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<td>Controlling DoD organization Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC.</td>
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**AUTHORITY**

31 May 1977, GDS, DoDD 5200.1-r; AGO, d/a ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam - Period Ending 30 April 1971 (4)

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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Commanding Officers
US Army Land Warfare Laboratory
US Army Logistics Doctrine, Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

THRU: Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

(C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. COMMAND.

(1) Commanders.

CG, USARV
1 November 1970 - 30 April 1971
GEN Creighton W. Abrams

DGC, USARV
1 November 1970 - 30 April 1971
LTG William J. McCaffrey

CG, USACEV
1 November 1970 - 30 April 1971
MG Charles C. Noble

CG, USAMEDCOM
1 November 1970 - 2 December 1970
BG David E. Thomas
3 December 1970 - 30 April 1971
COL Philip J. Noel, Jr.

(2) Distinguished Visitors Summary. During the reporting period distinguished visitors to this headquarters were:

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert B. Foster (GS-18)</td>
<td>Staff Members, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, U.S. House of Representatives</td>
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<td>Mr. Gary C. Michalak (GS-11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-4 November 1970</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

Reverend Dr. Robert B. Harriman (GS-17E) 6 November 1970
Executive Secretary, Department of Chaplains and Service Personnel, The Unit Presbyterian Church in America

MG Kenneth J. Hodson 8-16 November 1970
The Judge Advocate General

Rabbi Maurice Lanna (GS-17E) 9 November 1970
Director of Chaplain Personnel, National Jewish Welfare Board

LTG Fredrick J. Clarke 11-16 November 1970
Chief of Engineers, DA

Dr. May Ehrensberger (GS-17E) 12 November 1970
Chancellor, University College, University of Maryland

LG Earl C. Hedlund 14-15 November 1970
Director, Defense Supply Agency

MC John J. Klingenhagen 17-24 November 1970
CG, US Army Aviation Systems Command

COL(P) Alfred B. Hale 17-21 November 1970
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel HA, USARPAC

Mr. Leslie A. Squires (GS-18E) 19 November 1970
PSYOP Advisor to CINCPAC

BG George A. Godding 21-24 November 1970
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USARPAC

MG Herron N. Maples
Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, J-4, UEMACV

MG Dong Van Khuyen 25 November 1970
Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, JGS

BG Herbert E. Wolfe 1-11 December 1970
CG, US Army Security Agency-Pacific

MG A. T. Shtogren 4 December 1970
Director, J-6, Communication-Electronics Directorate, JCS, DA

Dr. Fatholiah K.-Mostofi 7-9 December 1970
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

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SPECIAL Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States
Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1971, HCS CSFOR-55 (R3)(U)

Mr. Marvin Colbs (GS-16) 8 December 1970
Assistant Director for Supply Management Defense Division, GAO

Mr. Leverne J. Duffy
Mr. Carmine S. Bellino 9-14 December 1970
Staff members, Committee of Investigations, Senate Committee on Government Operations

MG John N. Deane, Jr. 10 December 1970
Director, Defense Communications Planning Group

Dr. Curtis W. Tarr 11-12 December 1970
Director of Selective Service

MG Joseph W. Pezdirtz 16 December 1970
Chief, US Military Advisory Group-Korea

HON Carlos G. Cosacho 18-21 December 1970
Governor of Guam

ADM John S. McCain, Jr. 22 December 1970
CINCPAC

His Eminence Terence Cardinal Cooke
Rev Dr. Oswald C. J. Hoffman 24-25 December 1970
Military Vicar to Catholic Armed Forces Personnel Lutheran Layman's League and "The Lutheran Hour" Preacher

Rep G. V. Montgomery (D-MISS) 26 December 1970
Member, House Committee on Veterans' Affairs

CH (MG) Francis L. Sampson 5-15 January 1971
The Chief of Chaplins, United States Army

Rep G. Elliott Hagan (D-GA) 10 January 1971
Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Alleged Drug Abuse in Armed Services

BG Manley G. Morrison 11-15 January 1971
Chief, Medical Service Corps

BG John E. Murray 16-20 January 1971
Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, J4, CINCPAC

Dr. C. Edward Brubaker (GS-17E) 28 January 1971
Chairman, General Commission on Chaplains and Armed Forces Personnel

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States
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MG Winant Sidle
2 February 1971

Chief of Public Information, OSA,
and Chief of Information, OCoSFA

MG George P. Seneff, Jr.
3-11 February 1971

Deputy Project Officer, Project
MASSTR

Brigadier W. A. Bunting, OBE
3 February 1971

Director of Supply and Transport
Australian Army Headquarters, Canberra

BG Wilson R. Reea
4-7 February 1971

CG, US Army Computer Systems Command

RADM W. R. Flanagan
7 February 1971

Director, East Asia and Pacific Region
OASD, ISA

Mrs. Jeanie Smith
9 February 1971

Mrs. US Savings Bonds

Mr. Frank Bartimo
10 February 1971

Assistant General Counsel of Defense
Department

BG W. T. Meredith
11-14 February 1971

Assistant for Real Property Maintenance,
OSAD (I&L)

MG C. M. Gurner CBE
12-13 February 1971

Director, General Medical Services,
Australian Army Headquarters, Canberra

BG James L. Collins, Jr.
13-26 February 1971

Chief of Military History

BG Thomas J. Whelan, Jr.
17-25 February 1971

Special Assistant to TSG for MC
Affairs

BG Anne May V. neys
17-25 February 1971

Chief, Army Nurse Corps

Dr. T. B. Massey (GS-17E)

Director, Far East Division, University
of Maryland

Brigadier B. A. McDonald
Commander, 1st Australian Task Force
(Designate)

23 February 1971

Mr. Robert Tracy (GS-16)
Assistant Comptroller (Fiscal Policy)
28 February 1971

OCA, DA
May 15, 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1971, HCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

Mr. Clyde Hardin (GS-18E)
1-8 March 1971

MG James J. Gibbons
10 March 1971

Dr. Steven J. Lukasik
(GS-18E)
11 March 1971

LTG Joseph H. Heiser, Jr.
MG James G. Kalergis

MG S. E. Lollis
Mr. Gerald B. Russell

MG W. N. Redling

MG Jack C. Fuson
14 March 1971

MG D. B. Dunstan
16 March 1971

LTG Julian J. Ewell
17 March 1971

Brigadier J. Burns
22 March 1971

MG Carl W. Hughes
23-29 March 1971

MG John R. Deane, Jr.
25 March 1971

MG Charles J. Denholm
Mr. Howard Barlow (GS-18)
30 March 1971

Mr. James H. Hammond (GS-17)
2 April 1971

Mr. T. B. Hannon (GS-17)
4 April 1971

Special assistant for SEA matters to the ASA (R&D)

Deputy Commander US Military Assistance Command, Thailand

Acting Director OSD/Advance Research Project Agency

Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, DA
Deputy Commanding General for Logistics Support, USAMC
CG, USATACOM
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L)
Deputy Director, J-4, (Strategic Mobility) JCS
Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, USARPAC

Commander, Australian Forces, Vietnam

US Military Representative to Paris Peace Talks

Commander, New Zealand Army Logistics Support Group

Chief Surgeon, USARPAC

Director, Defense Communications Planning Group

CG, US Army Security Agency
Assistant Director for CONSEC, NSA

Associate Director, GAO

Regional Administrator of Region 9, GSA
b. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

(1) Reduction of USARV Strength. During the period 1 November 1970 through 30 April 1971, the personnel strength of USARV declined from 245,000 to 177,000. During Increment V of the Keystone Robin redeployments, eligible personnel who were assigned to redeploying or inactivating units received up to 60-day curtailment of their foreign tour. This
curtailment authorization was increased to 91 days during Increment VI. Additionally, in order to meet imposed strength ceilings, a USARV-wide curtailment program was used for personnel in grades E1-E6. The maximum curtailments under this program reached 50 days in Increment V and 40 days in Increment VI.

(2) Assignment Instructions for E1-E6 Personnel During Drawdown of Forces. To preclude returning curtailed E1-E6 personnel to CONUS without assignment instructions, USARV requested that DA modify normal AOR procedures to allow implementation of the reporting system allowing maximum utilization of telecom service messages and instructions expeditiously. Through the concerted efforts of USARV and DA, a decreasing number of personnel have been returned to CONUS without instructions each month. During April 1971, less than 50 E1 through E6 personnel receiving curtailments were returned without assignment instructions, compared to 1,240 during April 1970.

(3) Liberalized Leave Program. On 16 November 1970, the leave authorization for a normal tour was increased from 7 to 14 days, with the provision of CONUS as an authorized site. Initially, regularly scheduled commercial airlines and space-available flights, in limited supply, were the only means of transport. The key to success of this enthusiastically received program was the establishment of competing charter services to bring the cost of transportation within the reach of the serviceman. The initial charter flight departed Tan Son Nhut on 5 December 1970. To ensure equitable distribution of limited tickets, the charter services honored an allocation system to units countrywide. As the supply increased to meet the demand, the allocation system was phased out in April 1971.


(a) It is the policy of the Department of Defense, the US Mission, and this command to refrain from importing workers from a third country into Vietnam or retaining TCN employees in the employ of US Force contractors when personnel requirements can be satisfied by local labor.

(b) At end-FY70, USARV-invited contractors were required to review more carefully requests for issuance of original and renewal GVN work permits and visas for TCN employees. This review was to insure that work required to be performed by TCN's could not be performed by Vietnamese nationals due to the level of skill required in the job, or that Vietnamese nationals with job-related experience and potential were not available in numbers required to replace TCN's.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

(c) During the 1st and 2nd Qtrs, FY 71, numerous applications for GVN work permits and visas continued to be submitted by contractors to the American Embassy for coordination and approval by officials of the Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Interior, GVN. The number of applications, in comparison with the number of Vietnamese employees at USARV separated due to reduction-in-force (RIF) during the same time frame, indicates that US Forces contractors were not providing sufficient objectivity and thorough review in order to make substantial progress in their efforts to replace TCN employees with Vietnamese nationals.

(d) On 8 October 1970, action was initiated to provide officials of USARV-invited contractors information regarding Vietnamese employees affected by reduction-in-force separations in USARV, MACV and US Navy. This information included the affected employee's name, position title, grade and step, organization, effective date of RIF and the RVN province or autonomous city in which the employee would accept relocation to obtain continued employment. This information was provided to contractor officials in each geographical location in which area civilian personnel offices (ACPO) are located; i.e., Cam Ranh, Can Tho, Da Nang, Long Binh, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Saigon. The information provided was specifically designed to assist contractors in obtaining Vietnamese employees to replace TCN's and afford out-placement assistance to employees involuntarily separated from employment with the US Forces.

(e) The number of TCN employees utilized by USARV-invited contractors was 7,391 on 30 September 1970, and 6,033 on 31 December 1970. Therefore, a reduction of 1,358 TCN employees (18.4 percent) was realized during this period.

(f) The number of Vietnamese employees utilized by USARV-invited contractors was 24,348 on 30 September 1970, and 21,358 on 31 December 1970. Therefore, a reduction of 2,990 Vietnamese employees (12.3 percent) occurred during this period.

(g) The primary cause of reduction of TCN and Vietnamese employees in the USARV-invited contractors' work force during the period 1 October—31 December 1970 was budgetary limitations imposed upon this command.

(h) During January 1971 HQ USARV, monitoring employment policies and practices of TCN and Vietnamese employees of USARV-invited contractors, implemented refined procedures for contractors to obtain initial or extension of current GVN work permits and visas for their TCN employees. These procedures require all applications for such permits and
visas to be processed through the Civilian Personnel Director (CPD) prior to being forwarded to the American Embassy and GVN for issuance or renewal. This processing action includes careful screening of job requirements and the labor market, including a review of lists of RIF’d employees in the geographical area in which the position is located to determine whether Vietnamese nationals are available with appropriate skills to fill the position. If qualified Vietnamese nationals are available, the request for initial issuance or renewal of GVN work permits and visas is returned to the contractor for his action to request referral of interested prospective employees from the appropriate ACPO for selection to fill the vacancy or the position to be vacated by the TCN employee. Upon selection of a Vietnamese employee to fill a position currently occupied by a TCN employee, the contractor is responsible for terminating the TCN employee and effecting his repatriation from Vietnam.

