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**AUTHORITY**
AGO D/A ltr, 2 May 1975; AGO D/A ltr, 2 May 1975

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SECURITY
MARKING

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ATTACHED are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report submitted by BG Don. Dunlop for the period 22 June 1968 to 30 April 1969 during which time he served as Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps Tactical Zone.

2. BG Dunlop is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. Wilson
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
BEST

AVAILABLE

COPY
30 April 1969

Commander
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHAG-DST
APO 96375

1. (U) References: Regulation number 1-3, HQ USARV, subject as above, dated 1 June 1968 and letter AVHAG-PO, HQ USARV, subject as above, dated 5 July 1968.

2. (U) This debriefing report is submitted in accordance with cited references and covers the period 22 June 1968 to date while I was assigned as Deputy Senior Advisor, III CTZ. Functional areas in which the III Corps Advisory Group has responsibility or a major interest are covered in appendices hereto. Additionally, the topics appearing below are submitted as meriting particular emphasis.

3. (C) OVERALL ASSESSMENT.

a. General: Although the combat effectiveness of ARVN units in III CTZ leaves much to be desired, there has been an overall, and in some cases marked, improvement in most units during the ten-month period covered by this report. Lieutenant General DO CAO TRI, who assumed command of III Corps and III Corps Tactical Zone on 5 August 1968, was principally responsible for this improved combat effectiveness. His employment of general reserve battalions in areas distant from Saigon had the immediate effect of transforming the Corps from a relatively static posture to an offensive-oriented one. He has employed an average of eight general reserve battalions in this role since his assumption of command. Additionally, his emphasis on the spirit of the offensive, multi-day operations, US/FWAF/ARVN/RF/PF combined operations, timely reaction to contacts, and removal of maneuver elements from province and district capitals have had a very salutary effect. Other factors which contributed to improved operational effectiveness were the issue of the M-16 and M-60, availability of greater quantities of the M-79, the activation of two additional maneuver battalions and three artillery battalions, relief of many ineffective regimental, battalion and company commanders, more meaningful guidance emanating from corps level, battalion training programs conducted by US units,
and the growing realization among ARVN units that they can defeat the NVA/VC decisively on the battlefield.

b. US Influence: To put this enhancement of combat effectiveness in proper perspective, the great influence on General Tri by Lieutenant General WALTER T. KERWIN, JR., CG II FFAC EV and SA III CTZ must be recorded. General Kerwin, who developed an extremely close rapport with the III Corps Commander, consistently urged offensive operations, the "pile-on concept" when contact was made, aggressive search and destroy operations, and combined operations. In virtually all cases, General Tri responded positively to such overtures and rapidly became imbued with the same offensive-minded concepts. In their daily conferences and joint briefings, these two corps commanders closely coordinated the operations of all friendly forces within the III CTZ.

c. Progress: Solid progress has been registered in several fields during the past ten months. In particular, the ARVN units assigned to III Corps have improved their combat effectiveness in terms of reaction to contacts, semi-independent company size operations, air mobile operations, and multi-day operations.

(1) Reaction to contacts: Last year at this time, the night move of an ARVN unit to reinforce a contact was virtually never accomplished and reinforcement during daylight hours was normally too late and ineffective. At the present time, ARVN units reinforce units in contact routinely, both during daylight hours and at night, and much more expeditiously than in the past. If air mobile assets are available, they are used for this purpose.

(2) Semi-independent company size operations: ARVN commanders have a propensity for keeping their battalions together for all kinds of operations. This stems from a feeling of safety in numbers and is caused in part by the limited communications within a battalion. The advisory efforts to encourage smaller formations have had considerable success. Many battalions now employ by company and, as a result, more contacts are gained and more effective operations are conducted. This problem is not yet solved across the board, but progress toward this end is encouraging.

(3) Air mobile operations: During the past ten months, III Corps units have conducted an average of 74 combat assaults per week. Their technique in conducting air mobile operations has improved considerably. The 25th ARVN Division is very accomplished in this regard and their proficiency in such is comparable to that of US units. The 5th and 18th ARVN Divisions have not yet reached this degree of proficiency, but do a creditable job and continue to improve. The number of air mobile operations currently being conducted by RF units in Long An, Hau Nghia, and Tay Ninh Provinces - and the professional manner in which they do so - is worthy of particular note.
Multi-day operations: During the past ten months, there has been a significant increase in the number of multi-day operations. A year ago ARVN battalions would cease operations — often breaking contact — in the middle of the afternoon in order to get back to their base camps before dusk where they were allegedly needed to protect the local installation. This concept has gradually dissipated during this time frame, and planned operations of several days are normal and those of two or three weeks not unusual. This is particularly true in the 18th Division. ARVN units have learned they can live and operate in the field for extended periods.

Principal Problem Areas: As current SEER reports indicate, III CTZ ARVN units have a long way to go before attaining satisfactory combat effectiveness by US standards. The principal deficiencies continue to be a low level of leadership, serious imbalances in grade structure, lack of supervision by the chain of command, the prevalent belief by commanders that excessive friendly losses are tantamount to relief, over-centralization of authority, lack of operational responsiveness, a great reluctance to conduct independent or semi-independent small unit operations, weak coordination of fire support, the strong tendency to conduct search operations in column formation, poor security on operations, ineffective employment of cavalry units, defensive-minded ambushes, an excessive desertion rate, inadequate promotion and schooling policies, and a weak program for ministering to the individual needs of the soldier and his family. The leadership, or lack thereof, of the ARVN commander is of utmost importance. The effectiveness of a battalion can change overnight from black to white, or vice versa, with the change of commanders. Unfortunately, there are not enough dynamic ARVN commanders available. The serious shortage of field grade officers and captains constitutes another critical deficiency in the field of leadership. Of the number authorized within the three divisions in III CTZ, 19% of the colonels, 29% of the lieutenant colonels, 88% of the majors, and 52% of the captains are currently assigned. Only eight percent of the company, battalion, and regimental commanders hold the grade authorized for their positions.

Comparison of US/ARVN Infantry Battalion: The combat effectiveness of and combat results obtained by ARVN units are normally equated with like US units. It is well to keep in mind the important differences that exist. At appendix I is a comparative analysis between the US and ARVN infantry battalion. Although this is not a comprehensive study, it does depict the significant differences as regards strength, number of individual and crew served weapons, communications assets, fire support, and air mobile support. As stated in the appendix, these factors, together with the leadership differential, lead me to conclude that the combat effectiveness of the US infantry battalion to be approximately three times that of the ARVN infantry battalion.
5. (U) DEPCORDS/USA INTERFACE. The rapport between personnel supervised by DEPCORDS, II FFV and personnel supervised by USA, III Corps has been outstanding. The system of having the advisory effort split out under these two organizations has not only worked, but it has worked extremely well. Since many facets of the overall problem are of concern to both advisors of the military units and the political structure, continued close coordination and cooperation are essential. The "one team concept" has been a reality in III CTZ in a very real sense.

6. (U) QUALITY OF ADVISOR PERSONNEL. The advisory system can be only as effective as the officers and enlisted men who comprise it. All members of the advisory system should be top quality. This is considered particularly important as we reach the stage where ARVN progressively shoulders more and more of the tasks currently accomplished by US/FMAF forces. Ideally, the same criteria used to select commanders of US brigades should be applied in the selection of division senior advisors, and the same criteria used to select commanders of US battalions should be used in selecting regimental senior advisors. Other officer and enlisted positions, whether in a unit or a staff, should be filled by individuals possessing the highest qualifications.

DONALD D. DUNLOP
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Senior Advisor

Appendices: I - Comparative Analysis - US/ARVN Inf Bn
II - Personnel and Administration
III - Intelligence
IV - Plans, Operations and Training
V - Logistics
VI - Political Warfare
VII - Engineer
VIII - Communications
IX - Chemical

Copies Furnished:
COMUSMACV
CG, II FFV
DEPCORDS, II FFV
1. (C) PURPOSE. The purpose of this paper is to compare and assess the combat power and effectiveness of the US infantry battalion and the ARVN infantry battalion. Used as a specific basis for comparison is the infantry battalion employed in an airmobile operation utilizing all available ARVN/FAC support. Data was acquired from USARV Force Development, IIFFV, III Corps and III Corps USAAG. Assessments and value judgments reflected in this paper are solely those of III Corps USAAG.

2. (U) AREAS STUDIED.
   a. Strength - authorized and present for operations.
   b. Number of individual and crew served weapons.
   c. Number of radios.
   d. Artillery support.
   e. TAC air support.
   f. Airmobile support.
   g. Leadership.

3. (C) STRENGTH.
   a. US Inf Bn - authorized strength, 920; approximately 49% (450 men) are normally employed in the airmobile role. Four line companies. Information is contained in MTOE 7-175TA00 which is a standardized MTOE for infantry battalions in Vietnam.
   b. ARVN Inf Bn - authorized strength, 639; approximately 53% (340 men) are normally employed in the airmobile role. Three line companies. The HQ company is often utilized as a 4th infantry company.

4. (C) WEAPONS.
   a. Type      | AUTH US | AUTH ARVN
        M-16      | 841    | 565
        M-14      | 24     | 0
        .45 cal pistol | 35     | 74
        M-60 MG    | 26     | 6
        M-79       | 110    | 27
        60mm mortar | 0      | 6
        81mm mortar | 12     | 4
        4.2" mortar| 4      | 0
b. Recapitulation of type weapons:

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<th>Type</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
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<td>Individual weapons</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79s</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10 - 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recoilless rifles/rocket launchers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10 - 10</td>
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5: (C) RADIOS.

a. A US infantry battalion is authorized 312 radios; an ARVN battalion, 55.

b. Radios authorized for US battalion:

- 6 - AN/GRC-5
- 1 - AN/PRC-53
- 19 - AN/GRC-125
- 64 - AN/PRC-25
- 2 - AN/PRC-24
- 5 - AN/PRC-46
- 1 - AN/PRC-47
- 1 - AN/PRC-49
- 7 - AN/PRC-74
- 108 - AN/PRC-9
- 72 - AN/PRC-4
- 2 - AN/GRC-106
- 1 - AN/PRC-41
- 2 - AN/GRC-122

Total: 312

c. Radios authorized for ARVN battalions:

- 5 - AN/GRC-87
- 18 - AN/PRC-6
- 32 - AN/PRC-25
- 55

*There are AN/PRC-10 radios remaining in the Inf Bn in an approximate ratio of 1 AN/PRC-10 to 4 AN/PRC-25s. The AN/PRC-10s will be completely replaced as RVNAF modernization progresses.
6. (C) ARTILLERY SUPPORT. This is a difficult area to assess in any definitive manner. ARVN artillery is deployed frequently and rapidly to provide heavy support for maneuver elements. With few exceptions, ARVN artillery is employed territorially and seldom moves. US artillery supports ARVN operations consistently. The US infantry battalions enjoy significant advantages in quality artillery planning and adjustment of fires. Each US battalion has its own Arty LNO and forward observer teams with each company. The ARVN battalion has only one Arty LNO who also acts as a forward observer. In the normal battalion contact situation, it is estimated that the US battalion receives at least three times the artillery firepower that the ARVN battalion receives.

