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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971 (U)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG 805FR-65 (R2) (U)

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. On 15 December 1970, the 282d Aviation Company (AH) conducted a graduation exercise for the twenty (20) VNAF pilots they had been training under the Improvement and Modernization Program. The VNAF pilots arrived on 6 September 1970 and had flown a total of 3651 hours up to the graduation date.

b. On 29 January 1971, the first aircraft of the 282d Aviation Company (AH) departed for Long Ha RNV to establish a forward base area in support of AKVN I Corps Advisory Group for the LAM 8CM 719 Operation.

c. On 30 January 1971, the remaining commitment for the 282d Aviation Company (AH) arrived at the Long Ha forward position. The unit operated from LZ Kiwi with eight (8) UH-1H’s and three (3) UH-1C’s.

d. On 12 February 1971, the 131st Aviation Company (5A) began flying in direct support of the Lai Son 719 Operation. Earlier, the intelligence obtained from the regular reconnaissance missions of the 131st Aviation Company (5A) in Military Region I and the Steel Tiger Region had been used in the initial phase of Operation Lai Son 719.

e. On 1 March 1971, an O-1 aircraft from the 21st Aviation Company (UA) while operating near the abandoned airstrip at Kham Duc came under small arms fire. The pilot took evasive action but one hit was received. The bullet entered the right door passing through the seat and the pilot’s leg. Although seriously wounded the pilot was able to maintain aircraft control until the observer could position the rear controls and take over control of the aircraft. The observer flew the aircraft back to Chu Lai Combat Base, lined the aircraft up on short final and the pilot was able to land the aircraft without further damage or injury to the aircraft, observer or himself.

f. On 5 March 1971, the five (5) OH-58A aircraft and crew of the XXIV Corps Artillery Section, which were attached to the 62d Aviation Company (Corps) were subsequently transferred back to the 108th Artillery Group. These aircraft and crews were originally attached on 1 October 1970.
g. On 9 March 1971, an OV-1 aircraft from the 131st Aviation Company (SA) came under extensive 37mm anti-aircraft fire resulting in the complete destruction of the right vertical stabiliser and a portion of the right horizontal stabiliser. The pilot successfully brought the aircraft under control, flew to Da Nang Air Force Base and landed without further incident.

h. On 3 April 1971, fifteen (15) rounds of enemy eighty-two millimeters (82mm) mortar fire impacted in the immediate vicinity of the 131st Aviation Company (SA) at Phu Bai with negative casualties and negative damage.

i. On 30 April 1971, the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) Detachment Provisional APO 96215 was assigned to HHC, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion on Letter Orders #137, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade dated 19 April 1971, as a Permanent Change of Station. Headquarters, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion Special Orders #17 dated 30 April 1970 further assigned the FLIR Detachment to the 282d Aviation Company (AH) located at Marble Mountain Air Facility.

j. Organisational structure and unit location are attached at Inclosure 1.

k. Changes of command and principle staff positions within the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the reporting period are attached at Inclosure 2.

l. The 212th Combat Aviation Battalion and subordinate units authorised and present for duty strength are attached at Inclosure 3.

m. Type aircraft, number authorised and on hand for the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion and subordinate units are attached at Inclosure 4.

n. Results of operations conducted by subordinate units during the reporting period are attached at Inclosure 5.

o. A Summary of Significant Enemy Engagement by subordinate units of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion are attached at Inclosure 6.

p. Awards and Decorations awarded to members to the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion are attached at Inclosure 7.

q. Personnel of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion that died during their assignment are attached at Inclosure 8.

r. Events of Historical Significance:

(1) On 27 Nov 1971, the 59th Signal Detachment was released from the 220th Aviation Company (UA) at Phu Bai, RVN and reassigned to HHC, 212th CAB at Marble Mountain Air Facility, Da Nang, RVN as per Special Order #23, Headquarters, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion, dated 29 Nov 1970.

(2) On 1 Jan 1971, the 116th Aviation Company (AH) was reassigned to the 23rd Infantry Division at Chu Lai Combat Base as per COUSMACV Message, dated 160223Z Dec 1970.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROS CPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) On 2 Jan 1971 the YO-3A Detachment was reassigned to the 73rd Aviation Company (SA) at Long Thanh, RVN as per USARV message 2806582 Dec 1970.

(4) On 1 Feb 1971, C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry was reassigned to the 1/5 Moob Bde as per General Order #419 Headquarters 1st Aviation Brigade dated 17 Jan 1971.

(5) On 27 Feb 1971, the Dong Ha compound was hit by rockets & mortars. Negative damage to LZ Kid or the 282d Aviation Company (AH) personnel stationed there at the time.

(6) On 1 Mar 1971, an OH-1B aircraft of the 131st Aviation Company (SA) crashed 3 miles south of Phu Bai, RVN airfield upon returning from a mission. The pilot & the observer ejected over the airfield. The pilot, CPT James J. Shrock, was killed when his parachute failed to deploy. The observer landed safely on the airfield ramp with only a minor ankle injury.

(7) On 6 Mar 1971, the 154th Medical Detachment was reassigned from the 17th Combat Aviation Group to the HHC, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion as per General Order #1913, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade.

(8) On 10 April 1971, the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion was assigned to the 15th Combat Aviation Group as per General Order #3395, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, dated 18 April 1971.

(9) On 26 Apr 1971, seven (7) personnel received minor injuries during a rocket attack on the 282nd Aviation Company (AH) area at Marble Mountain Air Facility, Da Nang, RVN.

(10) On 28 Apr 1971, a Warrant Officer pilot of the 282d Aviation Company (AH) sustained a fatal head injury by walking into the tail rotor of a UH-1H while performing a Maintenance Operational Check.

(11) From early February 1971 to early April 1971 the Republic of Vietnam engaged enemy forces in South Vietnam and Laos during operation LANDSOUTH 719. The 212th Combat Aviation Battalion operating from seven widely separated locations conducted a variety of day and night support missions in marginal weather and subject to frequent hostile fire. During the course of LANDSOUTH 719 the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion flew 6622 combat hours, 7724 sorties carrying 14,082 troops, and moving over 30 tons of cargo. During this same period one hundred thirty five (135) aircraft were shot at with nine (9) receiving hits and only (1) aircraft lost. Visual Reconnaissance by subordinate units accounted for sighting 720 enemy soldiers, 61 trucks, 51 anti-aircraft positions and 52 tanks. The valorous and dedicated performance of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion materially assisted the Vietnam Military Forces in the IAW LANDSOUTH 719 combat operations.
AVBAMO

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, OSC 0520-65 (V) (U)

2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Critical MOS Shortages:


(b) Evaluation: Due to the priority of the unit's mission and complexity of aircraft and sensors, it is essential that personnel critical to mission completion be maintained at or near authorized strength levels.

(c) Recommendation: That the critical skill requirements of CW-1 units be given priority for re-assignment of personnel from standdown units and that the across-the-board early drop policy currently in effect be re-evaluated with the intent of developing a selective screening process to retain critical skills essential to mission accomplishment.

(d) Command Action: Continue to advise higher headquarters on unit personnel status.

(2) Critical MOS Shortages:


(b) Evaluation: A/228th Aviation Company was recently transferred from the 1st Cavalry Division to the 1st Aviation Brigade. It is configured as an organic Assault Support Company which receives considerable support from its parent headquarters. Aviation companies of the Brigade are organized to operate independently thus requiring a greater fill of these critical MOS to achieve and sustain a satisfactory mission readiness posture.

(c) Recommendations: A partial fill of these MOS shortages under the 1st Aviation Brigade would alleviate the problem temporarily. A more equitable distribution of Chinook MOS personnel should be emphasized at higher command levels.
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AVVAY-5C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROE CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

11 May 1971

(d) Command Action: Redistribution of assets available within the Battalion has been made and commanders at higher levels of command will be kept informed of continuing needs and changes.

b. Intell: None

c. Operations:

(1) Target Identification Pilot (TIP) Qualifications

(a) Observation: In the past many enemy targets have not been taken under fire due to the lack of experience of the O-1 pilots to call in and direct Tactical Air Strikes. These targets include trucks, enemy personnel, tanks and active anti-aircraft positions.

(b) Evaluation: Additional in-country training can be made available which would enable O-1 pilots to direct high performance aircraft against enemy targets. All too frequently, before the Air Force could place a FAC on station, the target has evaded further detection.

(c) Recommendation: That as many as possible O-1 pilots be trained for directing Air Force Tactical Fighter Aircraft. The 220th Aviation Company (UA) has made contact with the US Air Force FAC contingent colocated at Phu Bai, RVN, whereby training would be given if approval can be obtained.

(d) Command Action: A letter regarding approval will be prepared and forwarded thru channels to higher headquarters.

(2) Utilisation and Requirements for Utility/Cargo Fixed Wing Aircraft.

(a) Observation: Use of the U-6A (Beaver) aircraft has resulted in a rapid and regular turn-in and IX of avionics equipment. Down time on mission essential avionics equipment has decreased due to this means of transportation to and from the avionics general support facilities.

(b) Evaluation: Starting in mid-February 1971, the 212th CAB initiated an "on-call" availability of a U-6A to be used for transporting repair parts and equipment to distant GS units located at Vung Tau and Tuy Hoa. This program increased the availability of signal and avionics items and decreased the down time of equipment needing parts.

(c) Recommendation: That the U-6A or other cargo F/W aircraft be retained for the purpose of supporting the 131st Aviation Company (AS).

(d) Command Action: Continue to inform 1st Aviation Brigade of the needs for cargo fixed wing aircraft.

(3) Utilisation of O-1 aircraft at night.
AVBAT-BC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCT CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Observation: During the high threat periods around the Chu Lai Base, the 2d Platoon, 21st Aviation Company, which supports the Americal Division, was tasked to provide visual reconnaissance on a twenty four (24) hour basis. The night visual reconnaissance being rocket/mortar watch around the Chu Lai complex.

(b) Evaluation: The mission of rocket/mortar watch around the Chu Lai complex was to be a tactical deterrent. The concept was that if the enemy heard or saw the aircraft it would not fire the rockets or mortars for fear of being spotted. The enemy did not hesitate to fire rockets on many occasions with the aircraft overhead. The O-1's were not the only aircraft performing the mission of rocket/mortar watch. Elements of Air Cav Troops and assault helicopter companies were also in the area. In addition to the aircraft, prearranged artillery would immediately be fired once incoming rockets/mortars were received. The O-1, being unarmed and not controlling the prearranged artillery was given last priority for developing the situation. The mission was additionally ineffective in that the helicopters operating in the same area always had priority and performed the same function. The inability to obtain pinpoint coordinates at night further decreased the effectiveness of the O-1 aircraft as a tactical deterrent.

(c) Recommendation: That the O-1 aircraft not be utilised during the hours of darkness when other aircraft are duplicating the same functions and have priority over the area. If the O-1 is used, the controlling agency should coordinate all other aircraft operating in the area in regards to call signs, frequencies, operational procedures, and responsibilities.

(d) Command Action: Supported headquarters will continue to be advised of the mission capabilities of the O-1 aircraft and recommendations will continue to be made as to effective utilisation, elimination of problem areas and hazards to personnel and equipment.

(e) Utilisation of dual controls provided in O-1 aircraft.

(a) Observation: An unnecessary tragedy or accident may be easily prevented by utilising the dual controls provided for the observer in O-1 aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: On 1 March 1971, a pilot of the 21st Aviation Company (UA) was seriously wounded by enemy ground fire. He was able to maintain control of the aircraft long enough to allow the observer to position the dual controls and take control of the aircraft. The observer had only been in the O-1 three times prior to the incident, however, he had received rudimentary instructions on how to handle the aircraft. He was able to fly the aircraft back to Chu Lai where the pilot, nearly unconscious from loss of blood, was able to assume control and land the aircraft.
AVBAY-BC

11 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCO CSFOR-65 (R2) (0)

(a) Recommendation: That the dual controls provided in the O-1 aircraft be positioned for use subsequent to take off and a brief orientation on use of controls and systems be given to all observers on combat missions. It is further recommended that the controls not be placed in position during take off and landing unless a rated aviator occupies the rear seat.

(d) Command Action: All O-1 units within this command have been advised of the recommendation for utilizing the rear controls and have implemented such policy.

(5) Altitude Flying

(a) Observation: The normal VR altitude of 1500 feet AGL can be highly effective if the aerial observer is equipped with a pair of binoculars. The advantages of flying above the small arms effective range is quite apparent. However, at 1500 feet AGL vulnerability to larger anti-aircraft weapons including .51 CAL, 23mm and 37mm remains of considerable concern.

(b) Evaluation: In most cases the observer is not equipped with binoculars. Even with the trained eye, camouflaged targets are not easily seen at the 1500 ft AGL altitude without optical aid.

(c) Recommendation: Supported units provide all aerial observers with binoculars. A compromise exists as to altitude and mission. A dual ship mission can be employed using one aircraft with an experienced observer flying at low level (tree top - nap of the earth) and a second aircraft at 2500-3000 feet AGL acting as cover.

(d) Command Action:

(1) The hazards of low level flying normally far outweighs the possible increased value of such missions and will not be employed except under strict tactical necessity.

(2) Supported units have been requested to provide binoculars for all observers.

(6) Secure FM Radio

(a) Observation: That the use of a secure means of FM voice communications reduce the effectiveness of mission accomplishment.

(b) Evaluation: O-1 secure voice operations in liaison with Army gunships, Airforce FAC & TAC Air operations have encountered limiting factors. The difficulty in obtaining and utilizing required different key lists and subsequently keying the KT-26 effectively reduces the flexibility factor required for the widest operational employment of the O-1.
AVBAY-BC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Recommendation: That KY-28 utilization be directed toward organic unit operations, and that circle wheel-or similar low level voice codes be employed for inter-unit FM voice liaison.

(d) Command Action: The establishment of a secure base frequency has reduced the requirement for secure voice and the passing of essential frequencies and information is accomplished more readily.

(7) Delay in clearance time

(a) Observation: Artillery units are extremely slow in registering and firing on targets of opportunity. In many cases, a grid clearance is given although friendly maneuver elements are still within the grid area and many times registration missions are cancelled because clearance was not available.

(b) Evaluation: That delays are costly in time, material and man hours as well as lost targets of opportunity.

(c) Recommendation: That the supported artillery units attempt to find more expeditious means for obtaining clearances for registration and target of opportunity missions.

(d) Command Action: All supported field artillery headquarters have been informed of the tactical consideration and loss of mission effectiveness in untimely delays obtaining clearance to fire.

d. Organisation:

(1) Increase in TO&E Avionics Personnel

(a) Observation: Under TOE 1-257F the O-1 units of this command are authorized only two avionics personnel. The increased level of assigned O-1 aircraft, but without increased avionics personnel, places the 220th Aviation Company (UA) in a strikingly shorthanded avionics maintenance posture.

(b) Evaluation: The 220th Aviation Company (UA) presently has sixty-two (62) FM, thirty-one (31) UHF and thirty-one (31) ADF radios which are utilized almost daily. Without communication the O-1 mission is impossible and the loss of any avionics severely reduces the mission accomplishment.

(c) Recommendation: That the TOE 1-257F be increased to minimum of four to six (4-6) avionics personnel to provide a satisfactory level of functional avionics.

(d) Command Action: That the recommendation will be considered and higher levels of command will be informed of the additional avionics personnel requirements.

e. Training: None.
OPERATIONAL REPORT—LESSONS LEARNED OF THE 212TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. Logistics

(1) Repair kits for Side Looking Airborne Radar

(a) Observations: The 131st Aviation Company (SA) has experienced mechanical problems with the block assembly FSN 5881-858-5931 used in the inflight processing of SLAR imagery. Frequent failures of the bearing assembly FSN 5841-908-9028 and gear case and motor have plagued the unit's operations.

(b) Evaluation: The unit does not have the capability to repair the block assembly except for minor malfunctions. When unrepairable at the unit level, the block must be dispatched through the 317th LEM at Vung Tau to CONUS. Delays of up to six months have been experienced through this system.

(c) Recommendation: Repair kits consisting of the bearing assembly and gear case motor should be made available to unit level to alleviate the necessity of dispatching critical items to CONUS for repair.

(d) Command Action: The 131st Aviation Company (SA) has requested repair kits through supply channels without success.

(2) Martin-Baker J-5 Ejection Seat

(a) Observation: The time release mechanism in the Martin-Baker J-5 Ejection Seat requires calibration every 90 days with the 131STOCH1 test unit. Calibration of this test unit is presently being accomplished by the 7/13 USAF RTAB, Udorn, Thailand every 180 days.

(b) Evaluation: Calibration of the testing mechanism should be accomplished at DS level.

(c) Recommendation: The 142nd Transportation Company should be equipped with the necessary equipment to calibrate the 131STOCH1 test unit. Calibration of test device should be performed through normal support channels.

(d) Command Action: The Commanding Officer 142nd TC has been advised of the DS inability to provide adequate support for the Martin-Baker J-5 Ejection Seat.

(3) Protective Clothing and Equipment

(a) Observation: The following critical issue items are becoming increasingly difficult to obtain in sufficient quantity and/or appropriate sizes: Nomex gloves, Novex flight suits, Leather boots and strobe lights.

(b) Evaluation: The Nomex flight suits, leather boots and Nomex gloves are the prescribed uniform for crew members while participating in aerial flight. Some crew members have been observed wearing jungle boots due to nonavailability of leather boots.

(c) Recommendation: That the subject of prescribed flight gear receive command emphasis.
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AVBAY-BC · 11 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS GSFQR-65 (R2) (U)

(d) Command Action: A check was made to insure that all items were on valid requisition and that follow up action had been taken. Recent changes in supply procedures will allow consolidation of requisitions at Battalion level to be processed thru 11th Combat Aviation Group.

(h) Shortage of film and chemicals for the 131st Aviation Company (SA) (OV-1)

(a) Observation: The present supply system has failed to provide the required chemicals and film on a timely basis which is essential to the completion of the 131st Aviation Company (SA) primary mission.

(b) Evaluation: Despite the repeated submission of requisitions, continuing reconciliation and follow up action, the supply of monobath would have been exhausted on two (2) separate occasions. In both incidents, the 131st Aviation Company (SA) made arrangements outside of normal supply channels and picked up supplies at Cam Ranh Bay in an OV-1 aircraft.

(c) Recommendation: That higher logistical commands arrange to replenish needed film and chemicals on a timely basis through normal supply channels.

(d) Command Action: Supply channels have been alerted to the complexity of the problem area, and consistent liaison is maintained to insure timely requisitioning and prompt issue and/or stockage of required supplies.

(f) Wing mounted camera system for OV-1 aircraft.

(a) Observation: Due to stand down of US Air Force units, photo reconnaissance support has been severely limited.

(b) Evaluation: The OV-1 aircraft can perform limited photo reconnaissance missions utilizing a wing mounted camera system such as the KA-39. The present MTOE, 1-25TF dated 10 May 1967 deleted the requirement and authorization for a wing mounted camera. The KA-39 is obsolete by Army standards and parts are not available with which to repair the cameras on hand. Numerous requests are received by OV-1 Units for photo missions of point and strip targets. The hand held camera can perform a limited function but does not produce the detailed coverage per frame.

(c) Recommendation: That parts be made available to units utilizing the KA-39 wing mounted camera. That OV-1 aircraft units be given authorization by MTOE for replacement of the KA-39 camera.

(d) Command Action: A request through channels has been made that any KA-39 cameras and/or parts that become available as U.S. Army OV-1 Units stand down be transferred to this command.
(6) Requisition Cancellations

(a) Observation: During a ninety (90) day period, the 131st Aviation Company (SA) experienced a seventy-four percent (74%) cancellation on all avionics requisitions. During this same period fifty-six percent (56%) of all maintenance items were also cancelled. All cancelled items had received valid DAU document numbers and were cancelled without explanation on the ADP reconciliation summary. Valid reasons for the cancellation were not received by the consumer.

(b) Evaluation: Numerous requisitions, supported by valid DSU document numbers, fail to appear on the ADP reconciliation sheet. Requisitions appear to be lost between the DSU and its source of supply.

(c) Recommendation: That new procedures be developed which will insure that requisitions are not lost between DSU and source of supply.

(d) Command Action: Elements of this command will be advised of logistical problem areas. Liaison officers will continue to be dispatched to supporting units for purposes of reconciling document registers. Listings of lost or unexplainably cancelled requisitions will continue to be forwarded to appropriate headquarters.

(7) Preposition of T53-L7 Engine.

(a) Observation: The NORS rate in Military Region I for engine T53-L7, FSN 2850-6515-8519; propeller assemblies FSN 1610-617-9735; and propeller controls FSN 1610-671-1092 has proven to be excessive.

(b) Evaluation: All of the above items are time change components at the 1200/1600 hour level of usage. This unit's flying hour program exceeds 1200 flight hours per month. Without consideration for unscheduled failures, two (2) of each item must be on hand to avoid unnecessary down time on aircraft. RDD requisitions for these items have been cancelled by the DSU each time submitted due to the fact that they are AIMT items.

(c) Recommendations: That this unit be stocked with two (2) propeller assemblies, two (2) propeller controls, and two (2) T53-L7 engines to avoid the 3-9 day aircraft down time (NORS) experienced by EDP requisitions.

(d) Command Action: Command action has been taken by the 212th CAB, 1st Aviation Brigade and AMC authorizing prepositioned stockage of two (2) propeller assemblies, two (2) propeller controls and two (2) T53-L7 engines. However, nonavailability of the items has effectively precluded their being pre-positioned.

g. Communications

(1) Shortage of Assigned FM Frequencies
AVBAY-BC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Observation: That due to the shortage of assigned FM tactical frequencies, those in use quickly become overcrowded and jammed.

(b) Evaluation: An extensive shortage of FM frequencies has existed in Military Region I for a considerable time.

(c) Recommendation: That larger quotas for FM frequency allocation be assigned subordinate units use as primary and alternate frequencies.

(d) Command Action: Additional frequencies have been requested through command/staff channels on numerous occasions with negative results. The 212th Combat Aviation Battalion has placed emphasis on air to air brevity during unit operations to reduce radio traffic as much as possible.

h. Material: None

i. Other: None

8 Incl
1 - Organizational Chart Structure
2 - Personnel Changes
3 - Auth/Present for Duty Strength
4 - Aircraft Status
5 - Operational Statistics
6 - Summary of Significant Enemy Engagements
7 - Awards and Decorations
8 - MIA-KIA Data

CARL A. WILSON JR.
LTC, IN
Commanding
AVBATS-C (6 August 1971) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971 - RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96349 21 August 1971

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC, APO 96384

1.(c) Paragraph 2, subparagraph f (Logistics) (6) (Requisition Cancellations) has been reviewed by the S4, 11th CAG. An evaluation of this situation was made and the following comments are submitted.

a. While the problem in question is not a new one, it apparently was quite serious during the reporting period concerned. The Direct Support Maintenance Units involved were attached to the 26th General Support Group at Hue/Phu Bai. Many requisitions were unexplainably lost, yet carried a document number until the monthly reconciliation summary was requested.

b. The specific cancelled documents referred to in the OR-LL have since been reordered by the 131st Military Intelligence Company and there has been a marked improvement in supply actions from the Direct Support units involved. This is due in part to the constant liaison established by the 212th CAB at the Direct Support units. Reconcilliations are demanded frequently by the 131st MI Company, and cancellations are now identified early enough to preclude complete supply outages.

c. The 11th CAG has taken similar action to establish liaison personnel at each Direct Support unit in the area. It is a serious drain of responsible supply personnel to maintain a daily check on the adequacy of each Direct Support unit, but otherwise this group receives inadequate supply support.

2. This headquarters also recommends that the present system of handling requisitions between the Direct Support unit and source of supply be reevaluated. Elimination of the problems discussed above will result in reduced NORS down time rates and a savings in man hours, permitting trained supply personnel now serving as liaison to return to assigned duties. Unit combat readiness and deployability will improve significantly.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

HARRY B. BROWN
Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBAGC-S (6 August 1971) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Reports—Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 30 April 1971 - RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384  30 AUG 1971

TO: Commanding General
    USARV
    ATTN: AVGCG-DST
    APO 96375

This Headquarters has reviewed and evaluated the operational report—lessons learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
HAROLD C. PHILLIPS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
A
AVHD-DO (11 May 71) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 212th Combat Aviation
Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, MSC CEFOR-65 (R) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 23 SEP 1971
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 212th Combat Aviation
Battalion and concurs with comments of endorsing headquarters with the
exception of page 9, paragraph 2d(1): Nonconcur. Contrary to the unit's
comment, the 220th Aviation Company is not authorized any avionics main-
tenance personnel under MTOE 1-127FP03, P10070, implemented by GO 184,
HQ USARPAC, 5 May 1970. Further, there are no records at this office to
indicate any increased level of assigned aircraft. Unit has been advised
on the proper method of submitting MTOE or TOE changes.

2. Additional comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Critical MOS Shortages," page 4, para-
graph 2a(1) and (2): Concur. This Headquarters conducts a daily review
of all authorized and assigned strengths by MOS. Assignment of replace-
ments by this Headquarters is on an equitable basis to major and subordi-
nate commands with distribution to lower units determined by those commands.
The 212th CAB is a subordinate element of the 1st Aviation Brigade and
internal allocation of resources is determined by the Brigade. During the
current reduction of forces, Keystone Oriole, the 1st Aviation Brigade will
retain all personnel presently assigned to standby and drawdown units.
In addition, DA is informed monthly of critical shortages in specific
MOSC and grades. No action by USARPAC is recommended. Action is required
by DA to insure timely fill of requirements by MOS and grade.

   b. Reference item concerning "Wing mount camera system for 0-1 air-
craft," page 10, paragraph 2f(5): Recommend further study by USACDC.
This unit was authorized ten (10) camera, KA-39 under MTOE 1-257FP03,
P10070, implemented by GO 184, HQ USARPAC, 5 May 1970. This item has been
deleted from SB 700-20 as no longer required. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

F.L. MINSWITZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy from:
212th CAB
1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ 212th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 20 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in the subject report with the following comment:

Reference item concerning "Secure FM Radio", paragraph 2d, page 7, MACV has recently directed the use of a single key list for each military region for use by all services and advisors. This action has resolved the problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MAH

1LT, AGC

Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV
212th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
APO SF 96349 (NNAF, Da Nang)

HHC, 212th CAB
APO SF 96349 (NNAF, Da Nang)

51st Medical Detachment
APO 96349 (NNAF, Da Nang)

59th Signal Detachment
APO 96308 (Phu Bai)

21st Aviation Company (UA)
APO 96374 (Chu Lai)

1st Platoon
APO 96319 (NNAF, Da Nang)

2d and 3rd Platoon
APO 96374 (Chu Lai)

A/228th Aviation Company (ASHC)
APO 96374 (Chu Lai)

51st Transportation Detachment
APO 96374 (Chu Lai)

62d Aviation Company (Corps)
APO 96319 (NNAF, Da Nang)

131st Aviation Company (SA)
APO 96308 (Phu Bai)

Detachment
APO 96237 (Udon, Thailand)

220th Aviation Company (UA)
APO 96308 (Phu Bai)

131st Medical Detachment
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282d Aviation Company (AH)
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FLIR Detachment
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Period Ending 30 April 1971
22nd CAB OPERATIONAL STATISTICS
CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ENGAGEMENTS

1. On 1 Nov 1970, five (5) UH-1H's and two (2) UH-1D's of the 282nd Aviation Company (AH) conducted an eagle flight in support of the Quang Da Special Zone at coordinates AT 980600. On touchdown, the flight came under intense enemy fire resulting in one (1) gunner KIA and four (4) passengers and one (1) VNAP Pilot WIA.

2. On 3 Nov 1970, a light fire team of the 282nd Aviation Company (AH) flew in support of the Quang Da Special Zone for troops in contact at coordinates BT 0660 resulting in eight (8) structures damaged and sixteen (16) enemy KIA.

3. On 20 Dec 1970, seven (7) UH-1H's and two UH-1C's of the 282nd Aviation Company (AH) supported the Quang Da Special Zone. Two (2) aircraft received damage from enemy fire and six hundred - fifty nine (659) RVN Soldiers were transported in this operation.

4. On 22 Dec 1970, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 21st Aviation Company (UA) observed three (3) enemy soldiers at coordinates BS 470734. Artillery was employed resulting in three (3) enemy KIA.

5. On 24 Dec 1970, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 21st Aviation Company observed an estimated NVA battalion at coordinates BS 325964. Artillery was employed resulting in the following BDA reported by ARVN Forces: Fifteen (15) NVA KIA, twenty (20) structures destroyed, one hundred (100) 82mm rockets destroyed, nine (9) radios, three (3) crew served weapons, and seven (7) AK-47 rifles captured.

6. On 11 Jan 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) observed five (5) NVA soldiers at coordinates XD 233799. Artillery was employed with three (3) NVA probable KBA.

7. On 15 Jan 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted five (5) enemy soldiers at coordinates XD 922692. Artillery was utilised with undetermined results. At XD 125768, four (4) enemy personnel were sighted and engaged with 2.75" rockets resulting in two (2) possible KBA.

8. On 16 Jan 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company sighted a truck at coordinates XD 305082. An Air strike was called resulting in destruction of the truck.

9. On 17 Jan 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company sighted seven (7) enemy troops and one (1) truck at coordinates XD 122057. A tactical airstrike was employed with two (2) enemy KBA and one (1) truck destroyed.

10. On 19 Jan 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 21st Aviation Company (UA) observed three (3) UA at coordinates AT 934088, evading into a cave. Artillery was requested resulting in three (3) enemy KIA and the cave destroyed.

11. On 20 Jan 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 21st Aviation Company (UA) discovered a large enemy complex at coordinates BS 227868. Artillery was requested resulting in the destruction of two (2) hooches and thirteen (13) bunkers.

Incl 6 23

6-1
12. On 21 Jan 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted an enemy bunker complex at coordinates YD 240780. A tactical airstrike was employed with three (3) bunkers destroyed and two (2) secondary explosions.

13. On 25 Jan 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 21st Aviation Company (UA) observed an enemy base camp at coordinates XO 217016. A tactical airstrike was employed resulting in fifteen (15) hootches and six (6) bunkers destroyed with three (3) hootches damaged.

14. On 10 Feb 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) observed seven to ten (7-10) NVA troops at coordinates YD 240132. A tactical airstrike was employed resulting in one (1) KIA and five possible KIA.

15. On 20 Feb 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted two (2) enemy trucks and an unknown number of enemy soldiers. A tactical airstrike was employed resulting in two (2) trucks destroyed and five (5) probable enemy troops KIA.

16. On 21 Feb 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted a (thirty-seven) 37mm anti-aircraft site at coordinates YD 237045. An airstrike was requested resulting in one (1) enemy 37mm position damaged, three (3) bunkers destroyed, and one (1) KIA.

17. On 22 Feb 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) observed two (2) enemy trucks at coordinates XD 630610. Artillery was utilized to destroy both trucks. Additionally, at coordinates YD 235039 a tactical airstrike was utilized to destroy a (twelve point five) 12.5mm anti-aircraft position.

18. On 26 Feb 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) observed six (6) NVA near two (2) bunkers at YD 185032. An airstrike was requested resulting in three (3) KIA, one (1) bunker destroyed and one (1) secondary explosion.

19. On 27 Feb 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted one hundred (100) NVA troops and several trucks at YD 605159. Artillery was requested but results were negative due to airstrikes in the area.

20. On 28 Feb 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 21st Aviation Company (UA) sighted four (4) enemy soldiers at BS 536396. Artillery was requested resulting in three (3) enemy KIA.

21. On 28 Feb 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted a tracked vehicle at XD 539505. Gunships were employed resulting in destruction of the vehicle.

22. On 1 Mar 1971, the pilot of an O-l aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted one (1) enemy bulldozer. Tac Air was requested resulting in destruction of the bulldozer and one (1) enemy soldier KIA.

23. On 6 Mar 1971, sixteen (16) UH-1H's and two (2) UH-1E's of the 262nd Aviation Company (AR) conducted a combat assault in support of IAM SON 719.
One (1) UH-1H aircraft was forced to land at LZ Hope due to battle damage.

24. On 12 Mar 1971, two (2) UH-1H's of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) received intense small arms fire while conducting a combat assault operation in Quang Nam Province. Lead aircraft received numerous hits and all four (4) crew members sustained minor shrapnel wounds.

25. On 12 Mar 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted one (1) sampau at ID 23961. Guncivs were requested resulting in one (1) KBA and one (1) sampau damaged.

26. On 21 Mar 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted eight (8) to ten (10) enemy soldiers at coordinates ID 232520. A tactical airstrike was conducted with one (1) NVA KBA and three (3) additional probable KBA.

27. On 23 Mar 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted twenty (20) NVA Tanks at ID 6436. Artillery was adjusted resulting in five (5) tanks destroyed with twelve (12) secondary explosions. In addition, airstrikes were requested resulting in ten (10) tanks destroyed and extensive secondary explosions.

28. On 21 Mar 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 21st Aviation Company (UA) observed a large base camp at BS 308715. Artillery was employed resulting in the destruction of fourteen (14) structures and twelve (12) bunkers while damaging five (5) structures and three (3) bunkers.

29. On 21 Mar 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 21st Aviation Company (UA) sighted four (4) enemy soldiers at ID 719360. Guncivs were employed resulting in four (4) KBA.

30. On 25 Mar 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft from the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted ten (10) NVA soldiers at coordinates ID 705382. A tactical airstrike was conducted resulting in six (6) confirmed NVA KBA. At coordinates ID 711367 an additional thirty-five (35) to forty (40) NVA troops were sighted. Artillery was employed resulting in twenty (20) KBA and twenty (20) probable KBA.

31. On 30 Mar 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) adjusted artillery on one (1) hootch resulting in thirteen (13) secondary explosions. Additionally, the observer sighted two (2) NVA and four 122mm rockets. Artillery was requested resulting in fourteen (14) bunkers destroyed and two (2) probable KBA.

32. On 1 Apr 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) observed twenty-five to thirty-five (25-35) NVA troops at coordinates ID 752477. An airstrike was requested resulting in seven (7) KBA and ten (10) probable KBA.

33. On 7 Apr 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company (UA) sighted three (3) NVA soldiers. An airstrike was requested resulting in two (2) KBA at ID 315025. At ID 803076, ten (10) bunkers were sighted and fired on by artillery resulting in destruction of all ten (10) bunkers.
34. On 8 Apr 1971, two (2) UH-1C's of the 282nd Aviation Company (AH) engaged
five (5) enemy hootches at coordinates AT 905505 resulting in the destruction
of three (3) structures and damaging the other two. Additionally, one (1)
bunker was destroyed and fourteen (14) enemy KIA.

35. On 13 Apr 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 21st Aviation Company
(UA) observed ten (10) enemy troops enter a bunker at coordinates BS 798478.
Artillery resulted in destruction of the bunker and thirteen (13) probable KIA.

36. On 16 Apr 1971, the pilot of an O-1 aircraft of the 220th Aviation Company
(UA) observed a large truck off route 9320. A Tac Air strike resulted in
destruction of the truck.
## CONFIDENTIAL

### AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Period Ending 30 April 1971

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<td>101</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>426</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL

In Memoriam

Those Who Died In The Republic of Vietnam

1 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Nov 70</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>Joseph E. Ruhlinger</td>
<td>282nd</td>
<td>Hostile</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Nov 70</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>John C. King</td>
<td>131st</td>
<td>MIA to KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Nov 70</td>
<td>CW2</td>
<td>George H. Rogalla</td>
<td>131st</td>
<td>MIA to KIA</td>
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<td>15 Nov 70</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Richard W. Salmond</td>
<td>116th</td>
<td>Non-Hostile</td>
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<td>CW2</td>
<td>Benton L. Miller</td>
<td>0/3/71</td>
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<td>WO1</td>
<td>Thomas A. Knopik</td>
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<td>William G. Hasselman</td>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 212th Combat Aviation Bn

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May 71 to 31 Oct 71

CO, 212th Combat Aviation Bn

3 May 1972

N/A

711246

N/A

N/A

DAFD, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310