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1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of D. P. McAuliffe subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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18 JAN 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - BG D. P. McAuliffe

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

1. Inclosed are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG D. P. McAuliffe. The report covers the period December 1969 through November 1970, during which time BG McAuliffe served as Deputy Senior Advisor MR 3.

2. BG McAuliffe is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Clark W. Stevens Jr
Captain AC
Assistant Adjutant General

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MACMR-3

26 November 1970

SUBJECT: Debriefing Report (U)

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96227

1. (U) In compliance with USARV Regulation 1-3, a debriefing report is hereby submitted as I conclude my tour of duty as the Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps and Military Region 3 (MR 3), covering the period December 1969 through November 1970.

2. (C) Review of the Year's Events. The year 1970 has been a momentous one for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces of III Corps and Military Region 3 (MR 3). This year witnessed major turning points in the effectiveness of ARVN combat forces, in the relationship between ARVN forces and US forces, and in the nature of the external threat to MR 3 from enemy main force units. These factors have had a significant impact on the progress of Vietnamization wherein the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVNAF) assume full responsibility for the conduct of military operations and thus permit the redeployment of US forces from Vietnam with minimum risk. Highlights of the year's events follow.

a. The modernization of equipment of ARVN units was accomplished, although some shortages persist. This provided the essential capability to move, shoot and communicate, and to operate effectively against enemy forces.
b. An extensive program of combined operations, called the Dong Tien ("progress together") program, initiated in 1969, was concluded early in 1970. Designed to enhance the combat effectiveness of ARVN forces, the program paired ARVN and US combat units for combat operations in the same tactical areas utilizing common combat support assets (helicopters, artillery, etc.). It served to draw the regular ARVN forces away from the population centers to the remote areas where enemy main force elements were operating; it provided an effective training and confidence-building vehicle for ARVN units; it served to sharpen combat skills, to exercise unit leadership and to provide ARVN units with experience in coordinating and working with US combat support; importantly, it provided commanders and advisors a useful means of identifying operational deficiencies and initiating prompt corrective actions. The program provided the foundation for the enlargement of ARVN tactical responsibilities which progressed through the remainder of the year.

c. Commencing in April 1970, the III Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, launched a series of military operations in Cambodian territory to the west and northwest of MR 3 (summarized in Appendix 1). From April through June 1970, the period of maximum force commitments across the border, General Tri had six reinforced regiments operating in Cambodia, or almost one-half of the total combat force available to him (additional maneuver battalions were rotated to Cambodia during the campaign, which served to spread this combat experience). These operations were extraordinarily successful not only in terms of the heavy damage inflicted on the enemy, but equally importantly in the substantial boost to ARVN morale and self-confidence and the strengthening of unit leadership which resulted.

d. US forces withdrew from Cambodia in late June 1970, at the start of the wet season; they did not return to their former areas of operation on the western border and along the northern tier of MR 3. Instead, ARVN combat units replaced US units in these border areas, in accordance with the new mobile role assigned to the Army by President Thieu (in his 1 July 1970 decree on the role of regular and territorial forces). The ARVN forces were
deployed to intercept enemy main forces at or across the border, away from the heavily populated areas of MR 3; moreover they were postured so as to facilitate the redeployment of US forces. This was a major accomplishment of the wet season strategy pursued by Lieutenant General Michael S. Davison, Commanding General, II FFORCEV, and Lieutenant General Tri during the latter half of 1970 and constituted a major advance in the important Vietnamization process. (ARVN force deployments are reviewed in Appendix 2.)

3. (C) Impact of the Cambodian Campaign on ARVN forces. The significance of the campaign in Cambodia is that it was the first major offensive conducted on a large scale by ARVN forces of III Corps and its results have had far reaching effects, some of which are indicated below. Noteworthy is the fact that the cross-border operations were planned and executed by ARVN commanders and their staffs, and logistically supported by the ARVN system. (The ARVN operations in Cambodia are summarized in Appendix 1.)

a. Combat effectiveness. Overall, there was a significant improvement of combat effectiveness achieved by the ARVN units that participated in the cross-border operations, and this higher level of effectiveness has generally been maintained. In fact, these forces demonstrated that they were now capable of assuming a much heavier burden of fighting the war in Vietnam than had been the case previously. Most of the participating ARVN units engaged in hard fighting at one time or another against determined enemy forces and prevailed. Initially in the campaign, serious deficiencies were uncovered in the employment of armor and in the coordination and execution of combined arms operations. By and large, however, tactical errors were corrected promptly and the lessons learned were applied to future operations. Commanders and advisors often collaborated to work out on the ground more effective tactics for their units. A unit's success would breed self-confidence, and in turn lead to further success. Because of the rapidity of tactical movement and the distances involved, there
was more delegation of authority to subordinate commanders than
had previously been experienced in most ARVN units, and this
served to enhance both leadership and initiative. Moreover, most
of the battalion and company commanders who participated in this
campaign are still in these command positions, or have been promoted
to higher positions, and this combat experience remains within the
ARVN force structure of III Corps.

b. Morale. The successful Cambodian operations boosted
the esprit and self-confidence of the participating units, and the
morale of the individual soldier. Unit esprit has been buoyed by
the record of achievement in Cambodia and by the prospects of
further glory in a forthcoming dry season offensive. Nevertheless,
Cambodia has had an adverse effect on the morale of the new
recruit who has joined his unit since mid-1970. The recruit has
generally been exposed to unfounded "scare" stories and rumors about
Cambodia (spread at training centers and in some communities) and
in many cases he has deserted soon after joining his unit. (This
problem is further discussed, together with other ARVN personnel
matters, in Appendix 3.)

c. Logistics. The III Corps operations in Cambodia required,
for the first time, the ARVN logistic system to support large, highly
mobile task forces at long distances from rear supply depots and
maintenance shops. At first, the ARVN system did not perform
satisfactorily but, under the mounting pressures of combat operations,
it rapidly improved and, for the most part, ultimately met the
challenge. Noteworthy accomplishments and shortcomings in
logistics during the Cambodian campaign are summarized below
(these are more fully discussed in Appendix 4).

(1) The ARVN supply system proved capable of supporting
deployed combat forces over land lines of communication for
sustained periods of time.

(2) The concept of forward support was successfully imple-
mented for the first time in large scale operations by the corps
support organization, the III Area Logistics Command (III ALC).
These operations uncovered major deficiencies in the III ALC manning
and equipment which are presently being corrected. Importantly, it infused a spirit of teamwork and an attitude of "pushing support forward" which transformed a previously mediocre logistics organization into a responsive, effective one.

(3) Logistical planning, traditionally ignored by ARVN commanders and staffs, came to be recognized as an essential part of overall operational planning and execution. Accordingly, the quality and utility of logistical planning steadily improved as the campaign progressed.

