THE DEMAND FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION --
A STUDY OF MEDICAL SCHOOL APPLICANT BEHAVIOR

Frank A. Sloan

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The RAND Corporation, New York, New York

Studies of physician manpower have centered around the question of physician shortages.** The authors have raised an important issue, but their analysis does not develop a useful basis for policy prescriptions. This research would be an aid to the policy-maker if estimates of the marginal social rate of return on medical education instead of private returns had been obtained. If this social rate were high relative to other investment opportunities, expanding medical school enrollments would, of course, be an attractive policy.

Although an estimate of this social rate would be relevant to the government decision-maker, it seems inadvisable to attempt to do so at this time. Social rates, derived from private rates of return by enlarging the cost stream to include education costs which are not borne by the student, may be very inaccurate.

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the view of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

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** See Friedman and Kuznets [8], Hansen [10], and Rayack [13].
Because of consumer ignorance and externalities in the production and consumption of medical services, physician income is a poor measure of society's returns from medical education. * Optimization techniques may be used to obtain a more accurate approximation of the physician's shadow price. However, such a study would necessarily be an analysis of the entire health delivery system in which physicians are a factor of production. A considerable amount of behavioral research on the economics of health delivery should precede an undertaking of this size and complexity.

If no technical basis for determining the optimal size of the medical education system presently exists, it is probably best to leave this matter to the government decision-maker and medical school administrator who are responsive to political pressures and have a greater familiarity with the institutional framework. In the paper it is assumed that desired enrollment levels will be ascertained by the public policy decision-maker and medical educator. The formulation, considered here, may be used by the decision-maker in planning school enrollments, once he has determined the desired enrollment level.

In Section I, salient institutional features of the medical education system are reviewed. The market for medical education is placed in a supply and demand framework. In Section II, a model of student demand for medical education is presented. Comments on the form of the model and associated econometric problems are found in Section III. Sections IV and V contain the empirical results. A summary of results and a discussion of the policy implications which follow from the analysis are found in Section VI.

I. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

As Figure 1 indicates, there are two ports of entry into the medical profession, the domestic and the foreign medical school. Historically, the vast majority of practicing physicians have entered by the former route. The following characteristics distinguish this occupation from others which also require a sizeable human capital investment. B, the number of applicants, greatly exceeds C, the number of acceptances; B/C has varied at about 1.9 over the period 1926 to 1966, the years for which data are available. Virtually all who are accepted, enter as freshmen. D-E, attrition, and G, physician imports, have increased considerably since World War II. In medicine, graduation from medical school is tantamount to licensure.

The number of applicants to medical schools is the quantity of medical education demanded in the demand model which is presented below. The acceptance variable may be considered a measure of the quantity of medical education supplied by domestic medical schools. We exclude the supply side in this article. This does not mean that demand is more interesting, but rather our emphasis on demand is a reflection of the paucity of data on determinants of supply.**

A prominent characteristic of the medical education market is that excess demand for education is regarded as a situation which all parties expect to persist. Since physician supply is largely determined by the number of available "slots" in medical schools, one may question why demand merits attention, aside from the empirical evidence on occupational choice which the analysis produces. Demand has policy relevance because medical schools

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*If immigration and licensure regulations were eased, a considerable number of foreign physicians would probably immigrate to the United States. There is a substantial difference between physicians' earnings in the United States and in other countries. See Scitovsky [16].

**Supply is discussed elsewhere. See Sloan [17].
Figure 1

PROCESS OF ENTRY INTO MEDICINE

College Pool → Applicants → Acceptances → Entering Freshmen
A         B         C         D

Domestic
Additions
to
Medicine
G

↓

Additions
Physician
to
Imports
H

F

Graduates
E
base plans for expansion in part on forecasts of the applicant pool from which they select their students. Large numbers of applicants allow them to select students who are likely to succeed in medical school and subsequently in practice.

Medical school administrators want to be assured of ample numbers of "qualified" applicants for two reasons. First, they may be characterized as a quality-conscious group. There is a presumption that good college students are successful in medical school and become good doctors. Considerable evidence supports the association of college with medical school success. However, the nexus between performance in medical school and in medical practice, although presumed to exist, has not been demonstrated. Second, low-quality students are likely to drop out of medical school. Medical educators view keeping attrition rates at low levels as a high priority policy.

