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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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Situation at the Beginning of the Period. The most significant contact during August occurred on 18 August, when a VC operation from TTHN PHOC raided a VC complex consisting of 27 structures approximately 17 kilometers southwest of the camp. The contact, which resulted in 27 structures destroyed and seven VC killed, was believed to have involved an element of the 622nd VC Special Force Sapper Battalion. Enemy activity was at a low level throughout MR-2 during August as major elements of the POL Front remained out of contact. Intelligence continued to indicate that Special Forces camps within "7th Provinces Province had been targeted for an offensive to be conduct until September. In addition to sporadic contacts around Camps DUC 33 and PHOC MT, several caches were discovered within PLET ME's TAOR, where the K-1 Battalion, 75th NVA Regiment, had been identified in contact. Additionally, intelligence indicated a southward movement of enemy units through Pave Areas 701 & 702, as well as an increased activity within Pave Area 74C. Enemy activity, which was light throughout MR-3 during the month of August, was centered along Highway 22, between "7th" City and the Cambodian border. Elements of the 95th NVA and 271st VC Regiments, 9th VC Division, as well as the 239th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, remained in western War Zone C, where they continued to direct activities against Allied operations. Intelligence continued to indicate that enemy units within sub-regions 1, 2, and 3 were continuing to experience difficulties in personnel replacements and resupply, thereby forcing them to downsize the number of main force units to smaller guerrilla-type elements, as well as to disband and deactivate several units. Elsewhere in the MR, the enemy increased his infiltration attempts into MR-4, Province from the 111 NVA Base Area of Cambodia. With the exception of the period 29 to 31 August, during which hostilities were intensified, enemy activity in MR-4 during the month of August remained at a low level. By contrast, activity occurring in the IIIrd Special Tactical Zone maintained a constant low level. The enemy's brief period of increased activity probably represented an attempt to disrupt the senatorial elections of 30 August. His efforts at this time were characterized by limited attacks by fire against lightly defended troop positions, provincial capitals, and district towns. Prior to this high point, the enemy was thought to have been primarily concerned with resupply activities, personnel recruitment, and the resourcing of his former Cambodian sanctuaries.

Operations. The statistical data on operations conducted this quarter are shown in enclosure 5. OTU's Camp Strike Forces (CF) were engaged in sound, platoon and company size operations throughout their TAORs to provide intelligence, hammer enemy's weapons, and to otherwise conduct offensive operations.

Situation at the End of the Reporting Period. During October, the most significant contacts and intelligence activities involving Special Forces assets in MR-1 occurred within Camp TWINN DUC's TAOR. Attacks by fire plagued the camp during virtually the entire month, and four major contacts by Camp and "While Strike" Forces operations resulted in 18 enemy killed. The only other significant contact in MR-1, an operation from Camp TWINN SON killed 13 enemy. The contacts within TWINN DUC's TAOR were possible with units of the 11th NVA Regiment, elements of which were reported to have been participating in the attacks by fire against...
the camp. The attacks ceased during the last five days of the month, probably due to adverse weather conditions and the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by SF and MSF operations. October activity affecting Special Forces areas of interest within MR 2 was centered around Camp "THM", where sporadic contacts with up to company-size enemy units occurred throughout the month. Late in October, the enemy initiated an offensive against military installations in southwestern PLETKU Province, attacking SFP Oasis, the height Davis Engineer Compound, and various APWN and PUP/PP positions. On 23 October, the K-394th NVA Artillery Battalion was identified in contact in the eastern portion of PLETKU TAOR. Intelligence continued to indicate an enemy buildup within Cambodia, north of Camp BK FRAMG, and sporadic contacts occurred with unidentified enemy elements transporting supplies over a trail network in the northeastern portion of the TAOR. Elsewhere within Special Forces areas of interest, activity remained at a low level. During October, enemy activity was at a low level throughout MR 1. There were no major enemy relocation except for the 11th NVA Regiment, 6th "C" Division, which is believed to have relocated north into Cambodia from an area south of the K-394th NVA Artillery Battalion was identified in contact in the eastern portion of PLETKU TAOR. With the reported dispersal of the 1st NVA Regiment into small local force elements, there are presently no enemy units of regimental size operating in the TCM Vaccination Area. To the west of PLETKU Province, a new sapper battalion, the 10th, was reportedly operating in Base Area 35M, and north of TAY NAM City. Intelligence also indicated that the enemy has established a new infiltration route through central TAY NAM Province southward into Sub-Regions 1 and 5. Enemy activity in MR 1 remained at a low level throughout the month. The problem of personnel deficiencies was reported to be extensive among enemy units in northeastern MR 1. These shortages were said to have led to the disbanding of the 502nd GC Local Force Battalion in Base Area 170, as well as other enemy units in TAY NAM Province. Elsewhere, there was evidence of impending enemy movement from Cambodia into MR 1. Within Base Area 170, indications were received of troop movement by elements of the 1st NVA Regiment from "DD" TAI and "C" CAP to NAM 270 in the Seven Mountains region, possibly to avoid APWN operations on the two northern mountains.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

b. (C) Intelligence

(1) Significant Section Activities

(a) Collection: During the reporting period the S2 Collection Branch approved a total of 23 revised Operational Plans and addenda. Thirteen Operational Plans were terminated. Further, a total of 297 coded informants were terminated and 15 prospective agents were coded. During the three month period a total of 1,633,163 SVN ($13,846,45) from Cost Code 912 Funds was expended, resulting in the production of 2,598 intelligence reports (IRs). For the reporting period the cost per IR was $5.33. Nine Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICRs) and four SICR management messages were processed. Also during the quarter the FY 71 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter budget estimates were reviewed and revised. The final stages of the termination of intelligence operations were completed at 16 Special Forces camps.

(b) Operations:

1 A previously produced special study portraying troop ethnic composition in each CIDG camp was up-dated in August, September and October. These revisions were of particular import in recording significant changes in troop strength brought about by the conversion of numerous CIDG camps.

2 During the reporting period 5th SF GP (Abn) Intelligence Bulletins 7-70 through 9-70 were prepared and disseminated to all subordinate elements. The bulletins contained information of a general intelligence value, such as enemy weapons, tactics, and possible courses of action. In addition, reviews of significant dates during applicable months were included in view of the fact that the enemy has on past occasions initiated offensive activity to coincide with and commemorate certain dates of political, religious or historical importance.

(c) Counterintelligence:

1 Counterintelligence (CI) inspection teams conducted two announced and seven unannounced CI inspections in addition to local records checks, personnel security interviews and subject interviews. Inspecting agents were requested by staff sections of Headquarters and subordinate elements of 5th SF GP (Abn) for assistance concerning security matters and aided in advising elements in the security of defense information during forthcoming camp conversion and phase-down of 5th SF CI (Abn). Agent personnel were also involved in the incident investigations which concerned the well being and safety of the personnel residing on SIU3.

2 The Security Administration Section in-processed 510 personnel during the period 13 July through 12 October 1970, and out-processed 949. Persons processed for Special Leave totaled 92. 154 background investigations and 12 national agency checks were initiated on personnel processing into 5th SF GP (Abn), while 92 persons were processed for cryptographic clearance.
During the reporting period the polygraph section began organic support once again (on 14 September 1970). Since then the section has conducted 44 examinations concerning suspected Viet Cong activities and general security screening type examinations. In the first month of the resumption of the program, the examiner gave support to all four Military Regions.

The Special Operations Section increased the productivity of its intelligence nets through increased liaison and expansion of agents in the field. During the period July through October, twelve Viet Cong Infrastructure members and 22 Viet Cong were identified. Also, 27 raw information reports were disseminated to the intelligence community by 5th SF GP (Abn), 1st SF, Counterintelligence Branch.
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SUBJECT: Operational P’-t - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Peri.. sing 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(2) Military Region I.

(a) In early August the estimated enemy troop strength in MR I was 56,500 personnel, of which 49,000 were combat troops. There were three confirmed enemy divisions, nine independent regiments, and 35 independent battalions held by Order of Battle to be operating within the MR. Although no troop strength figures were received during September or October, USARV Order of Battle, as of late October, carried three enemy divisions, 17 independent regiments, and 35 independent battalions as operating within or on the borders of MR I.

(b) Enemy activity was generally at an extremely low level during August with little or no significant contacts reported from the majority of the CIDG camp.. The most significant intelligence development was the indication that the 304th NVA Division, which had infiltrated into QUANG TRI Province during the months of June and July, had undergone a major reorganization prior to infiltration. PW’s captured from the division’s 9th and 66th NVA Regiments revealed that their units no longer maintained sapper companies which are normally subordinate to an infantry regiment. It is now believed that these sapper companies possibly formed the nucleus for the newly activated 29th Sapper Battalion. In QUANG NAM Province, elements of the 5th Mobile Strike Force (MSF) conducted operations in an area north of Camp THUONG DUC, where enemy activity remained at a low level and little significant intelligence was received. In QUANG TIN Province, on 14 August, a CSF operation from TIEN PHUOC discovered an unoccupied regimental-size complex six kilometers northeast of the camp. On 18 August, another camp operation from TIEN PHUOC raided a VC complex consisting of 27 structures, approximately 5 kilometers southwest of the camp, resulting in seven VC killed. On 25 August, following a contact with an estimated enemy platoon 15 kilometers south of TIEN PHUOC, a search of the contact area yielded a cache of equipment the zone of which suggested the possibility that the site had been used as an ordnance facility. The contact, in which two VC were killed and four were captured, was believed to have involved an element of the 402d VC Local Force Sapper Battalion. In QUANG NGAI Province, information received from PW’s, HOI CHANH’s, and captured documents exposed indications of an impending offensive to be conducted by NVA, as well as VC Local and Main Force elements in the near future. A compilation of reports indicates that the enemy intended to complement his direct fire attacks against PF/FF outposts with indirect fire attacks against the more populated areas of QUANG NGAI City. During the month of September, enemy activity in MR I was generally at a low level with the exception of the AN NHA-THUONG DUC area. During the month of September, enemy activity throughout the remainder of MR I consisted primarily of the movement of VC Local Force and Main Force elements toward the coastal lowlands. On 29 September at 1030 hours, Camp THUONG DUC and THUONG DUC District Headquarters received an indirect fire attack consisting of approximately 50 mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket rounds. Three civilians were killed, two were wounded, and one bunker was destroyed. During the weeks prior to the attack, several agent reports had indicated that elements of enemy units were deploying toward THUONG DUC. A HOI CHANH statement at THUONG DUC District Headquarters on 24 September revealed that the 38th NVA Regiment, VC Military Region 5, was in the
area of the camp and would attack during the monsoon season. Further agent reports indicated particularly heavy enemy movement within four to five kilometers of the camp. In addition to the 38th "VA Regiment, the 577th NVA Rocket Battalion is believed to be involved at THUONG DUC. Present indications are that the attacks against the camp will continue during October, with the possibility of ground probes also being employed. Elsewhere in MR 1, Special Forces assets will probably continue to find enemy activity at a relatively low level. During the month of October, the most significant contacts and intelligence activities occurred within Camp THUONG DUC's TAOR. Continuing attacks-by-fire plagued the camp during virtually the entire month, and four major contacts by Camp and Mobile Strike Force operations resulted in 48 enemy killed. In the only other significant contact in MR 1, an operation from Camp HONG SON killed 13 enemy. The contacts within Camp THUONG DUC's TAOR were possibly with units of the 38th NVA Regiment, elements of which were reported to be participating in the attacks-by-fire on the camp. Information received from a POW who was captured on 15 October in THUONG DUC's TAOR revealed that the operational plan for the 38th Regiment is to maneuver the 490th Sapper Battalion and the 38th Regiment's 8th Battalion into an encirclement and attack of THUONG DUC during the 1970 monsoon season. Meanwhile, the 9th Battalion, 38th Regiment, is to fend off ARVN reinforcements with the aid of a 12.7mm antiaircraft machinegun company against Allied air support. The attacks-by-fire against Camp THUONG DUC ceased for the last five days of the month, probably due to adverse weather conditions and the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by CSF and MSF operations. The lull is expected to continue as long as the adverse weather conditions prevail. Elsewhere in MR 1, there were no significant intelligence activities involving Special Forces assets.

(c) There were no new weapons or equipment introduced in MR 1 during the reporting period.

(d) By the end of the reporting period, all Special Forces "A" Detachment camps in MR 1 had been converted into the ARVN Ranger border surveillance system. Therefore, forecasts as to enemy activities involving Special Forces assets in MR 1 are not applicable.

(3) Military Region 2.

