THE USSR'S CURRENT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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The basic question is whether the USSR's current posture in the Middle East is a threat to U.S. security.

The following essay will show the evolution of the present level of Soviet political and military activity in the Middle East, and the options open to the USSR in the remainder of the 70's.
In drafting this paper, I have drawn upon a number of current historical reviews, newspaper articles and news stories, including Soviet and Western sources. From these sources I have learned of the rapid growth of the Soviet political and military presence in the Middle East since 1955, and its intention to dominate that area as an operational base capable of neutralizing U.S. strength on NATO's southern flank and impairing the West's access to the Indian Ocean. The U.S. should continue its presence in the Middle East and endeavor to maintain its air and naval capabilities at a level at least equal to that of the USSR's capabilities in that area. Further the U.S. should actively seek a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and assist in the economic improvement of the Arab states through private and governmental action.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE USSR'S OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The USSR's current involvement in the Arab - Israel conflict and the presence of its navy in the Mediterranean are but manifestations of the primary importance of the Middle East in Soviet global strategy. The ultimate objectives of Soviet strategy in the Middle East are: "To remove Western influence in the area and to strengthen the Soviet position there as much as possible." To achieve these objectives, the USSR has since 1967 undertaken a broad initiative using economic diplomacy and military arms. The ultimate success of Soviet initiative in the Middle East would enhance Soviet strategic power in Western Europe by imperiling NATO's southern flank and neutralizing the U.S. Sixth Fleet now in the Mediterranean. Further, Soviet influence over the Suez Canal and the flow of Middle Eastern oil would have serious impact upon the entire commercial and industrialized world with particularly heavy effect upon Western Europe and Japan. With such leverage the USSR can weaken U.S. influence on its NATO allies and upon Japan. Thus, a strong position in the Arab world has become of primary importance to the USSR's strategic economic and foreign policies.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. CZARIST POLICY

From 1770 until the downfall of the Romanovs Czarist foreign policy was largely preoccupied with obtaining mastery of the Dardanelles and the eastern Mediterranean. However, Turkish and British opposition
denied such Czarist designs. Indeed, Turkish control of the Dardanelles has to date remained firm. At an alternative, Russian strategists attempted to bypass the Straits and obtain control of the Persian Gulf by conquest of the Persian Empire. However, British and Persian resistance blunted the Russian drive. The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 to divide Persia into spheres of influence was the closest the Czars came to success in this effort.

B. EARLY SOVIET POLICY - 1917-1955

During the first two decades of the Bolshevik revolution and almost up to the end of World War II, the Middle East, once a central preoccupation of Czarist statesmen, did not figure high on the list of Soviet priorities. In discussions between Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Germany's leaders in November 1940, the "general direction of the Persian Gulf" was mentioned as one of the obvious spheres of Soviet interest to be discussed at some future stage. However from 1941 until 1943, while the USSR was heavily engaged in war with Germany, Soviet interests in the Middle East were not energetically pursued. In cooperation with the Western Allies, Soviet troops occupied the Northern part of Iran to safeguard delivery of Allied war material. At the end of the war the USSR showed great reluctance to withdraw. However upon insistence of the United States and its Western allies, the USSR abandoned its position in Iran.
Turkey, with whom the Soviets had maintained close relations in the 1920s and 1930s, remained neutral during World War II. However, as the tide of war turned, the USSR became more and more critical of Turkish policy. Toward the end of the war, the USSR pressed demands for control of the Dardanelles and the cession of Turkish provinces.

While the USSR’s main concerns were still focused on Europe, and while the political and military problems of absorbing Eastern Europe preoccupied Soviet leaders, interest in the Middle East also reawakened. The claim for a Soviet mandate over Tripolitania and Eritrea made at the Potsdam Conference were perhaps not meant very seriously and were not pressed strongly when they encountered resistance. However it was indicative of the growing awareness in Moscow that the USSR was now a global power and that there were many new opportunities to strengthen its position in various parts of the world.

