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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA-A (M) (2 Jul 71) FOR OT UT 71B024 20 July 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Hugh F. Foster, Jr., CG, 1st Signal Brigade, Period 19 Jun to 1 May 1971 (U)

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, dated 4 November 1966, Subject: Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U).

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG Hugh F. Foster, Jr., subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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AVHDO-DO

9 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - MG Hugh F. Foster, Jr.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Inclosed are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MG Hugh F. Foster, Jr. The report covers the period 19 June 1970 thru 1 May 1971 during which time MG Foster served as Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade.

2. MG Foster is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ACK P. COOK
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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INDEX

1. Introductory Letter

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   A. USASTRATCOM and the Doctrine of Flexible Response
   B. Soldier Art Program
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   D. Communications Support-Cambodia
   E. Recovery of Fixed ICS/DTE Assets
   F. Project "Thrift"
   G. Communications Assets Recovery Agency (CARA)
   H. Training the Vietnamese
SCCPV-CG

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey
Deputy Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96375

1. (U) Senior Officer's Debriefing Report for the 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for the period 19 June 1970 to 1 May 1971 is submitted herewith pursuant to USARV Regulation 1-3, dated 1 June 1968.

2. (U) Specific items which warrant individual comment have been addressed in Tabs to this report.

3. (C) During the period covered by this report the 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) sustained reductions in authorized strength of about 23.5%. By 30 June 1971 the reductions will have reached about 36%. Throughout the reporting period the Brigade was below authorized strength, and for a great part of the period the personnel shortage was in the range of 2,000 - 2,600 men.

4. (C) The Brigade was able to absorb this very substantial understrength (and still maintain a creditable communications posture) for two reasons:

   a. As the general level of hostilities diminished we were able to consolidate contingency requirements, using one common pool of people and equipment which was capable of supporting any one of the numerous contingency plans.

   b. Careful analysis of resources committed to operational systems, review of contingency requirements, and the diminishing US combat structure made it feasible to take some calculated risks regarding Brigade capability to implement more than one contingency plan at a time.
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SCCPV-CG
SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

1 May 1971

5. (C) The reduction in Brigade structure and strength should not be construed by "Monday-morning quarterbacks" as proof that the Brigade was seriously overstrength prior to this drawdown. The tenor and extent of hostilities was substantially different a year or two years ago. Failure of the enemy to launch vigorous, widespread attacks against our many isolated Signal sites is something still not fully understood. They could have done so, and the Brigade of necessity retained the capability to restore or replace vital communications. As it became evident that the US force drawdown diminished the communications requirements, and hostile actions directed against our Signal sites did not increase, the risk associated with reductions in Brigade contingency capability became more acceptable.

6. (C) Almost all the Brigade drawdown took place among the Brigade elements engaged in the Corps Area Communications System (CACS) and the tactical augmentation to the Integrated Communications System (ICS). As the US combat elements redeployed our supporting communications systems did likewise. Until the implementation of contractor O&M of our fixed plant facilities, (ICS, Dial Telephone Exchange, etc) the reduction in US combat forces generated practically no reduction in fixed plant communications requirements. During the period covered by this report the strength of USARV declined by 88,000, but only seven ICS sites and five Dial Telephone Exchanges were closed out.

7. (C) It is most important that personnel planning future US drawdowns recognize that the number and type of communications personnel required by the residual force structure at any point in time is determined primarily by the geographic distribution of the forces and their command channels. Abstract strength figures have little meaning from a communications requirement standpoint. 50,000 US troops on Long Binh Post could be supported with a very austere Signal complement. 50,000 troops spread all over Vietnam is another story. Retention of a US element at Quang Tri for example, necessitates continued O&M of eight ICS sites to provide communications to MACV. It is largely immaterial whether the element at Quang Tri is a company or a division -- the requirements at the eight ICS sites are the same.
SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

8. (C) During this ten and a half month period the Brigade has weathered some severe communications trauma. Typhoon damage to telephone systems at Chu Lai and Da Nang in November 1970 was catastrophic. (The USASTRATCOM organization came to our aid immediately, when aid was requested, and they bailed us out. The knowledge that such assistance would be forthcoming was a material consideration in taking the calculated risk of cutting back Brigade contingency resources.) Operation Lamson 719 coincided with several other heavy demands on Brigade resources. Equipment had to be drawn from USARV depots, and additional personnel had to be brought into the Brigade from USARV resources in order to meet the burgeoning demands of Lamson 719. We literally stripped all elements of the Brigade of resources to support Lamson 719, and we had little in the way of uncommitted reserves if another contingency had developed. In brief, I took a calculated risk as to how far I could safely cut the Brigade strength without seriously endangering accomplishment of our military mission. Lamson 719 and the other concurrent operations tested that gamble almost to the limit, but the gamble paid off.

9. (C) The problems of a commander in Vietnam are tremendously more vexing and complex than those encountered in World War II, or even those encountered in the Korean fracas. Lack of expressed support by the mass of US citizenry at home, and the wildfire spread of drug use and abuse, have generated serious morale, discipline and command problems. Although many US soldiers in RVN have succumbed to the temptation of drugs and the blandishments of malcontents here and disloyal elements at home, it is to the everlasting credit of American youth that the great majority of them have performed outstandingly in particularly trying circumstances, and have served their country well.

10. (U) When I assumed command of the 1st Signal Brigade on 19 June 1971 I enunciated my philosophical guidance to the members of the Brigade:

"He who cannot lead and will not follow should get out of the way."

11. (U) For the past ten and a half months I have led the Brigade, and they have in every instance responded magnificently. I now must "get out of the way". Although some trying
times lie ahead, the Brigade is in a good posture to meet these challenges, and has the expertise and the will to do so. I am confident that the 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) will sustain USARV to the end with distinction.

Hugh F. Foster Jr.
Major General, US Army
Commanding

8Incl
(Tabs A thru H)
During my period in command of the 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) there were two very significant events which clearly demonstrated the value of having an organization like USASTRATCOM, with a world-wide capability to respond in support of unprogrammed requirements or unforeseen emergencies.

