AD NUMBER
AD512784

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES
TO: unclassified
FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES
TO:
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative and Operational Use, Export Control; Nov 1966. Other requests shall be referred to the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Attn: FOR-OT-UT, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY
31 Nov 1978, DoDD 5200.10; OAG, per Dept. Army ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD512784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Dec 1969, DoDD 5200.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DOD 5200.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

THIS DOCUMENT IS:
CLASSIFIED BY ____________________________
Subject to General Declassification Schedule of
Executive Order 11652-Automatically Downgraded at
2 Years Intervals-DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31,_____.

BY
Defense Documentation Center
Defense Supply Agency
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1966

SECTION I - Significant Activities

Command .................................................. 1-1c 1
Personnel, Health, Morale and Discipline ................ 2-2d 2
Intelligence and Counterintelligence ................... 3-3g 2
Operations, Plans and Training .......................... 4-4k 13
Logistics .................................................. 5-5h 16
Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations .................. 6-6b 26
Inspector General ......................................... 7-7b 27
Information ............................................... 8-8e 28
Staff Judge Advocate ...................................... 9-9c 29

SECTION II - Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Intelligence Collection .................................... 31
Operations/Transportation ................................. 31
Supply/Maintenance ....................................... 34

STATEMENT OF CLASSIFIED

In addition to security requirements which must be met, this document is subject to special export controls and each transmittal to foreign governments or foreign nationals may be made only with prior approval of

Asst. Chief of Staff for Force Development

NCTM "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"

WASH DC 20310
INDEX OF INCLOSURES

1. Units Under Operational Control of Headquarters, II Fórce
2. Location of OFCON Units
3. Distinguished Visitors During Month of August 1966
4. Distinguished Visitors During Month of September 1966
5. Distinguished Visitors During Month of October 1966
6. Location of Major Enemy Units as of 31 October 1966
7. Trends in Enemy Tactics
8. II Field Force Vietnam Operations Schedule
9. Air Resupply Trend Chart
10. II Field Force Vietnam Logistic Newsletter
11. Headquarters, II Fórce Supply Standing Operating Procedures
12. II Fórce Shoulder Sleeve Insignia Authorization
13. Tactical Air Support (Statistical Summary)
14. Map of III Corps Tactical Zone
15. Aerial View of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, 22 July 66
17. Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Staff Directory
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 Oct 66.

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) COMMAND:

   a. The assigned and attached strengths of II Field Force Vietnam has steadily increased since the last reporting period. On 13 August 1966, the 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 25th Artillery, was attached by General Order number 5445, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, dated 23 August 1966 with an effective date of 13 August 1966. This was followed by the 9th Transportation Car Company, attached by USARV GO 5521, dated 1 September 1966 with an effective date of 23 August 1966. In September the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor was attached by USARV GO 5944, dated 6 October 1966 with an effective date of 12 September 1966, and the 552nd Military Police Company was attached effective 23 September 1966 by USARV GO 5953, dated 6 October 1966. The 44th Army Postal Unit was attached by USARV GO 5953, dated 6 October 1966, effective 1 October 1966. A comparison of the assigned/attached strength for Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam at the end of the last two reporting periods is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 66</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 66</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Major subordinate units are shown at inclosure 1. Locations are shown at inclosure 2.

   c. Distinguished visitors received by this headquarters for the months of August, September and October are shown at inclosures 3, 4 and 5.