As World War II ended, the revelation that almost 6 million European Jews had been killed by the Nazi regime, and the desire of the Jewish population of Palestine for national independence raised the Palestine issue to major importance first for the major powers and later the United Nations. Soviet policy, which had been violently hostile to the Zionist dream of a Jewish national home in the 1920s and 1930s, was modified and favored the establishment of a Jewish as well as an Arab state in Palestine.
Soon after the war, the Arab world entered a period of prolonged crisis. Syria and Lebanon attained independence, and anti-British feelings in Egypt and Iraq became far more intense than ever before. With the downfall of the Axis, the USSR emerged as a potential ally in the struggle of the Arabs against the West. However, the Russians still had no capacity for ordering affairs in the Arab world and had little choice but to use indirect means to subvert the British position: endorsing partition for Palestine; encouraging the defiance of the West by Iran's Tudeh Party and Prime Minister Mossadegh; and supporting local communist parties in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. The United States, Britain and France, by contrast, possessed as many as forty-three bases approachable from the Mediterranean. Moreover, the U.S. Sixth Fleet's presence in the Mediterranean was a deterrent to Soviet advances in the Middle East. In sum, until the mid 1950s Soviet policy made little use of its growing prestige as the main champion of anti-Westernism.

Following Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet policy toward the Middle East was reoriented. Turkey was no longer the object of Soviet territorial claims, and the attitude toward Arab nationalism became friendly. The colonels who had overthrown King Farouk, and who had at first been denounced as fascist reactionaries, were now reappraised and upgraded. Syria became of considerable interest to Moscow in view of the growing influence of the extreme left in that country. In the Arab-Israeli dispute, the USSR increasingly supported the Arabs. The discovery of the revolutionary potential
of the Arab world was the great turning point in Soviet Middle East policy in the post-Stalin period. 21

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S DOMINANT ROLE

The year 1955, and the Bandung Conference marked the real beginning of the Soviet bid for power in the Middle East. The opening came when the USSR sanctioned an arms agreement between Czechoslovakia and Nasser's revolutionary government which had seized power in Egypt in 1952. 22 This agreement marked the beginning of Soviet efforts to break out of the containment represented by the extension of NATO to Turkey and the creation in 1955 of the Baghdad Pact and CENTO which included Britain, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran. 23

There seems little doubt that the initial purpose of this Soviet activity was defensive - to engulf Iran and Turkey and persuade them to abandon their alignment with the United States. 24 However, more important the Soviets were thus able to bypass the northern tier countries and to become actively involved in the intermediate southern tier from Egypt to Syria and Iraq. Thus the USSR was placed in a position to disrupt CENTO or at least neutralize it, and break the ring of U.S. backed coalitions (NATO, SEATO & CENTO) which appeared to be closing along its frontiers. 25
The Suez Crisis of 1956 helped to cement the Soviet–Egyptian alliance. On November 5, 1956, Soviet Premier Bulganin sent notes to Britain, France and Israel announcing that the USSR was firmly resolved to use force including ballistic missiles to destroy the aggressors and restore peace in the Middle East. Although U.S. pressure on Britain and France ended their intervention, the Soviet effort received all the praise from the Arab world for assisting Egypt. As the Soviet profile rose, the opportunities multiplied to score against the "imperialists." Yet a degree of uncertainty remained about the precise dimensions of Moscow's new posture. Soviet behavior during the 1957 Syrian Crisis may be viewed as an attempt to probe the interested parties' evaluation of Soviet stature. The Turkish–Syrian confrontation developed over reports that the USSR was planning to construct a major base at Latakia, south of the vital Turkish port of Iskendrun. Both sides deployed military forces and the Egyptians and Soviets partially mobilized in support of the Syrians. The firmness of Western warnings, clear indications of Turkey's determination to defend its interests, and the unity of the Western alliance structures persuaded the USSR's Khrushchev to announce that "there will be no war with Turkey." By 1958 Soviet political, military and economic ties with Egypt had become very close. Following the Suez Crisis the USSR had underwritten the first stage of work on the Aswan
Dam, and was to undertake the second, main stage as well, in 1960. 32 Substantial arms shipments had been delivered to Egypt and a loan agreement totalling $175 million had been signed. 33 Nasser visited Moscow twice in 1958, the second time in connection with the Iraqi revolution and the American landing in Lebanon. 34 Khrushchev promised every possible help, he would issue warnings, but made it clear that there would be no Soviet armed intervention. 35

On February 1, 1958, Syria merged with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic, a development which the U.S.S.R. viewed with disfavor. 36 During the same year Nasser had become more conciliatory towards the United States, again to the chagrin of the Soviets. 37 Finally, the Iraqi revolution, which Nasser had followed with high expectations and not a few designs of his own, had gone sour. The radical nationalists in Baghdad turned against the local Nasserists and entered into close alliance with the communists. 38 At the same time Moscow praised General Abdel Karim Kassem, leader of the revolt as a truly democratic leader and otherwise downgraded Nasser's status. 39

Between December 23, 1958 and April 1959, Nasser countered the Soviet challenge by a major anti-communist campaign. 40 This clash ended in 1960, after Khrushchev realized that Kassem was restricting the activities of the Iraqi communist party.
and that Nasser's leadership in Egypt and in the Arab world remained strong. It was in this conciliatory light that the USSR signed the Aswan Dam Agreement in August 1960, and otherwise strengthened its relations with Nasser during the last three months of 1969.