In July 1970 a critical shortage of skilled personnel developed in the USASTRATCOM Signal Brigade-Korea. Trained personnel to meet these requirements were not available from CONUS resources, and output from the Signal schools would not satisfy the requirement in a timely manner. Although the 1st Signal Brigade was at that time approximately 774 men below authorized strength we were able to tighten our belt a little further and provide, on very short notice, 230 enlisted men who were reassigned to the USASTRATCOM Signal Brigade-Korea on a PCS basis. This was not merely a matter of sending 230 individuals selected at random. The criteria governing selection included grade, MOS, time remaining on overseas tour, disciplinary record, and technical proficiency.

Within eight days of the initial request the first increment of 142 men had been brought in from scattered sites all over Vietnam, administratively processed, loaded on a chartered aircraft and flown directly to Korea. Within 24 hours after their arrival in Korea some of these personnel were on site performing their technical mission. Had the emergency been greater the period of collecting and processing the personnel in Vietnam could have been shortened. Since eight days was acceptable we utilized this time to advantage in conducting a more orderly processing, award of decorations to departing personnel where warranted, and to give personnel concerned an opportunity to take care of personal matters.

Throughout this eight-day period we maintained close and detailed coordination between the 1st Signal Brigade and the Signal Brigade-Korea. Because of differences in climate it was imperative that adequate clothing be available for these personnel when they arrived in Korea. Individual clothing sizes were passed to Signal Brigade-Korea by message. Uniforms, field clothing, etc., were available for issue immediately upon arrival of these personnel in Korea.

Due to a reduction in authorized strength of the 27th Signal Group in Thailand, in the latter part of 1970 substantial overages in enlisted assigned strength existed there. With a goal of getting below the strength ceiling in Thailand and assisting in the continuing enlisted replacement shortages within non-RVN units of USASTRATCOM-Pacific, a sizeable number
of available surpluses was reported to Headquarters, USASTRATCOM-Pacific. Based upon criteria for reassignment directed from that headquarters, 75 enlisted men were reassigned from Thailand to USASTRATCOM Signal Brigade-Korea.

Also in October, an immediate requirement arose in Korea for four qualified communications center officers. A request for assistance was placed with the 1st Signal Brigade by HQ USASTRATCOM and four officers were furnished immediately on PCS to USASTRATCOM Signal Brigade-Korea.

Another very significant example of the value of USASTRATCOM responsiveness and flexibility arose in November and December 1970. A succession of typhoons resulted in massive flooding of the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas. In Da Nang much of the outside cable plant had been taken over from the Air Force, and at Chu Lai the outside cable plant had been taken over from the Navy. In both locations the outside plant was in extremely poor condition and the plant-in-place records were missing, inaccurate, and/or not up-to-date. Locations of buried cables were uncertain, and there was no record of locations of splices in these buried cables.

As a result of the massive flooding and torrential rains there was catastrophic failure of the telephone service in both the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas, starting in November 1970. Organic 1st Signal Brigade cable crews and installation and repair personnel were diverted from other areas to the fullest extent possible in order to concentrate effort on restoration of service at Da Nang and Chu Lai. By early December it became apparent that the danger was so widespread that an acceptable level of service would not be restored in less than three or four months if the 1st Signal Brigade efforts were not augmented from outside sources.

On 10 December 1970 I sent a message to CG, USASTRATCOM-PAC and CG, USASTRATCOM describing our predicament and requesting immediate augmentation as follows:

a. Six two-man cable splicer teams, experienced in working with both paper-insulated and PIC cable.

b. Two experienced NCO cable splicer supervisors.

c. Thirty experienced IGR men.

d. Five experienced NCO IGR supervisors.
Within five days the first increment of augmentation personnel arrived in Viet Nam. Within a short time thereafter we received the full number requested. Personnel came from USASTRATCOM commands in Taiwan, Korea, Okinawa, Alaska, and CONUS.

With the help of these augmentation personnel, who did an outstanding job under very difficult circumstances, the telephone service in the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas was restored to an acceptable level about 15 February. As it turned out, the timing was well-nigh perfect. We had just about reached an acceptable level of service when operation Lam Son 719 was initiated. If the telephone service at Da Nang and Chu Lai had not been restored in such a timely manner it would have had very serious detrimental effect on the support of Lam Son 719.

The foregoing are excellent illustrations of the strategic value of the flexibility inherent in the USASTRATCOM organization.
SOLDIER ART PROGRAM

Although there has been superb photographic coverage of the war in Vietnam, in both still and motion picture, color and black-and-white, there was a noticeable lack of coverage of communications activities insofar as artistic renditions (sketches, pastels, water colors and oil paintings) are concerned. In the belief that within the 1st Signal Brigade there could be found some persons with artistic talent, a soldier art program was instituted in October 1970. Brigade personnel were solicited for individuals interested in participating in the program. Facilities and materials were made available in one room at the Southeast Asia Pictorial Center, and all applicants were given an opportunity to demonstrate their techniques and prowess. Emphasis was to be placed on portrayal of 1st Signal Brigade and other Signal Corps activities in the Republic of Vietnam.

About eight or ten 1st Signal Brigade soldiers expressed interest initially, and they were placed on TDY with the Pictorial Center for a few weeks for work and evaluation. Some soldiers with real talent were identified, and they continued in the program with this as their primary duty. A wide variety of techniques were employed, including one soldier who utilized a piece of mosquito net in a modification of the silk screen process. Initially only illustration board was available but eventually canvas and oils were acquired. Media currently employed include oils, acrylics, charcoal, pencil, watercolor and ink. The products of this program have added a touch of elan to the Brigade magazine, "The Jagged Sword". Selected items were displayed at Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade during the visit of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. They are being photographed in color and black-and-white for documentary purposes and eventual publication in a book of Signal soldier art. Originals will be sent to DA for permanent retention.