FOR OT UT 660522
AVFBC-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSPOR-65)

2. (C) PERSONNEL, HEALTH, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

a. Personnel actions designed to reduce the rotational hump problem caused by the large number of headquarters personnel scheduled to return to CONUS during the period 15 February - 7 March 1967 were continued during the reporting period.

b. Although there has been a significant increase in malaria cases, the health of the command remains excellent. A total of 239 cases were reported during the quarter as opposed to 76 cases reported in the previous quarter. Of the 239 cases, 121 were reported by the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) during the month of September. Those cases were directly related to Operation TOLEDO. Experience indicated that the incidence of malaria is a reflection of a combination of the rainy season, exposure site (location of operation) and exposure time (length of operation). The increased incidence indicates the continuing need for command emphasis on malaria preventive measures.

c. The three Chaplains assigned to Headquarters, II FFORCEV conducted 248 religious services during the reporting period. A total of 13,379 personnel attended these services. The Catholic Chaplain heard 642 Confessions, and the Sacrament of Holy Communion was offered 146 times and received by 2,334 persons. In addition, 259 troop visits, 60 staff visits, 31 civic action visits and 36 hospital visits were made by the Chaplains. The total of 248 services reflects 48 services conducted at Special Forces Camps and for Advisory Teams within the III Corps Tactical Zone. Participation in the religious program continues to be good.

d. Morale and welfare activities included several USO performances and the establishment of a Red Cross Recreation Activity at the headquarters complex. This activity, staffed by eight Red Cross personnel, is operated on a 7-day a week basis. A II FFORCEV Post Exchange was opened on 10 September to serve personnel in the Long Binh Area. The Special Services Officer has received quantities of recreational and entertainment equipment for issue to units. Morale of troops continues at a high level.

3. (SNF) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence Aspects and Results of Friendly Operations. There were three major operations initiated by direction of this headquarters during the reporting period. Summarized below is the intelligence information upon which each of these operations was based and the
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

enemy losses reported at the completion of each operation.

(1) Operation Toledo.

(a) Intelligence aspects. This operation was a 27-day search and destroy operation conducted into the May Tao Secret Zone (generally bounded by coordinates YT6700, YT9200, YS6784, YS9284) in Long Khanh, Binh Tuy and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. The operation was later shifted to the west and southwest after heavy contact by the 1st Australian Task Force with an estimated one to two reinforced VC battalions. The initial purpose of the operation was to locate and to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in the May Tao Secret Zone, an area believed to be the primary base area for the 5th VC Division. No major operations had been conducted in the area before by US/FWMAF.

The following significant activities were considered at the time in the planning of the operation:

1 Agent reports on 22 July 1966 revealed an estimated two VC battalions were conducting training exercises vic YS7895895. This area also had been reported as the Thu-Du Secret Zone. Additional agent reports indicated a number of civilian laborers had been transporting rice from May Tao Mountain to Hiep Hoa (vic YS880838).

2 Reports of VC battalions in the 1st ATF TAOR had been received. These reports were partially confirmed by reconnaissance and minor enemy contacts. The contacts were believed to have been with reconnaissance elements of main force units probably located in the May Tao area.

3 Visual reconnaissance indicated numerous trails and possible infiltration routes into the May Tao area.

4 Twelve agents sent into the May Tao area had not returned.

5 Rallier Lt Col Le Xuan Chuyen, former ACoS, Training, for the 5th VC Division provided detailed information on VC base and logistical areas. His information was investigated during the operation and generally found to be accurate.

(b) Results.

1 The operation was conducted in the May Tao area for approximately 12 days with insignificant contact and with only small amounts of material and equipment captured or destroyed. However, on 18 August, an event occurred which caused a change in the concept of
AVFBC-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

the operation, and which resulted in heavy losses to the enemy. Elements of the 1st ATF, participating in a pacification operation northeast of their base camp, encountered what was estimated to be one of two reinforced VC battalions. These forces were determined to be elements of the 275th VC Regiment and 860th Local Force Battalion, reportedly on their way to attack the 1st ATF base camp. This clash resulted in the following enemy losses:

a Personnel: 245 KIA (BC), 3 VCC.

b Equipment captured: 37 Ind wns, 1 BAR, 1 7.62mm wheeled MG, 3 AT wns, 2 57mm RR, 1 60mm mortar, 28 AT grenades, 22 rds 75mm AT ammo, 150 wns magazines, 1726 rds SA ammo, 28 60mm mortar rds, 8 7.62mm LGM, 3 LAW rds, 4 sets of web equipment.

c Equipment destroyed: 27 gal kerosene, 21 gal cooking oil, 20 pick heads.

