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24 NOV 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters,
United States Army Vietnam/Military Assistance Command
Vietnam Support Command, Period Ending 31 October 1972
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

THRU: Commander-in-Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-FD
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, DC 20310

1. (C) OPERATIONS. Significant activities. (withdrawn para 1)
2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED - COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Personnel.

(1) In-Country R&R Center.

(a) Observation/Evaluation. Because of its rather isolated location, access to the Vung Tau R&R Center is a continuing problem which is aggravated by (1) the lessened security of surface modes of travel resulting from the offensive which began in the Spring and (2) the continuing shortage of air transportation as the impact of turning over intra-theater air transportation to VNAF is felt.

(b) Command Action. At the most recently conducted GI Quarterly Conference, participants were made aware of the 7th Air Force publication...
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of the Southeast Asia air lift schedule which is distributed throughout the command on a monthly basis. This publication shows itineraries for all in-country scheduled air transportation. It is a valuable reference in arranging air transportation for in-country R&R participants, and it can help offset the shortage of dedicated in-country R&R aircraft.

(2) Joint Customs Group.

(a) Observation. The deactivation of the JCG resulted in the loss of experienced personnel to train local military police personnel, who had acquired the JCG's former mission, in customs law enforcement.

(b) Evaluation. Sufficient time was available prior to deactivation of JCG to request assistance from US Customs officials in training local military police who had been tasked to perform the JCG mission on a decentralized basis.

(c) Recommendation. That the decision to deactivate specialized units continue to be made sufficiently early to permit training of personnel who will assume the mission of the specialized unit.

(3) Joint Narcotics Investigation Detachment.

(a) Observation. The percentage of US forces personnel apprehended for heroin related offenses increased subsequent to the deactivation of JNID.

(b) Evaluation. This increase in apprehensions is indicative of the loss of a concerted effort at heroin suppression, rather than a decrease in the rate of use by US forces personnel.

(c) Recommendation. That the complete deactivation of specialized drug investigative units be delayed until total withdrawal of US personnel is substantially completed.

(4) Confinement.

(a) Observation. The initiation of morale and welfare programs for prisoners significantly improves prisoner attitudes, motivation, and behavior.
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(b) Evaluation. Utilization of installation resources, and the establishment of prisoner cooperation and participation as goals of the correctional treatment program results in a more efficient and secure stockade operation.

(c) Recommendation. None.

(5) Formation of the Vietnam Field Office, USACIDC.

(a) Observation. The creation of the VFO, USACIDC increased the need for close coordination and liaison between the Provost Marshal, USARV and the Commander, VFO. To assist in the provision of this close coordination, the offices of the Commander, VFO, and the Provost Marshal, USARV have been co-located.

(b) Evaluation. The cooperation and liaison between the Office of the Provost Marshal and VFO has continued throughout the formative, transitional and current periods.

(c) Recommendation. That the offices of the Provost Marshal and the USACIDC element be co-located at the Army command level.

b. Intelligence. None.

c. Operations.


(a) Observation. When US Army troop strength was about 250,000, it cost approximately $22 per month to provide FE support for one soldier. When the strength dropped below 50,000, it cost about $68 per month to provide the same or lesser support.

(b) Evaluation. Costs of FE contracts are determined by the base data or quantities of real property facilities to be maintained and supported with utilities.

(c) Recommendation. Cost reduction can be effected if forces are consolidated, major installations transferred or closed down, and the level of FE services reduced.

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(d) Command Action. The above recommendation has been implemented to the maximum extent possible. Contractor manpower has also been reduced as troop levels have fallen, and overhead has been further cut by reducing the number of contracts from two to one.

(2) Contractor Performance Inspection,

(a) Observation. The current Facilities Engineering Contract (effective 1 October 1972) is a cost-plus-fixed-fee type contract. This method of payment eliminates the requirement for the Technical Inspection Team which evaluated the contractor's performance, under an incentive payment clause in the previous contract. The Technical Inspection Branch was eliminated in a group reorganization during Increment XII in May and June 1972.

(b) Evaluation. Reports from Region and Area engineers indicated the contractor's performance was lagging in work coordination and customer satisfaction. Many complaints indicated work was just not getting done. Based on these reports, some sort of in-depth check on contractor performance was needed. This check must include review of the installation's work coordinating methods, its manpower levels, the capability of its work force, and supply and material availability, as well as the relationship among all these factors. An objective decision on contractor performance can be reached with this information.

(c) Recommendation. A Facilities Engineering Inspection Team should be established to perform initial technical inspections or staff assistance visits to the contractor's operation at each installation.

