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Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities:

a. (C) General:

(1) This report covers the period from 1 February 1970 through 30 April 1970, and is submitted in accordance with AR 525-15, USAVR Regulation 525-15, and 17th Aviation Group (Combat) Regulation 525-15.

(2) Missions: To perform reconnaissance, surveillance and security for Free World Forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone. To engage in combat as an economy of force unit and provide limited anti-tank defense. One or more of the units may be placed in support of a major ground unit.

(3) Organization Structure: The Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry is located at Camp HOLLOWAY (AR800165), PLEIKU, Republic of Vietnam, and is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rudolph B. De France. Troops A, B, and D are colocated with Squadron Headquarters and Troop C is stationed at Camp RADCLIFF (BR10480), AN KHE, Republic of Vietnam. The Squadron has its full complement of cavalry troops as per MTOE 17-95T. (See Inclosure 1 for a list of subordinate units reflecting the organizational structure).

(4) Tactical Posture: Several changes in the tactical posture of the Squadron occurred during the reporting period. Effective 1 March 1970, the Squadron was released from OPCON of the 4th Infantry Division and returned to 17th Combat Aviation Group control. Troop B was deployed from 11 March 1970 to 27 March 1970 in support of ARVN forces in TUYEN DUC PROVINCE near DALAT and returned on 29 March to Camp HOLLOWAY. During the period from 13 March to 1 April, the squadron (-) moved from its old location at Camp ENARI (AR812355), DRAGON MOUNTAIN, Republic of Vietnam to its new location at Camp HOLLOWAY. Troop C moved from its old location at IANE ARMY AIRFIELD at AN SON to Camp RADCLIFF at AN KHE on 23 March 1970 and completed the move on 28 March 1970. C Company (Ranger) 75th Infantry become OPCON to the squadron on 30 March 1970 and was released on 19 April 1970. As of 30 April 1970, Troopers A and B were in direct support of the 21st STZ, Troop C was OPCON to TASK FORCE PURSHUT, and Troop D remained under squadron control.
b. Personnel:

(1) During the reporting period, the following major changes in command and staff occurred:

(a) LTC Rudolph B. De France 038-26-0859 assumed command of 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry on 3 March 1970, replacing LTC George B. Murray 178-21-1616.

(b) MAJ Ronald G. Maxson 573-44-6316 assumed duties as Squadron Executive Officer on 24 February 1970, replacing MAJ Robert L. Rackley 211-48-8326.

(c) MAJ Robert L. Rackley 211-48-8326 assumed command of A Troop on 24 February, replacing MAJ Ronald G. Maxson 573-44-6316.

(d) MAJ Leighton O. Haselgrove 267-60-9958 assumed command of B Troop on 2 April 1970, replacing MAJ Billy J. Bowling 117-38-3016.

(e) MAJ Billy J. Bowling 117-38-3016 assumed duties as Squadron S3 on 2 April 1970, replacing MAJ Leighton O. Haselgrove 267-60-9958.


(l) CPT Walter W. White 225-60-8716 assumed duties as Squadron Maintenance Officer on 4 March 1970, replacing CPT Steven L. White 267-60-1215.

The following are personnel occupying major command and staff positions:

(a) Squadron Commander: LTC Rudolph B. DeFrance
(b) Squadron Executive Officer: MAJ Ronald G. Maxson
(c) S-1: CPT Kenneth O. Lining
(d) S-2: CPT Dale L. Dunham
(e) S-3: MAJ Billy J. Bowling Sr.
(f) S-4: CPT Sherwood L. Emory Jr.
(g) S-5: WO1 Roy H. Majors
(h) Chaplain: MAJ Tracey A. Maness
(i) Safety Officer: CPT James F. Roberts
(j) Maintenance Officer: CPT Walter W. White
(k) Signal Officer: CPT Guy W. Fussell
(m) CO, HRT: CPT Lester C. Helrke
(n) CO, A Troop: MAJ Robert L. Rackley
(o) CO, B Troop: MAJ Leighton O. Haselgrove Jr.
(p) CO, C Troop: MAJ James A. Hahn
(q) CO, D Troop: CPT Vincent J. Falconio
(r) Squadron SGM: CSM Percy Armes Jr.

Unit strength and miscellaneous related data is attached as inclosure II.

(c) Intelligence:

During the reporting period, the S-2 Section activities included...
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AVBACB-GB

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 30 April, EOD CS FOR-65 (22) (U)

SECRET Clearances Validated - 83
SECRET Clearances Granted - 9
SECRET Clearances Initiated - 4
CONFIDENTIAL Clearances Granted - 7
TOP SECRET Clearances Validated - 6
TOP SECRET Clearances Initiated - 6
Security Debriefings - 98
Escape and Evasion Debriefings - 0

(2) Intelligence Summary for the squadron's tactical area of interest is as follows:

(a) KONTUM Province: Enemy activity in KONTUM Province was initially characterized by regular attacks by fire on ARVN bases. Enemy elements employed 82mm mortars, B-40 rockets, and 122mm rockets during stand-off attacks on the DAK PEK CIDG Camp. These stand-off attacks are a continuation of enemy activity during the month of January. On the 26th of February, the 3rd ARVN Regiment received 41 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. On the 1st of March, the 7th ARVN received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. On the 19th of March, the 233rd ARVN Company received 11 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The 1st of April produced a change in the enemy activity in KONTUM Province. The enemy continued stand-off attacks against ARVN bases and also conducted stand-off attacks in the PLEIKU area. Enemy ground attacks were conducted against the DAK SEANG CIDG Camp. On the 7th of April, elements of the 28th NVA Regiment and the 100th NVA Artillery Regiment began ground offensive operations at the DAK SEANG CIDG Camp, 222 NVA were killed. Statements from a POW indicated that DAK SEANG was going to be the center of the spring-fall campaign. The POW also revealed that the 28th Regiment had three maneuver battalions and one artillery battalion in the DAK SEANG area. On the 8th of April, CIDG elements from DAK SEANG engaged an NVA platoon, killing 8 NVA. The DAK SEANG CIDG Camp received stand-off attacks from the 8th to the 11th of April. The enemy employed 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, and B-40 rockets during these attacks. The DAK PEK CIDG received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar, 10 rounds of 122 rockets and 10 rounds of 110mm rockets on the 12th of April. CS Agent was employed by the enemy during this attack. Several ground probes from an unknown size enemy element accompanied the stand-off attack and there were 121 NVA killed. The DAK SEANG-BAK PEK CIDG Camps continued to receive stand-off attacks until the end of April. Ground attacks have not been conducted since the 12th of April on the camps.

(b) PLEIKU Province: The major aim of the enemy activity in PLEIKU Province were the interdiction of lines of communication and disruption of the SVN Pacification Program. Attacks by fire and mining were the primary methods employed by the enemy to accomplish their mission. The H-15 and L-15 Local Force Battalions have been conducting operations against RP/PL hamlets and friendly units in the area south of PLEIKU. Attacks by fire characterize the
majority of the operations conducted by the enemy in that area. On the 23rd of March, a PLXING CIDG element received ten rounds of 82mm fire. Attacks by fire were also conducted against U.S. installations. On the 6th of March, Camp HOLLOWAY (AR64473) received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. On the 1st of April, landing zone Blackhawk (5R036527) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 2 rounds of B-40 rocket fire. The enemy staged numerous attacks by fire on U.S. and ARVN bases during the early part of April. The stand-off attacks were part of the Spring Offensive started on the 1st of April. The 95B regiment has remained active throughout the last three months in the MANG YANG Pass and DAK ATUN RIVER area. The primary mission of the 95B Regiment is to interdict highway 19. The enemy used sniper activity, road ambushes, and mines to accomplish their mission. The local VC Forces have concentrated their activities in the villages and hamlets that participated in the GVN Pacification Program. Local VC units used propaganda to try and turn the villages away from the GVN. If propaganda did not produce desired results, the VC conducted assassinations, kidnappings, and harassing attacks to remove the villages and hamlets from GVN control. Intelligence information indicates the enemy has continued to train in sapper operations.