The medical school largely depends on foundation and government support rather than tuition as its primary sources of funds. The institution must base its case to these groups on the basis of high returns, relative to costs to society of investments in medical education. Dropouts in effect represent total leakages since non-graduates cannot practice medicine and with very few exceptions, medical school training cannot be applied in other occupational pursuits. If attrition rates are high, medical educators reason that capital will flow elsewhere.

In short, the government policy-maker may affect the size of the medical education system through measures which increase the number of applicants. Congress sensed this interrelationship in recent legislation which provides incentives for medical and other health manpower institutions to expand. In addition to grants to these schools for the construction and improvement of existing teaching facilities, the law includes low-interest rate loans to

*Peterson, et al. [12] found that the better medical student performs at a higher level for a few years after entering practice, but this relationship disappears after a few years in practice.
medical students.* It is not clear that the demand route is the most efficient method for increasing medical education production levels. It is one of several policy alternatives. A prerequisite for an evaluation of these is further research on the supply side.

*These provisions are contained in PL 88-129 and PL 89-290.
II, DEMAND FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION - THE MODEL

Applicants - The Dependent Variable. The number of applicants to medical schools in a given year represents the quantity of medical education demanded. The series includes both filled orders, applicants who are accepted as well as unfilled, the refused applicants. Cancelled orders, those students who decide against medicine because of entry limitations, are not contained in this series, but are considered below.* There is evidence that in high applicant years, the number of "qualified" applicants is also high.

In addition to the total applicant variable, a series which includes only "A" college record applicants is tested. There is a close, negative relationship between the percentage of the freshman medical school class which enters with an "A" college average and the percentage of the class which fails to graduate in four years. Given this information, it is interesting to test whether these "A" students respond to the same stimuli as total applicants. Are these students less likely to be influenced by earnings than poorer college performers? Although applicants are not disaggregated on the basis of college grades, entering medical school classes are. If it is assumed that all "A" students are accepted and attend, the entering class may be used as an applicant series.**

With two exceptions the explanatory variables represent direct education costs, income in medicine, and opportunity costs.

*This series is to be distinguished from the number of applications to medical schools which is also available. Applicants are superior to applications for purposes of demand analysis because the latter variable embodies the decision to enter medicine as well as a strategy to gain admission to the educational institution itself. This model is formulated to produce information about the former issue. Students who are interested in gaining admission to medical school now apply to more schools than once was the case. The applicant and acceptance data are compiled by the American Association of Medical Colleges. The series is published annually in the Journal of Medical Education.

**The assumption appears to be a reasonable one. Almost
which are incomes in occupations which are important alternative careers.

**Male College Graduates.** Some measure of the pool of potential applicants is required as the number of student decision-makers for whom choice of medicine is both marginal and non-marginal varies over time. Even though male college graduates is an imperfect representation of the pool since the A.B. degree has not been an admission prerequisite, it is the most suitable series available. This series and variants, such as the male population of age twenty-two, are utilized by medical educators to forecast applicants.*

**Price.** Price represents the direct cost of medical education. The series is tuition and fees in the year the applicant, if accepted, begins his professional education. Stipends awarded to medical students are subtracted from the tuition and fees series.** A proportion of the stipends, available to veterans under the G.I. Bill of Rights, is also subtracted from tuition and fees. Prices for classes entering 1929-1930 through 1957-1958 are medians.

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*all accepted applicants enter as freshmen. In 1965, 96 per cent of the students, who were accepted, attended. And only 13 per cent o entering medical school freshmen had "A" college records. In no year does the percentage of "A" students in entering medical school classes exceed 40 per cent. It seems likely that virtually rejected students had less than "A" college records.**

*Including graduates separately as an independent variable in estimation is preferable to specifying it as a deflator for applicants. This latter procedure involves a multiplicative relationship between graduates and the independent variables. There is no reason to introduce this complexity here.


**Other components of costs, such as student expenses for room and board, are not included since these would be incurred irrespective of the occupation which the individual selects.
Thereafter, medians are no longer available, and means are constructed from medical college budget data. Judging from cases where there are overlapping observations, the two segments of our series appear to be comparable. Prices, deflated by the Consumer Price Index (1957-1959 = 100), and quantities demanded are plotted in Figure 2.*

Clearly one major difficulty associated with an aggregate price variable is that medical school prices are heterogeneous, and the midpoint of these prices is selected. This deficiency would render our tests meaningless if there were pronounced movements in the distribution of medical school prices which were largely concealed by the aggregate figure. One such deficiency would exist, for example, if places in low-tuition, public institutions grew at a faster rate than in the private, and tuition and fee levels increased substantially in the latter. This is occurring in the 1960's, and caution should be exercised in extending a model which includes an aggregate price term as more post 1960 data become available.