2 With indications that the remnants of the 275th and possibly the 274th VC Regiments could be trapped following this encounter, Operation Toledo shifted to the south and east. During this phase, contact with enemy forces was light and sporadic; the conclusion being that the bulk of the 5th VC Division had avoided contact by moving into southern Long Khanh and southern Phuoc Tuy Provinces. However, large quantities of equipment and many base camps which showed signs of recent occupation were uncovered. The loss of the equipment and camps diminished the immediate capability of the 5th VC Division to operate in this area. The overall enemy losses to US/FWMAF during Operation Toledo (not including those to the 1st ATF listed above) were:

a Personnel: 11 KIA (BC), 10 VCC, 44 VCS.

b Equipment captured: 48 Ind wns, 6 C/S wns, 1 81mm mortar tube, 3 57mm RR, 1 60mm mortars, 3 81mm mortar bipods, 117,037 rds SA ammo (approx), 10,000 rds cal .30 linked ammo, 40 grenades, 10 claymore mines, 1 bangalore torpedo, 23 shirts, 16 trousers, 484 60mm mortar rds, 88 81mm mortar rds, 90 57mm RR rds, 23 75mm RR rds, 12 AT rockets, 2 rockets (type unknown), 12 containers penicillin, assorted documents, 9 cases medical supplies, 700 lbs clothing, 2 sewing machines, 5 protective masks, misc office equipment, 200 ft det wire, 10 boxes blasting caps, 146 blocks TNT, 25 time fuzes, 300 lbs commo equipment, 6 AN/PRC-10 radios, 2 AN/GRC-9 speakers, 11 entrenching tools, 7 ponchos, 50 sets of eating utensils, 12 picks, 2 mattocks, 1 2kw generator, 110 lbs rice.

c Equipment destroyed: 170 blds, 202 Special Handling Required, Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
bunkers, 11 tunnels, 3 mines, 2 claymore mines, 18.9 tons rice, 1 suitcase marijuana, 75 gal fuel oil, 6 tons salt, 2 bicycles.

(2) Operation Sioux City.

(a) Intelligence aspects. This operation was a 14-day spoiling and search and destroy operation northeast of Vam Cat (YT148290). Although little hard intelligence was available at the time, several factors influenced the decision to conduct this operation. The primary one was to demonstrate our ability to operate adjacent to War Zone "D" at will. The following were also major considerations:

1. The suspected presence of the 250th NVA Regiment in southern War Zone "D".
2. The southwestern corner of War Zone "D" had been an area of operations of the separate D800 (Dong Nai) Battalion.
3. Headquarters, Eastern Nambo (MR 7) was believed to be located in the vic of YT1442.
4. The 303d Local Force Unit of VC Phuoc Thanh Province was reported as operating south of Phuoc Vinh (XT9649), with last known location vic YTO95310. Agent reports indicated the unit also operated west of the Song Be River and probably provided some of the outer perimeter security for the approaches to War Zone "D" in this area.
5. Operations of the C-33 and Thi Xa Platoons that operated in the area along Highway 315. These two platoons had recently been noted manning OP and harassing friendly movements along Highway 315.
7. A rash of small unit harassments and ambushes during early August on villages, hamlets and RF/PF outposts.

(b) Results: There were no major contacts during this operation. Enemy Losses are listed below:

1. Personnel: 10 KIA (BC), 1 VCS.
2. Equipment captured: 11 Ind wpns, 72 rds SA ammo, 43 81mm mortar rds, 5 AT mines, 100 pick heads, 40 entrenching tools, 10 hoes, 1 homemade bangalore torpedo, 2 claymores, 1 grenade, 1 pistol belt, 1 VC gas mask, 10 rolls of sheet metal, 2000 steel rods,

Special Handling Required
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

19 tires, 1 steering wheel, 2 vehicle transmissions, 5 tire rims, 2 inner tubes, 330 gal fuel, 42 tons rice, 25 tons peanuts.