7. (C) TAC AIR SUPPORT. Another difficult area to assess. Both US and ARVN units receive effective support. However, in view of the fact that US commanders expect all firepower required and consistently request more strikes on a given target than their counterparts, the US infantry battalion receives considerably more TAC air support than the ARVN unit - perhaps 3 or 4 times as much.

8. (C) AIRMOBILE SUPPORT. The US battalion has a tremendous advantage in this area. Of the Assault Helicopter Companies (AHC) available to II FFV/III Corps for daily airmobile operations, two are assigned to III Corps to support 44 ARVN battalions (every 4 or 5 days this is reduced to one AHC because of maintenance standdown requirements). Conversely, 29 US battalions in II FFV are supported by an average of three AHC's from II FFV assets and 2 1/3 more from assets organic to each US infantry division (because of organic airmobile assets, the 1st Air Cav Div is not included in these figures). A US battalion averages approximately 5.5 AHC days per month while an ARVN battalion averages 1.3 AHC-days per month. Thus, the US infantry battalion receives more than four times the airmobile support that the ARVN battalion receives. The disparity between the US and ARVN battalions in regard to C&C helicopters is even more marked. Since the ARVN division receives only two C&C ships per day, one of which is basically utilized by the division commander, the ARVN battalion commander rarely, if ever, conducts an operation from the air. Conversely, the US battalion commander on operations is rarely without a C&C helicopter.

9. (C) LEADERSHIP. No attempt will be made in this paper to assess the margin held by the US battalions in this area. It is at the lower unit levels where a wide disparity in quality of leadership is particularly noteworthy. By US standards, the ARVN squad and platoon leaders are marginally effective at best.

10. (C) CONCLUSION. In each of the areas examined and assessed, the US battalions enjoy a wide margin over their ARVN counterparts. After comparing these two type units in terms of strength, organic weapons, supporting air and artillery fires, airmobile assets, communications, and leadership, it is considered that the combat effectiveness of the US infantry battalion to be approximately three times that of the ARVN infantry battalion.

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PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. (C) GENERAL. Considerable improvement in the personnel and administration field has been made in III CTZ during the past 10 months. More emphasis has been placed on the proper utilization of personnel, particular attention being given to civilian skills that can be utilized by the military. Periodically-conducted personnel management courses have brought about an awareness of current policies and systems to accomplish administrative functions rapidly and effectively at all levels. Awards and decorations have been monitored closely to insure that deserving individuals are recognized. Because of this emphasis, III Corps has the highest award rate to RF/PF personnel in the country. Although desertions continue to be excessive, the progress made in reducing the overall rate during early CY 69 is noteworthy. The Commanding General, III CTZ has directed new procedures and policies concerning desertion control which promise further reductions. A grade imbalance exists in field and company officer grades, resulting in more than 90% of tactical units being commanded by individuals of a lower grade than authorized. Of the 36 infantry battalions, 19 are commanded by captains. III Corps tactical units also suffer from a lack of rank and experience in middle enlisted grades. The G1, III CTZ, is confident that the JGS "Three Year Realization Program", which calls for all grades to reach a 90% grade level, will remedy this problem area by the end of CY 70. This is considered to be an overly optimistic assessment. The III Corps Prisoner of War Camp has shown improvement in the areas of administration, PW training, and security. Although established to be a youth rehabilitation center, it has been necessary to process and intern considerably more prisoners than the present facilities can accommodate adequately. Present building construction and movement of additional prisoners to the Phuoc Quoc Island Camp should provide some relief. The expanded combined Vietnamese/US MP patrols has resulted in improved traffic control, AWOL/desertion apprehension and curtailment of black market activities.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. Considerable progress has been made in the recruitment and induction of personnel into RVNAF. Beginning at district and province level, procedures of recruiting offices were revised to process incoming personnel more efficiently, and through frequent inspections by advisors and counterparts, receiving points were converted from unsanitary holding areas to clean reception centers with sleeping and messing facilities. Retention time of personnel in these areas was reduced to an average of four days from recruitment or induction until shipment to divisional training centers or to the main 3d Recruiting and Induction (R&I) Center in Saigon.

b. The 3d R&I Center, Saigon was physically reorganized, involving the relocation of activities to expedite the receipt, processing, equipping, messing, billeting, and shipment of personnel to national training centers. In October 1966, advisory responsibility for the recruiting and
induction program was assigned to HQ, MACV (J1). At that time, an average of 20,000 personnel per month were being processed through the 3d RAI Center in three day cycles.

c. Subsequent to a comprehensive study of advisor/assistance requirements for the foreseeable future, the 25th Infantry Division Advisor Team was reorganized on 1 March 1969 to test a Division Combat Assistance Advisory Team (DCAAT) concept. During the test, emphasis is being placed on continuous TOC operations, coordination of all US furnished combat and combat service support, monitorship of combined planning, and responsiveness to US requirements for analyses, reports and evaluations. The advisor effort was concurrently reduced in areas where ARVN is considered self-sufficient. Although the DCAAT test will not be finalized until early May 1969, the interim results are encouraging. It is anticipated that a reduction of several personnel spaces will be realized and, more important, that the advisory effort will be focused on areas where it is needed most.

d. The III CTZ Prisoner of War Compound has continued to be enlarged in capacity, and operational effectiveness has greatly increased. Several new buildings have been erected for training, and a third large compound containing 18 barracks is in the final stages of construction with an estimated completion date of 1 July 1969. This will increase the capacity from 3000 to approximately 3000 PW, essential since the population is currently 3100. Through the assistance of the advisors, 30 sewing machines, additional carpentry tools, and barbering sets have been obtained to permit the initiation of three additional training programs. The processing of PW for entry or shipment has also improved. Complete and accurate records are now being kept, including personal histories, intelligence reports, fingerprint cards and photos. The educational and vocational programs have been expanded to enhance the effectiveness of the Youth Rehabilitation Program.

e. A program to combine police operations was implemented. This resulted in an increase in the liaison, cooperation, and harmonious working relationships between US MP, ARVN QC, and Vietnamese National Police agencies in III CTZ. A program is underway to implement a Combined Police Operations Center with the National Police as the controlling agency. When finalized and placed in effect, the police forces, to include US MP, will function as an entity.

f. During the latter part of 1968, the first Corp. level personnel management courses were conducted by the III CTZ AG for all divisional, separate RF battalions, sector and A&DSL company AG personnel. Five two-week classes were completed with a total of 180 graduates. These courses have resulted in improvements in procedures for casualty reporting, orders, strength accounting procedures, promotions, and awards and decorations. The ARVN Interpreter Program in support of US units now manages 1100 interpreters assigned to USARV and MACV elements in III CTZ. The enlargement of this program and the dismissal of incompetent interpreters, has enhanced person to person communication as well as the operational capabilities of
US units and advisors in III CTZ.

g. During the last half of CY 68, the RVNAF annual leave policy was revised to enable each ARVN, RF and FF soldier to receive 15 days annual leave. To assist everyone in taking an annual leave, unit commanders were authorized to increase the percentage of personnel on leave at one time from 5% to 10% as long as the present-for-duty strength was maintained at 80%. This program was favorably received by all personnel in III Corps, and all those desiring leave were granted such prior to the 69 TET holiday period. This policy contributed considerably to the decrease in the desertion rate during the TET period, a period that in past years has experienced a notable increase in unauthorized absences.

h. The III Corps commander has given much personal attention to the desertion problem. In July 68, he directed that guidance sections be established at division, regiment and sector level. These sections assist the soldier on leave with transportation, billets, financial problems, food and other difficulties a serviceman can encounter when in a leave status. As directed, all subordinate III Corps units established guidance sections and results were favorable, especially in the CMD area where transportation arrangements were coordinated with the VNAF on a daily schedule. In many cases the assistance provided by a guidance section prevented a potential desertion. The combined efforts of ARVN commanders, supervisory personnel and unit advisors has resulted in a favorable downward trend in ARVN desertions during the 4th quarter CY 68 and the 1st quarter CY 69. ARVN commanders are beginning to recognize the serious ramifications of desertions and are displaying an increased interest in desertion control directives and policies.

3. (C) PROBLEM AREAS.

a. Notwithstanding the effort and progress noted above, the desertion rate continues to be a major problem area. Desertions continue to be a heavy burden for military and law enforcement agencies, limit the maintenance of force levels, and cause an excessive expenditure of resources in procurement and training of recruits.

b. The shortage of middle grade leaders and grade imbalances which exist in the ARVN command structure constitute another major problem area. The number of ARVN commanders who have achieved the required intermediate and advanced levels of schooling at the Command and Staff School is very limited.

4. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That emphasis on the programs to reduce desertions be continued and constantly re-examined to take advantage of new approaches on methods to improve command leadership.

b. That the expansion of facilities at officer and NCO schools be accelerated to increase the number of school trained leaders and more rapidly improve the qualifications of the ARVN officer and NCO corps.
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APPENDIX III

INTELLIGENCE

1. (C) GENERAL. The III Corps program of intelligence collection, production, and distribution has proven to be very efficient, particularly in the tactical commands subordinate to the Corps. The increasing awareness within the Vietnamese Intelligence Community of the necessity for prompt collection, processing, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence to maximize the timeliness and effectiveness of combat responses has contributed to the overall efficiency of the intelligence system and has demanded, and gained, a much improved product in terms of both time and content. The one deficiency noted is the reluctance of III Corps personnel to fully employ the more sophisticated aerial surveillance systems that are available to them. While progress is being made in this area, it appears that the potential of these systems will not be fully employed until more comprehensive training is given to the ARVN and they can integrate the products of these systems into their analyses. The success of the intelligence effort in the III Corps Tactical Zone is in great part due to the dynamic Corps G2, LTC Le Dat Cong, who is recognized by both ARVN and US/FWMAF as probably the most outstanding intelligence officer within the Vietnamese Army.

2. (C) G2 OPERATIONS.
   a. Accomplishments:
   
   (1) Production and dissemination of ARVN-generated intelligence reports have shown a marked improvement in both quantity and quality. The timely dissemination of ARVN-produced intelligence to US units has resulted in a more effective program of evaluation of information and much closer coordination on estimates and combat responses between ARVN and US forces.

   (2) A much needed Corps Interrogation Center has been established, and as it becomes fully operational, it will result in closer Corps supervision of the interrogation of the more important prisoners and ralliers to the GVN. It will provide a central location for the submission of essential elements of information by other tactical units or agencies, and it will avoid the duplication of interrogation effort now being experienced throughout the Corps Tactical Zone.

   (3) The establishment of a G2 Advisor element within the ARVN G2/G3 Tactical Operations Center (TOC) has developed a sense of teamwork between the advisors and counterparts of both the G2 and G3 staff sections and has provided a more effective reporting system of tactical intelligence information through ARVN and advisory channels. The increased effectiveness realized through this joint effort has been especially noticeable in the combat responses to immediate exploitable tactical information by ARVN units subordinate to III Corps.

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b. Problems:

1. Dissemination of ARVN-produced intelligence to subordinate and lateral units is a major problem. The historical precedent of passing intelligence only to the commander hinders the timeliness of valuable and often perishable information. Insistent advisory effort can overcome this problem in time.

2. The present structure of the ARVN G2 staff and the precedent of passing information only to the commander results in a minimum of cross-fertilization among the internal divisions of the G2 staff. Through constant advisory effort to ensure that there is coordination between the operations of collection, current intelligence, order of battle, and G2 Air, the validity of ARVN-produced intelligence has vastly improved in the intelligence community, but until ARVN develops its own coordination procedures the problem, without advisory assistance, will remain difficult.

3. The coordination between the ARVN G2 and G3 in the development of operational plans is not at a desirable level. A program is now in effect to encourage closer coordination whereby enemy order of battle and current intelligence indicators will become an integral part of the G3 planning.

4. Similar to the previously mentioned problem is the lack of coordination with the G3 staff for operational reaction to processed intelligence. The advisory effort in this problem is to encourage G2 to provide the intelligence, to assist in planning a reaction to the data, and to obtain the results from G3 in after-action reports.

c. Conclusions: The ARVN intelligence community is knowledgeable and experienced. The effectiveness of its intelligence efforts can be enhanced by closer coordination between commands, staff sections and elements of individual staffs. Hard copy publication of finalized intelligence reports and aggressive dissemination of these reports will improve the timeliness of combat response. Greater advisory emphasis in these areas will improve broader dissemination channels and develop the habit of closer coordination between intelligence and operational staffs.

3. (C) G2 AIR OPERATIONS.

a. Accomplishments:

1. The popularity of aerial photography with the ARVN continues to overshadow other aerial surveillance systems. However, ARVN appreciation has shown a marked improvement for the capabilities of other systems, such as infra-red photography, side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), and, to a limited degree, airborne personnel detection systems (SNIFTER), and color camouflage detection (CD) film. At division level, liaison personnel from US units have aided the advisors in demonstrating the capabilities...
and limitations of these systems. USAF reconnaissance experts have also assisted Army advisors in introducing ARVN to the more sophisticated aerial camera systems and to provide ARVN with a working knowledge of the advantages of these new systems when balanced against the requirements of the commander.

(2) As a result of the increased knowledge and appreciation of the sensor systems, the ARVN use of aerial surveillance as an integral part of operational planning has increased. While this method of employment is primarily centered around intelligence collection planning, the use of these systems by the operations staff has increased, and use of aerial photography in support of combat operations has shown a steady, although slow, growth.

(3) Intelligence reports based on photo interpretation of products resulting from ARVN-generated requests, submitted exclusively through ARVN channels to III Corps, has increased greatly during the past 10 months. These requests represented a bare 25% of the total III Corps requests in mid-1968 and have now reached an all time high of 85%, with a corresponding decrease in advisor-generated requests.

b. Problem Areas:

(1) A basic problem directly affecting the future development of the ARVN G2 Air operations is the lack of personnel trained in the methods of processing the new products of the various aerial surveillance systems. Further complicating the problem, and of equal importance, is the lack of modern high-speed film processing equipment.

(2) While present ARVN G2 Air personnel are well qualified as photo interpreters, they lack the technical training or knowledge in the methodology of image interpretation from multi-sensor systems. The techniques for interpretation of the other systems (infra-red, SLAR, and CD photography) are more sophisticated than those of basic photo interpretation and require additional training for the technician.

(3) Because of a shortage of more sophisticated photo interpretation equipment, ARVN technicians are only able to develop intelligence data from hard copy contact photo prints, with only the minimum essential equipment for measurements and magnification. Without equipment such as light tables and optical devices to allow maximum magnification of imagery, ARVN cannot proceed to the more efficient and accurate methods of interpretation from the film negative or positive.

(4) While ARVN participation in the use of aerial surveillance has improved at Corps level and below, the channels of communication and coordination between the command levels above Corps and the reconnaissance unit which accomplishes the request are dependent upon US channels of communication between ARVN elements at Corps and VNAF reconnaissance elements.
(5) Dissemination of G2 Air information to Corps is entirely through US channels of communication, which require that US personnel always be available. From Corps to the subordinate ARVN units, however, dissemination through ARVN channels is possible and is being practiced as much as possible. The barriers of communicating the information to the subordinate elements include the ever-present language barrier and the disparity of technical ability and experience with multi-sensor systems on the part of the various subordinate G2 Air personnel.

c. Conclusions: The ARVN photo interpreters have the basic interpretation skills and knowledge and do a good job with respect to photographic interpretation. Their main shortcoming in the area of multi-sensor image interpretation lies in the shortage of equipment for doing the job, a lack of training and experience in the technical requirements of interpreting the products of the other sensors, and their limited exposure to the capabilities and limitations of those systems. All of these problems can be solved through well established training procedures and through procurement of proper interpretation equipment. Also, there must be direction to open a channel of communication between VNAF and ARVN. At present the US controls all VNAF reconnaissance. There is no lack of ability or interest in the G2 Air field, and the current problems in this field can be solved with concentrated, formal schooling and the procurement of proper equipment.
1. (C) GENERAL. The nature of combat operations of III CTZ units has varied widely during the past 10 months. The periods of more intense activity (wide-spread enemy initiated contacts in August, September, and February) were punctuated by periods of deliberate enemy inactivity when he sought to avoid contact by every means. With the assumption of command by Lieu Dang Trong on 5 August 1968, III Corps units changed from a defensive to an offensive posture, principally due to the employment of general reserve battalions outside of the Saigon area. ARVN units continue to have problems in attaining an adequate level of sustained offensive operations with the retention of 15 battalions in support of RD, but have displayed more aggressiveness and confidence in their ability to close with and destroy the enemy during the period covered by this report. Two battalions in the 18th ARVN Division were activated during this period, bringing the composition of each of the three divisions in III CTZ to 12 maneuver battalions and one armored cavalry regiment. The activation of two additional Corps Artillery battalions brings the total to 5 operational artillery battalions in III Corps Artillery and 2 in each division. Nine ranger battalions and a recently activated armored cavalry regiment comprise the remaining units in III CTZ. ARVN units have made some progress in planning operations, but the majority of the commanders rarely plan operations more than one day in advance and often fail to monitor and supervise the execution of plans made. Since June 1968, considerable emphasis has been placed on the upgrading of the quality and facilities for training; consequently there has been some improvement in the area of training in each division.

2. (c) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. Tactical Operations:

(1) The 5th and 25th Divisions have conducted extensive and frequent combined operations with US units; this was not the case for the 18th Division, due to the absence of any major US unit in the 33d DTA. Fifteen maneuver battalions remained in direct support of Revolutionary Development, six from the 5th Division, four from the 18th Division, and five from the 25th Division. Additionally, two battalions from the 18th Division have remained on static security missions directed by III Corps. Thus, 17 of the 36 infantry maneuver battalions organic to III Corps were not available to their commanders for extended field operations. In terms of overall combat effectiveness and results of operations, the 25th Division is adjudged to be the best division in III Corps. The 5th and 18th Divisions are both considered marginal in terms of combat effectiveness and overall results. The varying combat effectiveness of the three divisions is considered to be primarily a function of leadership, extent of combined operations with US units, and enemy density.
(2) 5th Infantry Division: Although the number of large and small unit operations increased significantly during the past 10 months, there has been no corresponding increase in the number of contacts or improvement in combat effectiveness. Some improvement was registered in the use of airmobile assets, and there has been a marked increase in the number of multi-day operations. Conversely, a lack of dynamic leadership and aggressiveness, particularly as regards the division commander and most of his regimental and battalion commanders, has deterred units from reacting rapidly to enemy contact and from responding promptly to tactical intelligence. The division has increasingly used its organic and other available fire support assets, but has failed to exploit their effect. In addition to those critical operational shortcomings, a high desertion rate has been one of the most serious problems confronting the division. A conscientious effort is being made to reduce the number of desertions, and during the past three months a discernible trend has been noted. Although the development of the 5th Logistics Support Battalion has improved the effectiveness of combat service support, there remains much room for improvement.

(3) 18th Infantry Division: The overall tempo of operations increased considerably in this division, particularly in terms of multi-day operations, which became the rule rather than the exception during the last six months. Although the division commander has recently demonstrated a willingness to react to enemy contacts to a degree not previously noted, his complete ineffectiveness as a military leader is the division's most serious problem. The quality of leadership at other levels of command, which has been another major problem in this division for some time, was improved by the replacement of three regimental and eight battalion commanders during the past seven months. Although airmobile operations have improved, they are not conducted in the frequency desired. The improved quality of intelligence obtained in recent months has resulted in more reliance on the information and more effective response. This division has registered an improvement in the employment of supporting fires, but fire discipline of the M-16 rifle remains a problem. The training of units within the division leaves much to be desired, and while combat service support is considered to be adequate, there is still over-dependence on US assets. Desertions constitute a particularly serious problem in this division, and no progress in lowering the excessive rate is evident. Factors which most improved the effectiveness of the division were the recent III Corps emphasis on supervision of operations, the issue of M-16 rifles, the addition of two battalions to the division, and the organization and proper utilization of the I & R elements. As stated above, the primary problem in the 18th Division is its ineffective commander. As a result, although some of the battalions have on occasion shown marked improvements in the conduct of operations, this division can be considered marginally combat effective, at best.

(4) 25th Infantry Division: Of the three ARVN Divisions in III CTZ, the 25th Infantry Division has made the most significant progress in combat effectiveness during the past 10 months. This was attributable to
an improved quality of leadership from the division commander on down through the chain of command. In terms of number of operations, number of contacts, use of airmobile assets, timely receipt of tactical intelligence, timely receipt of contacts, and employment of available supporting fires, this division has registered solid gains. Factors contributing to the improvement of combat effectiveness have been the increased availability of combat assault helicopter companies, more flexible guidance from III Corps, numerous combined operations with US forces, and the frequent attachment of general reserve battalions which permitted maximum commitment and flexibility of employment of organic units. The desertion rate, which was the highest in III Corps in October 1968, has decreased to the lowest in March 1969.

(5) Armored Cavalry Regiments: During the reporting period, the armored cavalry units within III Corps remained basically in the same locations for excessive periods of time, spending from 60 to 90 percent of the time performing static security missions. The missions assigned to the cavalry units did not take advantage of their mobility, fire power, and shock action. Although some of these units have done a creditable job in responding to contact situations, there is much room for improvement in the employment of III Corps cavalry elements. Beginning in March 1969 and under pressure from the Corps Commander, these units were employed properly, though infrequently.

(6) The ARVN battalions are relatively proficient in planning and executing airmobile operations, but non-availability of air assets have limited such operations. Although ARVN battalions have habitually used light fire teams as their primary fire support means, they are beginning to depend more on available artillery and organic support weapons. Reaction to intelligence was generally good, but a considerable improvement in the timely transmission of intelligence is required. Night operations were generally limited to ambush patrols, moving ambushes, and NDP. As mentioned above, a factor that improved combat effectiveness was the introduction of the new family of weapons.

(7) The performance of ARVN battalions in support of Revolutionary Development (RD) has improved slightly during the year. During the last quarter of CY '68, the results achieved by battalions in support of RD in terms of number of operations, contacts, and kills generally exceeded the average of all other III CTZ infantry battalions. Most battalions are not targeted against specific hamlets but, rather, are used to provide an "umbrella of security". This type of employment is caused by a general requirement of division commanders to keep the battalion together. Although their operational control has improved, the province chiefs are still reluctant or unable to fully employ the ARVN battalions in direct support of RD. In general, the RD battalions perform minimal civic action functions, have eliminated few VCI, and have generated limited Hoi Chans. They have contributed to RD and pacification by conducting offensive operations to preempt the VC and spoil their plans. There is general support of all levels for the JCS program to provide the province
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chase with the necessary regional force organization for pacification and return the RD battalions to division control in 1969.

(6) C3 Army: Since June 1968, there have been many improvements in air/ground operations within III CTZ. A concerted effort was made to train ANVN Air/ground operations personnel in the procedures for support, coordination, determination of air targets versus surface to surface fire support targets, coordination of tactical air support with tactical operations, and air interdiction. This is a prerequisite to ANVN achieving an effective self-sustaining force. The importance of communications between the air and ground team is now realized by the III Corps Forces. Through the medium of bilingual forms, the meaning and effect of numerous data pertaining to air/ground coordination has been conveyed to personnel performing air/ground operations duties. United States Air Force personnel operating in the division tactical areas have presented instruction to headquarters staff members of units down to and including company level on the utilization of tactical air in support of operations and the procedures for requesting tactical air support. The development of the VNAF FAC capability has been encouraging. The organization of the system has been completed and VNAF has assigned Air Liaison officers to each division and province, who remain at field locations. In addition, a number of forward air controllers have been assigned on a permanent basis to support each division and province. Due to the limited number of aircraft available, these personnel remain at Bien Hoa or Tan Son Nhut and are ordered on each mission, in response to Army requests, by the Direct Air Support Center. The limiting factors in assigning forward air controllers down to maneuver battalions are the number of radios and aircraft currently available in the VNAF system.

b. Plans:

(1) A limited improvement in planning and execution of operations has been noted. Inadequate logistical planning during operations still results in frequent combat essential missions being required.

(2) Combined Campaign Plan 1969: During the early part of 1969 the goals of the Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) 68 were reduced in number from 26 to 10 in CCP 69. This reduction did not eliminate any goals but updated and consolidated the goals into clearer and more practical statements which are consistent with improved and changing pacification and VC/NVA elimination programs within Vietnam.

(3) OPLAN 40-69: This plan is in effect and provides for the evacuation of all US noncombatants and designated aliens. It is periodically reviewed and changes made, when appropriate, to insure that it is current. The list of designated personnel is presently being reviewed and the plan will be updated formally upon completion. The plan is ready for execution should the necessity arise.

(4) OPLAN 2-69: Defense of Long Binh-Bien Hoa complex: This plan

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was put into effect in early February 1969. Its effectiveness was demonstrated in two major encounters with VC/NVA forces, one on 13 February in the vicinity of the Bien Hoa National Fallon Headquarters and Relay Station and the other on 25-26 February in Hu Li and Thu Khep. Since this plan has been in effect, the enemy has been unsuccessful in all attempts at major destruction of military resources in the complex.

(5) Defense of Tay Ninh City: The defense of Tay Ninh City has substantially improved since the redeployment of elements of the ARVN Airborne Division from the Capital Military District to the vicinity of the city in February of 1969. The deployment of these airborne units to Tay Ninh has resulted in a very effective combined RVNAF/US defense plan and concerted interdiction of enemy infiltration routes into that area from Cambodian sanctuaries.

a. Training: Since June 1968, emphasis has been placed on the upgrading of ARVN training. Programs established to support the training mission have been active and productive. Since June 1968, the Battalion Refresher Training Program has resulted in a total of 30 battalions being trained by US mobile training teams. The US units involved have been the 1st Inf Div, 9th Inf Div, 25th Inf Div, and the 199th Light Inf Bde. In addition to the refresher program for battalions, the reconnaissance companies of the division have received refresher training at Van Kiep National Training Center. A total of 11 reconnaissance companies have been trained there since June 1968. Status of the division training centers (DTC) is as follows:

(1) 5th Div - DTC located at Phu Van is an excellent facility. The last several months have produced many improvements and additions. Rifle ranges, mine and booby trap areas, a VC Village, and an extensive obstacle course have recently been constructed. A stream has been widened and a dam constructed to form a river crossing facility. In addition to the training sites, much has been done to improve housing, living conditions, and security. Courses being conducted at this time include Basic Combat Training (BCT), Company Commanders Refresher Course, NCO Academy, Squad Leader's and Tao Ewon Do courses.

(2) 18th Div Training Center - DTC located at Roi Dat. This DTC is still in the development stage. Although much work remains to be done to bring the facilities up to standard, progress has been made. New rifle ranges have been constructed, mine and booby trap areas is operational, and an infiltration course has been built. New buildings are presently under construction. Action is underway to develop a supply of potable water, the lack of which constitutes a primary problem. Courses of instruction presently in operation are BCT and the NCO Academy.

(3) 25th Div - DTC is located at Ben Hao. This is an excellent facility that has all of the necessary training aids and areas required to accomplish its mission. Courses of instruction are conducted in BCT, Company Commanders
Training has improved since June 1963, but additional command interest must be generated and maintained. Continuing assistance from US units and interest by senior ARVN Commanders will result in future improvement of ARVN training.

3. (C) PROBLEM AREAS.

a. Leadership: ARVN Commanders continue to overcentralize authority and fail to exercise proper follow-up of their orders. This has caused a lack of initiative at all levels of command, particularly at the company and battalion level. Staff officers at regimental, division, and corps level respond to the commanders' directives, rather than develop an original idea into a recommended plan.

b. Planning: Although there has been some improvement in this area, ARVN staff planning is generally weak by US standards. Principal causes are a lack of close coordination within the staff and inexperienced staff officers. Too often, lack of consideration of pertinent intelligence, logistical support or fire support results in a crisis which could have been avoided.

c. Tactical and Operational Weaknesses:

(1) Reaction to Contact: There has been somewhat of a breakthrough in this area, but it remains a problem calling for continued emphasis. Too often the reaction force is too late with too little, partly a function of lack of airlift. Additionally, ARVN units have much to learn about maintaining contact by fire and maneuver.

(2) Column Formations: Little, if any, improvement in combat formations was noted during the past 10 months. RIF and search operations particularly in the jungle, continue to be conducted by elements moving in single file with limited to non-existent point, flank, and rear security. As a result, unit effectiveness and capability to react to enemy action is severely limited. Advisor efforts to correct this deficiency have met with very limited success. Training programs developed at the National and each Division training center are concentrating on the improvement of company, platoon and squad combat formations - a step in the right direction.

(3) Poor Security on Operations: The enemy's patient and persistent search for friendly laxity and ARVN units' repeated use of the same routes or search patterns, coupled with the above mentioned lack of proper all-around security, continue to be major causes of excessive friendly casualties.

(4) Utilization of Fire Support: There continues to be a requirement for extensive direct US firepower support to ROKIF. The ARVN maneuver IV-6
elements usually fail to exploit available firepower. Upon contact with the enemy in gained, fire support is frequently deployed before the target is accurately located and well defined. Upon completion of air strikes and artillery preparations, units often fail to follow-up rapidly with ground forces, thus losing the initiative gained by fire power. ARVN commanders must rely heavily on US combat support assets obtained through the US advisor until more ARVN assets become available. As an interim measure, more emphasis must be placed on ARVN commanders and their staffs at all levels to process requests for US combat support assets through their chains.

(5) Reluctance to Disperse Forces on Search Operations: ARVN maneuver units fail to disperse adequately when conducting search operations. There is a great reluctance to conduct independent or semi-independent small unit operations. In most cases battalion commanders choose terrain features, rather than enemy forces, as their objectives. The relative lack of mobility and communications perpetuate this philosophy.

(6) Failure to Report Situation Promptly: Another continuing deficiency of ARVN units is the failure to render prompt and accurate reports. ARVN units are prone to (a) overestimate the size of the enemy with a resultant waste of fire support assets, and (b) withhold friendly casualty figures until the contact has broken. In either case, these practices preclude the higher commander from making a valid estimate of the situation and a timely, responsive decision.

d. RD Battalions: The commitment of almost half of the ARVN maneuver battalions in III Corps to RD missions poses a serious problem to the goal of improving their combat effectiveness. These missions severely restrict offensive spirit, create command and control problems between province chiefs and regimental commanders, and cause confusion in the minds of battalion commanders who are required to secure hamlets and territory on one hand, and to conduct mobile offensive operations on the other. Many commanders consider these to be conflicting missions and fail to accomplish either one effectively. The programmed relief of these battalions by RF units, if accelerated, will improve the overall offensive posture of III Corps materially.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

a. Although the combat effectiveness of ARVN units in III CTZ leaves much to be desired, there have been substantial improvements in many areas. LTC Tri's emphasis on the spirit of the offensive, the conduct of multi-day operations, the conduct of combined operations with US/FWMAP elements, timely response to contacts, and the employment of multiple general reserve battalions in areas distant from Saigon have had a very salutary effect on the overall ARVN combat effectiveness in III CTZ. Issue of new equipment, relief of ineffective commanders, more meaningful guidance from corps level, training programs conducted by US units, and the growing realization by ARVN units that they can decisively defeat the enemy on the battlefield
all indicate that ANAV units are gradually coming into their own.

b. The principal deficiencies in the operational field are weak leadership, lack of supervision by the chain of command, reluctance to conduct independent small unit operations, the belief by commanders that excessive casualties are tantamount to relief, a laxity in security while on combat operations, and failure to conduct aggressive day and night operations on a continued basis.
1. GENERAL.

a. The RVNAF logistics system is established and operates similarly to the system that US forces employed prior to functionalization and MILSTRIP. Although Corps and Divisional units are supported by technical service companies for direct support, this system is presently undergoing modernization/reorganization. Most significant of these changes is the organization of a Direct Support Battalion in each Division which integrates all technical service supply and maintenance functions into one organization. Regional and Popular Force units are supported by Province Administrative and Direct Support Logistics (A&DSL) Companies. Field maintenance and supply support to Division Support Battalions and the Province A&DSL Company is provided by an Area Logistics Command (ALC), which is not an organic Corps organization. III ALC, which supports III Corps, is centrally located in the metropolitan Saigon area.

b. A large percentage of equipment used by RVNAF is US manufactured and procured. The RVNAF Modernization Program has resulted in the replacement of old and deteriorated vehicles and equipment in addition to introduction of more sophisticated weapons. Programming and procurement of MAP equipment have not, in all cases, kept pace with requirements.

2. ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. Logistical Support Planning:

(1) With increased offensive type operations conducted in III CTZ, there have been numerous instances of National Reserve Forces operating under OFCON of III Corps. After several instances of lack of prior planning, Headquarters, III Corps established pre-operation meetings where commanders and their operations and logistical personnel were brought together at a coordination session prior to the unit's move to the field. All such sessions have met with complete success for RVNAF and Advisor coordination. Firmly established support plans have been finalized at such meetings, resulting in coordinated movements of units to AO and subsequent smoother flow of resupply. The use of similar planning sessions has spread to Corps and Division planned operations as well.

(2) Improved coordination between III ALC and Headquarters, III Corps has resulted in more timely support provided units on combat operations. Significant was the establishment of an ALC forward supply point in Tay Ninh Province in support of large scale operations of National Reserve Forces. Subsequently, province A&DSL companies at several locations have operated in a similar manner.

(3) Significant accomplishments in the medical area included the
gradual lowering of ARVN malaria cases during a period when civilian cases increased by 400 percent. Adoption of the use of CHLOROQUINE, PRIMAQUIN tablets, DAPSONE, bed netting and increased command emphasis contributed to this successful program. Another accomplishment was the improvement in the efficiency of medical supply channels, including MEDCAP supplies, which led to improved outpatient medical care.

b. Organizational and Equipment Changes:

(1) III Corps has recommended numerous changes in organization and equipment to keep pace with force structure increases and changes in concept. Noteworthy was the assignment of a Transportation Battalion in direct support of the Corps, the recommendation and subsequent addition of external aerial delivery equipment to ARVN TO&E, and submission of a request for additions to the Table of Allowances for generators and lighting equipment in support of the bridge defensive program.

(2) Reorganization of the ARVN Medical Service increased the capabilities and responsiveness of military medical care. At Corps level, medical assets have been consolidated by the formation of a medical group. This group exercises technical supervision and control over all ARVN medical elements within III CTZ except National Reserve Forces. Within the ARVN divisions, the medical elements have expanded from company size units to a battalion. This expanded medical organization furnishes the division with the capability of providing improved care at lower levels. In addition, the concept of joint utilization of Province military and civilian medical facilities was instituted to pool GVN medical resources.

(3) The 5th Infantry Division served as the test unit for the formation of a Division Support Battalion. The concept was field tested from Sep - Dec 1968 and received JGS/CLA approval. The 18th and 25th Infantry Divisions initiated formation of their support battalions on 1 April 1969, and ARVN divisions in the other Corps areas are scheduled to do likewise in the near future. This concept involves the consolidation of the divisions' direct support supply and maintenance capabilities, as augmented by command and control, transportation and communications elements, into a functional support unit along lines similar to a US Division Support Command.

c. Equipment Modernization for RVNAF: III Corps has kept abreast of programmed equipment for the RVNAF Modernization Program. When JGS/CLA releases information on equipment programs, III Corps prepares a distribution plan based on priorities that can be adjusted prior to arrival of assets. Preparation of distribution plans in advance has proven to be effective in expediting delivery of the new equipment immediately upon notification that items were ready for issue. As a result of recent issues of move, shoot, and communicate items, there has been significant progress in upgrading the RVNAF equipment status.
d. **Transportation:** Less dependency on the use of aircraft has been demonstrated by ARVN during the past eight months. With increased security of land LOC, there has been increased use of convoys to major locations in III Corps. When aircraft lift is required, increased planning and scheduling have been evident. As a result of determining realistic resupply schedules, there has been a reduction of "special mission" requirements. Joint convoy control procedures were established between USARV and Headquarters, III Corps. The coordination of the III CTZ Traffic Coordination Regulating Committee and the USARV Highway Traffic Control Center has reduced the number of convoy conflicts at critical road junctions in III CTZ.

3. **PROBLEM AREAS.**

a. There is a definite lack of command and staff interest shown in subordinate and supporting activities in the area of logistics. Command and staff visits are rarely made to III ALC, and visits to direct support and A&DSL companies are nearly nonexistent. As a result of lack of interest and first hand knowledge, there is a lack of supply impetus down to supported units unless a problem area develops. The Corps logistics staff reacts to problems, rather than initiating action to preclude problem areas.

b. There is little staff coordination on programs and operations between staff sections. Numerous operational plans have been ordered without proper staff action resulting in establishment of poor priorities, insufficient reaction time to requirements, and indiscriminate waste of materials. Lack of follow-up and lack of verbal communication to higher and subordinate levels deters timely action and reaction. Many problems have developed as a result of JGS providing direct guidance, assistance and direction to units subordinate to Corps without the same information being provided to Corps. When this is done, no action or interest is evident within the Corps staff.

c. **Equipment and Facilities Shortage:**

(1) Considerable amounts of critical end items continue to be in short supply. In many cases equipment is received through the RVNAF Modernization Program with insufficient repair parts and tools available to adequately perform required maintenance.

(2) Despite many advances in the medical field over the last year, ARVN does not have sufficient medical facilities or equipment in all areas. Ambitious hospital construction programs are in early stages of development, but progress is slow. Medical facilities are generally inadequate and poorly equipped.

(3) Publication of approved TO&E has failed to keep pace with the ARVN upgrading program. Approved authorizations and subsequent realignments have been generally slow.

(4) One major problem besetting the ARVN medical service is the lack
of organic rotary wing aircraft dedicated to medical evacuation within III CTZ. The entire evacuation responsibility is borne by USARV.

(5) The majority of III ALC depots are located in the metropolitan Saigon area. Response time to supported units is particularly slow when security of land LOC is threatened. The centralization of these depots became particularly critical during the TET offensive of 68, when a need for dispersion became evident.

4. CONCLUSIONS. The present RVNAF logistical system is functional and capable of accomplishing its assigned mission. RVNAF has demonstrated its capability of managing their logistical system with the limited assets that have been made available to them. However, although the logistical system is sound from a management and procedural aspect, it is limited by the tight control exercised by JGS/CLA, centralization of supply depots, and critical item shortages. There is a definite requirement to teach maintenance and supply technicians correct methods and procedures for the new and sophisticated equipment that is now being issued to RVNAF. The Division Support Battalion has streamlined the support system and, once fully operational in all divisions, will provide an adequate, functional, division support activity. RVNAF units consistently reflect very low deadline rates, and this capability, coupled with increased assets and an effective maintenance training program, will complement the present supply system.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Continued emphasis on staff liaison, coordination and complete staff action to include follow-up at all staff levels.

b. Emphasis be placed on generating command and staff interest to develop supply impetus down to supported units.

c. Reduce tight control of command controlled items at JGS/CLA level and establish reserve stocks at the Corps logistical support elements.

d. Fill present TO&E shortages and expedite adequate repair parts and special tool stockage.

e. Introduce effective maintenance and supply training program commensurate with functionalization and modernization.

f. Establish a VNAP MEDEVAC capability.

g. Disperse supply and maintenance depots which support III Corps units from metropolitan Saigon. This will provide tactical dispersion and allows the depots to be more responsive to supported units.
APPENDIX VI

POLITICAL WARFARE

1. GENERAL. The POLMAR effort at III Corps level is efficient in its operation and aggressive in its execution. One reason for this is that all key ARVN staff members are POLMAR trained and have considerable experience in their respective areas of interest. In addition, several have attended special schools in the United States. They are receptive to advice, and the rapport between counterparts is excellent. However, the same degree of efficiency and aggressiveness is not evident in subordinate units. This is primarily due to the lack of POLMAR trained personnel in smaller units, especially RF/PF units. The III CTZ Commander is aware of this problem and has initiated an energetic POLMAR training program for RF/PF cadres. One of the primary objectives of POLMAR is to improve the leadership, morals, discipline and conduct of the ARVN soldier. The Political Indoctrination Division has this responsibility and at Corps level has an efficient organization and program. It is in this area that the Korean and Chinese POLMAR advisors concentrate their effort. There is a continuous flow of guidance and directives to subordinate units, but due to lack of trained personnel and lack of follow-up from higher headquarters, their programs lose some effectiveness. The US advisory effort has been in the area of PSYWAR with major emphasis in encouraging ARVN to utilize available PSYMAR assets in support of tactical operations and in using current PSYOP intelligence to target specific units. Significant progress is being made in this area as can be seen from the recent implementation of the ARVN initiated Combined PSYWAR/PSYOP Coordination Center. Another important POLMAR function is the Social Welfare Division. The primary US advisory effort in this field is one of assistance with emphasis being placed on assuring that Social Welfare activities are equally distributed throughout the Corps area. My overall assessment of ARVN POLMAR activities in III Corps is that definite progress is being made in efficiency in all facets thereof.

2. PSYWAR.

a. Accomplishments:

(1) Activities: Since July of 1968 there has been a steady increase in III Corps PSYWAR activities.

(a) The average number of leaflets dropped rose from 12 million per month in the first six months to 45 million per month in the last six months of 1968.

(b) The average ground distributed leaflets increased from 1.5 million per month to 2.1 million per month.

(c) The average air loudspeaker hours increased from 40 hours per month to 135 hours per month.
(d) The average ground loudspeaker hours increased from 350 hours per month to 500 hours per month.

(e) In conjunction with this increased activity, the Hoi Chanhs also significantly increased in the latter half of 1968. There were 764 Hoi Chanhs in the first six months and 1855 in the second six months with 1090 of these coming in the final three months.

(f) These increased averages of PSTWAR activity are continuing in 1969 in all areas.

(2) Campaigns: There were three major PSTWAR/PSYOP campaigns in III Corps since July 1968.

(a) The Accelerated Pacification Campaign was supported by PSTWAR/PSYOP resources. The ARVN PSTWAR personnel in III Corps combined their assets with those of the Vietnamese Information Service and the Ministry of Chieu Hoi to inform the people of the policies of the GVN and to promote the necessity and usefulness of the pacification effort. Also in conjunction with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, leaflets were distributed and tapes were broadcast to induce VC supporters to rally to the GVN.

(b) The Nguyen Trai Campaign was a highly successful campaign which was aimed at the intermediate and high level VC cadre. It began on 15 October 1968 and was originally scheduled to end on 15 December 1968. However, because of its success, it was extended until 31 January 1969. A total of 229,833,000 leaflets were distributed by ARVN and FMAF in III Corps in support of this campaign. This intense campaign brought significant results. There were over 300 ralliers in each of the four months encompassed by the campaign, which was a marked increase from the first eight months of the year.

(c) The 1969 Tet Campaign was launched on 18 January 1969 and was in three phases: Pre-Tet, Tet, and Post-Tet. The 30th POLWAR Battalion printed numerous letters and greetings from district and province officials to the people. During the Tet period the great majority of leaflets disseminated and tapes broadcast were centered around the theme of the VC returning to their families and the GVN. The considerable increase in Hoi Chanhs, beginning at the end of February, is evidence of the success of this campaign.

(3) Coordination with G2 has improved greatly in recent months. ARVN G2 and PSTWAR personnel are now consulting each other on a regular basis. G2 is providing current intelligence on location, identification and condition of specific enemy units. The PSTWAR Section then tasks the 30th POLWAR Battalion with printing leaflets, targeting these units by name and disseminating the leaflets over suspected enemy locations.

(4) Aggressive measures have been taken to get the PSTWAR Teams to directly support combat operations. Directives from LTG Tri to ARVN informed the units as to what assets were available and encouraged them to
use these assets. Results of this new emphasis are now becoming apparent as PSIWAR Teams are being assigned to battalions during operations. ARVN PSIWAR Teams did an excellent job in the combat action around Bien Hoa Air Base during the period 23-26 February 1969.

(5) A Combined PSIWAR/PSYOP Coordination Center (CPOC) has been established and will coordinate all PSIWAR/PSYOP activities in III CTZ. The Center, located at III Corps Headquarters, is under the chairmanship of the DCS POLWAR and is staffed by representatives from all agencies concerned with PSIWAR and PSYOPS in III CTZ. The Center will eliminate duplication of effort and provide a central source for information and reports on PSIWAR/PSYOPS activities. In the past there have been coordinating committees and periodic meetings within the PSYOP community, but the present effort will have all of the PSYOP agencies working together on a daily basis in the same physical location. It will provide the maximum use of available assets and will better define the areas of responsibility for the different agencies. This Center was ARVN initiated, and it is felt that it is a giant step forward in the advisory effort to prepare ARVN to take over the responsibility for PSIWAR/PSYOP efforts in III CTZ.

(6) The PSIWAR Section at III CTZ gathered the many interrogation forms for Chieu Hoi and POW and synthesized a composite form concerning the extraction of PSYOP intelligence from these sources. The form has been sent to all sectors in III Corps to be used at Chieu Hoi and POW interrogation centers. The form is quite comprehensive and should provide a standard intelligence source for the PSYOP exploitation of Hoi Chanhs and POW.

b. Problem Areas

(1) There is a critical need for more and better PSIWAR/PSYOP equipment at all levels of operation. This equipment should be acquired through ARVN channels. Better and more printing capability is needed at Corps and Division level. Amplifiers, speakers, movie projectors, jeepsters and tape recorders are needed in the PSIWAR Teams at Division, Regimental, and Battalion level. Repair of on hand items is also a major problem. The PSIWAR equipment is, in many instances, unique even to the US supply system, making repair parts and trained personnel hard to come by. There is a reluctance to turn items in for repair for fear of never getting them back. Again the burden is on the ARVN supply system, a problem evident in almost all areas of ARVN activities.

(2) The ARVN have a very limited air delivery capability for PSIWAR material. US assets fly the majority of the delivery missions and an effort must be made to develop, within VNAF, an organization similar to the US Special Operations Squadrons to enable ARVN to have an effective operation.

(3) There is a very serious lack of capability for night loudspeaker broadcasting. In developing ARVN PSIWAR, steps should be taken to insure night loudspeaker capability is considered. One of the most effective
times for targeting the enemy is at night and the only aircraft available that presently have this capability are the C-47's. Helicopter broadcasting would be the best solution, but thus far there has been no success in obtaining aircraft to fulfill this mission.

c. Conclusions: The PSYWAR advisory effort is pointed toward increasing the ARVN emphasis on targeting the enemy with PSYWAR. The ARVN personnel at III Corps have been receptive and aggressive toward the advisory effort in this area and some results have been achieved. This awareness and responsiveness must now be implemented at Division level and below. Also a primary objective in the PSYWAR advisory effort is to get the ARVN to operate and function along the lines of US PSYOP operations. It is felt that progress is being made in this area. With the previously mentioned Coordination Center in operation, ARVN will be working on a daily basis with the entire US operation and progress should increase more rapidly.

d. Recommendations:

(1) That ARVN equipment authorization be reviewed, a thorough inventory of on hand equipment be made, and necessary action be taken to obtain the needed equipment through ARVN channels. Advisors are presently compiling a list of required items.

(2) Efforts be made to get a PSYWAR Special Operations Squadron capability in VNAP to include night loudspeaker capability.

3. POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION.

a. Accomplishments:

(1) In October 1968, LTG Tri initiated a campaign to increase the POLWAR capability of RF/PF units. POLWAR representatives from each province were briefed on the plan and instructional materials were issued to RF/PF units. Officers from RF/PF units were selected to attend POLWAR schools in Saigon and Dalat. RF/PF noncommissioned officers were selected to attend a POLWAR training course at the 30th POLWAR Battalion. Two of these two-week courses have been completed, graduating a total of 167 students, and more courses are programmed.

(2) Tae Kwon Do instruction continues to be a successful and popular program. Supervised by the Political Indoctrination Section with instruction by Korean Advisors and ARVN soldiers, the program continues to help build confidence and leadership in ARVN soldiers.

b. Problem Areas

(1) There is a serious lack of trained POLWAR cadre at regimental level and below. There are many personnel assigned POLWAR duties in small units who have not had POLWAR training. This is especially true in RF/PF units.
(2) There is a need for equipment such as tape recorders, cameras, and sound equipment at the company and battalion sized units to more effectively carry out the Political Indoc trination mission.

c. Conclusions: The Political Indoc trination Section seems to be well organized and functional. Little demand is placed on US advisors for support. There is an effort being made to train additional POLWAR cadre, as evidenced by the above mentioned course for RF/PP at the 30th POLWAR Battalion and the plans for establishing two training centers in III Corps for POLWAR NCO. Officer training is accomplished at national level in Saigon and Dalat, and increased quotas are needed for III Corps.

d. Recommendations:

(1) Efforts should be made to supply the needed equipment to improve political indoctrination programs.

(2) Continued efforts should be made to increase POLWAR training. A special effort should be made to increase the number of officers trained at the national schools.

4. PX/Commissary.

a. Accomplishments:

(1) On 1 July 1968 the United States provided a grant of $4.2 million to the RVNAF PX/Commissary System in the form of commodities and foodstuffs in order to increase the number and variety of stocked items. With the introduction of these commodities, the number of line items available to RVNAF personnel increased from 18 to 30. This grant expired on 30 September 1968, and through the sale of these goods, the system here in III Corps has increased the number of line items to 42. Most of the items are produced locally, but items from the United States, Japan, Nationalist China, and Australia are also in the system.

(2) Construction of four new outlets and renovation of an existing building will increase the number of outlets in III CTZ from 42 to 47. One of these new outlets is being constructed in Loc Ninh, especially significant since it will service troops in a remote area of the Corps where no outlet was previously not available.

(3) Just as PF soldiers were granted PX/Commissary privileges in the summer of 1968, an effort is now being made to make PF dependents and CIDG personnel eligible for PX/Commissary purchases.

b. Problem Areas:

(1) There is a serious lack of storage space in all outlets in III CTZ. The quantity of items available can increase only as the storage space increases.
(2) There is no rice, the main staple of Vietnamese people, presently available in the PX/Commissary system. Servicemen must buy rice on the civilian market.

(3) The majority of the outlets are concentrated in population centers throughout III CTZ, thus making purchase for many servicemen in the more remote areas difficult.

(4) Many of the personnel functioning as administrative personnel in the various outlets are not properly trained for their jobs.

c. Conclusions:

(1) It is evident that the PX/Commissary system has a strong positive effect on the morale of RVNAF. This effect is related directly to the availability of retail outlets and the quantity and quality of items stocked.

(2) The RVNAF PX/Commissary system has been in effect for only 12 years and under the present administrative system for only eight months. Although progress is being made at a rapid rate, many problems still exist and must be resolved as time and money permit.

d. Recommendations:

(1) Rice should be introduced into the system as the primary foodstuff carried. Servicemen should be allowed to buy rice at a rate of 10% lower than it is sold on the civilian market, as is the case with other commodities carried in the system.

(2) The entire inventory should be expanded to include a greater variety of foods, as well as items such as soap, towels, footwear, and other items essential to personal hygiene.

(3) A concentrated and comprehensive training program encompassing all phases of proper logistical and administrative procedures should be developed, emphasized and become mandatory for all personnel involved in any way with the PX/Commissary system.

(4) Emphasis should be placed on outlets in remote areas, especially those servicing RF/PF units. A dynamic construction program is needed to enlarge existing facilities and to construct new outlets where the PX/Commissary facility is not now readily available.

5. SOCIAL WELFARE/RELIEF COMMODITIES.

a. Accomplishments:

(1) The Social Services Department’s budget allowance has increased from $98,000,000 to $140,000,000.
(2) To better satisfy the essential requirements of the service-eman's dependents during times of child birth, sickness, death, natural or tactical misfortune, or individual accidents, the authorized strength of the III Corps Social Service Office has been increased to 65 WAC, which is 24 more than its strength of one year ago.

(3) In addition to the increase in funding and staffing, facilities have been increased by six dispensaries, six maternity hospitals, twenty dependent housing areas, three tailoring classes, nine elementary schools and six kindergartens.

b. **Problem Areas:** The major problem area encountered is the unavailability of welfare assistance items.

c. **Conclusions:** The overall objective of the Social Welfare Division is to bring to the RVNAF and/or their dependents a happier, healthier, and more wholesome life, with the ultimate aim of increasing the combat potential of the Army. The III CTZ Social Welfare Division has made substantial progress toward that goal during my tenure.

d. **Recommendations:** Effort be made to increase the amount of relief commodities furnished to ARVN.

6. **CIVIC ACTION/CIVIL AFFAIRS.** Although this is not a primary responsibility of the POLWAR Section, there have been several Civic Action/Civil Affairs projects undertaken by ARVN POLWAR Section.

a. **Accomplishments:**

   (1) In December 1968 and March 1969, Combined Civilian Orientation Conferences were held at III Corps. These were programs in which civilians from the III Corps areas were invited to visit various military facilities in order to gain a better appreciation of what the ARVN and Allied Forces were accomplishing. It was a joint III Corps POLWAR - II FFV G5 operation, and was considered to be quite successful.

   (2) There has been some progress made in small scale, high impact projects accomplished by ARVN units at III Corps and in the ARVN Divisions. There are constant requests for this type of civic action project, but the only source of funds has been AIAK funds obtained by US Advisors.

b. **Problem Areas:**

   (1) There are no trained ARVN personnel in the area of Civic Action/Civil Affairs. The primary mission of the ARVN Civic Action program is to improve the relationship between the civilian populace and the Army. The civilians are given information on Army activities, and the soldiers are encouraged to maintain high standards of conduct when dealing with the civilian community.
(2) With one exception, there are no funds, materials, or personnel allocated for civic action in the ARVN organization. The exception to this is those units having the specific mission of supporting Revolutionary Development.

(3) There is no emphasis placed on Civic Action in the ARVN. They have learned to rely on US assets for this mission and consequently have avoided becoming deeply involved.

c. Conclusions:

(1) The field of Civic Action for ARVN is one full of potential. The ARVN units are sometimes the only representatives of the GVN in an area and could perform a valuable service in promotion of the GVN image if they were prepared and trained to accomplish high impact civic action projects.

(2) This Civic Action capability would also be an aid to the all-important Pacification effort.

d. Recommendations:

(1) Funds similar to AID funds should be authorized to ARVN to conduct high impact civic action projects.

(2) ARVN personnel should be trained in the area of Civic Action.

(3) Closer coordination should be effected between ARVN units and the officials in the provinces and districts in which they are operating. ARVN units have the manpower to work with the material available in the provinces and districts.

7. 30th POLWAR BATTALION.

a. Accomplishments:

(1) In November of 1968, the Battalion acquired a 1250 Multilith Press which was excess property of the 1st Infantry Division. This press, coupled with the similar press already in use in the Battalion Print Shop, raised the printing capacity to approximately 3,000,000 leaflets weekly.

(2) During the final quarter of 1968 and the first quarter of 1969, the Battalion's 301st POLWAR Company, assigned to the 18th Infantry Division in Xuan Loc, conducted training courses for seven-man political warfare teams from each of the battalions of the 18th Division. These teams increased the Division's psychological operations assets for tactical operations.

(3) During the month of February 1969, the Battalion prepared its first Leaflet Catalogue. This publication contains information on available quick reaction leaflets and describes ordering procedures. The catalogue will be distributed to district and battalion level in III Corps.
(4) On 19 December 1968, the new Table of Organization and Equipment for the battalion was approved by the General Political Warfare Department and sent to JGS for examination and approval. The new TOE should appreciably increase the battalion's printing and PSYWAR capabilities, since it authorizes an increase in equipment and personnel.

b. Problem Areas:

(1) The 5th, 18th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, each of which has a POLWAR Company attached, tend to misuse the PSYWAR/CA Teams. The majority of the time at least one of the teams is assigned to the division G5. This leads to the use of these "standby" teams in such activities as operating public address systems for division ceremonies and performing "house cleaning" functions which should be performed by personnel assigned to the G5 sections. While these duties are probably necessary in most cases, they detract from the mission of the teams, which is to operate in the hamlets and with tactical units, conducting political indoctrination and psychological warfare.

(2) The unit's printing capacity is presently hindered by the shortage of generators to supply power for the operation of the printing plant.

(3) The battalion has on hand only twelve of the 24 authorized UH-5 loudspeaker sets. This shortage is especially critical for the PSYWAR/CA Teams in the field.

c. Conclusions:

(1) The battalion has continued to improve in all areas of its operations. Printing output has increased gradually, and especially noteworthy is the increased utilization of the battalion's twenty PSYWAR/CA Teams in tactical operations.

(2) If the new battalion TOE is approved and the authorized equipment issued, the equipment shortages in the battalion will be alleviated and the capability of the battalion will be increased significantly.

d. Recommendations: JGS approve the TOE of the 30th POLWAR Battalion as soon as possible, and the equipment be issued to conform to the new authorization.
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APPENDIX VII

1. (C) GENERAL. Engineer requirements in III CTZ are considerable. The road net consists of nearly 4,000 km of national, provincial, and village roads of which only a fraction is paved and an estimated 50% abandoned awaiting proper security conditions and availability of engineer resources before repair. With over 100 interdictions, roadblocks or obstacles per month, road and bridge repair and contingency planning become a major effort. The necessity for resupply by air and emphasis on air mobility requires year-round maintenance and rehabilitation of numerous airfields. III CTZ engineer assets of three divisional battalions and one combat engineer group are woefully inadequate for these requirements. Massive US engineer support is used to take care of all but a small fraction of the total requirements. The current ratio of US to ARVN engineer resources in III CTZ is an estimated 7:1. Notwithstanding, III Corps engineer accomplishments have been considerable and have demonstrated that with additional equipment and more experienced leadership, their units should be able to assume a greater role.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. Road Construction and Rehabilitation: Approximately 68 kms of roads were opened and rehabilitated as follows: Long An Province, 18 km; Hau Nghia, 10 km; Long Khanh, 6 km; Minh Duong and Phuoc Long, 34 km. This was a major accomplishment which opened many areas that had been denied normal access to commercial arteries. An estimated 12 company months of effort were required. Less successful was the operation to restore an 18 km stretch of National Highway 20 located near the II Corps boundary. This road became nearly impassable during the 1968 rainy season. To date, an estimated 9 company months have been expended and results have been far from satisfactory.

b. Bridge Construction: Four major bridges and several minor bridges were reconstructed after enemy interdiction. The reconstruction of the Phu Long Bridge at Le Thieu, the La Nga Bridge on QL 20, and the Can Gio Bridge on Highway 5A south of Saigon were major undertakings successfully accomplished despite lack of equipment and restricted site conditions. It is evident that ARVN combat engineers excel in this type of work. Advisor efforts in this area were concentrated on improving scheduling and forecasting; however, improvements were negligible because of ARVN lack of control of material deliveries.

c. Critical Bridge Contingency Planning: Working jointly with II FFV engineers and the 20th Engineer Brigade, 32 bridges were identified as being critical to Free World Force military operations. Agreements were reached as to responsibilities for assembling tactical bridging at each site in the event of interdiction. III Corps accepted responsibility for planning and execution for 11 of the bridges. Requirements for material and equipment were identified and joint plans developed. With these accomplishments during this reporting period, preparations in this area...
are now satisfactory. The ARVN engineer capabilities for execution were proven when the Pan Lue Bridge was interdicted on 20 June. ARVN engineers and equipment were on site within 6 hours. The 20th Engineer Brigade delivered supporting material and equipment within 10 hours and a 1000 foot M476 float bridge was assembled and opened for traffic by 1800 hours 2 July.

d. Airfield Construction: ARVN engineers rehabilitated or upgraded three major airfields as follows:

Chon Thanh: 30th Engineer Group constructed a Type II C130 field.

Tanb Linh: 18th Engineer Bn constructed a Type II C7 field.

Due Hoa: 25th Engineer Bn in a joint project with the 79th Engineer Group (US) expanded existing facilities.

The project at Chon Thanh involved 10 company months of effort. Failure to use accepted quality control practices to obtain proper compaction and survey made it necessary to reconstruct portions of the project several times. The quality of the work at Tanb Linh was excellent and the project was accomplished in a reasonable time. This can be attributed to the battalion advisor who remained at the site throughout the project to personally supervise quality control and construction practices. The project at Due Hoa was an outstanding example of a successful joint US/ARVN engineering project. Requirements were generated by the 25th ARVN Div and the 12th Aviation Group. The 20th Engineer Brigade accomplished survey and design. Responsibilities for construction and priorities were agreed to at a joint meeting held in November 1968. Construction was accomplished on schedule in early 1969.

e. Combat and Operational Support: 90% of the missions in this category were accomplished by divisional engineer battalions. Combat support consisted primarily of demolition teams which accompanied infantry units on operations and expended an estimated 25% of the divisional engineer capability. The 30th Engineer Group (Combat), whose TOE mission is to provide combat and operational support to divisions and DTA, provided no combat support and very little operational support.

f. Revolutionary Development: Approximately 5% of ARVN engineer resources were expended on projects in this category. The most significant project was in Long An Province, where 16 km of village roads were opened and restored. This project involved the erection of 6 siffle bridges. The project is a continuing one, although it has been hampered by lack of security. One grader and several dump trucks have been destroyed by mines. Recently arrangements were made with the 9th Division (US) to improve security for ARVN work forces.

g. Base Development: Base development projects occupied approximately
15% of the effort. Major projects were the construction of a Popular Forces training camp at Ben Due, a Tactical Operations Center for Headquarters III Corps and several facilities for the use of CC III Corps.