(c) BTH DINH Province: Enemy activity began at a moderate level. The majority of the activity in the province was restricted to attacks by fire on allied installations during the early weeks in February. On the 1st of February, Lending Zone ENGLISH (BB880010) received 35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, 1 helicopter and 1 building were damaged. The enemy also conducted minor ground attacks on PAVN Camps and allied bases. The major purpose of these attacks was harassment of small allied units operating in the province. Extensive use of booby traps was discovered by the allied forces during the months of February and March; in the middle of February, the enemy began to conduct operations against villages and hamlets. Civilians were threatened with death if they continued to support GVN. Assassinations and kidnappings were conducted by VC elements in the province. As in other provinces, the Spring campaign began on the first of April. A definite increase in enemy activity was noted in DINH DINH Province. Most major allied bases received attacks by fire. Lending Zone ENGLISH (BB880010) received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on the 1st of April. Lending Zone TWO BITES (BB881496) received 16 rounds of 82mm mortar fire also on the 1st of April. Enemy ground attacks showed a marked increase during the first week in April. The 3rd Battalion 1st ARVN Regiment was engaged by two enemy Battalions. The enemy had 37 killed in this action. On the 6th of April, Camp RADCLIFF was attacked by sappers. The enemy destroyed 12 aircraft and damaged 2 more. In most cases the enemy has been using sapper tactics on mid or installations. The employment of sapper tactics allows the enemy a maximum amount of offensive flexibility with a minimum amount of force. The enemy is continuing to conduct operations to interrupt GVN pacification efforts. On the 19th of April, an unknown number of enemy threw hand grenades into DAI THAY Village, there were seven civilians killed and 45 wounded. POW's have given
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AVLACQ-GB 10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry

Period Ending 30 April, RCS CS POL-65 (R2) (U)

information that suggests that the 22nd NVA Regiment is being deactivated. There is no firm evidence to support this information; however, it is possible that the unit is being deactivated to provide replacements for the 3rd NVA Division, its parent unit.

(d) TUYEN DUC Province: Enemy activity in the TUYEN DUC Province was characterized by attacks by fire and ground attacks on ARVN and RF/PF Camps. The enemy had a secondary mission of terrorism and interdiction of SVN pacification programs. On the 18th of February, a bomb was detonated in a theater in DUC TRONG, eight civilians were killed. On the 26th of February, the 1st RF Company was engaged by an estimated two enemy companies employing 82mm mortars and automatic weapons. During the month of March, the enemy continued to attack by fire RF/PF Camps. The 133rd RF Company received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. On the 8th of March, the 302nd RF Company engaged an enemy battalion resulting in the identification of the 860th Local Force Company. The 810th Local Force Battalion was identified by documents found by the 11th ARVN Rangers. The 810th Local Force Battalion had been located in the same general area last year. Enemy activity showed a definite increase during the first week in April. The spring offensive began on the 1st of May and sharp ground attacks and intense attacks by fire were conducted by the enemy. The Vietnam Military Academy received a ground attack destroying one building. Military installations in the DUC TRONG City area received an intense attack by fire with the enemy using 107mm and 60mm rockets, 82mm mortar and 57mm recoilless rifle fire. A high level of enemy activity was maintained through the middle of April. Terrorist activity was directed against SVN officials. On the 12th of April, a policeman's house in DALAT City was bombed resulting in several civilian casualties. On the 16th of April, the DALAT City Hall was bombed resulting in numerous civilian casualties. Attacks by fire and two ground attacks on the 16th of April resulted in 18 killed and 9 civilians wounded. It is expected that the ARVN and RF/PF bases will continue to be the main target for enemy operations. Attacks by fire have been employed more in the last week in April than ground attacks. The enemy will probably continue the attacks by fire and conserve his ground forces for later missions. Several identifications of elements of the 15th Regiment, C-2 Sapper Company, and 2nd VC Regiment have been obtained since the start of this operation. Storable arms, ammunition and food caches have been found in Base Area 226 and the VINH THUAN Valley area.

d. (C) Operations: (Operational Statistics attached as enclosure III).

(1) Units supported and maintenance stand-downs by number of days:

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(2) Quarterly Operations by Troops

(a) Troop A during the reporting period operated in support of the 4th Infantry Division in the general vicinity of AN KHE, TASK FORCE DAGGER in the vicinity of DAK TOI and DAK TONG, and the 24th STZ in the DAK TOI and DAK HET area. During the month of February, the troop supported the 4th Infantry Division to the north of AN KHE generally concentrating on the area along the SONG BA RIVER. The area to the northwest of AN KHE along the SONG BA Valley was given extensive coverage. Numerous contacts were made during this period with squad size elements. Two very significant findings were made. On 1 February, after an insertion of the aero rifle platoon, a prisoner escaped from a nearby NVA POW camp and gave himself up to the troop. This later led to the location of two enemy POW camps, an NCO training school, and a medical training school. On 28 February, a battalion size training area was found southwest of AN KHE. Troop A continued to support the 4th Infantry Division in March, operating in the same general areas as it did in February and also concentrating on the SONG BA RIVER VALLEY to the northwest of AN KHE. Contacts continued to be made with squad size enemy units. Early evening and early evening road reconnaissance of Highway 19 from PLEI KU to AN KHE was conducted as it had been the previous month. On 30 March 1970, Troop A and 6/75 Rangers formed TASK FORCE DAGGER which operated initially to the southwest of PLEI KU and then to the southwest of PLEI HONG. No significant sightings were made by the TASK FORCE in spite of the fact that extensive coverage was given to the assigned areas, indicating a lack of enemy presence in the area at that time. On 6 April, Troop A was detached from the TASK FORCE and worked the DAK SEANG and DAK HET areas where it continued to the end of the reporting period. Contact was made with squad to platoon size elements throughout the month. Intense automatic ground-to-air fire was encountered on numerous occasions. Troop A destroyed numerous bunkers, structures and grain caches during the reporting quarter. The aero rifle platoon was inserted 15 times to develop the tactical situation and search enemy complexes. Several runner teams were also extracted by the lift platoon. Troop A reported 20 confirmed enemy kills, and 1 probable kill for the period.
(b) Troop B during the reporting period operated in the general vicinity of AN NHE in support of the 4th Infantry Division, southwest of Kontum in support of 21st STZ, south of Dalat in support of ARVN forces in Tuy Duc Province, and in the DAK TO and DAK SEANG area in support of the 24th STZ. In the first ten days of February, the troop operated to the north of An Hiep in the DAK ROM and Song Con River areas. Extremely thick vegetation and rough terrain hampered observation efforts but the troop was able to find several enemy complexes and infiltration routes. Several contacts were made with squad size elements. From 12 February through the 15th, the Troop supported the 28th STZ to the southwest of Kontum. The troop made contact with an NVA company killing 33 NVA in the four day period. Several mortars, rifles, radios and quantities of munitions were captured. The remainder of the month and early March occupied the troop in support of the 4th Infantry Division ground elements operating in the mountains near the Song Kon River to the north of An Hiep. The troop continued to make contact with small enemy units in the area. On 5 March, the troop returned to support the 24th STZ to the west of Pleiku. On the 6th of March, the troop found an arms and munitions cache in the area. On 10 March, the troop moved south to Pran Rang Air Base to support the ARVN operations to the south of DAK TO. Operations were conducted in the mountains to the southwest of DAK TO until 28 March, when the troop moved to Camp Koa Koa. The troop found several very large bunker complexes in the DAK TO area, one consisting of over 200 bunkers. ARVN forces were led to cache sites on several occasions. A large portion of troop operations was spent screening around the ARVN ground forces. Operations in April were centered in the DAK SEANG area and to the south of DAK TO along Rocket Ridge. Intense automatic ground-to-air fire was received on nearly every mission in the area. Contact was made on numerous occasions. With squad and platoon size elements. Troop B was very successful in locating the 122mm rocket positions along Rocket Ridge which had been firing on DAK TO and Tan Canh. By employing Cobra guns and tactical air, several launch positions and storage areas were destroyed. A large number of bunker complexes, mortar positions, and machinegun positions were reported. During the entire reporting period, the troop was very successful in locating enemy base areas, bunker and cave complexes, and weapon positions. The nco rifle platoon was inserted 6 times to develop the situation, and secure downed aircraft. Troop B reported 99 confirmed enemy kills and 23 probable enemy kills for the period.

