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FROM:
Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS C5 FOR-65 (R2) (O).

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities:

a. (C) General:

(1) This report covers the period from 1 May 1970, through 31 July 1970, and is submitted in accordance with AR 525-15, USARV Regulation 525-15, and 17th Aviation Group (Combat) Regulation 525-15.

(2) Missions: To perform reconnaissance, surveillance and security for Free World Forces in the II Military Region. To engage in combat as an element of a line unit and provide limited anti-tank defense. One squadron of the units may be placed in support of a major ground unit.

(3) Organization Structure: The Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, is located at Camp HOLLOWAY (ARVN), MONKU, Republic of Vietnam, and is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rudolph B. DeFrance. Troop A, B, and D are under command with Squadron Headquarters and Troop C is stationed at Camp RACCLIFF (ARVN), KHE, Republic of Vietnam. The Squadron has its full complement of cavalry troops as per MTCE 1785T. (See Inclosure 1 for a list of subordinate units reflecting the organizational structure).

Tactical Posture: At the beginning of this reporting period Troops A, B and D were under operational control of the Fourth Infantry Division. Troop C was in direct support of the ARVN II Military Region. Additional changes in the tactical posture of the Squadron occurred during this reporting period. Troop A was deployed from 19 May to 5 June 1970 in support of the 23rd Division (ARVN) operating in MONKU KHE Province, Cambodia to the West of Saigon. Troop A then returned to Camp HOLLOWAY on 5 June 1970. On the 31st of June 1970 Troop A was placed in direct support of the ARVN II Military Region. Troop B was placed in direct support of the 6th Infantry Division, Troop C was placed in direct support of the 17th Airborne Division, and Troop D remained under Squadron control.

b. (C) Personnel:

(1) During the reporting period, the following major changes in command and staff occurred.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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AVMCB-20

10 August 1970

SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, R55 C5 F04-65 (R2) (C)

(a) MAJ Walter W. Wolfe 165-4-60-1097 assumed duties as Squadron
Executive Officer on 9 July 1970, replacing MAJ Ronald G. Mason 537-4-6346.

(b) CPT Clyde A. Harris 526-40-6866 assumed command of C Troop
on 11 June 1970, replacing MAJ James S. Hahn 316-36-6528.

(c) CPT Michael F. Fisher 537-60-6570 assumed duties as Squadron
Safety Officer on 2 May 1970, replacing CPT James F. Roberts 320-34-7767.

(d) CPT Arthur H. Thomas 111-34-1766 assumed duties as Squadron

(e) WO1 Ernest P. Luplanovit. 263-32-6118 assumed duties as

(f) CS1. Leonard E. Cruse 263-60-3722 assumed duties as Squadron

(2) Unit Strength and miscellaneous related data is attached as
Inclosure 3.

(c) (C) Intelligence:

(1) During the reporting period, the S-2 Section activities included:

SECRET Clearances Validated - 70
SECRET Clearances Granted - 5
SECRET Clearances Initiated - 10
TOP SECRET Clearances Validated - 6
TOP SECRET Clearances Initiated - 2
Security Debriefings - 101
Escape and Evasion Debriefings - 0

(2) Intelligence Summary for the Squadron's tactical area of
interest is as follows:

(a) KONTUM Province: Enemy activity in KONTUM Province during
the month of May was maintained at a fairly high level. There were no
sustained stand off attacks or major ground contacts during this period,
however sporadic stand off attacks were conducted against the DAK PEX, DAK
SEANG, and NVA NET Special Forces Camps. The enemy employed 75mm recoilless
rifles, 3-40 rocket, and 82mm mortar fire during the attacks on the Special
Forces Camps. Frequent small ground contacts were also initiated during
this period. On 16 May the 6th PF Platoon in KON HONG Village, approx-
imately nine kilometers Southeast of TANH CAH received a 20 round 82mm mortar
stand off attack and small arms fire from an estimated enemy company. Documents
captured during the attack identified the C-3 Company/36th Local Force
Battalion. Intelligence reports indicated there would be an increase in

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attacks against small RF/PF units. During the rest of the month of May, 
enemy activities remained at a high level, however marked decrease in 
enemy activity was noted by the middle of June. At this time the enemy 
initiated contacts dropped to a low level. The only significant enemy 
contact was an attack by fire against the 122nd ARVN Regimental Headquarters 
on 25 June. At that time agent reports indicated that enemy forces would 
concentrate their activities against ARVN and RF/PF units. The enemy 
intended was to reduce civilian confidence in the Government of Vietnam 
ability to protect itself and the population at large.

(b) PLEIKU Province: Enemy activity in the early days of the month 
of May was at a moderate level. The primary areas of enemy activity were 
LE THUNG District Headquarters located 15 kilometers East of PLEIKU CITY, 
Camp HOLLOWAY located 3 kilometers East of PLEIKU CITY, and the DUC 00 
Special Forces Camp. LE THUNG District Headquarters was subject to stand 
off attacks from 16 to 19 May. On the 17th of May, the compound received 
11 rounds of 107mm rockets followed by a small unsuccessful ground probe. 
Camp Holloway and the II Military Region Headquarters were the targets 
of attacks by fire from 17 to 22 May. The enemy employed 122mm rockets during 
the attacks by fire. Highway 19 between PLEIKU CITY and the Special Forces 
Camp at DUC 00 was also targets by the enemy during this period. On the 
21st of May a truck convoy received small arms and B-40 rocket fire destroying 
three trucks and damming two 5000 gallon fuel tankers. During the month 
of June the enemy began to increase terrorist activities in the small 
thalats in PLEIKU Province. On the morning of 1 June, there were four 
terrorist incidents resulting in three abductions. Six civilians were 
abducted, and in the fourth incident 25 houses were burned by an unknown 
size unit. On the 12th of June the 116th RF Company received 13 rounds of 
60mm mortar fire wounding 12 personnel. Enemy units in PLEIKU Province began 
to conduct harassment attacks against ARVN and RF/PF units. As in KCENTU 
Province, the enemy harassment attacks were planned to reduce the confidence 
of the people in the Government of Vietnam's ability to protect itself. 
Rocket attacks on targets in the PLEIKU Area have stopped, and there has 
been a significant decrease in attacks by fire employing mortars.

