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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAAC-PAP-A (M) (1 Nov 71) DAFD-OTT 16 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Cavalry Units - 3d Sqdn, 17th Cav; 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav; and 7th Sqdn, 1st Cav for Period Ending 30 April 1971 (U)

Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, TN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. As Section 1 of the report is not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program it has been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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1. DAFD-OTT 711088
2. DAFD-OTT 711089
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Defense Documentation Center
Commanding Officers
US Army Land Warfare Laboratory
US Army Logistics Doctrine, Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
PARAGRAPH 2
Lessons Learned

1. (U) PERSONNEL: None

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

   a. Observation: Many agent reports were being received on secure
teleprinter 2 to 3 days after they were reported to U.S. agent handlers. This,
   added to the time between an agent making an observation and his reporting
   to his handler, made much of the information 5 to 7 days old before it was in
   the hands of 3/17 ACS elements operating in the field who could exploit the
   information.

   b. Evaluation: With the constantly changing situation in a combat
   zone, many of these agent reports were useless because the reported enemy unit
   had moved out of the area before 3/17 ACS elements received the information.
   A closer liaison with intelligence units operating within the 3/17 ACS area
   of operation was necessary.

   c. Recommendation: Air Cavalry units should be supplied with the locations
   of NI field offices within their area of operation and those same field
   officers be briefed as to the U.S. units operating within their Area of Operation
   to better facilitate the dissemination of information. Also both the field
   offices and user units should take it upon themselves to establish a liaison
   system.

   d. Command Action: Liaison has been
   established between the 3/17 ACS
   and a field team operating out of Phu Loi. As they receive the information
   typewritten copies are forwarded directly to 3/17 ACS. Using this system, it
   has been possible to cut the time span from the agent making an
   observation until the user unit receives it to as little as 12 hours.

3. (U) OPERATIONS:

   a. Observation #1

      (1) Observation: The need for a practical, safe and attractive
      base for our revetments was solved when this unit hauled in gravel for that
      purpose.

      (2) Evaluation: The use of gravel greatly reduces the possibility
      of an accident. As with PSP, or any other metal base, there is always the
      possibility of catching a skid shoe and causing an accident. The use of
      gravel also alleviates the possibility of the aircraft skidding or sliding on
      a wet or oily surface. Since this unit installed the gravel, there have been
      absolutely no drainage problems.

      (3) Recommendation: That all units take a look at their revetments
      to find if any of these potentially dangerous situations exist. If so,
      recommend that they consider the possibility of reforming their revetments
      with at least six inches of gravel.

   (4) Command Action: None.

DAPD-OTT 711088
Incl 1
b. Observation #2

(1) Observation: Immediately after experiencing an engine failure in an AH-1G, the gunner attempted to jettison the wing stores and was unable to do so.

(2) Evaluation: Subsequent investigation determined that the gunner's jettison switch was defective. Since that incident, we have been testing the jettison system of all our AH-1G's. Another was found to have a faulty salvo jettison delay relay. A test or check of the wing stores jettison system is not included in any of the periodic maintenance inspection checklists. In testing the impulse cartridge receptacle for activation of the electrical current, the inboard system will register a continuous current, however, the outboard system registers only a sudden electric impulse as the salvo mode is activated. Unless the impulse is observed, it may be thought that the outboard system is not receiving the activation current.

(3) Recommendation: That a check of the wing stores jettison system be included on the preventive maintenance periodic inspection so that it will be tested at least every 100 hours.

(4) Comment Action: None.

c. Observation #3

(1) Observation: The use of a light fire team of AH-1G's as a visual reconnaissance team is, under most circumstances, unproductive and wastes valuable flight hours on the aircraft.

(2) Evaluation: The altitude and airspeed which an AH-1G must fly prevents any detailed observations of the terrain, especially in densely wooded areas. The size of the aircraft also presents a large target for enemy gunners while flying at an altitude low enough to attempt a visual reconnaissance.

(3) Recommendation: That a light fire team of AH-1G's not be used as a visual reconnaissance team.

(4) Comment Action: None.

d. Observation #4

(1) Observation: During 4 Troop's tenure in Cambodia, ground to air fire often does not start until early afternoon.

(2) Evaluation: The majority of all ground to air fire 4 Troop has had has been in the afternoon. Evidently, the enemy knows that late in the day we cannot concentrate full firepower on the area because of the short time until darkness falls. He knows that we want then break contact.
The only times any of our aircraft have been fired on in the morning is when the scout has uncovered something important or we have been in support of troops in contact.

(3) Recommendation: Trying to get most VR hours in the morning would be one solution. Also, since the afternoon reconnaissance is a must, try and save your VR blocks closest to your base for this time. If a ship did go down your QRP and Popsickle-Chinook element would be closer at hand and darkness would not then be such an overriding factor as it would be in an area a long distance from your base.

(4) Command Action: None.

4. (U) Organization: None.

5. (U) Training: None.

6. (U) Logistics:

a. Observation #1

(1) Observation: With the phase out of the U.S. effort in III MZ no support units remain to maintain aircraft rearming and refueling facilities at forward bases.