(c) Troop C operated in support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the general vicinity of the An Lao Valley, west of Pleiku as part of Task Force Dagger, and to the south of the Hang Yang Pass as part of Task Force Pursuit. During February and March of the reporting period, the troop supported the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the mountainous An Lao Valley area and along the coastal plains in the brigade area of operations. Numerous contacts with small enemy elements were made during the period. The troop's principal mission during this period was to interdict enemy movement from the mountain base areas to the populated coastal plains. From 6 April through 10 April, the troop operated to
the southwest of Plei Meo to take the place of Troop A in TASK FORCE DAGGER. Enemy contact was very light during this period and no significant enemy activity was observed. Troop C returned to support the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the mountainous areas to the south of the Plei Meo Valley, in the general vicinity of BR270 as the brigade attempted to close on elements of the 3rd NVA Division. The troop made contact with enemy sound and platoon sized units, until the last week of April when it came under OPCON of TASK FORCE PURSUIT.

The Task Force, under control of the 8th Infantry Division, operated in the enemy base areas to the south of the MANG YANG PASS. A large number of bunkers and structures were spotted by the troop in the area with recent usage by small enemy elements. Troop C reported destroying a large number of enemy complexes during the reporting period. The aero rifle platoon was inserted in times to develop the tactical situation, search enemy complexes, or secure downed aircraft. In addition, the lift ships extracted several ranger teams that had been in contact. Five confirmed enemy kills and four probable kills were reported for the period.

Troop D conducted search and clear operations in the Camp ENAI TAOR and the PLEI KU TAOR during the reporting period. Periodic convoy escort was also conducted. During the month of February, the troop conducted several sweeps in the southwest and northern TAOR of Camp ENAI. A search and cordon of a village and several night ambushes were set. There were no significant findings. In March, the troops worked in the PLEI KU TAOR conducting sweeps to the south of Camp Holloway in search of the mortars that had been hitting the post from the south. Two one day sweeps were also conducted north of Pleiku in the TAOR. The troop was unable to locate the mortars even though an intensive effort was made to include the use of mine sweepers. No significant sightings were made to the north. During the first half of April, the troop had the mission of standby airborne reaction force for the air cavalry troops operating in the Dak Seang area. The troop was not inserted. Another ground sweep was conducted to the north of Pleiku on 16 April. Troop D retained the mission of standby airborne reaction force until 23 April when it began search and clear operations in the western PLEI KU TAOR. The troop sweeps during the period accounted for six NVA WIA and 1 NVA KIA. Automatic weapons fire and B-40 rocket fire was received on several occasions. Several enemy mines and booby traps were destroyed by the troop.

C Company (Ranger) of the 75th Infantry came under the operational control of the Squadron on 30 March forming TASK FORCE DAGGER with Troop A. During the operation, ranger sightings were reacted to and exploited by air cavalry elements. Most of the actual insertions and extractions of the teams were made by the 52nd Aviation Battalion with the air cavalry troop extracting teams only when lack of other air assets made it necessary. The ranger teams initially operated to the south and southeast of Plei Meo until 7 April when the area of operations for the Task Force was changed to the mountainous area west of Plei Meo. The area of operations to the south and southeast of

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AVBACD-0B

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 30 April, RGCS GS FOR-65 (82) (U)

FLEX ME proved to be lacking in enemy activity at the time of the operation. The teams did initiate ambushes on 3 occasions accounting for 40 KIA, but the area as a whole was devoid of significant enemy activity. On 7 April, the teams were inserted into the new area of operations to the southwest of FLEX MEONG. Operations continued in the area until 19 April when the company moved to AN KHE. This area also lacked any significant enemy activity. Extensive air cavalry reconnaissance and ranger team observation provided few sightings. The Ranger/Air Cavalry Task Force provided a rapid and extremely flexible organization for gathering and reacting to intelligence information. The lack of enemy sighting and contacts in the areas of operation provided important intelligence on lack of enemy presence in the area.

c. (U) Organization: No change since last ORLL.

d. (U) Training:

(1) The Army Aviation Refresher Training School Program. The maintenance program of the squadron was greatly enhanced as a result of refresher training provided by these courses. (See Inclosure 4).

(2) Aviation Training: (See Inclosure 4).

(3) Special Training: None

(4) The Squadron engaged in training; a total of 69 days during the Quarter.

e. (U) Logistics:

(1) Supplies:

(a) Class I - Headquarters and Headquarters Troop drew rations from 4th Infantry Division 1 February thru 13 March 1970. From 14 March thru 10 April 1970, rations were drawn from the 88th SAS Battalion. Troop A drew rations from the 4th Infantry Division 1 February thru 16 March 1970; from 17 March thru 30 April 1970; A Troop drew rations from the 88th SAS Battalion. B Troop drew rations from the LSA, Phan Rang 10 March thru 29 March (Forward Area); from 23 March thru 30 April 1970, drew from 88th SAS Battalion. C Troop drew rations from 1 February 1970 from the Logistics Command at AN KHE; from 24 March thru 30 April, drew rations from 4th Infantry Division (AN KHE). D Troop drew rations from the 4th Infantry Division 1 February thru 13 March 1970; from 10 April thru 30 April 1970 drew rations from 88th SAS Battalion. (INF and D Troop operated a consolidated mess 13 March thru 30 April 1970 with D Troop assuming operation on 10 April 1970).
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AVGCS-9E

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 30 April, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Class II - Supplies were requisitioned from the 88th S&S Battalion.

(c) Class III - Package POL products were requisitioned through the
88th S&S Battalion and issued by S-4 to the Troops. Diesel and JP-4 were re-
quisitioned through the 45th General Support Group.

(d) Class IV - Construction material was acquired through local
contractor by troop commanders.

(e) Class V - Ammunition was requisitioned from Ammunition Supply
Points 346, 341, LSA DALAT, an unnumbered ASP at AN SON. Ammunition was posi-
tioned forward at Camp RADCLIFF, LZ TWO BITS, KONTUM, DAK TO II, and PHU NHOM
in support of operations.

