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**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

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**AUTHORITY**

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980
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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 57th Transportation Bn, Period Ending 31 October 1971 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 57TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TRK)
APO San Francisco 96317

AVCIL-R-57-83

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (57th Transportation Battalion (TRK), Period Ending 31 October 1971) RCS CSFC-65 (R2) (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
5th Transportation Command
APO SF 96349

TO: Commanding General
United States Army Support Command, Da Nang
APO SF 96349

I. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. The battalion headquarters is presently located at Camp Haskins, Da Nang, RVN. The battalion units are:
   (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, located at Camp Haskins.
   (2) 62nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck), located at Camp Tien Sa, Da Nang, RVN.
   (3) 363rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck), located at Camp Haskins.
   (4) 563rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck), located at Chu Lai Combat Base, RVN.
   (5) 572nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck), located at Camp Haskins.

b. The 62nd Transportation Company was reassigned to the battalion from 5th Transportation Command, Da Nang, RVN on 4 August 1971.

c. The 363rd Transportation Company was reassigned to the battalion from 80th General Support Group on 16 June 1971.

d. The 563rd Transportation Company was reassigned to the battalion from the 27th S&S Battalion on 30 April 1971.

e. The 64th Transportation Company, a former unit of the battalion, Keystoneed in June 1971.

f. The battalion mission is currently to provide command and supervision of subordinate medium truck units engaged in line haul operations from Da Nang to Phu Bai and from Da Nang to Chu Lai; port clearance and local drayage in Da Nang and Chu Lai; operate trailer transfer points at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai; plus, other motor transport services as directed by 5th Transportation Command.
g. Local haul, drayage and port clearance/delivery in the Da Nang area is performed by the 62nd, 363rd and 572nd Transportation Companies. Line haul operations between Chu Lai and Da Nang local haul in Chu Lai is performed by the 563rd Transportation Company. The line haul mission between Da Nang and Phu Bai is performed by the 363rd and 572nd Transportation Companies.

h. The duties of the 62nd Transportation Company remained relatively constant during the reporting period. The company was primarily involved in port clearance at Deep Water Pier, Bridge Ramp and 13th Aerial Port. This mission also included local haul throughout the Da Nang area depot complexes, plus, the movement of cargo to all active ports in the area. In mid-September cargo was beginning to stockpile at Deep Water Pier and Bridge Ramp, Da Nang, RVN. With the prospects of increased travel restrictions for the RVN presidential election in early October a major effort had to be effected to clear the ports. The company participated in Operation Port Clearance for a period of eight days in which the cargo awaiting inland clearance was reduced to a manageable level.

i. The principal activities of the 572nd and 363rd Transportation Companies during the reporting period have been to perform line haul convoy operations between Da Nang and Phu Bai and certain local haul functions as directed. These operations are routine and are performed daily. Convoys generally consist of ten to fifteen task vehicles (tractors, 5 ton, with trailer), two or three security vehicles (5 ton Armored Gun Truck), and one command and control vehicle (4 ton truck with mounted machine gun). The round trip of an estimated 120 miles generally takes seven to eight hours without significant mechanical breakdowns enroute. Organic security vehicles have been adequate to counter occasional enemy harassment activities.

j. The 563rd Transportation Company engaged in logistical support for this total reporting period. The unit provided transportation support for the 23rd Infantry Division (Americal) for movement of all classes of supply to the Division's forward areas and movement of support command materials in and out of the Chu Lai area. At the end of May 1971, the 23rd Division withdrew their troops from Fire Base Hawk Hill, so the commitment to haul to that location was discontinued. At the end of June 1971, the 23rd Division closed Duc Pho so the daily line haul commitment to that location was discontinued at that time. At the beginning of July 1971, the company was given the mission of line haul between Chu Lai and Da Nang. An average of 15 trucks per day has been committed to this mission. Port clearance of the Sand Ramp in Chu Lai continued as a major mission of the 563rd Transportation Company during this reporting period with an average commitment of 10 trucks per day often operating 24 hours a day.

k. Over the reporting period the battalion averaged 1,533,000 ton miles monthly, plus, maintained an average tractor availability of 85%.

I. The following assignments and reassignment occurred during the reporting period:

(1) MAJ Darwin D. Albers was reassigned from the S-3 to Battalion Executive Officer on 12 September 1971.

(2) MAJ Walter J. Jankowski was assigned as the Battalion S-3 on 13 September 1971.
(3) CPT Earl B. Burch was assigned as Commanding Officer, 563rd Transportation Company on 10 August 1971.

(4) CPT William E. Damon was assigned as Commanding Officer, 572nd Transportation Company on 7 September 1971.

(5) CPT Wilson R. Waldron was assigned as Commanding Officer, 62nd Transportation Company on 2 October 1971.

(6) CPT Gordon Kurtz was assigned as Battalion Maintenance Officer on 14 July 1971.

(7) CPT William Graham was assigned as Officer in Charge, Trailer Transfer Points on 14 September 1971.

(8) CPT Daniel Pomerleau was assigned as Battalion S-4 on 4 August 1971.

(9) CPT Howard F. Russell was assigned as the S-1 and Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment on 9 August 1971.

(10) 1LT Fidel Cantu was assigned as the Assistant S-3 on 7 September 1971.

(11) 1LT Stanley La Fond was assigned as the Assistant S-1 on 14 August 1971.

(12) 1LT Leonard Brightwell was assigned as the Assistant S-3 on 10 October 1971.

(13) 1LT Charles A. Sealand was assigned as the Battalion Physical Security Officer on 24 October 1971.

(14) 1LT Gerry S. Bryan was assigned as a Platoon Leader, 62nd Transportation Company on 19 October 1971.

(15) 1LT Clayton E. Anderson was assigned as a Platoon Leader, 363rd Transportation Company on 18 August 1971.

(16) 1LT Milton B. Hill was assigned as a Platoon Leader, 363rd Transportation Company on 14 September 1971.

(17) 1LT Nolan B. Dawkins was assigned as a Platoon Leader, 572nd Transportation Company on 5 September 1971.

(18) 1LT Thomas E. Brown was assigned as a Platoon Leader, 572nd Transportation Company on 5 September 1971.

(19) 1LT William D. Harell was assigned as a Platoon Leader, 572nd Transportation Company on 5 September 1971.

(20) 2LT Kenneth H. Hodges was assigned as a Platoon Leader, 363rd Transportation Company on 5 September 1971.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (57th Transportation Battalion (TRK), Period Ending 31 October 1971) RGS OSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

transport Company on 12 October 1971.

(21) WO3 Floyd D. Smith was assigned as Maintenance Officer, 572nd Transportation Company on 21 October 1971.

m. Battalion strength as of 31 October 1971:

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<td>Authorized</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>763</td>
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<tr>
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<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
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2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Drug Problem.

(a) Observation: To allow heroin addicts to remain distributed about the company is generally destructive to morale and discipline.

(b) Evaluation: Supervision of heroin addicts had placed an impractical demand on supervisors at the platoon level. Due to addicts apathy, lack of concern for personal hygiene and thievery generally associated with drug abuse, their presence in the truck platoon was resented by platoon members and made a significant negative impact on morale. For lack of available medical or other confinement facilities, all known addicts were moved into quarters immediately adjacent to the orderly room and required to perform details as directed by the First Sergeant. These individuals were not assigned to guard or driving duties and were denied access to weapons. Quarters assigned were austere with a minimum of furnishings facilitating enforcement of acceptable standards of police and hygiene. These procedures were successful in improving the order and discipline of the unit.

(c) Recommendation: These procedures should be adopted by units affected by drug abuse pending the implementation of effective medical programs.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations.

(1) Convoy Defense.

(a) Observation: It has been noted that on occasion during the reporting period that interference with convoy operations has not originated from enemy action but from anti-American demonstrations by the South Vietnamese civil population along convoy routes.
(b) Evaluation: These groups would often demonstrate or cause such commotion that the road would be closed and movement of cargo stopped. Security for the convoys has been provided by Gun Jeeps, Gun Trucks, and V-100 (Armored Cars).

(c) Recommendation: It should be noted that with the lessening threat of enemy fire and a greater threat of civilian unrest through demonstrations and fire bombings, the V-100 armored car has proven to be the most capable vehicle. Its maneuverability, field of vision, fire power and overall protection make it the best vehicle in these types of situations. Gun Jeeps, though maneuverable, are tremendously vulnerable to fragging and fire bombing and have limited field of vision when positioned in between trailers. Gun Trucks have sufficient fire power and field of vision, but lack maneuverability in close quarters.

(2) Coordination of Night Operations.

(a) Observation: In an effort to reduce American-Vietnamese incidents, the majority of battalions transportation operations were shifted to nights for two weeks during the month of September 1971.

(b) Evaluation: Problem areas soon became apparent due to the lack of availability of supervisory personnel and equipment at both shipper and consignee operational sites. This greatly retarded the battalion’s efforts to move cargo resulting in far too little cargo moved.

(c) Recommendation: More and improved coordination with supported activities, i.e., shippers and consignees must be initiated by the command responsible for these activities. Transportation capability and mission execution is wasted if shippers and consignees are not specifically tasked and monitored to support the overall effort in consonance with increased truck transportation activities. Sufficient supervisory personnel, materials, handling equipment, cargo checkers and other workers are imperative to avoid lost time at loading points and destinations, for proper utilization of vehicle assets.

(3) Vehicle Control.

(a) Observation: Increased travel restrictions, to include having a sergeant E-5 or above in command of every vehicle, or, having vehicles convoy under the control of an officer or senior NCO, was instrumental in reducing incidents of a serious nature with VN Nationals. However, increased travel restrictions greatly reduced the over all effectiveness and tonnage of local and line travels.

(b) Evaluation: Increased travel restrictions work directly against the mission of transportation units.

(c) Recommendation: That future travel restrictions be applied to all
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AVCD-B-57-33
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (57th Transportation Battalion (TRK), Period Ending 31 October 1971) RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (v)

non-mission essential movements and allow freedom of movement to units having as a primary mission the movement of essential and necessary logistical items.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics: None

g. Communications:

(1) Line Haul Communications.

(a) Observation: Communications while on convoys presents a problem due to distances involved between the convoy element and control elements.

(b) Evaluation: TOS radios do not have the range to net with the control stations along the convoy route.

(c) Recommendation: Communications systems should be reviewed and the possibility of providing radios with a longer range to line haul units be considered.

h. Material:

(1) Vehicle Maintenance.

(a) Observation: The battalion's success in completing its assigned missions lies solely on the ability to keep the vehicles operational. It has been experienced that a unit devoted to preventive maintenance and who instills in each individual a sense of pride to keep his vehicle operational can and will complete all missions.

(b) Evaluation: It has been this battalion's policy to have motor stables every morning prior to operation of the vehicles. The vehicles and drivers then must complete successfully a technical inspection before they are authorized to go on the road. This procedure has tremendously reduced breakdowns and accidents due to equipment failure while in convoy. Upon return to the unit, motor stables are again performed with preference given to major problem areas and after operations maintenance. The motor stables are conducted with the Platoon Leaders, Operations Section and Maintenance Section in attendance. It has also been observed that having a weekly and monthly award for most accident free miles driven is another good driving incentive. Another morale builder is that of paying local nationals to work in the tire shop.
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AVCD.B-57-53

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (57th Transportation Battalion (TRK), Period Ending 31 October 1971) RGS CSM 65 (R2) (U)

(a) Recommendations: These type morale boosters, a strong IM program, incentive awards and the hiring of local nationals give the individual more incentive to work on his vehicle and to keep it operational, which results in completed missions.

1. Other: None

FRANK FRANCOIS
LTC, TC
Commanding
AVCD-TCCO (1 Nov 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 57th Transportation Battalion (TRK), Period Ending 31 October 1971, (RECS CSFOR-65) (R2) (U)

Commanding Officer, 5th Transportation Command, APO San Francisco 96349
18 November 1971

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, ATTN: AVCD-GC, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington DC 20310

1. (U) Forwarded LAW AR 525-15 is the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the 57th Transportation Battalion (TRK).

2. (U) Concur with basic correspondence, no further comment required.

[Signature]

ORVIL C. METHENY
COL, TC
Commanding
AVCD-GO-0 (1 Nov 71) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 57th Transportation Battalion (TRK), Period Ending 31 October 71 [RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)] (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Da Nang, APO 96349

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-OH, APO 96375

(C) Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 71 from Headquarters, 57th Transportation Battalion and concurs with the basic report as modified by the below comments.

1. Page 2, para 1h: The second sentence should read......15th Aerial Port and not ..........18th Aerial Port.

2. Page 4, para 2a(1):
   a. The procedure recommended was necessary in all units prior to the initiation of the present Vietnam Drug Program which became effective on or about 25 October 71.
   b. Under the present program, it is not necessary for a command to hold a drug abuser in his unit once he has been identified. As soon as a person comes up positive on a urinalysis, that person can be sent to the Drug Treatment Center or the Drug Abuse Holding Center. Circumstances and desires of the commander will dictate which of the two facilities should be utilized.
   c. Under the present exemption program, the commander may once again send the individual to the Drug Rehabilitation Center or hold him in the unit for a maximum of 7 days at which time he is considered drug free. If the individual is identified as positive on a urinalysis any time after release from the Drug Rehabilitation Center or the seven day hold in the unit, he is eligible for the Drug Treatment Center or the Drug Abuse Holding Center.
   d. The present Vietnam Drug Program is therefore so organized that it is not necessary for a commander to hold drug abusers for maximum period of time in his unit.

3. Page 6, para 2g: One of the primary blocks to communications in addition to distance within MR 1 are the terrain features, in particular, the Hai Van Pass. In an attempt to overcome this obstacle, the convoy control elements responsibilities were passed to an element on the far side of the Pass as the convoy moved over the top of the Pass. Distance, however, still remained a problem.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 57th Transportation Battalion (TRK), Period Ending 31 October 71 [RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)] (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
STANLEY M. FOSCUE
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
AVHDO-DO (1 Nov 71) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (57th Transportation Battalion (TRK), Period Ending 31 October 1971) RCS CSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 10 FEB 72

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATT: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 57th Transportation Battalion and considers it an adequate reflection of the unit's activities during the period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy turn:
USASUPCOM-DNG
57th Trans Bn
GPOP-FD (1 Nov 71) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 57th Transportation Battalion (TRK), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. M.H
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned Hqs., 57th Transportation Bn, Period Ending 31 October 1971 (U)

CO, 57th Transportation Bn, Period Ending 31 October 1971

N/A

N/A

N/A

DAFD, DA, Washington, D.C.