(2) Evaluation: The withdrawal of the 1st Air Cavalry Division resulted in the close out of divisional support element which operated aircraft rearming and refueling facilities at Quan Loi, Lai Khe, Kon Tum and Loc Ninh. As a result this squadron was directed by the 12th Aviation Group to assume responsibility for the facilities of this squadron.

(3) Recommendation: That QM and ordnance detachments be attached to this squadron for the operation of fixed rearming and refueling facilities.

(4) Command Action: This squadron has requested to 12th Aviation Group (Combat) that support detachments be attached.

b. Observation #2

(1) Observation: No installation engineer support was made available to A Troop, 3/17th ACS at Quan Loi.

(2) Evaluation: The original movement of A Troop to Quan Loi in August 1970 was intended for a period of only two to three months. However, the location of A Troop at Quan Loi was extended for an indefinite period. Due to the fact that all real property at Quan Loi belongs to ARVN, no installation engineer support is available.

(3) Recommendation: Provisions should be developed under which PA&E installation engineer support can be provided to U.S. units located on ARVN bases.

(4) Command Action: This squadron has requested thru 12th Aviation Group (Combat) that PA&E support be made available to A Troop at Quan Loi.

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7. (U) Communications: None.
8. (U) Material: None.
9. (U) Other:
   a. Observation #1

   (1) Observation: During the period 2 November 1970 to 10 April 1971 the 3/17th ACS was OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division and further OPCON to the 1/9 Air Cavalry Squadron.

   (2) Evaluation: Initially, this arrangement caused no command and control problems as the 1/9 Squadron Commander was the senior commander. However, in January 1971, the 1/9 changed commanders. The new commander was junior to the commander of the 3/17 but no change was made in command relationship between the two units. Had the two commanders not worked together previously and had they not been thoroughly mission oriented conflicts could have arisen.

   (3) Recommendations: When one unit is placed under the Operational Control of another the unit with the senior commander should be the controlling unit.

   (4) Command Action: None.

11 Inclosures
1. Unit Organization
2. Unit Locations
3. Unit Strength (Military)
4. Unit Strength (Civilian)
5. Awards & Decorations
6. Friendly Losses
7. Intelligence
8. Aircraft Status
9. Operations Results
10. Aircraft Loss and Damage

Distribution:
3/17 A Plus
2- CINCUSARFOR, ATTN: GPOD-DT
2- USARPAC, ATTN: GPOD-DT
3- USAVY, ATTN: AVHDC-DO
2- 1st AVN BDE, ATTN: AV1016-DO
6- 12TH AVG (GPO), ATTN: AVAUS-C
2- II FFV, ATTN: AVFED-P

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AVPAU-CG

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 34 Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS GSFOH-65 (R2) (U)

1 May 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

CARL J. KAALUND
LTC, FA
Commanding
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AVBAUS-C (1 May 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3/17th ACS, for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSPOR-65 (P3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96266 19 May 1971

THRU: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, ATTN: MACIR-G3PT, APO 96266

Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC, APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCG-DST, APO 96375


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3/17th Air Cav Sqn for the period ending 30 April 71.

2. (C) The following comments are provided:

   a. The report was submitted in incorrect format.

   b. Section 1, paragraph 8, communications should be reported under Lessons Learned.

   c. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2, Intelligence. This headquarters is coordinating with field offices at all posts where 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) units are stationed to provide timely intelligence to each aviation unit.

   d. Reference Section 2, paragraph 3b, jettison of wing stores. All units within 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) assigned AH-1G aircraft have been directed to incorporate a wing store check into the preventive maintenance periodic inspection. This check is to be conducted IAW TM 55-1500-221-20 and as outlined in USAV Weekly Summary 4265 dated 5 April 71.

   e. Reference Section 2, paragraph 4a, rearm and refuel facilities. This headquarters published orders on 20 April 71 assigning an OH detachment to 3/17th ACS effective 15 May 71. This action will enable 3/17th ACS to meet its operational requirement.
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AVBAUS-C (1 May 71) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1971

f. Reference Section 2, paragraph 4b, Engineer support at Quan Loi. This headquarters has forwarded a request for permanent PAME engineer support at Quan Loi. Coordination has been accomplished with the TRAC Engineer Officer to provide immediate assistance from the 159th Engr. Gp.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOHN H. SUTHERLAND
MAJ, IN
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65(R3) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-O, APO 96384
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310.

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

2. (C) Comments follow:
   a. Reference item concerning ground to air fire, page 16, para 3d; concur. This fact had not previously been noted. An article on this will appear in the next TRAC PERINTREP.
   b. Reference item concerning AH-1G wing stores jettison system, page 16, para 3(b)(1); concur with observation, evaluation and recommendation. It is, therefore, recommended that the unit submit an EIR (Equipment Improvement Recommendation) IAW provisions of para 3-7.4, TM 38-750 to US Army Aviation System Command.
   c. Reference item concerning installation engineer support, page 17, para 6b; concur. Existing regulations do not authorize PA&E to provide facilities engineering support on facilities transferred to GVN. As ARVN facility engineer services are limited, US units located on ARVN bases must handle their own building repairs on a self help basis. A request for PA&E support at Quan Loi and Tay Ninh, as an exception to policy, was endorsed through this headquarters on 8 May 71 to the USARV Engineer.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