(4) Maintenance proved to be the most serious continuing logistics problem affecting operational effectiveness throughout the campaign. Fundamental deficiencies in the maintenance system, long recognized by advisors but rarely accorded ARVN command attention, were exposed, such as, shortages of critical repair parts caused by inadequate maintenance management and insufficient usage data; shortages of tools, test equipment and technical publications, also reflecting a previous lack of attention to maintenance; poor reporting, which contributed to an overall lack of responsiveness; equipment failures directly attributed to poor first and second echelon maintenance. The impact of maintenance on the operational effectiveness of the mobile task forces, which relied so heavily on tracked vehicles, served to focus the attention of the corps commander and his major subordinate commanders on the problem. This provided an unparalleled opportunity to advisors to press for reforms in maintenance procedures and attitudes, both in the operational units and in the backup support organizations. Substantial improvements have already been realized and are continuing, but much remains to be done.

(5) Aerial resupply was not utilized extensively for the deployed ARVN forces but only sparingly to meet emergency requirements, because of a minimum availability of helicopters to III Corps. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) helicopter support was unresponsive to requirements for night resupply missions.

(6) VNAF aerial medical evacuation support was unsatisfactory at night, although generally satisfactory during daylight hours. This problem has continued to the present, and has had a detrimental
impact on the morale of the ARVN soldier (since many casualties are produced at night). As a corrective measure, night flying is being stressed in the training of the VNAF helicopter squadrons recently activated to support III Corps.

d. Battalion Advisors. Restrictions placed on the participation of US advisors in cross-border operations in the April-June period dictated that they be withdrawn from their ARVN units when those units went beyond a distance of 30km from the border. By the time the III Corps task forces had reached that limit, they had been through a shake-down and were generally operating smoothly. Thus, when US advisors were withdrawn, and US combat support (principally helicopters and artillery, for VNAF tac air had been providing support throughout) was terminated, the ARVN maneuver battalions demonstrated that they could operate effectively without US advisors. This has led to a conclusion, shared by most ARVN commanders, that the continuous presence of US advisors at battalion level was no longer needed but that provision should be made to establish US liaison with those battalions supported by US combat support assets for specific operations or periods of time.

4. (C) Impact of the 1970 Wet Season Campaign on ARVN Forces. The wet season campaign in MR 3, July-December 1970, was designed to exploit the achievements and opportunities resulting from the Cambodian campaign, and it accomplished this objective as indicated below.

a. In implementing the wet season strategy, ARVN combat forces of III Corps were deployed out to the western border and the northern tier of Military Region 3 and there they have assumed a new, mobile combat role. They have replaced US combat units which previously had defended those border areas. The ARVN forces were thus positioned astride main enemy infiltration and resupply corridors, in the remote, higher threat areas, to interdict and deny the movement of enemy main forces from Cambodia into MR 3. This has, in turn, permitted a redispersion of US combat forces in MR 3 toward their ultimate redeployment out of country. A corollary benefit of this campaign is that it started the
process of divorcing the regular ARVN forces from their previous static territorial security role, which is now being assumed with increasing effectiveness by the VNAF territorial forces.

b. Complementary to the wet season campaign conducted in MR 3 have been the continuing cross-border operations of III Corps forces. These operations have served to deny enemy re-entry to and use of their former sanctuary areas north of War Zone "C" (Tay Ninh Province) and Binh Long Province, as well as the Parrot's Beak and Angel's Wing areas close to Saigon. They have also compounded the enemy's logistic support problem and contributed to the disruption of his command and control system. Moreover, the continued presence and activity of RVNAF elements across the border have maintained pressure, at least indirectly, on enemy main forces operating in southeastern Cambodia, while at the same time providing material and moral support to the Cambodian government forces.

5. (C) Appraisal of ARVN Forces of III Corps.

a. Combat Forces.

Infantry Divisions. Two of the three divisions assigned to III Corps, the 18th and 25th ARVN Infantry Divisions, are combat effective with good leadership and morale, and they can be counted on for mission accomplishment. The 25th Division, under the command of MG Nguyen Xuan Thinh, is ranked among the top three ARVN divisions in country. The 18th Division has shown steady improvement under the command of MG Lam Quang Tho, and has responded well to the division's new mobile mission in Cambodia. The 5th ARVN Infantry Division has not performed effectively for any sustained period during the year. Early in the year, it was possible to attribute the division's shortcomings to turbulence suffered in the take-over of the US 1st Infantry Division's tactical area and the division base camp (Lai Khe). However, in two subsequent operations into Cambodia (north of Binh Long Province), the performance of the participating divisional elements was undistinguished, and reflected the poor leadership and
inactivity that had characterized the division all year. The division did benefit from the more recent cross-border operation, to Snoul (November 1970), although it is unlikely that the present division leadership will capitalize on these gains. There are two feasible remedies to the division's plight, both of which have been proposed to General Tri: (a) replacement of the division commander, MG Nguyen Van Hieu, and the commander of the 8th Regiment; (b) further participation by divisional elements in cross-border operations, to lift the morale and exercise of the combat skills of the unit commanders and soldiers involved. (General Tri has recommended that General Hieu be replaced, and is considering future operations involving the 5th Division.)

(2) Airborne Brigades. The ARVN Airborne Brigades have demonstrated that they can operate effectively as independent fighting units over sustained periods. When committed, they do require substantial combat support (particularly air) and logistic support from non-divisional resources. The brigade commanders are capable and experienced. On the other hand, the division itself has shown its inability to operate effectively as a division because of an inadequate control structure at the top, insufficient organic combat support and logistic support resources, inadequate division leadership and an unresponsive division staff.

(3) Ranger Groups. The ARVN 3rd Ranger Group under the command of the highly capable Colonel Pham Van Phuc is one of the elite combat units of III Corps, the nucleus of General Tri's successful TF 333 of the Cambodian campaign. The 5th Ranger Group has proven combat effective although it is less experienced, less versatile than the 3d. The 6th Ranger Group is relatively untested except for operations within the Capital Military District. Commitment of these groups also requires that substantial combat support and logistic support be provided, for they have only marginal organic support capabilities (except for the 5th).

(4) Armored Cavalry. The ARVN Armored Cavalry Regiments of III Corps (except for the 1st ACR of the 5th Division) became effective fighting machines for the first time during the Cambodian campaign. Initially in the campaign, armored operations were characterized by a lack of aggressiveness and poor coordination, and
were beset with serious maintenance deficiencies. The pace, range and intensity of the combat operations in which they were then engaged had not previously been envisioned by the planners and logisticians. The successes achieved by these units are a tribute to the leadership and drive of General Tri and his capable task force commanders, and to the technical competence of COL Truong Bay, Commander, III Area Logistic Command (III ALC), whose organization provided the supply and maintenance support that kept the armor rolling. With the recent activation of the 3d Armored Brigade as a major subordinate unit of III Corps, under the command of COL Tran Quang Khoi, the most successful of General Tri's task force commanders in Cambodia, continued attention to and improvement of armored operational effectiveness can be expected.

b. Combat Support.

(1) Field Artillery. The ARVN field artillery has proven to be an effective supporting arm in mobile combat operations over sustained periods. ARVN divisional artillery has had, up to this time, both a combat support mission and a territorial role. However, the recent introduction of territorial artillery into MR 3 will gradually release more ARVN divisional artillery from territorial security missions to the support of mobile divisional forces.