Price may be expected to have a substantial impact on the quantity of medical education demanded for two reasons. First, price affects expected net lifetime returns from medical education directly through its impact on the potential applicant's cost stream. Second, if, as is plausible, the cost of funds varies directly with the size of investment outlay, many students are expected to decide against a career in medicine when price is high.

Effective tuition in other fields is considered below. See Ph.D. Stipends.

With the exception of the G.I. Bill which has provided substantial funds to medical students, stipends to medical students have been low. As recently as 1962, the mean scholarship was $103. In the mid 1960's the mean has risen rapidly. The estimate for 1966 is $191. Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Volume 186, Number 7, p.666 and Volume 202, Number 8, p.197.

Basic source of price data: Education volumes of JAMA.

*All series in this study which are not expressed in physical units are deflated by the Consumer Price Index.
There is considerable evidence that capital markets for educational investments are very imperfect. Typically the student finances a portion of his education internally. Some also obtain funds from external sources, such as foundations or from banks. The supply of funds schedules which students face differ markedly among individuals. The shape and position of this schedule is largely dependent on family wealth which determines the amount which may be financed internally as well as student ability which is related to scholarship support. As supply of funds schedules are probably less than infinitely elastic throughout much of their range, a large number of students may favor small educational investments with low returns over larger ones with higher expected yields, even though the latter may be preferable on a private rate of return criterion.

Figure 3 depicts supply of funds schedules for three hypothetical individuals. As seen in this diagram, the schedule is likely to be discontinuous at points where a given source of funds is exhausted. The three ranges of a schedule such as S₂ may represent borrowing from internal funds, loans from medical societies and commercial banks, and "moonlighting", respectively. One would expect to observe substantial applicant-price elasticities around these discontinuities.*

Physician's Income in Independent Professional Practice. Although much has been said about the incentives of high incomes in medicine, there has been no research to determine the magnitude of the response to high earnings. In this model the impact of physician income on occupational choice is measured. The income information is derived from three sources. The method, used to derive the series, and problems of comparability are discussed in an appendix to

*Price may be considered to be predetermined endogenous. Prospective medical students take tuition and fees as given. If a medical school administrator observes that a price increase has a pronounced effect on applicants, he may resist pressures to increase tuition in the future. In any case, medical school tuition decisions precede applications.
this paper.

Certain types of market information are diffused to interested decision-makers with a lag. Prospective applicants may be aware of physician income levels, but only those of some past period. In a recent survey which investigates, among other topics, labor market information, Freeman finds that students' perceptions of current physician and dentist income levels substantially understate the actual. Students seem to have a much greater awareness of recent earnings developments in all other occupations included in the survey.* Perhaps, income information is more poorly transmitted in non-salaried fields. Or physicians, high earners as a group, and supplying a good which society regards as a merit want, fear redistributive measures, were actual incomes widely known. Unlike other independent variables which enter concurrently with the student's senior college year, this income variable corresponds to his second semester freshman-first semester sophomore year.

The following group of explanatory variables represent returns in alternative occupations. The menu of alternatives to medicine is long, but degrees of freedom considerations place a constraint on the number of occupations which may be included. If the tastes of the student who considers a career in medicine can be identified, the number of alternatives may be narrowed considerably. Some empirical evidence of student career preferences is provided by a survey of graduates of twenty-eight medical schools. On the basis of the survey, candidates for inclusion in the model are returns in scientific and engineering professions, law, business, and elementary and high school teaching.**

Forgone earnings are the major cost of a career choice. These opportunity costs might have been incorporated into a more

* See Freeman [7].
** See Schumacher [15].
inclusive price variable if (1) there were a single major alter-
native to medicine and (2) if the student treated direct and oppor-
tunity costs identically, as economic theory would suggest. Avail-
able evidence suggests that a large portion of opportunity costs 
are likely to be financed internally by foregone or postponed con-
sumption. Medical student consumption levels appear to be far 
below those of college graduates who are not in graduate school.*

The following variables are included.