(d) Command Action. A Facilities Engineer Assistance Team (FEAT) was established in September 1972 to perform regional inspections. The team consists of five to nine individuals versed in all fields of FE, as well as safety. The team's schedule allows all facilities to be visited once each quarter.

(3) Control of New Construction During the Drawdown Period.

(e) Observation. During the drawdown period fewer facilities are required for residual forces. There is a possibility of using funds for unnecessary new construction.
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(b) Evaluation. In order to preclude unnecessary expenditure of funds during drawdown, tighter controls are required to ensure approval of only mission essential new construction. Customers formerly submitted job order requests through Engineer channels to the FRB at HQ USARV/MACV SUPCOM without evaluation at intermediate HQ.

(c) Recommendation. Projects should be reviewed at the RAC/ASE to determine project mission essentiality. RACs/ASEs should establish priorities and should recommend approval of only those projects deemed absolutely necessary for mission accomplishment. These projects would then be forwarded through the FRB to the CDR, USARV/MACV SUPCOM for approval.

(d) Command Action. The above recommendations have been implemented.

d. Organization.

(1) Operational Control in Engineer Regions.

(a) Initially in Vietnam, Engineer activities were separated into two functional categories, troop effort controlled by the Engineer Group through the Engineer battalions and Facilities Engineering controlled by districts. In effect there were two chains of command from Engineer HQ, USARV to the operating elements in the same geographic areas.

(b) Evaluation. Diminishing troop assets required the phase out of the Engineer Groups and reorganization of the command. The Engineer Region concept was formulated whereby a Region Engineer would command all residual Engineer troop units and control all Facilities Engineering efforts (acting as the Contracting Officer's representative (COR) in a given region). This combining of Engineer functions provided a single focal point for all engineer activities in the regions and has proven to be most effective in maximizing engineer support in a period of limited resources.

(c) Recommendation. This new concept of merging the troop effort and FE under a Region Engineer should undergo evaluation by GCC to determine the long term effectiveness of this organization.
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(d) Command Action. USARENGRGP will continue to operate under this centralized concept.

(2) Explosive Loading Operation

(a) Observation. The primary mission of the Port Security and Waterways detail was explosive handling safety. A staff advisor to the DCG for port security inspections was a secondary mission. As such, the PS&WD was operationally controlled by USARY, ODGOPS.

(b) Evaluation. The explosive loading detachments would have operated more efficiently in their primary mission if there had been a closer organizational relationship with USARY DCSLOG. This would have benefited the smaller ELD units and improved operations in the ports themselves.

(c) Recommendation. The Port Security and Waterways Detail should be operationally controlled by the DCSLOG due to its primary explosive handling mission. The staff advisor would be given free latitude to coordinate with the DCSLOG on matters of port security.

e. Training. None.

f. Logistics.

(1) Instability of Automated Stock Accounting Systems to Accommodate Drastic Changes

(a) Observation. Supply operations at the direct support unit (DSU) level were hampered in their efforts to keep pace with the rapid drawdown of troop units because the NCR 500 and its related programs were not sufficiently flexible to react to a drastically changing supply posture.

(b) Evaluation. The absence of a positive method or program to project future stockage requirements based upon troop reductions resulted in inefficient NCR 500 operation. The NCR 500 and its programs were not designed to accommodate sharp increases or decreases in troop strength. R/O computations were based on demand history and, as a result, replenishment requirements were submitted for quantities which would be excessive when received. This occurred even with the fairly rapid response of the direct support system and its relatively short order and ship time. It was necessary to "trick" the NCR 500 into ordering reduced quantities by arbitrarily erasing
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Demand history. These efforts were extremely time-consuming and were only partially successful.

(c) Recommendation. That programs be developed for the NCR 500 to accommodate rapid troop and supply reductions.

(d) Command Action. To permit more flexibility and greater management intervention, the NCR 500 mechanized supply activities were converted to manual stock accounting. This action has been completed.

(2) Transfer of POL Operations to ARVN.

(a) Observation. During the last six months two major POL complexes were transferred to ARVN: the Da Nang and Long Binh facilities. The Da Nang transfer included three tank farms with almost 190M bbls storage capacity, a petroleum testing laboratory and all connecting pipeline. Long Binh included a tank farm with 66M bbls storage capacity, a packaged POL yard, a jetty for barge discharge and a petroleum laboratory.

(b) Evaluation. Most facilities and missions were turned over on schedule with only a few minor delays caused by training and inventory discrepancies. The transfer was successful and well organized. The ARVN have discharged all new missions effectively. Areas needing more ARVN attention are tank farm and package POL yard operations and safety procedures. On the basis of correlation samples, laboratory and quality assurance testing have proven to be extremely accurate.

