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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DA NANG
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVCA DNG-CG

14 October 1966

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (RCS-CSFOR-74)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHOC-DST
APO San Francisco 96375

In compliance with AR 1-26 and USARV Regulation 1-3, the attached
Senior Officer Debriefing Report is submitted.

GEORGE H. YOUNG, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
DEBRIEF REPORT

Country: Republic of South Vietnam
Debrief Report By: George H. Young Jr., B3-036Eh2
Duty Assignments: Plans and Operations, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam; Americal Division; United States Army Support Command, Da Nang
Inclusive Dates: 1 March 1967 to 18 October 1968
Date of Report: 7 October 1968

Logistics, I Corps Tactical Zone,

1. (C) The current logistical concept in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) involves the operation of one wholesale system operated by the Navy which is complemented and extended by Army and Marine Corps logistical units. Navy has supply responsibility for wholesale Class I and III, II and IV common and construction material. Army and Marine Corps provide for retail distribution of supplies beyond Navy Support Activity, Da Nang Storage Activity (Army), and Navy supply point, Chu Lai and have full responsibility for service peculiar Class II and IV, Class V, and required services for their respective forces. This system is working well and results in little or no duplication among the services.

2. (C) Supply: Class I
   a. Navy Support Activity, Da Nang has the wholesale subsistence responsibility in ICTZ. The retail mission is performed on an area basis by Army and Marine support units. In NICTZ there are retail supplies
points located at Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Phu Bai. Dong Ha is operated
by the Marine Force Logistics Command. They support all US Forces in
the local area. Quang Tri and Phu Bai are operated by the Army and
supports all US Forces in Quang Tri and Huo/Phu Bai areas. Those essentialy are Army only. All three supply points are supported from NSA,
Da Nang via coastal lighterage. There are two retail activities in
SICZTZ located at Chu Lai and Dac Pho. NSA Da Nang operates a depot at
Chu Lai and provides support for the Army supply point in Chu Lai and
the Forward Support Activity (FSA) at Dac Pho.

b. There are five bakeries in ICTZ. Three are Marine operated and
two are Army. The Marine bakeries located at Dong Ha and Da Nang provide
support to all US Forces in those areas. The Marine bakery in Phu Bai
is operated by the Marines with Army augmentation and supports the
Hue/Phu Bai area north to include Camp Evans. US Army Forces in
Quang Tri area are supported by the Army bakery at Quang Tri. A second
Army bakery at Chu Lai supports US Forces in Chu Lai and Dac Pho areas.

Milk is provided to all US Forces by plants located at Chu Lai and Da
Nang which are operated under Navy contract. Ice cream is provided Army
Forces in SICZTZ from contractual Navy milk plants plus Army operated 2½
gallon ice cream machines located at Dac Pho and Hill 63. In WICTZ ice
cream is provided by Army operated 2½ gallon ice cream machines located
at Dong Ha, Camp Evans, and Phu Bai, plus one continuous flow ice cream
machine at Quang Tri. Ice cream from the Navy Contract milk plant
at Da Nang is also flown to Quang Tri three (3) times weekly and
Phu Bai four (4) times weekly. Ice is provided by Navy contract,
however, this is not sufficient to meet Army requirements in NICTZ. Four 15 ton ice plants will be established in NICTZ, two at Quang Tri and two at Phu Bai. These plants will be Army owned and operated. A Korean contract firm is also establishing a 50 ton ice plant at Phu Bai.

c. The NSA, Da Nang is procuring fresh fruits and vegetables in-country and trans-shipping directly to Army troops in ICTZ.

