I. IS THERE AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER?

The political world today offers a picture of manifold disorder in the presence of technologies which embody a high degree of order in human affairs. This side-by-side of disorder and elaborate techniques and organizations leads to the theme of this essay: The disorder is not simply the wonderful irrationality and variety of human society. It is the confusion and the clash of highly developed and unreconciled systems.

The disorder has many aspects. It is in people's minds, where values and concepts are deranged, in relations of man to society and authority, in politics and economics.

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This paper is a modified version of the author's earlier paper, Trans-National Society, Sovereignty, and Leadership: The Environment of Foreign Policy (P-3662), prepared for journal publication.
My concern here is with international relations, which reflect all these disorders.

The political scientists offer us less help than we need. They speak of an existing international order, a hierarchy of powers, a balance of power upset or restored, national interests that presumably explain the ways of governments; but they find it hard to define these ordering principles and apply them to overcome disorder. Why do the nations, or the governments that pretend to represent them, habitually encroach upon each others' interests when most have pledged themselves to nonaggression in the U.N. Charter and belong to some 200 intergovernmental and 1600 nongovernmental international organizations, all devoted to cooperation?*

Economic science is no more helpful. It cannot tell us enough about the relationship between economic growth, this much worshipped deity, and human welfare and international peace. Why do the goods-hungry nations push their exports on each other? Why do they twist their exchanges in the name of their balances of payments that are always

in deficit, or threaten to be? Why do the international systems of conflict resolution, political and economic, prove to be so disappointing; and why does war remain, in the cutting words of an American pacifist of thirty years ago, "the health of the state"?*

If this is an order, its principle is hard to fathom. Yet, if it be chaos, one must note that not everything conceivable has happened. Violent deaths resulting from international conflict still are but a fraction of violent deaths from "domestic" causes. In the United States alone, we have some 50,000 traffic deaths per year, to cite but one domestic cause.** The political world, with its powder kegs and smoking fuses, has existed for 22 years without a general war. This is already one year more than the interval between World War I and World War II. It suggests some kind of international order, if only an order for a time.


**Daniel P. Moynihan, "The War Against the Automobile," The Public Interest, Spring 1966, p. 10.
II. THE DUAL PATTERN OF ORDER

Perhaps time is a key to the understanding. It takes time for escape routes out of a maze to be tested, patience to be worn out, and confusion to give way to desperate action.

In the 1930's and 1940's, the world community was drawn together in a catastrophe. States and societies confronted each other in a spasm of violent contact. They emerged from the catastrophe exhausted, cast into a new hierarchy of victors and vanquished, and they found themselves at the beginning of a process of pacification and healing. But lasting peace requires an orderly system for the adjudication and sublimation of conflict, that is, some approximation to legitimate government. If that could not be created, the recuperation of the participants in the last catastrophe would make them ready for the next, by way of a cumulation of unresolved conflict matter and the creation of fresh capacities for combat.

Neither World War I nor World War II led to the institution of legitimate government on the international plane. Instead, these two catastrophes led to the resumption of the dual order of international life that had preceded them and whose internal contradictions had provided
fuel for them. This was the duality of **transnational society** and **sovereign states**; the first linking social units of all countries together in vast exchanges of diverse kinds and subjecting the social units to a permanent revolution of technology; the second, providing whatever security, law, and allegiance to collective purposes the states could manage to generate. International organizations attempted to shape the two patterns and then to reconcile their incompatibilities, to smooth the way for commerce regardless of its social effects, to make sovereigns behave like nonsovereigns for the sake of the transnational exchanges, potential aggressors like nonaggressors, while safeguarding the power of the sovereigns to disrupt the exchanges and to aggress. The League and the U.N. had no mandate to provide government.

As a result, the two patterns could develop and show their incompatibilities. The adjustment problems of the advancing transnational society called for international government. The security problems of the sovereign states called for control of the impacts of transnational exchanges. Life could benefit from some of the freedoms resulting from this counterpoise. It could tolerate some of the symbiotic accommodations in the form of colonial empires and population
resettlements, "suitcase corporations" and anonymous armies. But with the earth getting more crowded, new technologies permitting more interference with the lives of others, and political organizations remaining inadequate or growing more so, the tolerance could not be boundless. Intolerant quests for power would be stimulated by impotence in the face of unresolved conflict, by needs to revolt and to repress. National civilizations would risk being seized again by virulent forms of national socialism, where they were not already in their grip as in the totalitarian states, and the fabric of transnational society would risk being torn up.