At a cost of very few personnel and a very modest expenditure for supplies this program has made an important contribution to the history of the 1st Signal Brigade and the Signal Corps in the Vietnam conflict.
Communications equipment in Vietnam deteriorates rapidly due to the deleterious effects of heat, moisture, dust and turbulence of operating and maintenance personnel. As with many types of equipment, timely rehabilitation can prevent serious damage or degradation beyond a repairable condition. The mobile and transportable equipment with which the 1st Signal Brigade is equipped constitutes the greatest bulk of this equipment in the entire Army. CONUS and other overseas commands were seriously depleted of this equipment to satisfy the requirements in Vietnam. It is therefore imperative that this equipment be maintained in good condition for use in Vietnam, and that it be in the best possible condition when it is released for retrograde. To this end several major rebuild/rehabilitation programs have been initiated by the 1st Signal Brigade.

**AN/TRC-90 REBUILD PROGRAM**

Utilizing USARV funds, a contract was awarded to Collins Radio Company to establish a rebuild/rehabilitation facility at the Bangkok Area Maintenance and Supply Facility (AMSF) of the 1st Signal Brigade. Government space, equipment and parts were provided, and Collins provided personnel, management and additional parts as required. Since Collins was the manufacturer of this equipment the repair and rehabilitation was greatly facilitated by close relations with the source of parts in CONUS, the unique parts coming, of course, from Collins Radio Company.

Four AN/TRC-90 Transportable Tropo Scatter Radio Terminals were made available from 1st Signal Brigade assets in Vietnam, shipped to Bangkok, and delivered to the Collins facility for complete repair and rehabilitation, including addition of modifications to some early production items which did not have the benefit of changes made in later production models. The equipment was completely removed from the shelters, the shelters were completely renovated, equipment was cleaned, repaired, replaced, modified as required, reconfigured in the shelters and tested. The end product was a like-new terminal. The four terminals initially provided permitted Collins to set up an assembly line, and as fast as one shelter was completed and returned to Vietnam another shelter was shipped to Bangkok.

Once the success of this operation was established it was expanded to include AN/TRC-129 and AN/TRC-132 terminals, which are similar in nature and also manufactured by Collins Radio Company. As of 26 April 20 AN/TRC-90 terminals and 9 AN/TRC-129 terminals have been processed through the Collins facility and returned to Vietnam. Seven additional AN/TRC-90, 12 additional AN/TRC-129 and 6 additional AN/TRC-132 terminals are programmed for processing through this facility by 30 June 1972.
The cheap labor available in Bangkok has enabled us to restore 1st Signal Brigade assets to like-new condition at minimum cost to the government and with minimum transportation of the equipment.

AN/MRC-85 REBUILD PROGRAM

The 1st Signal Brigade has 13 AN/MRC-85 Tropospheric Scatter Radio Terminals in Vietnam, all of which have been in use for many years. They have been exposed to heat, moisture, dust, abuse, cannibalization, vibration and heavy usage. Retrograde of these assets to CONUS and subsequent repair in a CONUS Depot would be very costly. Consequently the Long Binh Area Maintenance and Supply Facility (operated by Federal Electric Company under the COMVETS Contract) has been given the responsibility for overhauling and repairing these terminals. This program is just beginning, but the prevailing low wage rates will make this rehabilitation much less costly than in CONUS, and will eliminate round trip shipment and resultant damage.

SWITCHBOARD SB-249 REBUILD PROGRAM

The SB-249 switchboard is a single-position switchboard normally used in multiples of 3 or 9 to create transportable manual switchboards for support of large tactical headquarters. There are 143 SB-249 positions in 1st Signal Brigade assets, all of which have seen much hard usage and most of which are in need of major repair/rehabilitation.

Eleven additional SB-249s were found in the Da Nang and Long Binh Property Disposal Yards. They were in very bad condition, and by customary CONUS standards, would be considered uneconomically repairable.

Having had previous experience with the capabilities of Korean switchboard manufacturers to perform factory-type rebuild of US military switchboards, exploratory discussions were initiated through the USASTRATCOM Signal Brigade-Korea. As a result of these discussions we received informal estimates from the Korean manufacturer that he would provide a complete factory rebuild of 50 switchboards at a unit price of $375. (The acquisition cost of an SB-249 is $5,900.)

The USARV procurement office is in the process of negotiating a contract with the Korean firm for rehabilitation of all 154 positions. The first increment to be rehabilitated will be the 11 positions recovered from the Property Disposal Yards. (Because of their advanced state of deterioration these positions may cost more than $375 each.) As these SB-249s are rehabilitated and returned to Vietnam they will be changed out with other SB-249 positions, which will then be rotated to Korea on a "closed loop" basis until all 154 positions have
been rehabilitated.

This program will enhance telephone service in Vietnam, provide expeditious service, and minimize shipping costs and costs to USARV. It will also result in material in better condition when retrograde or redistribution to other Army units becomes appropriate.
In late June 1970 there were indications of an impending requirement for voice communications between Headquarters, MACV and the American Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Initial information was sketchy, highly classified, and indicated very minimal requirements. "A couple of voice circuits and a couple of teletype circuits" seemed to be the extent of the requirement. In response to my query I was informed categorically that there was no foreseen requirement for secure voice capability. The US Chargé D'affaires at Phnom Penh forbade the introduction of US military personnel to install, operate and maintain equipment. This necessitated, resort to contractual assistance, but during the early and critical planning phases the security classification attached to the requirement and guidance from JCS prohibited discussions with contractor representatives.

Permission was obtained for military personnel in civilian clothes to visit Phnom Penh and conduct an area survey to identify suitable locations for a communications site. The US State Department desired to maintain a "low US Profile," so a location was selected in the vicinity of the commercial airport outside Phnom Penh. Engineering studies and path analyses indicated that an acceptable link could be provided using tactical tropo-spheric scatter radio equipment.

In due course we received authority to discuss the project with the contractor. Equipment was assembled from 1st Signal Brigade resources, shipped to Phnom Penh by Vietnamese Navy LST, and installed at the Phnom Penh Airbase by contractor personnel. After the customary period of settling down, adjusting antennae, and installing local distribution systems (both cable and multi-channel VHF radio) the system was put to traffic, although not accepted as satisfactory from a DCA-standards viewpoint.