(f) Class VI - Major end items, less aircraft and armament, were re-
quisitioned from the 88th S&S Battalion.

(2) Requisitions submitted during 1 February thru 30 April 1970:

Non-expendable = 229
Completed = 53
Cancelled = 18
Turn-in = 214

(3) A reconciliation of all outstanding requisitions is made with the
88th S&S Battalion each quarter.

(4) Reports of survey submitted = 9

(5) Combat lessons submitted = 20

h. (U) Communications: Signal and Messages Center Operations

(1) General: In this quarter, total number of messages sent & received
on squadron equipment dropped because of the relocation from Camp BMARI to Camp
HOLLOWAY RVN. On 16 March 70, the Squadron Communications Platoon started con-
struction of a new communications center at Camp HOLLOWAY. On 23 March 70, the
7/17th Air Cavalry Squadron Communications Center closed at Camp HOLLOWAY at
that time the 13rd Signal Battalion assumed responsibility for transmission
and reception of electrical messages from and to 17th Combat Aviation Group and
for traffic on the world wide net. From 23 March 70 to 30 April 70, a back-up
high frequency radio teletype circuit to 17th CAG was maintained at the 7/17th
Air Cavalry Squadron Communication Center.

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The squadron communications platoon maintained a forward RT detachment at AN KHE from the beginning of the quarter until 12 March 70. On 9 April, the Communication Platoon sent an AN/GRC-106 and two operators to a forward position at TAN CANH. This forward AN/GRC-106 detachment was still forward at the end of this quarter.

(3) Operational Statistics: (See Inclosure 5).

1. (U) Materials

(1) Aircraft maintenance support is provided to the squadron by the 60th Direct Support unit as indicated below:

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<th>Unit/Location</th>
<th>DSU/Location</th>
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<td>60th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
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<td>A Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>60th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
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<tr>
<td>B Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>60th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
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<tr>
<td>C Troop, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KHE</td>
<td>79th DSU, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KHE</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(2) Vehicle maintenance support is provided by two direct support units as indicated below:

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<th>Unit/Location</th>
<th>DSU/Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>B Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KHE</td>
<td>5th Maint Bn, QUI NHON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) When B Troop was located at PHAN NHANG, a portion of the unit's maintenance element was located with the troop to perform unscheduled maintenance and light combat damage repairs. All heavy maintenance was accomplished at Camp ENARI.

(4) Statistics on aircraft strength and availability are included in inclosure 6.

j. (U) Civil Affairs

(1) Generals: Major areas of S-5 activity during the last quarter were education, recreation, sponsoring of social events, and sponsoring the Catholic Orphanage of TU TAM.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUMWIE Report

Period Ending: 30 April, RCS GS FOR-55 (R2) (U)

(2) Operation and Training Activities:

(a) PLEI POC NGO (AR830366): During the 1st Quarter, the civil affairs team gave instruction for the use of power saws. This included not only its proper maintenance, but also a demonstration. The PP/PT forces were transported to a firing range where they served their weapons. The team also made maximum effort to provide transportation for the children of PLEI BROK RONGAL so that they may attend the school in PLEI POC NGO.

(b) IA SON (AR817376): During the past quarter, the civil affairs team helped to rebuild the Catholic church in IA SON.

(c) TU TAM Orphanages: The S-5 team in conjunction with D Troop, is helping to support the orphanage of TU TAM.

1. Supplying edible garbage for the live stock.
2. Presenting additional clothing, food, and toys for the children.
3. Organising a picnic for all the children at BIEN HOA LAKE.

(3) Logistics: The civil affairs team received support from LE TRONG District. The squadron chaplain, D Troop, PLEIKU AIR BASE 55, personal resources of team members, PLEIKU hospital, 4th Medical Battalion and the 4th Infantry Division 55.

(l) Civil Affairs Projects:

(a) Sanitation:

1. The S-5 team supplied soap for the Montagnard villagers.
2. A general clean-up project was conducted throughout both villages.

(b) Recreations: The team conducted two hours of organized sports for school children of both villages.

(c) Social Events: Three picnics to BIEN HOA LAKE were sponsored, one for the school children of IA SON, one for PLEI POC NGO school children, and one for the orphanage of TU TAM.

(d) Psychological Operations: During the past quarter, many reports of NVA troops were received by the S-5 team from the Montagnards. A report of assassination of a member of IA SON village by NVA was received. All this information was turned over to the S-2. The Montagnards in PLEI POC NGO are most cooperative.
CONFIDENTIAL
AVBACB-08
10 May 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 30 April, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Transportation: The S-5 team provided transportation for people to medical facilities, market and school.

(f) Miscellaneous: The team distributed 7000 lbs of food and gave over 500 plague shots.

k. (U) Accident Prevention

(1) The accident rate per 100,000 flying hours was 32.0 for this quarter. The previous quarter was 40.5

(2) Accident rate statistics for this quarter are attached at Inclosure 7.

(3) Accident Summary for quarter by month

(a) February: One accident:

On 8 Feb 70, A Troop, AH-1G #66-15295, Pilot Cpt Snyder, major damage. The collective sleeve and scissors assembly failed while in flight. The pilot had no forced landing area available and was unable to jettison his wing stores. He did an excellent job in ditching in trees with no collective pitch control. The pilot and copilot experienced compression fractures of the back.

(b) March: Three accidents:

1. On 1 Mar 70, C Troop, OH-6A #66-11043, Pilot CW2 Harrington, total. The pilot exceeded the operating limitations of the aircraft while on a low altitude low airspeed visual reconnaissance mission. He demanded more power than the aircraft had anti-torque pedal to compensate for and spun into the trees. A white phosphorus grenade, hung by the pin, exploded on impact. The copilot received burns on his legs. The pilot was not injured.

2. On 8 Mar 70, A Troop, AH-1G #67-15809, Pilot ILT Foster, major. Pilot endured IMC conditions in dust and lost control of the aircraft, resulting in a hard landing. There were no injuries.

3. On 16 Mar 70, C Troop, UH-1H #66-16669, Standardization Instructor Pilot ILT Bass, major. The instructor pilot was demonstrating an autorotation and lost his rotor RPM and airspeed decay excessively, resulting in a hard landing. There were no injuries.

(c) April: One accident

On 11 April 70, OH-6A #67-1498, Standardization Instructor Pilot Cpt Martinez, major. The aircraft struck the side of a revetment while IF was attempting to work under downwind conditions. There were no injuries.
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1. (U) Religious Functions

(1) The 7/17th Cav Chaplain, during the quarter, conducted a total of 13 Sunday and 7 weekday Protestant services, with a total attendance of 1,057.

(2) Catholic Mass was conducted 14 times with a total attendance of 633.

(3) Religious services were conducted at Camp ENARI, AN KHE, and Camp HOLLOWAY.

(4) The 7/17th Cav Chaplain, during the quarter, made 610 visits to troop areas and made contact with 1,262 individuals. The Chaplain visited 25 men in hospitals.

(5) The 7/17th Cav, D Troop in particular, is supporting the TU TAM Catholic Orphanage. Support is also being given to missionaries in the PELEKU area by way of designated offerings and supplies.

(6) Because of a reduced number of chaplains in the country, the 7/17th Chaplain gives religious coverage to the 604th Transportation Company at Camp HOLLOWAY.

(7) Chaplain (MAJ) Tracy A. Maness is presently assigned as Squadron Chaplain.