(2) Communications. ARVN tactical communications have proven responsive and effective, although somewhat limited by equipment shortages.

(3) Engineer. The ARVN Combat Engineers have consistently provided professional and responsive support to III Corps forces. However, during the Cambodian campaign, the engineer equipment available in the ARVN structure was insufficient to support fully both cross-border operations and the requisite engineer effort within MR 3. Also, a persistent shortage of construction materials has affected engineer capabilities.
Air Support. The air support provided to the forces of III Corps by the Air Force of the Republic of Vietnam (VNAF) varied in quality and responsiveness as indicated below:

(a) Tactical air support (fixed wing) has been, for the most part, responsive to the supported ARVN forces and effective, during daylight hours. At night, this support is virtually nonexistent because of lack of night observation devices for surveillance and night instrumentation for fighter-bomber and observation aircraft. VNAF forward air controllers (FACs) have not performed as well as they could because of a general reluctance to search areas systematically for targets or to adjust artillery fire on targets, and a recurring inability to maintain contact with the ground commanders. These deficiencies have been made known to USAF advisors with the VNAF.

(b) Helicopter support for III Corps has been generally unresponsive. The VNAF helicopter pilots have been reluctant to fly night missions (even if it meant saving the life of a wounded ARVN soldier), have often become misoriented during flights into remote areas, and have had repeated difficulty in maintaining contact with ground commanders. The principal reason for this lack of responsiveness, in my view, is that up to the present time the VNAF helicopters supporting III Corps have been loaned from the resources of other Corps. These particular pilots have never really felt that they were members of the III Corps team. This situation should improve as the VNAF helicopter squadrons which will be dedicated to the support of III Corps and MR 3 are activated and become operational, provided a spirit of teamwork is encouraged.

(c) One assault helicopter squadron and one cargo helicopter (CH-47) squadron were activated in September and are currently in training; their operational capability will be phased in gradually through early 1971. Two additional assault helicopter squadrons will be activated in the first quarter of 1971 to round out the support for III Corps and MR 3. Special provision is being made in the training of these units to stress night flying proficiency, terrain recognition (map reading), and coordination with ground elements—all deficiencies noted in VNAF support in the recent past. In
addition, General Tri and his division commanders have been urged by General Davison to develop friendly relations with the commanders of the supporting VNAF units in order to promote a sense of teamwork among the ARVN-VNAF units.

(d) The total VNAF helicopter support to be dedicated to III Corps will fall short of that now made available to III Corps and MR 3 from US resources (in country). This lesser amount of airmobile support should suffice, however, if future military planning and thinking are adjusted accordingly. It will necessitate the maximum use of land lines of communication so as to minimize requirements for aerial resupply; the optimum employment of artillery and tactical air support to minimize the need for helicopter gunships; and increased use of forward support facilities to maximize the utilization of helicopter assets in forward areas. Fortunately, the current wet season operations in Cambodia, conducted without US helicopter support and with a less than satisfactory level of VNAF helicopter support, serve to condition thinking and attitudes along this line.

6. (C) Vietnamization Problems. Certain problem areas affecting progress toward Vietnamization goals have been identified in the preceding paragraphs, namely, the ARVN maintenance system which although substantially improved continues to warrant much command attention; the 5th Division's need for a change in top leadership and for an upgrading in combat effectiveness, which have been stressed to General Tri (and with which he is in agreement); and the lack of responsive air support, which is also receiving attention on both Army and Air Force sides. There are additional problems, outlined below.

a. Personnel. There was considerable personnel turbulence created in ARVN units by the Cambodian operations and the Presidential decree (July 1970) which promulgated the new role of ARVN forces. These combined to relocate ARVN combat units far from their previously accustomed operational areas near population centers -- and thus separated the soldier from his family, friends, familiar surroundings and, in some cases, sources of additional income (e.g., part time jobs in nearby communities).
Moreover, "scare" rumors and exaggerated stories concerning the enemy threat and conditions in Cambodia were generated and spread among gullible recruits. As a result there has been a general increase in desertions over the past six months coupled with considerable difficulty in maintaining a sufficiently high level of recruiting to offset desertions, casualties, and attrition. Studies disclosed the profile of the deserter as being a rifleman or basic trainee, between the ages of 17 and 21, single, with less than six months service. This was taken into account in formulating corrective actions. Troop education programs were launched to explain the new role of ARVN forces, and to depict the activities of ARVN units across the border as well as environmental conditions in Cambodia. Police control measures were instituted to apprehend deserters and draft dodgers throughout the Capital Military District, since many young deserters usually head for the Saigon area. These and other measures have had some success in producing favorable trends recently in both desertions and recruitment (Appendix 3). However, continued command emphasis will be necessary if a healthy personnel strength posture is to be maintained in the ARVN forces of III Corps. The appropriate advisors must continue to monitor this situation closely.

b. Border Surveillance. The mission of border surveillance and border defense will be a difficult one for ARVN forces to accomplish after the redeployment of US forces, and will require continuing command attention. There will be generally less friendly force density in the border regions than when US forces were operating there with ARVN units. There will be fewer aircraft available, and virtually no night aerial surveillance capability (see para 5b(4), above). Under the circumstances, the ARVN forces deployed on the border will undoubtedly have to operate in small patrol formations, widely dispersed, to cover likely avenues of enemy infiltration and movement; rapid reinforcement capabilities will have to be maintained and exercised -- by air and ground means. Logistic support will be taxed. In addition, a sensitive combat intelligence capability will be required to complement the use of troops for border surveillance. Toward this end, ARVN requirements for such equipment as ground surveillance radars,
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ground sensors, airborne surveillance devices, and night observation devices should be periodically reviewed.

c. Base Transfers. ARVN units have acquired a number of sizeable base camps from redeploying US units. These base acquisitions have enabled the consolidation of unit rear areas from previously widespread locations and, in many cases, have moved the rear elements closer toward the new forward operating areas of ARVN forces. General Tri believes that, through these base acquisitions, the critical housing shortage (for troops and dependents) that has long beset his units can now be alleviated. There is a danger, however, that the tasks of providing security for, operating and maintaining these large base camps will drain off combat power of the resident tactical units. There is not an adequate RVNAF post engineer type organization, although a very austere one is being formed, and there will continue to be heavy reliance on unit self-help to maintain these camps. An example of what is not desired was furnished by the 5th Division upon taking over Lai Khe. A full infantry battalion was committed to base defense and an engineer company to base maintenance. This commitment was subsequently reduced to one rifle company and an engineer platoon. However, desirably, these tasks should be performed entirely by the rear (hq and support) elements of the resident units. Advisors will have to continue to watch this situation closely and, when imbalances occur, recommend corrective measures promptly.