Almost immediately there was imposed an urgent requirement for secure voice capability at Phnom Penh. The US Chargé D'affaires did not desire secure voice capability, but JCS directed it to be installed. Over a period of several weeks the Chargé took several actions which seriously hampered our ability to carry out the directions from JCS. Among other things, the Chargé refused to grant clearance for military personnel to go to Phnom Penh to install the secure voice equipment. He also prohibited the contractor from making local purchases of
essential fuel and lubricants, thus necessitating that all such supplies be transported from Vietnam by Vietnamese Navy LST. Other actions hindered but ultimately did not preclude accomplishment of the directed communications mission.

After arrival of the new American Ambassador (Ambassador Swank) in Phnom Penh the atmosphere changed markedly. Ambassador Swank was most cooperative and helpful. In addition to granting permission for US military personnel to enter Phnom Penh in civilian clothes to install secure voice equipment he also authorized a group of military personnel to enter in civilian clothing to assist in upgrading the tropo terminal and local distribution communications within Phnom Penh, which included cable and VHF radio systems among and between the site at the airport (Site 96), the old US Embassy, the new US Embassy, ARVN headquarters and FANK headquarters. A generally acceptable level of quality and reliability has been achieved on this system, including the secure voice capability. This is primarily due to initial selection of equipment which had potential and capabilities considerably in excess of the initial statement of requirements. Nonetheless, the system does not have the quality and reliability associated with the Defense Communications System.

In January 1971 the Phnom Penh airfield was attacked by a VC sapper force which did considerable damage to buildings, hangers and aircraft. Because Site 96 is off to one side and a considerable distance from hangars and aircraft parking areas the VC either overlooked or ignored it. The vulnerability of Site 96, however, became quite apparent. CG 1st Signal Brigade therefore proposed to MACV that a survey team be sent to Phnom Penh to select alternate sites to which Site 96 could be relocated, where security would be improved. It was further proposed that additional equipment be installed at those sites so as to have an alternate route immediately available.

The survey was approved and conducted. Seven potential alternate site locations were identified and inspected. Subsequently path profiles were prepared and engineering analyses were conducted for each of the potential sites. Meanwhile, the equipment shelters at Site 96 were sandbagged and bunkered in for protection.

After evaluating site survey reports and engineering analyses a site on the banks of the Bassac River was selected as the most desirable location. It combined good technical attributes, close proximity to the old and new US Embassies, and good access
via VHF radio link to FANK headquarters. It was also close to a Cambodian Army Military Compound which could provide protection and assistance in an emergency. The contractor was directed to prepare plans for conducting tests from this new location. After several weeks of planning and preparation of cost estimates for contractual purposes we were on the verge of beginning the tests when the Defense Attache Office in Phnom Penh advised that the selected site was now considered undesirable because of its vulnerability to recoilless rifle fire from across the river. Inasmuch as Site 96 was now bunkered in and surrounded with barbed wire it was now considered that no relocation was necessary. The contractor was therefore directed to stop work on his test plans.

Notwithstanding these instructions, reliance upon the facility at the existing Site 96 is considered risky and undesirable. Although bunkered in and surrounded by barbed wire, this entire facility could easily be victimized by a sapper attack. VC sappers have penetrated many military installations in Vietnam that are much more heavily guarded and protected. Search for an alternate site should therefore be pursued.

To this end CG 1st Signal Brigade proposed to MACV J-6 that permission be obtained to send a two-man military survey team to Phnom Penh to study in detail the antenna tower location at FANK headquarters, specifically to determine whether there is adequate room for guys to support an extension of the present 50 ft tower to a height of 180 ft. Limited space and existing road nets were reported to preclude installation of guys necessary for a 180 ft tower.

MACV J-6 agreed with the proposal and has obtained permission for the survey team to visit Phnom Penh. If the results of the survey are favorable the tower will be raised to 180 or 204 feet, antennae will be installed, and tests will be run from that tower to several sites in Vietnam to see if the communications path can be improved. If these tests prove successful it will be possible to relocate Site 96 from its exposed location in the vicinity of the airport to the heavily guarded area adjacent to FANK headquarters. This will improve communications in the Phnom Penh area by placing the receiver site more centrally with respect to the tributary stations, and will eliminate the need for one VHF radio system.

The establishment and maintenance of communications to Site 96 is illustrative of the problems so often encountered
in providing communications services. Starting with an under-
statement of requirements and security classification so high
that essential participants could not be informed of what was
to transpire, we ran the entire gamut of administrative hind-
rances, transportation bottlenecks, diplomatic difficulties,
technical problems due to the age of the equipment (especially
the antennae, which had been in open storage in Vietnam for
over 2 years), vacillation in the future course of action, a
period of hazardous operating conditions when contractor per-
sonnel abandoned Site 96 during the attack on the airfield,
and the customary problems of weather, heat, air conditioning,
parts supply and equipment maintenance. The length of the
tropo scatter shot has made it susceptible to fading caused by
atmospheric changes, but even so, the system has been generally
satisfactory.

New antennae have been procured from CONUS to replace the
old and degraded antennae currently in use. Utilization of
these new antennae, coupled with testing from alternate loca-
tions (including the higher tower at FANK headquarters) should
lead to a greatly improved system, and could result in a sys-
tem which meets DCS standards.
In 1964-66, when the concept of fixed plant communications facilities for Vietnam was adopted, it was expected that the equipment would be installed once, never to be removed. For all practical purposes it was written off the books as assets without future potential, being both literally and figuratively "set in concrete". Nebulous reference was made to post hostilities use in a nation building role and use by the Vietnamese military forces, but recovery of these fixed facilities for use elsewhere in the world or return to contingency stocks in CONUS was not a part of the concept. During the early stages of planning for these facilities the Army proposed use of transportable/relocatable facilities so they could be recovered after cessation of hostilities. The proposal was rejected by OSD, reportedly on the basis that the transportable configurations would be more costly than installation in pre-engineered buildings.