3. (C) Class II & IV

a. Navy Support Activity, Da Nang provides wholesale common item support to all US Forces in ICTZ. This includes those items which have been agreed upon between the Army and NSA as common service support items (CSSI). Additionally, NSA, Da Nang provides wholesale support of construction and fortification material. We provide Army peculiar material for all US Forces in ICTZ from the Da Nang Storage Activity and Qui Nhon Depot.

b. The Da Nang Support Command and Marine Force Logistics Command provide the retail distribution of all Class II & IV to their respective forces. The Army Support Command establishes supply points and FSA's to provide support to US Army units. To support Army/Marine operations, such as the relief of Khe Sanh, joint FSA's are established by Army/Marine units to provide support on an area basis.

c. Interservice support agreements (ISSA's) have been executed between USARV and COMHAVFORV for common service support, and construction and fortification material support.

d. Divisional DS and 1st Log Comd DS/GC level activities place
requisitions on the NSA system for those items of supply provided by NSA, Da Nang. The specific procedure utilized depends on the location of the customer in relation to the NSA Depot as well as the organic RC capability of the supported unit. Army peculiar supplies are requisitioned from Da Nang Storage Activity except by the Americal Division and 1ACD which currently are based on Qui Nhon Depot. Both NSA and Da Nang Storage Activity pass unfilled requisitions to the USA ICCV (formerly 11th ICC). Issues to Army from Navy are accomplished on reimbursable basis with reimbursement accomplished by USARPA/MA.

e. Depot operations in the Da Nang Support Command, when compared to other 1st Log Depots, are relatively small in terms of tonnages and line items. However, the depot does receive approximately 3000 requisitions daily. The depot was an off shoot of a contingency requirement and was established using the 560th General Supply Company as the basic unit upon which to build. This DSU had a large inventory and line item count, most of which were fringe. The majority of these items later became excess. Reorganisation of the depot is in progress in order to reduce stocks and provide more responsive supply support to combat units in ICTZ. The US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (USAICCV) is currently preparing an ASL for the DMSA, using as a basis the demand supported ASL's from supported units and supporting DSU/GSU's. Stocks are being reduced by excessing non-demand supported and "nice to have" items, and by shipping all Common Service Support Items to the Naval Support Activity.

f. Automatic Data Processing Equipment located in the Depot will be reprogrammed to reflect the new mission. To improve the data base, logically program incoming stocks and identify excesses, a 100 per cent
The inventory of all stocks in the depot, supply points and DSU's and GSU's is under way. The objective is to obtain a 95% level of accuracy by 15 January 1969. The inventory in the DNG Depot is being conducted with the assistance of Project Counter IV personnel. Inventories in the DSU/GSU's utilize organic personnel. The Depot inventory began in August 1968, and will be completed by 1 November. The DSU/GSU inventories will be completed on/about 18 October. Inventories were preceded by periods of intensive training, including classroom instruction and practical exercises involving actual counting. Complete location surveys were performed at each storage area. Stocks were rewarehoused and locations consolidated and remarked.

The Depot inventory involves over 58,000 lines in approximately 70,000 locations. Approximately 36,000 lines in 45,800 locations are being inventoried in eight DSU's/GSU's and one Supply and Service Company.

4. (C) Class III:

a. In ICTZ (N), the Navy delivers bulk petroleum from Da Nang to Marine storage facilities at Cua Viet, and a Navy storage facility at Tan My. From Cua Viet all products are delivered by Navy barge and bladder boat to Dong Ha. A JP-4 pipeline runs from Dong Ha to the Army storage facility at Quang Tri. From Tan My a pipeline delivers JP-4 to Marine storage at Phu Bai and Navy bladder boats deliver other bulk products to Hue. From pipeline terminals, storage facilities and the Hue offload site, trans-shipment to other storage facilities and retail delivery, is by Army and Marine tank trucks. The Army has been designated to operate and maintain the pipeline systems in ICTZ (N). Wholesale packaged POL for Army forces is received from NSA, Da Nang and distributed by Army DSU's and FSA's.
b. In ICTZ (S) bulk and package POL is supplied from N.A, Da Nang to Sa Huynh for the Army FSA at Duc Pho, and to the NSA facility at Chu Lai.

c. One major construction project (almost complete) consists of a buried pipeline extending from Tan My via Hue and Camp Evans to Quang Tri, a distance of 44 miles. It is planned as a multi-product line with pump stations at Tan My, Hue and Camp Evans, as well as Quang Tri to permit reverse pumping if necessary.

5. (C) Class V

a. The Class V supply system in ICTZ consists of Army and Marine Corps units utilizing joint ASP's at Da Nang and Quang Tri. Army storage is at Camp Evans, Chu Lai, Duc Pho, Phu Bai and Hill 63.

b. The majority of Class V support for all services in ICTZ is received via deep draft vessels at Da Nang and in limited quantities at Duc Pho and Chu Lai. Forward distribution from Da Nang is by Navy controlled lighterage to Dong Ha and Hue for onward movement by truck. Line haul Transportation (Truck) is utilized to move from Dong Ha to Quang Tri and Camp Evans and from Tan My/Hue to Phu Bai.

c. The Army ASP at Chu Lai is primarily supported out of Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay. A small amount is shipped from Da Nang but this is limited due to port congestion and the limited storage capability in the Da Nang area.

6. (C) Services:

a. Transportation: Line haul and unit distribution of Army supplies are accomplished by Army assets. NSA has common user land transportation (CULT) responsibility in the Da Nang area and provides port and beach.
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clearance. Navy also clears the beach at Chu Lai. Army provides
beach clearance at Sa Huynh. Port clearance responsibility at Dong Ha
has been assigned by III MAF to FLC with 1st Log Cmd clearing the short
fall at this location (approx 40 per cent). Port clearance at Tan My/
Hue ramp is responsibility of the US Army. While there has been little
line haul trucking on Highway 1 north from Da Nang, the advent of the
monsoon season will place more emphasis on this means and the arrival of
Program 6 truck units will provide the capability.

b. Port and Beach Operations:

(1) The establishment of the LOTS site at Wunder Beach on 5 March
1968 was essential to augment the Navy's capability and insure adequate
support of Army elements. There also was a shortfall of Navy capability
to conduct discharge operations at the Deep Water Pier of Da Nang. The
Army assisted by having the 565th Trans Co (Term Svc) reinforce terminal
operations of Navy Support Activity, Da Nang. This mission terminated
15 July and the 565th Trans Co has been relocated to meet increased and
new requirements in IV CTZ. The LOTS site also terminated over-the-beach
operations in September 1968. Army terminal units located at Wunder
Beach have been relocated within ICTZ (403d Term Trf Co) and to III CTZ
(159th Term Bn and 561st Term Svc Co). In the event a bombing halt is
directed, it is suggested that Wunder Beach be reopened immediately in
order to insure support is provided to NICTZ. Considerable effort is
currently being made to re-establish the Vietnamese railroad north of
Da Nang. Regardless of the success of this endeavor, it will be neces-
sary to reopen Wunder Beach as soon as the weather will permit.

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(2) Navy assumed responsibility for terminal operations at Sa Huynh/Duc Pho on 15 August 1968. Army personnel and equipment utilized for this mission were returned to their parent units at Qui Nhon.

(3) The 329th Trans Co (Hvy Boat) is still reinforcing NSA, Da Nang's coastal lighterage capability. Its craft are being released at the rate of two LCU's per month as new Navy assets are received.

7. (C) Maintenance: Maintenance units of Da Nang Support Command provide direct support for all Army non-divisional units and back-up direct support for two AN/MFQ-4 countermortar radar sets operated by the Marines. Maintenance direct support units provide repair parts for eight AN/MFQ-10 countermortar sets and seventy-eight AN/PPS-5 ground surveillance radars operated and maintained by Marine personnel.

8. (U) Graves Registration and Mortuary Services: Army and Marine Corps provide their own GRREG. Army provides mortuary service for all US/FWMAF in ICTZ.

9. (U) Property Disposal. Army provides for all US Forces in ICTZ.

10. (U) Laundry. Army laundry in ICTZ is processed by contract laundries, TCB laundry units and individual local arrangements. Contract laundry service is provided by the Navy in accordance with current ISSA's.

11. (C) In light of the deployment of tactical forces in ICTZ, the present logistical system is effective and includes a minimum of duplication. As discussed above, where feasible, Army and Marine support efforts have been combined. Assignment of the full logistic responsibility in ICTZ to either the Army or the Navy/Marine Corps team would not appreciably reduce the number of personnel and equipment required.

12. (C) In early August 1968, logistic support Program 6 units
started arriving in ICTZ to replace those units from other support commands which were assigned or attached to Da Nang Support Command upon its activation in February 1968. Deployment of these seventeen (17) plus units to ICTZ will not represent an increase in supporting troop strength but will improve unit integrity and provide better command and control of combat service support at the operating levels. Units which have arrived in ICTZ to date have been highly motivated, well trained and anxious to get the job done.

13. (C) The future of the Da Nang Support Command depends upon the tactical forces being supported, their distribution, and the intensity of operations. At this time there are no decisions known to relocate any substantial part of the Army forces now in ICTZ, although plans to that end have been prepared but not confirmed. In fact, the arrival of the 1st Bde, 5th Mec Div and other Program 6 units (Tactical) increased the Army strength in ICTZ by approximately 8 - 9000. If a major decrease in Army strength supported in ICTZ occurs, that fact, and other pertinent factors such as geographic distribution of supported forces and contingency requirements for support of Army reinforcements will be reviewed to determine the scope of Army infrastructure, including command and control, to be retained in ICTZ.

14. (C) Lessons Learned:

   a. Item: ASL for Incoming DS/GS Maintenance Units.

   Observation: CONARC msg UNCLASS, FOUO 61866, subject "Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) Instructions, AR 220-10", states that all non-divisional DS and GS maintenance units will deploy less ASL and maintenance shop stocks.
Evaluation: Three (3) direct support units have arrived in ICTZ with no ASL as specified in the above policy statement. These units have been greatly hampered in providing adequate direct support to non-dividual customers due to the lack of repair parts. One unit, the 596th Lt Maint Company remains seriously deficient on ASL items after six months in-country. The status of repair parts resupply follows:

1. ASL filled - 40%
2. Demand Accommodation - 50%
3. Demand Satisfaction - 45%
4. DSU zero balances average 40% on ASL. High demand items show 75% zero balance. Two additional DS units (237th Maint Co (DS) and 377th Maint Co (DS)) are scheduled to arrive in ICTZ between 15 - 30 October 1968.

Recommendation: That DS/GS maintenance units deploy with appropriate ASL items.

b. Item: Closed Loop Support Program (CLSP)

Observation: Two objectives of the CLSP as stated in USARPAC Reg 700-69 are to meet quantitative authorization requirements, and to maintain the authorized equipment population within a predetermined and acceptable condition. For many end items of engineer and automotive equipment, serviceable assets are not available to meet the demands.

Evaluation: Due to lack of sufficient assets, equipment is driven until it is completely unserviceable. This problem is caused when the equipment is due for overhaul and replacement assets are not available, thus the equipment must be retained in service. One of two things will happen by the time assets become available. First, the equipment will be
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Upon the point of overhaul and will be washed from the system, or second, the item will be retained for controlled cannibalization and finally turned in for salvage. The Closed Loop Support system is very good in concept, but under present conditions, ineffective. In dealing with major assemblies and component parts, (i.e., engines, transmissions, etc), the deadline requirements generally exceed the input allocations, since it is not good maintenance practice to pull a major assembly until a serviceable replacement is on hand. This means that Closed Loop assets are retained in the system in an unserviceable condition awaiting serviceable assets.

Recommendation: That a more realistic evaluation be made of actual requirements and additional replacement assets be made available.

c. Item: Southeast Asia Huts

Observation: Southeast Asia Huts used by the Navy and Marines afford better shelter than the Army tent frame.

Evaluation: Southeast Asia Huts, using metal roofs, are more durable cheaper and more desirable to live in than the Army tent frame. The huts are the same 16' X 32' size as the Army tent frame however, the Navy funds these huts for $40,000 each, erected, while the tent frame costs over $600,00. The use of the Navy design would not only save a considerable amount of money, but produce better living conditions for the troops.

Recommendation: Army units in NICTZ should be allowed to convert to the Navy design for Southeast Asia huts.

d. Item: Floating ASP

Observation: During operations in Northern I Corps during the "Tet" offensive, it became necessary to provide resupply of ammunition from the beach-head direct to the using unit due to the closing of river channels by enemy offensive operations. An example of one such operation was the Landing Ship Dock (LSD) Cleveland, loaded with 500 short tons of ammunition.
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and located just off the coast of Northern South Vietnam. Class V personnel were stationed on the ship to identify the ammunition and report transactions through appropriate channels. Helicopters (sling-out) were used to move ammunition from ship to forward ASP and gun positions. Another craft, LST #839 was also used in this operation.