2. (U) Medical Section:

(1) The Medical section of this squadron consists of a flight surgeon, a section sergeant, and eleven medics. The distribution of the medics has been changed since the last quarter. There are two medics with each new rifle platoon (formerly one), and one with each of the three platoons in D Troop. With the exception of C Troop, all personnel receive their primary medical care from the Camp HOLLOWAY Disp. This dispensary is jointly run by the Flight Surgeons and medics of the 52nd Aviation Bn (Combat), and the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry. C Troop receives its primary support from the 4th Aviation Dispensary of the 4th Infantry Division at Camp RADCLIFFE, AN KHE.

(2) At Camp HOLLOWAY, the dispensary receives laboratory and x-ray support from the 71st Evacuation Hospital. Medical supplies are obtained from 4th Division Medical Supply Office, and thru the 52nd Aviation Bn (Combat).

(3) Medical Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical Category</th>
<th>Previous QTR</th>
<th>REPT QTR</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patient Visits</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immunizations</td>
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<td>900</td>
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<td>Venereal Disease</td>
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<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
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AVBAC-06

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 30 April, ESC CS FOR-65 (RS) (U)

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 30 April, ESC CS FOR-65 (RS) (U)

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (U) PERSONNEL: None.

b. (U) INTELLIGENCE: Enemy use of abandoned firebases.

   (1) Observations: This unit has observed several instances of NVA and VC units utilizing abandoned US and ARVN firebases in the BU FRANQ, DMZ TO, and BM HET areas.

   (2) Evaluations: The enemy accomplished this by building their own bunkers within the old firebases. Old friendly positions were left undisturbed and the new enemy bunkers were carefully camouflaged.

   (3) Recommendations: When working areas where old abandoned firebases and friendly positions are located, insure that the positions are carefully checked.

   (4) Command Actions: It is now squadron policy to carefully check out old positions.

c. (C) OPERATIONS:

   (1) Use of U.S. advisors and ARVN interpreters on command and control aircraft.

      (a) Observations: When working with CIDG and ARVN units without advisors, it is extremely difficult to obtain responses such as smoke for identification of friendly positions or movement of ground elements to specific targets.

      (b) Evaluations: On several occasions, this unit has worked with CIDG and ARVN units and has experienced great difficulty in moving or otherwise assisting the ground elements.

      (c) Recommendations: C & C ships carry a US advisor and ARVN interpreter when working with CIDG and ARVN ground units; this is especially necessary when the allied ground elements are without U.S. advisors.

      (d) Command Actions: Whenever possible while working with CIDG or ARVN ground elements the C & C ship of the air cavalry troop carries a U.S. advisor and an ARVN interpreter. This method of operation has proven to be very successful in recent operations.

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10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 30 April, UCF 05 FOR 65 (E2) (U)

(2) Air cavalry utilization of the FAC or the fighters UHF frequency.

(a) Observation: While working with tactical air, it has been observed that targets can be faster and more effectively engaged if the scouts are on the FAC or Fighter's UHF frequency.

(b) Evaluation: While working with tactical air strikes, we have found that having the scouts on the FAC or fighter's frequency enables faster and more effective adjustment of bombs.

(c) Recommendations: That the scouts be on the FAC and or the fighters UHF frequency during a tactical air strike, also the scouts should be briefed by a FAC on how to adjust the Tactical Fighters Strikes.

(d) Command Actions: Scouts have been instructed during a tactical air strike, to be on the FAC's end or the fighter's UHF frequency.

(3) Using white phosphorus and colored smoke in marking areas with reduced visibility due to smoke and haze.

(a) Observation: While working in the DALAT area, the scout platoon observed that the use of WP grenades with a heavy haze and smoke present in the area was ineffective, due to smoke color.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the smoke and haze, when a white phosphorus was put on a target, both gunships and fighters had difficulty in locating the target.

(c) Recommendations: That while working in areas where there is reduced visibility due to haze, ground fog, and smoke, marking will be one using a colored smoke and a WP together.

(d) Command Actions: All OH-6A crews have been briefed on using colored smoke in conjunction with WP in marking targets under reduced visibility due to smoke and haze.

(4) Use of the AH-1G Cobra as a rescue aircraft.

(a) Observations: Recently, a AH-1G attack helicopter from an air cavalry troop rescued a two man crew of a light observation helicopter (LOH) shot down by enemy fire.
(b) Evaluation: Both of these helicopters were on a last light VR when the LOH received fire. The LOH pilot managed to fly approximately 2 kilometers before he was forced to land in an unsecured area. Because of impending darkness, the pilot of the attack helicopter made the decision to rescue the crew by having them sit on the two ammo bay doors. He salvaged his rockets, landed, and completed the rescue. He experienced no control or CC problems. Although a rescue of this nature is somewhat hazardous, it can, nevertheless, be done.

(c) Recommendations: That AH-1G helicopter pilots be made aware of a rescue capability for 2 personnel. That snap-on seat belt be placed in each ammo bay of AH-1G helicopters. That commanders use attack helicopters only as a last resort for rescue operations, keeping in mind such important parameters as terrain, density altitude, and the enemy and friendly situation.

(d) Command Action: The AH-1G will be used as a rescue ship only as a last resort.

(5) Communications with long range patrols:

(a) Observation: It has been noted that all long range patrols in an area of operations utilize the same frequency for radio communications causing communication problems between aircraft and individual long range patrols.

(b) Evaluation: During current operations, there are as many as 12 long range patrols in the area of operations. All these teams utilize one frequency for all radio traffic. During periods when a troop is working closely with a single team, communications are severely hampered because of traffic between other teams in the area. This situation is particularly bad when the long range patrol is adjusting fire from troop AG-1G's, or during contact missions.

(c) Recommendations: It was recommended that long range patrols have an alternate radio frequency that could be utilized when working with aircraft, or that the patrols carry a second radio so that they can monitor their primary and an alternate frequency.

(d) Command Action: The above listed recommendations were discussed with the Commanding Officer, C Company, Ranger of the 75th Infantry, who is considering the proposals at this time. As an interim measure, during periods when a troop is communicating with a single patrol, other patrols are advised to discontinue admin/log traffic.

(6) Scout dog and handler attached to ground cavalry platoon:

(a) Observation: It became necessary for the ground cavalry troop to employ a scout dog and handler on patrols due to frequent ambushes.

(b) Evaluation: By the attachment of the dog and handler to each ground platoon, there is earlier warning of enemy ambush and a faster rate of march.
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, 7TH SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY
PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Recommendation: All ground Platoons be assigned a dog and handler.

(d) Command Action: One dog team and handler has been assigned to the troop. The feasibility of a dog and handler for each platoon is being investigated.

4. (U) ORGANIZATION: None.

5. (U) TRAINING: Non-aviation trained personnel.

(1) Observation: Non-aviation trained personnel cannot adequately perform aircraft maintenance functions.

(2) Evaluation: This unit currently has individuals who extended or reenlisted for aircraft maintenance assignments. These personnel have no prior training or knowledge of aircraft maintenance. It requires most of a combat tour just to train these individuals to do an adequate job. These individuals fill authorized maintenance positions precluding assignment of properly trained personnel. This situation places a significant additional burden on the units already heavily commited qualified maintenance personnel and makes it difficult to maintain acceptable standards of safety and availability.

(3) Recommendation: Individuals should not be allowed to extend or reenlist for a maintenance MOS unless they attend an MOS producing maintenance school enroute to their new duty station.