KENNETH A PAYANT
MAJ, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
AVBAGC (1 May 71) 3d Ind (4)

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384 8 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVBAGS-DST
APO 96375

(U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971, and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E. L. BARNARD
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operation Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Additional comment follows:

Reference item concerning "Observation #2," page 17, paragraph 6b, 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2f and 2nd Indorsement, paragraph 2c. At the time the decision was made to retain elements of the 3/17th ACS at Quan Loi and Tay Ninh, no Facilities Engineering (FE) Support was provided and the units were treated like any other small units around the country that are at a location for a short period of time. Since that time, the policy has been reviewed and we now retain the property and provide minimum Facilities Engineering Support to US units on ARVN bases. The Facilities Engineering contract is being modified to provide Facilities Engineering Support to the units at Tay Ninh. The requirement to provide support at Quan Loi no longer exists due to relocation of the unit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy furn:
3/17th ACS
1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 3d Squadron 17th Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1971
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Mah

MAJ. L. Mah
2LT, AGC
Amm AG
## UNIT LOCATIONS, Semi-Annual ORIL

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INCLUSION 2 to Inc 1

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**HEADQUARTERS**  
3D SQUADRON, 17TH AIR CAVALRY  
F-RIGD ENDING  
30 April 1971

## UNIT STRENGTHS (MILITARY), Semi-Annual ORLL

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**Inclosure 4 to incl 1**
HEADQUARTERS  
3D SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY  
PERIOD ENDING  
30 APRIL 1971

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:  SEMI-ANNUAL ORLL

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INCLUSION 5 to Inc 1

15
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HEADQUARTERS
3D SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY
PERIOD ENDING
30 APRIL 1971

FRIENDLY LOSSES, QUARTERLY CALL

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DIED NOT AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION

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WOUNDED OR INJURED NOT AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION

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INCLUSION 6 to Incl 1

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

**HEADQUARTERS**
3D SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY
PERIOD ENDING
30 APRIL 1971

**INTELLIGENCE: SEMI-ANNUAL ORIL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY UNIT</th>
<th>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MR-6 HQ</td>
<td>Vic AN 8850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR-7 HQ</td>
<td>SE of GIA SAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA LONG (P) HQ</td>
<td>NE of NUI BE T40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>445 VC MF Inf Bn</td>
<td>Vic NUI BE w/1 Company in LONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HAT Mountain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South of NUT ONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South of NUI BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SE of VC DAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East of Blackhorse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N HAT DICH AND BINH SON AREA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SE of XUAN LOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South of HONG HCHI (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SE of Binh Son Plantation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North of the VINGER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NE of AN LOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispersed NE of AN LOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BU GIA MAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vic BU GIA MAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western War Zone &quot;D&quot;, Base Area JG</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PHU GIAO (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TAN UYEN (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAUV THANH (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NW of SNEU, Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NE of SNEU, Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SW of SNEU, Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vic of SNEU, Cambodian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NW of Phu Dep in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NW of SNEU, Cambodia</td>
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<td>Vic SNEU, Cambodia</td>
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**INCLOSURE 7 to Inc1 1**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<tr>
<td>NVA Inf Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; Spt Units</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1 NVA Inf Regt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>165 NVA Inf Regt</td>
<td>Vic of SUONG, Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209 NVA Inf Regt</td>
<td>NE of Chup Plantation, Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Arty Bn</td>
<td>NE of Chup Plantation, Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 111 Bn</td>
<td>Chup Plantation, Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 Sapper Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| VC Inf Div                  | NW of Chup Plantation, Cambodia           |
| HQ & Supt Units             | NW of Chup Plantation, Cambodia           |
| 95C NVA Inf Regt            | Chup Plantation, Cambodia                 |
| 271 VC Inf Regt             | W of Chup Plantation, Cambodia            |
| 272 VC Inf Regt             | E of Chup Plantation, Cambodia            |
| 22 Arty Bn                  | N of Chup Plantation, Cambodia            |
| 24 111 Bn                   | Chup Plantation, Cambodia                 |
| 95 Sapper Bn                |                                            |

The information obtained concerning all areas and enemy units provided input into allied intelligence channels.
CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS
3D SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY
PERIOD ENDING
30 APRIL 1971

AIRCRAFT ST. TUS, SEMI-ANNUAL ORLL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBORDINATE UNIT</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/4</td>
<td>8 8</td>
<td>9 9</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>10 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>334TH</td>
<td>2 3</td>
<td>5 21</td>
<td>14 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SQUADRON</td>
<td>32 28</td>
<td>48 40</td>
<td>20 23</td>
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INCLOSURES 8 to incl 1
## OPERATIONAL RESULTS, SEMI-ANNUAL GRL

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Sorties Flown</th>
<th>Troops Lifted</th>
<th>Cargo Tons</th>
<th>Enemy KIA</th>
<th>Structures Dam Dest</th>
<th>Sampan Dep Dest</th>
<th>Acft Loss (Acdt, Cdt, Main)</th>
<th>Acft Dam (Acdt, Cdt)</th>
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<td>B TROOP</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>236</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Afc, Helicopter)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>F/4</td>
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<td>1282</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td></td>
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AIRCRAFT LOSS AND DAMAGE, SEMI-ANNUAL ORLL

1. The aircraft loss figure includes aircraft retrograde to excessive maintenance requirements as a result of accident or combat damage.