Devotion to the two contradictory organization patterns is no monopoly of a single nation. Each nation appears to wish for communication with a suitable world-wide environment and to be master of its own fate. This applies to America as well as Russia. The American imagination is that the given, existing political entities might govern the transnational exchanges well by behaving peacefully -- if not all entities then at least "a concert of powers, built on the principle of collective responsibility."*

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The Soviet imagination is that the right entities and the right behavior will come into being as the result of a revolutionary transformation of all states not presently governed by a Marxist-Leninist party. The difference is significant. Still the two visions are congruent insofar as they imply a combination of home rule with suitable neighborhood, and especially of an existing way of home rule with a suitably improved neighborhood.

To be sure, each of the two patterns of international organization offers a proposition for the resolution of the peace problem. The key word of transnational society is contact makes community, the key word of the sovereign state, independence makes personality. Community means, of course, a civilized body politic, and personality, the integrity of the units in that body politic. Both the civilized international community and the national personalities are indispensable to peace. Yet the growth in the last twenty years of international contact as well as national independence does not appear to have brought us close to a civilized community of national personalities. The reason is that, unreconciled, both organizations are part reality, part fiction, and their slogans remain half-truths.
III. TRANSNATIONAL SOCIETY

Consider first the transnational society. By all counts, it is an impressive achievement. Plot the enormous network of personal and organizational, cultural, technical, economic and political contacts today of Europe, the Americas, and much if not all of the rest of the world, against the broken linkages of the Great Depression and the immediate postwar time. The involvements are vast and one need not cite statistics of the growth of trade, tourism, and investments to prove it.

The meaning of these involvements is harder to fathom. They look different from different vantage points, as division of labor or as intrusions, as blessings or disturbances. In any event, they put in question the unitary character of the societies involved. For example, we think of the dollar as American money, created and used in America, controlled by the Federal Reserve system. But American dollars are used, borrowed, lent by foreigners among themselves, even created by banks abroad, and uncontrolled by the Fed. "The Eurodollar market," says Oscar Altman of the IMF, "is so large that no one country
or group of countries can control it."* We speak without hesitation of an American economy, but an American economist asks, "What is the American economy?" And he answers: "How to define the economy is not clear, and so there must be doubt about how to define the national economic interest as well."**

If this startling statement is true for America, is it also true for others? Surely, all the so-called national economies interdepend, and that not only through trade -- because you drink Brazilian coffee and the Brazilians buy Swiss watches -- but also through the connecting activities of great business organizations, the international corporations. These corporate giants -- their names are well known -- organize production, mobilize and move resources, hire and fire, buy and sell in many countries. This is much admired and much decried. Why decried? Here we come to a significant point.

Are not most of these international corporations American corporations, that is, outward extensions of the U.S. body politic? They are and they are not. They do

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much business with the American government but are not run by it. They have influence on the U.S. Government but also on other governments. Their home offices are subject to U.S. Government controls, but their subsidiaries abroad are subject to other governments' controls and are often managed by nationals of other countries. No doubt many of these strange corporate citizens of transnational society are identified with America by their inspiration and methods; but it is wrong to consider them one-way streets through which an imperial American force flows into other countries. What is known in Europe as Le Défi Américain is the challenge of transnational society riding on American vehicles. This team is welcomed and feared in both Europe and America. The response to it is ambivalent on both sides of the Atlantic; one praises it for the services it renders and one attacks it -- pragmatically more often than dogmatically -- under the slogan, "Reject foreign control; exert sovereign power." The rider may be all right, but the vehicle is suspect.

The same is true for the key-currency role of the dollar and the international banker role of the American economy. Dollars are more useful as an international means of payment than gold or anything else; the short-term indebtedness of Americans in conjunction with their vast long-term creditor position looks like the normal posture of an international bank, and an American balance of payments deficit is the vehicle that puts dollars into international circulation. But, say the critics, who appointed the dollar to be transnational money, and America to be the banker? They do not find the answer in a convergent behavior of the members of transnational society, but in American power. This banker's role is just a way for America to grow fat on the sweat of others. Therefore let us dethrone the dollar and eliminate the payments deficit. Curiously enough, Americans try to do the same things, and they may in the end succeed, perhaps to the unhappiness of many.