(c) Recommendation. On all future POL transfers, USARV should directly coordinate with RVNAF JGS/CLC. JGS/CLC must give subordinate units direction to coordinate directly with the local USARV unit.

(d) Command Action. USARV requested MACV SAPOV to authorize direct coordination with the RVNAF JGS/CLC for future transfers of POL facilities/missions.

(3) Contractor Operation of Class I.

(a) Observation. Transfer of Class I operations to civilian contractors caused initial procedural problems, especially with requirements computation.
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(b) Evaluation. The rapidity with which it was necessary to transfer operations to civilian contractors appeared to preclude the overlap necessary to ensure no degradation in support or operational effectiveness. Therefore, the contractor experienced a period when the operation suffered. It also appears that some COR's failed to provide necessary guidance. Where a strong and involved COR was assigned, the transition to contract operations was smoother.

(c) Recommendation. That future actions of this type include sufficient overlap to ensure proper transition from military to civilian operation.

(d) Command Action. Evaluate future requirements and formulate plans accordingly.

(4) Change in Supply System During Drawdown.

(a) Observation. During a period of rapid drawdown of forces, when a simplified supply system was of paramount importance, the resupply and storage requirements for subsistence were made more complex.

(b) Evaluation. Adoption of the CONUS Master Menu necessitated additional requisitioning actions and freeze/chill storage requirements. The intangible increase to troop morale was not offset by the increased workload on supply activities involved.

(c) Recommendation. That programs, such as the CONUS Master Menu conversion not be implemented during a period of drawdown or buildup.

(d) Command Action. Formulate future plans to incorporate system wide changes under more controlled conditions.

(5) Requirement that Local Nationals Have Separate Gate Passes for Each Installation.

(a) Observation. Although all local national vehicle drivers assigned to the US Army Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam have valid MSS clearances, additional separate passes must be obtained and maintained to enter other areas where this agency conducts business, such as Tan Son Nhut Air Base and the HQ, MACV compound.
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(b) Evaluation. Procedures for the acquisition of additional passes are lengthy and, in addition to the loss of man hours caused by initial processing, require a considerable amount of administrative and clerical effort to complete.

(c) Recommendation. That procedures for obtaining and maintaining separate additional passes be shortened or otherwise improved. The command should consider the feasibility of creating a single pass that could be validated for all US areas to which a local national employee might require access in the performance of duty.

(d) Command Action. Administrative coordination has been established to expedite the acquisition of additional passes. Controls and procedures are being initiated to ensure proper maintenance of the passes. Employees unable to qualify for multiple-access will be released for reassignment to other organizations not requiring access to installations outside of their areas of assignment.

(6) Location of Property Disposal Facilities.

(a) Observation. The locations and constructed facilities at property disposal holding areas in Vietnam were not initially conducive to the easy shipment of off-shore sales.

(b) Evaluation. During the earlier periods of extensive combat support operations, the development of facilities for property disposal operations carried a low priority. Moreover, the US Army Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam did not commence regular off-shore sales and shipments until 1972. As a result, adequate installation facilities, such as docks and wash racks, were not originally available at property disposal holding areas. Also, most holding areas were not located near enough to ports for easy access.

(c) Recommendation. That future establishment or relocation of property disposal holding areas include facilities for handling off-shore shipments.

(d) Command Action. Selection of new holding areas since the beginning of off-shore sales operations has included considerations for either utilization or development of facilities to accommodate off-shore shipments.
(7) Security Requirements at Property Disposal Holding Areas.

(a) Observation. Following the departure of the bulk of US Army military personnel from Vietnam, there was an increase in security problems at property disposal holding areas.

(b) Evaluation. Although individual security problems can generally be traced to a specific deficiency, the Property Disposal Agency was not originally staffed with an organic security force to cope with the overall problems. Correction of security deficiencies often requires extensive coordination with other US Government activities as well as a variety of Vietnamese military and local law enforcement agencies. Effective investigation of internal security problems requires a certain degree of specialized knowledge involving procedures unique to property disposal operations. Outside criminal investigators often experience time-consuming difficulties in identifying unusual circumstances connected with PDO larcenies.

(c) Recommendation. That property disposal activities be initially staffed with an adequate security force, headed by an experienced security officer and a minimum staff, with sufficient authority to safeguard the US property entrusted to the organization.

(d) Command Action. A separate security division has been established within the Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam, and a separate manpower voucher was approved authorizing an organic security force for the Agency.

(8) Communications at Property Disposal Holding Areas.