(4) Command Action: As the problem continues to exist, this unit has established an on-the-job training program whereby inexperienced personnel work with qualified personnel. However, the number of personnel who can be trained in this manner must be very limited to preclude deterioration of maintenance quality.

f. (U) LOGISTICS: Tentage for troop movement.

(1) Observation: This squadron experienced a move requiring one troop to be airlifted to another area for extended combat operations. There were severe and longstanding tent shortages in the troops, although tentage was on valid requisition and on-in status had been confirmed. Redistribution of all tentage was required from the remaining squadron elements in order to fulfill the requirements of the troop.

(2) Evaluation: Valuable time was spent collecting tentage from the squadron elements.

(3) Recommendations: During times of undersupply, all available tentage should be centralized under the control of the S-4 and kept ready for shipment on short notice. The tentage with equipment for one air cavalry troop should be placed in conex containers with preplanned factors such as cube, weight and number.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 30 April, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U)

(4) Command Action: This plan is now in effect within the squadron.

(g) COMMUNICATIONS: None.

(h) MATERIAL: AH-1G Oil Coolers.

(1) Observation: Malfunction of oil cooler/turbo blower assembly.

(2) Evaluations:

(a) During the past three months, this squadron has changed three (3) AH-1G engines due to excessive engine oil temperature as specified in TM 55-1520-221-10 Chapter 7 page 7-2.

(b) Inspection revealed that sand and grass hidden from view under the turbo blower fan (item 7, fig 4, page 387, TM 55-1520-221-35P), undetectable following normal inspection procedures, caused clogging of the oil cooler (item 63, page 243, TM 55-1520-221-20P) and stoppage of the turbo blower (item 26, fig 3, page 249, TM 55-1520-221-20P), resulting in the out of limits engine oil temperature.

(3) Recommendations: That command action, as outlined below, be incorporated into TM 55-1520-221-FMP and be made mandatory for all units utilizing the AH-1G.

(h) Command Action:

(a) The following procedures are now incorporated into each AH-1G aircraft periodic inspection:

1. Oil cooler/turbo blower assembly will be removed from aircraft.

2. Oil cooler will be cleaned IAW TM 55-1520-221-20, page 5-80.

3. Turbo blower will be cleaned IAW TM 55-1520-221-20, page 5-83.

4. After the oil cooler/turbo blower assembly has been cleaned, inspected and rendered serviceable, the assembly will be reinstalled in the aircraft.

(b) Sufficient statistical information is not yet available to determine the results of this new procedure.

i. MEDICAL: None.

j. SAFETY: Marking of U-shaped revetments.
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AVBACB-GB

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 30 April, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U)

(1) Observation: AG-1C pilots experienced difficulty estimating clear-
ance within AG-1C revetments at the Golf Course Heliport, AN KHE, RVN.

(2) Evaluation: The revetments provided for AH-1G's at the Golf Course
Heliport, are U-shaped revetments with one long side and two short sides.
This shape necessitates sideward hovering in order to place the aircraft into
the revetment. Once inside the revetment, it is impossible to see the rear
wall of the revetment, therefore, tail rotor clearance cannot be determined.
This situation caused pilots to park the aircraft extremely close to the front
wall of the revetment increasing the possibility of a blade strike.

(3) Recommendations: It was recommended that all U-shaped revetments
be marked with white paint giving the pilots reference lines to guide them in
parking aircraft.

(4) Command Action: Two guide lines were painted from top to bottom
on the long wall of the revetments. A pilot can line himself up on the line,
one for each landing direction, and thereby assure himself of equal clearance
on both ends of the aircraft. Lines have also been painted down the center of
the two short walls so that the pilot can determine when he is centered in the
revetment. In addition, 4 inches around the top of all walls were painted
white to give pilots a better reference while parking the aircraft at night.

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2 CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPGP-DT, APO 96558
2 CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCG-DST, APO 96375
2 CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBAHC-O, APO 96384
7 CO, 17th AG (Cbt), ATTN: AVBACB-SC, APO 96240

INFO COPIES:
CG, Headquarters II Corps
CG, 4th Inf Div, ATTN: AVDDH-CG, APO 96262
2 Each Organic Troop

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Da: HEADQUARTERS, 17TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96240 29 May 1970

Tu: Department of the Army (ACSFOR, DA), Washington, D.C. 20510
Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96550

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate, and concurs with the contents as stated, except as indicated below.

2. (C) The following comments and recommendations are submitted:


      (1) Intelligence.

         Paragraph 1(2)(a-d) should indicate only information on the enemy units which affected the operation of the squadron. The number of aircraft shot at and hit by ground fire and the caliber of weapons should be included.

      (2) Aircraft.

         Reference paragraph 1(1)(4), the authorized number of UH-1H aircraft for HHT as shown in inclosure 6 should read 5. The total number of UH-1H should read 29 with a total aircraft authorized figure of 86. The figures shown in inclosure 5 are based on 1st Avn Bde fill level.

   b. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

      Material.

      Concur with paragraph 2h(2) with one addition. Engines should not be removed merely because the oil temperature exceeds 88°C. Care must be exercised to insure that the limitations as outlined in paragraph 27b, TS 55-2800-200-50/1 C-4 are exceeded before removing the engine.

F/R THE COMMANDER:

BILL W. COUGHAN
CPT, ACC

CONFIDENTIAL

GF:
CU, 7/17th ACS
AVFAC-213T (10 May 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 30 April 1970, dCS, CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO S.F. 96350 2 JUN 1970

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 9634

This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-Lessons Learned and forwarding indorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT L. JUENEN
Lieutenant Colonel, AGC
Acting Adjutant General

CC:

1 - x, 17TH AVN B (G), (LESS CALL)
1 - x, 7TH SQM, 17TH CAV, (LESS CALL)
DA, MAJ L.T. G. RAVIA V: BRIGADE, APO 96384  16 JUN 1970

THRU:  Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO-AVC-1ST, APO 96335
       Commanding-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, APO-GPOP-1ST, APO 96550

To:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.  20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned from the 7/17th Air Cavalry Squadron and concurs with the following exceptions:

   Paragraph 2f Logistics, page 19: Tentage for troop movements is a unit responsibility. Units that are authorized tentage must insure that they are in a serviceable condition. Tentage can not be placed in permanent storage in Vietnam. Tentage that are not in use should be erected at least monthly for drying and airing. Tentage must be ordered by components and not by complete assembles. The requisitions in this case were invalid. The unit has since requisitioned tentage by components and has verified valid requisitions. In addition to the tentage authorized by US, each troop will receive two (30 x 205) tents.

2. The following comments are included: Paragraph 2e(1), page 19: It is understood that an excessive training requirement does place a burden on a unit; however, it must be recognized that the input of school trained personnel does not meet the needs of our units. Training is either a directed or assigned responsibility of every unit in the Army. If the individual is qualified he must be accepted and trained.

Warren A. Peterson

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development

Warren A. Peterson

BCT AG

ASST AG
AVSEC DST (10 May 70) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 30 April, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "The Use of the AH-1G Aircraft", page 17, paragraph 2c(4): concur. The AH-1G's use as a rescue ship is proven.

   b. Reference item concerning "AH-1G oil coolers", page 20, paragraph 2h: concur. Unit has been advised to submit a DA Form 2028 presenting the procedures outlined in the recommendation and command action portions of this CRLL.

   c. Reference item concerning "Marking of U-shaped Revetments", page 20, paragraph 2j: concur. USARV letter, subject: Aircraft Revetments, dated 6 August 1969 states that gunship revetments will be marked with two reference lines, 8 inches wide, parallel to and 35 feet from each barrier wall. Correct positioning of the gunship in the revetment can be obtained by aligning the aircraft's skid toes with the reference lines. The above information has been passed to the 1st Aviation Brigade for dissemination to this unit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cly: 25-1 General

Cy furn:
1st Avn Bde
7th Squadron, 17th Cav
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 Aug 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with the following comment.

2. Reference paragraph 2h(3), page 20: Nonconcur. Adoption of such a recommendation would require worldwide compliance regardless of operational and environmental conditions. Further, it would increase aircraft downtime, create needless additional manhour expenditure, and increase supply problems due to higher mortality of parts required for replacement. The additional exposure to human error during assembly and disassembly would more than offset the level of safety gained through removal and inspection. Recommend that removal and inspection of the turbo blower and oil cooler be written into the trouble shooting section of TM 55-1520-221-20. Further, recommend that the inspection be accomplished only when oil temperature reflects gradual increase during continued operations. Engines suspected of exceeding the limitations specified in paragraph 27b, TM 55-2800-200-20/1, Ch 4, should not be removed until verified and validated in compliance with AR 750-23.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L. W. Ozanne
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV
CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH OF SUBORDINATE UNITS AS OF 30 APRIL 1970 (C)

1. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU, Republic of Vietnam is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-98T, and is equipped with 5 UH-1H Helicopters.

2. Troop A, Camp HOLLOWAY, is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-98T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LOH, and 8 UH-1H Helicopters. The 568th TC Detachment and the 288th Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.

3. Troop B, Camp HOLLOWAY, is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-98T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LOH, and 8 UH-1H helicopters. The 569th TC Detachment and the 238th Signal Detachment provide direct maintenance and avionics support.

4. Troop C, Camp RADCLIFFE, AN KHE, Republic of Vietnam is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-98T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LOH, and 8 UH-1H helicopters. The 412th TC Detachment and the 238th Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.

5. Troop D, Camp HOLLOWAY, is a standard wheeled vehicle mounted ground cavalry troop organized in accordance with MTOE 17-99T.

6. See Page 2 & 3 of this enclosure for organizational charts.

Inclosure 1
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS FOR 7TH SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY

NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

One (1) Signal Detachment per Air Cavalry Troop

TOE 17-95

NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

One (1) Transportation Det. per Air Cavalry Troop

HEADQUARTERS

OFF 29
WO 7
EM 181

AIR CAVALRY

OFF 19
WO 32
EM 350

CAVALRY

OFF 5
WO 0
EM 327

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP

TOE 17-967

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AIR CAVALRY TROOP

NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

ONE (1) Signal Detachment per Air Cavalry Troop

ONE (1) Transportation Detachment per Troop

CAVALRY TROOP

TOC 17-90T

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Inclosure 1
UNIT STRENGTH AND MISCELLANEOUS RELATED DATA AS OF 30 APRIL 1970.

1. (G) Unit Strengths

   a. Military.

<table>
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<td>57-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Sig Det</td>
<td>0-0</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>5-4</td>
<td>6-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop B</td>
<td>18-15</td>
<td>30-29</td>
<td>121-123</td>
<td>169-167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>569th TC Det</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>54-46</td>
<td>56-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1-1</td>
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<td>18-18</td>
<td>30-25</td>
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<td>169-159</td>
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<td>1-1</td>
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   b. Civilian.

<table>
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<th>UK AUTH</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>CONTRACT AUTH/CH</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
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<tr>
<td>238th Sig Det</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0/0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troop B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>569th TC Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
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<tr>
<td>238th Sig Det</td>
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-Enclosure 2-
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<tr>
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<th>MUX</th>
<th>O/H</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0/0</td>
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<tr>
<td>238th Sig Det</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
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2. (c) IN-PROCESSED PERSONNEL

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<th>APR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>117</td>
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3. (c) OUT-PROCESSED PERSONNEL

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<th>APR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>52</td>
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4. (d) PROMOTIONS

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<th>E-4</th>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
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5. (e) AWARDS DATA: The following awards were received by personnel of the Scu-aren as indicated:

CONFIDENTIAL
### CONFIDENTIAL

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<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSM-V</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSM-S</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM-V</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM-V</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ACM-S</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>PH</td>
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<td>1</td>
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6. (c) **CASUALTIES:**

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<tr>
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<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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7. (d) **EMERGENCY LEAVES:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ORDINARY LEAVE FOR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGP REASONS</td>
<td>0</td>
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8. (e) **BAR QUOTAS:**

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<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RECEIVED</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USED</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>67</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The table contains data for various categories, including casualties, emergency leaves, and bar quotas, with specific numbers for each category and month.*
## confidential

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TURNED BACK</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO SIGNS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

9. (U) ORDERS PUBLISHED:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
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10. (C) BREAKDOWN OF OFFICERS: Period and/or 30 April 1970

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery (Field)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Corps</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Engineer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| WARRANT OFFICERS | 177 |
| **TOTAL**       | 178 |

11. (C) BREAKDOWN OF AVIATORS: (Officers by Grade)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2Lt</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3Lt</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW1</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>165</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
# Operational Statistics for the Period

1. *(C)* Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>COMBAT</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>LIFTED</th>
<th>CARGO (TONS)</th>
<th>KIA'S</th>
<th>STRUCTURES DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TRP</td>
<td>1429</td>
<td>1031</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRP A</td>
<td>97:0</td>
<td>1270</td>
<td>6181</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>4512</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>3713</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRP C</td>
<td>6555</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>6617</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRP D</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>22,145</td>
<td>2909</td>
<td>18582</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>28</td>
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</table>

**Details:** 12

**Enemy Material Captured:**
- 1 - 9mm Chi Com Pistol
- 3 - MAS Rifles
- 6 - SKS Rifles
- 12 - AK-47 Rifles
- 2 - 7.62 LMG (RFD)
- 1 - Chi Com Model 57 MG w/Tripod
- 5 - U.S. .30 Caliber Carbines
- 1 - B-51 Rocket Launcher
- 2 - 60mm Mortars
- 1 - 82mm Mortars
- 1 - 122mm Rocket
- 6 - 60mm Mortar Rounds
- 7 - 82mm Mortar Rounds
- 25 - 8-40 Rounds
- 50 - 30 Caliber MG Magazines
- 1 - PRC-25 Radio
- 1 - Short Wave Radio (Type not identified)
- 1 - Tape Recorder, w/6 tapes
- 3 - Fts of Documents
- 50 - Lbs of Salt
- 500 - Lbs of Rice
- 1 - Viet Cong Flag
- 19 - Rucksacks
- 20 - Lbs Medical Supplies

**Enemy Material Destroyed:**
- 4,500 - Lbs of Rice
- 9 - 60mm Mortar Rounds
- 1 - 57mm Recoilless Rifle Rounds
- 6 - Boxes of AK-47 Ammunition
- 30 - Sticks of Dynamite
- 10 - Rafts
2. (C) Aircraft Lost and Damage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT TYPE</th>
<th>LOST</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
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<tr>
<td>HOR</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP A</td>
<td>CH-5A</td>
<td>8 (Note 1)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>2 (Note 2)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AH-10</td>
<td>2 (Note 3)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP C</td>
<td>CH-5A</td>
<td>1 (Note 4)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>3 (Note 5)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AH-10</td>
<td>1 (Note 6)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP C</td>
<td>CH-5A</td>
<td>3 (Note 7)</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>2 (Note 8)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AH-10</td>
<td>3 (Note 9)</td>
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</table>