(a) In early August, the estimated enemy strength in MR 2 was 57,000 personnel, of which 39,500 were combat troops. During the reporting period, enemy initiated activity was centered in southwestern PLEIKU Province. Contacts occurred throughout the period within Camp PLET ME's TAOR, and in late October the enemy initiated an offensive against military installations in that area. Elsewhere in MR 2, the enemy has been engaged primarily in supply procurement, as severe food and ammunition shortages have greatly hindered other activities during recent months. As of late October, estimated enemy strength was 57,000 personnel, of which 39,500 were combat troops.
(b) During the month of August, enemy activity ranged from a low to moderate level throughout MR 2. In KONTUM Province, enemy activity remained at a low level, with CSF operations reporting no significant contacts. However, intelligence received during the month continued to indicate that the enemy may be planning to conduct another major offensive in the DAK SEANG area prior to the end of the calendar year. Additionally, intelligence sources suggested the presence of a new NVA regiment west of DAK SEANG, which was reportedly equipped with armored vehicles and accompanied by Chinese advisors. An earlier report from the same area stated that a 1st NVA Regiment would coordinate with the 28th NVA Regiment to conduct offensive activity in the DAK SEANG area. Although the actual presence of such units remains unconfirmed, sensor activations indicated increased infiltration into the region during late July and early August. Activity increased slightly in Camp BEN HEI's TAOR during the month, as CSF operations sighted lights on several occasions and elements of the 4th MSF Battalion reported contacts with up to platoon-size enemy elements, as well as the discovery of several recently used bunker complexes. In PLEIKU Province, enemy activity continued at a moderate level as CSF operations from all four CIDG camps reported contacts up to company-size enemy units. Intelligence continued to suggest an upcoming offensive to be conducted within the province. However, resupply and transportation problems continued to hinder the enemy build-up, suggesting that the offensive might possibly be delayed. During late July, a PW captured nine kilometers northwest of Camp PLEI HE revealed that elements of the K-1 Battalion, 95B NVA Regiment, and the 631st NVA Artillery/Infantry Battalion were operating within PLEI HE's TAOR. On 8 August, an intelligence source reported that a 143d NVA Regiment with an estimated strength of 1,000 men was located 26 kilometers southwest of Camp PLEI Krong, inside Base Area 702. Although Order of Battle does not carry a 143d NVA Regiment, other intelligence sources did indicate increased activity within the base area. Elsewhere in PLEIKU Province, an intelligence source reported that a 2d NVA Regiment, BKQ Division, was located five kilometers northeast of PLEI Krong with the mission of attacking PLEIKU City during late August or early September. Although Order of Battle does not carry a 2d NVA Regiment in this area, other intelligence sources indicated that a battalion-size enemy unit was operating within the camp's TAOR. On 22 and 23 August, PW's captured 18 kilometers northwest of the camp revealed that the 1st Company, VC Region 5, was operating in the area. During late August, CSF operations from Camps DUC and PLEI HE discovered a three-ton rice cache in the K-1 Battalion's normal area of operations. Throughout the month, enemy transportation elements travelling through PLEI HE's TAOR encountered CSF operations and other friendly units. An additional burden was placed on enemy resupply efforts by the requirements of enemy units operating deep inside Cambodia. PW's revealed that supplies were being carried from Base Area 702 to the BA KEV area of Cambodia. Enemy activity during the month was at a low level in the southern portion of MR 2. Intelligence received during the latter portion of the month suggested an increase in activity in Base Area 470. However, Order of Battle carried only elements of the 250th NVA Transportation Regiment as operating in the vicinity, and the actual presence of any new units remained unconfirmed. During September, enemy activity affecting
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Special Forces assets in HR 2 remained at a low level, with major units of the H-3 Front remaining out of contact. The only significant contact in KOTUM Province occurred at Camp DAK MEK. On 12 September, the camp received three rounds of 81mm mortar fire and a ground probe by an estimated platoon-size enemy force. The camp received several other ground probes during the month, probably carried out by the 1st Company, 505th Inf BN. The BN was reported as the only local force company normally operating within DAK's AO. Elsewhere in KOTUM Province, an intelligence source indicated that the enemy was operating within DAK's AO. Intelligence continued to indicate that the enemy might initiate a large-scale offensive against Special Forces border camps. Enemy activity in the province remained at a low level during the month, however. Operatic contacts occurred within the AO of Camps HAIK MEK and ANG CO., involving enemy units of up to company-size in the same general area where the H-3 Battalion, 95th Inf BN, was last reported in contact during late July. However, intelligence sources reported that the battalion had relocated to Cambodia, and it was later positively identified in that country during September. FW's captured on 12 September by the battalion identified the 105th Battalion as operating along Route 10, south of Pleiku City. The FW's further stated that the unit would coordinate with the 106th BN Local Force Super Battalion to conduct operations along Route 10.

It was reported that the 42nd Local Force Company was operating in the area with the mission of interdicting Highway 15 east of Pleiku. In addition, previous intelligence indicated that the 42nd Local Force Company was in the Pleiku Province area. Elements of the 63rd Arm BN, working in concert, made several contacts during late September; approximately five miles south of the city. The 42nd Local Force Company was captured on 12 September. Intelligence continued to indicate that the enemy might initiate a large-scale offensive against Special Forces border camps. Enemy activity in the province remained at a low level during the month, however. Operatic contacts occurred within the AO of Camps HAIK MEK and ANG CO., involving enemy units of up to company-size in the same general area where the H-3 Battalion, 95th Inf BN, was last reported in contact during late July. However, intelligence sources reported that the battalion had relocated to Cambodia, and it was later positively identified in that country during September. FW's captured on 12 September by the battalion identified the 105th Battalion as operating along Route 10, south of Pleiku City. The FW's further stated that the unit would coordinate with the 106th BN Local Force Super Battalion to conduct operations along Route 10.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970, Hq. USA, ARVN-65 (K2)

In the lovin, major units of the enemy's 1-3 front remained out of contact
and continued resupply activities. Several contacts and incidents of anti-
hill activity were reported within Camp Lao (K2), possibly indicating
that elements of the 129th Artillery Regiment were still present in the
vicinity. Early in October, K4THM City received eleven 122mm rocket rounds.
Within seven days, and intelligence indicated that harassing attacks-by-fire
were continued within PHU Province. Activity was centered in Camp Lao, N.E.
Both of the operations made frequent contacts with up to company-size en-
counter force in the month. The enemy initiated an offensive against military
installations in the PHU PE area. Documents captured on 23 October by elements
of the 7th ARVN Regiment revealed that elements of the 1-34th Artillery
Battalion were operating within PULN Province. On 30 and 31 October, attacks
were mounted against Fire Support Base Gans, Camp Nam Bo, Davis, and its instal-
lations in southwestern PULN Province. The large-scale]apper attack against
the front logically indicates that the P-20th Artillery Battalion has relocated
from Pleiku Province from Cambodia. The increased willingness to extend
the perimeter by elimination of ammunition indicated that the supply shortage which had
rendered the enemy in this area had been alleviated. Intelligence sources and
previously indicated that the enemy would return to PHU Province after the
rainy season, and the identification of the 1-34th Artillery Battalion, substantiates
these reports. In the southern portion of PULN activity was centered
approximately 13 kilometers north-northeast of Camp Bo-Bo, where the enemy has
established a trail network extending from the Cambodian border into the interior
of QUANG DUC Province. Captured rockets indicated that the enemy was transport-
ing supplies from QUANG DUC Province into Base Area 140. The 21st Artillery
Battalion was probably responsible for the contacts sustained by all operations
in this vicinity. During November, the enemy is expected to continue supply
activities, while PULN Province may be the target of a limited offensive.

No new enemy weapons or equipment were introduced into the area during the
reporting period.

New intelligence has indicated a substantial enemy buildup in the
vicinity of the area with fighting positions prepared and supply lines
hastened into the region. Order of battle presently consists of the 25th
Infantry Regimental headquarters and the 25th Transportation Battalion
in the vicinity. However, intelligence sources have reported that a combat-
ready unit is located in the area, with the intention of attacking Camp Lao and
other targets in the area. PHU Province is likely to be the center of enemy
initiated activity in the near future, as enemy units previously operating within
Cambodia have returned and are probably now in an offensive posture.

Military Region 3.

In early August, estimated enemy strength in MR 3 was 15,000 personnel,
with 3,000 being combat troops. Camp Lao received sporadic attacks-by-fire
within the month. While an operation from Camp Lao enabled the enemy in the
only major contact involving Special Forces assets. In September, enemy activity throughout the MR generally lessened, with the exception of a significant increase in Camp LOC NINH’s TAOR. During October, the enemy continued to experience supply difficulties which resulted in a further decrease in his combat activities. By the end of October, enemy strength was estimated to be 74,000 personnel, of which 32,500 were combat troops. During August, the enemy in MR J operated with three confirmed divisions, eleven independent regiments, and 35 independent battalions. As of late October, the number of confirmed independent regiments had decreased to eight, while the number of independent battalions increased to 40.

(b) During August, enemy activity was light in both PHUONG LONG and BINH LONG Provinces. It was believed that the 5th VC Division Headquarters remained inside Cambodia, approximately 25 kilometers northwest of Camp BU DOP, while the division’s 17th NVA Regiment was held to be located approximately eight kilometers southwest of BU DOP. Analysis of available intelligence indicated that the 5th Division had formed a new regiment, the 6th, composed of divisional cadre and newly infiltrated personnel. Although the 6th Regiment was carried as unlocated during the month, it was believed to be conducting training exercises inside Base Area 351.

In TAY NINH Province, enemy activity for the second consecutive month was centered along Highway 22 in western War Zone C. On 1 August, a CSF operation from Camp TRAN SITH made contact with an estimated VC/NVA battalion in the vicinity of the TRAN SITH Bridge, eleven kilometers southeast of Camp THIEN NOON. The contact, which resulted in 15 enemy killed, was probably with an element of the 271st VC Regiment, 9th VC Division. Intelligence indicated that the 209th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, and the 95C NVA Regiment, 9th VC Division, had remained north of THIEN NOON to conduct offensive activity against Allied operations in that area. Elsewhere, Camp KATUM received sporadic attacks-by-fire during August, and although the enemy unit responsible remained unidentified, it was believed to have been an element of the 96th NVA Artillery Regiment, 69th VC Artillery Command, which was located approximately ten kilometers northwest of the camp. In HAU NGOIHA Province, enemy activity was again light, although intelligence reports indicated that the 269th VC Main Force and 126th VC Artillery Battalions, along with several unidentified units, began reinfilttrating into the province from the BA THU Base Area of Cambodia. Enemy units in Sub-Regions 1, 2 and 3 experienced severe difficulty in obtaining replacements and supplies throughout the month, forcing a number of elements to downgrade to local force companies. During September, enemy activity remained light in HAP LONG Province. The 124th NVA Regiment, 5th VC Division, was believed to have remained in an area approximately eight kilometers southwest of Camp BU DOP, while the division’s newly-formed 5th NVA Regiment was thought to be continuing its training activities within Base Area 351. The 5th Division headquarters remained out of contact in Cambodia, approximately 25 kilometers northwest of BU DOP. Enemy activity increased to a moderate level in BINH LONG Province, with Camp LOC NINH reporting numerous contacts with up to battalion-size enemy units in an area ten kilometers northeast of the camp. Numerous agent reports indicated that elements of two enemy regiments were located near LOC NINH, although the 275B Regiment, 5th VC Division, was the only unit of that size identified in contact. Enemy activity in TAY NINH Province decreased from a moderate level in early September to a low level by the end of the month. The enemy in that province directed his efforts primarily at the interdiction of Highway 22. Elements of four enemy
regiments were believed to be involved along the highway at various times during the month. Although the 91st NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division was not identified in the contact, elements were reportedly involved in interdictor operations for a six day period prior to redeployment back into Cambodia. The 7th NVA Division's 205th Regiment was believed to be located in the vicinity of KREK, Cambodia, while the 265th Regiment was thought to be located in the vicinity of MINH, also in Cambodia. Elements of the 5th VC Division's 95th and 971st Regiments were believed to have remained during September in an area west and south of the recently converted Special Forces camp at TREN HOCN and reportedly retained the interdiction mission along Highway 32. The 9th Division headquarters was believed to be located west of Base Area 351, while its 275th Regiment was thought to be in the vicinity of KOMPHON CHAM, Cambodia. In IAU NGA and LONG An Province, enemy activity during the month was light, with only sporadic contacts and attacks-by-fire reported. Intelligence continued to indicate that many of the enemy units in the region were suffering from shortages of food, supplies and manpower. In an attempt to compensate for these shortages, VC Sub-Region 7 and 9 reportedly combined to form the LONG An Sub-Region. As part of this move, it was believed that several understrength enemy units were combined to bring their strength up to a reasonably combat effective level. During October, enemy activity was again light in PIKG, LONG and MINH LONG Provinces. The 6th NVA Regiment of the 5th VC Division remained out of contact, probably in Base Area 351. The 765th Regiment, 5th VC Division, which was previously located in an area southwest of Camp TH DOP, was believed to have redeployed during the month deep into Cambodia. The 5th Division headquarters was believed to be located approximately 25 kilometers northwest of Camp TH DOP, while the division's 275th VC Regiment probably remained in an area approximately ten kilometers north of Camp TH MINH, MINH LONG Province. The 156th VC Local Force Battalion was identified several times during the month, and at the end of the period was believed to be operating throughout the northern and central portions of MINH LONG Province. In AN MINH Province, enemy activity varied from a slight increase in enemy activity as compared to September, although no major incidents were reported with the exception of a 30-round attack-by-fire against a KATUM operation on 10 October. A few small arms document captures north of the MINH City identified the 10th Sapper Battalion, Sapper High Command, which was the first positive identification of any sapper battalion operating within IAU MINH Province. Intelligence indicated during October that the enemy has established a new infiltration route from Base Area 351 westward to MINH BA DUB, then south into VC Sub-Regions 1 and 5. The route was reportedly established in an effort to furnish enemy elements in those Sub-Regions with the men and supplies they are seriously lacking. During the coming month, enemy activity in this area is expected to remain at its current level, with no major offensive incidents expected against Special Forces assets.