7. (C) US Advisory Effort.

a. Structure. The Cambodian campaign has demonstrated that the advisory structure associated with ARVN forces can be reduced without adverse impact by rolling it up from the bottom, that is by commencing with the elimination of the maneuver battalion advisory teams. There are some battalions which, because of mission, location or level of effectiveness, will continue to warrant the presence of US advisors, and such a capability should be retained in the advisory
structure in the form of mobile liaison teams. Thereafter, assuming no reversals in the Vietnamization process, regimental teams could be eliminated, but similarly retaining a mobile liaison capability at the division level. Reductions at the division and corps levels can best be accomplished by the elimination of selected functions, initially those of a non-advisory nature. I foresee a continuing need for the division senior advisor with a team sufficiently large to cover the principal staff functional areas and to provide a mobile liaison capability. A similar structure should be retained at corps level also. There is one area which needs immediate strengthening, that of providing adequate logistic support to the widespread advisory teams throughout MR 3. The present system is not capable of meeting even minimum advisor requirements after US units depart. A feasible solution is to establish an advisory support element which would function on an area basis to "push forward" minimum essential supplies and services to advisory teams in the field. A recommended change to the Joint Table of Distribution of the US Army Advisory Support Group, III Corps and MR 3, was recently forwarded to MACV which would initiate the roll-up of the advisory structure as outlined above and establish an austere advisory support element.

b. Quality. It has been my experience that those advisors who were the most effective in working with their counterparts and achieving the objectives we set forth were, in just about every case, officers who had been carefully selected for these positions on the basis of quality, experience, and empathy toward the Vietnamese. If an officer measured up in all three criteria, the probability was high that he would also measure up as an advisor. In the case of colonels and lieutenant colonels, the Army's "command recommended" indicator has generally guaranteed the quality desired for the positions of division and regimental senior advisors. As the advisory structure is reduced, the quality of those advisors remaining in key positions will assume increasing importance and should be made a paramount criterion in the personnel screening and selection process. The designation of key senior advisor positions by the Army for "command credit" will, I believe, provide the incentive for promising officers to want to serve in these, as it does now. In addition, longevity is becoming a factor of increasing weight as the level of combat activity subsides. I believe that, for maximum effectiveness and influence, and
minimum turbulence, division senior advisors and key advisors at the corps level should now remain in their positions for their entire tour, assuming they are performing effectively. Longevity should be sought at the regimental level also, consistent with roll-up plans.

8. (C) The Corps Commander. Having served with Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri in a close working relationship on a daily basis for the past year, I have been impressed by his patriotism, dedication to the Army and his mission, strong pragmatic leadership, relentless drive against the enemy, personal courage (his heroism in combat is legend), honor, and love for the Vietnamese soldiers entrusted to him. There is no question but that much of the credit for the extraordinary progress made by III Corps and MR 3 in the past year must be attributed personally to General Tri, for his enlightened leadership, initiative, resolve, perception and vision. Yet, rumors of corruption follow him, alleging, for example, that he receives kickbacks from province chiefs and from the lumber industry, and is involved in black market activities. By his own admission, General Tri is wealthy but he maintains that his wealth is inherited. His family has, for generations, owned much land in Bien Hoa Province. He makes no effort to conceal the trappings of luxury with which he is surrounded in garrison and at home. As one born to wealth, he takes much of this for granted. I find the charge of corruption -- as we understand it in a western sense -- completely incongruous with the soldierly qualities which are paramount in his character. Moreover, it has been my personal observation that the rumors of corruption associated with General Tri seem to rise and fall in direct proportion to his current prominence and popularity. Military Region 3 and, in fact, the country would be the real losers if such allegations were permitted to neutralize or remove his superb leadership.

9. (U) I close my report without recommendations, for the corrective actions which I believe should be taken in light of the past year's experience and the problems identified have been initiated.
MACMR-3

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and are presently being monitored. From a personal view, my
tour of duty as the Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps and MR 3, has
had all of the challenge, responsibility, interest and satisfaction
I could desire.

4 Incl

as

D. P. McAULIFFE
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Senior Advisor

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APPENDIX 1

CAMBODIA CAMPAIGN

1. (C) On 5 April 1970, III Corps launched a four day operation which included a one-day incursion into the northern tip of the Angel's Wing. This operation was a prelude to the major cross-border operations which followed. On 14 April, General Tri's forces made a relatively shallow penetration of the Angel's Wing - Highway 1 area. This maneuver caught the enemy completely by surprise. On 29 April General Tri's forces crossed the border in and north of the Angel's Wing to begin a major campaign (Toan Thang 42) which continued through 22 July 1970. This was a large scale operation involving three reinforced regimental size combined arms task forces which frequently changed composition throughout the campaign. Incl 1 shows a representative organization. The objective of Toan Thang 42 was to make a deep penetration of Cambodian territory west of MR 3 (Svay Rieng and Kampong Cham Provinces) to destroy supply depots, ammunition caches, and training areas. The operation began with a three pronged thrust into Cambodia along Highway 1 and 13 (Incl 2). The enemy had received tactical warning of the impending ARVN operations, but the depth and duration of General Tri's attack generally caught him off balance.

2. (C) During the month of May, two task forces (318 and 333) turned north in a sweep toward a linkup at the C. up rubber plantation (Incl 3). On 1 May, the ARVN Airborne Division (less one brigade) conducted air assaults (Toan Thang 43) into the Fishok area of Cambodia north of War Zone C, and continued to operate in that area throughout June (Incl 4). On 6 May the 9th Regiment (reinforced) of the 5th ARVN Division crossed the border (Toan Thang 46) to neutralize enemy base area 350 just north of Binh Long Province (Incl 5). Each of these operations had varying degrees of success (Incl 6).

3. (C) The most important lesson learned from the Cambodian Campaign was that the ARVN forces of MR3 were now capable of operating successfully against enemy main force units without US assistance. In addition, a more capable leadership emerged with a renewed confidence and greatly improved combat effectiveness. Combined arms teamwork improved when the ARVN Armored Cavalry Regiments were employed in operations with Infantry Regiments. Problems noted in the operations field concerned the over-reliance
on US gunship assets by Vietnamese commanders, particularly Airborne Commanders, prior to calling artillery. There was also a problem in airborne and other units to employ close-in patrols and ambushes to secure their CP's and NDP's in Cambodia. A situation which will affect future operations was the requirement to utilize nearly 100% of III Corps bridging materials to construct a total of 10 bridges in support of the campaign. These tactical bridging assets continue to support cross border operations and will remain tied up until permanent bridges can be constructed.
Controlling Headquarters: HQ, III CORPS (LTG DO CAO TRI)
Field Headquarters: HQ, 25th Inf Div (MG Thinh)
(Note: LTG Tri acted as Force Commander with MG Thinh as his deputy)

TF 225 (COL Chuyen)
HQ, 49th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div
2-49th Inf Bn
3-49th Inf Bn
4-49th Inf Bn
10th Armor Gp (10th ACR and one APC Sqd, 18th ACRO)
Plat/25th Engr Bn
C/303d Engr Bn (-)
6 tubes 105, A/252d Arty
4 tubes 105, C/252d Arty
7 POLWAR Teams

TF 333 (L'TC Fhuvt)
HQ, 3d Ranger Group
36th Ranger Bn
52d Ranger Bn
5th ACR
C/303d Engr Bn (-) (1 plat and Co Hq)
6 tubes 105, B/181st Arty
2 POLWAR Teams