Equipment destroyed: 18 huts, 7 bunkers, 1 sampan, 1 AT mine, 3 AP mines, 4.5 tons rice, 110 gal oil, 110 gal solvent, 385 gal fuel, 1 truck.

(3) Operation Rendezvous.

(a) Intelligence aspects. This operation was initiated on 30 August as a continuing long range effort to gather information and intelligence data on the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Sector Committee. The area of operations is bounded by coordinates XT5044, XT7544, XT7517, XT6017, XT5028. The following are significant activities that were considered in the planning of this operation:

1 Numerous reports were received that the VC would increase terrorism and acts of sabotage in the Saigon area in an attempt to discredit the GVN National Election in September.

2 Reliable information indicated that the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Sector Committee, which controls all of the activities of the VC units in Saigon and Gia Dinh Province, is located in the area of interest.

3 Intelligence holdings on the personnel location and alternate locations of the committee are limited.

(b) Results: No specific operation has been conducted to achieve the goals of Operation Rendezvous to date. There have been numerous operations by the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions in the area of interest. These operations have been oriented toward other objectives; accordingly, no tabulation of VC losses can be attributed to this operation. A tangible result that can be attributed to the efforts of Operation Rendezvous is the success of the 11 September GVN election.

b. Intelligence Production.

(1) The most significant accomplishment of intelligence production during the period was the publication of an 88-page Intelligence Estimate of the Situation in III Corps Tactical Zone, including 13 annexes. This estimate was the first original intelligence study of this magnitude undertaken by Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam. It will be updated at two-month intervals in accordance with Headquarters, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam policy.
Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

(2) The II Field Force Vietnam Intelligence Center contributed increasingly to the production of intelligence during the period. The Interrogation Branch, published four interrogation reports as a result of fifty captive interrogations. The Document and Material Exploitation Branch examined approximately 15,000 captured documents, of which 1521 were determined to be of value. From these, ten document reports were published. The Order of Battle Branch, in addition to its normal contributions to the daily Intelligence Summary and weekly Periodic Intelligence Report, published an Order of Battle, Special Study, War Zone "D". The Imagery Interpretation Branch, published a special study of withdrawal routes likely to be used by VC after presumed attacks on eleven different installations under study.

c. Intelligence Collection.

(1) The collection of information by aerial surveillance has been hampered by a shortage of O-1 aircraft in the III Corps Tactical Zone. A study was undertaken to determine equitable allocation of O-1 assets among using agencies. The study resulted in a portion of the assets remaining under the control of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for quick response to immediate missions and to permit the flexibility needed in supporting a constantly changing situation. The remaining aircraft were allocated to units for direct support with priority given to units in remote areas and to units not having an organic air capability.

(2) The current method of requesting all electronic reconnaissance from higher headquarters does not permit the flexibility and responsiveness needed to keep abreast of the fluid tactical situation that currently exists. From the viewpoint of this headquarters, it would be desirable to have reconnaissance aircraft (Mohawk) assigned directly to Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam to be employed in general support of the III Corps Tactical Zone. This method of allocation of assets would afford the degree of responsiveness necessary and would allow the senior US headquarters in III Corps Tactical Zone to assign priorities to missions as appropriate.

d. Deviations from Current Intelligence Doctrine. Experiments are now being conducted on the effectiveness of airborne infrared sensors during hours of daylight. There is reason to believe that the enemy is aware of the nighttime capabilities of the sensor and is attempting to exercise strict heat discipline during the hours of darkness. Many reports have been received indicating that much of the enemy cooking is done during daylight hours. Initial reports indicate that when properly employed, the sensor can be effectively used as a daytime intelligence collection source.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(1) Description.