By 1969, however, pressing needs had developed to upgrade communications in Korea and elsewhere. At the same time it became evident that some of the equipment originally procured and installed in Vietnam and Thailand was no longer required there, and could be made available for removal and use elsewhere if this proved feasible. The test of this reuse of SEA-CE assets materialized in the PACOM Improvement Plan, which proposed use of selected assets from Thailand and Vietnam to improve the US Military Communications in Korea. The plan was approved by JCS and implementation began about March 1970.

The type and amount of equipment to be removed varied widely from site to site. In some large installations only one of numerous radio terminals was removed. At other sites the entire C-E equipment, generators, power panels, air conditioners, pre-engineered buildings and fuel tanks.

This program has been carried on energetically in both Thailand and Vietnam, not only for shipment to Korea but to meet new requirements in Vietnam and elsewhere. As of 26 April the following equipment/facilities have been dismantled, preserved, packaged, packed and either shipped or are currently awaiting shipping instructions:

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Tab E
### Phu Tai

- An Khe
- Loeng Nak, Thailand
- Cu Chi

### Phu Loi

- Dial Telephone Exchange
  - Camp Enari
  - An Khe
  - Sattahip, Thailand
- Cu Chi
- Di An

### ICS Radio Equipment

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<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>2 ea FRC-109</td>
<td>Shipped to Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Chua Mt.</td>
<td>REL-2600</td>
<td>Awaiting Disposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>REL-2600</td>
<td>Re-installed at US/RVNAAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>FRC-109</td>
<td>Shipped to Okinawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>2 ea LRC-3</td>
<td>Awaiting Disposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Lam</td>
<td>LRC-3</td>
<td>Shipped to Okinawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
<td>REL-2600</td>
<td>Being dismantled and will be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reinstalled at US/RVNAAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ICS Training facility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although some contractual assistance was utilized in Thailand in dismantling the first few sites, the bulk of the work has been performed by 1st Signal Brigade personnel as an in-house effort. Details of this operation are found in the section titled The Communications Assets Recovery Agency Concept.

The equipment removed from Thailand and Vietnam has been successfully reinstalled in Korea and is operating today. Reports from Korea and from the Director of the Defense Communications Agency indicate that the long haul communications in Korea have been very materially improved as a result, and at a savings to the government of approximately $9,000,000.

Of the 54 ICS sites once installed in Vietnam, 27 will be removed in this fashion. Three have been reutilized in-country in conjunction with the US/RVNAF ICS training facility at Vung Tau. Twenty-four will be retrograded out of country to various locations as directed by higher headquarters. Assets and facilities for which there is no immediate need, either in Vietnam or elsewhere, are being shipped as complete site packages for storage in CONUS as contingency assets.

Of the 20 Army operated Dial Telephone Exchanges in Vietnam, one has been removed and relocated to Taiwan for use by US Forces there, two have been dismantled and shipped to CONUS, and one has been dismantled and is awaiting shipping instructions. In addition, one Dial Telephone Exchange was removed from Thailand and subsequently installed by the contractor at the US/RVNAF training facility at Vung Tau. Seven additional Dial Telephone Exchanges are scheduled for removal, one has already been turned over to the ARVN, and 8 more will be left in place and turned over to the Vietnamese Armed Forces as withdrawal of US Forces progresses.

The recovery of these fixed assets has required prodigious efforts by 1st Signal Brigade personnel, but it has established that recovery of these expensive fixed plant facilities, once "written off", is feasible.
In June 1970 an inspection of the Property Disposal Yards throughout Vietnam revealed that they were a source of great quantities of useable (and often times new) material which could enhance the living and working conditions of Brigade personnel and improve operating facilities. Consequently a major program was instituted to capitalize on these available assets.

As a first step I personally toured every Property Disposal Yard, making notes on the types and varieties of equipment and materiel available. I then required each of my Group Commanders to accompany me on a tour of the Property Disposal Yard in his geographic area, and pointed out the many items available to him for the asking, which could improve the lot of his troops or facilitate improvements in operating facilities, site defense, etc.

Having acquainted the senior commanders with the potential of the Property Disposal Yards, I solicited from Headquarters, USARV the authority to establish a 1st Signal Brigade representative at each Property Disposal Yard as a full time resident liaison agent. Through the cooperation of the USARV DCS Log and the Chief of the USARV Property Disposal Agency this request was promptly approved, and a resident representative was established at each Property Disposal Yard.

Thereafter I made it a point to visit every Property Disposal Yard whenever I was in the vicinity, accompanied by the Group Commander, Battalion Commanders, Supply Officers, Property Book Officers and any other members of the 1st Signal Brigade who would benefit from exposure to a tour of the Property Disposal Yard. The resident representative accompanied me on these tours, since it was his mission to be familiar with the contents of the Property Disposal Yard, to assist Brigade personnel in locating items they might require, and to bring to the attention of 1st Signal Brigade elements the arrival in the Property Disposal Yard of new items of potential interest to the 1st Signal Brigade.

Our interest were not restricted to communications-electronics items. The greatest benefits derived from the Property Disposal Yards, in both a financial and utilitarian sense, have been in the nature of construction materials such as perimeter lights, power cable, hot water heaters, hardware items, sewer pipe, hand tools, paint, toilets, wash basins, etc. ad infinitum.
In my first few tours through the Property Disposal Yards I merely identified items to be recovered and left it to the Group Commander to do so. Because of the large physical area and the heterogeneous nature of the Property Disposal Yards I soon learned that after my visit the Group Commanders and Division representatives were frequently unable to find items I had selected for removal. Consequently I instituted the practice of carrying a polaroid camera with me, I would take photographs of items desired and hand them to the Division representative, so that he could locate and identify the items later.

The polaroid photograph technique worked reasonably well for a while, but it soon developed that the constant flow of material in and out of the Property Disposal Yard's created such continuing change that after a week or so the photograph was frequently of no use.

To overcome this problem I instituted the practice of having my aide carry a can of orange spray paint and some stencils. As items were identified the aide stencilled appropriate markings on them to indicate the desired disposition. This procedure has worked quite well, since the item remains marked even if it is shifted around within the Property Disposal Yard.