TF 318 (LTC Lam)
18th ACR (-)
31st Ranger Bn
Plat/C/301st Engr Bn
4 tubes 105, C/51st Arty
4 tubes 46th Arty
1 POLWAR Team

3d Pde, 25th Inf Div (US)
2-14 Inf Bn
2-22 Inf Bn
2-27 Inf Bn
2-3d Mobile Strike Force
General Support:
Hq, 38th Arty Bn
6 tubes 155, A/38th Arty
6 tubes 155, C/38th Arty
2 tubes 155, B/38th Arty
B/301st Engr Bn
Elements of 3d Area Logistical Command
Elements of 73d Med Gp
VNAF TAC AIR
## CAMBODIAN OPERATIONAL RESULTS

### 14-17 APRIL 70
**TF 225, 318, 333**
**LOCATION: ANGEL’S WING**

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### 1 MAY - 30 JUN 70
**AIRBORNE DIV**
**LOCATION: FISHHOOK**

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### 22 JULY TO PRESENT
**LOCATION: NORTH OF DOG’S HEA, HUMP, PARROT’S BEAK**

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### SIGNIFICANT FRIENDLY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

- **M113 TRUCKS 25 C/S WPNS 2**
- **M41 IND WPNS 24**
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APPENDIX II
ARVN FORCE DEPLOYMENTS - III CORPS

1. (C) The overall character of the Vietnamization effort since 1969 has been one of gradual progress. In early 1969, ARVN battalions of III Corps were concentrated in the populated areas in close proximity to Saigon in an anti-coup posture. Major efforts were made starting in mid-1969, through a series of combined US-ARVN combat operations to move ARVN forces out to the remote, higher threat areas of MR 3, (Incl 1 and Incl 2). In January 1970 the emphasis began to shift from combined to independent operations, causing ARVN forces to assume unilateral responsibility for larger areas of operations (Incl 3); also shown at Incl 3, the dispositions of major ARVN forces prior to the start of the Cambodian campaign in April 1970.

2. (C) Following the Cambodian campaign, there was a shifting and expansion of ARVN areas of operational responsibility associated with implementation of the wet season campaign (Incl 4) in July 1970. The wet season plan had three main purposes: to facilitate the redeployment of US Forces; to convert the 18th ARVN Division to a completely mobile role, capable of deployment throughout MR 3 or across the border; and to position ARVN forces in the border areas and northern tier of MR 3 to interdict enemy infiltration and to defend against enemy main forces far from the population centers. The increased effectiveness of territorial forces in security and pacification efforts has facilitated the expansion of their operational areas (Incl 5), and has complemented the new mobile role of the ARVN forces.
JANUARY 1970
ARVN FORCES AREAS OF OPERATION

[Map of Cambodia with various regions labeled, including Binh Duong, Binh Tuy, Long An, etc.]

OPERATING WITH US FORCES
1. (C) General:

   a. Recruiting in the three ARVN infantry divisions continued to be stressed during the first nine months of CY 70. Quarterly recruitment quotas increased each quarter with an overall quota figure for the third quarter being established at 7,942 personnel. The quota was decreased for the fourth quarter of CY 70 to 5,700 personnel.

   b. Desertions continue to be a major problem in III Corps. Although the III Corps Commander has directed each unit to substantially reduce desertions during CY 70, the III Corps average rate of desertions per thousand assigned has increased to 20.9 during the first nine months of CY 70.

   c. The maintenance of a strong strength posture by RVNAF in III Corps is of critical importance to the successful conclusion of present and future plans. The heavy demands on the limited national manpower resources necessitates the most efficient operation of the personnel system possible.

2. (C) Accomplishments:

   a. Progress has been made in the recruiting programs utilized in the ARVN divisions of MR 3 with the 18th Division making the greatest improvement and recruiting the most personnel during CY 70. The 25th Division attained the highest percentage of recruiting quotas, but was assigned the smallest quotas of the three divisions. Each division increased their number of recruiting teams during CY 70 and monitored the team's productivity. In areas where recruiting teams were not producing satisfactorily, some of the teams were relocated geographically and renewed emphasis placed on team members to meet their quotas (See Tabs A and B).

   b. The three ARVN infantry divisions within MR 3 maintained an assigned strength of better than 100% during the first eight months of 1970, falling below 100% only after a sharp TCC strength authorization increase was implemented in August 1970. Strength was maintained in spite of increased casualties due to Cambodian operations,
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shifting of regiments from established regimental operational areas and increasing recruiting demands by other RVNAF and RF/PF/PSDF forces on a limited recruiting base.

c. The III Corps Commander implemented and/or continued the following programs in CY 70 to reduce the desertion rates in Military Region 3:

(1) Command emphasis was placed on desertion reduction.

(2) The inclusion of personal grievances as matters of special interest by ARVN Inspectors General.

(3) Pay grievance teams were established.

(4) Fair and equitable leave policies were initiated and utilized.

(5) The establishment of grievance committees which were used to revitalize indoctrination and orientation of soldiers, particularly recruits.

(6) Desertion control committees were established at division, regimental and battalion level.

(7) Personnel control checkpoints were utilized to apprehend soldiers leaving their units.

(8) The buddy system for recruits was used by pairing an experienced soldier with a recruit to help stabilize and teach the recruit during his first six months with a unit.

(9) Quality control measures were established for men recruited in an attempt to recruit men less likely to desert. A study was prepared and led to the following actions:

(a) Reception orientation and indoctrination of replacements has been initiated at the division training centers and older soldiers are briefed on the changing role of the regular force units.
(b) Presentations pertaining to pay and allowances, PX and commissary privileges and desertion laws are being utilized for new replacements.

(c) The new replacement is informed of unit accomplishments.

(d) Replacements are informed on unit procedure pertaining to leave and awards and decorations.

(10) Hq, III Corps launched a recruiting campaign entitled "Enlisted Evolution" from 20 September 1970 through 20 November 1970 with the goal of achieving a 100 percent strength posture for all main force RF and PF units. To support this campaign, police operations were launched in the Capital Military District, Gia Dinh Sector, market places, provincial capitals and district towns to stimulate youths to perform their military obligation or volunteer for the Army. Simultaneously, police operations included the checking of young men for draft dodger status, draft irregularities, and to apprehend deserters. The campaign produced the following results:
In the Capital Military District, 1,756 deserters were apprehended, 4,273 draft dodgers identified, 5,409 personnel identified with ID card irregularities and 16,399 personnel were identified for various minor offenses which included black market activities, curfew violation, and suspected VC.

(d) Statistical data pertaining to ARVN casualties from 1 April 1969 through 31 October 1970 is reflected by the graph at Tab J. Data includes the 5th, 18th and 25th ARVN Divisions and ARVN III Corps. The linear graph reflects KIA and WIA figures. Conclusions depicted by graph data follow: In-country casualties for the three ARVN divisions within III Corps continued to drop from May 1969 through February 1970 as the major contacts with enemy forces moved away from the large population centers. Casualties rose in March 1970 as the ARVN divisions assumed more of the combat load due to the Vietnamization program, with casualties peaking in May 1970, coincident with major operations in Cambodia. Since that date, casualties have fallen sharply as major enemy forces avoid contact in country and in Cambodia.