I am not arguing the pros and cons. I am describing the hazards of the transnational society, a cultural achievement that may be torn up, as it has been before, by the issue of power, by Lenin's question of "who, whom?", or
as Servan-Schreiber puts it more gently "Pourquoi eux, et pas nous?"*

This is not just an issue between America and Western Europe, and not just a recent one there. (The "American threat to Europe" is close to having its 100th birthday.) It is also an issue within Western Europe, where consolidations of transnational society are obstructed by power striving and resistance to it, now on the part of France, then on the part of Germany, some time ago on the part of Britain. It is also an issue within the COMECON, and between the industrial and the so-called developing countries. In all these settings, transnationalism is strained by inequity and power drives. Contact does not necessarily make community.

IV. SOVEREIGN STATES

Let me now turn to the sovereign state. It has been declared obsolete, but for an obsolete organism it shows remarkable vitality.* The sovereign state remains the overall protective organization par excellence, the agency to provide physical and social security, to organize allegiance, to generate power, and to apply power against external and internal opposition. If it does not "protect" in one of these ways, nothing will -- which is not to say that where it functions it protects the people.

This is a world-wide reality -- and unreality. I say unreality not just with an eye to the many mini-sovereignties which have been born in this anti-colonial century. The real states, "the powers," are somewhat imaginary, too. Their personality is blurred despite the semantics of official politics, the appeals to traditions, and the unceasing pressure for their survival as sovereigns.

This can be argued in two ways, via the inroads of transnational exchanges, and via the facts of military

*Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, Summer 1966. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America, International Integration Series, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1967.
life. The first argument is the obverse of the one I offered above. In brief, while the state sets itself up to protect its subjects or its "interests" against transnational "foreign" impulses and flexes its muscles to "nationalize" them and bend them to its "plans", it is often eroded along the way, defeated on the substance of social protection, and even turned into an engine of social revolution. May it not thus serve "economic growth"? To be sure, if the state knew what growth is healthy, and what is cancer, all might be well. But does it?

The erosion of the sovereign state by transnationalism is celebrated by those who value the state as a "bad thing", end transnationalism as a "good thing". I cannot accept this judgment, or its opposite for that matter. The business is not so simple. The state that is eroded by ungovernable transnational involvements is often not the dog-in-the-manger state but the peaceful, civilized state, not East Germany, but Belgium or Canada. It becomes the target of foreign interference and nationalistic or nihilistic countermovements which in some instances tend to make it oppressive, in others to split it up. The eroded state loses its benign personality and becomes a parasitic robot.
The second, military/political reason for the blurred personality of the sovereign state was well presented by John Herz. Thanks to long-range nuclear weapons and related military technology, Herz said, there has occurred "the most radical change in the nature of power and the characteristics of power units since the beginning of the modern state system.... Even the most highly organized and most strongly armed country ... can now be destroyed without the necessity of first breaking the traditional 'hard shell' of surrounding defense.... Permeability presages the end of the traditional protective function of state power and territorial sovereignty.... Utmost power in the possession of one state goes hand in hand with utmost impotence to counter the like power that others have."* Pursuing the same thought with regard to America and Russia, Jerome Wiesner and Herbert York say: "Both sides in the arms race are confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security."** And for America specifically, Richard Rovere says: "The power we

have today can get us into trouble of many kinds, but it seems useless for getting us out." But these lessons seem lost on those who now seek to acquire similar power at great cost.

Technology, the pride of civilization, thus tends to unmake the state, the chief artifact of political civilization, by the tools it furnishes to "peaceful" transnationalism as well as to modern warfare, by the two-pronged attack of the international corporation, the hither-and-yon of business and communications on the one hand, and of the ballistic missile and ABC weapons on the other hand.

To be sure, transnational agencies and states equip themselves with the elaborate technical devices to create order among people, words, and objects; and they confer incessantly about monetary, commercial, political, and military order. But more often than not they create only semblances of order. Internally, they apply these new techniques to combat the opposition. I am afraid that the desperate protest against "the trampling on man" in Russia, which twelve courageous Soviet intellectuals addressed to

*The New Yorker, February 3, 1968.
the Budapest conference of Communist parties in February, has meaning in many other countries as well.*

The intermingling of international and domestic violence is reminiscent of Europe's religious wars of the 16th and 17th Centuries. The linkage of domestic to international conflict is usually attributed to opponents, their evil designs and their agents; but it seems to me that the internal-external opponents -- everyone's opponents, and therefore everyone -- are simply bringing out the clash between our two principles, the fact that on the one hand the world is one (a continuum of internal and external society) and on the other hand it is many, with many disorderly pretenders to the function of order keeping.

V. HARMONIZATION MODELS

This dualism is of course not a modern invention, and neither are devices or structures to overcome it by some kind of harmonization. A distant precedent can be found in the universal church and the secular rulers of the European Middle Ages. The secular rulers resemble the modern states in being the masters of armed force; the universal church resembles the transnational society, with due allowance for the latter's lack of a head and a hierarchy, and the differences in dogma. The medieval dualism sought harmonization in the institution of the Holy Roman Emperor, an anointed international leader, and it found it for some time.

A closer precedent can be found in the 19th Century when nationalism and internationalism broke forth and were delicately balanced by channeling national forces into a political bed (statehood) and international forces into an economic bed (world economy) and by "a compromise between the popular and democratic appeal of political nationalism and the esoteric and automatic management of the international economic mechanism." So wrote Edward Hallett Carr, whose little book Nationalism and After

can serve as a first course in modern world politics. The feat of harmonization (for 100 years) is attributed largely to Britain, its City and its Navy, in the role of international policeman and conductor of the famous concert of powers.

Noting the renewed virulence of conflict in the 20th Century, the breakdown of the British order in World War I, the alliance of nationalism and socialism, the perversion of both into anti-humanism, and the catastrophes of the 30's and 40's, Carr wrote in 1945: "The best hope...in the next period lies in a balanced structure of international and multinational groupings both for the maintenance of security and for the planned development of the economies of...groups of nations."* His best hope was fulfilled in a strange, yet familiar way, at least temporarily.

*Ibid. p. 70.
VI. THE WORLD-WIDE CAMP-LEADERSHIP EXPERIMENT

In the last twenty years, the world has explored a harmonization via the organization of society and state power in two international camps led by two great powers. The exploration seems to be over. In many minds, its ending causes relief rather than sorrow. Is it not the harbinger of a new freedom, the end of a confrontation that threatened the world with nuclear war? One wished there were solid ground for being relieved, not merely the exhaustion following a fruitless effort.

Let me examine some features of this experiment, its pattern, origin, management, and decay. We know a great deal about it, but some of the knowledge is obscured by partisanship and simplification. We need to know more about it, not only to understand the past but also the present gropings and confusions which result from the decay of the experiment.

PATTERN

The experiment consisted of transforming the dualism of transnational society and sovereign states into a dualism of two world-wide groupings of social and political quality (camps), led by the social and political systems of two
great powers, the USA and the USSR. In this new dualism, each camp sought to organize internally transnational life and to coordinate state apparatuses, and each sought to channel social and political conflict into a great juxtaposition of the camps, variably named the cold war or the bipolar balance. Each camp was concerned with the development of internal rules and institutions governing trade, finance and other functions, and each was concerned with the delegation of sovereign state functions, regulatory and military, to the leaders or to supra-national configurations in which the leaders played the prominent roles.

Seen as a whole, this experiment followed nobody's grand design. It was conducted by all, not just by the leaders, acting on suppositions about interests, responsibilities, and obligations peculiar to each party. The suppositions and the actions based on them were somehow convergent. Few, if anyone, realized that they were experimenting with world government, certainly not on the Roman, or world conquest, model, nor on the federation, or 1787, model, but on a bipolar model of camp integration and juxtaposition. One who came close to this vision was George Kennan whose containment doctrine was really a co-existence doctrine.*

*See his "X" article in Foreign Affairs, July 1947.
For such an experiment to get underway (in the real world not in the philosopher's mind) requires special conditions. It was impossible in the 1930's, and it is impossible today. Why was it possible in the late 40's and early 50's? Three basic conditions prevailed: (1) The world economy and the world of states lay shattered from the catastrophes of the 1930's and 1940's, and there was a pressing need for a fresh start for both. (2) The USA and the USSR possessed material and moral resources to reach for leadership. (3) The universalist postwar political framework of United Nations plus great-power cooperation proved unworkable; yet the two great powers were unwilling to settle their conflict by war.

But these three conditions were only permissive. Two further conditions account for the launching of the experiment. (4) The two great powers took initiatives; and (5) numerous nations responded to their claims to leadership and engaged with them in a sequence of reciprocating actions. Let me say a few words about these two conditions.