(a) The major Viet Cong military/political subdivision included in III Corps Tactical Zone is Military Region One (MR 1), also known as T1, M7, or Eastern Nambo Military Region. The Region MR 4, also known as T4 or Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone, is entirely within III Corps Tactical Zone. Two provinces of the VC MR 6 (Phuoc Long and Binh Tuy) and Long An and part of Hau Nghia Provinces, of VC MR 2, are also included within III Corps Tactical Zone. MR 2 was formerly designated MR 8. The geographical boundaries of these military regions are illustrated at inclosure 6.

(b) There are two major VC base areas within the III Corps Tactical Zone. The first is the Duong Minh Chau or War Zone "C" in northern Tay Ninh Province. Located within this area is the headquarters of the Communist insurgent effort designated the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). The second major base area is War Zone "D", located in northwestern Long Khanh Province which contains the headquarters of MR 1.

(c) The VC provinces of Military Region 1 and those portions of Military Regions 6 and 2 located in III Corps Tactical Zone control 32 local force companies and 27 LF platoons that operate in III Corps Tactical Zone.

(d) There are five confirmed local force battalions located in four VC Provinces in III Corps Tactical Zone. These battalions are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Force Battalion</th>
<th>VC Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loi Bn</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Independent Bn</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506th Bn</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320th Bn</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>860th Bn</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) There are ten confirmed Viet Cong main force regiments operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone. The regiments with
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

their controlling headquarters are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC Main Force Regiment</th>
<th>Controlling Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70th Security Regiment</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U80 Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>680th Training Regt</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165A Regt</td>
<td>MR 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Thap II Regt</td>
<td>MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Regt</td>
<td>9th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272nd Regt</td>
<td>9th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273rd Regt</td>
<td>9th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th Regt</td>
<td>5th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275th Regt</td>
<td>5th Div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) The Four NVA regiments operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NVA Regiment</th>
<th>Controlling Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>250th Regt</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84A Artillery Regt</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141st Regt</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Regt</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) See inclosure 6 for sketch map of enemy locations as of 31 October 1966.

(2) Summary of Recent Activities.

(a) During August the 48th ARVN Regiment made contact with the 274th VC Regiment on two occasions. The first contact was on 1 August when the 2d Battalion, 48th ARVN Regiment made contact near Phu My in Phuoc Tuy Province, and the second was on 10 August, south of Phu My on National Route 15. These contacts resulted in confirmed VC losses.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

amounting to 38 KIA (BC) and 12 WIA.

(b) The major contact of the reporting period was between the 1st ATF and the 275th VC Regiment near Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy Province, on 19 August resulting in VC losses of 245 KIA (BC). Numerous individual and crew served weapons and a large quantity of ammunition were captured from the VC.

(c) In September enemy contacts were limited to small unit guerilla operations conducted primarily in support of the VC anti-election campaign. VC main force and NVA units appeared to be remaining in their jungle base areas for rest and recuperation.

(d) During October there were contacts with elements of three main force regiments. The 30th ARVN engaged the 6th VC battalion, 165A Regiment in dug-in positions in Long An Province. 25th Infantry Division (US) operations in the Filhol Plantation area resulted in a contact causing VC losses of 11 KIA (BC), 22 KIA (Poss) and one VCC. The captive disclosed that he was from the weapons company of the 7th Battalion, 165A Regiment, thus confirming the current operational area of this battalion. 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry had a contact with the second company, 269th Bn of the Dong Thap II Regiment near Duc Hoc, Hau Nghia Province, on 14 October resulting in 7 VC KIA. On 28 October, during Operation Shenandoah in southwestern Binh Long Province, the 1st Infantry Division had a contact with elements of the VC 272d Regiment resulting in VC losses of 71 KIA (BC).

(3) Tactics.

(a) In an effort to disrupt the constituent assembly elections on 11 September 1966, the VC increased their propaganda operations, harassment of isolated GVN units and outposts, terrorism in local communities and interdiction of communication routes. The frequency of these incidents increased sharply until election day but returned to a more normal level immediately after the election. Throughout this period VC main force and NVA units avoided contact with US Forces.

(b) Since the election period, VC main force and NVA units have continued to avoid major contact with US forces. They continued to conduct brief mortar attacks against friendly military installations and have attacked several isolated outposts where massing of large forces was not necessary.