(a) Observation. Property disposal holding areas (PDHAs) throughout Vietnam are under the operational control of US Army Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam (USAPDAV). USAPDAV is located in Saigon while activities under its control are located at Saigon Island, Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. The nature of property disposal activities dictates that they will be located where sufficient space is available. The space requirement most frequently resulted in PDHAs being located at or outside the perimeter of an established military installation. Communications was a minor problem during peak in-country military strength.
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(b) Evaluation. When troop drawdown impacted military activities, perimeters were drawn in. PDHAs were unable to physically move inventories to secure areas where proper communications could be maintained. Telephone systems became inoperative for long periods of time, on occasion for weeks. Frequently telephone lines were stolen from the poles and not replaced for several weeks. Essential communications was totally unreliable. USAPDAV is presently installing radio and teletype systems between USAPDAV and major PDHA activities throughout Vietnam to establish proper communications. These reliable communication systems will significantly enhance the capability of USAPDAV in the primary function of reutilization as well as sales, security and coordination of inventory movement activities.

(c) Recommendation. That overseas property disposal activities in areas of unrest and hostile activities be initially authorized to install radio and/or teletype facilities in order to maintain communications.

(9) Centralization of Graves Registration (GRREG) Activities.

(a) Observation. The capability for recovery, evacuation, processing, and disposition of deceased personnel and their personal effects must be maintained for as long as a significant number of troops remain in-country. It must further be assured that these functions are performed rapidly and efficiently.

(b) Evaluation. The actions taken in this case support the objective by centrally locating the support agency, by reducing processing time through elimination of an intermediate processing step, by providing the required capability in the form of qualified personnel and equipment, and by ensuring continuity of operations.

(c) Recommendation. That the concept of consolidation and centralization of GRREG services and facilities be employed in other areas whenever the local situation permits.

(d) Command Action. A continuous evaluation of support requirements and capabilities is underway with a view toward further reduction of the number of GRREG collecting points if and when this is feasible.
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(10) Infrared Suppression Kits and Decoy Devices.

(a) Observation. The introduction of infrared (IR) suppression kits to US Army aircraft was accomplished rapidly to combat the enemy's threat. However, some problem areas have been exposed.

(b) Evaluation.

1. The introduction of heat-seeking missiles by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong presented a tremendous threat to the USARV aircraft fleet. Upon detection of this threat, the USARV Aviation Officer requested assistance from US Army Aviation Systems Command (USAAVSCOM). The response to this request was superb, and within one month, IR suppression kits were introduced in the Republic of Vietnam to counter the enemy threat. Suppression kits were developed and shipped to RVN for all UH-1, AH-1G, OH-6A, and OH-58 helicopters. The ALE-29 flare dispersing decoy system was developed and shipped to RVN for the CH-47 helicopter. USAAVSCOM provided expert field service technical assistance for the installation of all kits and devices. Some problem areas existed with the systems; however, the responsiveness by USAAVSCOM to rectify the problem areas was tremendous.

2. Control and distribution of all IR kits and decoy devices was handled by the ACoS, G4, USARV Aviation staff. Several problems were encountered in the area of accountability and control in the shipment of kits from CONUS to RVN. Shipping information received was often late and inaccurate. Several shipments were inadequately marked externally, presenting problems of identification and resulting in much lost time in further shipment of kits to operational units. Several infrared countermeasure (IRCM) related items were shipped via commercial air and were improperly marked, resulting in their being detained by Vietnamese customs personnel for excessive periods of time before release.

3. The entire IRCM program has been completed for all UH-1, AH-1G, OH-6, OH-58, and CH-47 aircraft to USARV. This program has been extremely successful; however, it could have been accomplished in a much shorter time frame if the shipping and transportation data had been better organized and more expeditiously furnished to this command.
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(c) Recommendation.

1. That additional research be conducted to provide a more durable material for all IR suppression scoops and fairings.

2. That repair kits be identified by FSN and contain sufficient repair material to meet any anticipated repair requirements for the kit.

3. That a suppression kit be developed for an OH-6A that will require far less time for installation than the present model. A repair time requirement of less than eight hours in a combat zone would be acceptable.

4. That all aircraft shipped to a combat zone have IR suppression kits installed before shipment.

5. That all future Army production aircraft have IR suppressive capabilities built in as an integral part of the airframe.

6. That a Modification Work Order be published for the UH-1, AH-1G, and CH-47 IR suppression/decoy devices to permit continuity in historical records and to provide a basis for better control of the kits actually installed.

(11) Transfer of T55L7C Engines.

(a) Observation. Numerous problem areas were encountered by the Aviation staff with the T55L7C engines for VNAF CH-47 helicopters.