(c) BINH DINH Province: During the month of May activity in BINH 
DINH Province decreased slightly, with ground attacks and attacks by fire 
being the predominant type of incidents. On 20 May KHANH LE Hamlet received 
small arms, B-40 rockets, and mortar fire. On 18 May, the 19th and 992nd 
RF Companies and MAT Team 2/15th received approximately 75 rounds of 75mm 
rockets, rifle and 82mm mortar fire. Attacks were intense and were designed 
to economize forces and maintain maximum pressure on Free World Forces. 
The strategy continued into early June. On the night of 4 June, a partially
successful sapper attack was launched against QUI NHON Tank Farm 77. During late June enemy activity increased slightly and included terrorist attacks aimed at disrupting Government elections. On 22 June, a terrorist attack against a pre-election meeting killed 2 Government officials and wounded 13 civilians. During the first week of July, there was a marked increase in terrorist activity with the purpose of undermining the people's confidence in the Government's ability to protect them and to disrupt pacification and development programs. At the same time infiltration into western BINH TAY Province by elements of the 3rd NVA Division has been increasing. These enemy forces have so far been avoiding contacts with Free World Forces.

(d) CAMBODIA: Enemy activity in CAMBODIA was characterized by defensive reaction of enemy forces to the Free World Forces' BINH TAY operations. Enemy activity consisted of efforts to remove operational facilities and critical logistical supplies. Enemy defensive operations consisted of the employment of anti-aircraft fire designed to deny Free World Forces access to enemy base areas. Operation BINH TAY I encountered the greatest enemy resistance with sporadic but intense contacts. Aircraft supporting Operation BINH TAY I received frequent and intense ground to air fire in the area of operations. Major logistical caches discovered in the area of Operation BINH TAY I included 600 tons of small arms ammunition, and 3,570 mortar and rocket rounds. Free World Forces in Operation BINH TAY II met little resistance except in the vicinity of major caches, which were fewer than those found in Operation BINH TAY I. Only small unit contacts were made, and caches found were small and well dispersed. The enemy avoided significant contacts during Operation BINH TAY III and caches discovered were again small and dispersed. Material captured included 133 crew served weapons, 20 tons of ammunition, and 412 tons of rice. Operation BINH TAY IV facilitated the evacuation of Cambodian Military personnel, their dependents, and other civilian refugees from the LABANG SIEK/BA KEV area of CAMBODIA. There was very little enemy contact made during this operation.

(1) Quarterly Operations by Troops:
(a) Troop A during this reporting period operated in support of the 1st Infantry Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA West of DUC CO, the 21th STZ (Now 22d Div Forward) in the DAK TO, BEN HET, and DAK SEANG area, and the II Military Region Northeast and Southwest of the PLEIKU TAOR. During the month of May, Troop A operations in support of US and ARVN Forces were directed against enemy base areas 701, 702, and 740. At the beginning of the reporting period Troop A was in support of Task Force PURSUIT with no significant activities. Beginning 6 May, Troop A supported the 1st Infantry Division for two days in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA to the West of PLEI DEREK. Operations were characterized by the discovery of large bunker and living structure complexes with light enemy contacts in the vicinity of the complexes. On 8 May the Troop began support of the 22d ARVN Division operating in Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA to the West of DUC CO. Several structures and 2 tons of rice were destroyed during the three days with the 22d ARVN Division.
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Light enemy contact was made with 1 NVA KIA. From 12 May to 17 May the Troop supported the 4th Infantry Division continuing its operation in CAMBODIA. The significant finding during that operation was an airfield with a POL storage area. The remainder of the operation was characterized by light enemy contacts typified by sporadic ground to air fire by small enemy elements. On 19 May Troop A was deployed to BAN ME THOUT to support the 23rd ARVN Division conducting Operation BINH TAY III in MONDOM RIKI Province, CAMBODIA. The move to BAN ME THOUT was made without incident on 19 May and operations began on 20 May. The most significant activity for the remainder of the month was the destruction of several enemy 82mm trucks. On 5 June Troop A was released from support of Operation BINH TAY III and returned to Camp HOLLOWAY. Troop A was in direct support of II Military Region from 5 June to 23 June and was employed in the DAK TO, BEN ME area and to the South of DUC CO. No major operations were conducted by the Troop within this period of time. On 21 June the Troop assumed the mission of screening for the 22nd ARVN Division's Operation BINH TAY IV in CAMBODIA. The objective of this operation was to evacuate approximately 12,000 CAMBODIAN military personnel and their dependents, with all of their equipment and personal belongings, from the towns of BAK EV and LABANG JIY. Light contact with the enemy was made but with no significant effect on the primary mission of evacuation successfully completed. During the remainder of the month in the Troop supported II Military Region to the North of KONTUM and in the PLEIKU TAOR with few significant activities and light enemy contact. Throughout the month of July Troop A continued to support the II Military Region and Company B 5th Special Forces Group. Operations were significantly restricted during the first half of the month due to the monsoon weather. Significant operations for July began on the 21st of July to the Northeast of the PLEIKU TAOR. Troop A initiated contact with elements of an enemy support battalion on 21 July. The next day a large number of enemy soldiers were spotted by the Acre-Scouts and the area was immediately taken under fire. Continuous gunship, artillery, and Tactical Air firepower was employed until the next day. It is felt that a large portion of the enemy unit was killed, but because of the effects of the massive firepower employed it was impossible to ascertain the extent of enemy losses. On 30 July the troop again made contact with an enemy unit, this time to the South of PLEIKU. By the use of massive firepower from gunships and Tactical Air strikes, within a period of six hours the Troop killed, or was responsible for the death of, 14 NVA. At the end of the reporting period Troop A continued to support the II Military Region.