(c) No new enemy weapons or equipment were introduced into NS during the reporting period.
(d) Enemy activity in MR 3 is expected to remain at a relatively low level during the coming period with no major enemy offensive activity expected near Camps BU KHOP, TRANG SUP, and TONG LE CHON. Activity can be expected to consist of continued resupply missions and the re-establishment of former base areas.

(5) Military Region 4.

(a) In early August, enemy strength in MR 4 was estimated to have been 44,000 personnel, of which 33,600 were believed to have been combat troops. Although at the close of the previous period, the reinfiltiration of troops was suspected, subsequent information tended to discredit the prospect of their return to MR 4 from Cambodia, despite the cessation of Allied cross-border operations. In view of the fact that recent intelligence has emphasized that the enemy is using guerrilla forces, in addition to main and local force units, to effect his anti-pacification policies, it is likely that the capabilities of larger units are being used inside Cambodia. Additional intelligence has suggested that units engaged in counteracting the government's pacification program have been somewhat debilitated by personnel losses, resulting from these activities. As a result, at the end of October, although the total enemy strength in MR 4 remained at approximately 41,000 men, the total number of combat troops was estimated to have been 32,700.

(b) With the exception of the period 29 - 31 August, during which hostilities were intensified, enemy activity during the month of August remained at a low level. By contrast, activity in the 16th Special Tactical Zone during the high point remained at a low level. The enemy's brief period of increased attacks probably represented an attempt to disrupt the senatorial elections of 30 August. His efforts were characterized by limited attacks-by-fire against lightly defended troop positions, provincial capitals, and district towns. Prior to this high point, the enemy was thought to have been primarily concerned with resupply activities, personnel recruitment, and troop movement. In the western portion of MR 4, reports had indicated the buildup of enemy troops on the western slopes of NV GIAI. The reported movement of forces from NUI OTO, as well as the relocation to northwestern NUI GIAI of the 18th NVA Regimental Headquarters, suggested that that unit may have contributed the majority of forces to the troop concentration. Presently, elements of the 18th NVA Regiment are thought to have redeployed to NUI OTO, although, in addition to the reported movement of its 24th Battalion to an area 25 kilometers southeast of HAT TIEN District Town, other information indicated that its 24th Battalion may have relocated to the Three Sisters region. During the month, there were two incidents in the seven mountains area involving 120mm mortars, despite the reported destruction of two of these weapons, the subsequent impacting of a 120mm round at Camp 9A GIAI indicated that the enemy's capabilities may have been significantly increased in Base Area 1400. In the northwestern portion of MR 4, reports reemphasized the possibility that the 295th VC Main Force Battalion was operating in central Base area 704, in conjunction with local guerrilla units. Several reports also indicated that an estimated 200-man company of recruits was being trained in this region. Information suggested that units in the area were
ordered in early August to prepare for an offensive, possibly against selected targets in HONG NGU District, against which activities were reported to have been previously targeted. Elsewhere in MR 4, elements of the 504th VC Local Force Battalion, in conjunction with other guerrilla forces, were reportedly located in the Horseshoe area with the mission of harassing Navy PBR's patrolling the region, probably in an effort to keep the waterways open for resupply activities. In addition to the enemy's interest in the movement of troops and supplies on VC MR 4, evidence also revealed that he may have been interested in resecuring former Cambodian sanctuaries. The emphasis on such efforts may have resulted in the reported deployment of a Forward Command element of the enemy's Military Region II to the southwestern portion of Base Area 470. Allegedly, the Forward Command Post was given direct control over the 88th NVA Regiment, the DT1 and DT2 VC Main Force Regiments, and five provincial guerrilla units. It is possible that this delegation of authority was intended to permit the regional headquarters to devote more of its attention to Cambodian affairs. During September enemy activity consisted primarily of light attacks-by-fire against military outposts and troop installations, as well as taxation efforts, troop movements, and resupply operations. The level of activity remained relatively low throughout the month with the exception of limited highpoints on 23 and 28 September. Except for the deployment westward of an element of the 18B NVA Regiment to a position approximately 25 kilometers southeast of HÀ TIEN District Town, the disposition of major units in MR 4 remained relatively unchanged during the period. Within the Seven Mountains area where the remainder of the regiment was carried, ARVN forces on NUI CAM discovered a cache and contacted an unidentified enemy unit on 20 and 21 September, respectively. According to agent reports and captured documents, the enemy reverted to the use of primarily guerrilla tactics in his effort to counteract the GVN pacification program. Intelligence pertaining to directives allegedly levied on VC committees in districts adjacent to Base Area 704 indicated that COSVN had ordered guerrilla forces to consolidate their capabilities and cooperate with the VC infrastructure, particularly in regard to taxation activities. Elsewhere, a three-phased plan was said to have been initiated to combat the pacification program, to include propagandizing against the GVN, infiltrating People's Self Defense Force and Popular Force outposts, and employing main force tactics against the government's installations. The recipient of the orders, the VC BEN TRE Provincial Committee, was also reported to have been assigned the task of creating a new unit, the 516C VC Local Force Battalion. The battalion was reportedly to have been used--along with COSVN reinforcements--in an offensive scheduled for the end of October. Other information from the period may have disclosed influences affecting the enemy's renewed interest in primary tactics. Whereas various information referred to shortages of weapons and ammunition among enemy forces, a report from KIÊN TUONG Province disclosed that ammunition and equipment had been confiscated from guerrilla forces and shipped to the SONG TRANG Region for distribution to units inside Cambodia. Other indications suggested that morale may have been low among enemy personnel, requiring the addition of NVA troops to several units and the movement elsewhere of men whose homes were near a unit's area.
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of operations, in order to deter desertions. The only section of MR 4 which appeared to have been less affected by shortages was the Seven Mountains region. During the month, several reports suggested that the enemy had deposited supplies in the NHN HANOI Region and that a substantial enemy force may have gathered inside Cambodia along the border of western CHA DINH Province, with the intention of deploying either into Base Area W40 or into the U-HaiN Forest. During the month of October, enemy activity in MR 4 remained at a low level, with an average of 2.6 incidents per day throughout the region. However, the majority of these incidents occurred in W40 and not within MR 4, which had a daily average of only 2.2 incidents within the three provinces of the 4th Special Tactical Zone. Enemy activity was characterized predominantly by anti-pacification attacks by the enemy against outposts in the provinces of KIEN HOA, DINH THONG and VINH BINH. In order to a rallier, the enemy had almost completed the second of three phases of a plan outlined in GCSVN Resolution 20, to defeat the GVN pacification program and initiate a country-wide uprising. However, in contrast to this report, other information suggested that recent hostilities may have been costly to the enemy. A result of losses allegedly suffered in KIEN HOA Province, the enemy was said to have shifted the focal point, from which the projected uprising would spread, from there to DINH THONG Province. In addition, the problem of personnel deficiencies was reported to have been extensive among units in northeastern MR 4. These deficiencies were said to have led to distributing personnel among district level forces and disbanding the 502d VC Local Force Battalion, located in northwestern Base Area W40, and units in KIEN BINA Province. Elsewhere, there was evidence of intended enemy movement from Cambodia into MR 4. Early in the month, a substantial enemy force was reported to have gathered along the Cambodian border northeast of MR 4, with plans to deploy to the U-HAIIN Forest. Later, on 27 October, there was a CSF contact, approximately 25 kilometers west of Camp VINH GIA, with an estimated two platoons, which may have been an element of the previously reported enemy force. Nearby, within Base Area W40, there were indications of troop movements by elements of the 158th REGiment from HAI DINH and KIEN CHAI to HAI CHAI, apparently to avoid VC speculation on the two northern mountains. During the period, in addition to alleged supply operation from the U-HAIIN Forest to Base Area W40, several reports claimed that supplies had been moved to MR 4 for use in the northwest central portion, of which there was a CSF contact with an estimated 50 enemy personnel on 13 October.

(c) There were no new weapons or equipment introduced in MR 4 during the reporting period.

(d) Although it is possible that the enemy will substantially increase activity during the coming period, in accordance with his alleged plans to start a general uprising in the near future, it is more likely that personnel deficiencies and ammunition shortages will preclude a significant rise in the level of hostilities. As a result of these shortages, the enemy units in northeastern MR 4 are reported to have been forced either to conserve for their shortages by purchasing ammunition through penetration agents or to disband and distribute their personnel among local guerrilla forces. Elsewhere in MR 4, a significant increase in...
activity may occur, when the deployment of an allegedly sizeable enemy force to the U-MINH Forest is completed. However, pending the arrival of these troops and others, which may be moving to other areas within the military region, it is unlikely that hostilities will be escalated beyond their current low level.
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c. (C) Operations.

(1) Military Region 1 (Co C)

During the reporting period, Company C assets conducted a total of 1880 operations which resulted in 233 enemy killed, 33 captured and 53 weapons captured.

(a) On 7 Aug, at 1130 hrs, 15 kms SW of TIEN PHUOC, a company sized CSF operation from the Camp initiated contact with a VC Base Camp. Seven VC were killed, four VC, three AK-47's, one M-79 and miscellaneous documents were captured.

(b) On 19 Sep, 10 kms NE of Camp BA TO, a company sized CSF operation from Camp initiated contact with six VC. Enemy broke contact withdrew W. Res: three VC KIA and two AM-79 CIA.

(c) On 18 Oct at 1140 hours, three kms S of Camp THUONG DUC, two companies from the 1st MSF and one company from Camp were fired on by an estimated VC/NVA company. Enemy broke contact S. Twenty VC/NVA were killed, one 75mm RR, two B-40 Rocket Launchers and one Chicom radio were captured. One LLDB and one MSF member were killed and six CSF were wounded.

(d) On 22 Oct at 0518 hours, three kms SE of Camp THUONG DUC, two Co's from the 1st MSF and one company of CSF from Camp were attacked in their night location by an estimated VC/NVA company. Enemy broke contact and withdrew SE. 20 VC/NVA were killed, four AK-47's and one B-40 RL were captured. Five CSF were killed, 13 CSF and three MSF were wounded. Two M-16's, one M-79 and miscellaneous webgear were lost.

(2) Military Region 2 (Co B)

During the reporting period, Company B assets conducted a total of 5,117 operations which resulted in 35 enemy killed, 17 enemy captured and 24 weapons captured.

(a) On 23 August at 1200 hrs, a platoon size CSF operation from Camp PLEI ME, PLEIKU Province, initiated contact with five VC seven kms NW of Camp. Res: One VC KIA, three VC CIA, one M-1 Carbine, 2,000 lbs rice CIA.

(b) On 15 Sep, an ambush from a company CSF operation from Camp BU PRANG, QUANG DUC Province, ambushed four VC/NVA 14 kms NE of Camp. Res: Four VC/NVA KIA, two AK-47's, and four rucksacks full of corn CIA.

(c) On 14 Oct, a platoon CSF operation from Camp BU PRANG, QUANG DUC Province, initiated contact with an NVA platoon 13 kms NNE of the camp. Res: Seven NVA KIA, four AK-47's, CIA.