**Starting Salaries of Male College Graduates in General Business.**
These salaries represent representative offers to college seniors 
for positions to be assumed on graduation. The variable measures 
disincentives to make further substantial formal investments in 
human capital. As business income is specified to correspond to 
the prospective student's freshman year in medical school, it can 
only have the impact of discouraging students who have already 
taken some pre-medical courses.**

**Ph.D. Stipends.** Stipends in fields leading to the Ph.D. degree 
have been large, at least relative to medicine. Although no time 
series data on scholarships are available, a longitudinal study 
of Ph.D.'s in the sciences does list sources of financial support 
for individuals who have received Ph.D.'s in selected years between 
1935 and 1960 by the year in which they received their degrees. 
As these data are published in percentages instead of absolute 
amounts, the proportion of support, derived from sources other 
than personal savings, husband, wife, father, mother, own earnings, 
loans, and other as a measure of stipends available in other fields

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* Based on a comparison of medical student consumption information in Altenderfer and West [3] and engineer's data in Dickey [5].

** Source: Frank Endicott, Trends in Employment of College and University Graduates in Business and Industry, published annually by Northwestern University.
is calculated. The proportion of support, derived from these sources, is subtracted from one. The resulting series is the percentage of a student's personal expenses in Ph.D. fields not covered by fellowships. The sign of the coefficient is expected to be positive.

Median Incomes of Ph.D.'s in the Biological Sciences. Because of similarities in the technologies of the two disciplines, one expects to observe a high cross-elasticity of demand between graduate education in biology and in medicine. Other scientific fields might have been selected, but incomes in other scientific professions move closely with biology, and therefore we would not be able to derive reliable estimates for several occupations in the sciences. The interpretation of our results may be affected by this tendency of incomes in the sciences to move together. Coefficient estimates incorporate the effects of a combination of fields and thus overstate the influence of earnings in biology on the quantity of medical education demanded.

Supply-Created Demand for Medical Education. We stated above that demand has an impact on supply. Clearly the interrelationship need not be unidirectional. Changes in the number of students accepted may cause shifts in the demand schedule. Shifts due to a change in the structure of medical education may be distinguished from those which may occur under the existing system.


**Biologist earnings data are published in bulletins of the National Science Foundation.
There is scattered evidence in the medical education literature that many students exclude medicine because their credentials indicate a near zero probability of acceptance, even if the excess demand for medical education gap narrowed considerably. These individuals might emerge as applicants if a number of medical school administrators' tastes changed from preferring to produce a Cadillac-type physician to a Volkswagen orientation, a policy which placed a greater emphasis on physician manpower quantity, probably at the cost of some quality, and if programs could be devised to reduce mediocre student dropouts. Because medical educators have, at least since the Flexner Report, which was published in 1910, maintained a Cadillac-orientation, it is not possible to test this proposition statistically.

One may, however, hypothesize that some students recognize that the probability of acceptance is greater in some years than in others. If it appears that the medical education system is reducing acceptances, some individuals may not apply and take courses which are relevant for other careers. And if there has been an expansion of enrollments, these students may become applicants. A comparison of turning points in the applicant and acceptance series suggests that supply shifts in t-1, measured by the number of students which medical schools accept, produce demand shifts in the same direction in t. Acceptance turning points, with the exception of the immediate post World War II period, when other factors dominated, always precede those in the applicant series by a year. Because lagged acceptances enters the model with an unexpected negative sign and is insignificant when the years 1947-1952 are included, the variable has been omitted in the final specification of the model. Although current evidence of the impact of supply is not strong, the relationships merit further investigation. Studies in the medical education literature, historical accounts of the medical education market in the 1930's, the turning points, and research on labor force participation which suggests a similar mechanism for the labor force as a whole are clues that the factor is operative. Once sufficient data to estimate a supply
of medical education function are available, it will be possible
to move from a single equation to a recursive description of this
market which incorporates the supply-demand interactions.
III. THE FORM OF THE DEMAND MODEL

Variants of the model in both static and dynamic form are presented in the following section. In the latter formulation it is assumed that an equilibrium level of demand is associated with values of the explanatory variables.

\[ \text{Applicants}_t = a + b \text{Graduates}_t + \text{Price}_t + \ldots + u_t \] (1)

One major reason for differences between actual and equilibrium demand is that student programs are not easily changed in many cases. For some individuals course of study changes would be relatively minor. They might, for example, attend summer school to take the chemistry course required for admission to medical school. Other students would require major curriculum adjustments.

