WESTERN EUROPE AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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The basic analytical question posed by the August 1968 Soviet-inspired Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia is the one posed in 1956 by the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian Revolution: did this act represent a reversal or only a postponement of the decline of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe? Has the rise of indigenous forces in favor of national independence and internal liberalization been defeated or only postponed?**

Let us begin by consigning to the rubbish-heap of history some outdated concepts and find new ones that better fit changed reality. First, "Soviet bloc" and "East European satellites," indeed, "Eastern Europe" itself as an "area" of analysis remain useful to study the rise and decline of post-1945 Soviet power and influence to its west, but the area is otherwise by now so differentiated that generalizations are dangerous. Partial, delayed, sometimes reversed Soviet

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decolonization there reveals somewhat transformed but still largely persisting nations, states, and ethnic groups, most of them stressing their own histories, political cultures, and economic and social needs, each as independent of Moscow as it feels possible and prudent to be. Some are no longer "satellites" and together they are no "bloc," Soviet or otherwise. In short, as Professor Burks has pointed out, all communism in power tends to become national communism.  

Secondly, totalitarianism is an inadequate concept when applied to Eastern Europe. Too vague, too sweeping, too extreme, it obscures distinctions among the states in question. This is true with respect to such liberalized states as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia (even after the Soviet invasion), Kádár's Hungary, and even in part Ulbricht's East Germany. Let us, therefore, use "coercive" (e.g. Stalinist terror), "welfare" (e.g. Khrushchev's mix of incentives and repression), "consultative" (Titoist Yugoslavia, where geographic areas and interest groups now play significant roles), and "participatory" authoritarianism (Yugoslavia after Tito?) to describe them.** Although not completely sufficient, for they lack the often decisive elements of personality and accident, these distinctions form the most useful general framework for an initial overview.

Two other concepts are of great importance for understanding current East European development; nationalism and covert social fascism. Nationalism has helped to ease the transition from traditional to modernized society, in democratic as well as authoritarian politics. Different and more complex than in France and England or even in Germany, nationalism in Eastern Europe has normally been ethnic and linguistic, infused by resentment of backwardness and foreign domination, futuristic and messianic. Often intensified by

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*Burks, R. V., The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe, Princeton, 1961, p. xxv.

hostile external pressures, East European nationalism tends to be integral in character and centered in the intelligentsia. Particularly in the economically less developed areas, it has been identified not only with historical and cultural values of the peoples concerned and with priority for independence and national interest but, under postwar communism and in fact also within many of the prewar East European fascist movements, as the necessary and best framework for progress, economic development, and political modernization, whether or not the ultimate public goal be the welfare of the nation, the "working class," or "world socialism."

After 1953 de-Stalinization, leading to the decline of Soviet authority and influence, interacted with popular pressures for economic reform and rising nationalism to revive traditional East European political cultures. This substitution of nationalism for Soviet compulsion as the major mobilizational and interpretive factor in East European modernization has replaced the internationalist and pro-Soviet elements of the Marxist-Leninist tradition by populist, chauvinist, anti-minority programs combining integrative national traditions and hostilities with the drive for economic modernization, while still professing to be Marxist-Leninist. The combination can best be termed covert social fascism. It is fascist insofar as it fulfills Nolte's definition of fascism:

... anti-Marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a radically opposed and yet related ideology and by the use of almost identical and yet typically modified methods, always, however, within the unyielding framework of national self-assertion and autonomy.

It is social because of its strong emphasis on modernization and social welfare. It is covert in that it exploits the disintegration of Marxist-Leninist ideological orthodoxy to clothe its fascist aspects in Marxist-Leninist terminology.

* Nolte, Ernst, Three Faces of Fascism, Holt, Rinehard and Winston, New York, 1966, pp. 20-21. Whereas Marxism-Leninism claimed it would reconquer the pre-industrial Rousseauist virtues of humanist community (Gemeinschaft) by overcoming alienation resulting from capitalism through elitist, forced, "scientific"
This type of mobilization was made easier by two other factors: First, having been both frustrated (ex-imperial like Poland and Hungary) and anti-Russian (Poland, Hungary, and Romania), East European nationalism became the more virulent—and in Romania remains so today. Second, prewar communism and the postwar ruling Communist elites in the underdeveloped areas of Eastern Europe had been largely of minority ethnic origin (Jewish in Poland and Hungary; Jewish, Hungarian, and Ukrainian in Romania), arising from Communist elites in these areas:

... the reaction of economically poorer and less sophisticated cultures to the West, as that contrast affects persons and groups subjected through social disorganization to great personal insecurity ...

They were thus non-nationalist, dependent upon Moscow, and therefore pro-Soviet. In some instances after Stalin's death they became anti-Soviet and revisionist, i.e. genuinely internationalist. But internationalism in developing areas, as in Russia before Stalin, is normally a phenomenon of alienated westernized intellectuals. Maintenance of communism's popular support, arising largely because

... it is a theory of the ecumene which gives direction, meaning, and importance to proud populations which have suddenly discovered that they are backward and exploited ...

thus requires its transformation into national communism.

Most of the prewar East European intelligentsia were nationalist, populist, or socialist. When, therefore, the ethnically and nationally alienated Communist elites in Poland and Romania lost Soviet support (e.g. due to de-Stalinization and Khruschev's pragmatic anti-Semitism, whereby he hoped to gain more popular support for the East European Communist regimes or in Poland by revisionism on the part of

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industrialization, fascism, although of a divided mind (if not conduct) toward industrialization, claimed to do the same though the martial virtues of an elite incorporating national or racist rather than class or international values.

* Burks, Dynamics, p. 72.

some) they could not substitute mass popular support for Soviet assistance. They were therefore, like the Indians in Kenya, the Chinese in Indonesia, or the whites in the American militant Negro movement, politically doomed to the rubbish-heap of history.* In sum, then, the trends in Eastern Europe of peaceful evolution toward liberalization, rationalization, and covert fascism all represent varieties of nationalism and modernization.

Post-1945 Eastern Europe has changed through the interaction of internal and external forces.

Domestically, the gradual, uneven revival of traditional East European political cultures, interacting with Soviet attempts to contain and reverse this process, can best be understood by an analysis involving three distinctions. The first is between economically developed and less developed areas. The second is between areas with an historically predominantly democratic political culture (Bohemia and Moravia) plus those which judging by history might develop one (East Germany? Hungary?) and those whose modern political culture has tended toward what is here called covert social fascism. The third is between areas traditionally anti-German or anti-Russian, or, in the case of Poland, both.**

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* This was particularly true of the Jews, for sociological as well as religious reasons. In Poland, Hungary, and Romania, loci classicorum of this phenomenon, until industrialization got under way the commercial class had been largely Jewish. Inevitably, therefore, the largely peasant ethnic majorities identified them with exploitation (as many Negroes in the U.S. black ghettos do today) and much of the rising ethnic majority bourgeoisie became anti-Semitic. Thus radical social reform of bourgeois, ethnic majority origin in these countries tended to be anti-Semitic, while conversely some Jewish intellectuals were driven by persecution and alienation to communism and to exile in the U.S.S.R. (Most Jewish intellectuals embraced Zionism or the Bund.) Moreover, pre-1945 communism in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, all areas anti-Russian by tradition, was inevitably anti-national. The Jews thus became vulnerable on two grounds—each allegedly "international": as "bourgeois Zionists" or as "Russian agents."

** For an analysis of the role of economic development alone, which, however, in my view neglects the dimensions of history and national antagonisms, see Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky, "Communism and Economic Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXII, No. 1, March 1968, pp. 110-123, reprinted in
The first and second distinctions are generally causally related: as elsewhere, political democracy has taken roots in economically developed countries with a large bourgeoisie. Only in Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech lands, is there a long, firmly and widely-based tradition of democracy. In East Germany there is not but might be, in spite of its bureaucratic authoritarian traditions, were it not Communist. Of the partially developed areas, an independent Hungary, judging by 1956, would probably have then moved toward a left-wing populist democracy and, were it to cease being Communist, might again. If not Communist, Slovenia and Croatia might become Christian Democratic.

In most underdeveloped and in some developed countries the mobilization requisite for modernization is carried out through either external force or native nationalism plus elitist and if possible charismatic leadership. Communist and fascist elites have typically carried out ideologically-oriented bureaucratic industrialization.*

In the small, rarely genuinely independent countries of Eastern Europe those modernizing elites often of necessity relied upon external support from Germany or Russia.

Attempts to modernize Eastern Europe also are made more difficult by the uneven distribution of natural resources throughout the area. The economic geography of these countries is extremely varied, even within states. In East Germany and the Czech lands economic development had been largely completed before 1945. Western Poland, Hungary, and Western Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Croatia) are approaching industrialized status. Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria are in the early stages of development. The rest of Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Herzegovina,


Macedonia, and the Kosmet) and Albania are still largely agrarian, even tribal in character. Thus the underdeveloped areas, Poland (in part), Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, face common problems of development. East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser degree Hungary, on the other hand, have been trying to overcome via economic rationalization the disastrous effects of Moscow's imposition on their highly developed economies of the Stalinist centralized economic model. Moreover, while Stalin had forced industrialization in all these countries and the post-1948 Yugoslav economic development had gone its own decentralized way, Khrushchev in the early sixties unsuccessfully tried to concentrate industrialization in highly developed areas (East Germany and Czechoslovakia), thereby relegating the less developed areas to sources of raw materials (notably Romania vis-a-vis East Germany and Czechoslovakia.) Revolting against this Khrushchev model from both economic and nationalistic viewpoints, Bucharest insisted on nationalistic, protectionist industrialization.

Since the Soviet economic model has now been outmoded by increased industrial complexity and western competition,* the East German, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian Communist elites have therefore been trying to maintain their power and authority, as the Yugoslav elite has since 1951, by combining rationalization, i.e. end of mass security police terror, decentralization, and (except for East Germany) a market economy with consultative authoritarianism characterized by institutionalized interest-group representation.

Various alternatives are available to them. First, economic rationalization may be carried out by a unitary or federalist nationalism directed by a charismatic leader. Tito's combination of partisan leader and Emperor Franz Josef has succeeded, whereas the fate of Dubček, like T. G. Masaryk the idealized common man, is not yet

clear. In this alternative the elitist party moves from its original, conspiratorial, separate ("marginal") existence based on partisan victory (as in Yugoslavia or Albania) or Russian support (elsewhere) to a new role resting increasingly on consensus rather than force and on nationalism plus functional competence—i.e., a rationalized incentive- and consumer-oriented policy of economic growth. Thus power is converted into authority, and coercion into welfare or even (as in Yugoslavia) into consultative authoritarianism.

A second alternative, which Ulbricht has followed with some success, is to combine Soviet support and popular resignation to his rule with extensive economic decentralization and rapid growth (albeit not at least as yet a market economy) and economic (but not political or cultural) interest group representation, i.e., partially consultative authoritarianism. He thus somewhat diminishes popular hostility to his rule, while containing popular anti-Russian and anti-Communist sentiments by repressive political controls.

There have been three external factors in recent East European developments. The first, primarily Soviet in origin, was de-Stalinization, which aided East European nationalism and liberalization. Although temporarily reconsolidated by the 1956 Polish and Hungarian events, Soviet influence in Eastern Europe again declined after 1959. This was largely due to the second factor, primarily of Chinese origin, the Sino-Soviet split, whose blow to Soviet authority and power helped Tirana and Bucharest to gain greater autonomy. The third factor has been Western: willingness to reciprocate Soviet moves toward detente and to refrain from intervening in Eastern Europe, thus making East European Communist elites less fearful to liberalize, and encouraging the flow into Eastern Europe of Western culture, science, and technology.

Of the six major challenges to Soviet influence in post-1945 Eastern Europe, to date three have been permanent: (1) the Soviet breaks with Yugoslavia in 1948 and (2) with Albania in 1960 and (3) the gradual Soviet-Romanian estrangement since 1962. Three others have in varying degrees been reversed: (4) the Polish October and (5) the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, and (6) the Czechoslovak move
toward autonomy and liberalization in 1968. These six also differ in two other respects: first, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania are all far from the decisive strategic glacis of the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe, while Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are all in or close to it. Second, the first three challenges to Moscow's authority did not initially involve liberalization as well as nationalist deviation while the latter three all did.

These differences pinpoint the two main defensive aspects of the current Soviet estimate of its vital interests in Eastern Europe. The first and most important is strategic: to keep West Germany weak and Germany divided, thus guarding the invasion route to Russia through the East German and Polish plain. This necessitates controlling the government and industrial power of East Germany, now the U.S.S.R.'s main foreign trading partner, and of Czechoslovakia, as well as maintaining predominance in Poland. The Soviet objective is to prevent a unified, potentially hostile Germany as well as block the Eastward expansion of American or West German economic and political influence. The second aspect is ideological: Moscow feels it cannot afford to allow either freedom of speech and the press or the formation of opposition parties in the East European Communist states, lest they imperil Communist hegemony and Soviet control there and even at home in the U.S.S.R.

Within this context developments in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania have threatened Soviet interests in four main ways. First, their reassertion of nationalism tends to encourage it elsewhere in Eastern Europe, thus threatening Soviet minimal security interests in East Germany and Poland and the Warsaw Pact system. Simultaneously, East European nationalism saps the credibility of Soviet "proletarian internationalism," the legitimization for Soviet imperial influence.

Moreover, for Moscow the Romanian and Yugoslav economic rapprochement with the West in general and with West Germany in particular, as well as the recent Czechoslovak tendencies in that direction, sabotage the offensive Soviet aims in Europe, i.e. the expulsion of the U.S. and the isolation and political destabilization of West Germany,
as well as, by isolating and destabilizing East Germany, the defensive ones. (In addition, Hungary's and Bulgaria's trade with West Germany has burgeoned.) Moreover, it makes more effective and attractive Western, notably West German, economic and technological penetration of Eastern Europe and thus weakens Soviet allegations of technological superiority over the West.

Third, in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia liberalization in politics and culture, coupled with economic rationalization, decentralization, and introduction of market principles, are seen by Moscow as endangering their own and other East European states' Soviet-style orthodoxy. Indeed, particularly where as in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia these trends interact with internal ethnic nationalism (Slovak, Croat, Slovene, Macedonian, Albanian), East European nationalism menaces the passive presence within the centralized Soviet Union of the minority nationalities, notably the Ukrainians. For in the U.S.S.R., a multinational state only 55 percent Great Russian, as economic development produces a native modernizing intelligentsia, minority nationalities become increasingly restive. Moscow thus has a domestic as well as a foreign policy reason from fearing nationalism in Eastern Europe.

Fourth, in the international Communist movement East European developments, notably the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Romania's flirtation with China, Cuba, and other deviant Communist parties, have lowered support for Soviet policies and endangered plans for the scheduled international Communist conference. In order to stage the conference the U.S.S.R. has made concessions to other Communist parties which have impeded Moscow from acting in Russian imperial interests—e.g. the situation before invading Czechoslovakia; and when the U.S.S.R. did invade, it also lost greatly in the international Communist movement thereby.

Given the number of variables and the complexities of the processes just described, and the further differentiation brought about by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, any serious contemporary analysis of Eastern Europe requires a country-by-country approach.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Will Dubček become an instrument of Soviet-imposed repression or will Moscow force him out? Or will he or his successor eventually resume Dubček's pre-invasion course toward liberalization and national autonomy? To answer these questions requires some background. Why did the Russians invade? To what has Moscow forced Dubček to agree and why? And what are Dubček and the Russians doing about it?

German imperialism and despairing of the West, accepted Russian protection and in 1948 the Communist take-over and, until 1962, Gottwald's and Novotný's repressive regimes.

Yet the Western and democratic traditions of Czechoslovak history predisposed it to resent foreign domination and domestic oppression. Thus liberalization in Czechoslovakia was only delayed. Five factors drove out the Stalinist Novotný and unleashed the flood gates of reform. First, de-Stalinization, the forced public revelations of his complicity in Stalinist crimes, and the end of massive police terror destroyed Novotný's authority and prestige. The second was economic. By 1963 the Czechoslovak economy had a negative rate of economic growth and Czechoslovak exports were not competitive on the world market. The disruption in the early 60's of its foreign trade patterns with China, Romania, and even, in worsening of terms of trade with the U.S.S.R., the counter-productiveness of the centralized Stalinist economic model for a highly-developed economy, extensive Soviet-decreed credits to the third world, plus low agricultural productivity contributed to an increasingly desperate economic situation. Incompetent, politically-appointed managers, the preference of a large part of the unskilled working class for preferred security over incentives, wage egalitarianism, and disastrous work discipline made the problem seemingly insolvable, at least with Novotný's retaining centralized political repression. He and his associates could not drastically reform the economy themselves because they were too personally threatened and would not. For they rightly perceived that the personnel changes required for rationalization and decentralization would imperil their political power. The resulting bad economic situation convinced the intelligentsia, much of the party cadres, and even most of the working class that Novotný must go.

The third factor was the recoalescence and return to influence of the Czech and Slovak intelligentsias: writers, journalists, economists, and social scientists. For the Communist intellectuals de-Stalinization and economic collapse had swept away Marxist-Leninist

Perhaps "de-Khrushchevization" would be even more accurate; Novotný was a Khrushchevist.
ideology. And contrary to any other East European country there was another ideology available, liberal, nationalist, democratic, pro-western, symbolized to many by the founder of the First Republic, the great philosopher-statesman T. G. Masaryk. For the last five years the intelligentsia has been cautiously preparing the way for the great turn which finally came at the end of 1967. Much of this occurred in working groups on democratization and technological backwardness in the Academy of Sciences. In June 1967 a few writers defied Novotný's regime, and in October 1967 student demonstrations occurred in Prague. Both were hesitatingly and only partially crushed—a sure mark of the regime's weakness.

Fourth, the attitude of Czech intellectuals toward the Germans and the Russians began to change. West European and West German economic progress had led to the realization by many liberal Communists in Prague and Bratislava that only massive West German credits and technology could make the Czechoslovak economy again competitive on the world market. Combined with rising hatred of the pro-Novotný Ulbricht and Czech realization, especially through travel there, that West Germany was neither neo-Nazi nor militarist, the Czech attitude toward Bonn became more favorable. (The Slovaks have always been less anti-German.) Conversely, continued Soviet support of Novotný and Ulbricht plus growing Soviet technological inferiority to Western Europe and the United States lowered Soviet prestige.

The fifth, and at the end the precipitating factor was the revolt of the Slovak Communists against domination from Prague. Slovakia, like Québec, is the poorer, less developed, strongly Catholic part of a multinational state, less democratic but deeply nationalist. Since 1919 the Czechs, Communists even more than non-Communists, have ruled Slovakia from Prague not wisely but too closely and too clumsily.

In 1963 Novotný reluctantly sacrificed the two leading pro-Prague Stalinist Slovak Communists, Široký and Bacílek. The latter was replaced as head of the Slovak Communist Party (KSS) by Alexander Dubček. Dubček had been raised in Soviet Central Asia, where his father, an early Slovak Communist, had settled after an unsuccessful stay in the United States. However, both father and son had been expelled from
the U.S.S.R. in 1938 and some of their associates shot or imprisoned. Although Dubček rose in the KSS after 1945 and went through the Moscow Party School, he probably did not forget his earlier experiences. Moreover, once head of the KSS, he cultivated popularity, used academic experts, and worked toward a more rationalized, partially liberalized communism and equality for Slovakia with the Czech lands. A personal clash with Novotný in October 1967 made Dubček and the Slovaks ally with the Czech Communist liberals. In unprecedentedly-free Central Committee votes, and despite belated, clumsy Soviet opposition, they got rid of Novotný, first as Party Secretary in January and then in April as President.

To do this Dubček had given freedom to the liberals in the communication media. Once free, they led the massive thrust toward economic rationalization, free speech and press, equality ("symmetrical federation") for the Slovaks, maintenance of the primary alliance with Moscow but improvement of political and economic relations with the West (especially with Bonn),* and a degree of political opposition which, many of them hoped and expected, would lead to a genuine multi-party system. With the Communist apparat discredited and demoralized Dubček felt he could only try to limit and control the reform and, it seems, himself became more liberal in the process. The likelihood exists, however, that after he had removed his conservative opponents he would probably have tried to push back liberalism as well. In any case, he was determined to rehabilitate communism by reforms but also to maintain what he saw as the three essentials of communism in Czecho-slovakia; alliance with Moscow, continuing nationalization of industry, and a Communist party federalized but continuing to control the commanding heights of the society, with other interest groups consulted in the decision-making process but not forming opposition parties: in short, a kind of Communist corporative state.

Pushed by Ulbricht and Gomulka to intervene and by Tito, Ceauşescu, Longo, and Waldeck-Rochet not to, Moscow long hesitated

*See the speech by Foreign Minister Jiří Hajek to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, Rude Pravo, June 12, 1968.
before the invasion. The Soviet leadership was probably divided. Why did they finally march in? They feared that Dubček would not or could not safeguard his essentials, the conservatives would be purged, that opposition parties would be formed, press freedom would bring rising criticism of Moscow, East Berlin, and Warsaw, and East Germany, Poland, and indeed the U.S.S.R. itself would thus become infected. In part, such Soviet fears were probably justified: liberalization in Czechoslovakia would have encouraged liberalization among its neighbors. (Whether the Soviet solution, invasion, will in the long run allay their fears is another question.)

The Soviets expected that, in order to modernize and make competitive his economy, Dubček would accept even more massive West German credits than Romania has (Bucharest now has a $375 million trade deficit with Bonn. Thus West Germany would begin to replace Soviet economic influence in Czechoslovakia, thereby automatically contributing toward isolating and destabilizing East Germany. Finally, Dubček's emerging alliance with Tito and Ceaușescu, a revival of the inter-war Little Entente, was seen by Moscow as anti-Soviet. In sum, Moscow was not prepared to allow its influence in Czechoslovakia to be eroded and the devolution of its empire in Eastern Europe to proceed.

Even so, Soviet action was slow, hesitant, and often contradictory. First, Moscow reluctantly let Novotný be replaced by Dubček. Second, underestimating thereafter the speed and extent of change in Czechoslovakia, the Russians still hesitated, thus losing in world opinion and in Warsaw and East Berlin by their hesitation to invade, and misleading Dubček as well. Third, when on August 21 they finally did invade, in large part to prevent the rout of the conservatives, although their military moves were speedy and massive, their political planning was based on two mistaken assumptions: that popular resistance would not be a major factor and that some conservatives would support them. They did have some basis for the latter belief. Reports indicate that three of the conservative leaders, Indra, Korder, and the KSS First Secretary Bílak, were relatively pro-Soviet. But although in modern times Czechs did not resist Nazism or communism very strongly, this time the almost unanimous heroic passive resistance
of Czechs and Slovaks so intimidated potential Quislings that the
Soviets could not find any to endorse them publicly. Moreover, Czecho-
slovak radio stations continued broadcasting and mobilized the whole
country against the invaders while helping to prevent major clashes
with Soviet troops. Conversely, the Soviets, hoping to get President
Svoboda to collaborate, did not remove him.

But even after Dubček and his closest associates were arrested,
Svoboda, in refreshing contrast to his equivocation when Minister of
Defense in 1948, held firm. Thus Czechoslovakia and its leaders re-
mained steadfast in passive resistance, storing up the kind of patri-
otism through sacrifice and suffering which the country never had had
before and will profit from greatly in the future. The spirit to
which its people so nobly responded was fittingly put into words in
an August 22 KSS resolution:

. . . Let us lift our heads against the raised gun barrels.
With the calm and prudence of a dignified and free people
. . . let us stand proudly as our fathers stood and so that
our children will not be ashamed of us. We are adopting
this standpoint to the sound of the occupation forces
shooting, but we do so freely, and with an awareness of our
historic responsibility . . .

So Moscow again reversed Its tactics. It decided to exact from
Svoboda and Dubček in Moscow, by threat of indefinite military occu-
pation, the concessions they had not gained by force in Prague: re-
imposition of censorship and banning of opposition parties or clubs;
renewed security police activity; return of Soviet "advisers" to
defense, intelligence, and political police areas; limitation of the
purge of the conservatives and removal of some liberals; and, most
importantly, continued Soviet military occupation until Moscow agrees
that the situation is "normalized"—and thereafter the permanent sta-
tioning of Soviet troops on the Bavarian-Czech border. The Moscow
agreement was also a partial retreat for the Russians: after arrest-
ing them and publicly denouncing them as traitors, they returned
Dubček and his associates to power. Such hesitant tactics are not
the stuff of which empires are maintained.

"Proclamation to the Slovak People", Radio Czechoslovakia,
August 22, 1968. For a detailed reconstruction of the Soviet invasion,
The Czechoslovak leadership agreed to these concessions to prevent indefinite military occupation and an eventual Quisling regime and in the hope that the future, as National Assembly President Smrkovský put it thereafter, would allow "a renewal of the trend toward socialist democratization." They seem to have left the degree to which they would implement their agreement an open question.

The prospects for Czechoslovak liberalization and independence for the next few years are thus uncertain and gloomy. Censorship has been reimposed and removals of liberals (Krieger, Pavel, Ciřaf, Šik, Hájek) have occurred. Some of the population, worn out from the tension and sickened by the concessions the Soviets demanded, is beginning to relapse into bitterness and apathy. Yet the conservative KSS First Secretary Bílak has been replaced by Husák, a strong national Communist--ironically, the bête noire of the liberals in Bratislava, to whom he appears only a more educated Gomulka. Indra and Kolder have been removed, and in fact the rout of the conservatives is now greater than before the invasion. (The October 1968 Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement may result in the return of some.)

On the international scene, the Soviets have for the near future restored their domination in Czechoslovakia and thus also stifled any tendencies in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, or Bulgaria toward liberalization or independence, and checked a major potential success for West Germany. On the other hand, Moscow has greatly worsened its relations with Yugoslavia, Romania and all West European Communist parties, who for the first time almost unanimously denounced the Soviet invasion, as have the Chinese and the New Left. Castro, dependent on Soviet aid, endorsed Moscow but only in order to try to push Soviet policy in a more militant, anti-American direction, and for the first time publicly asked for a Soviet military guarantee.

The disintegration of NATO and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops

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**Ibid., October 5, 1968.
from West Germany have been at least delayed. West Germany, more fearful of Moscow, is less likely, as is Japan, to move away from the United States. Bonn has also suspended its decision to begin ministerial-level discussions with East Berlin, a major Soviet and East German objective. The U.S. loss of international prestige and influence from its Vietnam policy is now counterbalanced by the world-wide outcry against Moscow's occupation of Czechoslovakia. Finally, the blow to East-West détente will at least slow down U.S. and, for Moscow much more importantly, West German ratification of the non-proliferation treaty as well as the initiation of and progress in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic weapons negotiations.

In short, by restoring their control over Czechoslovakia, the Russians have blocked any potential deviations in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, but in the rest of the world their influence has suffered. Even in Czechoslovakia, where the Good Soldier Svejk's tradition of silent, concealed, but persistent opposition to foreign domination is long, Dubček, Svoboda, and the Czech and Slovak peoples will hardly soon forgive or forget. The Soviet invasion has probably ended the long tradition of pro-Russian feeling among the Czechs, who will now bide their time and husband their strength for the long, complex struggle ahead.

What will be the final result we can hardly yet foresee. The Soviets will try to turn Dubček into an unwilling instrument, who will effectively support Soviet foreign policy, notably against West Germany, and will reluctantly purge his liberal colleagues, repress domestic dissent, lose popular support, and thus be able to survive only by Soviet backing—or they will remove him and try the same with his successor. Limited economic decentralization, as in East Germany, will be allowed as long as political repression continues, and Slovak autonomy, although discouraged, will be permitted as long as it does not further liberalization or weaken Soviet control. As for the West, the Russians anticipate that as after 1956 its shock will soon be overshadowed by its desire to resume East-West détente, while conversely the destabilizing effects of détente in Czechoslovakia will now be more effectively kept under control. Dubček and his associates, on
the other hand, will try to be only as repressive as they feel compelled to be and to maintain a kind of unspoken national conspiracy of \textit{attentisme}, holding out for better days.

Much, then, will depend on the skill and the persistence of the Czechoslovak leaders. As Smrkovský said, "We realized that our decision could be regarded by the Czechoslovak people and by history as a wise solution or as treason."*

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It seems logical to divide the other East European states with respect to their attitudes toward the Soviet invasion: participation in, as compared to condemnation of, this Soviet action. Since the German question played a significant role in the Soviet decision and since Ulbricht was perhaps the invasion's strongest advocate, I shall begin with East Germany.

EAST GERMANY AND THE GERMAN QUESTION

East Germany enthusiastically pushed for and participated in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak developments endangered Ulbricht's and Moscow's roles in East Germany, for the Soviet Union the most important and for the West the least understood state in Communist Eastern Europe. The eighth industrial state of the world and the U.S.S.R.'s largest and for high technology its most important foreign trade partner, East Germany is Moscow's guarantee of maintaining its greatest gain from World War II: the partition of Germany and the Soviet domination of its Eastern part.*

Yet East Germany is potentially politically the most unstable of the Communist East European states, for one overwhelming reason. It is not a nation but the smaller, weaker part of Germany, and since nationalism and economics favor West Germany, its population will at best resignedly tolerate East Germany's Soviet-sponsored rulers. Nor is it likely that East Germany will soon gain a national identity as has Austria. Austria had the potential for nationalism in centuries of Hapsburg history and the impact of two disastrously lost wars. Moreover, post-1945 Austria was not as anti-national in origin as East Germany; the Austrians happily escaped from Germany's fate.

Thus the problem of evolution from coercion to consensus, from coercive or welfare to consultative or even participatory authoritarianism is qualitatively different for East Germany than for all other Communist East European states.

Much more has changed for the better in East Germany in the seven years since the 1961 Berlin Wall than is usually realized in the West. Ulbricht has moved ruthlessly but flexibly, apparently with Soviet support, toward consultative authoritarianism in economics while retaining coercive authoritarianism in the cultural and political spheres. Moreover, as Soviet dominance has declined elsewhere, Ulbricht's influence in Moscow has reached new heights. His importance to the Soviets has increased as the East German economy has become more important to them, as East-West détente and the new West German Ostpolitik have opened up the frozen German question, and, finally, after Moscow finally felt compelled, as he had long advocated, to invade Czechoslovakia. In short, although still basically unpopular, his economic achievements are increasingly if reluctantly respected in East Germany and his influence in Moscow is by now probably the greatest of any of the Soviet Union's allies.

The 1961 Berlin Wall and the New Economic System, which it made possible, were the great turning points in East German affairs. Before the Wall Ulbricht's state was being so rapidly drained of skilled labor that its economy was nearing collapse. Thereafter resignation gripped the population, thus lowering popular pressures against Ulbricht and the Russians. Ulbricht has therefore felt freer to adopt and, contrary to Novotný, has been far-sighted enough to push through a drastic if still bureaucratic economic reform, the New Economic System: extensive decentralization of the economy, replacement of political cadres by technically-trained managers, significant satisfaction of consumer needs, and, of the greatest potential political significance, considerable institutionalization of economic and technological interest-group representation. Thus functional conflicts are no longer suppressed but channeled and profited from by the system—all while the commanding height of power, the SED Presidium, remains in the hands of the primarily political, still semi-conspiratorial, "marginal" élite of Ulbricht and his closest colleagues. However, the East German economic reforms remain essentially bureaucratic. They do not, as in Yugoslavia, involve the introduction of a market economy or enterprise autonomy in foreign trade.
Thus a new technological "counter-élite" has come into power in East Germany at most levels below the Presidium. This group seems unlikely, however, to challenge the control of 75-year-old Ulbricht or of his probable hard-line successor Erich Honecker. Only decisive change in Soviet policy toward Germany, East and West, would make such a challenge likely; and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia makes this seem farther away than ever.

But the East German New Economic system does provide much more professional career mobility, and a cadre party, except at the very top, of a new, educated type. In short, bureaucratic rationalization, status, and security is provided in return for professional competence and abstention from political dissent. This model of partially consultative authoritarianism has worked in East Germany for two main reasons: first, the lack of prospect for anything better, given the Soviet crushing of the June 17, 1953 East Berlin revolt, the Wall, and the 22 Red Army divisions, and, second, the long German tradition of bureaucratic rationality and political conformism to authoritarian rule. East Germany seems likely, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, to continue to provide what Ulbricht and the Russians want: economic and political reliability.

But Ulbricht's rationalized rule still remains potentially unstable, when and if the German question will begin to unfreeze. This the new German Ostpolitik and the Czechoslovak liberalization threatened to begin. For Ulbricht and the Russians, therefore, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was inter alia intended to reinsure East Germany's stability and block West Germany's influence.

Although East-West détente and the Berlin Wall produced a more stable East German state, they also partially unfroze the German question. Moscow resumed an active, offensive European policy, East Germany acted on West German public opinion, frustrated by the Wall's blocking of internal German travel and its blow to the dream of reunification, and West Germany's resultant new Ostpolitik did the same in Eastern Europe, including East Germany. Bonn did well in Southeastern Europe, would have done well in Czechoslovakia had not the Soviets invaded, and was beginning to bring about the isolation of
East Germany. It also overcame its own threatening isolation by abandoning its opposition to détente.

The new West Germany Ostpolitik involves a temporary priority for détente over reunification in order to use détente to bring about conditions which could lead first to the liberalization of East Germany after Ulbricht and eventually to German reunification. It abandoned the Adenauer policy of the isolation of East Germany to offer to improve political, economic, and cultural relations with East Germany without, however, officially recognizing it de jure. It sought improved relations with the East European states, diplomatic and most of all economic. In all these moves, Bonn's trump card was its booming economy (now recovered from the recent recession), its high-level technology, and its willingness to guarantee German firms' credits to their Communist customers. Only Bonn can provide markets for agricultural products, high technology, and credits to cover the large East European passive trade balances, made more so by the EEC's agricultural discrimination against non-members. And particularly now that the Grand Coalition in Bonn has successfully adopted neo-Keynesian economic policies and restored prosperity. Bonn can easily absorb the passive trade balances economically as well as politically.

Thus détente produced a race to gain from it between Bonn and East Berlin, as between Washington and Moscow. What it has not produced, contrary to many Western expectations, is the stabilization or disappearance of the German problem; on the contrary, its most important single result in Europe has been to unfreeze that issue.

Thus Ulbricht's rationalized rule still remains potentially unstable, at least to the extent that the German question remains unfrozen in spite of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was in part the further unfreezing of it threatened by Czechoslovakia.

liberalization which caused Ulbricht to urge, and the Soviets to carry out, the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yet the rise of West German economic influence in Eastern Europe will probably only be postponed by it, and will rise in Yugoslavia and Rumania. Once unfrozen, the German question will not easily be frozen again.
Poland supported, indeed probably urged Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. How did Gomulka, who had fought bitterly to increase Polish autonomy in 1956, sanction military suppression of national communism in Prague? What has turned Warsaw, the apparent refuge of East European liberalism in 19.6, into a backwater of reaction? To understand this process one must realize that in Poland communism and nationalism have interacted with disastrous results, turning the Polish situation into an example of political decay.*

Except for the interwar years modernization in Poland has occurred under foreign rule or influence. Polish nationalism until 1939 was imperial: ethnic Poles dominated Belorussians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians to the East. It was for the overwhelming majority of Poles symbiotically combined with Roman Catholicism. Poland was thus in both politics and religion hostile to the Germans on the West and the Russians on the East. For the last 15 years, suppressed and frustrated by Soviet influence but still unquenchable, Polish nationalism has revived, in 1956 primarily in a social democratic but now largely in a covert social fascist form.

Polish communism until 1945 was a small anti-nationalist sect, condemned to impotence by its unconditional support of Moscow, which had unsuccessfully tried to conquer Poland in 1920 and never accepted the 1919 Polish Eastern boundaries. (Even so, Stalin dissolved the Polish Communist Party in 1938 and shot its leadership, a blow unfor-gotten today.) Moreover, like most Communist parties in most other East European underdeveloped countries, its members came largely from alienated, anti-nationalist ethnic minorities, notably Jews. Finally, because it came to power in 1945 on Red Army bayonets, Polish communism was even more profoundly alienated from patriotic public opinion. After 1945 those Communists, largely Jewish, who had returned from exile in Moscow profited from Stalin's anti-Titoism and overcame the small group of native Communists led by Gomulka, who had fought in the underground during the war. After 1953 popular resentment of Russification, Soviet economic exploitations, and post-1953 revisionism (arising primarily from the end of police terror and revelations of Stalinist crimes among Communist intellectuals) combined in 1956 to replace the discredited Stalinist leadership by Gomulka. After considering intervention on the side of the remaining Stalinists (the "Natolin" group), the Soviets compromised with Gomulka, who tolerated the collapse of agricultural collectivization, reached a modus vivendi with the Catholic Church (then as now the most influential Polish institution) and reluctantly and temporarily tolerated considerable cultural freedom and influx of Western cultural influence.

But only reluctantly. Gomulka has never been a revisionist or a liberal. In domestic affairs something of a Bukharinist, in foreign policy he is one of the few remaining "proletarian internationalist" Communist leaders, supporting Soviet foreign policy as long as it is anti-German and he is allowed autonomy ("domesticism") at home.

Pilsudski established Polish independence; Gomulka gained Polish autonomy from Moscow. But neither could meet the problems of economic and political development of the country; and neither was willing to modernize in spite of the oligarchy--Pilsudski's nationalist, Gomulka's Communist--with which they came to power. Thus like Pilsudski Gomulka has come to the end of the road in the last years of his rule.
By 1956 the internationalist Moscovite wing of the party, largely Jewish, had split into Stalinists and revisionists. The non-Jewish nativist wing had also split into Stalinists and those who in 1948 had followed and been purged with Gomulka. Both (Jewish) revisionists and some (non-Jewish) Stalinists competed for Gomulka's favor; and he chose the revisionists only because the Stalinists remained pro-Moscovite. But when after 1956 Gomulka, in return for autonomy, supported Soviet foreign policy, he discarded the revisionists and in turn was supported by the ex-Stalinists and his pre-1948 supporters. The result, an uneasy balance, led to a complex realignment of Polish Communist factionalism.

Gomulka's domestic policies also became more conservative. He vetoed economic rationalization, decentralization, a market economy, and increased economic ties with the West. The result, coupled with a rapidly expanding population forbidden to emigrate, has been an economic situation whose slow rate of improvement runs far behind popular demands, plus the alienation of the modernizing economic bourgeoisie. Gomulka also stifled and alienated the creative intelligentsia and students. Interest groups have been little institutionalized; politics is secret and conspiratorial; nationalism is frustrated by slavish adherence to Soviet foreign policy at a time when Romania and Yugoslavia have profited from deviation from it; and the ruling political elite, like Gomulka himself, has been narrow, non-innovative, and unresponsive to technological change. In short, politicization has outrun institutionalization and political decay has set it.

Gomulka remains in power by combining Soviet support with balancing between the challenges of the various currents of opposition. During the last five years he has been challenged from three sources. The first and most important is Moczar's "Partisans," the pre-1948 nativist group plus by now some of the non-Jewish Stalinists, now covert social fascists, who combine extreme nationalism, economic

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modernization, "anti-Zionism," and populist élitism. Peasant and worker in origin, with military, intelligence, and security police backgrounds, anti-oligarchic by conviction and lust for power, highly conspiratorial, they are in the line of descent from prewar Polish fascism. (Indeed, the PAX, the surviving prewar fascists, supports them.) Some reports indicate that they might like to be less subservient to Moscow in foreign policy, including improving somewhat Warsaw's relations with Bonn. They probably favor better relations with the Church and certainly urge escape from economic stagnation. Their orientation toward nationalism and economic and social change plus their promise of a massive purge of the present Communist oligarchy has given them the wide popular appeal they clearly possess. Their anti-Semitism combines resentment against their largely Jewish Communist opponents, tactical use of it to get rid of them, and demagogic popular appeal, notably to the peasantry, where before 1939 anti-Semitism had been endemic, and to that large proportion of the working class of peasant origin.

Apparently closely allied with but not to be confused with the Partisans are some party officials, notably the cadre chief Ryszard Strzelecki. Non-Jewish and in part pre-1956 Stalinist in character, they apparently balance between Gomulka and Moczar, cooperating with the latter but not primarily oriented, as Moczar seems in long-range aim to be, toward Gomulka's removal. Of them the least is known; and their position is in many respects the most strategic.

The second source of challenge to Gomulka is a tendency which may be best termed "technocratic," centering in modernizing industrial bureaucrats oriented toward economic rationalization. Its main figure, Edward Gierek, the party secretary of the Silesian industrial district of Katowice, has there a solid local base of power. Gierek has on occasion seemed to be allied with Moczar, only later to move away from him again.

The third challenge, that of the liberal revisionists, arises basically from the same causes as in 1956: ideological revisionism in politics and economics combined with nationalist resentment against Soviet influence. Its prominent figures are writers, journalists,
economists, sociologists, and philosophers. Its main public expression has been in student demonstrations. Some of its student leaders are sons and daughters of the post-1945 Communist élite, many Jewish. Their ideological positions reflect a melange ranging from antifunctional Luxemburgist internationalism (reminiscent of Marcuse) to rightist revisionism inspired by Italian communism.

The recent public Polish crisis goes back to a 1964 challenge by revisionist writers, followed by quickly suppressed student demonstrations in Warsaw. Student dissent surfaced again in 1966. After the 1967 Israeli-Arab war Gomulka's attack on Polish supporters of Israel enabled Moczar openly to use anti-Semitism against those remaining Jews in the party apparat as well as against liberals in and out of the party. In spring 1967 student and writer resentment against Gomulka's immobilisme and Moczar's anti-Semitism, sparked by Gomulka's suppression of DzIady, an anti-Tsarist classic drama by the Polish national poet Mickiewicz, led to defiance by the Writers Union and to several massive student demonstrations in Warsaw and all other Polish university cities. Moczar launched a massive counteroffensive against revisionist professors, writers, and student leaders. Many of the former were fired from their jobs and the latter were jailed and pressured to recant. Via anti-Semitism Moczar also struck against his enemies within the party. For a few weeks political Warsaw experienced something close to a reign of terror. The purge was widespread in party, journalistic, and scientific circles. Although the lay Catholic "Znak" group expressed its opposition, the Church itself remained relatively silent. Then Gomulka, alarmed, sounded the retreat. It was the easier for him to restrain the Partisans because some of them reportedly revealed their antifunctional sentiments. A subsequent Central Committee plenum reestablished the political balance but Moczar was promoted to the Party Secretariat, thus winning more than he lost.

Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia will discourage experimentation in politics or economics in Poland as in other areas under Soviet influence, Gomulka's stagnant domesticist communism seems thus likely to have its life further prolonged. The Polish
version of covert social fascism may well thus be at least delayed, if not permanently prevented, from coming to power. But in either case Poland presents anything but an encouraging prospect.
BULGARIA

Bulgaria participated in and supported unconditionally the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Ever since it was liberated by Tsar Alexander II from the Turks, Sofia has never been strongly anti-Russian. (Its alliances with Germany in the two world wars resulted from economic involvement with Germany and from Berlin's promise to give all of Macedonia to Bulgaria, while Russia's pro-Serb policy prevented this.) Since 1945 Bulgaria has remained one of the most faithful Soviet satellites. However, opposition to this policy has been overcome by the Bulgarian Communist leadership at the cost of constantly diminishing its authority and base of support, e.g. the purge of the national Communist Kostov in 1948 and the crushing of the attempted national Communist military-party coup in 1965. The present Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, is thus by now so weak domestically that he needs Soviet support to keep himself in power, particularly now that Bulgaria's historic enemies, Yugoslavia and Romania, are anti-Soviet. Bulgaria has traditionally regarded the Macedonian area of Yugoslavia as rightly hers, has annexed it during two world wars and lost it after both, and regularly utilizes Soviet-Yugoslav tension to reiterate its claims to the area. Thus Bulgaria's Macedonian irredentism complements its pro-Russian tradition in binding it to Moscow, and any increase, as at present, in the degree to which Sofia is allowed to express its irredentist demands is one indicator of rising Soviet-Yugoslav tensions.

There have been only a few significant recent changes in Bulgarian foreign or domestic policy. (All are due presumably in part to the impact of the unsuccessful 1965 coup.) Yet there is no reason to suppose that Zhivkov will significantly deviate from the Soviet policies; and life in Bulgaria, although easier, will probably remain for the near future firmly under his, and Moscow's control.*

HUNGARY

Of the four countries that intervened with Moscow in Czechoslovakia, only Hungary has showed any significant signs of supporting Prague or at least of attempting to persuade Moscow to be lenient with Dubček's regime. Yet Kádár himself cannot escape from Soviet control. Red Army divisions are still in Hungary, and though he is no longer considered by most Hungarians to be a Quisling but, rather, the best they can hope for under the circumstances, he still needs Soviet support against potential resumption of domestic opposition.

Hungary thus remains in its post-1956 Thermidor period.* However, in recent years economic decentralization and cultural relaxation have become much more extensive than in East Germany. In order to forestall the destabilizing political effects of the economic reforms Kádár has given limited interest-group representation to trade unions, the agricultural cooperative council, and Parliament. In short, Hungary is now a partially consultative authoritarian state. Even so, Kádár remains firmly in power, no political opposition is allowed, and in all essential questions Soviet control of Hungarian foreign policy continues firm.

The most striking sign of Kádár's desire for more autonomy from Moscow and, probably, for comprehensive reform at home came when he tried to maintain good relations with two of the members of the reconstituting Little Entente: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In the interwar period these three countries, who in 1919 had annexed territory and millions of ethnic Hungarians from defeated Hungary, allied with France against Admiral Horthy's regime, for which

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The annexation of ethnically-mixed Transylvania by Romania in 1919 and her recovery of it after 1945 inevitably make Hungarian-Romanian relations bad. Ceaucescu's increased discrimination against the Hungarian minority there has worsened them further. Moreover, although Kádár's attitude toward Dubček has been relatively favorable, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia showed signs earlier this year of reviving ethnic assertiveness and the entry of Hungarian troops into Slovakia on August 21, reminiscent of the entry of Bela Kun's army in 1919 and Horthy's in 1939, must have thrown a shadow over Hungarian-Czechoslovak relationships.

Hungary will not play a major role in East European affairs or in Soviet policy in the near future. It will, however, continue to work toward limited détente at home and abroad, to rationalize its economy, to benefit from trade with West Germany (without stepping out of line vis-à-vis Soviet German policy), to liberalize within fairly narrow limits, and thus to cultivate its own garden while waiting for better times.

As to the states opposed to the invasion, Tirana, like Peking, condemned it as Soviet imperialism and revisionism. Bucharest condemned it as infringement of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and violation of the Warsaw Pact. Belgrade denounced it as imperialism and anti-socialist behavior.
After the invasion, Albania followed China in denouncing both the Soviets and Dubček as revisionists, again demonstrating its sectarian irrelevance to East European politics. It also formally denounced the Warsaw Pact, from which it had been de facto excluded since 1960.

Tirana remains neo-Stalinist and an ally of Peking: underdeveloped, fanatical, ruled by a group of Western-educated modernizers, comparable more to Syria than to the rest of Eastern Europe. China finances Albania's perennial budget deficit. Albania and China share anti-Soviet and anti-Yugoslav policies. In recent years, however, there have been a few signs, of as yet uncertain importance, of Sino-Albanian strain.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia and its fear of a Soviet move in the Balkans have caused Albania to readjust its policies in the Balkans. It has become sharply hostile to Bulgaria; it ceased its recent occasional esoteric criticisms of Romania, the only 1st European state with which its relations have seemed good; and, most importantly, it has stopped attacking Yugoslavia, for historic and irredentist reasons (the Kosmet) its most important permanent enemy. Conversely, Belgrade has intensified its cultivation of Tirana. However, the Soviet threat has also reversed whatever minor worsening of Sino-Albanian relations have occurred, and reports of resultant Albanian attempts to improve relations with the West remain unconfirmed. Albania continues to share with China, Yugoslavia, and some West Europeans a feeling that Washington may well be more interested in détente with Moscow than in supporting them.

*E.g., minimal Chinese participation in the Scanderbeg celebration; far from total Albanian emulation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution; and decline in Albanian reprinting of Chinese articles.

In sum, the, Albania's reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia has been to improve its relations with all of its anti-Soviet neighbors in order to reinsure itself against any Soviet military move against it.

RUMANIA

Romania joined with Yugoslavia and the French and Italian Communists in condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and has remained firm in its condemnation despite Soviet pressure and rumors of impending Red Army invasion.

Bucharest's move away from Soviet domination began quietly in the late 1950's when Gheorghiu-Dej mysteriously convinced Moscow to withdraw Soviet troops from Romanian territory. His and Ceausescu's maneuvering to escape from Soviet domination has been worthy of a long tradition of Romanian foreign policy: shifting alliances with Byzantine skill so as to serve national interests. It was made possible by decline in Soviet authority and firmness combined with the opportunities opened by the Sino-Soviet split.

Feeding on historic anti-Russian sentiments and territorial irredentism (the Soviet 1945 annexation of Bessarabia) and on resentment over Khrushchev's CMEA integration policy, which would have condemned Romania to the status of a raw material provider for the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, genuine Romanian independence gradually reemerged. This independence first manifested itself in Bucharest's neutralism in the Sino-Soviet dispute and then in gravitation toward the West, in direct contrast to Soviet and ostensibly Warsaw Pact policy. It was furthered by the hostility of ethnically Romanian Communists, led by Dej and now by Ceausescu, toward pro-Soviet ethnic minority elements within the party: Hungarians, Ukrainians, and Jews. In short, the current policy reflects a resumption of the pre-war anti-oligarchy, modernization-oriented, highly nationalistic elements in Romanian radicalism. Before the war these were primarily

represented by the fascist Iron Guard: today, less mystical, more modernization-oriented, indeed, less obscurantist than the Polish Partisans, they are represented by the covert social fascist elements in Romanian communism.

In foreign policy Romania has resumed its pre-1945 traditions of balancing among various hostile powers and seeking protection against the most dangerous single threat to its independence—now the U.S.S.R. This continues the tradition of the interwar foreign minister Titulescu and, more than has usually been realized, even of its wartime fascist dictator Marshal Antonescu. Domestically, its policy is populist, emphasizing nation more than international class solidarity (Nazi or Communist). It is highly elitist, successful in economic growth, intolerant of anything like genuine autonomy for the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, and combines limited relaxation of police control, but no political opposition, with as independent a foreign policy as Ceauşescu feels he can afford.

In some respects Romania's deviations from Moscow are less serious than Czechoslovakia's. Romania deviates along nationalist but not liberalizing lines. It is nowhere near as vital to Soviet security interests as Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the skill and extent of Romanian balancing in foreign relations can be compared only to Ayub Khan's Pakistan: it involves good, or at least correct relations with all major powers. Romania has supported most Soviet policy positions in Moscow's dispute with China but has rejected Soviet organizational domination of international communism, thereby enabling Bucharest to maintain correct relations with other Communist states also seeking independence: North Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Albania, and China herself.

However, Ceauşescu's attempted alliance with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia posed a particularly serious threat to the U.S.S.R. Moreover, he has gone further than either the Yugoslavs or the Czechs on the issue of Israel, by not only rejecting Moscow's anti-Israel policy but carrying on a rapprochement with Jerusalem.

Romania has resumed relations with Bonn against Soviet wishes and profited economically thereby. It has joined with other non-atomic
powers to oppose the non-proliferation treaty and with other developing nations against the industrialized powers of East and West. It has remained within the Warsaw Pact and CMEA but primarily to restrain their use against itself.

In sum, Romania has defied the Soviet lead on a series of increasingly important foreign policy issues, while the U.S.S.R. has become increasingly sensitive to challenges (Romanian as well as Czechoslovak) to its leadership. Thus Romania's position vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. has become increasingly precarious, but Ceausescu shows no signs of major retreat and Moscow has not at least as yet seemed inclined to invade.
YUGOSLAVIA

The August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia marked a defeat for Yugoslav foreign policy, which with Prague and Bucharest had been actively trying to recreate a de facto Little Entente, this time directed primarily not against Hungary and Germany but against the Soviet Union. However, insofar as the invasion has further alienated Romania from Moscow, and provided that Moscow does not, as seems unlikely, invade Romania as well, Yugoslav-Romanian relations will improve still further as a result and Yugoslav, like Romanian, opposition to the scheduled Soviet-sponsored Moscow International Communist conference will increase. Tito may also well be able to cement his ties with the now considerably less pro-Soviet French and Italian Communist parties. Moreover, he will try to improve his relations with the West, notably Washington and Bonn, since he may well want American military aid and will want more West German credits. With Czechoslovakia's liberalization suspended, the example of Yugoslavia's will become relatively more important. In any case, once again, as in 1956, Tito's desire to remain on good terms with Moscow has been frustrated. All the more reason, therefore, for him and Yugoslavia to move closer to Western Europe and the United States.

For the last twenty years Tito has tried to compensate for his 1948 forced break with Moscow by his activity in the third world. After 1955 he participated in a partial rapprochement with Stalin's successors in order to play a renewed role in international communism as well. His primary motive in both cases was to insure Yugoslavia's freedom of movement vis-à-vis both the West and the U.S.S.R. by not becoming completely dependent upon either for economic support and military protection, as well as to further his exalted idea of his own importance.

This traditional Titoist foreign policy is today largely bankrupt. The third world is split, its prestige much lower, and its conflicting voices little heard in the world. The international Communist movement is split and weakened; and Tito's polarization within it, due to his domestic revisionism and nonaligned status as well
as to Chinese and Cuban hostility and mixed Soviet feelings toward him, allow him less flexibility than Ceaușescu. Thus, although Yugoslavia probably will not abandon its third-world ties, they will have lower priority in the future.

The major new factor in Yugoslav foreign policy is thus Western Europe. Economic liberalization at home, massive foreign tourism, at least 250,000 Yugoslav workers in the West, and the rising involvement of Yugoslav enterprises with, plus increasing imports from, Western Europe, all push in this direction. Yugoslavia's attempts to become an associate member of the Common Market have so far been unsuccessful, but Belgrade continues to try. The cultural influence of Western Europe, notably of Germany and Italy, pervades Yugoslavia and has begun to affect Yugoslav internal politics. Indeed, the rapprochement of Yugoslavia with Western Europe may well turn out to be the best way of diminishing nationalities tension, by satisfying one of the main aims of the Western republics and giving them and the rest of Yugoslavia a larger framework than their own conflicts.

The most striking recent instance of the rise of West European influence has been West Germany's. Renewed prosperity there reversed a temporary decline in Yugoslav workers in West Germany, who again probably number at least 150,000. West German-Yugoslav trade is rising rapidly. The passive Yugoslav trade balance with the Federal Republic, now around DM 800 million ($200 million), is running around DM 400 ($100) million per year. Since perhaps DM 730 ($182) million yearly comes into Yugoslavia from Yugoslav workers in West Germany and West German tourism, the excess of West German exports to over imports from Yugoslavia is perhaps DM 1 billion ($250 million) per year. The recent reestablishment of diplomatic relations on Belgrade's terms, i.e., continued relations between Belgrade and East Berlin, marks an economic gain for both sides, but politically, since Yugoslavia is the poorer partner, it will favor Bonn.

Domestically the situation in Yugoslavia becomes increasingly precarious. The end of predominant Soviet influence in 1948 and the subsequent liberalization revived the traditional political cultures in that multinational country.
This has led to the revival of nationalities tensions. These are now the most important features of Yugoslav politics, and even before the departure of Marshal Tito they already overshadow the Yugoslav political scene, thereby largely immobilizing Yugoslavia in international affairs.

The memory of the ghastly war-time mutual slaughter of Serbs and Croats and Tito’s determination to prevent its recurrence suppressed traditional nationalities tensions until recently. Nor, after Tito goes, is Yugoslavia likely to disintegrate. The freezing of European boundaries in the nuclear age, the remaining memories of the War, and the realization by most Yugoslav Communists that independence for the republics would probably mean the end of communism in them, will probably be enough to keep the country united. But although united, far from unified. Rather, nationalities tension will probably continue to rise and the Central European developed areas and the East European underdeveloped ones will thus drift farther apart.

Yugoslavia, like Czechoslovakia, was founded only in 1919. In ethnic and religious rivalries, stages of economic development, and attitudes to their neighbors, its nationalities are the most variegated and contentious in Europe. Slovenia is Central European, the Kosmet still almost Middle Eastern. Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Macedonia (Orthodox or Moslem in religion) are anti-German and therefore less hostile to Russia. The Roman Catholic republics, Slovenia and

Croatia are closer to Austria by tradition, less anti-German and strongly anti-Russian. Slovenia is highly economically developed; Croatia largely so; Serbia is in between; Macedonia, Bosnia, and the Kosmet are still very underdeveloped.

Most recently, the resurgence of Slovene and Croat nationalism, including rising Croat hostility to their Serb minority and anti-Serb feeling by the minorities in Serbia, the Hungarians in the Vojvodina and the Albanians in the Kosmet, have led to a defensive, strong, emotional Serb nationalism among even those Serbs hitherto pro-Yugoslav in sentiment. Whereas the Slovenes, Croats, and Macedonians have in Marinko, Bakarić, and Crvenkovski respectively leaders of recognized stature and authority, the Serbs do not. Renewed Serb nationalism is therefore the more frustrated, above all because this lack makes it unlikely that Marshal Tito, himself half Croat and half Slovene, will be succeeded by a Serb.

The geographic impetus of political and economic liberalization, particularly the 1963 fall of the hated Serb head of the security police Aleksandr Ranković, came from Slovenia and Croatia, the most highly developed, westernized areas of Yugoslavia. Decentralization, a market economy, workers' self-management, and expanded foreign trade carried on by individual enterprises, all long the rule, have intensified rapidly since.

Political liberalization has progressed less, indeed, less than in Czechoslovakia before the Soviet invasion. However, there has been some academic discussion of a two-party system and the Zagreb philosophical journal Praxis has propagated a "humanistic Marxism," more liberal and less bureaucratic, similar to interwar French and German Marxist theories. The political ideas of Christian Democracy are probably spreading in predominantly Catholic Croatia and Slovenia; and Milovan Djilas, now at liberty, is a social democrat who since Rankovic's fall believes in working within Yugoslav communism for its liberalization. Yet there are no immediate prospects of a two-party system in Yugoslavia. Rather, de facto opposition within the party or, more accurately, the six parties of the six republics, is now easier and more extensive. Furthermore, some of the Yugoslav "social
organizations" (notably the trade unions) are showing some signs of independent spirit. In sum, Yugoslavia is a stage of consultative authoritarianism, and to the extent that federalism has become more genuine, at least in a geographical, institutional sense moving toward participatory authoritarianism.

The most striking single recent development in Yugoslavia has been the student demonstrations at the University of Belgrade and at other universities. They arose out of a feeling of alienation from and protest at: (1) a still rather stagnant, partisan-dominated social structure, whose professed ideology of workers' self-administration and withering away of the state has been far from realized in practice; (2) the low standard of living and especially the over-supply of students, who as a result of the rationalization of the economic reforms are not sure of jobs; and (3)—the new factor, and the first time that in part for this reason Yugoslav society had experienced a crisis—the influence of the student demonstrations in France, West Germany, and Italy, transmitted by the Yugoslav press and television, plus the ideological influence, direct and via the Praxis group, of New Left thinking in West European Marxism. The party leadership was initially divided about how to deal with the demonstrations and only Tito's tactically brilliant endorsement of many of their demands ended the crisis for the present. Yet this may well turn out only to be an armistice; the social tensions the demonstrations revealed can hardly rapidly or easily be contained.

Yugoslavia, then, remains largely in a state of waiting—for Tito's departure. As after de Gaulle's in France, prediction is difficult. But like post-de Gaulle France neither political stability nor influence in international affairs is likely to be furthered by Tito's passing.
CONCLUSION

It is not now possible to give a definitive answer to the question with which this paper began: has the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia decisively and permanently reversed the trend toward autonomy and liberalization in Eastern Europe or will the indigenous forces for national communism again revive? On balance, it seems to me unlikely that any permanent reversal has occurred. Rather, the invasion has probably limited and slowed down tendencies that will reoccur.

This seems likely for reasons arising out of Soviet as well as East European affairs. As to the former, I share Professor Brzezinski's view that Soviet society is tending toward bureaucratic degeneration,* and that the countervailing forces of intellectual ferment, nationalities tensions, and economic revisionism make a full-scale reversion to Stalinist imperialism in Eastern Europe extremely difficult. Brezhnev has neither Stalin's complete power nor the former dictator's iron conviction that his own solutions should be imposed regardless of cost in life or rubles. Nor did Khrushchev. And the likelihood that even a new and more charismatic leader in Moscow could reconsolidate the Soviet political élite without the aid of wartime pressure is slim.

The invasion was primarily an assertion of Great Russian imperialism, not "proletarian internationalism." The Thermidor of Bolshevism may turn into Great Russian Fascism: imperialism, anti-intellectualism, anti-Semitism, anti-Westernism. Meanwhile, signs of political decay accumulate.

As to Eastern Europe, modernization furthers rationalization and popular pressures on their regimes, which may be controlled as in East Germany or acquire independent impetus as in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. If politicization outruns institutionalization it leads to political decay (e.g. Poland). Everywhere politicization and nationalism, combined with the demand for economic growth,

threaten rigidly centralized regimes. Moreover, the attraction of Western Europe, and particularly the economic pull of Western Germany, can be temporarily contained but hardly obliterated.

Thus an interim period of some repression and then a slower, more limited resumption of liberalization seems to me the most likely prognosis for Eastern Europe. Even so, however, it will probably remain, as will Western Europe, the object, not the subject of world politics. Soviet evolution, the East-West relationship, and the German problem will overshadow although not necessarily override internal changes in Eastern Europe.