Subsequently each Property Disposal Yard became the assigned responsibility of a designated Group Commander in the 1st Signal Brigade. His mission in this regard was primarily three fold:

a. To withdraw assets identified by CG, 1st Signal Brigade and dispose of them as directed.

b. To identify and withdraw assets of use to his command.

c. To identify and withdraw assets of potential use to other elements of the 1st Signal Brigade.

The nature of the material in the Property Disposal Yards is such that items having potential use throughout the 1st Signal Brigade might be found in the Long Binh Property Disposal Yard, but not in other Property Disposal Yards. To capitalize on these assets and make them more readily available to all elements of the 1st Signal Brigade a Brigade holding area was established on Long Binh Post in August 1970, utilizing an abandoned radio transmitter site which was under the 1st Signal Brigade control. This site soon acquired the nickname, "Hernando's Hideaway". Hernando's Hideaway is a fenced enclosure with a
building in the center and considerable storage space on all sides. Offices were established in the building and
containers were acquired and lined up along one side of the
compound fence. Shelves were built into the CONEXs, and a
stock record card system was established to maintain account-
ability and control over acquired assets.

Having established the facility, all Group Commanders and
all Property Disposal Yard liaison representatives were instruc-
ted to identify and obtain any items which appeared to have
broad usefulness to 1st Signal Brigade elements. Such items were
shipped to Hernando's Hideaway, sorted and identified, entered
on stock record cards, and placed on shelves in the CONEXs.
Any commander or Property Book Officer in the 1st Signal
Brigade has blanket authority to withdraw any item from
Hernando's Hideaway, subject only to the requirement that he
provide an issue slip to document (for audit trail purposes)
the disposal of the assets.

Large or bulk items which would not fit in the CONEX are
stored under canvas along the other sides of the compound.

Once a month a machine listing of Hernando's Hideaway
assets is prepared and distributed widely to 1st Signal Brigade
units and to other USASTRATCOM Commands in the Pacific area,
thus informing them of the availability of these assets. Items
for which there has been no demand in six months are reported
for disposition instructions, which may include return to the
Property Disposal Yard. So far there have been few items in
this category.

It may be noted that not all withdrawals from the Property
Disposal Yard pass through Hernando's Hideaway. By far the
majority of the material withdrawals are used directly by the
Group withdrawing the assets. As of 1 May 1971 the total
dollar value of withdrawals from Property Disposal Yards by
1st Signal Brigade elements, for use within the Brigade, totaled $1,742,712. The monthly issues to Brigade units from
Hernando's Hideaway showed a steadily increasing utilization
of these assets as Brigade personnel became more aware that
Hernando's hideaway offered the solution to many of their
most vexing problems. Monthly issues from Hernando's hideaway,
from inception to 1 May 1971 were as follows:

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Month | Nr of issues | Value
---|---|---
Aug 70 | 3 | $231
Sep 70 | 40 | 4,096
Oct 70 | 83 | 11,565
Nov 70 | 176 | 27,517
Dec 70 | 277 | 25,921
Jan 71 | 452 | 66,184
Feb 71 | 452 | 47,569
Mar 71 | 567 | 128,600
Apr 71 | 345 | 52,000

2,364 | $367,293

Operation Thrift has thus enhanced the operational capabilities of the 1st Signal Brigade, improved the living and working conditions of 1st Signal Brigade personnel, and permitted completion of projects which had been in a hold status for many months due to lack of material.

In addition to the above the 1st Signal Brigade has withdrawn from PDO and shipped to Fort Huachuca materials needed for important post projects and for use by the USASTRATCOM Communications-Electronics Engineering and Installation Agency. These materials have an acquisition value in excess of $1,343,780.
The recovery of a complete ICS site is a complex operation, entailing such functions as dismantling communications-electronics equipment, disassembling antennae and towers, removing generators, air conditioners and power control equipment, dismantling the buildings, preserving/packing/packaging all of the foregoing for shipment and transporting it to a port area for shipment. In addition to the expertise required there must be comprehensive documentation, including tagging of individual components and preparation of packing lists and shipping documents. There is also a massive requirement for logistical support, including procurement and delivery of lumber and packing materials, arrangements for transportation, establishment of facilities for building boxes and crates, provision of fork lift/wreckers/cranes, and numerous other capabilities.

Experience with recovery of the first few ICS sites and Dial Telephone Exchanges made it abundantly clear that the relatively small ad hoc organization put together for that effort was not adequate for the magnitude of the job that lay ahead. Consequently, in March 1971 the Communications Assets Recovery Agency was established as an element of the 1st Signal Brigade, within currently authorized spaces and utilizing available personnel. The organization, mission and functions of CARA are as outlined in the inclosure to this Tab.

The process of organizing and establishing CARA on paper was relatively straightforward. The acquisition of material resources (fork lifts, compressors, wreckers, flat bed semi-trailers, etc) proved much more difficult, and at this time has not been satisfactorily resolved in entirety. Acquisition of personnel with appropriate skills has also been somewhat slower than desired.

The decision as to the number of mobile teams to be included in the CARA structure was based on the forecast of known and anticipated tasks. In addition to removal of ICS sites and Dial Telephone Exchanges CARA is also charged with dismantling pre-engineered buildings at various locations in Vietnam, either for retrograde or for reinstallation elsewhere in Vietnam (which is also a CARA responsibility).
Tasks accomplished by CADA and its predecessor organization are as follows:

1. Seven ICS sites (to include C-R equipment, IR building, power generating equipment and building, antenna, tower and all ancillary equipment).

2. Five Dial Telephone Exchanges (minimum of 1000 lines).

3. Twelve ICS radio terminals (to include NDX gear, antenna, and tower).

4. Six transportable ICS sites (e.g. MDC-65 & VSC-82), to include antennas and towers.

5. Two HF receiver sites and one HF transmitter site.

6. Four communications centers and 19 AN/FSG-70 teletype terminals and AN/AS packs.

7. Two UNIVAC 1004 computer systems, three IBM 360/20 systems and numerous single items of rental data processing equipment.