The Soviet and American transitions to the camp/leadership experiment fall into 1946/47, when Shdenov and Stalin announced their concept of two world camps, and Truman and
Acheson, the Truman Doctrine. The Soviet transition was easier in that it amounted to an application of the Soviet model of government to the new "people's democracy" states and of traditional spheres-of-influence concepts to international politics -- although the transition was not free of problems.*

The Truman-Acheson doctrine was a more radical departure from the traditional American foreign policy positions of national interest diplomacy on the one hand, and "world order through world law" on the other hand (imperfectly labelled isolationism and internationalism); or if you wish, a new synthesis of the two.** In his famous message to Congress, President Truman postulated a concrete leadership role for the American state: "I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities

*Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, Praeger, New York, 1961, Chapter 3. As early as 1919, one could learn from Stalin that "the world is decisively and irrevocably split into two camps, the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism." (Eliot R. Good- man, The Soviet Design for a World State, Columbia University, New York 1960, p. 166.) The socialist camp consisted then of one state and a set of nongoverning parties.

**Arthur Schlesinger, J., "Origins of the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, October 1967, offers interesting observations on this development.
or by outside pressures."* And elaborating in a Jefferson Day speech, he said, "We must act in time -- ahead of time -- to stamp out the smouldering beginnings of any conflict that may threaten to spread over the world... Our responsibility is to stand guard before the edifice of... the United Nations.... The world looks to us for leadership."**

The situation to which these words were addressed, the response they found -- Britons hailing America's "coming of age", Walter Lippmann warning of the "big hot generalities" -- the concrete policies -- the interventions in Greece, Turkey and Western Europe, the prudent termination of intervention in China's revolution, -- all this will not hold us here.*** The Truman Doctrine declared a rationale of policy on which international treaties and unilateral acts would be based in the years to come. With it, the United States entered into the bipolar arena where

"free world" and "socialist camp" were to organize, the two great powers were to lead followers and to confront each other in conferences and shows of force, each impelled by its own dim vision of a world-wide prize and neither willing to go all-out to win the prize.

Comparatively speaking, the United States, with its pluralistic society and its partners long experienced in world-wide involvement, was better equipped than the Soviet Union to weave a complex transnational fabric of economics and culture. But lacking the powerful instrument of the international revolutionary party which the Soviets had, the United States was less well equipped to coordinate state apparatuses. In the inter-bloc contest, the balance was perhaps even, with the free world better prepared for economic performance and peaceful order, the socialist camp for the political exploitation of malperformance and disorder. I shall not say more about the different ideological and cultural equipments of the two powers and camps.

What of the followers? Leadership is a two-sided social relationship, not simply a measure of size. To be more than a gleam in the would-be leader's eye, it requires that there be followers who are disposed to accept the arrogation of the leader's role, to trust his vision, and
to put their own resources beside his in the service of the joint enterprise. The existence of these dispositions was proven in the European Recovery Program, the formation of NATO, the Korean War, and other reciprocating actions of the governments which shaped the Free (or Atlantic) World here, the Socialist Camp there.

MANAGEMENT

The management problems of the experiment fell into three classes, bipolar management; camp management; and the approach to the "uncommitted" grey areas. Each class of problems called forth interesting responses which I can only sketch here.

Bipolar management revolved around the mutual threat, its cultivation as well as the prevention of its execution. The perceived threat was that of the achievement of dominance by the other leader and the other camp. The cultivation of the threat consisted of systematically interpreting the opponent's acts and words as manifestations of the threat, and on the other hand, of acts and words of one's own which although explained as defensive, nonthreatening, could be perceived by the other side as offensive and threatening.*

The prevention of the threat's execution, finally, consisted of a diplomacy of forbearance in extremis.

Examples of these activities abound, the propounding of "anti-ideologies" of encirclement and hostile penetration; of commitments to defend all like-minded nations ("free" or "socialist"), the proclamations of peaceful intent, occasionally flavored by promises to "bury" the other side; the arms race; the defensive/offensive probes in Berlin, Korea, Cuba, etc.; and the manifestations of forbearance in these crises and in a search for deterrent postures and "arms control."

Camp management attacked the great problems of transnational society and state relations in the camps. Transnational society called for organizing the economic and cultural exchanges among the competing, complementary, more or less "developed" units of the camps. State relations, on the other hand, posed the interesting problems of the leader vs. the followers and of the relations among the followers. Given that all states, notably the leaders themselves, claimed to be sovereign, how were these individual sovereignties to be sublimated into some kind of camp sovereignty ("here NATO, there Warsaw Pact"), how was leader or camp sovereignty to be made responsive to the interests of all, and legitimate?
There were historical answers to these problems, albeit tentative and impermanent ones. On the social plane, the nations appeared to mind Emile Durkheim's affirmation "that an economic or any other function can be divided between two societies only if they participate from certain points of view in the same common life, ... cease to hold to an exclusive patriotism, and learn another which is more comprehensive."* Sovereignties within the camps proved permeable, even though stubborn. For a time at least, the leader's concepts tended to be camp concepts. At the beginning of the 1950's, American statesmen, Dean Acheson, Paul Hoffman, etc., had the answers to Europe's questions. The followers' interests in recovery, state preservation, unification (German or European), etc., tended to be represented by the leader's policies; the leader's balance of payments deficit was the lubricant of international economic cooperation;** the important decisions on how to prepare for war and how to fight it were virtually delegated to the leader; and the states looked,

when the light fell right, like organs of the free world
or of the socialist camp -- some, like the Federal Republic
of Germany, of course, more so than others, say France.
(The two Germanies indeed were, and still are, key pieces
of the bipolar pattern.)

There was also interesting experimentation with the
structure of these organs. The follower states were unequal
and both camps were in search of a hierarchy. Every Ameri-
can ally sought to consolidate the leader-led relationship
in some preferential form, and each found some sympathy
in America. Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, each sought special relationships in its own way.
The Western leader usually resisted a firm commitment to
preferences and even liked to picture himself as an equal
among equals.*

Finally, the approach to the "uncommitted" grey areas
of the political atlas brought together intra-camp and
inter-camp management problems. Grey area states could
be recruited into camps or held neutral. These states
themselves, although mostly poor and weak, could derive

*Hans J. Morgenthau, "The American Tradition in Foreign
Policy," in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World
bargaining and blackmailing strength from the competition of the camps, individually or by combining in the U.N. and other frameworks. The way in which military contests came to be focused on these unimportant states testified to the functioning of the camp/leadership relationship among the principal states; but it also showed its flaws.

**DECAY**

This was the pattern of the great experiment in "a balanced structure of multinational groupings", or if you prefer, the odious cold war. It did not end in a clash of arms, as a similar structure did in the days of Thucydides, at least not so far. For that we must be grateful. It decayed, in both camps.

In the West -- I must neglect the East -- the decay became apparent in the 1960's; perhaps the Cuba crisis was the watershed between forward and backward movement -- or was it the Suez crisis of 1956, or the EDC crisis of 1954? The roots of the decay do not, in my opinion, lie in any specific event or a single person, not even General de Gaulle. They lie in a failure to surmount the enormous difficulties of the undertaking, a failure which can often be traced to the period of prevalent forward movement.
The popular explanations of the decay are legion. Let me name some of them in stylized form, neglecting self-criticism.

From the viewpoint of follower states: the arrogance, ineptitude, monopolism, complicity of the leader states;

From the viewpoint of the leader states: the presumptions, indiscipline (schisms), "narrow nationalism" of the follower states.

From the viewpoint of political economists: the blundering of the world of states;

From the viewpoint of political sociologists: the perversions of ungovernable trans-national society;

And from a fatalistic viewpoint: declining "need," or return to old "realities."

Each of these explanations is one-sided and inadequate; but each also offers a starting point for the student of international affairs. For a citizen of one of the leading states, fairness commands that he point to the failings of the leader. But the others are far from blameless.

For the camp/leadership experiment to succeed, the parties, and above all the leader, must transcend themselves. It is not enough for the leading state to hear the call and to exert himself; he must surpass himself. What does this
mean? He must embrace the transnational society building up in his camp, he must create legitimate camp government to fit that society, and he must somehow hold at bay the camp opposite in controlled tension. Despite great insights in these necessities, the United States failed to see the effort through in the period behind us.

Americans perceived the need for comprehensive international integrations, but they were prepared to integrate themselves into the free world only functionally and informally. The United States perceived the need for the sublimation of other state sovereignties; but it jealously preserved its own. It favored Britain's entry into the Common Market; but not its own entry into an Atlantic Common Market. United States' participation in any institutional merger of sovereignties in the Atlantic Community was firmly rejected, not just by isolationists, but by such ardent Atlanticists as Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, John F. Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy.* Needless to say, no such thoughts entered into basic security legislation, e.g. the MacMahon Act. Camp laws, such as the Atlantic Treaty,

were not rewritten to limit the sovereignty of the states and to make constitutional the "integration" of state functions, including the leader's state functions.

Americans managed successfully their share of maintaining the tense inter-camp peace, but they became uncertain of the content and mission of their own civilization. Twenty years after the inception of the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance, Europeans no longer find the answers to their questions in America. Europeans and Americans question each other about arms and money, crisis management and commitments, and about how to cope with the automobile, the city, and the preservation of the natural habitat; but they have no ready answers for each other. Not only did the transcendence of the leadership relation fail to take place; that relation lost some of its cultural basis in a short time. There are parallels on the Soviet side.