3. (C) Residual Problems:

a. Notwithstanding the effort and progress noted above, the desertion rate continues to be a major problem in III Corps and
Military Region 3. The recent increases in unit movements and participation in the Cambodian operation which preempted the attention of commanders from this vital area have adversely influenced the desertion rate. The III Corps Commander has recognized this increasing trend and directed the division commanders to pay special attention to increasing the flow of information to the lowest unit to stem rumors and capitalize on successes of the Cambodian operation.

b. During the recent operations in Cambodia it was recognized that the personnel replacement system was not responsive in filling heavier than average personnel losses, particularly in Armored Cavalry and Ranger units. Although replacements were eventually obtained, there was a considerable delay between the time the losses were incurred and the time replacements were provided. The primary reason for this delay was the lack of a sufficient reserve of trained manpower. The 3d Ranger Group has participated in many operations over the past months that has taken the unit out of its normal area of operation. This operational concept has reduced the recruiting ability of the unit since personnel volunteering for a specific unit want to remain near their homes. Replacements for Armored Cavalry units are furnished through the Armored Command School. The output of students during the Cambodian operations did not meet the casualty rate of these organizations and consequently, considerable time lapsed before replacements were made available to these units which would offset the heavier than average casualty rate. JGS has verbally approved 105% overstrength for A/C regiments.

c. The trend in ARVN promotion problems is discussed in Part III and Tab I. The rapid expansion of the RVNAF has created shortages in leadership positions which cannot be solved quickly.
PART II
IMPACT OF CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS ON DESERTIONS

1. (C) General: Unit turbulence created by the Cambodian operations and the diversion of command attention to more immediate tactical problems are considered to be the primary causes of increased desertions. The increase trend was similar in all divisions with an approximate 4 men per thousand per month increase. The III Corps average increased from 25.1 deserters per thousand per month in the first quarter, to 29.3 deserters per thousand per month in the second quarter and 28.5 deserters per thousand per month in the third quarter of CY 70. The 25th ARVN Division was affected the greatest by these increased desertions. The division average desertion rate increased from 25.2 desertions per thousand per month from January through April 1970, to 32.2 for May and June 1970.

2. (C) Accomplishments:

a. With the 25th ARVN Division having the highest desertion rate in III Corps, plans were developed and implemented to lower the desertion rate for present and future operations in this division. Many of the same methods utilized by the U.S. military in the USA were also employed by the division and are reflected below:

(1) After an individual has been AWOL for a period of 7 days, a letter is sent to his family requesting their assistance in returning him to duty.

(2) Once he is classed as a deserter, a request is sent to his local area police notifying them of his status and requesting their assistance in his return.

(3) The division still has a program in effect which gives soldiers a pass, leave or citation for assistance in identifying and locating deserters.

b. The potential ARVN deserter is a young man that falls into one or more of the following categories:

(1) Age - 17 to 25.

(2) Assigned as a rifleman - Accounts for approximately 65% of the deserters.
The single soldier, less than six months service, volunteered and housing not available for his family is the greatest threat to desert.

c. The following charts reflect data compiled by the studies described above and are attached at Tabs C, D and E.

(1) The chart at Tab C reflects desertion category. For example, a non-married soldier compared to a married soldier with 5 or more children or less than 5 children and a soldier who has served less than 6 months compared to a soldier who has served more than 6 months.

(2) The chart at Tab D reflects desertion figures by age and function.

(3) The chart at Tab E reflects a comparison of the salary of soldiers with the approximate living expenses they incur.
RECRUITING vs DESERTIONS

5th DIV

18th DIV

25th DIV

1969 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
## CONFIDENTIAL

### MONTHLY AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED
STRENGTH CY 70

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FUNCTION | EFFECTIVE | JAN - AUG 70 | REMARKS
--- | --- | --- | ---

| DESERTERS CLASSIFIED BY AGE |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 26 | 31 | 34 | To 25 | To 30 | To 34 |

| Pit Ldr | 1 | 3 | 2 | 6 |
| Asst Pit Ldr | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Off/Pers Wing | 1 | 1 |
| Sqd Ldr | 1 | 3 | 16 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 31 |
| Asst Sqd Ldr | 2 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 15 |
| Clerk | 3 |
| Switch Bd Op | 1 |
| RTO | 1 |
| Interpreter | 1 |
| Recon Pers | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Sig Opr | 1 |
| During Trans | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| Cannoneer | 5 | 12 | 12 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 42 |
| Litter Car | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Barge Opr | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| Driver | 1 | 3 | 3 | 21 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 38 |
| Gunner | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 17 |
| Medic | 1 |
| Electrician | 1 |
| Cav Pers | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 13 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 36 |
| Ammo Car | 1 | 27 | 41 | 31 | 35 | 19 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 164 |
| Riflemann | 27 | 309 | 433 | 374 | 292 | 414 | 287 | 72 | 33 | 2241 (65%) |
| Basic Tng | 25 | 234 | 203 | 143 | 72 | 88 | 21 | 2 | 2 | 793 (26%) |
| in trans | |

53 | 576 | 689 | 575 | 429 | 603 | 351 | 90 | 53 | 3419

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

**DESERTION STATUS**

**CLASSIFICATION BY AGE AND FUNCTION**

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<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td><strong>576</strong></td>
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42

**CONFIDENTIAL**
### Salary and Minimum Living Requirements

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<td>Salary per month</td>
<td><strong>Food</strong> 2000</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Breakfast</strong> 1050</td>
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<td><strong>Smoking</strong> 990</td>
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<td><strong>Toilet Items and Soap</strong> 400</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Hair cuts</strong> 100</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong> 4,540</td>
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<td><strong>Single Single</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Salary Per month</td>
<td><strong>Food</strong> 2500</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Breakfast</strong> 1200</td>
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<td><strong>Smoking</strong> 990</td>
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<td><strong>Newspaper</strong> 300</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Toilet Items and Soap</strong> 400</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Refreshments</strong> 300</td>
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<td><strong>Single WO</strong></td>
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<td>Salary per month</td>
<td><strong>Food</strong> 3000</td>
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<td><strong>Breakfast</strong> 1100</td>
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<td><strong>Smoking</strong> 1500</td>
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<td><strong>Refreshments</strong> 500</td>
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<td><strong>Hair cuts</strong> 100</td>
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<td><strong>Laundry</strong> 400</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Toilet Item and Soap</strong> 400</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Newspaper</strong> 300</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong> 7,400</td>
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</table>

- If married situation is most critical
- Does not include any additional expenses
1. (C) General:

a. The over-all impression of the ARVN promotion system is that it is highly complex, difficult to comprehend and subject to varying interpretations. On closer examination, one fault shows through clearly: The system is so encumbered with restrictions bearing upon promotion eligibility as to tend to limit, rather than to expand, the availability of qualified officers and NCOs in the proper grades for leadership and other key positions.

b. Battlefield promotions provide an excellent means of infusing capable combat leadership through the officer and NCO structure. However, a review of the current battlefield promotion system indicates that its success hinges on meeting individual award prerequisites and on the initiative of unit commanders to recommend subordinates. These restrictions tend to operate against the prompt promotion of deserving junior officers and junior NCOs. Some modification of the promotion criteria appears to be warranted not only to provide a more flexible, responsive system but also to encourage the accelerated promotion of those young men who have served with distinction in combat.

2. (C) Accomplishments:

a. The III Corps Commander has been trying to obtain reforms in the promotion system that would: (1) provide Corps commanders more latitude in making or recommending officer promotions; and (2) give a bigger break to officers in command positions. In this connection, he feels that he has adequate authority for enlisted promotions. There has been some improvement in this area as evidenced by a considerable increase in functional (temporary) and battlefield promotions of officers this year. There were only 130 promotions of this type in III Corps during CY 1969 (excluding the annual or permanent promotions); however, for the first six months of 1970, there has already been more than a 200% increase.

b. The III Corps Commander has continued to express dissatisfaction with some of the promotion criteria which he feels act to the disadvantage of officers in command positions and favor staff officers.
at higher headquarters. He has urged JGS to authorize the Corps commanders to promote company commanders to the grade of captain, and battalion commanders and district chiefs to the grade of major after having served successfully for three months in these positions and having received one citation for meritorious service rather than the presently required two or three. JGS is currently considering implementing or partial implementation of the III Corps Commander's proposal.

c. The JGS took a much more liberal approach to functional promotions, however, apparently borrowing the logic behind the III Corps Commander's recommendations for battlefield promotions and applying it instead to functional. It was recommended that the current criteria for time in grade and time in duty position be cut in half for personnel serving in combat units, but remain the same for staff and technical unit officers. This would make the time criterion for functional promotions of combat officers the same as the current criterion for battlefield promotions. Current battlefield and functional promotion criteria and the JGS and III Corps positions are shown at Tabs F and G respectively. The JGS recommendations were favorably considered by the conference as was a III Corps recommendation to limit to cases of personal misconduct the bar to promotion resulting from adjudication of eight or more days confinement.

d. A recapitulation of regular force promotions in III Corps for CY 1969 is attached at Tab H.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CURRENT CRITERIA</th>
<th>JGS RECOMMENDATION</th>
<th>III CORPS RECOMMENDATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 6 months time in permanent grade</td>
<td>1. 9 months in permanent grade</td>
<td>1. Same as current criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 3 months time in current position</td>
<td>2. 6 months in current position</td>
<td>2. Same as current criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. a. 3 citations for promotion to LTC and Col</td>
<td>3. Same as current criteria</td>
<td>3. Delete citation requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 2 citations for promotion from 2LT up to Major</td>
<td>4. One of the above conditions will be waived if a soldier has an outstanding victory</td>
<td>4. Criteria 1 &amp; 3 waived after 3 months successful service as company commander or battalion commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1 citation for promotion from Corporal up to Aspirant</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Have an outstanding victory</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURRENT CRITERIA</td>
<td>JGS RECOMMENDATION</td>
<td>III CORPS RECOMMENDATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 1 year in permanent grade</td>
<td>1. a. 1 year in grade for combat support and technical units</td>
<td>1. a. Same as JGS proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 6 months in current position</td>
<td>b. 6 months in grade for combat units</td>
<td>b. Nine months in grade for combat units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Assume TO&amp;E function 1 or 2 steps higher than current rank</td>
<td>2. a. 6 months in current position for combat support and technical units</td>
<td>2. Same as JGS proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Efficiency score 80 for field grade or 70 for company grade officers</td>
<td>b. 3 months in current position for combat units</td>
<td>3. Same as JGS proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. No more than 8 days closed confinement during the last year.</td>
<td>3. Serve in a position authorized a rank higher than his current rank</td>
<td>4. Same as current criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Not under detention or awaiting appearance before a court</td>
<td>4. Efficiency score same as current criteria</td>
<td>5. No more than 8 days closed confinement for personal misconduct during the last year. Punishment for command responsibilities will not apply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Must not be a Captain promoted from EM ranks or not having a Junior High School diploma</td>
<td>5. Same as current criteria</td>
<td>6. Same as current criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Same as current criteria</td>
<td>7. Same as current criteria.</td>
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## Recapitulation of Regular Force Promotions in III CTZ

1 Jan - 31 Dec 69

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<th>Annual Promotion</th>
<th>Functional Promotion</th>
<th>Battlefield Promotion</th>
<th>Automatic Promotion</th>
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<td>264</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>SGT1</td>
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<td><strong>Total NCO</strong></td>
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<td>152</td>
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<td>881</td>
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*Total does not include automatic promotions.
**Functional promotions include officers only.
PERCENT OF AUTHORIZED KEY PERSONNEL ASG.

LEGEND:

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- Indicates goal for end of 1970

As of 30 Sep 70
LOGISTICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE CAMBODIAN CAMPAIGN

1. (C) General:

   a. During Toan Thang 42 there were three Task Forces (TF) to be supported, TF 225, 318, and 333. TF 225 received support from the 25th Division Logistics Battalion (Log Bn) while TF 318 and 333 were supported by III Area Logistics Command (ALC). In addition III ALC was required to support III Corps Forward Headquarters and 73d Medical Group as well as its own forward element personnel (Incl 1).

   b. The 25th Log Bn which established a forward support element in western Hau Nghia Province (Go Dau Ha) functioned extremely well in support of TF 225. III ALC also did an excellent job considering operational burdens encountered. The changing situation required that III ALC forward be relocated three times between Go Dau Ha and Tay Ninh (West). Since the beginning of Toan Thang 72, III ALC forward has been operating continuously from Tay Ninh (West).

   c. The Cambodian operation proved that the ARVN Logistical System was able to support extended operations in the field. ARVN forces relied on a land line of Communication (LOC) as 97% of all supplies were moved by vehicle and only 3% by aircraft. At times units experienced a low stockage of supplies, however, with limited transportation, they were able to effect resupply before the situation became critical.

2. (C) Logistical Accomplishments and Problem Areas:

   a. Supplies Required/Issued: Corps G-4 submitted a list of requirements to III ALC. In turn, III ALC established stockage levels for the support elements (i.e., Class I - 5 days, Class III - 5 days, Class V - 10 days). Inclosure 2 lists average daily issues of these classes of supply throughout the campaign. During the first few weeks of the operation a considerable number of major
items were issued as listed in column A of Inclosure 3. There were certain items critically short; most significantly there were serious shortages of .50 caliber ammunition. The US loaned 500,000 rounds until the Vietnamese were able to resolve the problem.

b. Maintenance Except for initial US support in rendering a few tracked vehicles operational, all maintenance and evacuation of vehicles during this period was accomplished by ARVN. The availability of repair parts was a continuous problem as there was a lack of realistic PLL's and vehicle repair was relatively slow. Inclosure 3 lists the quantities of major items repaired by the two support elements during a one month period. The figure of 136 tracks repaired is a relatively high one and substantiates the fact that Armored Cavalry Regiments were not performing Preventive Maintenance (PM) as many deficiencies corrected by forward DSU's were organizational in nature. In most cases it was very difficult to obtain maintenance management data. As the level of operations has decreased, such data have been more readily available.

c. Medical Support: It was agreed in advance that VNAF would "air evac" wounded to a clearing station operated by the 73d Medical Group. Limited treatment was provided at the station and patients were further evacuated to hospitals by helicopter. On the average 51 people were evacuated per day which required anywhere from 10 to 24 sorties in the same period. The most significant problem was in timely evacuation, however, as the operation progressed, this problem was alleviated.