It is assumed that a fixed proportion of the discrepancy between actual and equilibrium demand is made up in each year.

\[ \text{Applicants}_t - \text{Applicants}_{t-1} = k(\text{Applicants}_t - \text{Applicants}_{t-1}) \] (2)

Substituting (1) into (2) one obtains

\[ \text{Applicants}_t = (1-k)\text{Applicants}_{t-1} + k(b \text{Graduates}_t + c \text{Price}_t + \ldots) + ka + ku_t \] (3)

It is well-known that ordinary least squares yields inconsistent parameter estimates in situations where a lagged dependent variable is combined with an autocorrelated error term. Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is biased toward two, leading the unsuspecting analyst to the false conclusion, in many cases, that no serial correlation in the disturbance term exists.*

A method for deriving consistent parameter estimates, suggested by Wallis, has been applied to a few variants of the model.**

** See Wallis [18].
The procedure has not been applied generally in this study, and the results, using the Wallis procedure, are not reported and discussed here to conserve space. We have relied on ordinary least squares for two reasons. First, an emphasis on consistency seems misplaced in situations where there are fewer than twenty degrees of freedom. Second, in virtually all cases tried, the estimates of the parameter of the autoregressive scheme were not significantly different from zero.

Other sources of lags are also relevant. Lags, due to imperfect information, have been considered above. Expectation formation is also a factor. A widely-used formulation of the latter is an adaptive expectations model which may also be reduced for purposes of estimation to a structure with a lagged dependent variable. Implicit in our basic model is the assumption that the decision-maker expects the incentives to enter medicine to be the same in period $t + n$ as it is in period $t$. Preliminary experiments showed the results could be improved by adding the growth rate of biologist's income as an independent variable. It is plausible that student decision-makers place some emphasis on rates of change in income as well as levels in deriving earnings forecasts.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS - TOTAL APPLICANTS

Two features of the results which are contained in Tables 1 and 2 merit attention. First, the model accounts for most of the variation in medical education demand in the historical period. The variants of a basic model described above, may be used by the health manpower decision-maker to predict the quantity of medical education demanded in future years, given information on tuition and fees, scholarships in medicine and in alternative fields, the number of college graduates, and incomes in selected occupations. Second, our results indicate which policy instruments are the most effective means for inducing larger number of students to apply to medical school.

Predictive Ability

One major criterion for model evaluation is predictive power. \( R^2 \), corrected for degrees of freedom, is one indicator, but it is usually high in a time series context. A useful supplement especially if the series contains a strong non-trend element, is a plot of actual and estimated values of the dependent variable. Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate the models' ability to anticipate movements in the medical school applicant series. The plots and Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that autocorrelation is not serious in the majority of cases.

Parameter Estimates

Parameter estimates of the total applicant formulation are found in Tables 1 and 2. These structural estimates are evaluated in this section, and policies which might be instituted to affect the quantity of medical education demanded are suggested. Several variants are presented as multicollinearity is pronounced, and thus an important aspect of the results is the sensitivity of the Durbin-Watson statistics are not presented when two time periods are used to obtain the parameter estimates.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variant</th>
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<th>Graduates t (thousands)</th>
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<th>Physician Income t-3</th>
<th>Ph.D. Stipends t-l</th>
<th>Base Business Income t-l</th>
<th>Applicants t-l</th>
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<th>R²(C)</th>
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*The numbers below the coefficients are t-values. \( R^2(C) \) is \( R^2 \), corrected for degrees of freedom.

D.W. is the Durbin-Watson statistic.

*Significant at the 5 per cent level using a two-tail test.

\( ^b \) Significant at the 1 per cent level using a two-tail test.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variant</th>
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<td>-10.22a</td>
<td>0.73b</td>
<td>- 7.18</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.81</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>6578.85</td>
<td>28.52b</td>
<td>-12.41b</td>
<td>0.82b</td>
<td>- 7.87</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>-79.55a</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>11019.24</td>
<td>35.49b</td>
<td>-8.97b</td>
<td>1.18b</td>
<td>-3.14</td>
<td>-104.38a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>5845.66</td>
<td>21.81</td>
<td>-13.98b</td>
<td>0.67a</td>
<td>-5.04</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>-82.59a</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>10314.36</td>
<td>31.67</td>
<td>-10.00a</td>
<td>1.08a</td>
<td>-2.27</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>-103.92a</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>-1030.57</td>
<td>- 5.86</td>
<td>-2.61</td>
<td>1.33b</td>
<td>-2.54</td>
<td>-68.67a</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>0.89b</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
estimates under alternative modes of specification. Data limitations force us to derive parameter estimates from different time spans.