Projected workload for CADA for FY-72 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Installation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Time Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Com Centers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Nov - 1 Q FY 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 Q FY 72 - 4 Q FY 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dial Telephone Exchange</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 Q FY 72 - 3 Q FY 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. AUTODIN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Q FY 72 - 4 Q FY 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ICS Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Site and 1 Terminal</td>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sites and 7 Terminals</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Q FY 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Site and 3 Terminals</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Q FY 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sites and 4 Terminals</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Q FY 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sites and 2 Terminals</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Q FY 72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In CARA lies the key to success or failure in the entire program to recover and retrograde these valuable C-E assets. It is hard and exacting work, often under the most difficult conditions of weather and environment. Replenishment of expendable supplies is a continuing problem, as is transportation of the large volume of material which comprises an ICS site or a Dial Telephone Exchange.

Due to non-availability of fork lifts, flat bed trailers, and other key items, plus certain personnel shortages, CARA has not yet been able to demonstrate its full capability. The members of CARA have nonetheless performed in an outstanding manner under frequently adverse circumstances, and have demonstrated to me that a lesser organization is not adequate to the magnitude of the total task confronting the 1st Signal Brigade at this time and for many months to come.
COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS RECOVERY BRANCH, CARA

The Communications Assets Recovery Branch, referred to as CARB, is the mission performance element of the agency and is organized into one fixed team with facilities located at Long Binh RVN, and three mobile teams. The fixed team is responsible for preservation and packaging in the Long Binh/Saigon area, while the mobile teams are capable of performing the complete recovery functions of de-installation, preservation, packaging, and packing (referred to as D/PPP) of various sites and equipment on location throughout Southeast Asia. Each mobile team is subdivided into functional sections (the C-E de-installation section, the preservation, packaging, and packing section, and the antenna/engineer de-installation section).

OPERATIONS BRANCH, CARA

The Operations Branch of CARA is the staff element responsible for accepting tasking from HQ, 1st Signal Brigade, staff coordination with elements of the Brigade, tasking, and integrated planning for the various elements of the agency.

SUPPORT BRANCH, CARA

The Support Branch, CARA, is responsible for vehicle maintenance, material availability, storage capability, transportation requirements, and accountability of all equipment used by the entire unit. To fulfill this requirement, Support Branch, CARA, is subdivided into a Motor maintenance section, supply section, yard section, and transportation section.
MISSION: To de-install, preserve, package and pack fixed USASTRATCOM C-2 Assets, real property associated with communications sites, and other government assets in RVN as directed.

Monitor and assist the 29th Signal Group as required.
Prodigious efforts of many people over a period of many years have resulted in an approved force structure for the Vietnamese Army, US-approved TOEs and TDAs for Vietnamese Signal Corps units and activities, and approved plans and programs for turnover of equipment and facilities to the ARVN. In the tactical communications area the equipment authorizations have been tailored to the force structure to be supported. In the non-tactical area (ICS, Dial Telephone Exchanges, Area Commcenters, etc) the determination of facilities and equipment to be turned over has been carefully evaluated in the context of Vietnamese civil and military requirements of the future. A major consideration in all these determinations has been the ability of the Vietnamese Army to produce enough trainable personnel to adequately operate and maintain the facilities and equipment which they will receive.

The Vietnamese Army has its own Signal School at Vung Tau. They do a fine job of training the Vietnamese soldiers to operate, maintain and manage the employment of tactical communications equipment. In addition, the 1st Signal Brigade conducts 3 training programs for ARVN soldiers:

a. The US/RVNAF Training Facility at Vung Tau.

b. The US Army Southeast Asia Signal School #1.

c. The 1st Signal Brigade "Buddies Together" Program.

THE US/RVNAF SIGNAL TRAINING FACILITY AT VUNG TAU:

This is a government-owned/contractor-operated activity which trains selected RVNAF personnel in the operation, maintenance and repair of ICS and Dial Telephone Exchange equipment. A prerequisite for attendance at this school is the ability to speak English adequately to absorb the technical training. To achieve this level of proficiency Vietnamese servicemen are given aptitude tests and selected members are trained at an English Language school, also located in Vung Tau. English Language training lasts from 20 to 40 weeks, depending upon the aptitude of the individual student. Student progress is tested periodically, and those students who are not making adequate progress are siphoned off to other tasks where whatever English Language proficiency they have developed can be put to use. Students who successfully complete this English Language course are then given an additional 4 weeks of intensive training in the specialized English Language of the communications-electronics technician.

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Following this the students enter the US/RVNAF Training Facility and receive a 10 week course in basic electronics. Graduates of this course who are destined to be Dial Central Office Repairman are then moved directly to 12 weeks of specialized technical training in that field. Students destined to become multiplex or microwave repairman receive an additional 4 weeks of common subjects training, after which they branch out into the 12 week multiplex specialized training course or the 16 week course of specialized training in microwave repair.

All graduates are sent to an operating site for supervised On-the-Job-Training for as long as it takes them to become site qualified. It appears this will normally require 6 months.

Up to this time the technical controllers for ICS sites have been trained at the ARVN Signal School by a combination of US Military and ARVN instructors. The US/RVNAF Training Facility will commence training of technical controllers in the near future.

The first class began training in basic electronics at the US/RVNAF Training Facility on 1 July 1970. The first class (11 students in the microwave repairman course) graduated on 3 February 1971 and is currently in the on-site OJT phase of their training. Since 3 February the classes, purposely kept small in size, have been graduating with reassuring regularity. The school facility has the capability of handling 6 basic electronics classes simultaneously, and input is phased so that a class graduates about every 2 weeks.