(1) The screening process employed by CPD has revealed that a large number of positions in the USARV-invited contractors’ work force occupied or requested to be filled by TCN employees can be filled by Vietnamese employees. During 1 January 1971-31 March 1971 the TCN work force of USARV-invited contractors was further reduced by 673 employees (11.2 percent) to a total work force of 5,360 employees. During the period 1 January-31 March 1971, the Vietnamese employee work force of USARV-invited contractors increased by 664 employees (3.0 percent) to a total work force of 22,002 Vietnamese employees.

(5) Provost Marshals’ Conference. The USARV Provost Marshal conducted the first Provost Marshal Conference of 1971 on 12 February 1971. Invitees include all provost marshals in the Republic of Vietnam, representatives of the US Internal Revenue Service and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and MACV CORDS advisors. The major topic of concern was drug abuse but additionally physical security, crime trends, criminal investigations, and other law enforcement topics were discussed. The conference proved to be very rewarding. Another conference will be scheduled for the summer period of 1971.

(6) Career Information for Officers in RVN.

(a) In response to a recommendation from the field concerning the stationing of OPO Branch representatives in RVN, HQ, USARV formulated an approach which was based upon the premise that by expanding the capability which the USARV staff already has, USARV can create a responsive and viable solution to the problem of counseling all officers.
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(b) In pursuit of this goal it was concluded that a concept of organization and operation based on expansion and enhancement of existing contacts with OPO by the USARV AG should feature:

1. Increased contact and improved dialogue with OPO through periodical correspondence such as monthly letters from each OPO Branch and use of frequent newsletters from OPO.

2. The development of procedures which would enable the USARV AG to provide timely information and guidance without imposing an unmanageable workload on OPO.

3. Visits by career branch representatives to RVN.

4. Designation and advertisement of an activity in the USARV Officer Assignment Division office which would provide a focal point for officers’ questions and a source for information and guidance from OPO on an informal and rapid-response basis.

(c) On 15 February 1971, a career information service was initiated at USARV and announced to the field in a letter from this HQ, AVHDP-HP, dated 12 February 1971, subject: Career Information for Officers. Basically, officers desiring general or personal information reference career programs (Army Aviation, Advanced Civil Schooling, Officer Special Career Programs, etc.) and other career information, direct their queries by telephone or in writing to this headquarters, ATTN: Officers Assignment Division.

(d) Questions received from the field concerning career information are answered by this headquarters based on information available and maintained from continuing contact with OPD, OPO. Those questions which cannot be answered at this headquarters are forwarded to respective career branch representatives at DA, and answers based on the most current information available are obtained and passed on to the officer concerned as expeditiously as possible. Communications are accomplished telephonically, when feasible, to insure the timeliness and applicability of the information being supplied.

(e) During the period 1-18 June 1971, representatives from OPD, OPO, DA will visit RVN and participate in an extensive itinerary geared to providing as much officer participation as possible; a further development of positive lines of communications as espoused by the Modern Voluntary Army concept.
Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

(7) Semi-Centralized Promotion to Grade E5. On 28 March 1971, a requirement was received from DCSPER, DA to evaluate the feasibility of a semi-centralized promotion system to grade E5 comparable to the newly established E6 promotion system. After soliciting inputs from the staff and major commands, USARV responded as follows:

(a) The proposal for semi-centralization would enhance the promotion system to grade E5, in that it would facilitate promotion of the best qualified individuals on an Army-wide basis. This proposed system would provide a more equal opportunity for promotion by elimination of the position-vacancy requirements as a precondition for promotion consideration. This requirement has been an irritant to enlisted personnel for some time. All too often it resulted in promotion opportunities only for those fortunate enough to be at the right place at the right time, as opposed to promoting best qualified individuals. The proposed system would be equitable and would still leave the commander the prerogative of making a recommendation for promotion if he feels that a man is, in fact, ready for promotion. Due to USARV's combat environment promotion opportunity to grade E5 without regard to time-in-grade and time-in-service should be continued in RVN, just as it presently exists for grade E6. In this regard these accelerated promotions, patterned after the existing USARV E6 system, should be available to recognize those individuals performing in an outstanding manner in a combat zone. USARV currently promotes approximately 10 percent of its E6's under this accelerated promotion system and its retention to the grade of E5 is considered essential for this command.

(b) The current semi-centralized promotion system to grade E6 has been well received at all echelons of this command and is considered a significant step in the Army's continuing effort to improve the enlisted promotion system and to enhance the promotion opportunity for the best qualified individuals on an Army-wide basis. This allows all E6's to compete world-wide with their contemporaries based on point scores and is considered the most equitable.

(c) With respect to the present system the following recommendation is offered for consideration - establishment of an Army-wide cut-off score for placement on E6 recommended list. The system currently in effect precludes the addition of personnel to the present command standing lists who do not score as high as the bottom man already on the list in the same MOS in that particular command.
Vung Tau R&R Site. In response to the need for a recreational site in southern RVN, the Deputy Commanding General, on 10 February 1971, approved a program for reestablishment of an R&R site at Vung Tau. A temporary phase, to meet the immediate need of redeploying/inactivating units in MR 3, was the establishment of day and overnight use of the beach facility. Due to the limited capacity of the beach facility, usage is allocated by USARV Special Services Agency. Billeting (tentage), messing, and security are furnished by using units, with control and services being provided by USASUPCOM Saigon. The goal is to establish an improved facility, patterned along the lines of the northern R&R site at Da Nang.

c. INTELLIGENCE.

(1) Significant Enemy Activities.

(a) During November and December 1970, and January 1971, enemy-initiated activity throughout RVN was generally at a low level and, with few exceptions, was characterized by economy-of-force tactics. Enemy activity continued to be heaviest in VC MR-2 and -3 (the Delta area) where the enemy sustained a generally moderate level of attacks by fire, ground assaults, and mining. Principal targets were lightly defended outposts, watchtowers, hamlets, villages, and lines of communication, although a vigorous enemy reaction to sustained ARVN operations against base areas was noted in Chau Doc and Kien Giang provinces. The enemy increased his use of water sappers and of 107mm rockets in these attacks. Also, during the first week in December, activity increased noticeably in VC MR-6. Elsewhere, with the exception of heavy shellings south of the DMZ in December and January, and substantial ambushes and attacks by fire against LOC's and bases in Tay Ninh Province in January, activity was at a low level.

(b) Noteworthy during these three months were the departure of the last elements of the 304th NVA Division from Quang Tri province; evidence of the disbanding of the 36 NVA Regiment, Front 4; and the identification of one regiment each from the 5 VC, 7 NVA, and 9 VC Division in northern Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces during January. Otherwise, the disposition of enemy forces remained relatively unchanged. During December and January the enemy declared three unilateral cease-fires of seventy-two hours each during Christmas and New Year's, and 96 hours during Tet. Although there were a considerable number of small, enemy-initiated incidents throughout RVN during these periods, the enemy did not take advantage of them to launch widespread attacks.
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(c) During the months of February, March, and April activity increased, as the enemy conducted his annual Winter-Spring campaign and reacted to large ARVN operations in Laos and Cambodia. For much of this period, fighting connected with Operation LAMSON 719 dominated military activity. The enemy reacted vigorously to the ARVN thrust into his Laotian supply routes. Elements of five NVA Divisions plus numerous support units (including two probable armor battalions) were committed, under control of the 70B Front, to the defense of the Ban Dong-Tchepone area. The resultant combat was unprecedented in intensity. Additionally, B-5 Front units applied pressure against supporting US and ARVN troops in northern Quang Tri Province, although economy-of-force tactics prevailed there. Final results for the operation, which commenced on 30 January and terminated on 8 March (for US Forces), were: enemy losses of 13,642 KIA, 56 CIA; friendly losses of 1,708 (177 US) KIA, 6,466 (1,056 US) WIA and 693 (42 US) MIA. In addition, both sides lost large quantities of war matériel captured or destroyed. Enemy losses included approximately 95 tanks. While world attention was focused on LAMSON 719 in Laos, another significant ARVN operation was underway in Cambodia. The 5 and 9 VC and 7 NVA divisions were involved in sporadic heavy fighting while defending enemy bases along the line Chup-Dambe-Snoul from several large ARVN task forces on TOAN THANG 1/71. The operation began on 3 February 1971 and as of 30 April was still underway. As of 30 April, results were 6,392 enemy KIA and 237 CIA; while Allied losses were 594 (11 US) KIA, 2,830 (26 US) WIA, and 229 (7 US) MIA.

(d) Although enemy units in RVN generally failed to respond to exhortations to strike Allied targets in order to draw Allied Forces from Laos and Cambodia, activity did increase, particularly in VC NR-5 and the B-3 Front. Enemy activity in VC NR-5 during February, March, and April was characterized by periodic surges, lasting from three days to one week, as the enemy went through various phases of his Winter-Spring campaign and initiated his Spring-Summer campaign. For the most part, enemy initiatives during these phases were low-scale, economy-of-force actions. However, on 28 March, probable elements of the 409 NPA Battalion executed a classical sapper attack against elements of the 1st Battalion, 46th US Infantry at FSB Mary Ann in Quang Tri Province. This attack killed 30 Americans, wounded 78 others, while it cost the enemy only 12 killed. Even more significant, however, was the 29 March attack on the Duc Duc district capital in Quang Nam Province by the 38 NVA Regiment, in which the enemy destroyed a refugee hamlet and killed 100 civilians. Concurrent attacks on military targets in the area resulted in 20 ARVN/RF/PP soldiers killed, plus 46 wounded. Enemy losses totaled 59 killed and three suspects detained. Enemy forces of the B-3 Front launched a campaign in the highlands in late March. On 15 March, the 95B NVA Regiment initiated an enemy drive to gain control of the Ben Het area.
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (H3)(U)

in Kontum Province by overrunning FSB 6 (YB 9318). However, ARVN units reacted strongly and, with heavy US air support, retook the base on 1 April. A\nAfter a week of heavy fighting, enemy pressure eased; but as of 30 April enemy units were still in the area. During this fighting the enemy suffered very heavy losses (estimated at 3,430 KIA between 31 March and 30 April), with the bulk coming from the 66 and 26 NVA regiments. For the most part, action in the southern half of the country continued at normal levels. However, in April combat increased noticeably in southeastern Tay Ninh Province and SR-1. Small but continuous attacks against the US 60th Land Clearing Company and RF units operating in the area claimed 7 killed and 56 WIA. On 7 and 24 March, the 11th ACR was involved in two contacts which claimed five Sheridan tanks. In VC M5-2 and -3 a significant increase in successful enemy attacks on RF/FF outposts was noted in February, March, and April. Also, on 28 March, the Cong Long District town in Vinh Binh Province was struck by elements of the D-3 VC Regiment and local force units. The well coordinated attack killed 23 friendly troops and 22 civilians, against enemy losses of 6 KIA and 2 CIA. Finally, the discovery of a scuttled SL-6 trawler in An Xuyen Province in March and the sinking of an SL-8 trawler off An Xuyen Province on 12 April evidenced enemy emphasis on infiltration into the Delta by sea.

(c) In March, it became apparent that the 21 NVA Regiment was no longer subordinate to the 2 NVA Division, but operated under the direct control of VC MR-5. Analysis in April showed that the DT-2 VC Regiment in VC MR-2 had been disbanded with its three understrength battalions subordinate to province or military region headquarters. Finally, in April, the majority of the 188 NVA Regiment moved from its long-time base in the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc Province to the U Minh forest to help enemy forces counter the increasingly successful ARVN operation there.

(2) Significant Intelligence Operational Activities.

(a) Publications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 December 1970</td>
<td>Combat Results in Military Region 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 December 1970</td>
<td>Large Caliber Ammunition Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1971</td>
<td>Combat Intelligence Lessons, Issue Number 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 January 1971</td>
<td>Graph comparing enemy-initiated incidents in South Vietnam during 1969 and 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 January 1971</td>
<td>Forecast for Tet 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January 1971</td>
<td>Comparison of enemy activity in 1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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13 February 1971 Analysis of VC/NVA Military Situation at the Beginning of 1971
20 February 1971 Selected Data on Enemy Forces and Activity History of the 274 VC Regiment March 1965-February 1971
1 April 1971 Combat Intelligence Lessons, Issue Number 10
25 April 1971 Climatic Outlook for May

(b) A monthly intelligence briefing was conducted for all newly arrived personnel assigned to duty with Headquarters USARV. In addition, intelligence briefings were given for visiting dignitaries as required.