(b) Evaluation.

1. USAF and USARV Inter Service Support Agreement 4066-1 initiated a transfer plan of 15 T55L7C engines to the VNAF for spares. Subsequent negotiations at various staff levels including USAVSCOM in St. Louis, and the Air Force Advisory Group in Saigon, increased this quantity to 24. The quantity was to be available in monthly increments of three to seven engines per month.

2. During the month of October 1972, three engines were to be delivered to VNAF and, pending the issue of those engines, a USAVSCOM message arrived concurring with the additional transfer of 24 T55L7C engines. The USARV Aviation staff section had not received any previous data on these 24 engines nor had any plans been formulated to permit supply of these 24 additional engines.
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3. There was a communication gap between CONUS (USAAVSCOM) and USARV concerning the programming of these 24 additional engines. No prior coordination was effected to permit USARV to react to this requirement.

4. Additionally, the arrival of 23 CH-47A aircraft from CONUS required, without notice prior to arrival, the removal of T55L7B engines and replacement of T55L7C engines. This further depleted available T55L7C engines in-country.

5. USARV transferred 15 CH-47A aircraft to VNAF. Eight T55L7B engines on these aircraft required replacement by T55L7C engines. These requirements have exhausted all USARV T55L7C assets.

(c) Recommendations. In the future, Aircraft Intensively Managed Items (AIMI) managers at USAAVSCOM should notify USARV of any plans for shipment of additional engines. Secondly, offices at all levels that negotiate the transfer of aircraft from CONUS to VNAF should evaluate and monitor the VNAF powerplant requirements.

(d) Command Action. The logistics section of the USARV Aviation staff has honored the Inter Service Support Agreement by providing VNAF with engines from its in-country assets and submitting requests to CONUS for more T55L7C engines to complete the outstanding commitments.

(12) Transfer of CH-47 Aircraft to VNAF.

(a) Observation. Numerous aircraft transfer problems have been encountered with aircraft systems under the Improvement and Modernization (I&M) Program.

(b) Evaluation.

1. The USARV Aviation staff was tasked by Department of Army to receive, process, and issue to the VNAF, 23 CH-47A aircraft under the VNAF I&M Program. Several aircraft were received with avionics and engine configurations that did not meet the transfer criteria. During the assembly process, several maintenance difficulties were encountered with the Integral Span Inspection System (ISIS) rotor blades.

2. Sufficient USARV assets were not available to fulfill the transfer requirement for CH-47A aircraft under the VNAF I&M program. Twenty-three aircraft were shipped from New Cumberland Army Depot and arrived in...
Saigon between 1 and 18 October 1972 for the USARV Aviation staff to assemble and issue to VNAF. Of the 23 aircraft, 10 required the replacement of the T55L7/L7B engines and 15 required the replacement of the ARC-54 FM radio. The transfer requirements for VNAF dictated that the T55L7C engines and the ARC-131 FM radios be installed in their CH-47A aircraft prior to acceptance. Permission was obtained from USAVSCOM to remove the L7C engines and the ARC-131 radios from retrograde CH-47 aircraft and exchange them for the T55L7/L7B powerplants and ARC-54 radios in the CH-47A models.

USAVSCOM advised that the first 12 aircraft from CONUS would probably require modifications to meet the transfer criteria since sufficient time was not available to accomplish all necessary work at New Cumberland prior to scheduled shipment dates.

3 The maintenance operational check and hover tests of the first aircraft resulted in severe maintenance difficulties with the newly modified ISIS rotor blades. After 30 minutes of operation, four of the six blades on the first aircraft had lost varying amounts of the aerodynamic filler material from the nose cap to spar and from the blade pocket to spar bounding areas. One blade had deteriorated to the extent CONUS retrograde will be required for factory repair. Equipment improvement recommendations were submitted and USAVSCOM was notified of the difficulty. USAVSCOM advised that the Boeing Vertol Field Representative would receive repair material and instructions for in-country repair of the blades. Two other aircraft were operationally checked and the same difficulty was experienced with both aircraft. Blades that were repaired by the Field Representative were again operationally tested and the repaired areas were found to be satisfactory. However, the filler material continued to be lost from the areas of the blades that appeared to be satisfactory on the previous tests. Of the first 18 blades tested, 13 have proven unsatisfactory. USAVSCOM has been requested to send a team to repair blades on site or to grant permission for the return of all ISIS rotor blades to CONUS for repair. USAVSCOM has also been requested to expedite the shipment of nine T55L7C engines to cover the difference between the total required and the number of serviceable engines recovered from the retrograde aircraft.

(c) Recommendations.

1 That in future operations of this nature, aircraft be prepared to meet transfer criteria prior to departure from CONUS.
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2 That a detailed after action report outlining all the problem areas and the impact of this unprogrammed project upon this command's capabilities be prepared upon completion of the project and copies furnished Department of the Army, USAASCOM, and all other applicable agencies.

(d) Command Action. This project has been assigned a high priority and has consistently received command emphasis. This Headquarters is coordinating directly with USAASCOM to resolve the problem areas in order to expedite completion of the project.

(13) Modification Work Order Configuration Control.

(a) Observation. Several areas of concern have been exposed concerning modification work orders (MWO) in accordance with the Configuration Control Program.

(b) Evaluation.

1 The maintenance of valid MWO configuration control data in USARV has been an extremely difficult task. Due to mission requirements and other priority functions, the application of normal MWOs on aircraft in USARV was looked upon by most units as something that should be done, but not now! This attitude, coupled with little or no command emphasis, resulted in non-compliance of numerous normal MWOs and a loss of accountability of many others. The aircraft retrograde requirements included the application of all MWOs or retrograde of the MWO kits with the aircraft. These requirements, for the most part, were overlooked.

2 Entries in historical records were found to be inaccurate for nearly all aircraft. Many MWOs which were applied were not reflected as such in the historical records. Additionally, many MWOs recorded as being applied in the historical records were found to be absent from the aircraft.

(c) Recommendations.

1 That continued command emphasis be placed on MWO accountability and compliance.
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2. That the owning unit of aircraft requiring MWO applications be responsible for ordering all kits which can be installed organically or by its supporting DS/C4S unit. Documenting the issuance of the MWO kits to specific units for specific aircraft will constitute responsibility for accountability of all kits regardless of the disposition of the aircraft.

(d) Command Actions. In an effort to purify the master MWO configuration control records, and to ensure the application and compliance of all applicable MWOs for the USARV fleet, the following actions were taken by the USARV Aviation Officer.

1. All echelons of command were directed to place emphasis on the compliance of outstanding MWOs against their aircraft.

2. The Quality Assurance Branch, ACO/GS, G4, Aircraft Maintenance Division, USARV Aviation staff assumed total responsibility for MWO configuration control, requisition review, application, and accountability for all aircraft in the USARV fleet.

3. A computer program was devised to produce printout sheets for all applicable MWOs for each aircraft by serial number. MWO printout sheets for every aircraft in the USARV fleet were distributed to the owning unit for completion.

4. Each unit was required to conduct a 100% MWO inventory and inspection of their historical records and aircraft to ensure continuity and accuracy of data recorded on the printout sheet and in the aircraft historical records.

5. The USARV Aviation Staff's Aircraft Maintenance Assistance and Liaison Team visited each USARV unit to ensure that the proper procedures were being utilized in the performance of the 100% physical inspection of MWO kits not applied or on hand, the reporting of MWO compliances after application and the reporting of MWOs which were applied, but previously not reported.

6. Close monitorship by the Quality Assurance Branch of all requisitions for MWO kits, recording of all kit releases, and shipments by unit and aircraft serial number, and MWO application.
(14) Retrograde Site Storage,

(a) Observations. As military assets in the Republic of Vietnam are reduced, problems have developed in the available operable retrograde facilities.

(b) Evaluation.

1. The principal retrograde areas are presently Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Saigon. Each of these areas have limiting factors which affect its suitability. Da Nang has presented problems in that landing of fixed wing aircraft for surface shipment has required helicopter sling load transport due to the various roadway limitations. As troop levels decline security of equipment in the port area is also more difficult. This is also noticed since security precludes landing of CAS aircraft in this area for aircraft retrograde.

2. Nha Trang has problems similar to Da Nang except that there are no usable port facilities and retrograde movement must be via truck to Cam Ranh Bay. The alternative to this is air shipment from Nha Trang.

3. The Saigon area presents several distinct problems. First, the only port area is Newport and requires movement through central Saigon for delivery from Tan Son Nhut to the port area, and has neither water nor electrical power at the port. In the past this has cratered and could not readily accommodate heavy load transport. Because of the security problems for such transport, the security center for movement presents a similar problem. The port area is extremely short supply and no adequate area is restricted.

(c) Recommend that the proper unit be located at Saigon, and that planning and planning for a combat theater consider all retrograde plans for future movement and rollup operations prior to deploying a facility.

(c) Command Action. At this present time it appears that negotiations will have to be conducted on a head to head basis with the Cam Ranh Bay or Vung Tau port areas, to determine the best alternative, and determine whether to be moved expeditionally or not at the later time.