3. (C) Residual Problems:

a. LOC: Land lines of communication must be maintained or logistical problems will become acute. A lack of VNAF aircraft resulted in inadequate airlift support for aerial resupply and MEDEVAC.

b. Maintenance/PLL: These problems are chronic and require that commanders place continuous emphasis on PM, deadline reporting, and supply accounting.
c. Transportation: The availability of trucking assets was one of the critical logistics problems encountered during the campaign. A trucking capability of 15,700 tons per day was required while a capacity of only 10,000 tons per day was generally available. In addition, these assets were not employed in the most efficient manner. In October, however, III ALC acquired forty-two 12 ton semi-trailers. The CO, III ALC believes that he can now provide sufficient transportation for forthcoming operations.
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FORCES SUPPORTED

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<tr>
<td>III ALC SUPPLY POINTS</td>
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<td>72D MEDICAL GP</td>
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9,643
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**LOGISTICS EXPERIENCE DATA**

**AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES**

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<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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## MAJOR ITEMS ISSUED AND REPAIRED

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<td>WHEELED VEHICLES</td>
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<td>105MM</td>
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<td>155MM</td>
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<td>106MM</td>
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<td>OTHER WEAPONS</td>
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<td>ENGINEER ITEMS</td>
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ARVN SUPPLY IMPROVEMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

1. (C) General:

a. Supply in the past was one of the main weaknesses of the ARVN system. However, extended operations and US redeployments have placed greater responsibility on ARVN commanders in demanding results from within their own logistical system.

b. The establishment of forward supply points, maintaining stock records accurately, and limited transportation assets are basic problem areas, however, through ARVN self-sufficiency and experience areas of concern are being alleviated.

2. (C) Accomplishments:

a. Improvements:

(1) Third Area Logistical Command (ALC) and Division Logistics Battalions have established Forward Supply Points for extend operations.

(2) Logistical schools were established in each Technical Service to meet instructional requirements related to the Improvement and Modernization Program.

(3) Prior to the Cambodian Campaign stock records were maintained at Regimental level. Since the start of the US redeployment ARVN has become proficient and self-sufficient in maintaining records.

(4) A US/VN Combined Logistics Improvement Committee (CLIC) has been established to isolate specific problem areas, determine solutions, and provide assistance and training as required.

(5) There is emphasis on follow-up action in subordinate units in obtaining equipment status and insuring timely issue of shortages within SM/DSL centers.
(6) Direct Support units have been directed to place additional control measures on the distribution of supply items to insure correct utilization.

(7) Improvement in accountability of stocked items by establishing better reporting procedures from subordinate units to SM/DSL centers.

b. Capabilities:

(1) ARVN has initiated his own TOE changes for additional transportation equipment to overcome resupply difficulties in support of forward areas.

(2) Majority of III Corps attached truck of transportation assets are for movement of troops rather than supplies.
ARVN MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

1. (C) General:

   a. A lack of Command Emphasis in the past was the major problem of the maintenance effort. Technically unqualified personnel are other factors contributing to the overall posture.

   b. However, since the Cambodian operation commanders have displayed greater interest in placing emphasis on Material Readiness. More factual records are being maintained at lower units, and expanding of technical skills further enhances areas which previously was not enforced because of US involvement.

2. (C) Accomplishments:

   a. Improvements:

      (1) Track vehicle contact teams from Direct Support elements are now being attached to Armored Cavalry units on a continuous basis.

      (2) Programs for cross-training ARVN with US units have been instituted.

      (3) CMMI teams have been established for the first time within Divisional units, plus there are two Corps teams to inspect Non-Divisional organizations.

      (4) The most significant improvement since the beginning of the Cambodian operations is Command Emphasis. Due to this experience, commanders at all levels realize the importance of scheduling standdown periods and having the lowest unit commander supervising preventive maintenance.

   b. Capabilities:

      (1) ARVN maintenance personnel are well qualified to encounter situations of technical necessities not only in ordnance, but engineer and signal fields as well.
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(2) Technical Service's have been programing individuals through schools and on-the-job training to meet greater responsibilities reference US withdrawals.

(3) Maintenance personnel at organizational level are knowledgeable and efficient in their respective areas. (i.e., Four Warrant Officers in the ACR's are school trained from Fort Knox, Ky.)

(4) Inspections are now being conducted between operations by unit commanders and maintenance officers, giving maximum Command Emphasis.
CURRENT SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE EFFORT FOR THE DRY SEASON

1. (C) General:

   a. The major effort being given toward the forthcoming Dry Season Campaign is track vehicle maintenance. An intensified maintenance program has been established for the M41 tanks and M113 personnel carriers.

   b. Repair Part Supply for both programs continues monitoring by the Office Chief of Ordnance (OCO) and Ordnance Advisory Division (OAD) through close coordination with 83d Ordnance Group.

2. (C) Accomplishments:

   a. M41 Rehabilitation Program:

      (1) The program initially began on 1 September 1970 with a projected date of completion 30 November 1970.

      (2) 1st ACR, 5th Division, 5th Acr, 18th Division, and 18th ACR, 3d Armor Brigade, have completed the "Rehab Program." This totaled forty-eight (48) M41s overhauled.

      (3) The 15th ACR, 3d Armor Brigade, is presently envolved with the last phase. No major problems are being encountered and completion should be on schedule.

      (4) Senior Advisor's from all Armored Cavalry Regiments are extremely pleased with the display of ARVN efforts, technical knowledge, and the excellent coordination between organizational and supporting elements, toward making the program one of the most successful to date in this field.

   b. M113 Program:

      (1) The program began on 15 November 1970 with an approximate date of completion 31 December 1970.
(2) All ACR's will standdown during this period with exception of one Troop per Regiment, which will rotate with other Troops within the unit on normal tactical operations.

(3) The program will encompass not only 1st thru echelon but also include instruction on preventive maintenance techniques given by unit maintenance personnel.

(4) Tank Troops will be receiving tank gunnery instruction from Officers and Senior NCO's within the unit.

(5) Additional class instruction is programmed at the Armor Command School reference maintenance and tank gunnery.

c. Repair Part Supply:

(1) Repair parts for the M113 program are being compiled and submitted to 20th Base Depot.

(2) In addition, part lists are being consolidated at 3d ALC for out of country replenishment by early January 1971 concerning future operational needs.
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG D. P. McAuliffe**

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**Abstract:**

N/A