(b) During this reporting period Troop B supported the II Military Region in the vicinity of DAK TO, DAK SEKANG, and DUC CO. Troop B supported the 4th Infantry Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA, and in the AN NI area. Troop B also supported II Military Region in the PLEIKU area. During the period from 1 May to 15 May, Troop B operated Southeast of DAK TO with little enemy contact. Troop B next supported the 4th Infantry Division from 5 May to 15 May in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA. In the initial assault of
NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia. Troop A was then the mission of selecting landing zones for the airdrop of five to seven tons of food and medical supplies and then to screen for the subsequent forces. The Troop located and destroyed, through a combination of CAS, artillery, and tactical air strikes, numerous bunkers and structure complexes used to cache weapons and supplies. Throughout the period, intense ground-to-air fire was encountered but no aircraft were seriously damaged. On the 17th and 18th of May, the Troop worked in the PLEKU TAOR with no significant findings.

From 19 May to 20 May, Troop B supported the 22d ARVN Division in Operation BINH TAY II as it conducted a Search and Destroy Area 70E in PHATDKHI Province. CAMBODIA to the West of DUC TAO. Large bunker complexes were located by the Troop and destroyed by the use of tactical air strikes. Enemy contact was light throughout the operation. Tactical air support during Operation BINH TAY II was outstanding. On several occasions bombs were delivered at a rate within 15 minutes of request. This can be attributed to Lt. Hynds, Senior Reserve Air Controller supporting the 22d ARVN Division. His personal interest in Air Cavalry operations and his support with the Troop is phenomenal.

Troop B operated in the the PLEKU TAOR in support of the II Military Region from the 27th of May to the 31st of May. Operations were con" in the Northeast portion of the TAOR and resulted in one enemy KIA and one Detained. Troop B next supported the 22d ARVN Division to the South of DAK TO from the 1st of June to the 31st of June. The operations were characterized by light enemy contact with the location and destruction of large bunker complexes through the employment of tactical air strikes. Beginning 6 June, Troop B supported the 2d Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division in Operation WAYNE HURRICANE to the South of FSB Blackhawk. Light enemy contact typified the operation. Numerous new bunkers and structure complexes were found and destroyed by the Airmen and gunships. Troop B terminated support of Operation WAYNE HURRICANE on the 23d of June. On 24 June the Troop supported the 26th Infantry (Mech) in operation BINH TAY IV with the mission of maintaining a security along the route to be utilized in the operation of 101st Airborne military personnel and their dependents. The operation was completed without incident on the 27th of June. During the period 28 June through 30 July the Troop supported the 4th Infantry Division to the North of AN KHE and along the SONG BA River Valley to the Southwest of AN KHE. The only significant contact during that period was on 30 July. The Airmen discovered a large enemy force Northwest of AN KHE. The enemy was engaged with all available fire support to include SAMs, chain gunnship, artillery, and tactical air strikes, resulting in 39 enemy killed. On 11 July Troop B supported the 17th ARVN Regiment to the South of PLEKU. Flying was greatly restricted during the month of July because of monsoon weather. Low ceiling and low visibility caused delays in take off and a greatly reduced capability to execute in the area of Operations. During this reporting period Troop B engaged numerous bunker and structure complexes located in two areas. The Airm-Rifle Platoon was inserted seven times during the reporting period to develop the situation or to secure downed aircraft. Troop B reported 15 enemy killed and eight enemy probably killed. Targeted 31 July.
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Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65, (R2) (U).

(c) Troop C during this reporting period supported TASK FORCE PURSUIT Southwest of AN KHE, the 1st Infantry Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA and in the vicinity of AN KHE, the 22nd ARVN Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA, and in the BEN HET, DAK SEANG area. Troop C also supported the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the LZ English area. Beginning 1 May through 5 May, the troop supported TASK FORCE PURSUIT to the Southwest of AN KHE with no significant activities.

On 6 May, the troop supported the 22nd ARVN Division in the Rocket Ridge area to the Southwest of DAK TO with little activity. Beginning 5 May through 7 May the troop operated in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA in support of the 22nd ARVN Division's Operation MINH TAY II with the mission of assisting Free World Forces in their assault on NVA base areas within CAMBODIA. Numerous large bunker complexes were located in Base Area 701. Intense ground to air fire was received throughout the area of Operations resulting in one IOK being downed by enemy fire. Several sets of tracks made by heavy tracked vehicles were spotted by the troop. Indications were that the vehicles had moved to the South, however, no tracked vehicles were sighted. Troop C supported the 4th Infantry Division in Base Area 702 in Eastern CAMBODIA from 8 May through 12 May. On 9 May the troop located two M-3 scout cars and a dump truck that had been destroyed by an air strike. Numerous large bunker complexes were located and destroyed by the employment of gunships, Artillery, and Tactical air strikes. Ground to air fire in the area was intense throughout the operation. Beginning 13 May through 25 May, the troop supported the 22nd ARVN Division to the West of DUC CO in CAMBODIA.