Student dropout from all causes has been very low, approximating 9% of those who begin technical training at the US/RVNAF Training Facility. Student output and current status are as follows:

H-29
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>IN COUNTRY</th>
<th>OFF SHORE</th>
<th>OJT</th>
<th>SITE QUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BASIC ELECT/COMM F SUBJ</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICROWAVE REPAIR (REQ 316)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECH CONTROLLER (REQ 311)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARRIER EQUIP REPAIR (REQ 164)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAL CENTRAL OFFICE REPAIR (REQ 143)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The US/RVNAF Training Facility is operated by PAGE Communications Engineers under contract. In addition to installing all the equipment in the school facility and conducting all training, PAGE is responsible for training ARVN instructors to take over the full training responsibility. There has thus been established a stable capability which need not be seriously affected by withdrawal of US Military Forces, and which can continue in effective operation as long as may be required for the ARVN to become prepared and take over this training facility. The ARVN should be able to phase in instructor personnel (15 of whom have been trained at Fort Monmouth for this specific mission) and achieve a high level of independent capability in 12-18 months. I anticipate it will be necessary to retain a small nucleus of contractor personnel for many years, both to insure a continued high level of sophistication in the training and to provide adequate expertise in the maintenance and repair of school facilities.

Two major tasks must be accomplished before this facility will reach its peak of effectiveness as a Vietnamese training institution.

a. All site manuals and training literature must be translated from English to Vietnamese. The technical nature of this literature requires translators of considerable technical sophistication, and such personnel are few in number. They are also greatly in demand for translation of technical documents for tactical communications-electronics equipment, radar equipment, and equipment of other Services. It therefore appears that completion of this translation task is at least 24 months in the offing. Outstanding graduates of the training facility could be brought back after completion of their OJT and assigned the task of translating the literature, but this would further delay the full Vietnamization of the operating sites. The trade-off should be evaluated carefully.

b. As long as the US Military and US contractor personnel continue to operate portions of the ICS there will continue to be a need to train Vietnamese students in the English Language. The hour by hour, minute by minute coordination of activities on the complex ICS System requires continuing interchange of technical information among and between the sites. It is unlikely that the Americans will ever become sufficiently proficient in the Vietnamese Language to achieve this capability for technical coordination, and the future tenure of US Military forces in Vietnam makes it imprudent to embark upon a Vietnamese Language training program for US Military. It therefore appears that the requirement for proficiency in technical English Language will continue until
such time as the Vietnamese have assumed full responsibility for the individual ICS. At that point in time they should have developed the capability to conduct the training in the Vietnamese language, and the 20-40 weeks of English language training will no longer be required. At that time, of course, the U.S. will have already trained all of the personnel required to operate the ICS, and the only need for the training facility will be to maintain a small but steady flow of replacement personnel. In addition, however, the training facility has great potential value to the Republic of Vietnam as a source of trained personnel to operate and maintain the civilian communications system which will be developing over the next decade or two. The training facility therefore appears destined to continue operation for many years to come.

**THE SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGNAL SCHOOL #1, AT LONG BINH:**

This school was established to provide refresher training for incoming Signal personnel who needed such training. Many replacement personnel came from other overseas areas or assignments in CONUS where the equipment they worked with was different than the equipment to which they were assigned in Vietnam. Even recent-school graduates were found to have need of additional training to bridge the gap between classroom theory and the practicalities of the battlefield. Once the facility was established the mission was expanded to include training of Free World Military Armed Forces (including Vietnamese Armed Forces personnel) as requested by them and within the physical capabilities of the school facility.

The SEASS #1 has trained a goodly number of ARVN communicators in a wide variety of skills, and continues to do so. It has made an important contribution to the total Vietnami- cation Program.

**THE "BUDDIES TOGETHER" PROGRAM:**

A third program, and one which has to date generated by far the largest number of trained ARVN communicators, is the 1st Signal Brigade "Buddies Together" Program. In this program the units of the 1st Signal Brigade at all command levels, from Brigade Commander to the individual soldier on the site, work intimately with their ARVN counterpart in a combination of formalized classroom training and On-the-Job-Training. When possible the ARVN soldiers come to the US facility on a detail or temporary duty basis for varying periods of time, depending upon the nature of the training they are to receive.
In some instances the Brigade personnel go to the ARVN site and conduct training on the ARVN equipment and in the ARVN environment.

Training under the "Buddies Together" Program has not been limited to the purely technical aspects of communications-electronics. Recognizing that the ARVN Signal Corps personnel must operate complete systems and facilities, the "Buddies Together" training has encompassed all related functions, such as generator operation, maintenance and repair, air conditioning maintenance and repair, wheeled vehicle maintenance, and many administrative specialties. Over 30 different subjects have been taught. The controlling philosophy of the "Buddies Together" Program has been that if the ARVN want the training we will provide it, regardless of the subject matter.

The close rapport which has developed between 1st Signal Brigade personnel and their ARVN counterparts has led to some very close off duty relationships. Brigade personnel habitually invite their ARVN counterparts to picnics and parties, and the ARVN respond in kind. Athletic contests, exchange of awards and trophies, and civic action programs to improve the lot of the ARVN soldier have proliferated throughout the Brigade. These close personal relationships have reaped benefits in improved cooperation among American and Vietnamese personnel during this critical period of phasedown of US communications and turnover of selected facilities and responsibilities to the ARVN Signal Corps. Twenty-eight Province Senior Advisors and six Division Combat Advisory Teams currently receive their communications support through Vietnamese Communications Systems, and this transition has been greatly facilitated by the close personal relations established among US and ARVN communicators through the "Buddies Together" Program.

The biggest constraint on the three training programs described above has been the limited ability of the ARVN Signal Corps to provide students. The ARVN Signal Corps must compete with other branches of the army, the other military departments, and the civil government for personnel having high intelligence and aptitude for communications-electronics training. The standards of civilian education in Vietnam are not such as to produce great quantities of personnel so qualified. In addition, the necessity to support on-going tactical operations understandably has the highest priority for personnel. During Operation Lamson 719 there was a noticeable decrease in the number of ARVN communicators made available for training under the "Buddies Together" Program. The same has been true when other major operations were in progress.
Notwithstanding the many problems encountered, the training programs have proven highly effective. As of 31 March 1971, 810 students were in training, 1,727 had completed training and an additional 121 were site qualified for ICS. This is a very commendable performance which reflects great credit on all participants.
Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Hugh F. Foster, Jr.

Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 19 June 70 thru 1 May 1971.

MG Hugh F. Foster, Jr.

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