Evaluation: With normal supply routes closed due to enemy action at Hue and the Cua Viet River, the use of a floating ASP permitted resupply of forward ASP's and artillery positions, thus preventing prolonged delays and reduction in mission capabilities of Class V customers.

Recommendation: Since the LSD and LST type ships have a helicopter pad and a relatively large ammunition capacity, they are ideal for Class V resupply. Therefore, it is recommended that a specified number of LSD and LST type vessels be dedicated as floating ASP's during periods when river ports are closed due to enemy action.

a. Item: Logistical Advisory Effort for ARVN.

Observation: Current procedures prescribe that our advisory effort for ARVN is under the Deputy for CORDS, MACV.

Evaluation: The effectiveness of logistical advisory effort to ICTZ ARVN troops is highly questionable. Although the US Army advisory personnel appear competent and motivated, there are numerous indications that ARVN combat service support units are not progressing sufficiently to maintain abreast of the improvements being experienced by ARVN combat and combat support troops. The supply and maintenance procedures of ARVN combat service troops are obsolete. The maintenance capability is largely dependent upon civilian augmentation. ARVN combat service support
troops are improperly positioned to provide responsive support. Stockage levels are inadequate. Supply procedures are lengthy, complicated and generally require revision in order to be responsive.

Recommendation: The entire logistical advisory responsibility should be assigned to 1st Logistical Command. The CG, 1st Log Comd should be the principal advisor to the J-4, Joint Staff (RVN) and to the Commander, Central Logistics Command. 1st Log Comd support commanders should also be designated as the senior advisors to the ALC commanders in their respective CTZ's.

f. Item: Construction of Additional ASP's, ICTZ.

Observation: Consideration is currently being given to construct additional ASP's for stockage of US Army ammunition in ICTZ. Present Army stockage objectives in ICTZ provide for 25 days of Class V supply. This is equivalent to approximately 30,000 tons. Breakout of stockage is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>DOS</th>
<th>S/T</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUANG TRI</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMP EVANS</td>
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<td>1095</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHU BAI</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA NANG</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8122</td>
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<tr>
<td>HILL 63</td>
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<td>1095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHU LAI</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duc Pho</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>25.0 days</td>
<td>29,524 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommendation: In the interest of economy, no additional construction of US Army ASP's in ICTZ should be initiated.
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**g. Item: Push Packages (Automatic Resupply)**

**Observation:** Field Depots and DSU's in SVN have considerable quantities of excess supplies and equipment much of which cannot be identified.

**Evaluation:** While the push package concept and/or automatic resupply procedures are generally good in theory, it is believed that much of the excess material generated in Vietnam was caused by push packages being shipped from CONUS during build-up of U.S. Forces in RVN. Considerable effort is being made, to include offerings and redistribution to sister services, to reduce excess inventory. However it is anticipated that this task will not be completed in the near future.

**Recommendation:** That DA review push package/automatic resupply concepts and procedures to insure only essential supplies and equipment are provided on a push basis.

**h. Item: NCR 500 Program**

**Observation:** The use of the NCR 500 in Direct Support Maintenance units has been most effective in processing requisitions through the Supply System. Initially this program was hampered due to the lack of trained operator and supervisory personnel. As a stop-gap measure schools were established in ICTZ for operators. Supervisory personnel were required to attend classes conducted by Ist Log.

**Evaluation:** While the above schools will be conducted as required, it is felt more emphasis should be placed on training NCR 500 operators in CONUS.

**Recommendation:** That operator and supervisory personnel be required to attend training courses in CONUS prior to deployment to RVN.
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG George H. Young, Jr., DCS, P&O, USARV; DCG, American Div; CG, USASUPCOM Da Nang**

**Conduct Date:** 7 October 1968

**Contract or Grant No.:** N/A

**Department of the Army, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310**