Could it have been otherwise? One must appreciate the enormous difficulties, conceptual and practical, of legitimizing one's power on the one hand, and diffusing or sharing it out on the other hand, of guiding others while being guided by them; of "upgrading the common interest" where the persistence of state sovereignties favored
crystallization of divergent interests.* It was as difficult as the achievement of nuclear fusion where highly energized particles must be held together until they reach the temperature of fusion. For the camp/leadership experiment to succeed meant to hold the revived sovereignties in the camps together to the point of fusion, and to develop bipolarity into a system of checks and balances.

The failure to overcome these difficulties is understandable but tragic. Perhaps it could have been otherwise. The penalty for the failure is the decay of the experimental framework by which transnational society and government might have been reconciled, at least in two halves of the world. It is also possible that for political man as we know him, such a two-worlds pattern might have allowed for the highest degree of integration that is compatible with the protection of individual liberties. Of course, we do not know that. We only know that the decay of the experiment releases forces in society, states, and individuals that suggest at times a war of all against all, and at other times opportunities for a better life.

*These difficulties and the need to overcome them are the subject of a vast literature on the Atlantic Alliance to which Henry A. Kissinger, Stanley H. Hoffmann, Robert E. Osgood, Karl W. Deutsch, Raymond Aron, Pierre Hassner, James L. Richardson, and others made important contributions.
VII. THE RENEWED CONFLICT AND THE WEAK BEST HOPES

Thrown back onto the task of finding a principle of government for the transnational society, the people of the world are not short of "best hopes". Their leaders and spokesmen offer a variety of such hopes, and it would be kinder to praise the good points of all than to speak of their weaknesses. But most of these hopes are unpromising for a world of three billion men, where electric power plants produce plutonium besides electricity, and for a time when collectivities do not feel compelled to concentrate on great common tasks. Therefore I must warn of the weaknesses. Let me pass some of these hopes in brief review.

HOPE #1: THE SUPER-POWER DUUMVIRATE

Some political scientists say America and Russia have the means to oversee the other states and to hold their anarchy in bounds through extreme sanctions, either in collusion or through the balance of terror.* Peace orders are being designed that rest on the guarantees of the two super-powers as outsiders, not as integral parts of camps.

This is a dream -- with some, a nightmare -- of the old bipolar world. The means by which one super-power can frighten the other are useless to elicit consent and constructive cooperation from the many, without which the transnational society does not work. They invite emulation ("Pourquoi eux, et pas nous?"). Thus power proliferates, not only physical power, but also the power to disorganize and to "go it alone". The mutual fear of the super-powers is overlaid with their fear of the new powers and becomes less manageable than it used to be. Tactical combinations with third parties disturb the balanced anarchy under the duumvirate. "Nothing could be more dangerous," said West German Chancellor Kiesinger, "than for us to find that the great leading powers lack... a clear world-political concept." Yet having to prowl as lone wolves, the super-powers may be less generous than they were as camp leaders and less capable of a concept of world order.

HOPE #2: WORLD EMPIRE

World-wide hegemony is a fantasy of power that is rarely professed openly. Every statesman knows that to

*Address to the German Society for Foreign Policy, Bonn, June 23, 1967.
avow it risks mobilizing an overwhelming coalition against his state. But this knowledge may not keep a great power from maneuvering itself into a position where it stands virtually alone against all. It is a distinct risk of the decay period of camps and leadership for the former leader to become a self-appointed policeman. Neither a private vision of ultimate peace nor the possession of powerful weapons may help him create order when the community he presumes to protect is indifferent or hostile to his policing. Indeed he may be weakened and demoralized in this practice.

The lessons of precedent and experience are never sufficiently appreciated in theory. A small book by an American political scientist of the "realistic school" entitled Imperial America,* talks sympathetically about a "unifocal system" of world power, but like others of that school, he tends to underrate the moral basis of political power.