2. F Troop, 4th Cav figures include only the month of April.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HQ TROOP</th>
<th>A TROOP</th>
<th>B TROOP</th>
<th>F TROOP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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INCLOSERS 10 to Incl 1
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (U)


   a. Personnel: None

   b. Intelligence: None

   c. Operations:

      (1) Use of ARVN Platoons as Aero Rifle Platoons for Air Cavalry missions (Browns).

         (a) OBSERVATION: As American forces withdrew from Vietnam, it became necessary to back up the Aero Rifle Platoon with ARVN quick reaction forces. The difference in language caused some confusion on the ground during maneuver and during delivery of Aerial firepower.

         (b) EVALUATION: ARVN Platoons, normally from the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Company, were trained in the specialized skills required of the Aero Rifle Platoons. These platoons, called "Browns" were used in place of the Blues. A U.S. adviser was put on the ground with the Browns to preclude the language barrier. This initial procedure was modified for the Dry Season Campaign in Cambodia. The Browns were used but without the advisor. To resolve the language problem, a command and control helicopter was used with the Air Cavalry Commander and a representative from the ARVN Command, sitting side by side to resolve the problem.

         (c) RECOMMENDATION:

            (1) That Brown Platoons, if utilized by a U.S. Air Cavalry Unit, be placed OPCON to that Air Cavalry Unit. The order placing the Browns OPCON should specifically state the Cavalry Commander is authorized to make Brown insertion where he considers justified without regard for ARVN unit boundaries. This would allow the commander to rapidly adjust his assets to properly orchestrate the battle field.
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(d) COMMAND ACTION:

(1) This command, with organic assets, trained the browns in Aero Rifle Platoon tactics and techniques.

(2) This command initiated action which resulted in the browns being placed OPCON to this command.

(3) This command made numerous Brown insertions to secure downed A/C and to perform other ARP missions.

(2) Use of additional attack helicopters to support Air Cavalry Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The load carrying restrictions of the AH-1G, precludes the gunships of a Pink Team staying on station as long as the OH-6A on VR missions. To increase station time, the ordnance load must be reduced to allow greater fuel loads.

(b) EVALUATION: The need exists for an attack helicopter unit to be immediately responsive to the needs of the Air Cavalry VR Team operating outside static fire base artillery fans. Endurance should not be a factor for these aircraft and POL can be reduced and ordnance increased to maximize firepower. The standard NATO call for fire plus the capability for in flight briefing greatly reduces the time attack helicopters needs on station for engaging its target.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an attack helicopter unit operate with Air Cavalry routinely.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This command implemented the system outlined above and it worked effectively.

(3) Attachment and assignment of Air Cavalry Troops.

(a) OBSERVATION: To be totally effective, the Air Cavalry Troop must remain under the control of the Squadron Commander.

(b) EVALUATION: In a fast moving and fluid situation, the Squadron
Commander must be able to cross attach and reinforce any troop that has located the enemy. If a troop is attached, assigned, or placed OPCON to another maneuver element, the Air Cavalry Commander has lost his flexibility and capability to develop the situation and influence the course of action. Other conditions which require cross attachment or reinforcement are: Excessive battle damage, low maintenance availability, Division directed areas of priority, or an enemy contact large enough to be exploited by two or more Air Cavalry Troops. Due to the standardized methods of operation in the Air Cavalry Squadron, effecting cross attachment or reinforcement posed no problems. The Squadron simply called the troops concerned on the radio, and directed one or more troops to provide a designated number of teams or specific type of aircraft to another troop. This capability was not limited to aircraft alone. On several occasions aircraft were shot down in a location far removed from their organic Blue Platoon. In these situations it was faster to direct another Blue Platoon to proceed to the scene and secure the downed aircraft and extract the crew. On occasion the Blue Platoon of one troop could be used as the QRF for another troop.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION**: Air Cavalry Troops must remain under the control of the Squadron Commander to provide flexible Air Cavalry response to any enemy situation.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION**: In this Squadron, the cross attachment and reinforcement of individual troops is conducted frequently. This command has effectively shown the ability and flexibility of Air Cavalry Troops under the Squadron control, in developing and influencing the course of action.
(4) Air Cavalry Utilization by ground commanders.

(a) OBSERVATION: On several occasions, ground commanders did not realize the value of Air Cavalry operations and they viewed the unit as a source of 3 types of aviation assets to solve their firepower, resupply and command/control problems.

(b) EVALUATION: Each platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop makes an important contribution to the Cavalry mission and to try and change the procedure reduces the effectiveness of the unit. An Air Cavalry unit is not an aviation unit but rather a reconnaissance maneuver element similar to the armored cavalry. One time exceptions to maintaining troop integrity lead to inconsistency and will worsen rather than help the situation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Air Cavalry commander must insist every effort of the commanders to fragment their unit into an odd job artist company. Direct the ground commander to the proper channels for requesting aviation support and continue with the Air Cavalry mission.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: We successfully implemented the recommendation.

(5) Arming of light observation helicopter.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Light Observation Helicopter when armed with the minigun and used for scout missions has certain undesirable characteristics.

(b) EVALUATION: After observing the LOH as used in its Scout role with and without the minigun, it was determined that the minigun is a hindrance to the scout. First, if the minigun is mounted, there is one less crewmember on the aircraft. This reduces the "Visual Reconnaissance" of the Bn.
of the Scout by one third. Second, with the minigun mounted, there is a tendency on the part of the scout to use his aircraft as a "Gunship," again reducing the VR capability of the Scout.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commands using the Light Observation Helicopter in scouting missions should crew the aircraft with three crew members. The gunner should be armed with the M-60 machine gun and the observer armed with the M-16.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This Command has successfully employed the above recommendations with outstanding results.

d. Organization, None
e. Training, None
f. Logistics:

(1) Supply of forward rearm points.

(a) OBSERVATION: Movement of Air Cavalry Troops to forward laagering locations during the Cambodian operation resulted in rearm points being established at several locations. Difficulty was encountered in manning these rearm points since the TOE did not provide for a service platoon within the troops. An accurate inventory was one of the critical problems.

(b) EVALUATION: Several times the Class V stock dropped to near zero and a tactical emergency had to be declared so that the fixed wing aircraft necessary to resupply Class V could be diverted from other missions to resupply the forward rearm points. It was found necessary to impress on the unit the need for nightly ammunition inventories in order to keep Class V Stock at proper levels.
(2) Maintenance Standdown

(a) OBSERVATION: Each Air Cavalry Troop should receive a minimum
   of a two day maintenance standdown per month.

(b) EVALUATION: It is a common practice in Infantry, Armor and
   some Artillery units to conduct periodic standdowns for one or two days. This
   allows the unit to catch up on maintenance, while incurring no further battle
damage. Air Cavalry is a comparable combat unit and required the same
   consideration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Within the Air Cavalry Brigade, the number
   of VR Teams required to effectively provide visual reconnaissance remains
   stable and increases dramatically during periods of enemy activity. Due to the
   flexibility of Air Cavalry, one troop can adequately cover another Troop's AO
   for one or two days and a standdown could be given to each troop on a rotating
   basis.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: A three day standdown has been obtained for
   each troop to allow them to recover and in the future a one day standdown will
   be provided monthly.

INCLOSURE
1: Station List and Organization Chart
2: Letter SUBJECT: Air Cavalry Brigade Operations, 5 April 1973

CARL M. PUTNAM
LTC ARMY
Commanding
DISTRIBUTION

3 Command General, 3rd Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
5 12th CAC, ATTN: AVBAUS-C, APO S.F. 96266
2 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBAFC-O, APO S.F. 96384
3 USARV, ATTN: AVHCC-DT, APO S.F. 96375
2 CIN CUSARPAC, ATTN: CPOF-DT, APO S.F. 96558
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBAUS-C 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1/9th ACS for Period Ending
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96266 28 May 1971

THRU: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, ATTN: MACSAR-G3PT, APO 96266

Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC, APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOG-DST, APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned, 1/9th ACS for the period ending 30 April 1971.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOHN H. SUTHERLAND
MAJ, IN
Adjutant

CF: CG, 3rd Bde, 1st ACD
MACR-G3PT 2d Ind.

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS G3PO-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266 2 JUN 1971

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHD-DO, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (Airmobile).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT F. CARRELL
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK
DA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384  5 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, AITN: AVHC-S-DST, APO 96375

1. This headquarters has received subject Operational Report-Lessons Learned and concurs, except as stated below.

2. Reference Para 2f(1) of subject report. Present TOE's do not authorize the MOS 55B series personnel at the troop level. To alleviate this problem units must submit fully justified request for modification of existing authorizations. To prevent zero balances of Class V requires continuing checks of stocks on hand and expended. The daily inventory conducted by the 1/9 Cavalry coupled with reordering based on daily usage adjusted for time required from shipment to receipt should prevent shortages from occurring.

3. Reference paragraph 2f(2) nonconcur with the recommendation that each cavalry troop stand down maintenance two to three days per month. It is preferable to have only a portion of the troops aircraft down at any one time for maintenance as opposed to all down for a two or three day period. Otherwise a severe manpower and equipment shortage will exist on those days when all equipment is down, with an excess maintenance capability during the remainder of the month. Additionally, there will be a tendency to delay maintenance which should be completed on a daily basis for accomplishment during the stand down period allowing small faults to progress to a more serious state. Scheduled maintenance has proven to be a reliable system which should be continued in all aviation units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E. L. HARMAN
CPT, AGC
Aust AG
AVHDO-DO (Undated) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 18 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry (Airmobile) and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

GIDEON MALEK
CPT. INF.
Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1/9th Cav (AM)
1st Avn Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry (Airmobile), period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AG
Capt AG
CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Station List, 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry, 30 April 1971 as of 2400H (U)

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FORWARD CP</th>
<th>HEAR</th>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Tay Ninh East</td>
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<td>HHT</td>
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<td>A Troop</td>
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<td>C Troop</td>
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1. This Squadron recently compiled the data concerning the formation and employment of the largest grouping of Air Cavalry the Army has known. This group was a defacto Air Cavalry Combat Brigade and we recorded our observations while conducting operations with eight Air Cavalry Troops, two ground Cavalry Troops, a Ranger Company, and a Combat Tracker Team. The report as you receive it has no official sanction; however, it can serve some purpose to those following the footsteps of the "First Team." This document was officially submitted to 1st Cavalry Division, prior to the Squadron being reassigned to the 1st Aviation Brigade on 10 April 1971. There has been no official comment returned.

2. As so often happens when administrative reports are compiled in the midst of actual combat operations, the most important lessons are overlooked. While omitted in the report, we must emphasize two important points.

   a. The proposed combination of the attack helicopter battalion with the Air Cavalry Squadron within the Air Cavalry Combat Brigade is extremely important. Air Cavalry must operate with maximum fuel and go light on ordnance to increase time for visual reconnaissance in the operational area. On the other hand, the attack helicopter battalion operates with maximum ordnance since time on station is not as important as is the firepower it delivers. This concept was proven time and time again in the 1st Air Cavalry Division which used its Aerial Artillery to provide that additional firepower.

   b. There are pros and cons about arming the LOH with the minigun. It is my opinion, after observing the Scout with and without the minigun, that the minigun is a hinderance to the Scout. First, if the minigun is mounted, there is one less crewmember on the aircraft. This reduces the "Visual Reconnaissance" capability of the Scout by one third. Second, with the minigun mounted there is a tendency on the part of the Scout to use his aircraft as a "Gunship", again reducing the VR capability of the Scout.
AVBAUX-C

SUBJECT: Air Cavalry Brigade Operations

3. Our hope in compiling the attached report was to assist the formation of the Air Cavalry Combat Brigade at Fort Hood. We are willing to provide any additional data that may be available.

/S/ CARL M. PUTNAM

/T/ CARL M. PUTNAM

LTC ARMOR

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, II Field Force, USAV Vietnam
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CG, Project MASSTEck, Fort Hood, Texas
CG, USA Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama
CG, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) Vietnam
CG, TriCav Division, Fort Hood, Texas
CG, USA Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky
CG, 3d Brigade 1st Cavalry Division (Sep) Vietnam
CG, 1st Aviation Brigade, Vietnam
Director Army Aviation, DACSFOR
DRA, II Corps, MACV
CO, 12th Combat Aviation Group, 1st Aviation Brigade, Vietnam
Director, Doctrine Directorate, USACDC, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
CO, USACDC, Armor Agency, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Chief Armor Branch, OPO, Department of the Army
Col Gilbert R. Reed, HQ USACDC, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
Col Robert H. Nevins Jr., 9th ROK Div. Vietnam
Col William R. Gearan, DACSFOR
LTC Jack W. Anderson, DCSOPS
LTC Ronald T. Walker, OSCSFOR
LTC Robert F. Mollinelli
LTO Billy Williams, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Vietnam
2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel: None
   b. Intelligence: None
   c. Operations:

(1) Non-Air Cavalry Missions

   (a) OBSERVATION: The Troops of the 7/1 Air Cavalry Squadron are continuing to receive and conduct Non-Air Cavalry missions, i.e., movement of large units from point A to point B, single ship resupply missions into relatively unsecured landing zones, etc.

   (b) EVALUATION: Although demonstrating the versatility of the air cavalry concept, the use limitations imposed on flying assets should necessitate better utilization of the air cavalry package to coincide more closely with its stated mission. An air cavalry troop should be utilized on operations where a number of troops must be inserted but not just for the actual movement of a large number of troops. As soon as landing zones are cleared for insertions, the air cavalry troop should perform screening, blocking, and/or reconnaissance type missions. Not only does this concept permit the air assets to be used in the most efficient manner, but it enables a smaller ground force to accomplish their mission more quickly and effectively.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: Using units should review and screen mission requirements, and place more emphasis on placing the correct type mission with the most applicable air assets, i.e., air cavalry package, VNAF package, or assault helicopter company.

   (d) COMMAND ACTION: As a result of the air cavalry troops being utilized in various roles, air mission commanders were instructed to thoroughly brief the ground unit on the troop’s capabilities. Additionally, all aviators were given instruction as to the many roles the troop could be expected to fill.

(2) Aviator Complacency
(a) OBSERVATION: On 2 December 1970, the pilot of a UH-1H helicopter was wounded, and later died, as a result of enemy fire. The entire incident happened after mission completion and the package had been released to return to Vinh Long.

(b) EVALUATION: Although the death of one pilot itself cannot usually be the basis for a lesson learned, the facts surrounding this incident were of some value to this unit. After departing Thoi Binh, RVN, the flight of three UH-1H aircraft was climbing to enroute altitude, and was paralleling a canal line that had always been used as a visual enroute navigational aid. Passing through 800 feet, the flight entered a preplanned enemy helicopter trap that wounded the Aircraft Commander of the first aircraft, and put numerous bullet holes into two aircraft of the flight. Other pertinent facts of value: (1) the AH-1G gunships and OH-6A scouts had already departed over the same area and had not received fire. (2) practically all pilots had removed and were not wearing their chest protectors. This fact alone has no bearing because the wound was sustained in the head, except that it could possibly have been a saving factor at another time. Since neither Cobras nor LOH's received fire, it can be assumed that the UH-1H's would not have been fired upon if they had been accompanied by gunships. Also, if the flight had been at a higher altitude, they probably would not have drawn the enemy fire which consisted of only small arms.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) Since this action was caused mostly by aviator complacency, wide dissemination of this incident could prove of value to other aviators flying in combat operations. (2) When released from a mission, AH-1G's, OH-6A's, and the UH-1H's should return in the same flight if at all possible. If not, pilots are to gain altitude over secure areas to minimize exposure to hostile fire at low altitudes.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: All aircraft flights have been instructed to fly to and from the AO at 1500 feet AGL. Chest protectors are mandatory for all crew members during any flights away from the base airfield. Chest protectors will be worn when flying from the AO back to base camp after being released from a mission. Whenever possible, the entire flight or package will fly together for mutual protection.

(3) Utilization of Aero-Scouts

(a) OBSERVATION: The Aero Scouts are often misutilized as an offensive weapon. The job of the scouts is to find and fix the enemy and depart the area promptly and let the Cobras and troop insertions take over.

(b) EVALUATION: There is no reason for the Aero Scouts to re-enter an area where they have recently received intense fire. Too many LOH's have been shot down by entering the hot area again. The Air Mission Commander should closely monitor the feasibility of letting the LOH team go
back into a known hot area, even after Cobra strikes are put into the area. The scout can recon-by-fire but that is not to be misinterpreted as staying on station and fighting it out with the enemy. The LOH pilot sometimes gets complacent and develops the attitude that he cannot be shot down which is far from being correct.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All Air Mission Commanders and all Aero-Scout pilots should at all times be made aware of the inherent danger of re-entering a known hostile area with a team of OH-6A's.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This Squadron continues to encourage the LOH pilots not to re-enter a known hostile area for the second or third time, through safety meetings, instructions in each troops SOP, and debriefings which are held by the AMC after each days flight.

(4) Operations in a mid-intensity environment concerning flight altitudes.

(a) OBSERVATION: The concept of using AH-1G's, circling at 1200-1500 feet above the ground covering the OH-6A scout aircraft low-level, was found to incur a large number of aircraft hits in the Cobras during Operation Lamson 719.

(b) EVALUATION: In a mid-intensity environment with 12.7MM, 23MM, 37 MM, and 57MM anti-aircraft weapons, circling over the same general terrain at 1200-1500 feet AGL is not practical. The number of 12.7MM encountered in Laos made it wise to try different altitudes and fly irregular patterns. B Troop aircraft tried altitudes from 1500 feet to 8500 feet AGL, with the least amount of hits taken between 3500 feet and 5500 feet. Altitudes above 5500 feet drew fire from larger caliber weapons, such as 23MM or 37MM weapons.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Aircraft operating in an environment with a large number of 12.7MM, 23MM, and 37MM weapons should operate between 3500 and 5500 feet.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This information was disseminated through command channels to the 223rd Aviation Battalion and 2nd Squadron, 17th Armored Cavalry and to the 1st Aviation Brigade via commander's conferences.

(5) Reporting procedures while attached to one unit and under operational control of another.

(a) OBSERVATION: It was noted while attached to the 223rd Aviation Battalion and under the operational control of the 181st Airborne
Division during Lamson 729, that a double reporting system was in effect. B Troop had to make the same operational reports to both units. Most of the reports wanted the same information while a few differed in format and asked for different information.

(b) EVALUATION: Under this system, the unit involved was required to make a greater number of reports and it was later discovered that information from some reports was being counted twice in some instances due to the double reporting system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In such circumstances, instructions from the controlling headquarters should clarify and monitor reporting channels and in most instances designate a single channel for reporting.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The problem was made known to the 223rd Aviation Battalion Headquarters through commander conferences.

(6) Informing Subordinate Units

(a) OBSERVATION: Units experienced conflicts between patrols operating in the same area.

(b) EVALUATION: Within the period covered by this report numerous incidents in which patrols have been endangered by other friendly units combat patrol actions in the same area. These included ambushes being illuminated by helicopters and being fired upon by the perimeter, RF and US patrols running across each other’s path, and convoys being delayed or aborted due to poor road conditions or impassable obstacles. All units should be required to report any operations in which they are involved in their TOC for further dissemination to other units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The TOC’s at all levels distribute information on friendly operations within their areas of operations, giving special emphasis to any possible conflicting missions.

(7) Use of Grappling Hooks on Dismounted Patrols

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of a length of rope and grappling hook can be a valuable asset in heavily booby trapped areas.

(b) EVALUATION: During this reporting period training missions were conducted with RP’s in areas that were in places heavily booby trapped. The density of booby traps was so great at times that the areas could not be reconed effectively. It is not desirable to bypass these areas because they may contain enemy caches or materials needed by the enemy. Often it is impractical to carry enough demolition equipment.
to blow the booby traps in place. Thus, a practical and feasible alternative
is to use a grappling hook to detonate booby traps. This method, when used
properly, is rapid, safe, and when used in conjunction with normal visual
caution is quite effective.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a grappling hook be included in
the basic gear for dismounted patrols.

(8) Respect Toward Vietnamese Personnel

(a) OBSERVATION: The conduct of US military personnel on
and off duty is a major consideration in relations with the Vietnamese people.

(b) EVALUATION: During this reporting period there have
been operations such as convoys and patrols during which some personnel
showed little or no respect to Vietnamese soldiers and civilians. The
Vietnamese are very observant and are greatly influenced by manners, respect,
and professional behavior. Unfavorable conflicts between US and Vietnamese
personnel serve no useful purpose and can only harm the cause of the American
government and slow down the Vietnameseization program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders at all levels emphasize
the importance and necessity of treating the Vietnamese people, both civilian
and military with dignity and respect. Any unnecessary occurrences of abuse
to Vietnamese personnel be reported and corrective measures taken.

(9) Rearming and Pulling Maintenance on AH-10 in the AO.

(a) OBSERVATION: The turn around time for AH-10's between
rearming and take off has on occasion been unacceptably too long. Mainten-
ance problems were often encountered which could not be repaired in the
field.

(b) EVALUATION: The AH-10's when completely expended
required additional assistance to rear, especially when the turret stores
had been expended. Since the AH-10 does not carry a crew chief, minor
maintenance problems that develop in either the aircraft itself or in the
complex rearming system often delay the mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a crew chief and armorer for the
AH-10 be taken to the staging field to preclude these problems.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: An AH-10 crew chief and armorer will
go to the staging area with one of the lift ships on each mission.

e. Training: None
SUBJECT: OR-LL (Cont)

f. Logistics: None

g. Communications: None

h. Material

1. 2.75" FPAR

(a) OBSERVATION: A 2.75" FPAR with a flechette warhead lost the warhead while in flight. Prior to the impact the warhead detonated at 300 feet.

(b) EVALUATION: The flechette warhead is designed to detonate when the rocket motor has expended. Even so the warhead did detonate prior to impact without a rocket motor attached.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That proper torque be applied to the warhead and that overflight of populated areas be avoided when feasible in accordance with the mission.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The torque will be checked on all warheads of flechette rockets prior to rearming. All AH-1G's will avoid overflight of populated areas.

i. Other: None

George W. Shalcross
LTC, AR
Commanding

6 May 1971
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHAW-C (6 May 71) 1st Inf
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 30 April 1971, HQS GSFBR-65 (K3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 164th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96215 29 May 1971
TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVAGC, APO 96384

1. (U) The attached 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry OEF for the period ending 30 April 1971 has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. (C) The following comments are made on the report:

   a. Paragraph 2a: The 164th CAG is able to maintain combat operations with the present reduced level of personnel. However, continued critical shortages in field skill maintenance personnel will affect mission capability if continued over an extended period.

   b. Paragraph 2c: DAAC, in conjunction with the 164th CAG, is conducting airmobility seminars in each of the Division level headquarters in HR 4. Participants include the AHCA commanders and staff, U.S. Advisors, and aviation personnel from this Group. The discussion of problem areas during these seminars has and will continue to improve airmobile operation in HR IV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Walter L. Klein
CPT, FA
Assistant Adjutant
AVBAGC (6 May 71) 2nd Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG5 CSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384 5 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGS-DST, APO 96375

(U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Period Ending 30 April 1971, and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E.L. BARNARD
CPT, AGC
Aset AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, period ending 30 April 1971 and Troop D, 3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry for the period 1 November 1970 to 1 February 1971, designated Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry for the period 1 February 1971 to 1 May 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

CPT, AGC
Asst AG
| A Troop | A/C Loss: (1) UH-1H; (6) OH-6A | A/C Damaged: (8) UH-1H; (3) OH-6A; (1) AH-1G |
| B Troop | A/C Loss: (4) UH-1H; (6) OH-6A; (4) AH-1G | A/C Damaged: (9) UH-1H; (13) OH-6A; (4) AH-1G |
| C Troop | A/C Loss: (1) UH-1H; (2) OH-6A; (1) AH-1G | A/C Damaged: (20) UH-1H; (15) OH-6A; (16) AH-1G |
| C 3/17 A/C Loss: (8) UH-1H; (8) OH-6A; (3) AH-1G | A/C Damaged: (15) UH-1H; (12) OH-6A; (5) AH-1G |
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Cavalry Units, 3d Sqdn, 17th Cav; 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav; and 7th Sqdn, 1st Cav for Period Ending 30 Apr 71.

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 70 to 30 Apr 71.

CO's, 3d Sqdn, 17th Cav; 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav; and 7th Sqdn, 1st Cav.

May 1971

711088
711089
711204

N/A

N/A

DAFD, Washington, D. C. 20310