**NOTE 1.** Five Combat Loss, three extensive maintenance

**NOTE 2.** Two Combat Loss

**NOTE 3.** Two Crash

**NOTE 4.** One Extensive maintenance

**NOTE 5.** Two Extensive maintenance, One Combat Damage

**NOTE 6.** One Combat Loss

**NOTE 7.** Three Combat Loss

**NOTE 8.** Two Extensive maintenance

**NOTE 9.** Three Extensive maintenance

3. (C) Flying Hour Statistics for the Periods (Based on DA Form 1352)

a. The average flying hours by type aircraft, by troop:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CH-5A</th>
<th>AH-10</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOR</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP A</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>204</td>
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<tr>
<td>TROOP B</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>269</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>206</td>
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b. The average flying hours by type aircraft:

<table>
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<th>AIRCRAFT TYPE</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-5A</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-10</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>206</td>
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</table>
### CONFIDENTIAL

c. The cumulative flying hours by troop and by type aircrafts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>AH-10</th>
<th>OH-14</th>
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<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>906</td>
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<tr>
<td>TROOP A</td>
<td>1773</td>
<td>1681</td>
<td>1128</td>
<td>5281</td>
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<td>1817</td>
<td>1247</td>
<td>1283</td>
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<td>TROOP C</td>
<td>1321</td>
<td>1247</td>
<td>2149</td>
<td>5217</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5111</td>
<td>4878</td>
<td>5766</td>
<td>16055</td>
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*Enclosure -*
### 1. (*) The LARTS Program

<table>
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<th>APR</th>
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<tr>
<td>ICH Airframe</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1H Airframe</td>
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<td>AH-1H Airframe</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCH Engine</td>
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<td>AH-1G Armament for SH</td>
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### 2. (U) Transitions

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<td>OH-6A</td>
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<td>4</td>
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### 3. (U) EP/STP

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<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CONFIDENTIAL

#### SIGNAL AND MESSAGE CENTER OPERATIONS STATISTICS (U)

1. (U) **Quarterly Message Statistics:**

   - **a. Originating Messages:**

     |          | MAR | APR | TOTAL |
     |----------|-----|-----|-------|
     | **IMMEDIATE** |     |     |       |
     | 52 Confidential | 41 Confidential | 71 Confidential | 167 |
     | 0 Unclassified   | 3 Unclassified   | 1 Unclassified   | 7   |
     | **PRIORITY** |     |     |       |
     | 1 Confidential   | 2 Confidential   | 3 Confidential   | 6   |
     | 48 Unclassified   | 29 Unclassified   | 62 Unclassified   | 139 |
     | **ROUTINE** |     |     |       |
     | 0 Confidential   | 0 Confidential   | 0 Confidential   | 0   |
     | 12 Unclassified   | 3 Unclassified   | 20 Unclassified   | 35  |
     | **Subtotal Conf** |     |     | 173   |
     | **Subtotal Unc**   |     |     | 181   |
     | **TOTAL** |     |     | 354   |

   - **b. Terminal Messages:**

     |          | MAR | APR | TOTAL |
     |----------|-----|-----|-------|
     | **FLASH** |     |     |       |
     | 1 Confidential | 0 Confidential | 0 Confidential | 1   |
     | 0 Unclassified | 0 Unclassified | 0 Unclassified | 0   |
     | **IMMEDIATE** |     |     |       |
     | 77 Confidential | 58 Confidential | 95 Confidential | 199 |
     | 15 Unclassified | 19 Unclassified | 2 Unclassified | 40  |
     | **PRIORITY** |     |     |       |
     | 66 Confidential | 2 Confidential | 7 Confidential | 75  |
     | 151 Unclassified | 73 Unclassified | 167 Unclassified | 391 |
     | **ROUTINE** |     |     |       |
     | 3 Confidential | 3 Confidential | 5 Confidential | 11  |
     | 85 Unclassified | 96 Unclassified | 87 Unclassified | 268 |
     | **Subtotal Conf** |     |     | 286   |
     | **Subtotal Unc** |     |     | 699   |
     | **TOTAL** |     |     | 985   |

   - **c. Total Messages Handled During Quarter:** 1339
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SIGNAL AND MESSAGE CENTER OPERATIONS STATISTICS (U)**

1. **Quarterly Message Statistics:**
   
a. **Originating Messages:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMMEDIATE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Confidential</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Confidential</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>139</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ROUTINE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidential</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Subtotal Confidential</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal Unclassified</td>
<td>101</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>274</td>
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<td>355</td>
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b. **Terminal Messages:**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FLASH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidential</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIORITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidential</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>191</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>66</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
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<td>151</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>391</td>
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<td>Total Classified</td>
<td>406</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>532</td>
<td></td>
<td>985</td>
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c. **Total Messages Handled During Quarter** : 1,339
2. (U) Quarterly Messages Center Statistics:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COURIER OUTGOING</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM CENTER OUTGOING</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COURIER INCOMING</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>407</td>
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<tr>
<td>COM CENTER INCOMING</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>423</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>1007</td>
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3. (U) Quarterly Switchboard Statistics:

A. Average Daily Call ----------------------------- 583

B. Busy Hours: 0900 - 1100 - 1400 - 1500
### 1. (C) Aircraft Strength as of 30 April 70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CH-6A Auth/ASG</th>
<th>AH-1G Auth/ASG</th>
<th>UH-1H Auth/ASG</th>
<th>TOTAL Auth/ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>7 / 5</td>
<td>7 / 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TROOP</td>
<td>10 / 9</td>
<td>9 / 9</td>
<td>2 / 7</td>
<td>27 / 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B TROOP</td>
<td>10 / 9</td>
<td>9 / 8</td>
<td>3 / 8</td>
<td>27 / 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TROOP</td>
<td>10 / 10</td>
<td>9 / 7</td>
<td>3 / 8</td>
<td>27 / 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30 / 28</td>
<td>27 / 24</td>
<td>31 / 28</td>
<td>88 / 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. (U) Average Aircraft availability by Troop by Type Aircraft 1 Feb - 30 Apr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CH-6A</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>87% OR 0% NORS 13% NORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TROOP</td>
<td>75% OR 9% NORS 16% NORM</td>
<td>70% OR 8% NORS 11% NORM</td>
<td>81% OR 5% NORS 11% NORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B TROOP</td>
<td>71% OR 14% NORS 22% NORM</td>
<td>57% OR 8% NORS 25% NORM</td>
<td>83% OR 2% NORS 15% NORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TROOP</td>
<td>83% OR 6% NORS 11% NORM</td>
<td>80% OR 7% NORS 13% NORM</td>
<td>85% OR 1% NORS 11% NORM</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Inclusion 6
SAFETY STATISTICS FOR THE PERIOD (Based on OPREP-5 Flying Hours)

1. (V) 1 Feb 70 - 30 April 70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TROOP</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMT</td>
<td>234</td>
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<td>107.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>5573</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>4723</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00.0</td>
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<td>C Troop</td>
<td>4310</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17th</td>
<td>15540</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
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2. February 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>HMT</td>
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<td>A Troop</td>
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<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>1750</td>
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<td>00.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>1166</td>
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<td>00.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>7/17th</td>
<td>5504</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

3. March 1970

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMT</td>
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<td>4652</td>
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<td>81.4</td>
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4. April 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TROOP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMT</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5384</td>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.

CO, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry