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It is easy to point out that this text "is" a legend while that other one "is not." The decision is based on experience: one "feels" that this "is" a legend; but when it comes to looking for an exact definition, which would enable us to decide with certainty whether a given text "is" or "is not" a legend — such a set of criteria we do not as yet have. The definitions offered so far have serious flaws. As the subsequent thinking is done on the basis of the old definition of the Brothers Grimm, let us reexamine this definition, see what the relations of its components are and what their merits may be. It is hoped that such an examination will give new insights.

As we said, the most well known definition of the legend, and the fundamental one to all other definitions, is the one of the Brothers Grimm: a legend is a story which is believed; it is told about a definite (real or fabulous) person, event or place.

Four factors are included in this definition:

1. the legend fits somewhere in the dimension of the historical time of the narrator:
   (a) the legend is connected with a definite historical (real or fabulous) event
(b) the legend is connected with a definite person, i.e., a named historical (real or fabulous) figure

2. the legend fits somewhere in the dimension of the geographical space of the narrator: it is connected with a definite place;

3. the legend is a true story: i.e., although it deals with supernatural events, it is "believed" by its bearers, it is regarded as being placed in the real world of the narrator and of his audience (contrary to this the fairy-tale, also dealing with supernatural events, is not "believed" by the same narrating community).

Subsequent classifications of oral literature have been based explicitly or implicitly on these factors. Although Roehrich (1966:3), in summarizing the work done, concluded that these principles were found inadequate, recent attempts at classification still go on using them: W. Bascom (1965), using material from various cultures, takes the criterion of the "belief" of the narrative community in the happening described in a specified kind of tale as the main distinguishing quality; and C. Scott Littleton (1965) attempts classification of texts along two axes: (a) the measure of the sacredness of the text in its society, and (b) the measure of the fabulousness of it, which are aspects of the "believing" and "time-and-place-boundedness."
In the legend, circumscribed by the traditional definition, many kinds are distinguished. The variety of "kinds of legends" and their definitions are under discussion because they are generally viewed as the main points of a suitable classification scheme for legends. Here we will discuss the points of the traditional definition; on the way we will meet two "kinds of legends" which are an outcome of Grimm's original idea that the legend is bound to time and/or space: the "historical legend" (determined by actors and events) and the "local legend" (determined by a named geographical point). We will see how far these qualities can serve as definitions for a classification. (For a discussion in which the difficulties of the conception of a "historical" and a "local" legend can be seen, see Burde-Schneidewind 1964).

In order to make our discussion concrete, the Grimms' propositions will be examined on a corpus of Jewish-Near Eastern legendary material.

The material: the survey is based on a corpus of ca. 750 texts, recorded from Jews coming from Mohammadan countries, now in Israel. The selected texts comprise ca. 1/5 of the collected Near Eastern material; the remainder are not legends. Excluded were texts whose actual oral circulation is doubtful (due to the unreliability of the recorders). Most of the recorded legends are sacred legends; another group comprise legends about demons.
(Hebrew shed, Arabic jinni) — approximately 50 texts. These and a few other legendary texts were not included in our discussion, as they are supposed (on independent grounds not dealt with here) to belong to other kinds of legends.

The legend: by "sacred legend" we understand an oral tale in which the official sacred power of the society resolves the conflict in the plot. Any recording of a tale is regarded as a valid text in itself (and not as a possible variant of some "tale-type"); the corpus of texts of a society is looked upon as an interrelated organic whole. Our definition binds the text to the society in which it was told: the "official sacred power" and the "conflict in the plot" are both parts of the particular society's culture. (For a detailed exposition of the concepts see Jason 1968a, 1968b.)

The society from which the texts originate may be characterized roughly as follows:

1. formal characteristics: politically semi-independent ethno-religious community in a traditional pluralistic society; it is part of a lower middle class urban stratum; it is semi-literate (in general, only men can read, and this only in a ritual, non-spoken language);

2. content characteristics: the culture has two components:
   a. A Jewish one (common to Jews on both sides of the Christian/Muslim border: religiously and ritually determined practices), and
b. Near Eastern one (common with the general Muslim culture, based on the Hellenistic one: secular components).

All this is said of the society while still in its original setting, before its dissolution with the mass emigration to Israel. For a discussion of the Near Eastern Jews in the past see the respective chapters in Baron 1942 and 1952ff; for a discussion of their present see in Eisenstadt 1954:90–97 and 1967.

Let us now examine Grimm's propositions one by one:

1. The temporal setting of our tales.

(a) The historical event: In the majority of the legends in our corpus no concrete historical event, real or fabulous, is explicitly stated. Instead, it is implicitly assumed by the narrator that the events described in the legends happened in a certain general frame. This frame is given by two factors:

a. the Jewish calendar starting with the "Creation" is known to everybody (year 1967/8 is 5728 since the Creation) — hence "the legends surely do not relate about events before this date" (a narrator's opinion).

b. the historical account of the Bible, expanded by the widely known "Yosiphon" book (a medieval paraphrase of the historical books of Josephus Flavius) supplies a non-interrupted
chain of events from the Creation to the second destruction of the Temple (year 70 C.E.).

The examined corpus has shown that the legends can be distributed along this historical frame. They are unevenly distributed, and cluster on certain points, ignoring others.

The frame would be as follows:
1. mythical time (from the creation until the birth of Abraham);
2. the life of Abraham and of his immediate descendants;
3. the founding of the Jewish state in Palestine;
4. the destruction of the Jewish state (the first destruction is looked upon as decisive);
5. the exodus to the Diaspora;
6. the epoch of the Diaspora (taken as a whole)
7. the recent generations
8. our generation;
9. the Redemption
   (a) eschatology;
   (b) return to the State of Israel.

In order to distribute the texts of our corpus among the points on the time-scale we used first of all explicitly mentioned names of heroes about whom it is known when they lived (or are supposed to have lived). This means that the same plot may appear in different places on the time scale according to its heroes being named differently. The second datum for placing a text on the time scale is a historical (or pseudohistorical) event mentioned (different historical
events can also be added to the same tale-plot). These criteria gave the groups 2, 3, 4, 5, 9. In each of these groups only very few texts were found. The rest of the tales have been distributed as follows:
group 8 – personal recollections of the informants about happenings while still living in the Diaspora;
group 7 – legends naming a local notable, known to have lived a still-recollected number of generations ago (includes family legends about forefathers – ca. 25% of our material);
group 6 – all other non-etiological material (statements of the informants clarified this implicit frame – ca. 50% of our material);
group 1 – etiological tales, not connected to a particular concrete point in time and space (the building of a known synagogue would be assigned to groups 7 or 8. Our culture does not possess real myths).

A cursory review shows that very few historical events are recollected, and that all of the ones mentioned handle a single problem which has a crucial meaning to the Jew: namely his national Diaspora problem. Groups 2 and 3 symbolize the beginning of the Jewish nation, groups 4 and 5 the beginning of the Diaspora, group 9 the end of it. As we said, the texts set in these periods are the only ones which explicitly mention historical events at all; the others do not.
One may wonder what happened to the many persecutions which the Jews not so long ago had to suffer; our concern is not with the recent Nazi persecutions; these could be thought of as too recent to produce legends (besides that they did not affect the bulk of Near Eastern Jews). In fact, a few legends about these events did spring up immediately among East European Jewry, but there exists in our material only a single tale about miraculous rescue from Nazi persecution (from Tunis, Archiv no. IFA 3749, translated in Jason 1968b. Tunis was occupied by the Germans in World War II). We do not yet know, however, how long tales about these events will persist in the oral tradition. Here we are concerned with the persecutions of the late Middle Ages, such as the expulsion from Spain (1492). This was a major catastrophe, dispersed the expelled over the whole Near East (the very area from which our texts are drawn), produced a vast literature, a major mystical movement and is well known as a real event to everyone — yet it does not appear in our corpus of legends. It seems to us that another factor was the decisive one here: namely, the principle of the "meaning" of the historical event in the frame of the value system of the society whose central dilemma is, as we said, the problem of the Diaspora. Although a great catastrophe, the expulsion from Spain was only a single event in a long chain of similar ones; it did not affect this central dilemma, the existence of the Diaspora. On the other hand, the still more recent establishment of the State of Israel was a
decisive event — and although so recent, immediately produced legends in the traditional pattern.

We see how the corpus of tales of a society has a dimension of historical time and every text can find its place on this "time-axis". This happens regardless of the possibility that in one text or another a known historical personage may act, that the happenings described in the text took place in a certain geographical point. Thus, it does not seem meaningful to classify texts according to whether a historical event is explicitly mentioned in the text or not.

(b) The acting characters of our tales: according to Grimm’s proposition, we are asking in our corpus of legends for the named actors. Counting showed that only 42% of the texts give the human acting characters a proper name.

These are mostly local community leaders (or their shrines) who lived in the recent generations; as the Muslim world has almost no historical archive material or other documentation preserved, very little or nothing is known about most of these local personages outside of the memories of our informants. There are 123 names mentioned; the majority of them are rabbis; secular leaders appear only a few times.

Seven names of medieval Jewish personages appear: four scholars: R. Gershom (10th century France); R. Moses Maimonides (12th century Egypt), R. Shalom Sharabi (18th
century Yemen and Palestine), and the much earlier scholar
R. Shimon Bar-Yohai (2nd century Palestine), known from the
covers of the widespread main kabbalistic book "Zohar"
(written in the 13th century), of which he is pseudoauthor;
two poets: R. Abraham Ibn Ezra (12th century Spain) and R.
Shalom Shabazi (17th century Yemen); we must add the pseudo-
historical R. Meir Baal Nes ("the miracle worker"), whose
shrine is in Galilee.

Further down the time-scale we find a few early biblical
heroes. The first figure is Moses, who appears here out of
any historical context, as an immortal representative of
mankind vs. God. He acts in the general frame of the post-
exile Diaspora period. Moses plays the same role in similar
Arabic folk legends. It seems that the stories, together
with Moses as actor, were taken over from the Arabs rather
mechanically; for the first such legend see the Kor'an,

The second biblical personage is Joseph (son of Jacob),
who acts the novel about him and Potiphar's wife. A few
other texts relate about Joseph's brothers and their sons.
The next hero down the time-scale is Abraham in conflict
with his enemies. At the bottom, in the mythical time
(see above, point 1 of the temporal scheme), Adam, Noah,
Moses, and Mohammed act in etiological tales (here Moses
and Mohammed are torn out of the historical context). The
following non-human actors are found: God; angels (unnamed);
Elijah the Prophet (see I Kings 17 through II Kings 2), who acts in approximately 1/5 of the tales (as he is an immortal he is not counted in the 42% of tales with named heroes); "Sons of Moses"; souls of the dead (partly of named rabbis, included in the 42% of the material containing named actors), and inanimate objects. Iblis (Satan) appears only in a single etiological legend (Jason 1965, No. 825 *A). So we see that the better half of the legends have anonymous actors.

Having listed the personages which appear in our corpus of tales, let us examine their characteristics. The most striking feature of the actors is that they are stereotypes: actually, they are only role-performers, who act in a pre-modeled play. It has no significance whether the actor has some proper name of a historical person or not, whether he is a recent, known community leader, an anonymous person or a medieval Jewish rationalistic philosopher — in the legend he will perform just the same deeds. The same can be said about the mythical images of Adam, Noah and Mohammad: they are freely interchangeable in the same role in an etiological story and have no individuality (for instance, Balys 1936, No. *411). The only distinguishable actors are the biblical personages: they are tied to their roles in the biblical and midrashic legends (these have a little different characteristics than our corpus of
tales on the whole). Moses performs a unique role as the representative of mankind against God (by the way, these are the only legends in which God himself acts). Elijah the Prophet, although a biblical human figure, is thought of as an immortal, omnipresent agent of the sacred power. In the role of Elijah any other non-human being (except God) can appear, including those which are inanimate. They reward, help and punish man.

Rather than being individuals the actors can be conceptualized as "tale-roles"; roughly, the existing actor-roles in our corpus of legends can be defined as follows:

a. the main hero, acting positively in regard to the demands of his society, or acting against it and so being the negative hero;
b. the anti-hero, acting in opposition to the main hero (and so also varying between being positive or negative); this provokes collision between the two actors, thus picturing the conflict between the principles they represent;
c. the resolver of the collision — some kind of agent of the sacred power.

The actor-roles are mostly distributed among performers of social roles as follows:

a. the positive hero (a. or b. in our above division) is a clerical community leader (this is the human actor-type which is most often named; the biblical heroes
are of course recognizable by their names); or an entire local Jewish community (almost never named, but posed as a type);

b. the negative hero can be any secular member of the Jewish community; the Jewish community as a whole (as opposed to its clerical leaders); or a representative of the Gentile world, who may be an ordinary member of the community or a leader;

c. the agent of the sacred power can be a human: a Jewish clerical community leader, or, rarely, another divinely inspired member of the Jewish community; an other-worldly actor (may also appear in human shape as a mysterious "stranger", "baldhead" etc., appearing in need and disappearing afterwards); or an object endowed (temporarily or permanently) with supernatural powers.

In this frame we can classify all acting characters, regardless of their being named or anonymous, human or supernatural, animate or inanimate. The behavior of the actor will be determined by the tale-role he plays, and not by his individuality. The legend tends to strip off the concrete person's historical setting, and to equate him with the appropriate role-stereotype.

Thus, there does not seem to be much use in classifying tales according to the proper name which perchance was used in a particular retelling of a tale. The "tale-role" is the important formative element. There would
seem to be little sense in classifying a text in which a named hero appears as a "historical legend," and the next text, with the same tale-plot but an anonymous hero, as something else (what would this "something else" be?)

Before we leave the temporal dimension, let us discuss briefly several other attempts in the same direction. Most familiar is C. von Sydow's classification of legends (v. Sydow 1948:23-86; descriptions and discussions see in Peuckert 1957, Roehrich 1966:4-9 and Tillhagen 1964:9-10). This classification is based partly on a time-scale, partly on the individual identity of the actors, and partly on the "formal" characteristics (by this latter he apparently means the plot of the tale): v. Sydow's scheme would be:

a. recollected time
   1. memorat – a "form-less" personal recollection;
   2. fabulat – a "form-bound" story about past events (started as a memorat);
   3. chronicat – a family saga, and ordered ("form-bound") chain of memorats and fabulats, narrated about several generations of a single family;

b. undefined time, but still in our present world
   1. Glaubensfabulat – a fabulat about some supernatural figure, "form-bound";
   2. Personenfabulat – a fabulat about some human (real or fabulous) figure, "form-bound";

c. mythical time
   1. Aitionsfabulat – an etiological animal tale (not clear whether "form-bound").
v. Sydow's time scheme is a rough sketch; as it is intended to be universal and not bound to a particular culture, it cannot of course be more concrete. As it stands it is, however, considerably tailored to fit Scandinavian material (e.g., the chronicat). When it comes to deciding where to assign a concrete text, things get rather difficult: in our corpus of tales, for instance, are found legends in a regular traditional "form," but told as personal recollections, and of which the whole community believe that they were actors and eyewitnesses (an account of a recent successful communal rain prayer — Archiv No. IFA 2906, from Persian Kurdistan). Where should we classify such a story? A memorat is "formless"; the "form-bound" fabulat is a tale which had time to wander away from the real person of its hero. Thus v. Sydow's classification seems to connect three dimensions which do not co-occur automatically: the temporal scale, the personage of the hero and the plot of the tale (the "form"). (For a critical discussion of other aspects of von Sydow's scheme, see Silverman—Weinreich 1965:206–207.)

Another brief account of a meaningful historical scheme, this time in a different medium — Chinese representational temple decorations — has recently been made by W. Eberhard (1967:30–31). As these decorations are dependent on popular novels and theater plays, we are actually again dealing with the tradition of verbal art and its concept
of history. The author finds a historical scheme under-lying the corpus of temple pictures, and suggests that it is the idea of national glory that determines the shape of the historical scheme depicted (I cannot give further explanation, as I am not familiar with Chinese culture and history).

A third brief attempt to construct a time-scale which passed unnoticed is Paul Radin's (1933:369) chronological sequence of Winnebago (North American Indian) myths. The myths describe how our world came to look as it does now, each successive stage being more human than the previous one:

(a) in the Primordial age the cosmos is still unformed and the attempts at creation are non-purposive; symbolized in the figure of the Trickster; no human beings yet;

(b) in the Primitive age the present world is formed; symbolized in the figure of the Hare whose actions are still non-moral but already purposive; human beings appear but are weak;

(c) in the Olympian age deities (Red-horn) are wholly purposive; struggle for preservation of the world for man, who is still weak;

(d) in the Heroic age man, triumphing, starts to rebel against gods; semi-divine Twins are the heroes.
Here, as in our time-scale, the points on the scale are not merely a chronological sequence; they are a meaningful sequence of events, leading to a goal: in our legends it is the solution of the Diaspora problem, and in the Winnebago myths it is the creation and possible meaningfulness of their present world. The "meaning" is the formative force, whether the time scale be set in mythical time, as is the case with these Indian myths, or in historical time, as is the case with the Jewish–Near Eastern tales. The people are not interested in history as such, be it of a personage (real or fabulous) or of a place; the historical (or the pseudohistorical and the mythical) events are only used to express and handle certain ideas and problems of the narrating society.

The cases discussed may teach us that a useful time-scale can be made for a particular culture; broad universal categories such as v. Sydow's may be attempted afterwards.

2. The spatial setting of our tales.

Each story is thought of as staged somewhere. If we take together all these "somewheres" of our corpus of tales, a certain geographic picture evolves. In this picture the narrator and his community are always in the center, and around this center spread rings of space of different qualities. Two basic divisions of space exist: "this world" and the "other world". Both are subdivided:
(a) this world
1. the center at which the narrator and his audience stand: their settlement and its surroundings, in which their daily life goes on. Here tales about local rabbis and personal reminiscences are set;
2. the more remote real world, which is occasionally visited by some members of the community, but not by all (e.g., the district town, a famous holy shrine, etc.). Here will be set tales about better known rabbis and occasionally the narrator's own reminiscences about journeys;
3. somewhere in "our country", meaning that the reality of the narrator's material world and social order are taken for granted and "our country" may even be mentioned as the setting of the tale, without a specific place being given; the hero is anonymous, or may be a medieval sage.
4. somewhere on earth but far away from "our country", meaning that the setting of the tale does not directly resemble "our country", but still is not fabulous. The hero is in this case again anonymous, or may be a medieval sage.
5. special symbolic places which may or may not exist in reality, such as: the king's town, the Holy Land, the Land of the Sons of Moses, etc. In such tales anonymous heroes or medieval sages may play.

(b) the other world

This is not described but only vaguely alluded to: God, angels, Elijah, the dead, appear from "somewhere"; Moses meets God "somewhere"; a poor man goes "somewhere" to search for his luck; an event happens in "the field", "the desert". This space can be subdivided into:

1. the other world proper: the world where man's soul finds itself after death: paradise, purgatory and hell. This space begins somewhere beneath the gravestone; to enter it, living man has to change his status into that of a dead soul, and there is no way back to this world as a living man;

2. the space between the crystallized paradise-hell region proper and this world. These are the "somewhere"s in the field, desert, Mount Sinai, etc., which are beyond this world. Their place is not defined, but one has in any case to leave one's town to reach them. God and other "other-worldly"
beings will appear there, while they will not be expected to appear to the living in this world proper. A living man can visit this region and return to this world, a thing which he is not supposed to be able to do with the "other world" proper. The state of sleep has this intermediate quality; it corresponds to the intermediate space-quality in being between life and death: other-worldly beings appear to living men in dreams; a living man can enter the dream state and leave it again to return to full life.

This would be the picture of the geographic space our corpus of tales is set in. Some features of this geographic picture will presumably turn out to be universal, such as the division between "this" and the "other" world and the concentric organization of the perception of space. The details of the breakdown and the qualities of the space-divisions will presumably vary from culture to culture. A particular proper place-name can appear only in a text whose events are staged in the spaces $a_1$ and $a_2$; in the rest of the texts the stage is only alluded to (but can be clarified by inquiring of the narrator).

A spatial scheme for another corpus of tales (which also happen to be Jewish sacred legends, but East
European) has been investigated by B. Silverman-Weinreich (1965:208-212). Her organizing principle differs from ours: instead of the viewpoint of the narrator being taken as the point of departure, an abstract scheme is used. This scheme has two dichotomous dimensions: (a) that of "this world" vs. the "other world"; (b) that of a named and an unnamed place. We may note that dimension (b) follows partly the Grimms' principle, but does not exclude from being legends the texts which are staged in the unnamed places. There are other, independent qualities in the tales which compel us nevertheless to treat the whole corpus of tales as being of the same kind (Silverman-Weinreich 1965:204).

The intersection of these two axes gives naturally four general types of settings. Each of these four groups exhibits a set of common characteristics, and so the meaning of the grouping could be investigated (unfortunately, in the brief paper of Silverman-Weinreich this was not possible). The four groups could be related to our scheme in a general way:

- **this world**: definite, named places—our points a1, a2
- **this world**: indefinite, unnamed places—our points a3, a4
- **other world**: definite, named places—our points a5, b1; sometimes b2;
- **other world**: indefinite, unnamed places—outside our scheme: fairy tale settings.
In the last setting Silverman-Weinreich's scheme steps outside the realm of what is commonly understood by "legend".

We saw that the geographic space (real or fabulous) in which a corpus of tales of a culture is set is organized in some way. Every text finds its place in this space, whether a certain geographic point is mentioned in the text or not. In addition, it is by now a commonplace that "local legends" are in reality generally known tale-plots which constantly change their concrete geographical affiliation. Thus it does not seem to be very useful to declare texts which happen to mention a specific place to be a special class of literary works. It seems to be more useful to investigate what the organization of the space in the culture under investigation is, how the texts are distributed in it and what the meaning of this distribution is.

We have arrived at the third point of the Grimms' definition:

3. The "believing" determinant. The Grimms put forth the concept of the "belief" vs. "non-belief" in the happening the tale describes. To "believe" in the happening the tale describes can mean that the narrator believes the tale tells "truth"; or, it can mean that the happening in the tale is described in realistic terms which make the happening "real", so to speak palpable,
to the narrator. A "real" story is always also regarded to be "true", but the opposite relationship does not hold. A tale dealing with a vitally meaningful, important theme will be regarded as "true" even if its setting is "unreal". In this sense myths are "true" although their setting may be completely unreal. The "truth" aspect is bound to the "meaning" the tales bear, an aspect which we have not discussed in the present paper (see Jason 1968a, points B5, C6, and a detailed exposition in Jason 1968b).

The concept of "belief", as understood by the Grimms, seems to be the "realness" of the tale for the narrator, and so we will discuss here this aspect of the "belief".

The Grimms put forth a clear-cut dichotomy of "believing" that a story tells about a happening which really took place vs. "not believing" such a thing. Today we know that the quality of the narrator's attitude to his tale is unstable, that it varies in different societies and with the individual; it differs even in different periods of the same individual's life.

Let us briefly describe the general attitude of our society to its oral tales. Narrators assured us that all tales they told us are reports of events which took place in reality, though perhaps they took place very long ago; otherwise there would be no point in telling the tales! (Ney 1963a:18; the same is, by the way, reported about a Hungarian narrator; see Erdesz 1961). This attitude
includes legends as well as fairy tales. Together with this generally uniform attitude, there seem to be different degrees of "realness" of a tale. Thus if my father told me that Rabbi So-and-So, whom my grandfather still saw living, made the melons of an arrogant gentile greengrocer jump and hit the greengrocer's head — this is obviously an account of a real happening; the said shop is still in the family of the greengrocer's descendants. But a story about a cruel king (always unnamed) who once demanded that a Jewish community (unnamed also) fulfill some impossible task and was punished by one of the "Sons of Moses" who came flying from "their land behind the river Sambation" (see Jason 1965, No. 922 *C), or an argument between Moses and God — these two tales are as far remote from our narrator as a fairy tale is. Nevertheless both tales should be counted, on independent grounds, as real sacred legends.

Taking into consideration this situation, we propose to turn the Grimms' dichotomy of "believing" vs. "nonbelieving" into a linear continuum, as we did with the temporal and spatial schemes: we will have a continuum of degrees of "realness" shading to extremes at either end. The texts will be distributed along the continuum, and with each retelling of a tale-plot the tale may change its place on the line.
The "believing" factor does not seem to be independent. From our example we may learn that it depends on the two other determinants we have discussed. The relation could be stated approximately as follows: the nearer, more known, and more everyday the historical and geographical setting of the tale is, and the nearer its actors to the narrator's personal experience — the more "real" the happening of the tale will appear to the narrator.

To return to the starting point, the definition of the Brothers Grimm: the criteria pointed out by them prove to be important qualities of the tales. They have, however, to be modified from absolute qualities to relative ones, from dichotomies to continua. The first two of the criteria — the temporal and the spatial schemes — must be constructed separately for every particular culture; the third — the "believing" quality — is a secondary quality which is the outcome of the other two and will be a product of a universal rule.
Notes:
1. It is my pleasure to thank here my teachers, A. Dundes, S. N. Eisenstadt and the late Mrs. Yonina Garber-Talmon, under whose kind guidance and encouragement this work took shape; the shortcomings are of course my own fault.
2. The Society for Folk-Narrative Research has been making efforts in recent years to classify legends. Several meetings of the Society have been devoted to this theme. See the reports and papers in Volkskunde 64 (1963), Acta Ethnographica 13 (1964), W. D. Hand's (1965) summary and L. Schmidt's (1965) critique of the proposals. For more recent discussions see the relevant papers and reports in Fabula 9:1–303. For previous type-indexings of legends see national catalogues in FF Communications, Nos. 8, 25, 60, 66, 122, 132, 175, 182, and Balys (1936); L. Roehrich discussed several kinds of legends in Maerchen (1956) and devoted a review-monograph (1966) to it.
3. Collected by the Israel Folklure Archives (Hebrew University, Jerusalem); in the last ten years ca. 8000 tales were collected from various Israeli ethnic groups; see Jason (1965) and Noy (1963b); the texts discussed in this study were taken from the first 6000 texts of the Archives.
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