(c) A weekly intelligence conference was held each Friday at 1330 hours. Participants were representatives from the local intelligence community and from the General and Special Staffs of HQ, USARV. The agenda included summaries of significant operations and enemy activity.

(d) The Current Analysis Special Intelligence (CASI) Section provided all source intelligence which was presented daily in the form of a Commander's Briefing Book to the Command Group and designated USARV Staff Members.

(e) The USARV Intelligence and Security Division Daily Intelligence Review (DIR) and Weekly Intelligence Review (WIR) were published throughout the reported period.

(f) USARV has taken a number of actions to assume management of the Unattended Ground Sensor Program from MACV effective 1 April 1971. These actions were in accordance with a DA plan, Southeast Asia Operational Sensor System (SEAOPSS), which is based on the principle that the system is to be integrated into standard Army procedures and organizations. Included in these actions were the assumption of operational responsibility for the sensor school at Vung Tau and the Sensor Maintenance Facility at Cam Ranh Bay.

(g) The major feature in the USARV program is the designation of the senior US military commander in each MR (Zone Coordinator) as the allocator of equipment and frequencies, based on allocations from USARV.

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d. PLANS, OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING.

   (1) Artillery Ammunition Expenditures.

      (a) USARV continued to manage ammunition expenditures by using allocation and then providing a management level as a ceiling.

      (b) Artillery expenditure levels shown below indicate that intensified artillery management was practiced by commanders at all levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>EXPENDITURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1970</td>
<td>932,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1970</td>
<td>925,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1970</td>
<td>986,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1970</td>
<td>542,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1970</td>
<td>414,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1970</td>
<td>361,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1970</td>
<td>308,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1970</td>
<td>324,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1970</td>
<td>322,686</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the DA, CY 70 Ammunition Budget was met and expenditures were significantly reduced, allocation controls were removed on 24 December 1970 and Management Operating Rates (MOR) established as command guidelines.

       (c) Expenditure levels for January 1971 (395,040), February 1971 (316,275), March 1971 (368,601), and April 1971 (364,397) indicate that commanders continue to employ artillery in an efficient, judicious manner.

   (2) War Dogs. During the reporting period the USARV Dog Training Detachment trained a total of 250 handlers in 19 classes and 243 dogs in 19 classes. The detachment has a total of 194 dogs on hand and 298 are assigned to combat units. Approval was granted for the transfer of 64 dogs to COHUS.
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CURRENT DISTRIBUTION OF WAR DOGS IN RVN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SCOUT DOGS</th>
<th>MINE DOGS</th>
<th>TRACKER DOGS</th>
<th>TUNNEL DOGS</th>
<th>MARIJUANA DOGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101st Abn Div</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde, 1st Cav Div</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d Inf Div</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5th Mech Div</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARVC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/10 Cav</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dog Training Detachment</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Combat Lessons. Combat operations continue to be analyzed and material of value to tactical units extracted and published in the following documents:

(a) Combat Lessons Bulletins.

- Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 15 (The Mechanical Ambush) 15 November 1970
- Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 16 (Fire Support/Surveillance Base: A New Concept in Interdiction) December 1970
- Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 1 (Sniper Operations) January 1971
- Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 2 (Operation Hiep Dong I) 26 February 1971

(b) Battlefield Reports - Tips for Commanders.

- 28 November 1970
- February 1971

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There was insufficient input from the field due to the Vietnamization Program and subsequent reduction of US combat activity to continue to publish both Tips for Commanders and Combat Lessons Bulletins, therefore both publications were combined into a single document. The document will become titled Tips for Commanders and will be published on a quarterly basis.

Training.

The USARV Sniper Program continues to enjoy success command-wide. During the reporting period 61 kills were credited to USARV units. One hundred and sixty-six snipers were trained during the period with an average of 300 snipers being employed.

The decision has been made at CONARC to eliminate the 32-hour RVN POP training program. Due to the magnitude of importance placed on the USARV in-country replacement training program, future replacements will become well oriented and prepared to perform in a combat environment.

In January the decision was made to reduce the frequency of visits to USARV by the CONARC Liaison Training Team. The team will now visit once semiannually rather than once a quarter with the next visit scheduled for the period 9-24 July 1971.

Command Vietnamization. The RVNAF OJT program as part of Command Vietnamization continued to increase during the reporting period. Reports submitted during the period indicate that 20,762 military and 5,554 civilian personnel were trained. A total of 62,357 military and 31,795 civilian personnel have been trained under the various programs offered in USARV since 1969.

Installation Defense Evaluations. During the reporting period 18 installation-defense evaluations and six reevaluations were conducted on installations in all four MR's. The evaluations indicated that the three most common recurring deficiencies were inadequate fighting positions and bunkers and the improper installation of tactical wire barriers. Overall improvement has been seen since the publication and distribution of two new appendices to the USARV defense pamphlet providing guidance in construction of fighting positions, bunkers, and wire barriers.

FANK Training. In December 1970, USARV was tasked to train Cambodian infantry battalions in individual, basic and advanced squad, platoon, company, and battalion subjects. The USARV Individual
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Training Group (TG) was organized from residual 5th SF Gp personnel to accomplish the mission. A command and control headquarters was established at Bien Hoa, with training companies located at Dong K. Thin, Chi Long, and Long Hai. The TDA for the entire organization was established, validated, and approved for implementation between 1 December 1970 and 25 January 1971. The TG is OPCON to MACT, but receives administrative support from USARV Training Support Headquarters, and remnants of the 5th SF Gp Headquarters at Nha Trang. Logistic support is provided by USARV. To date, 10 PANK battalions have been trained.

e. LOGISTICS.

(1) Class V Issue Experience. Total Class V issues during the current six months reporting period were 248.2 thousand short tons (STONS) as compared to the previous six months of 349.9 thousand STONS. This is a decrease of 101.7 thousand STONS issued, or a monthly average issue decrease of 16.9 thousand STONS.

(2) Class V Stockage Posture. Class V serviceable stocks on hand were 165.8 thousand STONS at the beginning of the reporting period and have decreased by 50.8 thousand STONS during the reporting period.

(3) Vietnamization of ASP's. Approval was granted on 24 November 1970 to close ASP #1 at Phu Tai Valley and move 3,500 STONS of ammunition to the ARVN 521st Depot at Qui Nhon. USARV's collocation with ARVN at the 521st Depot was completed on 6 January 1971. The USARV ASP at Phan Thiet was transferred to ARVN on 4 February 1971. The ASP at Soc Trang was transferred to VNAF on 26 February 1971. On 1 March 1971 5,000 STONS of storage space at the USARV Chu Lai ASP was made available to ARVN as the first step in the eventual complete transfer of this facility. The ARVN 524th Depot is being expanded into AREA #4 of Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. The 3rd Ord Bn has consolidated the LBN ASD into AREAS #1, #2, and #3 as part of the SGN SUPCOM phasedown.

(4) USARV Class V Support to III MAF. Effective 15 March 1971 Class V (W) support for residual III MAF units was transferred to USARV. On 1 April 1971 a separate ISSA was made for continued Class V support by USARV of the ROG/CBDE.

(5) Relocation of Ordnance Units (Ammo and EOD). The 44th Ord Det (EOD) moved from Cu Chi to Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, and Dalat. Cu Chi Base Camp closed on 15 December 1970. The 54th Ord Co (Ammo) was relocated from Long Binh to Quang Tri on 27 January 1971. The 85th Ord Det (EOD) was relocated from Pleiku to Quang Tri on 27 January 1971. On 1 February 1971 a flag change between HHC 528th QM BN, previously located at Da Nang, and HHC 184th Ord BN (Ammo), previously located at Qui Nhon.
SUMMARY

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was effected. The 99th Ord Det (FOD) moved from Phuoc Vinh to Long Binh on 15 March 1971.

(6) Single Ammunition Rate System. As a result of the USARPAC Munitions Conference held at Fort Shafter, Hawaii on 22-26 February 1971, a single-rate system for establishing Class V stockage objective went into effect in April. The new rate system replaced the dual-rate system previously used based on the intense combat rate (ICR) and the theater sustaining rate (TSR).

(7) Property Disposal Trends. During the reporting period the command-wide property disposal inventory dropped from 406.6 to 275.0 thousand STOHS. This decline is primarily attributed to inventory adjustments at the Qui Nhon, Da Nang, and Saigon Property Disposal Activities. In the reporting period, removals of items exceeded receipts by 3 percent, putting the item inventory on a downward trend. Future expectations indicate that increased emphasis on the DA-approved "Off-Shore Sale" and more positive merchandising will further assist to reduce the items inventory. During the reporting period, removals of scrap property exceeded receipts by 29 percent, reversing the upward trend previously reported.

(8) Off-Shore Sale. The initial sale of property in the Philippines resulted in sales proceeds of 32.5 percent of acquisition cost. In view of this, additional shipments of construction equipment are planned to the Philippines. The shipment of scrap has been frustrated by the absence of clear-cut requirements for sanitizing scrap metal. Approximately 1,000 STOHS of prepared scrap are now available at the Long Binh disposal yard. This scrap will be sold in RVN. Further experimentation with alternative modes of sale has been carried out by the Property Disposal Agency, USAPDAV, on 6 March 1971, a local spot-bid sale was conducted at Ho Nai Property Disposal Yard. Twenty-six bidders attended. Attracting most interest were wheeled vehicles.

(9) USAPDAV's Civilization/Vietnamization Program was formally approved by the Deputy Commanding General on 13 March 1971. This program provides for a direct hire of 73 Department of the Army civilians and 1,020 local nationals. The program also provides for the maintenance of all equipment to be eventually contracted to civilian firms.

(a) As of 30 April, 17 DAC applications have been received and ten have been reviewed. Of the ten applications reviewed, seven have been recommended for hire.

(b) USAPDAV has received its last voucher for 375 LN spaces, which brings the LN authorizations to the 1,020 end strength. Property

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Disposal Holding Activity (PDHA) are preparing personnel actions for these positions. It is anticipated that many of these positions can be filled by LN personnel who are now becoming available for hire due to the reduction-in-force.

(10) Significant Transportation Activities.

(a) Cargo Discharged and Handled in RVN Ports (STONS).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>DISCHARGED</th>
<th>HANDLED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1970</td>
<td>359,036</td>
<td>542,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1970</td>
<td>329,489</td>
<td>514,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1971</td>
<td>302,413</td>
<td>451,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1971</td>
<td>358,439</td>
<td>548,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1971</td>
<td>368,904</td>
<td>600,780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Sealand Container Service (STONS).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TOTAL CARGO SHIPPED INTO RVN</th>
<th>TOTAL SEALAND SHIPPED INTO RVN</th>
<th>PERCENT SEALAND OF TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1970</td>
<td>232.3</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1970</td>
<td>186.6</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1971</td>
<td>220.1</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1971</td>
<td>255.7</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1971</td>
<td>223.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1118.5</td>
<td>265.0</td>
<td>AVG PERCENT 24.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(c) Motor Transport Tonnage (STONS).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>PORT &amp; BEACH</th>
<th>LOCAL</th>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1970</td>
<td>239,529</td>
<td>169,893</td>
<td>93,360</td>
<td>507,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1970</td>
<td>219,079</td>
<td>162,910</td>
<td>109,591</td>
<td>491,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1971</td>
<td>182,166</td>
<td>201,298</td>
<td>151,904</td>
<td>535,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1971</td>
<td>233,821</td>
<td>149,262</td>
<td>186,491</td>
<td>569,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1971</td>
<td>244,634</td>
<td>144,922</td>
<td>191,732</td>
<td>581,288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Monthly reporting figures cover the 4-week period from the 22nd of one month to the 21st of the subsequent month.