(3) Military Region 3 (Co A)

During the reporting period, Company A assets conducted a total of 2,335 operations which resulted in 51 enemy killed and 12 weapons captured.
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(a) On 1 Aug, a CSF company operation from Camp TRANG SUP, TAY NINH Province, made contact with an estimated enemy BN, 11 kms SE of Camp THIEN NHON. Results: 15 enemy killed, five AK-47s, one B-40 RL, seven Bangalore torpedoes, 36 Chicom grenades, one 122mm rocket and other assorted equipment and ammunition captured in action. Six CSF WIA.

(b) On 10 Sep, a CSF company from Camp L\OO NINH, BINH LONG Province, initiated contact with an estimated three enemy companies seven kms NE of Camp. Res: 10 VC KIA. One CIDG WIA.

(c) On 10 Oct, a CSF company from Camp KATUM, TAY NINH Province, received 30 rounds of 60mm mortar and small arms fire in their RON position 13 kms NE of Camp. Res: One CIDG KIA.

(4) Military Region 4 (Co D)

During the reporting period, Company D assets conducted a total of 3,321 operations which resulted in 55 enemy killed, one enemy captured, and 26 weapons captured.

(a) In August, there were no significant contacts or incidents reported. Those skirmishes that did occur were sporadic and of short duration. Contacts and incidents dropped to an all time low. Camps TO CHAU and TH\:\-NH TRI converted to ARVN Ranger at the end of the month.

(b) In September, minor contacts and incidents increased, but none were of great significance. The major contacts occurred on the water ways and were initiated against the airboat sections. Camps TUYEN NHON and CAI CAI converted to ARVN Ranger at the end of September.

(c) During October, contacts and incidents continued to increase. The most significant contact was made by Camp VINH GIA in an operation across the border approximately 25 kms W of the camp. Though the number of operations and contacts doesn't compare to the previous quarters results, by the end of October Co D had six fewer camps than in the previous quarter. Camps THUONG THOI and NH NHAN THON converted to ARVN Ranger at the end of October.
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C. CAMP AND ORGANIZATION:

1. CIDG CAMP CONVERSION TO ARVN Ranger:

   a. On 26 Jun 70, 5th SF Gp (Abn) received a message granting authorization to publish a plan for the phaseout of the CIDG program and the phase-down of US Sr. This was to be accomplished during the period 1 Jun 70 to 31 Mar 71. On 30 Jun 70, CP CIDG 3-70 (SCCIDG) the conversion of the CIDG to ARVN Ranger and subsequent phase-down of USASF was published. This order authorized and directed the phase-down of CIDG by requiring conversion of 30 "A" areas to ARVN Ranger during the period 1 Jun 70 to 31 Dec 70. Under this plan USASF strength in support of the CIDG program is to be reduced to zero by 31 Mar 71.

   b. Listed below are the camps that converted during Aug, Sep, and Oct 70.

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<th>CAMP</th>
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<th>HAND-OVER</th>
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       TOTAL HAND-OVER 1 3161

| 1   | Kai Loc | Closed Aug| 455       | 386      |
| 2   | Nhinh Long| 30 Sep  | 455       | 400      |
| 3   | Ba To    | 30 Sep   | 455       | 512      |
| 4   | Gia Vuc  | 30 Sep   | 455       | 424      |
| 5   | Thieu Anar| 30 Sep  | 455       | 339      |
| 6   | Trung Anar| 30 Sep  | 455       | 339      |
| 7   | Thian Anar| 30 Sep  | 455       | 339      |
| 8   | Loo Minh | 30 Sep   | 455       | 339      |
| 9   | Tueyen Anar| 30 Sep  | 455       | 339      |
| 10  | Cai Cal  | 30 Sep   | 455       | 339      |

       TOTAL HAND-OVER 2 3448

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TOTAL PHASE 3: 3,409

(2) USASF Space Reductions: On 11 Oct 70 MACV sent a (keystone notiz) message to 5th Group requiring 5th Group to support Phase V redeployment. In support of Phase V redeployment (keystone notiz), 5th SF Op (Abn) was tasked with reducing USASF strength by 55% to an authorized strength of 1,971.

(3) MR 1 (Company G) Current Plans/Concepts:

(a) Due to the location of Mai Loc and its low recruiting potential, it was decided by JGS and the MR 1 CO to close camp Mai Loc and transfer the CIDC to another location. Mai Loc (A-101) was officially closed on 27 Aug 70 and the detachment was inactivated.

(b) During the reporting period five "A" detachments were inactivated as their CIDC camps were converted to ARVN Ranger. These detachments were: A-254, A-104, A-105, A-106, A-107.

(c) Due to the tactical situation at camp Thieu Duc, the conversion of this camp to ARVN Ranger was postponed until 31 Oct 70.

(l) MR 2 (Company B) Current Plans/Concepts:

(a) Company B continues with conversion to ARVN Ranger as outlined in 5th SF Op (Abn) OPORD 3-70 and Company B OPORD 10-70.

(b) During the reporting period six "A" detachments were inactivated as their camps converted to ARVN Ranger. These detachments were: A-211, A-231, A-233, A-251, A-253, and A-255. Also, detachment A-201, which advised the lst MSF BN, was deactivated during this period.

(5) MR 3 (Company A) Current Plans/Concepts:

(a) Continued emphasis is being placed on conducting platoon sized operations, with a company on standby for reinforcement. Platoon sized operations are able to cover a larger area and have been more effective than company sized operations as a counter-measure to enemy infiltration.

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Past efforts to increase the use of intelligence have been beneficial; this will continue to be a point of particular emphasis. During this reporting period the VNSF have almost completely assumed the responsibility of requesting and directing all air support. Requests for preplanned airstrike and assault helicopter companies are strictly a VNSF function with the USASF acting only in an advisory capacity.

(b) As in the past, this headquarters continues to plan and direct combat operations of subordinate B Detachments in support of HR objectives. B Detachments, in conjunction with their VNSF counterparts, continue to assist the A Detachments in the conduct of offensive operations. This has decreased in recent months as the A Detachments continue to accept more of these responsibilities. Of particular note is the role that the VNSF commanders are playing in the conversion of A teams to ARVN Rangers; VNSF commanders are solving many of the problems of conversion at the A Detachment level with logistical and administrative support from the higher detachments.

(c) This headquarters has followed and will continue to follow the assigned missions outlined in the Combined Campaign Plan 1970. At this time we are planning more platoon size operations composed of only VNSF and CIDG to prepare them for the turnover of responsibility and equipment. Also, more combined operations are being planned with ARVN in an effort to maintain complete coverage of assigned TAOR's.

(6) MR 4 (Company D) Current Plans/Concepts:

(a) During this reporting period the phase-down/conversion program has gone as planned, and in some cases ahead of schedule.

(b) The following is a listing by date, location and camp designation of the disbandment of units under C's control:

1 31 Aug - Three KKK companies from Ba Xaoi (A-421) were converted to RF/FF; Chau Doc Province.
2 05 Sep - Thanh Tri (A-414) converted to 67th Border Surveillance Ranger Bn.
3 05 Sep - To Chau (A-442) converted to 66th Border Surveillance Ranger Bn.
4 23 Sep - Thuong Thoi (A-432) camp transferred to Kien Phong Province.
5 02 Oct - Tuyen Nhon (A-415) converted to 75th Border Surveillance Ranger Bn.
6 02 Oct - Cai Ca (A-431) converted to 76th Border Surveillance Ranger Bn.
7 15 Oct - Hoc Hoa (A-402) camp transferred to Kien Tuong Province.

(c) The following FOB's were turned over during this reporting period:

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1 18 Aug - Thuong Thoi (A-432) FOB Cau Nguong turned over to Kien Phong Sector.

2 26 Aug - Tuyen Nhon (A-413) FOB Da Bien turned over to Kien Tuong Sector.

3 27 Aug - To Chau (A-442) FOB Tra Pho turned over to Kien Giang Sector.

4 25 Sep - Thuong Thoi (A-432) FOB Bien Dinh turned over to Kien Phong Sector.

5 30 Sep - Ba Xoai (A-421) FOB Chung Co (No. 21) and FOB Le Hoac (No. 23) were turned over to Chau Doc Sector.

7) Detachment B-55

(a) Due to the projected phasedown of the 5th Mobile Strike Force, the recruiting program for CIDG has been halted.

(b) In light of the impending phasedown of Detachment B-55 and the 5th MSFC, minimal replacements of USAF personnel lost to DEROS in the first two months of the reporting period have been effected. As a result of the curtailment of operations as phaseout nears, current losses in USAF strength are not being replaced. Det B-55 will continue to operate under its existing 10E structure with the remaining personnel performing additional duties as required.
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (ABN) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS OSFOR-65 (R2)

e. (C) TRAINING:

1) Combat Orientation Courses:

a) The Combat Orientation Course for 5th SF OP (ABN) replacement personnel again altered its Program of Instruction to keep newly assigned personnel abreast of the ever changing missions of the 5th SF OP (ABN), 1st SF. A special country briefing has been added to the initial orientation. This briefing is designed to enlighten all newly assigned non-Special Forces personnel of the mission of Special Forces in conjunction with the vast area of responsibility of 5th SF OP (ABN), 1st SF. This briefing also serves to update SF personnel returning to 5th SF OP for the 2nd and 3rd tours. The M-60 machinegun has also been added to the COC curriculum as this weapon is now being utilized at several detachments and within the SFOB's defensive perimeter. A class on the Geneva Convention and Law of Land Warfare has been included to meet USARV and Army wide requirements.

b) During the reporting period, the COC trained 29 officers and 163 enlisted men.

c) The following is a breakdown of students for classes 3-71 through 11-71:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COC CLASSES</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>COMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-71</td>
<td>19 July-26 July 70</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-71</td>
<td>26 July-4 Aug 70</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-71</td>
<td>9 Aug-16 Aug 70</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-71</td>
<td>16 Aug-23 Aug 70</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-71</td>
<td>23 Aug-30 Aug 70</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-71</td>
<td>30 Aug-5 Sep 70</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-71</td>
<td>13 Sep-19 Sep 70</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-71</td>
<td>20 Sep-26 Sep 70</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-71</td>
<td>25 Oct-31 Oct 70</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) MACV Recondo School:

a) The mission of the MACV Recondo School is to train selected personnel from US/FWMAF and ARVN units in specialized techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operations in Vietnam.

b) During the reporting period the MACV Recondo School trained 241 students from US, FWMAF, and ARVN units. The following is a breakdown of students by unit:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ENTR</th>
<th>DROPPED</th>
<th>GRADUATED</th>
<th>CERT OF ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1ST Mar Div</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Abn Div</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFFV (75th Inf)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd Abn Bde</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th SF OP (ABN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Div</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cav Div (ABN)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195th Inf Bde</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFFV (151st Inf)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROJA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Thai Army</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV Adv Teams</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5th Inf (Mech)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550th CIDG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Company A:

(a) During the first part of the reporting period the CIDG Training Center at Trang Sup provided basic and refresher training to 79 CIDG recruits. Although no formal artillery training is now given to the CIDG due to conversion, the CIDG receive refresher training on-site. As a result, there are now two 105mm howitzers with school trained CIDG at all the border camps in MR-3. Due to conversion of most of the camps, personnel at Company A are conducting comprehensive OJT programs under the guidance of 5th SF OP and MSF to train the CIDG for their ongoing mission.

(b) Because of a shortage of recruits at the camps, only 85 CIDG received Basic Infantry Training during this period. The instructors devoted more time to
operational report-lessons learned of the 5th special forces group (abn) for the period ending 31 october 1970. rcp orpfr-65 (r2)

weapons familiarization, maintenance, platoon and squad tactics with special emphasis on ambush techniques and immediate reaction drills to coincide with their ongoing mission during conversion.

(c) during the latter part of the reporting period all formal training at company a and subordinate detachments was discontinued due to upcoming conversion of the camps in mr-3. however, ojt continues at all levels, with particular emphasis being placed on marksmanship, small unit tactics and preventive medicine.

4. company b:

(a) throughout the camps usasf and vnsf conducted continued refresher training weekly. training consisted of the following type subjects:

1. basic combat training refresher
2. small unit tactics and crew drill
3. map reading and navigation
4. field fortification
5. care and use of radios
6. 105 howitzers and 106mm crew drill and firing
7. care and use of individual and crew served weapons

(b) due to the relatively large turnover of personnel, training must be conducted constantly in all subjects. on the job training is conducted to improve skills of all personnel and to familiarize them with areas other than their specialities. us artillery units provided training for the cdg crews at bu prang, dua lap, polae klang, dak seang, and pen het. instruction was aimed at improving the proficiency of the crew.

(c) camps are required to conduct camp strike force refresher training weekly on basic subjects to improve the cdg soldiers operational efficiency. thus far the weekly training program has proved very successful.

5. company c:

(a) usasf training for us personnel during the reporting period continued to emphasize mandatory requirements.

(b) vnsf: company c conducted the following courses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>course</th>
<th>number of students</th>
<th>graduation date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>auto mechanics course</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19 sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refrigeration course</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7 sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maintenance course</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7 sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refrigeration course</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20 oct 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVN-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. ROG OSFOR-AC (R2)

(e) CIDG: In light with the phasedown of the CIDG program, Company C conducted the following courses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</th>
<th>GRADUATION DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auto Mechanic's Course</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator Repair and Auto</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26 Oct 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) During the first part of the reporting period the Company C Training Center at Ba T. conducted Camp Strike Force Refresher Training for 105 CIDG from Camp Gia Vuc. Also, 208 CIDG recruits underwent Basic Combat Training at their "A" camp sites. This training was conducted by VSF cadre and they make the decision as to when a recruit is ready to be released from training and transferred to an operational status.

(2) There are no plans to continue refresher training for the CIDG Forces. MR-I will initiate a Ranger Training Program for CIDG troops as each camp converts. A training center has been established at Hoa Cam (Da Nang). In light with this new program, 18 CIDG Camp Strike Force personnel underwent Ranger Training at the Hoa Cam National Training Center. They were from Camps Minh Long, Tra Bong, and Gia Vuc.

(3) A four week Artillery Refresher Program was conducted at Camp Ha Thanh. This instruction was presented by MR-I ARVN Artillery and included crew drill, FO, and FDC procedures.

(4) During the last portion of the reporting period the MR-I CIDG Training Center at Ba T. officially closed its training facilities due to camp conversions.

(b) Company D:

(a) USASF: Due to personnel shortages inherent in a period of phasedown/conversion there was no USASF cross training conducted during the reporting period.

(b) VNSF: Company D conducted a food preparation school at Can Tho for 7 VNSF personnel. Four VNSF completed a preventive medicine course given at Can Tho. Also, nine VNSF personnel completed a 14 week preventive maintenance course given in Phu Trang.

(c) CIDG: Throughout the camps USASF and VNSF conducted training for the CIDG personnel in the following courses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</th>
<th>GRADUATION DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Course</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mess/Cook Course</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Course (Can Tho)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6 Oct 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CON{}FI{}D{}EN{}T{}IAL

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. CSF TRM 455 (R2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</th>
<th>GRADUATION DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Truck Driver's Course</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6 Oct 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Course (Quoc Tho)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17 Nov 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Course (Long Xuyen)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30 Nov 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) The Aircrane Company at Cao Lanh (A-40) is presently conducting a seven day course on aircraft operation and tactical employment for Republic of Korea Marine Corps (2 Officers and 5 NCOs).

(e) During the reporting period 294 Mobile Strike Force recruits underwent a six week Basic Combat Training course at Dong Ba Thin Special Forces Training Center.

(7) Detachment B-31 (Dong Ba Thin):

(a) During this quarter emphasis was placed on the quality of instruction by more use of training aids, lesson plans, and demonstration teams. Classes were monitored by VNASF personnel and taught by VNSF committee.

(b) At the end of each week a Weekly Monitor Report was prepared for the Commander of the VNSF Training Center; S-3, 5th SFDA; and G-3 VNASF High Command.

(c) Projects for improvement have been implemented and a current analysis of training at Dong Ba Thin is underway to determine lesson plans and POAs for future missions of the training center.

(a) Diagram for the enlargement of the VNSF Training areas, and firing range have been submitted to the VN ASF High Command. At present time, renovation and improvement of the VNSF Training Center camp defenses is continuing using CSF personnel with advise and support by VNSF and VNASF personnel.

(e) Courses graduated or in progress during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</th>
<th>GRADUATION DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VNSF Basic Airborne Course</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>20 Jul 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Reconnaissance Course</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27 Jul 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Tae Kwon-Do (Karate)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNSF Radio Operator</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7 Dec 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Combat Interpreter's Course</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18 Aug 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTDC Leadership Course</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>25 Aug 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Mobile Strike Force Refresher Tng</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>18 Aug 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th VNSF Basic Airborne Course</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13 Oct 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNSF Officer and NCO Basic</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30 Nov 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS OSFOR-05 (R2)

(6) Detachment B55 (5th Mobile Strike Force):

(a) USAF: USAF personnel have been exempted from mandatory training subjects due to operational commitments. Classes on F.O. procedures, physical security and alert procedures were given to keep the individual members of this Command abreast of new developments.

(b) VN: Formal VN training has not been observed at this time. Co-operation on a daily basis with US counterparts and instructing classes in basic military subjects to CIDG personnel constitute a program of on-the-job training.

(c) CIDG personnel training: Due to operational commitments of the 5th MSFC, refresher and on-the-job training were the primary programs in effect during the first half of the reporting period. During the second half of the reporting period, the majority of formal training for the 5th MSFC CIDG personnel was presented in the Nha Trang area to include Hon Tre Island, the Dong Po area and the ARVN NCO Academy. The great variety of training areas is a result of the lack of central training area available to the 5th MSFC. The 5th MSFC is scheduled to deactivate during the next reporting period.
SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1970. RUS GFOR-65 (R2)

p. (C) Combat Developments: Combat developments section has recently received a new item from the Land Warfare Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. This new item is the "hand grip" designed for the M-79 40mm Grenade Launcher and enables the weapon to be employed in the hand-held, waist or shoulder fired method. The item weighs only 1.12 pounds, and is made from an aluminum alloy. Various elements of the 5th SF GP (Abn) will test this piece of equipment.
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AVTIB-C
SUBJECT Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group 
(AFRICOM) for the Period Ending 31 August 1970. RGS CSGOR-65 (R2)

2. (U) Aviation:

(1) Army Aviation Support: Army aircraft have provided good support 
during the reporting period. Company C in Danang received, at the beginning 
of the reporting period, two UH-1s but was reduced to one on 1 September 
1970 due to the conversion of the 57th to ARVN Panzer. Company B in Pleiku 
continues to receive two UH-1s - Company A in Bien Hoa receives four UH-1s 
of which two are dedicated to Long Xuyen Training Detachment duties. Company 
D at Can Tho continues to receive two UH-1s. All of these aircraft are 
absolutely necessary for effective command and control, and light resupply.

(2) Tactical Airlift Support: The airlift support has remained highly 
satisfactory during the reporting period. The C-7A dedicated aircraft re-

(3) Tactical Air Support: The USAF has 5 FACs at Pleiku and 9 FACs 
located at Bien Hoa; most East attached to Company B. All other "C" detach-
ments receive FAC support from Sector FACs operating out of their associated 
provinces. Derradour T/5 AIR has been outstanding. Preplanned airstrike 
support has generally been outstanding.

(4) UH-1 Party Room 1 (Co C):

(a) Army Aviation Support: Primary support by Army Aviation during 
the reporting period was provided by the 282nd AHC. These helicopters were 
used at the maximum permissible extent. Crews averaged approximately 7-8 
 flying hours daily, and the maximum ACL was carried on almost all missions.
In spite of the frequency of quarterly and intermediate maintenance and 
inspection requirements, these two aircraft were available to this unit 
almost constantly. This is an improvement over the last reporting period 
as well as the crews themselves deserve recognition for their outstanding 
support.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: During the reporting period over 1000 
troops were moved by special mission airlift request on C-130, C-123 and 
C-7A aircraft.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: As in the last quarter, all requests for 
tactical fighter support were initially submitted to VNAP through C-13, WRL. 
Approximately 40% of all airstrikes were flown by VNAP.

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AVCR-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group 
(Agr) for the Period Ending 31 August 1970. RCS CSPG-65 (R2)

1) Military Region 2 (Co B):

(a) Army Aviation Support: Helicopter support for this period was 
generally good, although poor weather was a problem. The grounding of the 
CH-47 "Super C", and the removal of all CH-54s from MR-2 has posed a seri-
ous problem as there is now no heavy lift helicopter in MR-2. Any heavy 
lift requirement has to be accomplished by CH-54s from Long Binh.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: This support was excellent throughout 
the reporting period.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: This support was outstanding through-
out the reporting period.

2) Military Region 3 (Co A):

(a) Army Aviation Support: Aviation support during this reporting 
period remained at four UH-1D model aircraft. Supporting the "C" Detach-
ment are two UH-1D model aircraft utilized for resupply and a C-47. UPM 
continues to receive two UH-1D model aircraft on a dedicated basis.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: Throughout this reporting period, 
this headquarters received one dedicated C-7A aircraft daily. All C-130 
and C-123 aircraft requirements continue to be requested on a mission 
type basis.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: Preplanned airstrike requests con-
tinued to decrease appreciably during the reporting period due to the number 
of camps being converted to ARVN Ranger.

3) Military Region 4 (Co D):

(a) Army Aviation Support: Company P continues to receive 2 UH-1Es 
on a dedicated basis.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: Tactical Airlift Support is controlled 
by 14th Special Tactical Zone.

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h. (C) Logistics

(1) Supply:

(a) The average number of personnel supported during the period 1 August to 31 October 1970 was:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USASF</td>
<td>2,566</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF &amp; MSF</td>
<td>13,460</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) During the reporting period, significant quantities of equipment in excess of the operational needs of the 5th Special Forces Group were identified and reported in accordance with Department of the Army Guidance. Equipment declared uneconomically repairable was turned in through property disposal channels.

(2) Maintenance: Omitted.

(3) Movements: Cargo moved from the LSC in short tons, during the reporting period was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airland</td>
<td>736.2</td>
<td>448.7</td>
<td>393.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airdrop</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Convoy</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealift</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Services: During the reporting period, the Group Maintenance Facility began the LLDB Senior Non-Commissioned Officers’ Maintenance Course. The course is 12 weeks in length, and the objective is to train VMSF NCOs in the operation, maintenance, and repair of equipment assigned to their units.

(5) During the reporting period fourteen 2½ ton trucks, one hundred and forty-one HT-1 radios, and approximately 91 airboats were reported to MACV/USARV as excess to the 5th Special Forces Group. The vehicles and radios are to be turned in to the U.S. Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay. To date, fifteen airboats are to be transferred to the 3rd Marine Assault Group, Da Nang, twenty each to the Americal Division and six each to the 101st Airmobile Division.
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AV52-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Am) for the Period ending 31 October 1970. RG 659-65 (R2)

3) Military Region I: (Company C)

(a) Supply:

1. This FSP now supports 1,281 CSF, 218 MSF, and 201 U. S. personnel for a total of 1,700 troops. Supply emphasis has been on insuring camps are at, but not over, their basic loads of all classes of supply prior to conversion.

2. Due to recent directives from the Group S-4, the previous overages of rice stockage at the FSP have dwindled to a more workable inventory. Six thousand eight hundred bags were transferred to 11th Quartermaster Battalion (ARVN) during September and October and one thousand eight hundred of the next four thousand bags due in will be trans-shipped to Vung-Tau, near Saigon, for use by MACV CORDS. Reloading has been adequate with the possibility of a small excess after the end of October, when all the camps have converted. This excess will be laterally transferred to Command and Control Detachment North, also located in Da Nang. Canned mackerel supply has been critically short during several periods, but generally it has been more available than in the past. FOD supply has been adequate, as has the resupply of ammo. All requests from Company C to the Logistical Support Center at the SFOB have been cancelled to cut the flow of supplies to the FSP in anticipation of conversion of Company C on 30 November 1970. Only mission essential items have been requisitioned from 1st Logistical Depot in Da Nang since September.

3. The Naval Support Activity has completely turned over to the Army, leaving all logistical support in Da Nang to 1st Logistical Command.

4. Detachment B-11 in Chu Lai has, for all practical purposes, closed, with only four personnel remaining to hold the compound until final disposition is made of the real estate.

5. Camp Mai Loc was ordered closed by the end of August and all personnel, supplies, and equipment were returned to Da Nang by convoy, taking a total of four truck convoys. Personnel were reassigned throughout the company, and equipment was serviced and returned to stock.

6. All five southern camps have converted successfully, Ha Thanh and Tra Bong on 31 August and Gia Vuo, Ba To, and Minh Long on 30 September with the conversion of the last three southern camps completed, the liaison detachment in Quang Ngai also closed on 2 October. With only one camp, Thuong Duc, remaining to support, primary emphasis has been placed on preparing backload shipments for the SFOB in Nha Trang.

7. Thuong Duc has, again, come under siege, starting on 29 September, making resupply requirement a little tougher for that camp. Due to outstanding air support from I Corps aviation and the Marine Air Wing, aerial resupply by OH-53 has been accomplished in an outstanding manner. Due to the siege, however, the conversion of Thuong Duc has been delayed at least one week. This should place no particular burden on conversion of the C detachment on 30 November.
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AVOB-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period ending 31 October 1970. RCS OSFOR-65 (R2)

(b) Maintenance:

1. Vehicle deadline rate rose to 15 pot., with the primary problem area still being the evacuating of vehicles, particularly 2½ ton trucks, from the A Detachments. A total of twenty-six vehicles were converted to the ARVN Rangers, helping the deadline rate somewhat by reducing the total number of vehicles on hand. MHE deadline rate dropped slightly to 16 pot. Generator deadline rate dropped slightly to 18 pot., primary reasons are that a total of twenty-four generators, 1½ kw to 10 kw, were transferred to the ARVN Rangers.

2. Appliance deadline rate rose to 6.2 percent.

(c) Cargo Movements:

4. The following tonnages were moved by the mode as indicated during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIRLAND</td>
<td>1,093.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIRDROP</td>
<td>30.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONVOY</td>
<td>116.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEALIFT</td>
<td>67.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,307.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Aircraft availability slacked off beginning in October, due to the fact that the FSP only had three camps remaining to support. Only one of the three has a fixed wing airstrip, so the dedicated O7A was cut to three days a week. This has been sufficient to move all required supplies to Tien Phuoc. Nong Son and Thuong Duc have been resupplied by cargo helicopters.

(d) Services:

1. The FSP Maintenance Facility completed the fifth and final automotive and generator maintenance course for CIDO from all camps. In practically all cases, the CIDO trained in these courses agreed to convert to Rangers, hence, their new abilities will help the overall Ranger Program to be more successful.

2. The FSP Rigger Section continues to conduct courses in sling load operations for personnel from ARVN units as well as LLDB. To date, six courses have been conducted, with a total of 753 graduates from 26 different ARVN units.

3. The Maintenance Facility conducted an 8 week course in refrigeration maintenance and operation for eight LLDB. The purpose of the course was to familiarize the trainees with the operation and repair of refrigerators, freezers, fans, and air conditioners. The course ended on 10 October.

(e) Facility Improvements: Only facility improvements undertaken during the reporting period were repair and utilities of existing structures and roads on the compound.

CONFIDENTIAL
(a) Supply: The initial part of the reporting period, Company B FSP provided logistical support for ten "A" detachments and two "B" detachments. The most significant event of the three months was conversion of seven "A" detachments to ARVN Rangers. Conversion proceeded smoothly, all items on the ARVN Ranger TO&E and TA were laterally transferred to the Vietnamese Ranger Camp Commanders and all excess was backloaded to Pleiku. The emphasis was placed upon backloading during the reporting period but despite this, there was no difficulty providing the remaining "A" detachments with logistical support. Support was accomplished by maximum utilization of all available aircraft and truck convoys to Kontum, Duc Co, Plei Mrong, Nha Trang and Quy Nhon.

(b) Maintenance: Scheduled maintenance of all vehicles and equipment assigned or attached to Company B has failed to produce the high standards of preventive maintenance desired by this unit. From an overall 13% deadline during the month of July, a daily spot check was initiated on equipment and vehicles assigned or attached to Company B, and this has proven its worth. In the month of August 1970—the deadline rate was 6%, September it was 12% and in the month of October it was 33%. Overall maintenance of generators inspected during liaison visits on all "A" sites was found poor, with 33% of the equipment on site faulty or deadlined. A program of training indigenous personnel was initiated. During the three month period, eight indigenous personnel were trained on site and twelve indigenous personnel were trained in the Maintenance Facility. It was found a refresher course for generator operators is needed on all "A" sites at least once every six weeks.

(c) Air Movement: During September, the Air Movement Section lost one dedicated C7A aircraft. The difficulty presented was swiftly overcome by making use of all opportun aircraft. The following is a monthly total of cargo moved during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airland</td>
<td>1,570,980</td>
<td>1,468,424</td>
<td>1,217,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airdrop</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>377,199</td>
<td>801,727</td>
<td>365,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Services: The FSP supports "A" detachments in Class I through V. Class III logistical support comes from 88th S&S BN, 1st Logistical Command. Technical representatives from this location can, on request, go to an "A" detachment and give immediate and on the spot support.
Logistical support from ISC has greatly decreased due to impending closeout. Problems in obtaining supplies have been greatly reduced by judiciously scanning all "A" and "B" detachments requisitions and filling only those mission essential requisitions.

The goal of Company B FSF remains to close out this support point by 31 January 1971 without lessening logistical support for "A" and "B" detachments. Timely backloading is essential if Company B is going to meet the conversion date.

Support from the LSC, 1st Logistical Command and 2nd Logistical Command has been excellent.

Military Region III: (Company A)

Supply

The FSF at Company A supported an average of 235 U. S. personnel assigned and attached to the 5th Special Forces Group. At the end of the reporting period, an average of 2,500 personnel were deployed throughout the Military Region.

The LHTD has continued to run special operations in the Military Region which has required particular logistical support from Company A FSF. This support has caused a critical low in our class II supplies.

All classes of supplies have been requisitioned from LSC on an as-needed basis, therefore, all stockage levels, due to phasing down, have been below that of normal operating strength.

During this quarterly reporting period, the FSF at Company A spent $1,241,060 on local procurement of supplies and maintenance of equipment. Repair of items such as refrigerators, air conditioners, freezers, and water pumps has been a major expenditure. The volume of repair and highly specialized tasks which are occasionally necessary for these items requires a portion of the maintenance to be done outside the FSF.

Expendable items not available through normal supply channels requires a major expenditure, comprising about 25% of the monthly total. These items are generally of good quality and quantity.

Maintenance

The CIDO rehabilitation program continues. Presently one man is being trained in the area of vehicle maintenance. Two men are learning generator and MHE repair, and two men are learning air conditioning and refrigeration repair. All trainees are showing excellent progress at present.

New or rebuilt 1/2 ton engines, transmissions and differentials are still not available through supply channels. The same holds true with 3/4 ton engines. At present we are utilizing used parts and rebuild kits to keep our 1/2 ton deadline as low as possible. Vehicles requisitioned from LSC have yet to be received. This places a heavy burden on the automotive section as conversion requirements must be met.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS 5SFOR-66 (M1)

1 All B detachments were visited and PLL were reviewed and updated.

4 Deadline vehicles are increasing in number as skilled mechanics pursue better jobs and replacements are hard to find. Direct exchanging of vehicles has also become a problem as conversion has almost exhausted the normal stockage and the rebuilding of vehicles is time consuming.

5 Due to non-availability of fuel injection pumps and magnetic amplifiers for Libby 10kw generators, it was necessary to backload them to LSO for disposal or turn in for FDO.

6 Since gaining the services of a qualified weapons tech rep, the repair production aspect has been improved considerably.

(d) Air Movements:

1 During the reporting period a total of 2,392 short tons of cargo and 6,813 passengers were transported by air movements section of Company A FSP. A total of 741 short tons of cargo were transported via convoy. There were 1,651 short tons shipped by air in the following categories: 12 short tons by C-130; 19 short ton by C-123; 698 short ton by dedicated CIA aircraft; 922 short ton by rotary wing aircraft.

2 There were no tactical emergency or combat essential missions requested during this period. No significant problems were encountered by the air movements section.

(d) Services:

1 During the last reporting period the R&D facility at Company A performed routine maintenance at all detachment levels.

2 C detachment electricians are currently in the process of rewiring the CIDG hospital.

3 Two 20 foot water towers, complete with plumbing, were installed by C detachment carpenters and plumbers.

4 Due to phasedown there has been no significant projects planned for the future.

9) Military Region IV: (Company D)

(a) Supply: During this reporting period the S-4 Section supported the following number of personnel.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>1,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 30 September, A-4146, Thanh Tri and A-4341, Cai Cai, were converted to ARVN Rangers. Logistics support was terminated to Seaflot during this period.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period ending 31 Ocoto'ber 1970, RQJ: CONFIDENTIAL (A2)

(b) Maintenance:

1. Due to phase down no courses were conducted during this period.

2. Deadline equipment by type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Conditioners</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Pumps</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outboard motors</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airboats</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Movements: The following tonnage of supplies were moved during this reporting period:

- Airland: 2,366 tons
- Airdrop: 0
- Convoy: 123
- Backload: 212
- Total tonnage: 7,701 tons

(d) Services: Local Class III support is provided by the 228 S&S Company. Their support is outstanding. They always meet our demands. Local Ammunition (Class V) support is provided by the 54th Amno Base Depot (ARVN). During this period we have received excellent support other than 50 caliber API which we requisition from LSC. LSC continues to provide outstanding support. Due to phase out; no planned improvements to our facilities will be done.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. (U) Engineer.

   (a) The Engineer Section provided materials and technical assistance for the completion of twelve major 906 funded projects during this quarter. These projects included construction of the following: 15' x 45' addition to CIDG school; joint TOC/Comm Bunker; 10 8' x 8' fighting bunkers; 20' x 48' TOC; 15' x 100' building for dependent housing; POL storage areas.

   (b) In addition to the above projects, funds were provided to purchase materials for self-help projects such as burn out latrines, repair of dependent housing and the capping of bunkers.

   (c) Some projects were expedited by having materials pre-cut in Bien Hoa and then shipped to job site for assembly.

2. Repair and Utilities (RAU).

   (a) The RAU Section continued to provide maintenance and general installation in support of electrical, plumbing, and refrigeration requirements.

   (b) RAU warehouse stockage levels have remained at an adequate level.

   (c) Tech Reps have made several field trips to A and B detachment in support of their requests, particularly in the areas of refrigeration and electrical wiring.

3. Construction and Rehabilitation.

   (a) Military Region II

   (1) A-253: KB TEAM #4 was deployed to Camp Duc Co on 14 September 1970. Work on three living-fighting bunkers was completed, and ammunition bunker constructed and the TOC capped with concrete. A camp drainage system was installed and all work was completed 13 October 1970.

   (2) Det B-23: Construction of all facilities at A-233, Trang Phuc has been completed with the assistance of KB TEAM #4. All construction at A-236, Bu Prang is complete. KD TEAM #1 was deployed to A-239, Duc Lap to complete an underground dispensary and a number of living-fighting bunkers.

   (3) Det B-24: The construction of the TOC at A-242, Dak Pek is 97% complete as of 31 October, with only the plumbing work remaining. The dispensary at Dak Pek is 90% complete as of the same date. KB TEAM #4 was deployed to A-245, Dak Seang on 20 October 1970 with the mission of repair and rehabilitation of the airstrip. As of 31 October 1970 the project is 65% complete and all holes
(b) Well Drilling Operations: A well was completed at Plei Ljereng and one also at Duk Pak. Well operations at Bu Prang were unsuccessful and a well team is currently at Dak Seang.

(c) Budgeting and Funding: Omitted.

(d) Post Engineers: Omitted.

(e) Miscellaneous: Omitted.

Military Region IV

(a) There were six (6) projects completed during this reporting period; E-43 project #906-1103, extension of defensive wire, A-413 project #906-A-413-2, berm construction, A-414 project #906-A-414-1 dependent houses, project #906-A-414-3 bunker construction, A-421 project #906-A-421-3 capping of bunkers and team house, A-431 project #906-A-431-4 helipad. There are three (3) projects under instruction at the present time at Company D; Detachments A-404 project #906-A-404-1 defensive bunkers, A-413 project #906-A-413-3 mine bunkers, A-421 project #906-A-421-3 ammo bunker. These projects are scheduled to be completed before camp conversion date.

(b) Well Drilling Operations: N/A

(c) Budgeting and Funding: N/A

(d) Post Engineers: Staff Engineers are preparing the backload of excess equipment, repair and utilities items to Logistical Support Command, Phu Trang.

(e) Miscellaneous: N/A
AVGD-aD
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) for the period ending 31 October 1970 RCS CSPM-65 (RZ)

J. (U) Political Warfare (POLWAR)

1. General: Almost all of the S5 efforts have been tuned to effecting a smooth transition of the CIDG to the Ranger program, RF or STD. To date there have been few problems in implementing the program. It appears as though there is at least surface cooperation between the former A-camps, converting A-camps and the district and province officials.

2. Psychological Operations (PSYOP): The PSYOP role has been an internal affair aimed at converting the CIDG to other programs. The individual soldiers, families and friends have been deluged with information concerning rank assimilation and the numerous benefits accorded the man who joins ARVN Ranger, RF or STD. Most of the enemy oriented PSYOP has been turned over to the VNSF with the USAF personnel monitoring the program.

3. Motivation and Indoctrination (M&I): M&I teams have been sent to various camps, especially in MR 2 due to proximity. This is a culmination of several months of performing for the camps in support of the conversion program. It is felt by VNSF that M&I after this period would be ineffective since the remaining camps have already made their decisions and M&I teams will not convince those few who refuse to convert.

4. Civic Action (CA): The S5 Section has been coordinating with the Khanh Hoa Province Committee (on S5 activities) in order to establish priorities for local CA projects. Two Nha Trang school additions have been the main focus during the reporting period. This is in addition to food and equipment for a Catholic boys school and leperarium. In the field, the most important areas have been the animal husbandry projects. These have, in most cases, been successful and are considered to be the most lasting results from 5th SF Gp CA programs in the hinterland. The ARVN Rangers are taking over these programs in nearly all areas. Those that remain out of Ranger hands will go to such organizations as the Christian Relief Service at Company B.

5.Military Region 1 (Co C):

(a) Psychological Operations: During the reporting period, 92 missions accounted for the 7,108,000 air dropped leaflets. Leaflet requests are handled exclusively by the VNSF S5.

(b) Motivation and Indoctrination: M&I classes were held throughout the reporting period. During the latter portion of the period, the local VN gave classes. It is believed that this greatly aided in obtaining an 85% - 90% Ranger conversion.

(c) Civic Action: Food assistance to typhoon victims has been the current CA highlight this reporting period. The farm projects and the training of indigenous personnel in agricultural methods so that the projects will continue appears to be quite successful.
(6) **Military Region 2 (Co B):**

(a) **Psychological Operations:** The PSYOPS efforts have been internal. The idea was to direct the local population to the district and province agencies as USASF goes through a phase down.

(b) **Motivation and Indoctrination:** An intensive MAI program, augmented by the Company B POLMAR team has thwarted an expected high AWOL rate due to conversion. The AWOL rate has been held at a monthly per or below as a result of the MAI efforts.

(c) **Civic Actions:** During the months of August and September some 500 refugees at Plei Djereng and roughly 200 at Duc C. were assisted in relocating to the villages adjacent their respective camps. Company B supplied food to those people and provided a liaison with Pleiku Province for a teacher and school for each refugee camp. In both cases, due to the efforts of Company B, the refugees have become an integrated part of their communities.

On 15 October a similar relocation project began at Bu Prang with about 500 people. The project continues.

(7) **Military Region 4 (Co A):**

(a) **Psychological Operations:**

1. The use of the POLMAR team with MEDCARS has proven to be effective in creating the image of an interested GV.

2. Feedback from VN channels indicates that a substantial proportion of requested leaflet/loudspeaker missions are being flown by the 30th PSYOPS BN despite recent cuts in US assistance and air assets.

(b) **Motivation and Indoctrination:** In Mk 3 MAI teams have also proven effective by explaining in detail what the CIDG could expect in the form of personal gain from conversion. Also, the USASF CA/PO is advised against presenting any of the MAI material.

(c) **Civic Action:** Animal husbandry projects seem to have the most durability because of the foresight of a number of CIDG in their respective camps.

At all converting camps, an attempt has been made to turn over existing animal husbandry assets to those who display the most likely aptitude to continue the projects.

(8) **Military Region 4 (Co D):**

(a) **Psychological Operations:** A total of 5.5 million leaflets have been disseminated. Air loudspeaker broadcasts have been aided by Navy Beach Jumpers. The themes have included Chieu Hoi, Land Reform, GVN programs and explanation of Free World Forces presence in VN. Implementation of VN PSYOPS started on 30 September. PSYOPS has decreased steadily with the advent of conversion.
AVGB-RD
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the period ending 31 October 1970 RCS CEPHR-65 (R2)

(b) Motivation and Indoctrination: MAI is felt to be less than effective in this area since the POLWAR teams have given substantially less than total commitment to the program. The other usual methods of informing the CIDG of conversion have been used such as lectures and films.

(c) Civic Action: As conversion proceeds, this program is being turned over to the VN. The Navy Beach Jumpers have proven to be a welcomed ally in CA projects. Night MEDCAPS, begun during this reporting period, are meeting with a great deal of success as it provides medical and civic action attention to those individuals working the fields during the day visits.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 Oct 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

k. (U) Personnel.

(1) Promotions: A total of 169 promotions for enlisted men and 100 for officers were effected by this headquarters.

(2) Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and at the close of the period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period: 1 Aug 70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>A00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized:</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2419</td>
<td>3040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2370</td>
<td>2904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Close of Period: 31 Oct 70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>A00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized:</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>2396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1738</td>
<td>2172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Strengths for MPs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As of 1 Aug 70</th>
<th>As of 31 Oct 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MR I (Co C)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized:</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR II (Co B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized:</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR III (Co A)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized:</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVCU 3

MR IV (Co D)

Authorized: 80 206 58 136
Assigned: 56 206 30 93

(3) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) Judicial Punishments

**THIS QUARTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LAST QUARTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Non-Judicial Punishments:

**THIS QUARTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 15, UCMJ</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LAST QUARTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 15, UCMJ</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Legal Assistance: Legal assistance was rendered to 229 clients, an increase of 9 from the past quarter.

(d) Morale and Personnel Services. The following E&R allocations were received by the 5th SY OP (Amn) for the last quarter.
SITUATION: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 Oct 1970. RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

SITE | AUG | SEP | OCT
--- | --- | --- | ---
TOKYO | 25 | 25 | 0
HONGKONG | 18 | 27 | 50
TAIPEI | 16 | 16 | 18
SYDNEY | 50 | 50 | 60
HAWAII | 100 | 75 | 55
EDGEOING | 15 | 15 | 40
TOTALS | 224 | 208 | 223

(5) Recruitments: The following are the 5th SF OP (Abn) Recruitments Statistics for the last quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>DA OBJ</th>
<th>NA:</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>RAC</th>
<th>USAR/NO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>108.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>116.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>104.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>110.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Twenty-one extensions of ETS were completed during report periods.

(b) The monthly reenlistment objective is based on reenlisting 1% of our total assigned strength, regardless of category.

(6) Postal. The following statistics represent number of certified, insured and registered pieces of mail handled by SFOB.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSURED MAIL</th>
<th>REGISTERED MAIL</th>
<th>CERTIFIED MAIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUG 162</td>
<td>AUG 196 AUG 234</td>
<td>AUG 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 234</td>
<td>SEP 180 SEP 238</td>
<td>SEP 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 198</td>
<td>OCT 126 OCT 168</td>
<td>OCT 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 594</td>
<td>502 660</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Awards and Decorations:

(a) The total number of decorations awarded to 5th SF GP (Abn) personnel for the period ending 31 October 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>BS-V</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>570</td>
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<td>362</td>
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<tr>
<td>AM-V</td>
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<td>AM</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>ACM-V</td>
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<td>ACM</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Awards of the Bronze Star and below are approved by 5th SF GP (Abn). Silver Star to Distinguished Service Cross are approved by USARV.

(8) Special Servi
AVOB-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 Oct 1970. NOS OSFOR-65 (R2)

(a) General. The Craft Shop and photo lab was transferred from Camp McDermott and officially opened at SFOB on 15 Oct 70.

(b) Library. Attendance in the library was 511 for Aug, 493 for Sep and 488 for Oct 1970.

(c) Religious Activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Parish Activities</th>
<th>Invocation/Benedictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Visits</td>
<td>Conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling</td>
<td>Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Staff Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communion Services</td>
<td>Camps Visited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/A Payope Activities</td>
<td>Camps Visited</td>
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<tr>
<td>Memorial Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(10) Civilian Personnel.

General. The civilian personnel office continues to monitor promotions, hiring and other personnel actions closely. The phase down of civilian personnel is in effect and at present the strength of the units still operational during the months indicated are reflected below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHO</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>524</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co A</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>274</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co B</td>
<td>422</td>
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<td>371</td>
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<td>Co C</td>
<td>326</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 Oct 1970. RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co E</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>B-36</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>JGCD</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2318</td>
<td>2274</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Part of Co A till 1 Oct 70.*

(11) Miscellaneous: The following are miscellaneous activities programs conducted by 5th SF GP (Abn) during the last quarter. CIDG Strength and Accounting. CIDG Strength for Aug was 17,309 and Sep was 13,591. As of 31 Oct the CIDG Strength was 9,479. Strength figures will be lowered monthly in conjunction with camp conversion.

(12) Safety.

(a) General. Safety newsletters and command letters on safety continue to be published.

(b) Injuries and deaths by accidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. (U) Medical

(1) USASF Medical Care. The capability for provision of unit level medical care to USASF was expanded at SFOB dispensary by adding X-ray, electrocardiogram, audiometry and bacteriologic culture/identification facilities, in order to reduce traffic to Can Ranh Bay since the closure of the 8th Field hospital. USAHV hospital medical support to USASF throughout the Republic has remained excellent.

(2) CIDG Medical Care.

(a) CIDG and USASF medical procedures in the reporting and treating of Veneral Disease, Leprosy, Tuberculosis, and Plague have been Vietnamized by adopting the Ministry of Health programs for these diseases. The adoption of these programs will prepare Vietnamese medics, remaining on site after conversion of CIDG Camps, to obtain care in those disease areas for the military and civilian personnel living in and around these remote camps.

(b) Dossiers (the equivalent of annotated certification by the 5th Group) on individual CIDG nurses, medics and technicians, containing their medical training and capabilities, are being delivered by local medics and doctors to each Province Medical Chief prior to conversion. These dossiers will enable the individual to gain employment commensurate with his or her capabilities, in most cases within the same district, for those CIDG personnel unable to be converted to ARVN. The employment of some of these individuals in the SVN Rural Health Program will allow their skills to be used locally to benefit the health of troop dependents living near the remote camps.

(c) In order to implement Vietnamization, USASF advisors have assisted their SVN counterparts in adopting the ARVN immunization program for CIDG personnel.

(3) Preventive Medicine. CIDG Malaria remains markedly below the 1969 rate for this quarter, and shows also the seasonal variational decline seen at this time in 1969. This lower rate is attributed to persistent and effective command advisory emphasis calling for VNLF command action at all levels to require CIDG troops to take prophylactic anti-malaria medication and observe other malaria precautions. USASF malaria remains markedly below the rate for this quarter in 1969.
AVGB-SU

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RG3 CSFOR-65 (R2)

(1) Medical Supply. In the past, preventive medicine supplies within 5th Special Forces have been critical items in short supply. In an effort to increase the responsiveness of the logistical support to demands for these often critical items, the responsibility for FM supplies was transferred to Medical Supply channels. This has improved order-ship time, reduced the number of save-out items, and improved the overall Group sanitation effectiveness.

(5) Training. Assistance was begun, and is continuing, to the VMSF in updating their training programs for medics in order to meet new operational requirements.

(6) MEDCAPS. During the reporting period there were 275 MEDCAPS conducted at 12 locations throughout the Republic of Vietnam. A total of 61,513 patients were treated.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. ECS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. (U) Signal:

(a) During this reporting period all means of communications organic to the command continued to operate at a high level of efficiency with no major problems encountered.

(b) Headquarters 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF is continuing to review the nature and volume of all electronically transmitted traffic. Much of the traffic is handled by courier, allowing a move closer to the communication austerity goal set forth by COMUSMACV.

(c) In conjunction with the present communication austerity program all subordinate units of the 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, are requesting that teletype circuits be deleted when the traffic volume is low and other means are available. Additionally, shared frequencies have been turned in.

2. Training:

(a) In an effort to further upgrade the proficiency of the Special Forces communicator, all C Detachments are utilizing Morse Code to pass a portion of their daily traffic.

(b) During this reporting period increased emphasis has been placed upon safeguarding of defense information using AR 380-5. The purpose of classes held were to refresh each individual with the regulations governing safeguarding of defense information. The classes emphasized proper handling, classification/downgrading and storage of classified defense information and materials.

(c) Continued strong emphasis is being placed upon all companies of the 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF to eliminate all transmission security violations within the Military Regions. This is being accomplished by close coordination with the 101st RRU units in the Military Regions, and all means of communications are being monitored by the Radio Research Det\nts.

3. New Concepts/Equipment:

(a) During this reporting period the new high gain FM frequency antenna AS-223/GRC was tested by companies C and D. These tests proved that this highly directional antenna effectively doubled the transmitting range of FM radio sets while using either the secure or non-secure mode of operation.

(b) It was found that the AS-223/GRC antenna is light weight and can be installed in a matter of minutes. It is recommended that this antenna be procured through the Army supply channels, and held in supply stock for issue to Special Forces units.
2. (C) **Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.**

   a. (U) **Personnel: None**

   b. (C) **Intelligence:**

   1. (C) **Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Missions.**

      (a) **Observation:** Preflight checks by intelligence personnel often indicate that the necessary APD equipment is in proper operable condition, when in fact the equipment fails to operate during the actual conduct of the mission.

      (b) **Evaluation:** Post-flight checks often indicate that, although the equipment failed during the mission, it was in operable condition. A subsequent examination of the helicopter often indicates a faulty circuit in the internal electrical system of the craft.

      (c) **Recommendation:** When using non-organic air support or an air crew unfamiliar with APD missions, the UH-1 electrical system must be pre-flight inspected and any problems brought to the attention of the crew chief.

   2. (C) **Polygraph Utilization.**

      (a) **Observation:** Incident investigations and investigations concerning Viet Cong activities are greatly enhanced by the use of the polygraph only when proper investigative techniques have been used prior to the support of the polygraph.

      (b) **Evaluation:** The polygraph is most often abused due to the lack of a prior investigation. Proper prior investigation by trained personnel will alleviate many of the problems encountered in the course of an investigation.

      (c) **Recommendation:** The polygraph should be used only as a tool of investigation and only as the last step in an investigation. Further, case files should be instituted and maintained so that when polygraph support is needed, the polygraph examiner can read into the case for enlightenment as to how he should approach the actual polygraph examination. In essence, assigned counterintelligence agents or other investigators should bear the brunt of the burdens in an investigation, and the polygraph examiner requested as a last resort when all else has failed.

   c. (C) **Operations: Waterborne Operations**

      (a) **Observation:** Waterborne, especially airboat operations, prove extremely effective in covering areas when the monsoon season causes the water level to rise.

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(b) EVALUATION: The utilization of airboats is particularly effective because of their speed, maneuverability, fire power, and extensive area coverage capabilities. Sampans and other waterborne craft can also greatly increase the offensive coverage of a TACOR. It must be stressed, however, that waterborne operations are greatly enhanced by air assets, i.e. helicopters, gunships, FACs and C and C ships.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That when forces are employed in areas traditionally inundated during monsoon seasons, waterborne operations, utilizing air support, be strongly considered for planning purposes.

d. (U) Organization: None

e. (U) Training: MOI Training for Indigenous Instructors

(1) OBSERVATION: Indigenous instructors, at times, have not been able to effectively train CITOs, because of a lack of awareness of principles and methods of instruction.

(2) EVALUATION: Much training in actual subject matter has been given to the indigenous instructor, but MOI is not stressed enough. No matter how an instructor grasps the subject matter, his presentation will inevitably lose its effectiveness if he does not have a good awareness of the principles on instruction.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That increased and continual emphasis be placed on providing MOI training to Instructor personnel.

f. (U) Logistics: None

g. (U) Communications: None

h. (U) Material: None

i. (U) Political Warfare

(1) Distribution of PSYOPS leaflets

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been observed that when PSYOPS leaflets are disseminated in a hamlet, the other hamlet residents do not leave their homes to gather the leaflets. The children of the hamlet do, however, gather the leaflets and take them to the elders.

(b) EVALUATION: Children are a good means for distributing PSYOPS leaflets among all residents of a hamlet. The children bring the leaflets to their elders who have stayed in their homes or who have remained to work their fields.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: PSYOPS leaflets should be distributed to the children as well as the hamlet elders.
AVOB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 70. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(2) S5 Personnel working in off-limits areas (RQ S5)

(a) OBSERVATION: S5 personnel at every command level are the commander's contact with the local people.

(b) EVALUATION: S5 personnel are often hampered in the performance of their duties by commanders who will not allow them to mingle with the people. S5s are supposed to be able to advise the commanders as to the desires of the people for civic action projects. S5s are supposed to develop themes for PSYOPS campaigns directed towards the people and the enemy. S5s are supposed to be able to judge the economic and political situation within the command's area of interest. Short-sightedness on the part of many makes this part of the S5's job impossible because he is not allowed to participate freely with the people in off-limits areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That S5 personnel not be restricted by off-limits areas in the performance of their duties.

J. (U) Medicals

(1) Preventive Medicine Supplies (RQ Surg)

(a) OBSERVATION: All job-oriented supplies have been ordered through medical channels by end-users except preventive medicine (PM) items, causing some confusion in delivery of PM items to end-users.

(b) EVALUATION: Delivery of PM supplies through non-medical supply channels to end-user medical personnel has been slow because of the vast overall number of items supervised by non-medical supply personnel. Transfer of PM supplies to medical supply channels within 5th Special Forces Group has markedly improved order-ship time and reduced the number of due-out items, and improved Group Sanitation effectiveness.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That transfer of item management responsibility for PM equipment and supplies to medical supply channels be considered at all levels within the Army, particularly by operationally deployed units.

(2) Chlorination of Bulk Water Supplies (RQ Surg)

(a) OBSERVATION: Bulk water supplies at fixed installations are most effectively chlorinated by means of in-line hypochloritators.

(b) EVALUATION: At fixed Special Forces installations in RVN, several methods of chlorination of bulk water supplies have been utilized. Bulk chlorination at intervals using the slurry method has resulted in periods of inadequate chlorine residual when large volumes of water are consumed. Use of an Eradelator has the disadvantage of the extremely high initial cost ($30,000).
lack of repair parts and repairmen, and necessity for an operator. Use of in-line hypochlorinators involves low cost of installation, no operator cost, constant chlorination and little repair workload. Hypochlorinators are not in regular supply channels, must be purchased outside the 7th Army, and delivery time is exceptionally long.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the use of in-line hypochlorinators be considered for use at fixed installations, by all overseas 7th Army and other military branches, very early in the development of each installation, in preference to bulk slurry chlorination or use of Erdalators. To be effective, this requires stock levels of hypochlorinators already available in military supply channels, advance planning and wide knowledge of hypochlorinators.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

HARVEY G. PATTERSON

LTC, Infantry
Adjutant

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AVOR-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. FCS C/FOR-6c (R2)

1. I CTZ CORS, APO 96319
2. II CTZ CORS, APO 96350
3. III CTZ CORS, APO 96227
4. IV CTZ CORS, APO 96215
5. CO, 1st SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 97731
6. CO, 6th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, Fort Bragg, N.C. 28307
7. CO, 7th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, Fort Bragg, N.C. 28307
8. CO, 8th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 99337
9. CO, 10th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, Ft Devens Mass. 01333
10. CO, Special Forces Det (Abn), Europe APO NY 09050
11. 16th SF Co. 1st SF, APO 96291
12. 17th SF Co. 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96243
13. 18th SF Co. 5th SF Gp (Abn) Principal and Special Staff Office
14. CO A, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96227
15. CO B, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96318
16. CO C, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96337
17. CO D, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96215
18. 5th Sep B Det, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96240

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2. List of Commanders and Key Personnel
3. Troop Disposition Lists
4. Military Region Maps
5. Operational Statistics
6. Visitors Briefing
8. Table of Contents

Incl 2, 6, 7 and 8 wd, HQDA
AVHHO-DD (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(ABN) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CPON-65 (42)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96775

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 5th
Special Forces Group (ABN).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference Item concerning "Distribution of PSYOP Leaflets," page 54,
paragraph 21(1). Dissemination of propaganda should be accomplished by all
available means emphasizing the most effective means when possible. The
Face to Face aspect of placing leaflets in the hands of children for
distribution to their parents encourages the children to participate in
the propaganda effort, and will probably produce favorable residual
attitudes if the leaflet message does not offend the target audience.
Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference Item concerning "S-5 Personnel Working in Off-Limits Areas,"
page 55, paragraph 21(2). The mission of the S-5 generally is to gain the
support of the local populace through use of PSYOP and Civic Action/Community
Development Programs. To achieve this objective the S-5 must be free to
work with Local National Officials. This authority can not be considered
as license for indiscriminate visitations to off-limits areas in an unofficial
capacity. Should appearance of US personnel in off-limits areas become too
frequent an impression of official approval for such areas will be errone-
ously assumed by other US personnel and the Vietnamese populace in general
thus voiding the original purpose of the off-limits designation. Recommend
CO 5SF-GA 1SF in conjunction with local military and civilian law enforce-
ment officials develop a special pass for personnel required to work in
off-limits areas. Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference Item concerning "Preventive Medicine Supplies," page 55,
paragraph 2j(1): nonconcur. The so called preventive medicine supplies
and equipment are items of common usage by the Corps of Engineers, Chemical
Corps and Medical Department. Worldwide, the vast majority of these items
are utilized primarily by the Corps of Engineers in their insect and
rodent control programs. It would be neither efficient nor expedient for
the smaller user to manage these items on a world wide basis. The herbicides
and related equipment are utilized primarily by the Chemical Corps. The
relatively minor usage of these items by the Medical Department again does
not warrant transfer of these items to the medical supply system. Unit has
been so advised.
d. Reference item concerning "Chlorination of Bulk Water Supplies," page 55, paragraph 23(2): nonconcur. The determination of the best method to treat water is based on the quality of the water to be treated. In some areas because of unacceptably high content of solids the solid materials must be removed. In these areas an Erdalator must be used. In-line chlorinators have proven effective but are subject to malfunctions and down time. For this reason in many areas where this method is used it is highly recommended that a full time operator be assigned to preclude the system from becoming non-potable as a result of equipment failures. Historically, several outbreaks of disease have been traced to non-potable water from non-attended in-line chlorinator systems wherein the chlorination equipment had become inoperable while the continued to produce non-chlorinated water. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy for:
5th SFRA
GPOP-DT (15 Nov 70) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), for Period Ending 31 October 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (M2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 FEB 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report with the following comments:

Reference paragraph 2j(2), page 55: Concur. Due to the inherent problem of non-potable water being introduced into a water system by a malfunctioning in-line chlorination system, this type system would not be considered to be effective unless trained operator/maintenance personnel were available for constant monitoring of the system while it is in operation. In cases where chlorination only is required to produce potable water (as opposed to removal of suspended solids as is done in the Erdlator process), the in-line chlorination systems appear to be an effective, low-cost process. Studies should be made to determine the degree to which in-line chlorination systems could be used effectively were they introduced universally into the inventory.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AG
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES APO 96240

GROUP 1
LOW GRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DIR 5200.10

Incl 1 to 5th SF Cp (Abn) ORLL for the Period Ending 31 October 1970
## CONFIDENTIAL

### TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

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*CONFIDENTIAL*
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**TOTAL** 2093 560
Incl 4 to 5th SF GP GRL for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Military Region 2

DAK PEX (A-242)
DAK SEANG (A-245)
REN HET (A-244)
KOM TUM (B-24)

PLEIKU (Co B, 2nd MSPC)
(A-204)

BAN KI THUOT (B-23)
DUC LAP (A-239)
BU PRANG (A-236)

LEGEND
-----International Boundary
---Province Boundary
---MR Boundary
---Coastline

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65
1. (C) Missions:  
   a. Squad  910  3581  1299  1193  446  7183  
   b. Platoon  736  1488  722  1685  20  4651  
   c. Company or Larger  154  48  114  443  16  775  

2. (C) Contacts:  
   a. Frd initiated  79  60  31  9  3  1  
   b. VC initiated  27  32  34  38  1  1  
   c. Incidents  102  37  62  11  212  

3. (C) Confirmed enemy losses:  
   a. KIA  233  35  51  55  374  
   b. Cpr  33  17  1  51  
   c. Quarterly Comparison of Confirmed Enemy Losses Country-Wide:  

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4. (C) USASF Losses:  
   a. KIA  1  2  3  
   b. MIA  2  2  3  10  
   c. MIA  2  3  10  30  

Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years  
DOD Dir 5200.10  

Incl 5 to 5th SF GP ORLL for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1970  

CONFIDENTIAL
### Statistical Data (Cont)

d. Quarterly comparison of USAF casualties country-wide:

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j. (c) VNSF Losses:

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d. Quarterly comparison of VNSF casualties country-wide:

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c. (c) CIDG Losses:

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7. (C) RF/PF Losses:

**MR-1 ONLY**

a. KIA

b. WIA

c. MIA

d. Quarterly comparison of RF/PF Casualties country-wide:

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Operational Report
Lessons Learned, HQ, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces Group
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 70.

CO, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces Group
HQ DA, OASSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310

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**TOTAL OBSERVATIONS:
74
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COASFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310