3. (C) ARVN AREAS. The ARVN engineers in III CTZ have demonstrated their capability to perform military engineering tasks of all types. Their primary problem now is one of quantity. There are insufficient units to perform all the tasks required to support the type of army being organised and outfitted. A second major problem is the lack of a workable system of providing construction materials for operational support missions. These and other problems are discussed in detail below.

a. Combat Support: The 30th Engineer Group is employed as a construction group with missions assigned by JGS and Corps. Thus, the DTA are deprived of what should be their direct support engineers. This is a direct result of the lack of units and the priority given to higher headquarters for their own projects. Fortunately, US engineers are available to clear roads of enemy interdictions, make hasty repairs, restore roads to MACV standards and replace blown culverts. The problem will become serious when US tactical units are withdrawn and ARVN engineers will be required to clear roads and restore damaged sections.

b. Construction Materials: The system whereby ARVN engineers obtain construction materials is inadequate. The existing system is not responsive to the requirements of a combat engineer group. For example, type B permanent protective systems require 18 - 24 month lead time. Pier protection and bridge lighting systems fall into this category. In early 1965 after the Phu Long, Ong Thin, La Nga, New Port and Ben Luc were damaged or destroyed by enemy sapper action, a joint US/ARVN crash program was developed to identify critical bridges and install protective systems. ARVN III Corps Engineers were unable to respond as they were unable to obtain the necessary materials. The US II FFV agreed to provide the materials direct from US engineer battalions to ARVN battalions. Consequently, the ARVN system was never exercised or tested and the engineers thereafter leaned heavily on the II FFV for all material. Material to repair road interdictions is equally difficult to obtain. Culvert materials and bridging materials (except for tactical bridging) are under the control of the Public Works of each province. The combat engineers are unable to respond quickly to tactical requirements. It is this situation more than any one factor which limits the effectiveness of the ARVN combat engineer in an operational support role. An estimated 40% of all materials used by III Corps engineers during this period was provided by the 20th Engineer Brigade (US) through the auspices of the II FFV. An additional 30% was provided by the Public Works. Only 30% of required materials needed to perform assigned tasks were provided by the ARVN system.

c. Staff Organization and Functioning: Prior to October 1968 the positions of Corps Engineer and Commanding Officer 30th Group were filled by two different officers. In October, the positions were combined. The
group commander is now also the Corps engineer, which has created several problems. The Corps engineer is in the office only 25% of the time. In his absence, he does not delegate authority to the deputy, and the staff rarely takes action on important matters. Technical supervision over divisional engineer battalions has been poor, support for those battalions has diminished, and long range planning has been neglected. Decisions are often made in the best interests of the group instead of the Corps. The total engineer effort expanded on the job has decreased because the group CO is unable to spend adequate time supervising projects. He must spend about 25% of his time on the road between Hoc Mon and Dien Hoa and another 25% at Corps. The lack of progress is noticeable when the group CO is not physically present on projects.

d. Employment of Troops: The primary mission of Corps engineer troops is to provide general engineer support for the Corps, attached units and division tactical areas. Because of an insufficiency of units and inability to obtain construction materials, support for attached units and the sectors has been neglected. The majority of the available effort has gone to support Corps and in many cases to accomplish what should be JGS level projects. A comparison of the allocation of effort between 20th Engineer Brigade units (US) and the 30th Engineer Group (ARVN III Corps) is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Project</th>
<th>Percent Effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Local security</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Base construction</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Roads and Bridges</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Operational support</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Combat support</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Revolutionary Development</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

a. ARVN engineers have the professional competence and experience to accomplish all types of military engineer tasks.

b. Engineer units organic to or attached to the III CTZ are inadequate to handle the total engineer requirements.

c. The system for supplying construction materials is inadequate and reduces the effectiveness of ARVN engineer units. This problem must be resolved before new units are added to the force structure.

d. The current practice of assigning one officer as both CO 30th Engineer Group and Corps Engineer reduces staff effectiveness and control.
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5. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That the ARVN Chief of Engineers be encouraged to assign any new engineer units to be located in III CTZ to the operational control of CG III Corps to permit an increase in operational support effort to sectors and divisions.

b. That the construction material support for engineer units be improved. The Corps Engineer should be authorized to approve operational support tasks and draw material direct from supporting DSU's. Arrangements should be made so that ARVN depots can draw on USARV depots if materials are not available in the ARVN system.

c. That the ARVN Chief of Engineers be encouraged to assign another LTC to III Corps as Corps Engineer.

d. That the feasibility of organizing RF engineer companies to be stationed in each sector to provide operational support for the sector, increase province public works capability and to accelerate the opening of railroads and village roads be studied. Equipment could be provided from the pool of public works equipment now being repaired by US contract. Technical supervision and training could be provided by ARVN divisional and Corps engineer units.
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APPENDIX VIII

COMMUNICATIONS

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. The communications systems provided by the Vietnamese Armed Forces are the basis for all Vietnamese communications. The quantity and quality of these systems have a direct influence on the effectiveness of the command and control of all civil and military operations within III Corps Tactical Zone. The demand for improved communications throughout Vietnam, including III CTZ, are increasing as the responsibilities for self-government, military operations, and civic actions are being turned over to the Vietnamese.

b. The ARVN Signal Corps personnel are meeting the challenge with enthusiasm. They possess professional competence and technical proficiency in communications that will rival many US signal units. The ARVN has excellent communicators and they continually improve.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. During the past eight months, the III CTZ ARVN communications have improved, due in part to the continual pressure for more and higher quality service. Telephone service, once marginal to distant headquarters, has improved so that there is access from major areas to all provinces and regiments. Teletype message traffic has increased almost to system capacity. This type of communication is becoming more and more popular due to the capability of secure traffic and the reliability of the system.

b. The ARVN exhibit great flexibility in establishing and utilizing their communications systems. Tactically, the requirement for mobile command posts has placed great pressure on ARVN signal assets. All of the signal organisations have become accustomed to missions requiring considerable mixing of existing systems. ARVN signal personnel have learned to make maximum use of both area and command communications systems to provide the high degree of flexibility necessary to support mobile combat operations.

c. The responsiveness of communications to tactical requirements has improved considerably during the past ten months. The Corps command communications facilities have become "on-call" for immediate missions anywhere within the CTZ. Installation of a command multichannel voice system from III CTZ Headquarters in Bien Hoa to the command post of the Airborne Division in Tay Ninh is an example. This system required six terminals and two relay sites and was installed and operational within 24 hours. ARVN signal personnel were responsive to the tactical requirement, and the action was completed using ARVN equipment assets and VNAF air transportation.
d. Probably the most significant ARVN communication accomplishment is its reliability. Communications have become so reliable that the telephone is an instrument of command. The idea of accepting system outages and accepting impaired communications has been replaced by an urgent desire to get the system operational again. Repairmen and operators are highly trained and repair parts supply is receiving more command attention.

e. During the past year, much new US signal equipment has been introduced into Vietnam. With the introduction of this new equipment, ARVN is expanding its communications capacity and capabilities. The most significant improvement is in multichannel communications. With the introduction of AN/PRC-24 equipment, multichannel communications capacity triples. The introduction of microwave systems expands capacity even further, as it improves quality. The introduction of new FM and SSB radios has improved the efficiency and dependability of tactical communications. The effect has been an increase in ARVN use of their own communications for requesting combat and combat service support.

3. (C) PROBLEM AREA. The principal problem is in the area of new equipment introduction. Many times new communication equipment is issued to units which have neither trained repairmen nor sufficient repair parts. Often new equipment has excessive "down time" due to the nonavailability of repair parts. An example is the Single Side Band Radio AN/PRC-74. SSB is a new communications concept to the ARVN and consequently a high equipment failure rate is experienced. The ARVN supply system cannot keep up with the large initial repair parts demand. As a consequence much of their equipment is experiencing excessive "down time".

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS. ARVN tactical signal units within III CTZ display a professional competence and technical proficiency indicative of good communicators. They are responsive to the needs of commanders and the tactical situation. The ARVN communications systems are characterized by their reliability and flexibility. The skill level and operational competence of ARVN tactical signal units has been elevated to the point that they can carry their own load. In view of this, the requirement for Signal Advisors assigned to ARVN Divisions is being reevaluated.

5. (C) RECOMMENDATION. As new, modernized equipment enters the ARVN inventory, a need is created for familiarization and training of operator and maintenance personnel. Also an increased demand will be placed upon the ARVN supply system for repair parts. This area of training and repair parts needs more emphasis to reduce equipment "down time". This should be accomplished by ARVN training and supply personnel at higher echelons under the guidance of US Advisors at that level.

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APPENDIX IX

CHEMICAL

1. (C) GENERAL. During the past ten months, there has been an increase in deforestation activities and an improvement in the overall employment of chemicals, including herbicides and riot control agents. ARVN units do not possess the necessary equipment to conduct these missions and must process requests through US channels. US units must request permission through ARVN channels to clear areas for defoliation and deforestation and to use riot control agents. The III Corps advisory team processes all US and ARVN requests within the corps area.

2. (C) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. Joint US/ARVN approval was granted to defoliate 40,353 hectares by helicopter, ground and water based spray in III Corps Tactical Zone. In addition to this, there were 1237 defoliation sorties flown by C-123 aircraft in III Corps Tactical Zone covering an area of approximately 158,440 hectares.

b. JCS authorized the Commanding General of III Corps and III Corps Tactical Zone to grant permission for the emergency cutting of rubber and fruit trees along LOC and in areas used by the VC for staging attacks on friendly installations and convoys. This authorization reduced the time required for obtaining ARVN approval from several months to a matter of days. There were 118,814 acres of land cleared by land clearing teams in the III Corps Tactical Zone during the past ten months.

c. Riot control agents were used to block enemy infiltration routes, primarily in the 31st DTA. Approximately 59,120 pounds of persistent CS were dropped in support of ARVN requests.

3. (C) PROBLEM AREAS.

a. The principal problem area is the time required to process defoliation requests through ARVN channels. In some cases up to six months has elapsed between the time a defoliation request was submitted and final ARVN approval was obtained.

b. The use of chemical agents during ARVN tactical operations has been limited because of an insufficient number of protective masks in tactical maneuver units.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

a. The herbicide and deforestation programs in III CTZ have greatly improved security around base camps and along friendly lines of communications. The use of herbicides along border areas and enemy infiltration routes has degraded the enemy’s ability to avoid detection.

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b. With the increase in the number of protective masks being issued to ARVN units during the first and second quarters of calendar year 1970, it is anticipated that ARVN will hereafter make greater use of riot control agents in tactical operations.

c. ARVN units do not have the necessary organic equipment to conduct missions of defoliation, deforestation and using riot control agents.

5. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That command emphasis be placed on processing requests for defoliation in a more expeditious manner.

b. That ARVN units be provided with the necessary organic equipment to conduct missions of defoliation, deforestation and riot control.
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