As Nasser's policies toward Israel and Africa came into greater discord with those of the United States his rapprochement with the USSR increased. At home, in July 1961, Nasser's economic policies took a sharp turn to the left, with the nationalization of some 400 banks, factories and public utilities. By these and other measures Nasser convinced the Soviets that he was on the road to their brand of socialism. Moscow also expressed satisfaction when Egypt's National Charter of 1962 allocated 50 percent of the seats in parliament to workers and peasants. Trade relations between Egypt and the USSR also improved and 1962 became a record year for Soviet economic aid. Soviet TU-16 jet bombers and MIG fighters were supplied to the Egyptian air force and a great many official visits were exchanged.

In 1964, Khrushchev granted Egypt a new substantial loan and visited Cairo to show his approval of Nasser as the paramount leader in the Middle East and to demonstrate that Soviet persistence and patience had been vindicated.
Within a few weeks of Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964, the new Soviet leadership continued to court Nasser. A new military agreement was concluded in November 1964. In August 1965, Nasser went to Moscow, where he promised to support the USSR at the forthcoming Afro-Asian Conference, and was apprised of the Soviet side of its conflict with Red China.

At this point, Nasser was dependent upon Soviet arms and needed Soviet economic aid. For their part, the Soviets were interested in maintaining Nasser's leadership of the Arab world. Further, the Soviets also were interested in supporting Nasser's 3-year war against Yemen's royalists in support of a weak republican regime.

More important Nasser's position in the Arab world needed repair. For he had quarreled with Syria which had withdrawn from the UAR in 1961, and there was open conflict with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. Nasser's relations with the U.S. Government were beyond repair, and only Tito remained his great friend in the third world. Thus, the Soviet alliance was vital to Nasser's position.

The active role of the USSR in the Middle East in 1960s was not limited to Egypt. In October 1964, Soviet Marshal Grechko advised the Syrian defense minister that the USSR was ready to assist Syria materially and morally to defeat imperialism and its supporters. At that point, the flow...
of Soviet arms began, only to increase in 1965 after the left-wing Ba'ath returned to power following a bloody coup. In May of the same year, Soviet dam experts arrived in Damascus to begin an Aswan type project on the Euphrates. In addition the USSR agreed to extend and renovate Syria's railroad system. An oral agreement with the USSR had been signed in 1965, and in April 1966 a further Soviet offer was submitted to develop Syria's oil fields.

The overthrow of General Kassem in February 1963, was a major setback for Soviet plans for Iraq. Leading communists were tried and executed by the new Ba'ath government. The Soviet press denounced the terrorist methods of the new government and the Iraqi press attacked Soviet leaders.

A second coup in November 1963, brought in a regime of General Abdel Salom Arif, who sought improved relations with the USSR. His nationalization of Iraqi and foreign banks, and also certain major industrial enterprises met the approval of the Soviet Union. Soviet economic and military support flowed. However, following the death of President Arif, his brother became chief of state in April 1966. The USSR has continued its economic and military aid to the current regime. Soviet attempts to penetrate Jordan during the 1960s were largely resisted by King Hussein. Indeed during his visit to the USSR in September 1967, Hussein merely inspected Soviet military equipment and concluded a cultural agreement.
Finally during the 50s and 60s the USSR was feeling its way in the politics of the Persian Gulf. Its attitudes and comments were frequently contradictory. Soviet writers could not make up their minds whether the United States and Britain were bitter rivals there or whether they were working hand in glove. In any event during the 60s the USSR established diplomatic relations with Kuwait and the Gulf states. However, Soviet relations with Saudi Arabia were uniformly bad during this period.

By June 1967, the USSR had become a substantial Middle East power. It seized no military bases, but was offered the facilities it wanted by the governments of Egypt and Syria, Algeria and Yemen, of their own free will. Soviet influence spread as the result of loans, arms supplies, political assistance, support of the Arab countries against the West and Israel. What had begun as a limited Soviet "spoiling" operation against the U.S. backed Baghdad Pact was broadened in the years after the Suez War into a far reaching effort, first to root out U.S. influence from "progressive" Arab states (a category that tended to be synonymous with recipients of large supplies of Soviet weapons), and then to diminish U.S. influence in the area as a whole.

IV. THE EFFECT OF THE 1967 WAR ON THE SOVIETS POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The scope of Soviet policy in the Middle East was greatly enlarged after the June 1967 War between Israel and her Arab neighbors.
military influence (advisors, technicians, ground crews, and reportedly even pilots) replaced that of the UAR in Yemen after Nasser withdrew Egyptian forces from that country's civil war. With the creation of the People's Republic of South Yemen in November 1967 and Leftist Coups in the Sudan and Libya in 1969, the ranks of the "progressive" Arab states were greatly augmented, creating a still broader field for the growth of Soviet influence. However, while the Soviet Union's support was warmly welcomed in the new radical states, patron client ties were not yet firmly established as the 60s came to a close. The new rulers of Libya preferred to purchase French rather than Soviet weapons, and together with the Sudanese appeared to be aligning themselves directly with UAR foreign policy, evidently avoiding intimate policy consultations with the Russians. In the PRSY the People's Republic of China outflanked the Soviet Union on the left and appeared to have won patronage of the most radical political forces in the new republic. Even among the older "progressive" states, Soviet influence, while great, did not seem to give the USSR a high degree of control over clients' policies.

Moscow continued to extend aid to the Syrian regime, but modulated its praise for the Damascus rulers after the June War. The Syrians sought to gain leverage by making periodic gestures in the direction of Peking, which doubtless deepened still further Soviet uneasiness about Syrian reliability. Although the new Iraqi Baa'thist leaders received additional weapons and a growing share of Soviet economic aid after the July 1968 Baghdad coup, they continued to embarrass their Soviet sponsors by feuding publicly with the Syrian Baa'thists and indulging in wild excesses, including public executions, against political enemies at home.
Only with the UAR, which emerged from the June War more than ever the pivotal state for Moscow in the Middle East, did the USSR appear to have an intimate political relationship, but clearly not one in which Nasser was a mere satellite. Thus, while the number of left-leaning "progressive" Arab states grew substantially after the war and the radical Arabs' overall dependence on the Soviet Union for arms and political support increased even more, the USSR did not succeed in achieving a high degree of political control in any client state.71

Following the June 1967 War, Soviet arms shipments became of vital importance to the UAR, Syria and Iraq. The physical presence of Soviet military advisors and technicians in the UAR and Syria increased markedly.72 Elements of the Soviet fleet and air force units visited UAR and Syrian installations. In addition, Egyptian airfields and Soviet-supplied TU-16 (Badger) aircrafts were being used by the USSR for Soviet manned reconnaissance flights over the U.S. Sixth Fleet.73

In the spring of 1970 there was a dramatic increase in the Soviet on-site military presence in Egypt. Apparently implementing an agreement reached with Nasser during his unannounced visit to Moscow in January, the USSR began to emplace highly advanced SAM-3 surface-to-air missiles at key points in the Nile delta.74 By mid-year some 22 such sites were already in place, reportedly built and operated by Soviet crews.75 In mid-April, Israel charged that Soviet pilots were flying
"combat sorties" in the Nile delta region, Washington reports confirmed that Soviet pilots had taken to the air in Egyptian MIG-21's, evidently to protect the new SAM-3 installations.76

Finally, the Soviet Mediterranean naval force increased substantially in size and capability following the June 1967 War.77 The force grew to between 40 and 60 ships, dependent upon the season, including a helicopter carrier the MOSKVA.78 Elements of the Soviet navy also appeared in the Persian Gulf.79

In 1972, having achieved further strength in its position in the Middle East, the USSR was capable of further restricting U.S. influence in the Arab world and controlling U.S. access to Arab oil. Further, the USSR was approaching unchallenged predominance at the cross roads of the European, Asian and African continents.

The expanded Soviet role and presence in the Middle East also opened broader perspectives for the USSR with respect to the following related extra regional objectives:

1. Turning NATO's southern flank.

2. Creation of a base for future Soviet operations in East Africa.


However, because of the deep involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the USSR faced the risk of military confrontation with the U.S. whose support of Israel and naval presence in the Mediterranean challenged...
the Soviet presence in the Middle East. Such conflict ran counter to the spirit of "detente" which the Soviet Government was seeking to nurture in its relations with the U.S. and the West during this period.

V. THE SOVIET'S CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

On July 18, 1972, Egypt's President Sadat announced his decision to expel Soviet advisors, giving as reasons:

a) his disappointment with the type of weapons and the pace of arms deliveries by the USSR to Egypt

b) his disappointment with the outcome of Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in May 1972, insofar as the Middle East was concerned.

In his July 18 letter to the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, Sadat revealed that in April he had put forth three demands to the Soviets: (a) that there should be no limitations in the supply of arms to Egypt; (b) he could not tolerate the status of "no peace-no war" which was slowly draining Egypt's resources; and (c) Egypt would not accept any settlement based on territorial concessions to Israel.

With that the 15,000 Russian advisors, pilots and technicians who had been laboring to strengthen Egypt's war machine were sent home with little protest by the Soviets. However 1972 was not the year of unmitigated catastrophe. For well before Sadat's action, the Soviet Union had decided to diversify its investments in the Arab world. In April 1972, the Soviet Union and Iraq concluded a treaty of friendship, and thereafter entered into several other specific military and political agreements.
strengthening its ties with Iraq, the Kremlin gained a secure foothold on the Persian Gulf from which to make her naval presence felt — if necessary on a continuing bases.

Moreover, Iraq's geographical position has much to recommend it; it flanks Turkey and Iran, and borders on Syria, Jordan and the Arabian peninsula. It is also a springboard for the oil rich Persian Gulf area, including the various sheikdoms and emirates which possess a substantial part of the world's oil reserves.

Although Syria has been averse to signing a formal pact with the USSR, since 1972, Moscow and Damascus have drawn much closer together. In August and September 1972, the Soviet Union made major arms deliveries including SAM-3 missiles. The Russians may wish to use Syrian airfields to a greater extent than in the past and perhaps they also envisage construction of oil pipelines from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean — especially if their designs on Persian Gulf oil are as far reaching as many experts believe.

In sum, Iraq and Syria have now become the main pillars of Soviet power in the Middle East. For, when Sadat sent the USSR's air force packing, their Mediterranean fleet was deprived of important reconnaissance and support capabilities. In the process, its effectiveness vis-a-vis the more powerful U.S. Sixth Fleet has been reduced. The Soviet fleet has in fact used Syrian naval facilities and, if airfields could be secured in either country or both the military significance of the loss of the Egyptian bases would be measurably reduced. However, given the political volatility of Iraq and Syria, the Soviets have little assurance that those bases will be any more secure than those it lost in Egypt.
VII. THE PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY FOR THE REST OF THE 70s

The prospects for successful implementation of present Soviet policy in the Middle East do not appear bright. While making cautious attempts to establish itself in the Persian Gulf—a task complicated by the closing of the Suez Canal—and to maintain cordial relations with the "northern tier" countries (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan), Moscow still regards Egypt, Syria and Iraq as well as the eastern Mediterranean as its main area of operations. Its continuing reliance on Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, given the instability of Arab politics and the probable results of their October 1973 attack on Israel, can only spell future difficulties for both the USSR and others concerned with the affairs of the troubled Middle East.

While the USSR will maintain its position in the Middle East during the rest of the decade, it will not displace the U.S. as a potent factor in the Middle East. In view of the many rifts inside the Arab world and the fierce competition for patronage, the overall Soviet position seems fairly severe. But there is another factor—the UNITED STATES—which figures centrally in Soviet thinking and may in the end prove decisive. The U.S. Sixth Fleet will remain a potent deterrent force.

Further, continued American support for Israel, even to the point of defying the expressed wishes of both the Soviets and the Arabs, has had and will continue to have the paradoxical consequence of an improvement in relations between the U.S. and the Arab countries, and a weakening of the Soviet position. As Bernard Lewis has remarked.
The Egyptians have drawn their inference - that the Israelis have a good patron, while they themselves have had a bad one. Israel's patron is trustworthy and reliable and provides what the protege wants; Egypt's patron on the other hand has failed her in almost every respect, and left her significantly worse off than she was before . . .

So the USSR will continue its balancing act in the Middle East on many levels at once; helping its Arab clients rebuild their shattered war machines, supporting them in their attempts to regain territory lost to Israel, at the same time playing them off against each other and the U.S. with whom it also seeks detente and enhanced trade. 88

The sudden outbreak of armed conflict in the Middle East has again provided the USSR with an opportunity to strengthen its position politically and militarily in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East. At the same time, the importance of Israel as an American outpost on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean will bring U.S. power into continuing confrontations with the USSR and its Arab clients. Notwithstanding the threats of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya to cut off U.S. oil supplies, the U.S. must maintain its posture in the Middle East. Otherwise, the USSR will have ousted the U.S. from the Middle East, isolated Iran and Turkey, threatened Greece and secured the Persian Gulf. 39
FOOTNOTES

1. In modern usage dating from World War II, the term "Middle East" has come to be applied to the lands around the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, including Turkey and Greece, together with Iran and, more recently, the greater part of North Africa. Vol. XV Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 407.


3. Aaron S. Klieman, Soviet Russia and the Middle East, p. 38.


5. Ibid.


8. Whetten, p. 8; Laqueur, p. 8; Bernard Lewis, Russia in the Middle East -- Survival, Vol. 12, pp. 333-335.


12. Donovan, p. 2; Klieman, p. 10; Laqueur, p. 8.


15. Whetten, p. 13; Klieman, pp. 9-10; Laqueur, p. 9;


19. Laqueur, p. 9; Wlodzimierz Baczkowski, Soviet Policy in the Middle East, pp. 13-14; Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Goals and Policies in the Middle East, p. 4.

20. Laqueur, p. 9; Wolfe, p. 4; Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Target: The World -- Report of the Special Study Mission to the Middle East, South and Southwest Asia and the Western Pacific, pp. 203-213.

21. Laqueur, pp. 9-10; Wolfe, p. 4; Klieman, p. 35.


25. "Message from Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers to President Eisenhower", Pravda and Izvestia, 6 November 1956, p. 1; Messages to other Western leaders and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, Pravda and Izvestia, 6 November 1956, pp. 1-2.

26. Laqueur, p. 10; Baczkowski, p. 16; "Cable from President of Syria to Marshall Bulganin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers", Pravda, 9 November 1956, p. 3; "The Soviet Union is True Defender of Freedom and Independence of Peoples" -- Radio Address by Mohammed A. el-Kouni, Egyptian Ambassador to the USSR, Pravda, 15 November 1956, p. 4.

27. Becker and Horelick, p. 28; Whetten, p. 17.


32. Laqueur, p. 64.

33. Pravda and Izvestia, 1 May 1958, pp. 1-2; Pravda and Izvestia, 19 July 1958, p. 1; Pravda, 23 July 1958, p. 2; Izvestia, 23 July 1958, pp. 1-2; Laqueur, p. 64.

34. Laqueur, p. 65; Becker and Horelick, p. 26.


39. Laqueur, Id.

40. Laqueur, pp. 66-67; "First Summer in Aswan," S. Kondrashov, Izvestia, 6 July 1960, p. 3.


42. Fisher, pp. 722-723; Laqueur, p. 68.


44. Laqueur, p. 69; Fisher, pp. 717-719.

45. Laqueur, pp. 69-70.

46. J. C. Hurewitz, Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, pp. 24, 32; Laqueur, p. 70.


50. Pravda, 1 Sept. 1965, pp. 1-3; Laqueur, pp. 72-73.

51. Laqueur, p. 73; Fisher, pp. 716-718; Eugene M. Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Storm over the Arab World, p. 111.

52. Laqueur, Ibid.

53. Laqueur, p. 80.

54. Fisher and Bassiouni, p. 112-113; Laqueur, p. 81.


57. Laqueur, p. 85; S. N. Fisher, pp. 626-627.


60. S. N. Fisher, pp. 628-629.


63. Laqueur, p. 91.

64. Laqueur, p. 93.

65. Laqueur, p. 94.

66. Laqueur, p. 95.


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28. Izvestia, 2 May 1966, p. 3.


31. Izvestia, 19 July 1958, p. 1


34. Izvestia, 1 May 1966 p. 5.


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41. Kondrashov, S. "Franternal Arab Solidarity." Izvestia (Moscow), 1 August 1958, p. 3
42. Kondrashov, S. "Outline of a New State." Izvestia (Moscow), 7 February 1958, p. 3.
48. Messages from Bulganin to Other Western Leaders and Ben-Gurion Pravda and Izvestia 6 Nov. 1956, pp. 1-2.
49. Message from Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers to Pres. Eisenhower, Pravda and Izvestia 6 Nov 1956, p. 1


70. "Statement By USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs" Pravda 17 Apr 1955, p. 3.