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In each of the headquarters, United States Army Vietnam/Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Support Command, Period Ending 31 October 1972, RCS CSFOR-65(R-3)

(15) Test and Measurement Diagnostic Equipment Calibration.

(a) Observation. Numerous problems have been encountered with calibration procedures throughout USARV and the Republic of Vietnam.

(b) Evaluation. The calibration of test and measurement equipment utilized in the performance of maintenance on Army aircraft and related systems, has presented many problems to USARV units. The drawdown of US forces resulted in the loss of much of the organic military calibration capability and an increased reliance on civilian-contracted calibration sites. Calibration, like several other quality assurance programs, did not receive sufficient emphasis. This resulted in numerous test and measurement items, which were overdue calibration, being utilized in the performance of maintenance checks and operations. Many units were not aware of the calibration facilities available for their use nor of the procedures required to have items calibrated.

(c) Recommendations.

1. That continued command emphasis be placed on proper calibration procedures.

2. That all MAGY actions pertaining to the capabilities, location, movement, or change of policy in the operation of civilian-contracted calibration sites, be closely coordinated with the Quality Assurance Branch, Aircraft Maintenance Division, ACoS, G4, USARV Aviation Staff.

3. That the calibration program be included as a key item of interest on all aircraft maintenance staff visits and inspections.

(d) Command Action. In an effort to interject new life into the calibration program and to ensure that all units were following the prescribed calibration procedures, the USARV Aviation Staff's Quality Assurance Branch took the following actions:

1. A detailed letter of instruction for calibration services was provided to each USARV unit.
2. Each calibration site under civilian contract was visited by personnel from the Quality Assurance Branch, at which time the capabilities of the site were analyzed and the aircraft maintenance calibration requirements were discussed.

3. The USARV Aviation Staff's Aircraft Maintenance Assistance and Liaison Team visited each USARV unit, inspecting the unit's calibration program in detail, and providing assistance and guidance for the establishment of a sound calibration program.

4. Close coordination was made with the MACV calibration officer to ensure the continued availability of civilian-contracted calibration sites in each military region.

16. Integration of the Inventory Control and Movements Section, Aircraft Systems Branch, G4, USARV Aviation Staff.

(a) Observation. Prior to the September 1972 integration of the 34th General Support Group with the USARV Aviation Staff, similar operations of inventory control and movements operations resulted in duplicated reporting procedures, extended lag time for information exchanges, and slow response to rapid changes in strength and unit drawdown operations.

(b) Evaluation. The integration of the Inventory Control and Movements Section in the Aircraft Systems Branch, G4, USARV Aviation Staff, resulted in the elimination of duplicate reporting procedures: the consolidation of inventory control activities; and the controlled, orderly flow of retrograde aircraft. The streamlined organization in the Aircraft Systems Branch effectively establishes speedier coordination and response to command requirements.

(c) Recommendation. That any future aviation requirements of such magnitude as experienced in the Vietnam involvement be filled through the utilization of a responsive organization, such as currently exists in the 1st Aviation Brigade, G4, USARV Aviation Staff Section.
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(17) Completion of Project 981 on 3 September 1972.

(a) Observation. Upon the initiation of Project 981, the transfer of US Army aircraft to the VNAF, extreme difficulty was encountered due to a lack of qualified VNAF technical inspectors and test pilots to transfer aircraft to the VNAF.

(b) Evaluation. The lack of qualified VNAF technical inspectors and test pilots made transfer of aircraft complicated and difficult. Currently each military region has sufficient totals of qualified VNAF technical inspectors and test pilots which accelerated the transfer operations and facilitated a high degree of quality control.

(c) Recommendation. That planning for future operations involving transfer of aircraft include a transitional/instructional phase to allow training of qualified technical inspectors and test pilots for receiving agencies.

(18) Project Enhance.

(a) Observation. Difficulties encountered in Project 981 were also found in Project Enhance. Based on experience gained by Project 981, qualified technical inspectors and test pilots were identified in each military region.

(b) Evaluation. Project Enhance was a valuable training vehicle in identifying problem areas when involved in transfer of aircraft between two national military forces. The identification and use of qualified technical inspectors and test pilots aided in expediting the transfer of aircraft.

(c) Recommendation. That continued emphasis be placed on timely action, extensive coordination, and proper indoctrination of participants.

(19) Control of USARV Controlled Avionics Items (UCAI).

(a) Observation. Units within USARV having control of or access to USARV Controlled Avionics Items (UCAI) are failing to coordinate with the USARV Avionics Office for disposition on UCAI equipment. In the past, UCAI equipment had not been stringently controlled due to a lack of feeder information from units in the field.