The troop continued to locate bunker complexes and caches of enemy supplies. Ground to air fire continued to be intense. Troop C supported the 22nd ARVN Division in the BEN HET and DAK TO area from 29 May to 31 May. On 31 May one of the troop aircraft received what was believed to be 37mm anti-aircraft fire. The Cobra gunships were employed against the suspected enemy location and observed several secondary explosions. When a tactical air strike was employed on the suspected enemy location four more secondary explosions were observed. Beginning 1 June through 3 June, Troop C worked for the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division to the South of Fire Support Base BLACK HAWK. The troop was credited with one enemy KIA on 2 May. Troop C supported the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the vicinity of LZ English from 5 June through 23 June. Activities throughout the area were characterized by moderate enemy contact. Ground to air fire was sporadically intense. Numerous caves and bunkers were destroyed by the troop utilizing combined arms firepower. The troop was credited with 24 enemy KIA during this period. Troop C supported the 4th Infantry Division to the North of AN KHE from 21 June through 28 June and was credited with one enemy KIA. Troop C returned to the LZ ENGLISH area to work in direct support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade from 29 June through 31 July. Operations were limited primarily to the detection and destruction of bunker and structure complexes. The entire area of Operations had numerous indications of large enemy troop movements but enemy contact was light and characterized.
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AVTACB-CC 10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

by the engagement of small groups of enemy soldiers. During this reporting period the troop was credited with 49 enemy KIA's and 1 detainee. The Aero-Rifle Platoon was inserted 14 times to develop the situation and secure downed aircraft.

(d) Troop D, during this reporting period, operated in support of the 1st Infantry Division at PLEI DJERENG, II Military Region to the West of PLEIKU TAOR, and was on standby as a ready reaction force for the Squadron. At the beginning of the period, Troop D conducted a search and destroy operation to the West of PLEIKU. On 6 May, two platoons of D Troop conducted a road march to PLEI DJERENG to assist the 1st Infantry Division in the security of PLEI DJERENG Airfield. This operation lasted until 16 May at which time D Troop returned to Camp HOLLOWAY. Troop D conducted unit training on individual and crew served weapons while providing convoy escorts to DUC CO, Fire Support Base OASIS, and Fire Support Base BLACKHAWK. One platoon from D Troop provided convoy escort and perimeter security for A Troops move to BAN ME TH Wright. On 5 July, while D Troops was conducting a search and destroy operation to the West of PLEIKU, they sustained 1 U.S. KIA and 2 US WIA from an enemy command detonated mine. A continued sweep of the area produced no more significant activity. At the end of the reporting period, D Troop was continuing to provide convoy escorts and a ready reaction force for the Squadron.

(e) (U) Organization: No change since last ORLL.

(f) (U) Training:

(1) The Army Aviation Refresher Training School Program: The maintenance program of the Squadron was greatly enhanced as a result of refresher training provided by these courses. (See Inclosure 5).

(2) Aviation Training: (See Inclosure 5).

(3) Special Training: Both A Troop and B Troop Aero-Rifle Platoon personnel conducted classes at KOMTUM for the training of ARVN Scout personnel from the 22d ARVN Division as Aero-Rifle Platoons. This training included an orientation on Air Cavalry Operations with special emphasis on repelling training.

(h) The Squadron engaged in training a total of 92 days during the Quarter. (See Inclosure 5).

(g) (C) Logistics:

(i) Supplies:

(a) Class I - A Troop, B Troop, and D Troop drew rations from the 08th S & S Battalion, PLEIKU, RVN. C Troop drew rations from
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        Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (U)

the 4th Infantry Division at AN KHE, RVN. D Troop operates a consoli-
dated field ration mess for D Troop and Headquarters and Headquarters
Troop.

(b) Class II - Supplies were requisitioned from the 88th
    S & S Battalion.

(c) Class III - Package POL products were requisitioned
    through the 88th S Battalion and issued by S-4 to the troops.
    Dies 1 and JP-4 were requisitioned through 473rd S & S CO, PLEIKU, RVN.
    Forward resupply sites were established on a mission basis at DUC CO,
    BLACKHAWK, PHU HIEU, and OASIS.

(d) Class IV - Construction material was acquired through
    local contractors by Troop Commanders.

(e) Class V - Ammunition was requisitioned from Ammunition
    Supply points PLEIKU, 4th Infantry Division (AN KHE) and GUI NHOI.
    Effective 25 June 70 ammunition drawn in the PLEIKU area came under the
    control of the ARVN ASP, PLEIKU. Ammunition was positioned forward at
    LZ TWO BITE, LZ ENGLISH, KONTUKI, PHU NHOI, DUC CO, OASIS, BLACKHAWK,
    and ARMAGEDDON in support of operations. A Troop and B Troop operated a
    rearming point at CAMP HOLLOWAY.

(f) Class VII - Major and items, loss aircraft and armament,
    were requisitioned from the 88th S & S Battalion.

(g) Class VIII - Medical matériel was requested thru the
    71st Evacuation Hospital, PLEIKU, RVN.

(2) Requisitions submitted during 1 May thru 31 Aug 1970:

Non-expendable = 199

Completed = 28

Cancelled = 87

Turn-In = 146

(3) A reconciliation of all outstanding requisitions is made
    with the 88th S & S Battalion each quarter.

(4) Reports of Surveys Submitted = 8

(5) Combat losses Submitted = 31

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(h) (v) Communications: Signal and Message Center Operations

(1) General: Having completed the construction of the new Communications Center at Camp Holloway early in the quarter; operations during this quarter have been relatively stabilized. On 3 May 1970 a land line was installed, and the 7/17th Air Cavalry Squadron Communications Center resumed responsibility for transmission and reception of electrical messages from and to 17th Aviation Group (Combat). The 43rd Signal Battalion maintained responsibility for traffic on the World Wide Net.

(2) On 5 May 1970, the AN/ARC-106 and two operators returned from their forward position at Tan Canh. During the period 19 May 1970 through 6 June 1970, A Troop maintained a forward AN/ARC-2 at Ban Me Thiet, to provide radio teletype communications with their operations. The Squadron Communications Platoon operated the AN/ARC-102 in Ban Me Thiet during this time, maintaining radio teletype communications with the Squadron Headquarter as a back-up system. On 25 June 1970 three men with an AN/ARC-106 mounted on a 1/2 ton truck were dispatched to NAC CO from the Squadron Communications Platoon to assist in setting up and operating a navigational beacon for A Troop and to report on its operations. They returned to Camp HOLLOWAY on 28 June 70.

(3) Operational Statistics: (See Inclosure 6).

(1) (U) Materials

(1) Aircraft maintenance support is provided to the Squadron by the 604th Direct Support unit as indicated below:

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<tr>
<th>Unit/Location</th>
<th>DSU/Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMT, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
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<td>A Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
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<tr>
<td>B Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KI</td>
<td>604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
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(2) Vehicle maintenance support is provided by direct support units as indicated below:

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<th>DSU/Location</th>
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<td>62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU</td>
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<tr>
<td>B Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU</td>
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<td>C Troop, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KI</td>
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<tr>
<td>D Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU</td>
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(3) When A Troop was located at BAN ME THIOT, a portion of the unit's maintenance element was located with the troop to perform unscheduled
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Maintenance and light combat damage repairs. All heavy maintenance was
accomplished at Camp HOLLOWAY.

(b) Statistics on aircraft strength and availability are included
in Inclosure 7.

(U) Civil Affairs

(1) General: Major areas of S-5 activity during the last quarter
were education, sanitation, recreation, sponsoring of social events, and
sponsoring the Catholic Orphanage of TU TAM.

(2) Operation and Training Activities:

(a) PLEI POO NGO (AR830365): During the 2nd Quarter, the Civil
Affairs team gave instruction in the building of bunkers and other for-
tifications and the setting up of their perimeter.

(b) LA SON (AR817376): During the past Quarter, the Civil
Affairs team helped to repair one mile of road that runs through the village.

(c) TU TAM Orphanage: The S-5 team in conjunction with B Troop
is helping to support the orphanage of TU TAM.

1. Supplying edible garbage for the livestock.

2. Presenting additional clothing, food, and toys for the
children.

3. Organizing a picnic for the children at KIEN HUA LAKE.

(3) Logistics: The Civil Affairs Team received support from
LE TRONG District, The Squadron Chaplain, B Troop, PLEIKU Air Base S-5,
personal resources of team members, PLEIKU Hospital, and the 71st Med-
ical Evacuation Hospital.

(4) Civil Affairs Projects:

(a) Sanitation:

1. The S-5 team supplied soap for the Montagnard
villagers.

2. A general clean-up project was conducted in PLEI
POO NGO.

(b) Recreation: The S-5 team conducted ten hours of orgn-
SUSJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry 
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

ized sports for the children of both villages.

(c) Social Events: One picnic to BIEN HOA LAKE was sponsored for the children in the orphanage of TU TAM.

(d) Psychological Operations: During the past quarter, many reports of NVA troops and areas of concentration were received by the S-5 team from the Montagnards. One NVA mine was found that was intended for use against the S-5 team but was noticed by some Vietnamese civilians and reported to the S-5 team. The villagers in both PLET, POC KCO and IA SON are most cooperative.

(e) Transportation: The S-5 team provided transportation for the people of both villages to medical facilities, market, and school.

(f) Miscellaneous: The team distributed 10,000 lbs. of food.

k. (U) Accident Prevention

(1) The accident rate per 100,000 flying hours was 35.00 for this quarter. The previous reporting period was 32.00.

(2) Accident rate statistics and accident summaries are attached as enclosure 8.

l. (U) Religious Functions

(1) The 7/17th Cav Chaplain, during the quarter, conducted a total of 11 Sunday and 17 weekday Protestant services, with a total attendance of 1286.

(2) Catholic Mass was conducted 13 times with a total attendance of 756.

(3) Religious services were conducted at Camp HOLLOMON, AM KEO, PHU JAI, and AM SON.

(4) The 7/17th Cav Chaplain, during the quarter, made 846 visits to troop areas and made contact with 1,332 individuals. The Chaplain visited 25 men in hospitals.

(5) The 7/17th Cav is supporting the TAM Catholic Orphanage. Support is also being given to missionaries in the HAIKU area by way of designated offerings and supplies.

(6) The 7/17th is also giving assistance to the Christian and Missionary Alliance Leprosarium.
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(7) Because of reduced number of chaplains in-country, the
7/17th Chaplain was assigned TDY to the 268th Aviation Battalion during
the last three weeks of June. In the absence of a chaplain for the
52nd Aviation Battalion the 7/17th Chaplain is also acting as Post Chaplain
for Camp Holloway.

m. (U) Medical Section:

(1) The medical section of this squadron consists of a flight
surgeon, a section sergeant, and fifteen medics. There are two medics
with each aero-rifle platoon, one with each of the three platoons in
D Troop, and one with the S-5 Team. With the exception of C Troop, all
personnel receive their primary medical support from the Camp HOLLOWAY
Dispensary. The dispensary is jointly run by the Flight Surgeons and
medics of the 52nd Avn Bn (Cbt), and the 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav. C Troop
receives its primary medical support from the 4th Aviation Dispensary of
the 4th Infantry Division at Camp RADCLIFF, AN KHE.

(2) At Camp HOLLOWAY, the dispensary receives laboratory and
X-ray support from the 71st Evacuation Hospital. Medical supplies are
obtained from the 2/32nd Medical Depot in QUI HNON, and thru the 52nd
Aviation Bn (Cbt)

(3) Medical Statistics:

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<td>Hepatitis</td>
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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations
and Recommendations.

a. (U) PERSONNEL: None

b. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None

c. (C) OPERATIONS:

(1) Stereotyping of Air Cavalry Tactics.

(a) Observation: Air Cavalry tactics can become stereotyped
which leads to unfavorable situations.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

(b) Evaluation: It is easy for an air cavalry unit to become stereotyped in its missions. When working the same areas of operation this can lead to a dangerous situation. The enemy can recognize units, and it is not too difficult for the enemy to set up anti-aircraft weapons against the unit that does not vary its tactics.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that air cavalry units employ a variety of techniques to keep the enemy off balance. The unit that employs a variety of tactics will lose fewer aircraft and be much more successful in the accomplishment of its mission.

(d) Command Action: Each troop is to conduct an informal meeting whenever it is felt necessary to discuss a change in tactics. This type of meeting has led to a variety of tactics which have helped to break the stereotyping of air cavalry tactics and has kept the enemy off balance.

(2) Use of Scouts in the Air Cavalry Mission.

(a) Observation: Light observation helicopters (LOH) are in grave danger when hovering or spending extended periods of time over any one area while conducting visual reconnaissance.

(b) Evaluation: Each troop in the squadron has suffered casualties and aircraft damage in the past as a result of LOH's hovering too long in one area.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that all scout pilots be continually briefed on the hazards of hovering or staying in one place too long while conducting visual reconnaissance.

(d) Command Action: The squadron has made continuous efforts to eliminate this problem through briefings and on the spot corrections.

(3) Use of Tactical Air Support.

(a) Observation: The squadron has been able to achieve excellent results in the destruction of enemy forces and equipment through the proper utilization of tactical air support.

(b) Evaluation: In the past, troops in the squadron have lost many opportunities to bring the full brunt of tactical air support against the enemy due to lengthy briefings conducted over the radio with forward air controllers just arriving on station. Tactical air support was not responsive to the squadron's needs due to a lack of knowledge concerning the squadron's area of operations. This continuously caused a delay in air support responsiveness.
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AVBACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
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(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that each air
cavalry troop effect coordination with their supported units to obtain a
forward air controller to support the troops in their areas of operation.
The FAC has available pre-planned air strikes which can be diverted to
meet the needs of the air cavalry troop.

(d) Command Action: Coordination has been made with units
providing FAC's in the squadron's areas of operations and provisions
have been made for forward air controllers to receive a daily briefing
of planned air cavalry operations. At these briefings the exchange of
radio frequencies are made and the FAC receives all intelligence reports
concerning possible lucrative targets in the areas of operation.

(4) Improved Effectiveness of Marking Targets in Densely
Wooded Areas.

(a) Observation: Gunships often have trouble determining
where to shoot in relation to a mark as well as determining angle of
attack.

(b) Evaluation: The point detonating fuze of the 2.75" FFAR severely limits its effectiveness in dense terrain because of
height of foliage around the target. The smoke from the white phosphorous
or smoke grenade often drifts long distances prior to coming through
the upper canopy. This causes the gunships difficulty in determining
where to shoot in relation to the mark and what angle of attack would
be most effective as far as reaching the ground.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that the scout
elements give an approximate tree height as well as density of trees.

(d) Command Action: The aero-scouts and aero-weapons
platoon crews have been briefed on this procedure. This procedure has
improved the rocket accuracy and damage to enemy positions.

(5) Vehicular Movement Through Restricted Terrain.

(a) Observation: Recently, platoons moving through
terrain severely restricted by vegetation have been ambushed by enemy
elements up to 50 meters off the road or trail. These ambushes have
been well concealed and camouflaged, and detection has been impossible
beyond five meters.

(b) Evaluation: When movement is limited to one road or
trail, and visibility is restricted by close vegetation, the organic
infantry squad of the cavalry platoon is insufficient to provide adequate
flank security for the point element. The infantry squad cannot screen
more than 12 to 15 meters from the flanks of the column.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
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   (c) Recommendation: That sufficient infantry be made
       available to the lead platoon in column to sweep both flanks for a
       distance of at least 30 meters. This can easily be accomplished by
       attaching the infantry squad from the next platoon to the lead platoon.
       This gives flank protection not only to the lead platoon but to the
       whole column. Column speed is not restricted, because column movement
       is restricted to the speed of the point mine sweep team.

   (d) Command Action: Personnel of this unit are to be
       trained in this method of movement.

   (e) Standardized Training for Similar Sections in Each Platoon

   (a) Observation: During operations, elements of one platoon
       attached to another platoon for tactical reasons have been unable to
       work effectively together.

   (b) Evaluation: Training conducted by each platoon, while
       resulting in some improvement in troop morale and esprit, results in a
       loss of flexibility for the troop as a whole. Individuals usually become
       proficient in only the favorite tactical maneuver of their squad or
       platoon leader.

   (c) Recommendations: That training of the individual and
       of squads and sections be conducted on a troop rather than a platoon basis.
       Classes in tactics, battle drill, and general subjects should be given by
       the same instructor to all personnel and their platoon leaders who desire
       more intensive training may conduct individual training and methods of
       employment.

       (d) Command Action: Training in the troop is being conducted
           on a standardized basis.

           d. (U) ORGANIZATION: None

           e. (U) TRAINING: None

           f. (U) LOGISTICS: The Establishment of Forward Class III and Class V
              Points.

           (1) Observation: This squadron has been required to support
               ARVN operations at great distances from the Camp HOLLOWAY area. Most
               of these operations have been on a single troop support basis and required
               the establishment of at least two separate forward staging areas. The
               distance from the area of operations to the base camp (Camp HOLLOWAY)
               was the determining factor in selection of the forward staging areas
               and the means by which the Class III and Class V were transported to the
               staging area. If roads were available and secured to a staging area,
               truck convoys were used to transport materiel and equipment. If roads
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

are inaccessible or not secured, then the use of CH-47 aircraft was required to transport the Class III and V to the staging area.

(2) Evaluation: Initially, good weather conditions were favorable for the use of CH-47's and good roads were available for truck convoys. With the onset of the monsoon season limitations were placed on the use of CH-47's due to low ceilings, and road conditions slowed down travel time of convoys. Daily mission changes and weather conditions caused delays in getting the required Class III and V forward.

(3) Recommendations: That a limited operational load of Class V be prepositioned at selected fire bases and special forces camps within the current areas of operations. This would allow limited rearming capabilities until the normal operational load reached the forward staging point. JP-4 would be transported forward in a 5000 gallon tanker and 500 gallon collapsible drums would be ready in the base camp waiting to be slung or trucked out to the forward staging area.

(4) Command Action: Limited operational loads have been moved forward to fire support bases for operations conducted from QL 19 to the Cambodian border. One organic 5000 gallon tanker with a 100 gpm pump for backup is sent forward on a daily basis and ready for use upon arrival at the forward staging area.

g. (U) **COMMUNICATIONS:** None

h. (U) **MATERIEL:** None

i. (U) **MEDICAL:** None

j. (U) **SAFETY:** None
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AVBACB-OC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending July 31, RCS C3 FOR C3 (R2) (U).

RUDOLPH III FRANCE
IIC, AR
Commanding

Inclosure 1: Organizational Structure.
Inclosure 2: Major Command and Staff.
Inclosure 3: Unit Strength and Miscellaneous Data.
Inclosure 4: Operational Statistics.
Inclosure 5: Training.
Inclosure 6: Signal and Message-Center Statistics.
Inclosure 7: Aircraft Strength and Availability.
Inclosure 8: Quarterly Accident Summary.
Inc 2, 3, 5, and 6 wd, HQ DA

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7 C3, 17th AG (Cbt), ATTN: AVBACB-OC, APO 96260

INFO COPIES:
C3, Headquarters II Military Region
CG, 4th Inf Div, ATTN: AVDDH-OC, APO 96262
1 Each Organic Troop
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, for Period Ending 31 July 1970, nCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

TO: Department of the Army (CSFOR, DA), Washington, D.C. 20315
   Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

(U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

BILLY W. COUGHLIN
CPT, 1SG
Asst Adjutant

CP:
CO, 7/17th ACS
AVVL-GC-MIST (10 Aug 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCI, CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO S.F. 96350 2 SEP 70

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVNGC-DST, APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-Lessons Learned and forwarding endorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT R. OLM
CPT, AGC
ASS'T AG

CF:
1 - CO, 17TH AVN GP (G), (LESS CALL)
1 - CO, 7TH SQDN, 17TH CAV, (LESS CALL)
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AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOH-65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-UT,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Squadron,
17th Cavalry and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
I FFORCEV
7th Squadron, 17th Cav
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 Sep 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D.D. Cline
2LT, AGC
Asst AG
ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH OF SUBORDINATE UNITS AS OF 31 JULY 1970 (C)

1. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam is organized in accordance with MTCE 17-96T, and is equipped with 5 UH-1H Helicopters.

2. Troop A, Camp HOLLOWAY, is organized in accordance with MTCE 17-96T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LCH, and 5 UH-1H Helicopters. The 566th TC Detachment and the 236th Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.

3. Troop B, Camp HOLLOWAY, is organized in accordance with MTCE 17-96T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LCH, and 8 UH-1H Helicopters. The 569th TC Detachment and the 236th Signal Detachment provide direct maintenance and avionics support.

4. Troop C, Camp HOLLOWAY, AN KHE, Republic of Vietnam is organized in accordance with MTCE 17-96T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LCH, and 8 UH-1H Helicopters. The 112th TC Detachment and the 238th Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.

5. Troop D, Camp HOLLOWAY, is a standard wheel vehicle mounted ground crew - troop organized in accordance with MTCE 17-96T.

6. See Page 2-3 of this inclosure for organizational charts.
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS FOR 7TH SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY

NORMAL ATTACHMENTS TOE 17-957

One (1) Signal Detachment per Air Cavalry Troop

---

NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

One (1) Transportation Det. per Air Cavalry Troop

---

HEADQUARTERS

- OFF 23
- WO 7
- EM 101

AIR CAVALRY

- OFF 19
- WO 32
- EM 180

CAVALRY

- OFF 5
- WO 0
- EM 127

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP TOE 17-957

- OFF 23
- WO 7
- EM 181

SQUADRON HEADQUARTERS

TROOP SQ

SUPPORT SQ

HQ SLC

COMM FLAT

SUPPORT FLAT

MAINT FLAT

AVP FLAT

Inclosure 1

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AIR: CAVALRY TROOP

NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

One (1) Signal Detachment per Air Cavalry Troop

One (1) Transportation Detachment per Troop


CAVALRY TROOP

TOE 17-97T

Inclomure 1

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OPERATIONAL STATISTICS FOR THE PERIOD

1. (c) Results:

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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>TROOPS</th>
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<td>17,093</td>
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DETAILEES: 6

Energy Material Captured:
1 - SKS Rifle
1 - AK-47 Rifle
1 - Chi Com Model 56 MG
1 - B-40 Rocket Launcher
1 - M-16 Magazine
1 - Rucksacks
10 - 100 Lbs of Medical Supplies
3 - Sand Bags Full of Rice
3 - Rucksack Full of Documents
3 - Canteen
3 - Pouches

Energy Material Destroyed:
20 - 20 Gallon Drums of Fuel
8 - Rucksacks
3,000 - Lb of rice
3 - Bridgess
7 - Bicycles
6 - 2½ Ton trucks
24 - Boxes of Ammunition
1 - Ox Cart

2. (c) GROUND TO AIR FIRE FOR THE PERIOD

a. 1 May 1970 - 31 July 1970:

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<th>Cessna 6A</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
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Enclosure 4

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**b. MAY 1970**

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**c. JUN. 1970**

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**d. JULY 1970**

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**3. (c) Aircraft Lost and Damaged:**

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<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>1 (Note 5)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AH-10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP C</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>h (Note 6)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>3 (Note 7)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AH-10</td>
<td>1 (Note 8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE 1.** Two Combat Loss, one Extensive Maintenance, one Combat Damage

**NOTE 2.** One Crash

**NOTE 3.** One Crash

**NOTE 4.** Six Combat Loss, three Extensive Maintenance, one Combat Damage

---

*Enclosure 4*

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NOTE 5. One Extensive Maintenance

NOTE 6. Two Combat Losses, two Extensive Maintenance

NOTE 7. Two Casualties, one Combat Loss

NOTE 8. One Combat Damage

1. (C) **Flying Hour Statistics for the Period** (Based on DA Form 1352)

   a. The average flying hours by type aircraft, by troops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-10</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP A</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP B</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP C</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. The average flying hours by type aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-10</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. The cumulative flying hours by troop and by type aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-10</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>791</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP A</td>
<td>1617</td>
<td>1637</td>
<td>1233</td>
<td>4487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP B</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>3623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP C</td>
<td>1538</td>
<td>1176</td>
<td>1285</td>
<td>4279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4535</td>
<td>1414</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>13185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Units supported and maintenance stand downs by number of days

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>4th Inf Div</th>
<th>173d Abn Bde</th>
<th>22d Div (ARVN)</th>
<th>23d Div (ARVN)</th>
<th>Special Forces</th>
<th>P and II</th>
<th>Maint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troop A</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop B</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop C</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop D</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Enclosure 4-
1. (C) Aircraft Strength as of 31 July 70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OH-6A AUTH/ASG</th>
<th>AH-1G AUTH/ASG</th>
<th>UH-1H AUTH/ASG</th>
<th>TOTAL AUTH/ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7 / 5</td>
<td>7 / 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TROOP</td>
<td>10 / 8</td>
<td>9 / 9</td>
<td>8 / 8</td>
<td>27 / 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B TROOP</td>
<td>10 / 10</td>
<td>9 / 8</td>
<td>8 / 8</td>
<td>27 / 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TROOP</td>
<td>10 / 10</td>
<td>2 / 2</td>
<td>8 / 8</td>
<td>27 / 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30 / 28</td>
<td>27 / 26</td>
<td>31 / 29</td>
<td>88 / 83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (U) Average Aircraft Availability by Troop and by Type Aircraft
1 May - 31 July

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OH-6A %</th>
<th>AH-1G %</th>
<th>UH-1H %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td>85% OR</td>
<td>2% NORS</td>
<td>2% NORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TROOP</td>
<td>78% OR</td>
<td>79% OR</td>
<td>82% OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10% NORM</td>
<td>10% NORM</td>
<td>9% NORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12% NORS</td>
<td>11% NORS</td>
<td>9% NORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B TROOP</td>
<td>85% OR</td>
<td>70% OR</td>
<td>89% OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10% NORM</td>
<td>22% NORM</td>
<td>8% NORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5% NORS</td>
<td>8% NORS</td>
<td>3% NORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TROOP</td>
<td>69% OR</td>
<td>76% OR</td>
<td>77% OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21% NORM</td>
<td>21% NORM</td>
<td>22% NORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7% NORS</td>
<td>2% NORS</td>
<td>1% NORS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SAFETY STATISTICS FOR THE PERIOD (Based on O P E P-5 Flying Hours)

1. (U) 1 May 70 - 31 July 70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TROOP</th>
<th>HOURS FLOOH</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>4978</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>3556</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17th</td>
<td>13519</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
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</table>

2. May 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TROOP</th>
<th>HOURS FLOOH</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>142.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>2516</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17th</td>
<td>16346</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75.0</td>
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3. June 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>HOURS FLOOH</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>1334</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17th</td>
<td>1589</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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4. July 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TROOP</th>
<th>HOURS FLOOH</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>1152</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17th</td>
<td>4014</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. May: Three accidents:

   a. On 3 May 70, Troop C, AH-16 Sn 68-15179, Pilot CPT Vester. The aircraft had an engine failure. An autorotation was performed resulting in a hard landing with major damage to the aircraft. Both the pilot and the co-pilot suffered back injuries and abrasions. Engine analysis to determine the cause of the engine failure is not yet complete.

   b. On 10 May 70, Troop A, AH-16 Sn 68-15006, Pilot CW2 Stephanski. On takeoff from the Christmas Tree Heliport there was a tail rotor failure and then separation of the 90 degree gear box. Because of the resulting loss of anti-torque control and the forward shift of the center of gravity the aircraft crashed. The cause of the tail rotor failure and subsequent separation of the 90 degree gear box has not been determined. Complete analysis of the tail rotor assembly is still in progress. Both pilot and co-pilot were seriously injured and evacuated to CONUS.

   c. On 23 May 70, Troop A, UH-1H Sn 69-15115, pilot CPT Blake. In an effort to avoid wires across the take off path collective pitch was reduced rapidly. The aircraft rolled on its side after impact with the ground resulting in damage to the main rotor blades and separation of the tailboom aft of the synchronized elevator. The crewchief was fatally injured in the crash but the other crew members suffered only minor injuries.

2. June: Two accidents:

   a. On 23 June 70, Troop C, UH-1H Sn 69-17266, Pilot WO1 Yetmar. The aircraft had an engine failure in cruise flight. A commend autorotative landing was performed resulting in a hard landing and major damage. Although there was a full crew and five passengers aboard, no one was injured. The cause of the engine failure is unknown pending completion of teardown analysis of the engine.

   b. On 24 June 70, Troop A, OH-6A Sn 69-15981, Pilot WO1 Dalby. The aircraft had an engine failure. An autorotative landing was performed into a rice paddy, with no injuries. Originally classified as an incident, subsequent inspection revealed that depot level resources would be needed to repair structural damage. Investigation of the accident showed that the main fuel line had been disconnected and not reconnected prior to flight. The aircraft was able to start and fly using overflow fuel. The engine failed due to fuel starvation. An EIR has been submitted for a modification of the fuel inlet valve to prevent an engine start if the fuel line is disconnected.

**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry.**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1970.

**CO, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry**

<table>
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**Report Title:**

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry.