAR by radio that the two light-armored cars, which are supposed to go and meet a convoy the next day, were out of order so that the convoy would have to ensure its own safety.

The message was heard in Saigon on a civilian receiving station. Do you think that the Viet Minh do not possess such stations?

The radio and the telephone are very indiscreet means of communication. The enemy has many radio stations and knows how to use them. He also has hearing stations. Post Chiefs, for your security and the safety of others, do not broadcast IN CLEAR indications that the enemy may use to its profit. You have codes or camouflage processes, use them.

For the few minutes you will have gained by neglecting to cipher your message, many comrades might pay with their lives ... and perhaps yourselves also.

The example above was grave negligence. Understand it and do not make such errors.

DO NOT CONSIDER "GUERRILLA" AS A PERSONAL KEEPSAKE; PASS IT AROUND TO YOUR COMRADES
CHAPTER II. HYGIENE IN THE BUSH COUNTRY

"Measures need be taken against paludism. The man must be enjoined to sleep protected by a mosquito-net, and to take quinacrine regularly, when allowed by the supplies.

Experience taught us that 5 doses of quinacrine per week, or if not, 2 doses each five days, prevent paludism." (Viet Minh document)

Like ourselves, the enemy is liable to tropical diseases. In this domain, as well as in others, we must be stronger than him because each man who becomes sick because of negligence lowers our fighting potential.

The colonial campaign would formerly entail many more personal losses through diseases than on the battle field. Nowadays, this has changed owing to the progress of medicine. Yet the sanitary regulations must be applied by everyone. They can be summed up in a few simple principles, which must become true reflexes with you; here are the main ones:

1. AGAINST SKIN DISEASES AND PARASITES
   -- Bodily and clothing cleanliness
   -- Hair and nails cut short.

2. AGAINST HEAT STROKES AND SUN STROKES
   -- Loose clothing facilitating air circulation
   -- Colonial helmet or bush-country cap in the sunshine
   -- Colored glasses when possible
   -- Doses of salt after abundant perspiration, since perspiration depletes your bodies from mineral salts.

3. AGAINST COLEDS
   -- During rest period, do not keep on clothing soaked with perspiration
   -- Be careful with coolness at night in some regions. (Protect your abdomen especially)
4. AGAINST PALUDES!
- Sleep under a mosquito net
- Wear long sleeves and long trousers after sunset
- Take preventive doses according to medical advice (quinine, quinacrino, atobrine, promali., etc....)

5. AGAINST DYSENTERY, CHOLERA, TYPHOID FEVER
- Sterilize the drinking water
  - by boiling it (too), or
  - by using special tablets
- Protect food against flies
- Do not eat raw food which has not been sterilized first
  - by boiling
  - by soaking in permanganate water

6. AGAINST INFECTIONS (Especially to prevent skin infections)
- Take care immediately of any even simple abrasion of the skin
  - by application of an antiseptic after thorough washing
- Get rid of leeches by burning them (with cigarettes, for example) and not by tearing them off.

7. AGAINST VENERAL DISEASES
- Follow the precautions you know.

Finally, remember that abusing of ALCOHOL puts you in a state of lower resistance to diseases; drink as little alcohol as possible; you will feel much better.

Especially abstain from indigenous alcohols, most of all from the "CHOU".
Here, finally, in a humoristic mood, is an excerpt from an authentic Viet Minh combat report.

"To deceive the enemy during the attack of Q ... B ..., it had been agreed that the order "to the attack" would be replaced by "fall back".

During the attack, enthused by the fight, our men forgot the agreement and, hearing the order, fell back instead of attacking..."

As the other says: "By pretending ignorance too long, Jack started to bray". 
NOTES
ON THE FIGHTING
IN INDOCHINA
It would be impossible to codify a combat doctrine for small units in the theatre of operations of Indochina and to state it in a document having the appearance of regulations, because:

- the nature of the terrain, the ordinary action of the Viet Minh, and the means put at the disposal of friendly troops, vary considerably in accordance to the regions. Such variations occur within a same territory and the rule which is valid in one particular area loses much of its value in another, or even becomes unadvisable.

- the methods of action must be developed in accordance with the modifications of the Viet Minh potential and of our own potential; although such prescription fully justified in 1950 or in 1951, it is not so anymore in 1952.

That's why we have thought preferable to gather within a same brochure recent information, even if fragmentary, in which the heads of the different units may found the instruction applying to their particular situation.

The diversity of origin of these documents and the variety of experience which they reflect must incite the reader to draw from his own thinking the rules of conduct applying to his own mission.

This brochure supersedes the notes on the fight of small units (North Vietnam - December 1951 - July 1952) issued by the E.M.I.F.T., although their main passages have been retained in the re-writing deemed necessary.

A certain number of new notes have been added, some from the E.M.I.F.T., others from the F.T.N.V., as well as fragments from several studies.

Finally, a certain number of specific cases of recent experience constitute examples offered for meditation.

Saigon, March 30, 1954

General Commanding the Army corps NAVARRE
Commander in Chief in Indochina

(signed) (illegible)