Male college graduates is essentially the type of variable which medical school administrators use to predict the number of applicants. In isolation it is a poor predictor. For the period 1948-1965, the simple correlation of graduates and applicants is 0.32. With price and physician income included, the partial correlation coefficient is 0.53 (Variant I, Table 2). When business and biologist income variables are added to these (Variant V, Table 2), the partial correlation is also 0.53. Graduates does account for the trend in medical education demand, but fails to explain the high level of demand in the late 1940's and the early 1950's as well as the peaks and troughs in the series since 1954. Referring to the parameter estimates which are significant at the 5 per cent level or better, it appears that from 20 to 50 applicants to medical schools are generated from 1,000 male college graduates.

The results indicate that price, the direct costs of medical education, have a pronounced impact on the quantity of education demanded. The variable is significant at the 5 per cent level or better in all but two variants. The significant coefficients indicate that each dollar reduction in price may be expected on the average to generate from six to fourteen applicants.

Reasons for a substantial applicant response to price have been suggested above. Not only does price affect the net expected earnings to be derived from an investment in a medical education, but it also may determine whether or not the student must seek external funds in an environment where capital rationing is widespread. The parameter estimate of price undoubtedly incorporates both factors. A combination of scholarships and low interest-rate loans are thus potentially effective policy instruments to stimulate applicant activity.

In the vast majority of cases, lagged physician income is
significant, at least at the 5 per cent level. As all variables, expressable in monetary units, physician income is in terms of constant (1957-1959 = 100) dollar per annum terms. The significant coefficient estimates indicate that per dollar increase in physician income, approximately 0.4 to 1.3 individuals are attracted to medicine. It is not surprising that physician income has a much smaller impact on medical education than price. Both affect net earnings. But the capital rationing consideration does not apply to income. And also changes in earnings which accrue toward the middle of the physician's career may be expected to have a small impact on student occupational decisions at almost any positive discount rate.

* Government subsidies to practicing physicians is the policy instrument associated with the physician income variable. Such a scheme will not be attractive to the government decision-maker for two reasons. First, subsidization of the rich may well violate distributional constraints. Second, the policy would be much more costly than a scholarship-loan program. The physician income are about one-tenth the size of the price parameters. Scholarships are for four years. The subsidies would have to cover the years in which the physician is active. The precise cost of an income payment program depends on whether it is possible to discriminate between physicians whose behavior may be potentially changed by the subsidy, and those whose behavior would not. That is, would those who applied after the program was instituted or would all physicians receive the subsidies? In either case, the scholarship-loan program dominates a subsidy scheme.

Stipends in the Ph.D.'s are significant in three of the

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* We have attempted to fit an inverted U shape distributed lag in physician income to the data by a polynomial interpolation technique. Instead of the desired inverted U shape, "saucer-shaped" and "saw-tooth" weight structures have been derived. It is likely that the poor results reflect inaccurate measurements of physician income in some years. On the polynomial interpolation technique, see Almon [1] and [2].
five variants reported in Table 1. Although it appears that scholar-
ships in other fields do have an impact on medical school appli-
cants, the magnitude of the effect may be overstated. The estimates
suggest that a 1 per cent reduction in the amount of a Ph.D. stu-
dent’s educational expenses which are not covered by fellowships
would lower the number of applicants to medical schools by over
a 1000. If the annual educational expenses in a Ph.D. program
are $4000, the parameter estimates imply that $40 (or slightly
more) would produce a 1000+ applicant reduction. The largest
price coefficient estimate (-13.98) implies an applicant response
which is about one-half as large.

None of the base business income coefficient estimates are
significant. However in all but one case, they do exceed their
standard errors. The parameter estimates are larger than those
for physician income, but are smaller than the price coefficients.
This behavior is expected as the returns from base business earnings
accrue earlier than those which are considered in the physician
income series. The coefficients are smaller than the price para-
meters because as suggested above, earnings foregone may have a
smaller impact on career decisions than direct costs, and busi-
ness may not be a popular career alternative to medicine for the
type of person who is likely to become a medical school applicant.
Most of the relevant career alternatives to medicine probably require
some formal education at the graduate level.

As seen in Table 2, the biologist income growth variable is
significant in all variants. The corresponding level variable is
not. These results may indicate that over the historical period,
extpectations of large gains in income in biology and related sci-
cific fields, such as chemistry, mathematics, and physics, diverted
large numbers of students from a career in medicine. Student fore-

---

* The amount exceeds $40 if a portion of this fellowship
increase is spent and annual expenses thus exceed $4000.

** And thus add to the corrected R^2.
casts were based on recent growth of earnings in these fields.

Figure 5 reveals a substantial improvement in the models' predictive ability with the inclusion of this earnings series, especially in the years, 1957-1962, when applicants declined. After Sputnik, Federal support of the sciences rose markedly. Government grants had a substantial impact on stipends to students in scientific fields as well as on incomes in these occupations. The rate of increase in scientists' earnings has fallen in recent years. At the same time, there have been a larger number of applicants to medical schools.

The biologist earning coefficients indicate that it is important to consider an inward shift in the demand for medical education schedule as one cost of public support of basic and applied science. If biologist earnings were increased 10 per cent from the 1966 level of $12,000, the coefficients of Variant V, Table 2 would predict a decrease of 1002 applicants to medical schools.

Table 3 summarizes estimates of the time path of the applicant response. Three variants indicate that a major portion of the impact of changes in the explanator variables occurs in the first year. The fourth entry shows a much slower response, but is derived from a variant which contains a sizable amount of multicollinearity and unreasonable parameter estimates for other variables in the model. Evidence on the time path is inconclusive.
TABLE 3

The Time Path of the Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Variant</th>
<th>1-k</th>
<th>Per Cent Disequilibrium Gap Closed After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>One Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>IX</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS - "A" COLLEGE RECORD APPLICANTS

Table 4 and Figure 6 contain empirical results of equations with applicants with "A" college records as the dependent variable. As Figure 6 demonstrates, there has been a secular decline in the number of students with "A" college records entering freshman medical school classes. As mentioned above, it is assumed in this study that the number entering is a close approximation to the number who apply. Our inability to measure "A" applicants directly may account for the somewhat poorer results in regressions with this series as the dependent variable.

Both Variants 1 and 4, plotted in Figure 6, approximate the general movement of the series. The latter is more successful in predicting the peaks and troughs of the "A" applicant series. Variant 4's Durbin-Watson statistic, 2.65, indicates some negative autocorrelation is present. The plot of actual and estimated values in Figure 6 shows however, that the Durbin-Watson statistic is high because of a substantial overprediction and underprediction in 1952 and 1953 respectively.

Several differences between the total and the "A" applicant results are apparent. In the latter, the graduates variable is significant at the 1 per cent level in all cases. Approximately 9 "A" applicants are generated per 1000 male college graduates. In contrast to total applicants, price and physician income have no discernable impact on career decisions of students with superior academic records. Although the price coefficient is significant at the one per cent level when price and physician income are the only explanatory variables (Variant 1, Table 4), it is only a fraction of its standard error when business income and the growth in biologist earnings variables are included. Poor performance of the price variable may reflect data deficiencies. It is likely that the results would have been more satisfactory if immediate post-World War II observations had been included. As seen above, effective tuition and fees were low during these years. Furthermore, the price series
**TABLE 4**

Period - 1950-1965  
Dependent Variable - "A" College Record Applicants Planning to Enter in Year t.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variant</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Graduates t</th>
<th>Price t</th>
<th>Physician Income t-3</th>
<th>Base Business Income t</th>
<th>Growth Biologist Income t-1</th>
<th>Level Biologist Income t-1</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>R²(C)</th>
<th>D.W.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1816.91</td>
<td>-1.6⁴ᵇ</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>2584.82</td>
<td>8.76⁴ᵇ</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-6.87</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>2428.02</td>
<td>9.51⁴ᵇ</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-1.48</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>-0.28ᵇ</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>2389.46</td>
<td>9.56⁴ᵇ</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.27ᵇ</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 6

'4' APPLICANTS


3000 2800 2600 2400 2200 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000

ACTUAL

VARIANT I, P.32

VARIANT IV, P.32
may be an inappropriate one for an "A" applicant formulation. Direct costs to "A" students may be lower than to others who performed less well in college as scholarships are available to the outstanding students. Physician income is not significantly different from zero in any of the variants. This variable is not subject to the two information deficiencies which pertain to price. As was the case with total applicants, the base business income variable is not significant in any of the variants. However, three out of four coefficient estimates exceeded their standard errors. In Table 4 only one coefficient is larger (Variant III).

Also unlike total applicants, the level of biologist income is significant, but the growth rate is not. The opposite result was reported above. Students with superior records seem to be more responsive to biologist income than students in general. As stated above, a 10 per cent rise in biologist income from its 1966 level of $12,000 would be expected to produce a 1002 reduction in medical school applicants. Such an increase would result, on the basis of the biologist earnings coefficients of Variant IV, Table 4, in a decrease of 330 "A" applicants. Thus, a large percentage of the individuals who would decide against medicine would be college students with excellent college records.

These results are consistent with the view that income is less important to the "A" student than to other potential applicants. The former are not responsive to physician income. And they seem to be more attentive to levels than to rates of change in earnings in a scientific occupation. Levels may be more important to "A" quality candidates for admission than rates of change in biologist earnings because income enters their career decisions as a constraint on their behavior. These students are more concerned about their chances of earning a "reasonable" living in a scientific field. Once earnings in an occupation reach a critical minimum, other attributes of the occupation become relevant.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND GENERAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A primary purpose of this study has been to provide the government planners with policy instruments which may be used to affect production levels of the medical education system. It has been suggested that one possible way to stimulate medical school expansion is through policies which act on demand for medical education. Two series, total applicants and applicants to medical schools with superior college records, have been analyzed. The results indicate that potential medical students are responsive to differences in expected returns which exist among various occupations. "A" record students are in general less influenced by earnings. The policy recommendations which follow from the results are therefore directed to the former group of which the grade "A" college student is only a very small part. The results indicate that direct medical education costs have a substantial impact on occupational choice. Substantial increases in tuition and fees have decreased student interest in medicine. Furthermore, a combination of high direct costs and very imperfect capital markets may be expected to serve as a barrier to students who cannot finance their education internally. Stipends in Ph.D. fields have drawn potential medical students into these occupations. Clearly, government scholarship and loan policies should be reappraised. Earnings in other occupations do diverge some students from medicine. Starting salaries in business, although never significant at the 5 per cent level, probably also serve as a disincentive. Biologist income, a measure of earnings in scientific fields, exerts a sizable influence on occupational choice. As the government has some control over earnings in scientific fields through its expenditure policy, it should reexamine its manpower objectives. Physician income also has an impact on career decisions. Although it does not appear

*One may surmise that less than 10 per cent of all applicants in recent years have had "A" records.
that direct payments to physicians are feasible, the public sector may stimulate demand for medical education indirectly by implementing policies, such as health insurance schemes, which have an effect on physician earnings. Finally, although our tests have not yielded evidence in support of this view, it is plausible that supply of medical education has a positive impact on demand.
APPENDIX

Income information is derived from three sources: mean physician income from independent professional practice, 1929-1951, published by the Office of Business Economics of the Department of Commerce (OBE); medians from Medical Economics (ME) for selected years in the 1950's and 1960's; and means from Internal Revenue Services (IRS), published in a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publication. Since the Medical Economics medians exclude physicians aged 65 and over, they are closer to mean than to median OBE data which are also available, but are not used in this study. Even after splicing, we lack income information for 1952-1954, 1957, 1960-61. (See Column 1 of Table A.)

Basically, two approaches are available. One could simply fill in the missing observations by interpolating. Or an instrumental variable could be found, and the values predicted by the instrument, used to derive a consistent series. Largely because the 1955-1956 increase in the interpolated series, column 2 of Table A, seems unreasonable, essentially the latter approach is adopted. The solution is a compromise since estimates from the instrument are included only for years 1952-1961. If estimates for all years were substituted for the original values, information would be lost unnecessarily. Personnel per capita income is the instrument.
### TABLE A

**DIFFERENCES IN AN INTERPOLATED AND AN ESTIMATED PHYSICIAN INCOME SERIES (POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Interpolated</th>
<th>Estimated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946 OBE</td>
<td>15003</td>
<td>15003</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947 OBE</td>
<td>13787</td>
<td>13787</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948 OBE</td>
<td>13517</td>
<td>13517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949 OBE</td>
<td>14149</td>
<td>14149</td>
</tr>
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<td>1950 OBE</td>
<td>14702</td>
<td>14702</td>
</tr>
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<td>1951 OBE</td>
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<td>14840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952 missing</td>
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<td>16405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17416</td>
</tr>
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<td>1954 missing</td>
<td>16586</td>
<td>17163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 ME</td>
<td>17167</td>
<td>18870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 IRS-OECD</td>
<td>20253</td>
<td>19797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 missing</td>
<td>20839</td>
<td>19902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 IRS-OECD</td>
<td>21480</td>
<td>19624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 ME</td>
<td>21773</td>
<td>20682</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961 missing</td>
<td>22127</td>
<td>22487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 ME</td>
<td>22305</td>
<td>22305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963 ME</td>
<td>23610</td>
<td>23610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 ME</td>
<td>26253</td>
<td>26253</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 ME</td>
<td>28444</td>
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Medical Economics - Published in *Medical Economics*, "Continuing Survey of Physicians' Income."
References


References (cont'd.)