Morality, in turn, is overrated in the benign utopia of the world federalists who preach world empire by consent

*George Liska, Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy, Johns Hopkins, 1967.
of the nations. The idealists tend to be blind to the oppressive capacities of their imaginary world state, while the realists tend to condone the oppression practiced by the real empire-seeking states. Whether sought by realist or idealist, global overlordship appears to me a cruel illusion of order.*

HOPE #3: SELF-GOVERNMENT OF THE TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMY

Despairing of the sovereign states, some people, mostly economists, hope that the transnational economy will come to govern itself by supranational institutions that carve certain functions out of the states. One hope is that the international corporations will enmesh the nations so that governments cannot help but submit to their discipline, because welfare depends on the corporations. Another hope is that the states will delegate powers of

*World-wide government and world-wide anarchy polarize our thinking. As awareness of social and technical reality drives us from the latter to the former, awareness of political reality drives us in the opposite direction. But as the traveller approaches one pole, its attraction may well change to repulsion. For recent samples of the literature of such voyages, see Hedley Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wright, editors, Diplomatic Investigations, Essays in the Theory of International Politics, Harvard, 1966, and Charles Yost, The Insecurity of Nations: International Relations in the 20th Century, Praeger, New York, 1968.
central banking to a world central bank, because the world-wide economy cannot live for long with monetary warfare. One may sympathize with both hopes but one must note a certain illusion of 19th-century quality in the attempt to separate economic government from political government. It runs counter to the strong national-socialist tendencies of 20th-century societies and states. The international corporations may well be disciplined by the states rather than the other way around. Perhaps we shall have something called world central banking under the International Monetary Fund, but it will probably deserve the name as much as the "blue helmets" of the United Nations deserve to be called an army.

HOPE #4: REGIONAL INTEGRATIONS

Hopes for regional integrations or regional commonwealths enjoy much currency in Europe, and not only there. One abandons the world scale on which the experiment of the last 20 years was drawn and looks for a solution on the smaller, so-called regional, scale. The "region" is said to search for its personality. It must repel extraneous transnational influences, become "a master in its own house", and "assume its proper place in the world." This imperative courses through opinion in Europe, Latin America
and elsewhere. It finds sympathy among some Americans, although their own state is usually counted out of the regions. It is a hope for mini-camps.

The "regional" unit can be meaningful in a world-wide fabric of relations, just as a province can be meaningful in a state. Disregarding the cases in which the social-political "region" is largely a figment of the imagination (say, Latin-America), and considering one where a relatively high degree of social-political unification has developed, namely Western Europe, one must recognize the capacity of a regional camp to organize a province of transnational life, and at least its chance to organize segments of superior authority. One must also understand that this chance will be grasped the more readily the more barren the prospects of order on the wider scale. But building provinces is no substitute for building a state; and it can be a hindrance.*

I find two faults with the mini-camp ideology: It does not address itself to the world-wide problem and it

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makes a daring assumption about the world. The projected regional "houses" are too small, too confining for the traffic that pulses in them and through them; their walls are always in the wrong place. Leadership in the region may be harder to establish and to accept than it was on the big scale, and the commonwealth effort may decay even more readily. The "multi-polar balance" among the regions could be more shaky than the bipolar balance was. The daring assumption is that the United States and the Soviet Union will keep the world at peace while power struggles go on within and between the regions. I believe therefore that the regional units will at best serve as a frame for relatively minor or specialized joint undertakings. Comprehensive joint undertakings raise too difficult political questions. This does not gainsay the stimulation to industry and human traffic that a drive for cooperation with specific partners may produce in any country.

Of course, nearly every one proclaims that he will be the other's partner, the states, the mini-camps, and the great powers. But the kind of partnership one can observe is often more like that at a village dance than in a business enterprise: one dances the polka with one girl and looks for another one to do the waltz. This is
no way to organize durable partnerships in development assistance, or peace-keeping, or a "technological community."

HOPE #5: PRUDENT STATECRAFT

There remains the last best hope, the most sobering of all and yet perhaps the most important for our time. In the face of facts that call in vain for broad and firm international combinations we resign ourselves to hoping for prudent behavior of the struggling individual states.* We accept the fact that whatever the level of technology, international politics is a Hobbesian state of nature and we pray that the nations, at least our nation, will move warily in this dangerous state. We should also pray that some technical progress will slow down as long as we cannot tell whether it brings improvement.

What prudent statecraft is, how much caution, how much boldness, no one can prescribe. Prudence is not a system; it is a quality of conduct. To hope that it will prevail

*An analysis by James P. Speer, II ("Hans Morgenthau and the World State," World Politics, January 1968) illuminates the dilemma between (1) states approaching a "world state" through wise diplomacy that maximizes community, and (2) progress to community presupposing the existence of a "world state" that bars the mutual fear of the states. See also Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (Calman-Levy, Paris, 1962, Chapter XIX), on prudent statecraft.
with many men or even one, with leaders and with oppositions, in the midst of growing irritations, is not a hope that can be held lightly. Still it must be our hope that with the help of such prudence, communities and liberties will be kept alive until civilized government can be found for the transnational society.