ON QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

by
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The theme of the "quality of life" has become a focal point in recent public discussions of social policy issues.* One hears much talk of "the growing political necessity in industrialized societies to offer policies that go far beyond the "welfare state" and deal with "the quality of life"."** In line with such ideas, the quality of life is to provide an ultimate and global yardstick for the evaluation of social programs and policies. But, as one recent writer has very aptly put it:

The phrase "quality of life" has almost supplanted the older words "happiness" and "welfare" in contemporary discussions of policy in the urban and domestic areas. The phrase does have a fine ring to it and is somewhat less maudlin than "happiness" and somewhat less shop-worn than "welfare." However there is some question whether the brave new phrase is any less vague.***

In this case, as so often, clarification of the concept is a virtually essential preliminary to any meaningful application of it. No doubt, the most effective way to grapple

*The phrase entered upon its present, meteoric career during the 1964 Presidential Campaign: "These goals cannot be measured by the size of our bank balances. They can only be measured in the quality of the lives that our people lead." (Remarks of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Madison Square Garden, October 31, 1964.)


with this issue of just what "the quality of life" is consists in elucidating those specific factors whose presence or absence (presumably to a varying extent) could appropriately be regarded as coming upon the stage of discussion when questions of a higher or lesser quality of life are mooted.

The "quality of life" has two basic dimensions: the *aristic* and the *hedonic*. The former—as the overtones of the very word *quality* immediately suggest—relates to excellence. The second relates to satisfactions in general and, in particular, to happiness. For in the evaluation of a mode or pattern of life two issues immediately come to the fore: its merits as these are to be assessed by others, and its satisfactions as these are experienced by the subject himself.

For the sake of simplicity one might well coalesce all of the felt satisfactions of life under the rubric of happiness. But it must be stressed that this is actually an over-simplification. It is perfectly possible for people to take satisfaction (quite legitimately) in actions or occurrences which—like Kantian works of duty—do not promote their "happiness" in any ordinary sense of that term. However, assuming that this simplifying assumption may for present purposes be postulated, we may simply class the factors that augment the quality of life into two groups:

*From the Greek: *aristos* = the best or most excellent; *hedone* = pleasure or happiness.
the excellence-conducive and the happiness-conducive. Correspondingly, in contemplating the quality of life one operates with an essentially two-factor criterion.

One immediate implication of these rudimentary considerations is that the quality of life is not to be assessed in terms of happiness alone. And this suggested consequence seems manifestly correct. It is perfectly conceivable that one individual's state of personal happiness could be higher than another's, notwithstanding the former's lack of education, disinterest in the products of culture and the arts, and disregard of the rights and interests of his fellows (other things being relatively equal). But it would not allow from this hypothesis that the happiness-excelling individual is thereby superior in "quality of life." (We come back to the cutting edge of J. S. Mill's *obiter dictum*—"better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.")

It is not necessary for our present purposes to probe more deeply into the factors that relate to excellence in quality of life. The few obvious examples adduced above—education, culture, and solicitude for one's fellows—suffice to indicate the kind of thing at issue here. But it does seem important to make one further point in this connection. The idea of "self-improvement" is a thoroughly familiar tool in our army of everyday working concepts. The aristically oriented notion
that there are some things that make us better people is on all fours with the hedonically oriented notion that there are some things that make us happier people. And from the standpoint of individual or social psychology the former concept is no more inherently intractable than the latter. What is involved in the one is just as disputable as what is involved in the other. Thus if the matter of happiness is to be introduced within the pale of serious inquiry, then surely the idea of excellence as it figures in quality of life is not to be dismissed as beyond the area of possible investigation, "unscientific," and merely a matter of subjective taste.

Letting these brief remarks suffice as regards the excellence-oriented aspect of the "quality of life," we now turn to its happiness-oriented aspects.

At least three separate issues must be distinguished in any cogent discussion of the happiness of people:

1. **Consensus happiness requisites:** what people-in-general regard as the essential requisites for a happy life.

2. **Idiosyncratic happiness factors:** a person's own perception of "what he needs" for happiness, and his appraisal of the extent to which he possesses these resources.

3. **Hedonic mood:** the psychological feeling-tone (of a potentially ephemeral character) of "being happy."
The first of these items—the generally recognized happiness requisites—relate to what might be called the interpersonal sector. The list of items that presumably could figure prominently in this sphere of consensus would include such factors as biologico-medical well-being, possession of assets* and access to services, the quality of the environment (physical, social, and even political), status-recognition-esteem, satisfaction of work-life, freedom to pursue one's interests, availability of leisure, and the like. We have here to do with what by general agreement people of a given group by and large need to achieve happiness in the environment (physical and social) in which they operate. What these factors are which a given group views as comprising the essential requisites for happiness is not a matter for speculative punditry but is a reasonably straightforward matter for empirical—and specifically sociological—inquiry. And this, of course, holds not only for the items that are to figure on the list, but also for determining their relative weights, what sorts of tradeoffs there are among them, and the like.

*No doubt the old saw "You can't buy happiness" is correct as far as it goes, but what we certainly can buy are changes in one's pattern of life that in one's considered judgement will conduce positively to one's state of happiness. In particular it might be worthwhile to contemplate reactions to some hypothetical scenarios, especially those of an accession-of-assets type. ("If you were unexpectedly to inherit $1,000 [10,000; 100,000] what would you do with it?" And then one should go on to consider the reasons why this particular mode of investment is selected and into the character of its envisaged satisfactions.)
The items of our second category—the idiosyncratic happiness factors—are a matter of an individual's own personal view of his needs and aspirations. Here we enter the strictly personal sector and have to do with the individual's idiosyncratic perception of his own happiness-related needs, an area to be explored by asking people what they need for happiness, and not what they think that people-in-general need for happiness. In this context we get back to the old Epicurean proportion:

\[
\text{degree of satisfaction} = \frac{\text{attainment}}{\text{expectation}}
\]

The man whose personal vision of happiness calls for yachts and polo ponies will be malcontent in circumstances many of us would regard as idyllic. As the proportion implies, when increased expectations outstrip attainments—even significantly growing attainments—the net result is a decrease in satisfaction. An important lesson lurks in this finding, viz., that the idiosyncratic happiness of its members is of itself a poor measure of the attainments of a society in the area of social welfare.

Hedonic mood, the third item of our list, is of a quite different order from the preceding two. Though once again in the personal sector, we here confront something that is simply a matter of feeling, without overt reference to any intellectual apprehension of needs or desires. What is now at issue is merely a person's psychological feeling-tone in point of happiness, his transient state of relative
euphoria or dysphoria, of "glowing with satisfaction" or "smoldering with discontent" over the present condition of his life and lot. It is with just this sense of happiness in view, that someone would ask a date "Are you happy?"—a disquisition on the perceived quality of life is not the reply sought for. What is now at issue is a (presumably relatively short-term) psychological condition—one that may well be induceable by drugs, alcohol, etc.* The difference between happiness as a transient mood and as an ongoing state of things is nicely brought out in a passage from Michael Harrington's classic study of poverty:

Harlem eats, drinks, and dances differently than white America. It looks happier, and sometimes it might be happier, but, as everything else about the ghetto, being poor has a lot to do with it .... You will find faces that are often happy but always, even at the moment of bursting joy, haunted. That is what racism has done.**

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*But in most contexts the question "Are you happy?" does not relate to the instantaneous mood of the subject but is raised in a broader temporal context that has reference both to retrospective and to prospective considerations. In this regard "I am now happy" is very much like "I am now driving from New York to Los Angeles." Neither relates just to the condition-of-things-at-the-given-moment.

Having been careful to distinguish these three happiness-related considerations, it is only right to recognize that they are in fact interrelated. It is because of their prominent place among the personal (yet not thereby idiosyncratic) happiness factors of virtually all—and literally all "normal"—people, that the consensus happiness requisites are as they are. And it is because realization of a person's idiosyncratic happiness requirements is conducive to his attainment of a positive hedonic mood and in a systematic way facilitates its realization—or at any rate are presumed by him to do so—that the idiosyncratic happiness requisites are as they are. Thus to insist that these factors are significantly distinct is not to deny that they are interrelated, nor to deny that the factor of hedonic mood is—in the final analysis—the ultimately fundamental element within this range.

Of course, recognition of the fundamentality of hedonic mood is not to claim for it the status of an immediate and primary goal. In this context, the testimony of J. S. Mill is worth pondering:

I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have their
minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments of life (such was now my theory) are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing, when they are taken en passant, without being made a principal object. Once make them so, and they are immediately felt to be insufficient...

The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of life.*

Hedonic mood is the fundamental consideration—but in the last analysis and not necessarily the first (or second).

We have gone to such lengths in sorting out these three different issues involved in considering the happiness of people in order to be able to make one point, namely that the consensus happiness requisites are the only part of this happiness complex that is significantly in question in a consideration of the social policy aspects of the quality of life. Where the concept of quality of life is involved as a yardstick for the evaluation of social policies

and programs, one is certainly not concerned with the vagaries of idiosyncratic "needs"—and possibly very unrealistic—individual expectations. X's addiction to stamp collecting, Y's devotion to the recreations of the jet-set, and Z's longing for vast wealth are pretty much out of the picture. Again, the whole issue of hedonic mood and the matter of peoples transient condition of subjective euphoria or dysphoria is not at issue—or at any rate not in the first analysis (nor the second or third for that matter). Rather, the door through which considerations of happiness enter into the sphere of the quality of life as a social issue is provided by the first item of our list: the generally recognized requisites for happiness.

Any discussion of the abstract issue of the "quality of life" is going to be subject to severe tensions and stresses imposed by the inherent ambiguity of the term itself. Above all, these will be the (in many ways opposing) pull of the social indicators of the condition of an interpersonally defined, agreed or consensus quality of life and on the other hand the psychological measures of a subjective state of personal happiness. The salient fact for our present purposes is that it is the former, interpersonal and not the latter, idiosyncratic sector of the concept that is germane to the issue of the quality of life as a concept operative with respect to social programs and issues of public policy.
If this view—that the socio-politically relevant aspect of happiness relates primarily to its interpersonal rather than subjective aspect—is a correct one, then certain benign consequences follow. For then, insofar as the public policy aspect of the issue of personal happiness are concerned, the problem becomes significantly more tractable and amenable to resolution. The reason for this is that it is then feasible to put aside the vast plethora of individual difference and diversity, and focus upon the smaller and more orderly sector of needs, interests, requisites, and aspirations that are commonly recognized within the society and enjoy something of a universalistic status.

In dealing with the social policy aspects of the quality of life, it is obviously the lives of people in the aggregate that now concern us. Our attention is directed not at the atomistic or microscopic level of the quality of this or that individual life, but at the molar or macroscopic level of the climate of life in general. This aspect of the matter deserves exploration.

When considering the quality of life in a society, it is, of course, the individual who is basic, and it is the quality of individual lives that provides not only the starting point but also the ultimate terminus of the discussion. Given the pattern of life in Western societies, many individuals do—and all perhaps should—take occasional stock of themselves and their lives, and cast up some sort
of subjective personal account to assess the balance of the pluses and minuses of their present mode of life, balancing the sources of happiness, satisfaction and contentment against those of unhappiness, dissatisfaction, and discontent. This, of course, is not a matter of introspecting one's transient state of euphoria/dysphoria but of the rational assessment of reflection "in a cool hour" (as Joseph Butler puts it) regarding the nature, the extent, and the sources of one's satisfactions and their reverse. There is a long list of outstanding people who are on record as according with the view of Immanuel Kant who insisted in complete seriousness that he would under no circumstances be willing to live his life over again just as it was. Obviously a society in which many or most people would take this position upon taking due stock of the course of their lives is not one whose general quality of life has attained a satisfactory level.

Of course, to say that most thoughtful people take occasional stock of their lives is not to say that they invariably do so in a realistic and actionable manner. An interesting instance occurs in the autobiography of a well-known philosopher:

Averse to unmethodic ways of judging, it occurred to me that aid might be had by making a rough

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numerical valuation of the several ends in life which might be respectively better achieved, these by staying at home and those by emigrating; and that by adding up the numbers on each side, totals would be obtained which would yield more trustworthy ideas of the relative advantages than mere unaided contemplation.

Among my papers I find I have preserved the estimates then made. Here they are.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>England Advantages</th>
<th>New Zealand Advantages</th>
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<tr>
<td>10 Greater domestic comforts</td>
<td>20 More agreeable climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Larger choice of society</td>
<td>40 Better health</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Excitement in Literature</td>
<td>30 Less anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Science</td>
<td>35 More natural and therefore happier occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Art</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Intercourse with relations</td>
<td>30 Eventually more spare time</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Theatres</td>
<td>25 Ample provision for old age and better prospect for family</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Music</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Politics</td>
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<td>3 Accessibility of Continent</td>
<td>100 Marriage</td>
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<td>8 Literature</td>
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<td>110</td>
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<td>6 Music</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4 Politics</td>
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<td>301</td>
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Having made this careful assessment of the probable relative sources of happiness, the young writer immediately resolved to remain in England.
It is a rather immediate consequence of the preceding considerations that the criteria of satisfactions that an individual deploys in the rational assessment of his condition in point of happiness involve reference to two sorts of factors: those which are idiosyncratic to himself, and those which represent the consensus of his environing group. Now the items that represent such consensus happiness requisites—health, wealth, services, leisure, etc.—comprise the yardstick by which a broader than personal accounting of the climate of life becomes possible. The coalescing of these factors generates a social dimension of the quality of life. It is only because the quality of life has this social dimension, which we have signalized as the climate of life, that a reference to the quality of life becomes a workable yardstick for the evaluation of social policies and programs.

If each individual were an atomistically separate unit, a Leibnizian monad, world unto himself so far as the grounds of his satisfactions (contentment, happiness) were concerned, the design of socially workable measures for the evaluation of programs and policies would be a task of nearly hopeless complexity. The workability of social accounting—of reckoning up the extent to which the climate of life is enhanced or lowered under specific circumstances—is due to the fact that man lives a substantially generic and not effectively atomistic life, and is in the final analysis
underwritten by the regularities imposed by man's medico-biological makeup and the uniformities imposed by social conditioning. Such uniformities conspire to carve out a significant area for the domain of consensus happiness requisites.

The situation regarding the sphere of socio-political concern with the happiness of people is in some ways akin to that of such concern for health. It is not possible in the present dispensation of things in this world for society to make people healthy—as long as ageing, accident, disease, and just plain human carelessness make biomedical malfunction an unavoidable aspect of human life, and even the wealth of Croesus can at best help to postpone the inevitable physical dissolution that is an integral part of the human condition. What a society of course can do is to provide for its membership certain resources that facilitate the maintenance of a condition of good health on the part of individuals: access to medical care, availability of medical facilities, public health measures, health-care education, and the like. A society cannot make people healthy, but it can bring to realization certain resources conducive to the promotion of their individual health.

Exactly the same is true of happiness. It would not be sensible to regard it as the job of society—though the instrumentalities forged by the political order—to do that in principle impossible thing of making people happy. But
it is feasible—and in an affluent society not unreasonable—to expect society to forge those instrumentalities and to create those opportunities through which the achievement by individuals of the general happiness requisites is realized and the pursuit of their idiosyncratic happiness requisites is facilitated. The key terms of this contention are "facilitation" and the "creation of opportunities." It is not for the society to make each of its members, nappy but to facilitate the pursuit of happiness of people—in general and to afford them opportunities for this pursuit. The means to happiness may lie in Caesar's gift (think of panem et circenses), but the gift of happiness itself lies with the gods alone.

At this point our medical analogy breaks down. The health of people is interlinked by invisible threads. The man who endangers his own health can in many ways endanger that of others. Thus proper care of public health provides a warrant of justification for introducing the element of compulsion into this sphere—society can justifiably "force" people into measures conducive to the maintenance of their own health because that of others is involved. The responsibility for at least some major aspects of an individual's health is thus seen as lying, not in the hands of the individual himself, but directly with the society in general. But this is certainly not true as regards happiness. In point of happiness, it is the individual himself who, for
better or worse, must bear the entire direct responsibility for his own fate. A world in which the responsibility for individual happiness lay with the state directly—and not merely indirectly, within the confines of the creation of incentives, the opening up of opportunities, the facilitation of individual efforts, and the like—such a condition of things would be not a Utopia but a horror. (To accept this horror is to espouse the convenient but ultimately poisonous policy of exalting ends above means.)

It is a fundamental tenet of classical liberal-democratic thought that the responsibility of the state should not penetrate directly into the lives of people, but should at most affect their lives indirectly, by shaping to the general interest the environment (be it political, social, economic, bio-medical, aesthetic, etc.) in which people live. Correspondingly the state should concern itself with the life a person leads only insofar as this is necessary for the socially beneficial control of the conditions under which its people live. Obviously, extremely difficult borderline problems will inevitably arise. But this is not the place to pursue further these fundamental issues of political philosophy. The point important for present purposes is that one cannot move

*To say this is not, of course, to deny that society can act *in loco parentis* with respect to a minor or to safeguard—not only his health, but—his ultimate chances in "the pursuit of happiness."
from the area of general happiness requisites as such to the special province of those among them that are relevant from the angle of public policy considerations without at least some overt and explicit explanation of the boundaries of the socially actionable.

In this connection, it is necessary to take a closer look at the range of consensus happiness requisites. It may safely be assumed that a relatively comprehensive list would look somewhat as follows:

**SAMPLE LISTING OF CONSENSUS HAPPINESS REQUISITES**

I. **Basic Aspects of Personal Well Being**
   1. Health
   2. Wealth/Prosperity
   3. Security/Contentment
   4. Self Esteem/Self Respect
   5. Self Development/Education
   6. Status/Success

II. **Satisfactions Deriving from Interpersonal Relations**
   (a) **Based on Reciprocity**
      7. Family Relationships
      8. Love/Affection
      9. Sexual Fulfillment
     10. Friendship/Congeniality
   
   (b) **Self-Oriented**
      11. Self-Expression
      12. Leisure
      13. Activity/Exercise/Recreation/Fun
   
   (c) **Other Oriented**
      14. Social Acceptance by others/Social Equality
      15. Social Concern for Others
      16. Positive Impact upon Others
III. Satisfactions Deriving from Characteristics of the Environment

17. Freedom
18. Equality
19. Privacy
20. Pleasing or Aesthetic Surroundings

Now it is reasonably on the very surface of it that only a few of these items are and that it is plausible to impute responsibility for them (wholly or in substantial part) to the Society through its political instrumentality, the State. Health, prosperity, freedom in social modus operandi, and availability of leisure, are examples of factors with respect to whose attainment it can plausibly be argued that state action should facilitate individual effort. But status, love and friendship, self-esteem, family life—in sum, pretty much the whole gamut of interpersonal social interrelationships—are centrally important happiness-conditioning areas into which the democratic tradition is justifiably reluctant to see the long grey arm of the state intrude itself. No doubt, these items also qualify as consensus happiness requisites, but they belong to the personal rather than social welfare sector of this area.

Thus an abbreviation of the preceding list to those consensus happiness requisites that are socially actionable would result in something like the following list:
SOCIALLY ACTIONABLE CONSENSUS
HAPPINESS REQUISITES

1. health
2. property and economic well being
3. personal status/security
4. personal development/education and training
5. personal freedom and individual opportunity
6. political freedom and good government
7. equality
8. leisure
9. privacy
10. pleasing or aesthetic surroundings

This consideration enables us to advance the discussion by one more step, namely to the conclusion that those consensus happiness requisites that are socially actionable and thus belong to the social welfare sector—are the only ones significantly in question in a consideration of the public policy aspects of the quality of life. Thus when the topic of the "climate of life" or of the "public welfare" is at issue, happiness enters on the stage only very indirectly—namely through the existence of a domain of consensus happiness requisites following within the sphere of legitimate action on the part of the society acting through the agency of the state. The limited sector of the quality of life area which we have now isolated is coextensive with the domain of social indicators—i.e. measures of how well the society is doing in regard to promoting the realization of those specific concerns happiness requisites that are socially actionable.

*It is this that we have in mind in speaking about the socially actionable, and not "political feasibility" in the face of the constellation of the political forces of the moment.*
The starting-point for most recent discussions of social indicators is the list of factors that figured in the report of the presidential Committee on National Goals in the Eisenhower administration. The Commission on National Goals was a nonpartisan group appointed by the president to develop a set of goals for vital areas of our national life. The 11 members of the Commission—supported by private funds, and having no direct connection with the federal government—used the contributions of over 100 leading authorities and specialists in defining the final goals. The objective of report on goals was to stimulate a continuing discussion and debate among Americans concerned with the quality of life in the nation.

The eleven areas of domestic affairs with respect to which specific goals were developed are:

(A) **Status of the Individual:** enhancing personal dignity, promoting maximum development of capabilities, widening the opportunities of individual choice.

(B) **Individual Equality:** eliminating discrimination on grounds of race, sex, religion, etc.

(C) **Democratic Progress**: improving the quality of public administration at all levels, increasing the collaboration and sharing of power among the various levels of government, improving the professionalism of state legislatures and local bodies.

(D) **Education**: extending the quantity and improving the quality of education at all levels.

(E) **Arts and Sciences**: Extending the frontiers of theoretical and applied knowledge, Cultivation of the arts.

(F) **Democratic Economy**: Maintenance of competition and economic decentralization.

(G) **Economic Growth**: increasing both the quantity and quality of growth, including capital investment in the public sector, maintaining full employment and improving the standard of living. Fostering of productive invocation. Providing education for a more capable and flexible work force.

(H) **Technological Change**: Increasing the application of new technologies while guarding the economic security of the work force.
(I) **Agriculture:** Improving the well being of the agricultural sector of our economy.

(J) **Living Conditions:** Reversing the "decay" of the cities. Assuring the orderly growth of urban complexes and the availability of environmental amenities.

(K) **Health and Welfare:** Improving the quality and quantity of medical and welfare services. Reducing juvenile delinquency and family breakdown.

It is worthwhile to compare the factors with those of the official document *Toward a Social Report*, prepared under the direction of Mancour Olsen, and issued by the U. S. Department of Health Education and Welfare in 1966. The categories there at issue are:

I. Health

II. Social Mobility
   (1) Economic Opportunity
   (2) Educational Opportunity

III. Physical Environment

IV. Income and Poverty

V. Public Order and Safety (i.e. physical security)

VI. Learning in Science and Art
VII. Participation and Alienation

(1) Freedom
(2) Equality and Justice
(3) Family Status
(4) Social Integration/Alienation

This listing can without much difficulty be correlated with the preceding:

I = [K]  (Note: Brackets mean "in part")
II(1) = [G] + [A] + [H] + [I]
II(2) = [D] + [A]
III = [J]
IV = [G]
V = [J]
VI = E
VII (1) = [A] + [F]
VII (2) = [B] + [C]
VII (3) = [A]
VII (4) = [A] + [B] + [D]

By compiling these two lists, we can obtain the following listing as a first approximation to a set of "social indicators" indicative of the quality, or rather of the climate of life in a given social setting:
SOCIAL INDICATORS

(1) Public Health
(2) Public Welfare
(3) Status of the Person
   a. "Dignity" of the Individual (cf. 8)
   b. The standard of living (cf. 6)
   b. Economic Opportunity (cf. 6)
   c. Educational Opportunity (cf. 4)
   d. Social Mobility (cf. 8)
   e. Physical Security of Person and Property (cf. 8)
   f. Opportunity for Political Expression (cf. 9)

(4) Education
(5) Intellectual and Cultural Environment
   a. Progress in Science and Technology
   b. Cultivation of the Arts
   c. Cultivation of Humanistic Study and Research.

(6) Economic Environment
   a. Economic Productivity of Goods and Services
   b. Economic Innovation and Growth
   c. Economic Justice in Distribution (cf. 2 and 3b)

*Note that this factor comes into the picture only through the environmental factors considered below.*
d. Economic Democracy and Diversity

(7) Physical Environment
   a. Man-Made Environment (Housing, Streets, etc.)
   b. Natural Environment (Parks, Roads, etc.)
   c. The Aesthetus Dimension

(8) Social Environment
   b. Social Integration
   c. Social Mobility
   d. Public Order and Public Safety

(9) Political Environment
   a. Individual Rights and Freedoms and Legal Justice
   b. Democratic Process

It is clear that these nine categories of social indications are readily aligned with the previously given list of some of the principal socially actionable general happiness requisites:

1. health: (1)
2. prosperity and economic well being: (3) and (6)
3. personal status/security: (3) and (6)
4. personal development/education and training: (4) and (5)
5. personal freedom and individual opportunity: (3)
6. political freedom and good government: (9)
7. equality: (8)
8. leisure: (6)
9. privacy: (8)
10. pleasing or aesthetic surroundings: (7)

Thus even a cursory analysis shows how the area of social indicators blends into the region of the socially actionable quality-of-life factors with which our present deliberations have been primarily concerned. These two issues, viz. social indicators on the one hand and the socially actionable quality of life factors upon the other, are simply obverse sides of one and the same coin.

There remains one large and important open issue. If the "climate of life" or "the public welfare" is to be assessed in terms of the availability of the requisites of happiness insofar as this can appropriately be promoted by social action, then a potential gap remains open between the public welfare and personal happiness. The prospect remains that a society in which many or most achieve what people-in-general regard as the basic requisites of happiness may yet fail to be by and large happy. From the present standpoint, it is entirely possible (if unlikely) that one could improve the quality of life of people without in fact making them any happier. (The climate and quality of life are amenable to "social engineering"
tactics which cannot as easily lay hands to the idiosyncratic issue of personal happiness.) This distressing prospect merits closer consideration. But this is a theme we cannot pursue in the confines of the present paper.