(b) Evaluation. Shipping and disposition instructions issued by this office have consistently cited a requirement for submission of shipping information,
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relocation information, etc...; however, subordinate commands have not complied fully with these requirements. A listing of UCSI was disseminated to the field in January 1972; however, explicit instructions on the control of these items were never fielded. Currently, an updated UCSI equipment listing and a LOI outlining the procedures and responsibilities for the disposition and processing of UCSI equipment have been fielded. It is imperative that the USARV Avionics Office maintain stringent control of UCSI equipment to preclude the loss of valuable assets within RVN.

(c) Recommendation. That all unit commanders comply with USARV LOI, dated 31 October 1972, subject: USARV Controlled Avionics Items, and ensure that subordinate personnel adhere to the instructions outlined within the LOI.

(20) Retrograde of Avionics Equipment by KAPP Facilities.

(a) Observation. The USARV Avionics Office is being increasingly tasked by various commands in CONUS for information regarding shipment and/or status of various items of avionics equipment. Queries by this office to subordinate units requesting shipping information indicates that the majority of retrograded avionics equipment is improperly documented. Specific problem areas are the lack of Transportation Control Movement Document numbers, mode of shipment, date of shipment, name of carrier, and the final destination.

(b) Evaluation. Subordinate units have not followed instructions outlined in Keystone SOP's nor have they followed MILSTAMP procedures. Most information provided this office has been of a "personal knowledge" nature and is not documented.

(c) Recommendation. That unit commanders and commanders having control of KAPP facilities adhere to MACV Handbook on MILSTAMP and LOI on retrograde procedures for avionics equipment to be published by this office.

(21) Requisitioning of Part Numbers and Non-Army Master Data File (AMDF).

(a) Observation. Avionics repair parts are being ordered by part numbers and non-AMDF FSN with proper editing by the Aviation Supply Activity (ASA). This procedure reveals that an item is depleted for these parts in excess of 15 days at the 142d TCS Direct Support Unit, and 75 days.
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e Elsewhere. The item is then evacuated and the next higher assembly or end item will be ordered after this lengthy time lapse.

(b) Evaluation

1. Recent evaluation of units requisitioning avionics items or repair parts by part number of non-AMDF FSN's, reveals that items are deadlined many days in excess to those prescribed in AR 710-2 based on priority. Once the item has to be evacuated due to time criteria of awaiting parts, a requisition is submitted for the next higher assembly/end-item and requisition for the part is canceled. This is creating an undue time delay in the repair/replacement of avionics items.

2. Several studies at the US Army Electronics Command, as revealed by National Inventory Control Point field technical representatives, demonstrate that on part number requisition, delivery will be substantially in excess of 75 days and delivery of non-AMDF FSN requisitions will exceed 45 days.

3. The USARV Aviation Staff's Aviation Supply Activity, as part of its editing procedures, uses the consolidated Master Cross Reference Listing (MCRL) which changes almost all convertible part numbers to FSNs. Many of the FSNs from the MCRLs are not in the AMDF.

(c) Recommendation. That the Aviation Supply Activity, USARV Aviation Staff, determine items that are requisitioned by part number or a non-AMDF FSN, and advise the unit to return the item to the applicable depot and requisition the next higher assembly or end-item as a replacement which can be identified easily by AMDF FSN.

g. Communications. None.

h. Material. Material Losses in Conjunction with Base Transfers.

(a) Observation. On several occasions during the transition period between total US occupation of bases and subsequent total ARVN occupation substantial material losses were incurred.

(b) Evaluation. Losses occurred during the phasing of specific unit areas from US to ARVN control. As unit areas were vacated no or only a
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Few guards were placed in the area to provide physical security. Buildings were stripped and generally subjected to pilferage by US troops and others.

(c) Recommendations. Zone coordinators or some responsible agency must be designated to provide physical security for vacated areas.

(d) Command Action. Commander USARV has directed Army Support Elements (ASE) in each region to ensure physical security exists until transfer to ARVN is actually made.

1. Other. None.

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RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

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TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

Concur with the subject ORLL, with the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 2c(1)(c), page 9: Further cost reductions are possible if individual facilities can be inactivated promptly as troop populations are reduced.

b. Reference paragraph 2c(2)(c), page 4: One factor that should be considered in evaluating contractor performance is that of his responsibility for fixed operations, usually performed under standing operating orders. Utilities plant operations generally consume a heavy proportion of FE manpower and must be continued at nearly the same employee levels regardless of troop populations or contractor's staffing. As troop levels and contractor staffing decline, fewer of the contractor's force are available for job and service order work.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

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