(d) Rail Movement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>US MILITARY SPONSORED CARGO</th>
<th>US MILITARY SPONSORED PASSENGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1970</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>151,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1970</td>
<td>38,750</td>
<td>159,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1971</td>
<td>34,882</td>
<td>161,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1971</td>
<td>43,811</td>
<td>169,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1971</td>
<td>45,501</td>
<td>182,528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Sealand Retrograde Utilization (Number of Containers).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TOTAL AVAILABLE</th>
<th>UTILIZED</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1970</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1970</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1971</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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February 1971 2,739 861 31.4
March 1971 3,688 892 24.8

* The percentage of Sea-and capability utilized for retrograde during February was the highest for which records are available. Due to the short month and scheduling, fewer spaces were available.

(11) Rail Spur Construction. The Long Binh and Newport Rail Spurs were completed on 22 and 25 January 1971 respectively. The Long Binh Spur (32 KM) connects with the Saigon-Ho Nai mainline and provides sidings into the PDO yard, CC&S Retrograde Activity, and the Long Binh Depot. The Newport Spur (8 KM) provides rail access to the Newport pier facilities, thereby connecting Newport with the Saigon-Ho Nai mainline and the Long Binh Depot.

(12) Seat Utilization. USARV has continued to exceed its seat utilization standard of 95 percent for all months of reporting period. This data includes all MAC Channel traffic from RVN to CONUS destinations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Seats Allocated</th>
<th>Passengers Moved</th>
<th>Percent Utilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1970</td>
<td>38,606</td>
<td>39,828*</td>
<td>100.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1970</td>
<td>36,413</td>
<td>38,052</td>
<td>104.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1971</td>
<td>13,336</td>
<td>14,716</td>
<td>106.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1971</td>
<td>14,825</td>
<td>16,325</td>
<td>110.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1971</td>
<td>24,469</td>
<td>25,524</td>
<td>104.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* On 10 November 1970, 3,518 passengers were lifted to CONUS. This was the most passengers moved from RVN in a single day.

(13) Retrograde Movement Planning. During the reporting period, USARV DCSLOG, Transportation Division sponsored two Retrograde Movement Planning Conferences (20-22 November 1970, and 24-25 March 1971). The November conference resulted in a draft movement program for all service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) retrograde during the period January to June 1971, and the March conference refined the FY 71 forecast and developed a movement program for FY 72. In February 1971, the USARV Logistics Redeployment Guide (LOGREG) was published to assist logistics operators involved in redeploying of units, retrograde of unit equipment, and depot stocks and the turnover of facilities to RVNAP.
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(14) Standard Supply System (3S) ADP Progress Report (RCS PSA-1). As of 1 December 1970, the Logistics Systems Branch assumed responsibility for preparation of the 3S ADP Progress Report from Logistics Data Service Center (LDSG). The report gives pertinent statistical data on each USARPAC 3S cycle run by LDSG and the depots at Long Binh, Da Nang, and Cam Ranh Bay. The transfer of the reporting function was made in an orderly fashion with a minimum amount of turbulence.

(15) 3S Version 34 Conference. An orientation conference was held at USARPAC from 11-15 January 1971 to introduce 3S Version 34 to USARPAC subcommand representatives.

(16) During the period 1 November 1970 - 30 April 1971, wrap-up reports of Keystone assets received during Keystone Robin Alpha (1 July - 15 October 1970) and Keystone Robin Bravo (16 October - 31 December 1970) were prepared. Analysis of these reports revealed that 100 percent of the assets received during the Alpha increment have been accounted for and disposition completed in accordance with DA and USARPAC instructions. An interim wrap-up report for the Bravo increment was prepared on 28 March. A review of this report indicates that all assets have been accounted for, with disposition completed on 99.4 percent of receipts. The majority of incomplete actions involved items that are awaiting maintenance prior to being transferred to the ARVN.

(17) Procedures for equipment processing, accountability, and disposition are contained in Annex F (Logistics) of USARV OPLAN 183-70.

f. COMMAND MANAGEMENT.

(1) Management Information Systems.

(a) Major Army Subordinate Command Management Information System (ASMIS). A Burroughs 3500 computer was installed in the USARV Data Service Center during the period 15 November through 15 December 1970. It was accepted as fully operational 16 December 1970. On 15 November 1970 one RCS 501 and one RCA 301 computer were released as a result of the upgrade of computer system. The remaining RCA 501/301 system was discontinued 30 April 1971.

(b) USARPAC Standard Supply System (3S) Training Package. A 3S training package was prepared and distributed in April 1971 to all depots currently using 3S. This package was prepared under the monitorship of ODCMIS for the purpose of providing instructions to stock control personnel on MILSTRIP codes, 3S basic data files, and processing exception and adjustment type documents; and to provide ADP personnel instructions on the functions of each program in the 3S daily cycle.
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(c) 36 Benchmark ADPE Implementation. DA announced the award of a contract to Radio Corporation of America for third-generation ADPE in support of Logistics Support System 1971 (LSS-71) on 12 January 1971. RCA hardware/software training began for USARV cadre personnel at USARPAC on 1 March 1971 and USARYIS on 8 March 1971. A total of eight USARV programmer/analysts have attended this training. Site modifications are currently underway to insure that each site is prepared for ADPE installation in accordance with RCA contract specifications.

(d) Cost Savings During the Period. A continuing review of ADPE utilization and the drawdown resulted in the discontinuance of 162 items of leased ADPE from the USARV inventory during the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971. This reduction results in an ADPE rental and maintenance cost savings of $43,681/month. The replacement of two large-scale, second-generation computers by one third-generation computer will result in an additional cost reduction of $16,213/month effective 1 May 1971.

(g) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(1) During the 3d Qtr, FY 71, 713 complaints and 2,511 requests for assistance were processed. This represents a 19 percent decrease in complaints and an 11 percent decrease in requests for assistance. This decrease is attributed primarily to the reduction of in-country personnel strength. The ratio of justified to unjustified complaints remained constant at 34 percent justified, 66 percent unjustified. The apparent reluctance on the part of many enlisted personnel to use the chain of command continues and significant numbers of complaints are still being addressed to the President, members of Congress, top Department of Defense and Department of the Army officials, and the DA Inspector General. As in recent past, the largest number of complaints received during the 3d Qtr concerned unit administration, which tends to indicate a lack of confidence in the system. Of the 66 complaints received alleging racial discrimination, eight were determined to be justified. Overall, there were no indications of new problem areas or discernible trends.

(2) HQ USARV conducted annual general inspections of 35 USARV organizations during the period. Areas most often found to be unsatisfactory or deficient were: filing systems incorrect; orders incorrect in format and content; directive familiarity statements not executed and/or retained; required subjects not included in replacement training; orientations for incoming personnel incomplete; safety SOP's incomplete; fire-prevention measures inadequate; fund records not maintained in accordance with regulations; lack of command and staff supervision of
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funds; individual clothing and equipment records incomplete; unauthorized forms utilized; missing and/or incomplete entries in personnel records; ammunition not secure.

h. INFORMATION. None.

i. CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS. None.

J. COMMAND HISTORY.

(1) Organization.

(a) Two military history detachments (MHD) were inactivated during Increment V Redeployment: 29th MHD - 4th Inf Div and 30th MHD - Qui Nhon Support Command. Since Qui Nhon Support Command remained active, the 47th MHD - Da Nang Support Command assumed the mission of the 30th MHD in addition to its own.

(b) During Increment VI Redeployment, six military history detachments were inactivated. Since three of the MHD's were from redeploying units (18th MHD - 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, 21st MHD - 5th SF Gp and 28th MHD - 11th ACR), their inactivation caused no realignment of the missions of the remaining detachments. The 35th MHD - Saigon Support Command assumed the mission of the inactivated 15th MHD with Cam Ranh Bay Support Command. The two detachments from the two Field Force Headquarters, 7th MHD - II FFV and 13th MHD - I FFV, were inactivated and their missions assumed by the 17th MHD and 27th MHD respectively.

(2) During the reporting period BG James L. Collins, Jr., Chief of Military History, DA visited RVN. BG Collins visited all MHD’s and discussed problem areas with senior USARV commanders and the USARV Command Historian. Mr. John A. Albright, Historian, Current History Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History accompanied BG Collins. Additionally, Mr. Albright visited and trained MHD commanders during his visit in RVN from 27 January until 2 March 1971.

(3) On 2-3 April 1971, the first USARV Military History Conference was held at USARV Headquarters. Participants included COL Elizabeth H. Branch, MACV Command Historian, Mr. Jimmy E. Randle, USARV AG Records Management Office; commanders of 14 of the 16 active MHD's, and the Office of the USARV Command Historian.
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(k) USAV Regulation 870-3, Historical Activities — Historical Interview Program was revised and published during the reporting period. USAV Regulation 870-4, Historical Activities — Historical Properties was published.

k. AVIATION.

(1) Implementation of the VNAF Helicopter Augmentation Plan.

(a) Activation of eight additional VNAF UH-1 squadrons and one CH-47 medium-lift helicopter squadron was completed on schedule in accordance with VNAF Helicopter Augmentation Plan 70-51. These activations brought the VNAF helicopter force total to 12 UH-1 squadrons, one CH-34 squadron, and one CH-47 squadron.

(b) The activation of at least one VNAF UH-1 squadron each month during the period 1 September 1970 to 1 March 1971 placed a heavy burden on VNAF resources. Aircraft, repair parts, special tools, and ground support equipment required to equip the new VNAF squadrons were provided by USARV helicopter companies whose inactivations were coordinated with the VNAF squadron activations. Twenty VNAF pilots from each squadron flew with USARV assault helicopter companies for 90 days prior to their squadron activation to gain experience in airmobile operations. In addition, a 27-man team of instructor pilots, aircraft commanders, and maintenance personnel was provided by the inactivating USARV company for a 90-day period to assist the newly activated VNAF squadron in reaching early operational readiness.

(c) Planned activation of the VNAF CH-47 squadron on 1 March 1971 was accelerated to 30 September 1970 in an effort to meet an RVNAF requirement for medium-lift helicopter support of Cambodian operations. In addition to furnishing aircraft and associated equipment, the USARV CH-47 helicopter company provided training in, and supervision of medium-lift helicopter operations to the new VNAF squadron for five months.

(d) VNAF efforts are presently directed towards furthering the new squadrons' operational and maintenance capabilities and gaining additional experience in helicopter employment and utilization. Approval has been granted, for planning purposes, to activate three additional UH-1 squadrons and another CH-47 squadron during the third and fourth quarters of FY 72. The remaining CH-34 squadron will also be converted to UH-1H helicopters during this same period. At the completion of these activations, VNAF will have 16 UH-1 squadrons equally distributed among the four military regions, and two CH-47 squadrons, one each in MR's 1 and 3.
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(c) Success in future VNAF helicopter squadron activations will be predicated on a close and continuous coordination at all working levels. This coordination and liaison between the Air Force Advisory Group, VNAF squadrons, and USARV units is provided for in current plans.

(2) Aviation Accident Prevention Courses.

(a) USARV Aviation units are authorized 162 company grade Aviation Safety Officers (ASO) MOS 7423. In the second quarter FY 71 USARV had 50 percent of its authorized strength in this MOS.

(b) In order to alleviate this problem USABAAR provided a team of five instructors who conducted five one-week courses in accident prevention and accident reporting procedures during the period 17 November - 10 December 1970. A total of 279 aviators throughout RVN attended these courses. The course does not qualify aviators for award of MOS 7423; it is designed to familiarize them with the duties and responsibilities of an Aviation Safety Officer at Company Level in as short a time as possible.

(c) Assignment projections indicate that USARV will obtain 100 percent fill of MOS 7423 by the end of FY 71. Therefore, there are no plans for USABAAR to conduct another course for USARV in the foreseeable future.

(3) Turbine Engine Conservation Program.

(a) The turbine engine conservation program was instituted in an attempt to reduce the number of engine-failure accidents and incidents in RVN. The heart of this program is the daily recording of engine performance data which provides a means of checking engine condition on a daily basis.

(b) The program was encouraged and publicized through a series of six articles in the USARV Aviation Weekly Summary, which were later assembled and distributed in a single packet. Since the adoption of the program by all USARV units, engine failures have declined from 71 in August 1970 to 26 in March 1971.

(4) Aviation Safety Inspection Team.

(a) The Aviation Safety Inspection (ASI) Team has visited every unit in RVN at least one time, and has noted considerable improvement in units that have been inspected twice. While there is still room
for further improvement, the continued reduction in accident rates since the beginning of the FY is a good indication of the team's effectiveness.

(b) The favorable experience gained through the implementation of the ASI in USARV indicates that the concept might achieve similar results if applied in other Army areas throughout the world.

(5) Teardown Analysis.

(a) The Safety Division, in coordination with the 34th General Support Group, developed new procedures for collection, processing, and shipment of parts for teardown analysis. Duties and responsibilities associated with this program are outlined in USARV Supplement 1 to AR 95-5, dated 3 March 1971.

(b) The improved control procedures have significantly reduced the time required to obtain laboratory reports, thereby aiding accident prevention by insuring a feedback of current information to the field.

1. ENGINEER.

(1) Significant Activities. The United States Army Engineer Command Vietnam, (USAECV) provides command control of all non-divisional tactical and logistical engineer activities in RVN. With the withdrawal of the 18th and 20th Engr Bde's in April 1971, USAECV's field command units were reorganized as follows: The 35th Engr Gp (Cam Ranh Bay), the 45th Engr Gp (Da Nang), the 34th Engr Gp (Binh Thuy), and the 159th Engr Gp (Long Binh).

(2) US - ARVN Engineer Affiliation.

(a) A significant US Army contribution to Vietnamization is the on-the-job training (OJT) of ARVN engineers by US units. During the reporting period, 258 ARVN students have entered training in 11 courses and 40 have completed an OJT program of instruction. Since 1969, 1,040 ARVN engineers have completed OJT training.

(b) The 74th ARVN Engr Const Bn was activated on 1 January 1971, at Ben Lue, RVN. Unit training for this unit was not undertaken by US Forces as the Chief of ARVN Engineers preferred to continue with an as-required OJT program on an individual basis.
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(c) Action required for the transfer of industrial sites to ARVN Engineers is progressing. Engineer soldiers of the 5th ARVN Engr Cp are training at the Nui Le Quarry, and are scheduled to take over complete operation of the site by 1 June 1971. The quarry crusher complex at Nui Le supports the efforts of the 52nd ARVN Engr Const Bn in constructing 65 km of QL-1 from Gia Pay to the MR 2/3 border. The 20th ARVN Combat Engr Cp will reconstruct 55 km of LTL-7B from Cheo-Reo west to the junction of QL-14 and presently has engineers training at the Weigt-Davis industrial site. This location will be turned over to ARVN Engineers on or about 1 September 1971. The 65th ARVN Engr Const Bn was organized during the reporting period and is assigned the mission to complete 104 km of QL-14 from north of Ban Me Thout to Dao Thong. An industrial site is being jointly developed by the 65th ARVN and US Engineer units 14 km south of Ban Me Thout.

(d) Two 75 tons per hour (TPH) crushers will be shipped to MR 1 to establish ARVN industrial sites for support of tactical and secondary road programs. Another 75 TPH crusher will be transferred to ARVN at Song Phan to produce base rock.

(3) RVNAF Improvement and Modernization. The US 687th LC Co was inactivated as a result of equipping and training additional RVNAF LC units. There are three RVNAF Construction Battalions working on the LOC construction program. Joint training affiliation at two industrial sites between US/RVNAF engineers and the expansion of OJT to develop RVNAF capabilities to take over operations this summer has been progressing satisfactorily at Ban Me Thout and Nui Le. Training assistance has increased the total instructed to 1,707. Facilities maintained by the Vietnamese has increased to over 1,700 installations, and 659 personnel have completed some form of utilities training. Qualitative evaluation (by subjective rating standards) of training furnished the Vietnamese to date has been favorable.

(4) Mapping and Intelligence.

(a) The Mapping and Intelligence Division USAECV, manned by personnel of the 227th Engr Det (TL), continued to perform the following five major functions:

1. Provide staff support and planning in topographic matters to USARV and USAECV.

2. Maintain operational control over the 66th Engr Co (T) (C), the 579th Engr Det (Terrain), and Hydrographic Survey Team #1.

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3. Coordinate the activities of other in-country topographic agencies, which include two Vietnamese mapping agencies: The National Geographic Directorate and the 1st Engr Topo Gp; and the 1st Aus Surv Trp.

4. Coordinate in-country topographic activities with out-of-country agencies, primarily the United States Army Topographic Command (USATOPOCOM) and the USARPAC M&I Division.

5. Support the Vietnamization Program by endeavoring to increase the topographic capabilities of the Vietnamese mapping agencies.

(b) The 66th Engr Co has remained fully committed.

1. The Survey Platoon has been employed in survey support of both in and out-of-country agencies. Field work was completed on a survey to check and confirm the accuracy of the Orthopictomap for the USATOPOCOM. Support has also been provided for artillery control and engineer construction projects.

2. The Cartographic Platoon completed three base planning mosaics, continued work on the Phan Rang city map, and continued the updates of the military region road and airfield maps for the four military regions.


(c) The 579th Engr Det (Terrain) provided assistance in the location of construction materials. The unit also completed a drainage study in the vicinity of Phan Rang. Hydrographic Surv Tm #1 continued to provide hydrographic data to support the movement of construction materials by waterway. Vietnamese Navy personnel accompanied Hydrographic Surv Tm #1 for training.

(d) The Vietnamese agencies were primarily engaged with printing all in-country maps used by the Vietnamese armed forces. They now have the capability to provide mapping support for all Vietnamese operations within RVN.

(e) In the last six months, there have been considerable changes in the US topographic units in RVN. The 547th Engr Plt (Map Depot), 517th Engr Det (T) and 64th Engr Det (T) were inactivated. All map distribution responsibility was turned over to the 66th Engr Co (T) (C). The aerial photography contract with Asis Mapping Inc. was terminated in November 1970. The M&I Division has placed primary emphasis
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on increasing the Vietnamese in capability and technical proficiency by employing joint US/ARVN programs to train the ARVN in reproduction, cartography and surveying.

(5) Mine Warfare Center. During the reporting period the major accomplishments of the Mine Warfare Center have been: complete a country-wide study to determine the areas in which the greatest amount of mining and boobytrapping were taking place; the publishing of a road minesweep SOP for use by all units in RVN; providing country-wide instruction in the use of the new metallic/nonmetallic mine detector, the AN/PRS-7; and the conduct of mine detection evaluations, using several passive far infrared devices.

(6) USARV LOC Program. During the reporting period, a total of 229 km of the Army LOC Program was completed. Increased productivity since 1 January is the reflection of the good construction weather. US Troops completed 107 km, ARVN Engineers completed 39 km and the contractor completed 83 km. Additionally, considerable effort of both the contractor and troops was devoted to repairing roads damaged by weather and to upgrading previously constructed routes, major route segments totaling 571 km were turned over to the Director General of Highways during the six-month period.

(7) USARV LOC Construction. The USARV LOC Construction is detailed below:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>US Troops</th>
<th>Contractor</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total KM Programmed</td>
<td>1,759</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>3,192</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total KM Paved</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total KM Scheduled CY 71/72</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>1,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and beyond.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total KM Deferred/Unassigned</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

m. COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS. None.

n. MILITARY JUSTICE AND LEGAL AFFAIRS. None.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. PERSONNEL.

(1) Programming of Field Grade Officer Assignments.

(a) OBSERVATION: Field grade officer assignments are programmed 60-90 days in advance of arrival, based on requisition fill.
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Data derived from the requests for orders (RFO) furnished by the OPO career branches.

(b) EVALUATION: Programming of field grade officer assignments in advance of arrival is essential to effective personnel management and proper utilization of the limited personnel resources being made available to USARV during this period of force reductions. Instances have occurred in which an officer's original orders have been revoked, or amended to change the reporting date, without Headquarters, USARV being apprised. The failure of officers to arrive when scheduled adversely affects the capability of the command to manage personnel resources efficiently. The problem of "no shows" could be alleviated by requiring the OPO career branches to provide USARV with copies of any requests for amendment or revocation orders.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That OPO career branches advise Headquarters, USARV in each instance of revocation or amendment of orders on officers initially assigned to USARV.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

(2) Military Police Support.

(a) OBSERVATION: Using a guide of two percent in order to determine the approximate minimum number of military police needed to provide for discipline, law and order for a given force or area in RVN has been found to be valid and realistic.

(b) EVALUATION: FM 101-10-1 was used to determine this percentage slice which is the only known guidance. The two percent slice includes only those personnel needed to perform discipline and law-and-order missions. Unit overhead must be added to this percentage slice. Special units, such as sentry dog companies, physical security units, or correctional units, are not considered as part of the percentage slice, because their requirements are based on specific activities and must be added. The two percent slice does provide adequate discipline and law-and-order support for a given force based on its population.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That DA continue this percentage slice in determining military police discipline and law-and-order support as standard guidance for RVN.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.
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(3) CID Support.

(a) OBSERVATION: A critical shortage of criminal investigators has occurred in RVN due to an unforeseen and significant increase in the workload. As CID elements stand down all residual cases are transferred to the 8th MP Gp (CI). Because of these additional cases, as well as an increase in the number of new cases initiated, the 8th MP Gp (CI) developed an immediate requirement for 10 to 15 additional criminal investigators.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience has shown that under TAADS, an average of six months is required to get a change to an MTOE approved by DA. An additional three or four months elapse before personnel arrive to fill the spaces. This time lag makes the TAADS system unresponsive to emergency personnel needs of the command generated by the fast-moving and fluid situation currently existing in RVN. A more responsive system is required to allow commanders to obtain timely increases in personnel authorizations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An emergency personnel authorization system be developed to provide commanders with a method of obtaining requisitioning authority within 30 days following initiation of the action, the emergency authorization to expire in 180 days after approval, requiring the commander concerned to validate his emergency requirement through existing TAADS system.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: On 12 April 1971, the critical need for additional criminal investigators was made known to the Director, OPD, OPO, DA and Commanding Officer, USACIDA. OPD was requested to accelerate the assignment of 10-15 criminal investigators against existing authorized fill requirements, these replacements to arrive 30-60 days early. The request was approved. Personnel programmed for the September - November time frame will arrive during the period June - August 1971.

(4) Optical Laboratory Specialist Requirement.

(a) OBSERVATION: Qualified enlisted personnel are required for assignment as optometric assistants in nondivisional TOE units authorized optometrists.

(b) EVALUATION: Historically, the optometrist has had to rely on any available enlisted medical personnel for assistance with patients. This individual requires weeks of OJT to gain a fundamental knowledge of optics, prescription interpretation, optical neutralization, and fitting, adjusting, and repairing spectacle frames. Frequently, this
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The type of individual is simply not available, and when he is, it is only on a limited basis due to other requirements. The TOE assignment of enlisted optometric assistants is required, to provide continuous and efficient support for optometric patients.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Optical Laboratory Specialists, MOS 42E, presently authorized in optical laboratories should be authorized for assignment to nondivisional TOE units authorized an optometrist in a theater of operations. Staffing guidelines and TOE changes should be developed to reflect the authorization of optical laboratory technicians, MOS 42E, in nondivisional optometry sections.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

The Records Administrator.

(a) OBSERVATION: The command records administrator must be fully qualified with experience at major command level.

(b) EVALUATION: The success of the program can be related directly to the caliber of personnel directing it. He must not be assigned other duties.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That only high-quality personnel be selected and that replacement be scheduled to insure continuity within the program.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: That TAGO, DA, initiate worldwide recruitment action for the positions of overseas records administrators and nominate personnel who are highly qualified in the field of records management.

b. INTELLIGENCE: None.

c. OPERATIONS.

(1) Dustoff Operations, LAMSON 719.

(a) OBSERVATION: During Operation LAMSON 719, 5 February to 6 April 1971, there was a change in Dustoff operational techniques and command and control of Dustoff assets. In early March, the 237th and 571st Medical Det (Hel Amb) were placed under operational control of the CG, XXIV Corps, who further designated this operational control to the CG, 101st Abn Div. This action placed all US Army aeromedical evacuation...
helicopters operating in northern MR 1 under the control of one mission commander. The commanding officer of the 571st Med Det (Hel Amb), because of seniority in rank and experience, was designated as mission commander. He controlled the helicopter platoon of the 326th Med Bn, 101st Abn Div, as well as the two air ambulance detachments, for a total of 24 helicopters. After operational control was assumed, the mission commander constructed a separate Dustoff area at Khe Sanh and combined both operation centers. All missions were then received by the one operations center. In an effort to maintain unit integrity and fix operational responsibility, the evacuation elements of the 101st Abn Div supported all US Forces operating inside Vietnam and the two medical detachments supported the RVNAF and US aviators operating in Laos.

(b) EVALUATION: Initially, the most serious problem was the nonavailability of gunship support for aeromedical evacuation missions. Some evacuation missions were delayed as long as eight hours because gunships were not available for escort. To alleviate this problem the CG, XXIV Corps directed the 101st Abn Div to provide gunships in direct support of aeromedical evacuation missions and to divert, if necessary, the required gunship support from all other missions. The evacuation mission was given top priority. The ARVN ground commanders were very reluctant to brief Dustoff pilots on the current tactical situation before and during the aeromedical evacuation pickup. No communications could be established using ARVN interpreters because the ground elements were fearful of divulging information to the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Aeromedical evacuation operation in an intense or moderately intense antiaircraft environment necessitates increased armed escort support, accurate intelligence information, and protected secure landing zones (LZ). Optimum aeromedical evacuation support cannot always be provided, and delays will be experienced while routes of flight and the LZ are prepared and neutralized. Gunship support should be provided on a priority basis to Dustoff units for aeromedical evacuation operations in an intense or moderately intense antiaircraft environment.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

(2) Slot Machine Destruction.

(a) OBSERVATION: Subsequent to the Deputy Commanding General, USARV, decision to phase-out slot machines, it became apparent that control of their disposition would be the most significant problem.
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(b) EVALUATION: Destruction of all slot machines, slugs, and spare parts was decided upon after response from other commands to a sales offer was uniformly negative. Two control measures were implemented to preclude slot machines from being channeled onto the local economy: First, central registry of all machines by serial number prior to destruction, with certificates of destruction subsequently collected for serial number comparison. Secondly, slot machines remained under the physical control of commanders responsible for the open mess until destroyed, thus eliminating the possibility of theft of serviceable machines while in transit, or from property disposal yards. There has been no unfavorable reaction to the elimination of approximately 2,700 slot machines from Army open messes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That paragraph 10 of AR 230-6 be amended to allow major overseas commanders the authority to destroy amusement machines in a manner which provides the greatest degree of control in each situation consistent with basic constraints which may be established by DA.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

(3) Requirement for Reports.

(a) OBSERVATION: The scope and magnitude of Operation LAMSON 719 identified the need for information that was more comprehensive than operational reports normally provided to the Department of the Army.

(b) EVALUATION: During Operation LAMSON 719 this headquarters received numerous queries from the DA staff for previously unreported data and evaluations of specific subject areas. Many of the requests for information arrived after the beginning of Operation LAMSON 719; consequently, a great deal of the requested data was missing and not recoverable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Department of the Army identify specific areas of interest and provide them to MACV and USARV so that required reports may be included in operational plans prior to commencement of a special operation having the scope of Operation LAMSON 719.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Provide information in compliance with instructions received from DA.
d. TRAINING.

(1) Record Managers.

(a) OBSERVATION: There has been little evidence of formal training of records managers within RVN prior to September 1970.

(b) EVALUATION: Training is especially necessary in a short-tour area because of personnel turnover.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the training of file maintenance personnel be emphasized at the lowest level, and that command-sponsored formal training conferences for key records management personnel be conducted, as a minimum, semiannually.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: That training of personnel involved in records management be emphasized at all levels of command at service schools.

(2) Maintenance Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: There continues to be a shortage in aviation maintenance skills and the CONUS school system is unable to meet USARV requirements.

(b) EVALUATION: The Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS) was established from USARV assets as an in-country training facility to overcome shortages encountered throughout USARV. AARTS takes enlisted personnel who are either familiar with or trained in aviation maintenance MOS's and upgrades their technical skills so that they can function more effectively. After completion of this training, these individuals can be assigned for OJT in these areas and either be awarded the MOS or an additional MOS. AARTS is presently conducting ten different courses pertaining to aircraft armament systems repair, engine repair, airframe maintenance, aviation supply (FLL), and maintenance technical inspection.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That student output from CONUS schools be increased to provide sufficient maintenance personnel to USARV and to eliminate the requirement for USARV to operate an in-country training facility.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: That DA increase appropriate student output from CONUS schools.
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LOGISTICS

(1) Methods of Sale in RVN Disposal Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Usable property could be sold faster by augmenting the formal invitation for bids (IFB) method of soliciting buyers with other sales methods. An average of 175 days expire between the time usable items are received at the Property Disposal Holding Activity (PDHA) and the time the items are removed after sale. An expansion of buyer solicitation practices would possibly reduce time frames required to dispose of usable material.

(b) EVALUATION: Utilization of property is the first priority and any decrease in screening time prior to sales action will reduce utilization potential. This means that the reduction in time must be made in the sales cycle. The major drawbacks to utilizing other methods of sale to reduce the sales cycle time are GVN requirements placed on disposal contractors.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An integrated program of utilization screening, sales methods, and GVN clearances should be implemented. Initially, different methods of sale should be tried. In order to effectively utilize other methods of sale, GVN procedures should be altered to allow for the sale, collection of customs, granting of other clearances, and the removal of the property all in the same day. The most effective method of sale could be used for different types of property and removals would not be prevented by GVN requirements.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

(2) Sealant Usage.

(a) OBSERVATION: An average of over 70 percent of Sealant containership retrograde capability goes unused.

(b) EVALUATION: Shippers have no means of determining when use of Sealant service is economical. There is no established means of comparing the contractor rates with those established by Military Sealift Command for use of MSC vessels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Military Sealift Command should conduct a study to determine when the use of commercial container service is economical in comparison to MSC break-bulk shipping. The results should be published for the shippers use.

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(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

(3) **Issue of TA 50-901 by Central Issue Facilities (CIF).**

(a) OBSERVATION: Less than 10 percent of the TA 50-901 recoverable items issued by CIF's at Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh were being turned in by individuals upon departure from RVN.

(b) EVALUATION: Most units in RVN were accumulating large quantities of TA 50-901 that were either turned in or discarded by rotatees prior to their departure to the replacement battalion. A study was made to determine the minimum items required by new arrivals while traveling from the replacement battalions to their units. It was decided that all TA 50-901 clothing, but only minimum equipment would be issued by the CIF's. The TA 50-901 items of equipment now issued by CIF's are the helmet w/liner, poncho, and waterproof bag. All other TA 50-901 items are issued by the individual's unit. Items issued by the unit are determined by the battalion commander, and are dependent upon the unit's mission and geographical location. This policy also simplifies turn-in procedures, as items issued by the unit are turned in to the unit, and items issued by the CIF are turned in to the CIF upon the individual's departure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Appropriate action has been completed by this headquarters.

(4) **Sole User (SU) Voice Circuit between US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay and US Army Depot, Long Binh.**

(a) OBSERVATION: Based on the phasedown of US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, it was determined that a direct line of communication between supply activities would be highly desirable.

(b) EVALUATION: The direct line of communication would allow rapid response to supply problems that are expected to develop during the phasedown of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay. At present, communications between Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh are hampered by insufficient common user (CU) trunk circuits, causing a great delay in reaching subscribers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A sole user circuit be installed.
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(d) COMMAND ACTION: USARV reviewed the request for a SU circuit. A SU circuit can only be obtained by releasing a CU circuit, further degrading the already poor CU situation. Request was disapproved. An alternate solution is to place US Army Depot, Long Binh as a "party-line" subscriber on the Cam Ranh Bay/Inventory Control Center, Vietnam teletype line which is to be completed shortly. This is currently being investigated.

(5) USAMC Technical Teams.

(a) OBSERVATION: The first USAMC Technical Assistance Teams devoted to the Keystone Project were composed of approximately 20 members. These teams were a definite asset during the early stages of the project. As experience was gained and procedures became well defined, the amount of required assistance decreased. Military personnel became more proficient and familiar with the requirements for processing the equipment of redeploying units. Team strength was subsequently reduced to the present eight members.

(b) EVALUATION: USAMC technical assistance teams composed of DAC's are expensive to maintain. Dependency on such assistance must be kept to the absolute minimum with in-house capabilities developed as quickly as possible. Specific cost reduction could be realized if military personnel were authorized Condition Reservation Code, uneconomically unrepairable (CRC-H) verification authority. There is no technical reason for not granting those senior NCO's and WO's normally utilized for inspection and classification of material, CRC-H verification authority.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders supervising technical assistance personnel must insure the rapid development of in-house capabilities to reduce the reliance on USAMC technical assistance. USAMC should utilize military personnel for CRC-H verification rather than the more costly DAC's.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Teams will be requested when required.

(6) POL Equipment Supply in MR 1.

(a) OBSERVATION: Increased requirement for POL equipment in MR 1 caused strains on POL supplies in remainder of RVN.

(b) EVALUATION: The large requirements could not be met with Army in-country assets and had to be met with Marine assets, resulting in delay of equipment availability.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: To eliminate such occurrences, sufficient reserve and contingency stocks must be maintained in depot storage.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Recommendation made to supply authorities.

(7) Field Quality Surveillance and POL Handling.

(a) OBSERVATION: During recent Dewey Canyon operations, there was rapid movement of POL and related equipment to MR 1.

(b) EVALUATION: Neglected were qualified POL handlers and quality surveillance personnel. Heavy dependence was placed on OJT, resulting in below par POL operations and questionable quality surveillance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In view of the critical nature of POL operations, OJT should only be carried out in rear areas and not during mission operations.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Recommendation made to responsible headquarters.

(8) Award of DSA Contracts.

(a) OBSERVATION: DSA contracts for local-contractor delivery of package products were not awarded in a timely manner.

(b) EVALUATION: DSA contracts for high-usage package POL are awarded for six-month periods. Contractors usually require a minimum of three months leadtime to bring the products in country. The contracts for the January-June 1971 period were not awarded until mid-November. Inventories on several items were such that resupply was required in early January. Since contractors were not geared to produce early supply, emergency MILSTRIP requisitions to CONUS were submitted to avoid supply breakdown.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Contracts should be awarded in sufficient time to allow contractors to position products in-country at the beginning of the contract period.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.
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(9) Diversion of Petroleum Products.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many LN civilian personnel attempt to divert petroleum products for use or the civilian economy.

(b) EVALUATION: Numerous attempts by LN civilians to steal petroleum products on a large scale have been discovered. As a result of these attempts, action has been taken to place checks in the distribution system such as Call Forward Procedures, inspection teams, training of operational personnel on the methods and detection of theft, and installation of more accurate metering devices.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Continued emphasis should be placed on eliminating theft of government-owned fuel.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Continued emphasis be placed on eliminating theft of fuel.

(10) Unauthorized Use of Petroleum Products.

(a) OBSERVATION: A need exists to control unauthorized use of petroleum fuels.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to a significant shortfall in the bulk POL budget for FY 71, some action was necessary to reduce as much as possible the unauthorized use of petroleum fuel. Accordingly, a bulk proration system was initiated at the beginning of 2nd Qtr FY 71. The system was aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating wasteful, non-essential, and unauthorized POL expenditures. At the end of the ninth month of the fiscal year, expenditures were within budget limits.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The bulk petroleum proration system should be carried through FY 72 as a tool to control bulk expenditures.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The proration system will be continued.

(11) Inland Waterways.

(a) OBSERVATION: Assets for delivery of bulk fuel via inland waterways for MR 3 and MR 4 are excess to requirements.

(b) EVALUATION: A study was conducted to determine the requirements for vessels in MR 3 and MR 4 to deliver bulk fuels via inland waterways. A close examination revealed that consumption had decreased
approximately 30 percent in MR 3 and MR 4 and that assets were excess to requirements. As a result, three Y-tankers under contract from Luzon are being dropped from use.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That, concurrently with the troop drawdown, assets for movement of bulk POL be evaluated to include both water and highway.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Transportation units continually evaluate assets for movement of bulk POL.

(12) Evaluation of Shuttle Tanker Requirements.

(a) OBSERVATION: Shuttle tanker assets excess to requirements.

(b) EVALUATION: A test was initiated on 25 October and terminated on 5 December 1970, evaluating shuttle tanker assets in RVN. At the initiation of the test there were six POL tankers on station in RVN, one T-5 tanker, two T-2 tankers, and three T-1 tankers. Test results demonstrated that a T-2 tanker and a T-1 tanker assigned to each of MR's 1 and 2 could adequately support shuttle requirements for fuel. The T-5 Hampton Roads was released on 25 November 1970, and the T-1 Chattahoochee on 14 December 1970.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Periodic evaluation of assets in-country be made.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Two tankers were released from service.

(13) Closure of Tank Farm #1, Qui Nhon.

(a) OBSERVATION: Storage facilities at Qui Nhon were excess to requirements.

(b) EVALUATION: Consumption in the Qui Nhon area decreased approximately 20 percent and this reduction made it feasible to close a tank farm. Tank Farm #1 was closed as of 1 December 1970.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continuing evaluation be conducted of all facilities to determine if requirement exists for retention.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.
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1) Subsistence Requisitioning.

(a) OBSERVATION: Resale and troop issue subsistence requirements must be requisitioned separately by the Class I supply point from the supporting depot.

(b) EVALUATION: Many Class I activities are not properly requisitioning subsistence. If a particular item is required for both troop issue and resale, then two separate requisitions must be made for this item. This is required so that reductions in requisitions to CONUS can be made by USARV for troop strength changes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all Class I points requisition resale and troop issue subsistence separately.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: That Support Commands insure that recommendation above is complied with.

(15) Phaseout of US Army Depot, Qui Nhon.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the phaseout of US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, progress was repeatedly slowed by lack of enough Materiel Release Orders to keep available material handling and transportation resources busy.

(b) EVALUATION: The unprecedented rapid closeout of a General Supply Depot in RVN meant that there was no historical document on which to develop a plan for disposal of stocks. The short lead time for developing and implementing a plan did not provide for an orderly program for identifying, reporting, and disposing of the stocks, and the detailed disposition procedures had to be developed and executed "on the run". As shipping backlog disappeared, it was necessary for US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, to call Inventory Control Center Vietnam (ICCV) with requests for disposition on large quantities of nominations. Because ICCV did not have the capability to respond to large quantities of nominations on very short notice, the depot made arbitrary decisions regarding disposition. Items believed to be needed in-country were shipped to other depots. Other items were shipped to Okinawa. Other depots often received stock which was fringe, and subsequently reported to ICCV for disposition instructions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an adequate plan for disposition of all stock be developed before phaseout action of a General Supply Depot is initiated. The amount of stock to be moved must be estimated accurately and the rate of disposition must be consistent with the
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approved phaseout schedule and near the optimum rate. A backlog must be established that will allow for the inevitable delays in disposition instructions.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Future phaseouts will be better planned based on experience gained at US Army Depot Qui Nhon.

(16) Selected Items Management.

(a) OBSERVATION: As the quantity of items included in the DA Selected Item Management Systems (SIMS) increases, the ability of in-country inventory control centers for intensive management of these items decreases.

(b) EVALUATION: Under present USARPAC 3S procedures for the management of SIMS items, all items are coded-manager managed at the ICC's for establishment of requisition objectives, approval of replenishment requisitions, and approval of issues to customers. Originally the SIMS list consisted of approximately 4,200 lines, of which 1,400 matched the ICCV availability balance files (ABF). With the most recent increase in the number of SIMS items to 7,200, more than 3,700 lines now match the ICCV Theater Army Stockage List (TASL). Although this quantity of items may be manageable when distributed among NICP's, when management of all the items is imposed on one control center, intensive management of a large quantity of items becomes extremely difficult.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the quantity of items included in the SIMS program be carefully controlled and limited, if any meaningful management is to be performed by USARV Inventory Control Center.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This headquarters recommended to USARPAC via message that the quantity of SIMS items be carefully controlled so that management can be improved.

(17) MHE Deadline at US Army Depot, Da Nang.

(a) OBSERVATION: US Army Depot, Da Nang is encountering an extremely high deadline rate on all types of MHE.

(b) EVALUATION: The MHE problem can be placed into three categories: (1) old, nonstandard equipment, (2) lack of repair parts, (3) maintenance difficulties. US Army Depot, Da Nang has 41 old nonstandard pieces of equipment that were received from the Navy. These have a maintenance/operational-time repair ratio of three to one. This
means that to get one hour of productive work out of the item, three hours of maintenance are required. The lack of repair parts is a common problem for all MHE. However, the nonstandard machines make the problem acute. Maintenance difficulties stem from lack of qualified personnel to work on certain types of equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: 1. Exact type/quantity of equipment on hand be determined and reviewed for rebuild or direct exchange.

2. Exact repair parts required to relieve equipment from deadline be determined and supply action expedited.

3. Training requirements be determined and individuals trained to repair equipment.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Messages have been dispatched to obtain information for recommendations 1 and 2 above. However, information furnished for repair parts is incomplete. This Headquarters is reviewing the type mix for possible rebuild/DX with off-shore assets. The training program will have to be reviewed by US Army Support Command, Da Nang as MHE organizational and support maintenance repairs are performed by contract. Coordination will continue, to determine exact parts requirements.

18) Purchase Request and Commitment (PR&C) Submittals.

(a) OBSERVATION: PR&C from requiring support commands and depots for contractual services for depot supply operations are late in being submitted to HQ USARV.

(b) EVALUATION: Minimum standard processing time required once a PR&C is received at HQ USARV is six months. This includes time for review, adjustments, staffing, transmittal to USARPAC and USAPAV, and procurement lead time. The majority of FY 72 PR&C's were received in the second half of January and in February, 1971, with some arriving as late as March and April 1971. This results in heavy workload being compressed into a shorter period at USARV, USARPAC, and USAPAV.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That PR&C be submitted in the month of December.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: That support commands and depots be advised of submittal requirements during September and frequent follow-up on submittal status be made.
(19) Purchase Request and Commitment (PR&C) Preparation.

(a) OBSERVATION: A significant number of PR&C's for FY 72 contractual services were received with essential information and justification omitted.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to personnel turnover, experience in PR&C preparation is lost from one year to the next. New personnel are not knowledgeable of the contents and changes to applicable references and directives, or are unaware of their existence.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That personnel of support commands and depots charged with PR&C preparation be specifically identified.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: That specialized guidance be directed to such personnel in the form of current directives, requirements, and examples.

(20) Change in Prescribed Load List (PLL) Stockage Criteria.

(a) OBSERVATION: DA Circular 700-18 established, as a logistics improvement goal, a reduction in the range of items stocked at each supply support level. Actions have been taken in RVN to reduce stocks at the DSU/GSU and depot levels, but prior to February 1971 no action had been taken to reduce PLL stocks.

(b) EVALUATION: In February 1971, a detailed study concerning PLL stockage policies was initiated. At that time, items listed on PLL's were either initial provisioning, minimum stockage, or based on stockage criteria of three demands to add, and one to retain, in a 180-day period. The number of slow-moving items or nonmoving items on PLL's dictated the development of more restrictive criteria. The most effective means of eliminating slow-moving items from PLL's was to change the stockage criteria. As PLL and supporting Direct Support Unit Authorized Stockage List stockage were not compatible, actions were taken to bring them into accord. With some exceptions, the PLL stockage criteria were changed to six demands to add, and three to retain, in a 180-day period. As aviation DSU's operate under four-and-two criteria, the PLL stockage criteria for aviation-related items were changed to four demands to add, and two to retain in a 180-day period. In view of the low density of engineer line of communications (LOC) equipment, repair parts to support these items were excluded from conversion to the more restrictive criteria. In addition to these changes, the criteria, initial provisioning items, and minimum stockage items were deleted from PLL's unless they qualified under the new stockage criteria. These policy changes were effective 26 March 1971, with a target date of 20 April 1971 for full conversion to the
new criteria. It is anticipated that implementation of these changes will reduce PLL's to a manageable size and make them more responsive to high-usage items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders continue to look at stockage policy to determine ways in which inventory can be reduced without jeopardizing mission requirements.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: USARV directed the implementation of more restrictive stockage criteria on 26 March 1971.

(21) USARV's 2nd Direct Support Unit/General Support Unit Symposium.

(a) OBSERVATION: There exists a continuing requirement for this headquarters to host symposia with Direct Support Unit/General Support Unit personnel on a periodic basis.

(b) EVALUATION: During August 1970, a DSU/GSU Improvement Program was initiated in RVN. This program encompassed several policy changes at the DSU/GSU level and a plan for management improvement. It was determined that a symposium was necessary to insure full implementation and maximum cooperation. During late August and early September 1970, USARV conducted its first DSU/GSU symposium. The symposium was very successful and attendees recommended that another be conducted in six months. Immediately, plans were initiated for the second symposium which was held in late February and early March 1971. Experience gained from the first symposium revealed that smaller groups encouraged greater individual participation, thus making the symposium more beneficial to all concerned. With this in mind six separate sessions were held by "type" DSU and MR. One hundred personnel representing 71 units/staff elements concerned with DSU/GSU operations attended the six sessions. Several personnel from US Army Support Command, Da Nang and 1/5th Inf Div were unable to attend due to combat/combat-support operations, but a "make-up" session was planned for late April 1971. This "make-up" was held at US Army Support Command, Da Nang. This second symposium was extremely beneficial, as it covered all aspects of DSU/GSU operations. Many problem areas were resolved, and many recommendations were made by attendees for further research by the USARV staff.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That symposia be conducted for DSU/GSU personnel on a scheduled basis. From information available, semi-annual symposia appear to be the most beneficial.
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(d) COMMAND ACTION: With the completion of the second DSU/GSU symposium on 5 March 1971, plans are being formulated for a third symposium to be held in late July 1971.

(22) Command Supply Review Team.

(a) OBSERVATION: There exists a continuous requirement for this headquarters to monitor, assist, and inspect DSU/GSU supply operations.

(b) EVALUATION: During 1st Qtr FY 71, a DSU/GSU Improvement Plan and a DSU/GSU management program was implemented. The improvement plan encompassed several policy changes at the DSU/GSU level and the management program served as a means of identifying and assisting the five units reflecting the lowest monthly performance. In order to insure that policies/procedures directed by this headquarters were properly implemented, and that units with the lowest performance received maximum assistance, the Command Supply Review Team was established. This team was organized for the purpose of providing technical assistance to units requesting assistance and to inspect the supply operations of units reflecting low performance. The team is composed of personnel from the DSU/GSU, Depot Operations, and NCR 500 sections of Supply Division, DCSLOG USARV.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Establishment of this team has been extremely beneficial to this command and should be continued.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: USARV established a Command Supply Review Team on 16 November 1970.

(23) Improper Engine Replacement.

(a) OBSERVATION: Numerous serviceable engines on tactical vehicles are being replaced because of improper and/or incomplete diagnostic inspection and testing.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that multi-fuel and diesel engines are being replaced because of incomplete inspection and testing by DSU maintenance personnel prior to declaring an engine as unserviceable. The diesel engine can be adjusted and "tuned" similar to normal gasoline engines.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That training be provided to DSU inspector/maintenance personnel to reduce the number of serviceable engines currently being replaced in-country.

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(d) COMMAND ACTION: A complete engine diagnostic training packet has been developed and will be presented throughout RVN with the assistance of TACOM field representatives.

(24) 16mm Film Program - Improved Program Management.

(a) OBSERVATION: That in order to manage the 16mm motion picture film program in RVN effectively, an accurate data base must be maintained.

(b) EVALUATION: In early January 1971, a survey of 16mm motion picture accounts was initiated in order that accurate film account data could be established. This data base was required in order to determine film circuit and print requirements, the status of 16mm motion picture projectors and the accounts to which they are charged, and to close out the accounts of units which had been inactivated or redeployed and had failed to cancel their film accounts in the prescribed manner. As information from the surveyed units was received, it was provided to the Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service, Vietnam Regional Office, so that listings of film accounts could be purified and updated, and to the ICCV to ascertain projector availability for specific film accounts, improve accountability for projectors, and to provide ICCV with a basis for determining additional projector requirements in RVN. Accounts were closed as required and projectors issued or back orders established for those accounts having a valid requirement for a projector. The survey resulted in the purification of account listings and a net reduction of 215 accounts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an accurate 16mm film account data base continue to be maintained.

(a) COMMAND ACTION: That Special Services Agency continue to monitor closely the establishment and closure of 16mm motion picture accounts.

(25) Field Library Units, Paperbound.

(a) OBSERVATION: Field Library Units should be packed in waterproof paper to withstand outside storage prior to shipment to overseas commands. Present packaging does not permit this.

(b) EVALUATION: Field Library Units are contracted for by DA in bulk in order to obtain the best prices for each unit. The units are large and require inside storage as presently packed.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all field library units ordered in the future be packed for outside storage to conserve inside depot storage space.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: That any future orders to DA specify waterproof liners in the crates to allow outside storage.

(26) Flyer's Helmet (SPH-4) Problems.

(a) OBSERVATION: Maintenance units are having difficulties in obtaining repair parts for the SPH-4 helmets.

(b) EVALUATION: In mid-1970 electronic repair kits were force-issued to the major units in RVN. These kits are nonexpendable, but the components are expendable and should be requisitioned as they are consumed. Demand data was not being generated for the electronic parts because: requisitions were not being submitted; requisitions for electronic repair kit FSN 5820-134-3867 (a nonexpendable item) were being canceled. As a result, hundreds of SPH-4 flyers helmets have become inoperative. To alleviate this condition electronic repair items have been requisitioned and Army Marine Maintenance Command (AMMC) is accepting requisitions for these electronic repair items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: No action by higher headquarters required.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Action within this command:

1. Will insure that maintenance units can obtain repair parts.

2. Written instructions will be sent to the field on correct FSN's for repair parts and on the correct requisitioning procedures for these items.

(27) Engine Cleaning Program.

(a) OBSERVATION: A strictly enforced engine cleaning program was utilized during the LAMSON 719 operation.

(b) EVALUATION: Engine failure rate during the operation was less than the rate for the rest of USARV. Engine cleaning was not solely responsible for lowering the failure rate; however, it is considered a major contributing factor.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That strict adherence to engine cleaning procedures be stressed at all levels of command.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Message dispatched to major subordinate commands outlining necessity of engine cleaning program. In addition an engine cleaning instructional team has been providing instruction to aviation units in RVN on a continuing basis.

(28) Replacement Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: The US Army experienced difficulty in helicopter replacement to aviation units operating on special missions such as LAMSON 719.

(b) EVALUATION: The issue and lateral transfer of numerous helicopters were required in order to support the LAMSON 719 operation. Aircraft losses and damages were much higher than normal, and additional replacements had to come from in-country units and CONUS. In addition, units originally scheduled for drawdown did not drawdown; therefore, anticipated aircraft assets from these units could not be utilized to make up shortages. As a result, USARV is in a deficit position on UH-1H's and gunships.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That future special missions of any significance involving a large increase in helicopter air support be logistically coordinated for additional aircraft requirements at least two months in advance of mission commencement.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Requirement for aircraft to maintain USARV at 100 percent fill through November 1971 has been provided to Department of the Army.

(29) Retrograde of Automatic Data Processing Equipment (ADPE).

(a) OBSERVATION: During Increment V of USARV drawdown a significant amount of ADPE was returned to the vendor or released for reutilization by other Governmental agencies. Procedures for expediting the packing, crating and shipping of these high-dollar items, which require environmental control, were not adequate.

(b) EVALUATION: To improve the retrograde procedures for packing, crating, and shipping ADPE the Support Commands were tasked to provide the required support to prepare and to pack the equipment for shipment.

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2. Procedures were established by this headquarters to insure that shipping instructions were received from vendors in a timely fashion to avoid unnecessary rental payments for the high-dollar-value ADPE.

3. Direct coordination was made by representatives of this headquarters with personnel of the Keystone Multiple Processing Point to insure the expeditious shipment of ADPE and to resolve environmental difficulties.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: No action is required by higher headquarters.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

(30) Cover, Identification Tag, Personnel, FSN 8455-999-7302.

(a) OBSERVATION: The cover, identification tag, personnel provides a means of permanently recording the individual's spectacle prescription.

(b) EVALUATION: This information can later be used to reorder spectacles as required, without a reexamination. The plastic was designed to be stained easily by ink from a ballpoint pen. However, in RVN the recorded information does not provide legible information for a sufficient length of time and consequently is not presently used. The information recorded on the cover would greatly reduce time spent by optometrists who have to reexamine many individuals who need replacement spectacles, but who do not have a copy of their prescription available. An alternate means of imprinting the necessary information on the cover is required. Although no specific method is recommended at this time, efforts should be directed towards the development of a suitable implement which could be utilized both in a field or a garrison environment to imprint the required information on the cover.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to development of an implement which can readily be used to emboss spectacle prescription information on the Cover, Identification Tag, Personnel.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

(31) Nonstandard Repair Parts Requisitioning Procedures Instruction.

(a) OBSERVATION: Units are experiencing difficulty in requisitioning nonstandard repair parts.
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(b) EVALUATION: Many low-density construction items are operated by units of this command. Many of these items do not have DA technical manuals and repair parts list published; consequently, unit personnel, with no recourse but to use the manufacturers' manuals (and stock number) and having little experience in this area, are experiencing great difficulties in requisitioning and procuring these parts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Engineer Logistics School be furnished a suitable number of various manufacturers' manuals to be used for instruction of clerks in NSRP requisitioning procedures.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The Engineer Logistics School has procured fifteen Caterpillar manuals to initiate NSRP requisitioning procedures instructions. Additional manufacturers manuals have been requested.

f. COMMUNICATIONS.

(1) Communications in Support of Combat Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: USARV C-E must have sufficient time to prepare for communications support of combat operations.

(b) EVALUATION: During this reporting period, USARV C-E was requested to coordinate the communications support for LAWSON 719. The C-E equipment requirements were far in excess of the assets available to the units involved, arriving at USARV at about D-5. A time frame of this short duration does not permit the marriage of equipment from depot stock and personnel from various other units to be effectively inspected, installed, and operating in support of a combat operation of this magnitude. The physical movement of C-E equipment alone required stringent and time consuming technical inspections. Communications support also requires engineering at USARV, MACV and DCA-Southeast Asia Mainland. Short time frames do not allow for adequate engineering and so do not produce the best results.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That LIMDIS-cleared communications personnel be appointed at each level of command to participate in the early C-E planning of future combat operations.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.
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(1) Requirement for TOE Hand Slit-Lamp.

(a) OBSERVATION: A hand slit-lamp (binocular microscope) should be added to the division medical battalion optometry section TOE equipment field set.

(b) EVALUATION: The two optometrists presently authorized in division medical battalions provided the only eye/vision services available for division personnel. Consequently, a medical battalion optometry section is required to evaluate cases of eye trauma and disease. Although treatment is available in the medical battalion for routine ocular disease and injury, a slit-lamp evaluation would be invaluable in determining if the degree of the eye problem is severe enough to warrant evacuation of the patient to a hospital, or whether the condition can be treated locally. By providing a more definitive diagnosis, slit-lamp tests would not only influence the type of treatment recommended but also reduce unnecessary referrals to hospitals and thereby reduce man-days lost.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a binocular microscope (slit-lamp), preferably a portable, hand-held type, be added to the TOE Optometry Equipment Set, Field (FSN 6545-962-9061) authorized for the division medical battalion optometry section.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: That the Combat Development Command Medical Service Agency, Fort Sam Houston, initiate the action required to add the portable slit-lamp to the optometry equipment field set.

(2) Introduction and Evaluation of New Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: The RVN introduction of ENSURE items such as the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) system, the Iroquois Night Fighter and Night Tracker (INFANT) and the YO-3A Quiet Aircraft has presented problems unique to each system.

(b) EVALUATION: Each of these ENSURE items was introduced into RVN by the New Equipment Introductory Teams (NEIT). Personnel assigned to the teams were hand-picked and system trained prior to departure from CONUS. On arrival in RVN, the NEIT's were either assigned or attached to an aviation unit which was responsible for administration, aircraft maintenance, and common-item logistical support. Sufficient contractor field representatives were available to insure proper maintenance and coordination with the CONUS contractor. The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) conducted an evaluation and collected data to determine equipment combat
suitability for operation in RVN. In all of the above cases evaluations were completed in less than one year and prior to the DEROS of the original NETT members. The INFANT and FLIR were placed in an operational role upon completion of the evaluation. As of this date, the YO-3A evaluation has not been completed and a decision on its retention has not been made. The introduction of the INFANT and FLIR systems into an operational role after completion of the ACTIV evaluation resulted in the following problems which are common to all like introductions:

1. The normal Army supply system cannot support a new piece of equipment which has recently been introduced through the ENSURE program. Under normal conditions only sufficient spare parts are manufactured and included in the initial support package to sustain operations through the evaluation phase. A determination as to the future of the system is normally not made until the results of the evaluation have been analyzed. Justifying the expenditure of funds for support packages requires data and experience. This is minimally available and shortage of spare parts and assemblies becomes a problem. In addition, not all problems which are unique to a particular system will occur during the evaluation. Rectification of these problems can only be accomplished through personal initiative and drive by the team members including direct communication with the manufacturer. This results in additional lost operational time. If major components become inoperable they are returned to the contractor in CONUS for repair and return. This normally requires 30-45 days during which the equipment is inoperable, if no spare components are available.

2. No manpower spaces were authorized when the system became operational? This resulted in personnel being charged against existing manpower authorization and replacement personnel coming from existing resources. Due to cost only minimal contractor representatives were retained to provide technical assistance and to maintain liaison with the contractor. There are no applicable MOS's associated with the sensor systems; personnel with the closest applicable MOS must be procured and trained on the job. These personnel must be acquired from the pipeline or through special requisition. In USARV there is a critical shortage of enlisted personnel with aviation maintenance MOS's, and there is an authorized manning level of 92 percent for aviators. Any additional drain on present authorized manpower assets would result in an even more critical shortage in USARV operational units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: 1. Once the decision is made to accept a new equipment item for operational use, manpower spaces should be authorized to insure requisition authority of proper MOS's with sufficient overlap time to fully qualify the personnel.
2. Stockage of repair parts must be adequate to insure proper maintenance, and emphasis must be continued to insure expedited repair and return by the contractor of those items which are not available through normal supply channels.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: 1. That manpower spares be authorized when new equipment is accepted into operational units.

2. That stockage of repair parts be sufficient to insure an acceptable operationally ready rate.

h. OTHER.

Dissolution of Welfare Fund Activities of Redeploying Units.

(a) OBSERVATION: Three basic objectives must be accomplished when dissolving welfare fund activities of redeploying units:

1. All outstanding liabilities must be eliminated.
2. All fund bank accounts must be closed.
3. The dissolution must not interfere with morale and welfare support of troops during the critical standdown period.

(b) EVALUATION: Recent redeployments of combat divisions have been accomplished in two stages, with a considerable time lag between departure of the basic unit and one of its residual brigades. The CPF is the central depository for division welfare fund and provides basic administrative and control services to division welfare fund activities. Concurrent dissolution of the CPF and division welfare fund activities decreases the ability of the CPF to accomplish the above dissolution objectives for all the division welfare fund activities due to the administrative burden placed on the CPF to dissolve itself.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The CPF should remain active with a residual brigade throughout the major period of a two-stage division redeployment to facilitate the accomplishment of welfare fund dissolution objectives.
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(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CHARLES M. GETTY
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

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HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs with subject ORLL Report with the following comment:

Ref para 2g(2)(c)1 and 2g(2)(d)1, page 57 and 58 respectively:

Honconcur. The decision to deploy new equipment for operational use should be based on identification of manpower spaces required to maintain and operate the new equipment. Implementation of the deployment decision requires an MTOE submission to obtain authorization for both equipment and personnel. Manpower spaces may or may not come from within the approved spaces of the previous MTOE.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

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Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov to 30 Apr 71.

CG, United States Army, Vietnam

15 May 1971

N/A

N/A

N/A