(c) In a number of instances estimated VC squad size forces have positioned themselves so as to draw fire into populated areas while harassing base camp perimeters, convoys and small units.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

patrolling near villages. In some instances VC units have attempted to provoke air strikes and artillery fire against friendly villages and hamlets. This is an effective tactic in that it prepares the people for antigovernment propaganda and in some cases could even convert friendly Vietnamese to VC sympathizers.

(d) During recent operations several units have reported a new type of booby trap. These booby traps are employed using a grenade secured to a bamboo sapling which is staked to the ground. The pull ring of the grenade is secured to a stake in the ground so that when pressure is applied to the bamboo pole the pin is pulled, the sapling released and the grenade detonated seven to ten feet overhead. This is particularly effective against personnel riding on APC as well as personnel in the open.

(e) For trends in certain enemy tactics see inclosure 7.

f. VC Battle Losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA (BC)</th>
<th>KIA (Poss)</th>
<th>VCC</th>
<th>VCS</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>HVY</th>
<th>WPN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1608</td>
<td>1793</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINES/DEMO</th>
<th>RDS</th>
<th>AMMO</th>
<th>BLDG</th>
<th>GRAIN (TONS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4328</td>
<td>64,853</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>1485.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action at End of Period.

(1) Capabilities.

(a) Movements of VC regiments at the end of the quarter indicate a possible shift from the enemy's recent policy of avoiding battle. The repositioning of the 273d Regiment from western Binh Long Province to north central Tay Ninh Province concentrates the 271st and 273d Regiments at a point from which a multiregimental attack could be made in any of several directions. Likely objectives for such an attack could be Suoi Da or the 196th Light Infantry Brigade which has been committed in the vicinity XT450 for approximately one week. Following a contact on 28 October in the vicinity of the Michelin Plantation, the 3d Battalion, 272d Regiment was identified. This unit apparently withdrew to the southwest after the contact, indicating that the 272d Regiment may also be available for commitment in western Binh Duong Province or southeastern Tay Ninh Province.

(b) The regiments of the VC 5th Div appear to be...
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

preoccupied at this time with resupply of rice and preparation for future operations. However, these regiments are considered capable of attacking anywhere in Phuoc Tuy Province, southern Long Khanh Province or southeastern Bien Hoa Province. Priority of enemy effort will probably be placed on interdicting Routes 1, 2 and 15. Recent movements of the 275th Regiment also indicate a possible reconnaissance of Gia Ray.

(c) A threat which has been gradually developing over the last several months is the infiltration of men and supplies into the III Corps Tactical Zone. The presence of the 141st NVA Regiment in the vicinity of Bu Gia Map and the buildup of the 76th Regiment in northwest Quang Duc Province indicates an increase of enemy activity in the northeastern portion of the III Corps Zone. This activity could be aimed at targets as far west as Loc Ninh.

(d) During the last month of the reporting period, there has been a noticeable decline in VC initiated small scale operations. The reason for this cannot be positively determined; however, it is likely that the enemy has been withholding his local force and guerilla effort until such time as their employment can have maximum effect. Just such a time would appear to be 1 November, Vietnamese National Day, or the week prior to the US general elections.

(e) The enemy is capable of defending his base camps when attacked. He is capable of withdrawing into concealed safe areas almost anywhere in the corps zone.

(2) Vulnerabilities.

(a) Enemy main force units are vulnerable to spoiling attacks which are based on timely intelligence.

(b) The entire VC structure is vulnerable to imaginative and realistic psywar operations. Continued distortions of the truth cannot be sustained by the enemy, especially in the wake of the GVN triumph in the elections.

(3) Relative Probability of Adoption.

(a) Enemy guerilla operations can be expected to increase on Vietnamese National Day and continue at a relatively high rate during the following week.

(b) Harassment and attack of isolated outposts will continue with Suoi Da an, those outposts in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces offering the most likely targets.
AVFBC-H
CONFIDENTIAL
15 November 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(c) Infiltration of men and units across the II Corps and III Corps boundary will continue.

(d) Interdiction of highways can also be expected, especially in the VC 5th Division area.

(e) Defense of vital base camps is to be expected.

4. (S) OPERATIONS, PLANS AND TRAINING.

a. At the direction of the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, two war games were conducted by this headquarters with the assistance and participation of II FFORCEV Artillery, III Corps Advisory Group, Capital Military District Advisory Detachment, C-3 Detachment, 5th Special Forces Group, 219th Military Intelligence Detachment and the 377th Air Police Squadron.

(1) Operation COUNTERMOVE, a war game of the defenses of Tan Son Nhut Airbase, was conducted in August 1966. The conclusions reached as a result of this war game are as follows:

(a) There is a strong possibility that the VC can infiltrate mortar teams into the vicinity of Tan Son Nhut Airbase and inflict heavy damage with relatively light losses.

(b) With a lesser chance of success, the VC can infiltrate a force of less than one battalion to the vicinity of Tan Son Nhut Airbase. From this position, an assault on the airfield will achieve major damage to aircraft, but VC losses will be heavy.

(c) It is apparent that in protecting an installation as sensitive to attack as Tan Son Nhut, the primary effort should be directed toward preventing enemy forces from reaching the perimeter, or to areas where indirect fire can be placed on the installation.

(2) Operation COUNTERSTROKE, a war game of the defenses of Loc Ninh, was conducted in September 1966 and presented to Lieutenant General Seaman, Commanding General, II FFORCEV on 26 September 1966. The conclusions reached as a result of this war game are as follows:

(a) The CIDG camp at Loc Ninh is located in an untenable position and can be overrun by a regimental size force in four to six hours.

(b) The ARVN compound at Loc Ninh has serious
defensive weaknesses and can be overrun by a regimental size force in three to four hours. Current plans to reduce the garrison of this compound will further reduce its defensive capability.

(c) The proximity of the Cambodian Border to Loc Ninh and the intervening good terrain for rapid, concealed movement presents special problems in the defense of Loc Ninh.

(d) Fire support for this area is limited.

(e) Forces moving by ground to reinforce or relieve Loc Ninh must traverse areas that provide excellent ambush sites.

(f) Present and proposed contingency plans will provide rapid reaction forces to all isolated outposts.

b. Subsequent to the conduct of each of these war games, appropriate action was initiated to correct deficiencies found. These actions will be carried through to completion so that the defensive capabilities of Tan Son Nhut Airbase and Loc Ninh will be greatly enhanced. In many areas, remedial action has already been completed. Commanders at all echelons are fully aware of the status of the defenses at both locations.

c. The bulk of the combat operations conducted by US elements in the II FFORCEV area of responsibility were coordinated and directed by the major subordinate headquarters under the OPCON of II FFORCEV. These operations were in response to broad planning guidance from II FFORCEV.

d. Special operations were conducted under the direct control of II FFORCEV, to include:

(1) Operation ROBIN was a coordinated operation to receive the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at the ports of Saigon and Vung Tau, and to safeguard the transport to, and initial occupation of, the designated brigade base camp at Bear Cat. The 1st Infantry Division was designated as the sponsor unit and displaced the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from Bear Cat to Di An as a preliminary step. Sufficient forces were left at Bear Cat to provide security and continuous artillery support capability. Route security along Highway 1A from Saigon to Long Binh was provided by the 1st Infantry Division; security of Route 15 between Long Binh and Vung Tau was provided by elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and the 1st Australian Task Force.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(2) Operation WINCHESTER, implementation of an OPLAN to reinforce III MAF in the I CTZ, was implemented by II FFORCZV through the 173d Airborne Brigade; the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry was employed on this task.

(3) Operation UNIONTOWN, a static security mission involving the RMK Rock Quarry, Engineer and Signal sites in the Long Binh area, the TAOR for the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and the vicinity of the II FFORCZV Command Post, was conducted by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 2d Battalion, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), in that sequence.

(4) Operation TOLEDO, a combined operation controlled by II FFORCZV, was initiated on 10 August 1966 and continued through 7 September 1966. Elements participating in the operation included a US airborne brigade, two ARVN ranger battalions, a US Marine battalion landing team, an Australian battalion task force and US Army, Navy and Air Force support units. The operation was conducted in Phuoc Tuy and Binh Tuy Provinces with the initial area of interest in the May Tao Secret Zone. A large VC base camp was located and destroyed in the area where the enemy engaged an element of the 1st Infantry Division on Operation Abilene in April of this year. On 22 August the area of operations shifted to the west in the vicinity of the Courtenay Rubber Plantation. Although the operation did not result in the engagement of any major Viet Cong units, it forced the Viet Cong to abandon base camps and large quantities of war materiel.

e. The timing of operations and the forces employed are indicated on the II FFORCZV Operations Schedule at inclosure 8.

f. The tactical communications facilities of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam continued to expand during the period 1 August to 31 October 1966. On 11 August Nui Chua mountain, elevation 837 meters, was secured with an ARVN task force, and the 53d Signal Battalion established a radio relay site on 12 August 1966. Nui Chua Chan is one of three major hill sites that dominate the III Corps Tactical Zone and is, therefore, essential to providing radio relay communications to distant sites.

The need for lightweight air transportable radio relay equipment that could be placed inside a C-123 aircraft or CH-47 helicopter became urgent due to current operations and contingency plans requiring air lift of communications equipment. To provide an interim capability, the 53d Signal Battalion fabricated two configurations of AN/TRC-24 radios and AN/TCC-7 carriers in 3/4 ton trailers. Similar fabrications of radio relay equipment were made by the signal battalions.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

of the 1st Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division.

h. In October four new lightweight AN/MRC-112 for channel relay terminals were received, and two were immediately committed to operation in support of a Special Forces Detachment. Receipt of this equipment provided a much needed lightweight air transportable radio relay terminal.

i. As the troop strength of II Field Force Vietnam grew, communications requirements for base camp and field CP's also grew, but the arrival of additional signal units did not keep pace with this growth. Therefore, the tactical communications of II Field Force Vietnam continued to provide base camp facilities. The steadily increasing commitment of tactical communications to the base camp role has left little flexibility to provide forward or tactical CP's except on a limited basis.

j. In July 1966 the air traffic at Xuan Loc Airfield reached approximately two hundred takeoffs and landings per day with no air traffic control facility. To provide an interim capability, the 53d Signal Battalion was assigned the mission of training three air traffic control teams. These teams were given training by the 125th Air Traffic Control Company, and one team was deployed to operate the Xuan Loc Airfield on 15 July 1966. Current traffic averages 260 takeoffs and landings per day. Another air traffic control team was assigned to operate the Tay Ninh West Airfield on 23 September with an average of 300 takeoffs and landings per day.

k. The present air traffic control capability in RVN is inadequate to meet the requirements for operation of the numerous airfields; as a result, this headquarters has used its communications element to provide interim capability. It is essential, however, that regular air traffic control teams be assigned to this function so that tactical communications teams can be returned to their primary role.

5. (C) LOGISTICS.

a. Operations.

(1) Logistical support for the reporting period. Logistical support for the reporting period was focused on the following major operations:

(a) Operation BLUE JAY (30 Aug - 29 Sep 66). Purpose of this operation was to support the deployment of the 196th Infantry Brigade to the vicinity of Tay Ninh III and establish a base camp at that location. The 25th Infantry Division was designated by II FFORCEV G3 as the sponsoring unit. In coordination conferences attended by
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSPOR-65)

representatives of USARV, II FFORCEV, 1st Logistical Command, 25th Infantry Division and US Army Support Command, Saigon, it was determined and agreed upon how the advance party would be handled and how the base camp would be logistically supported. It was further agreed that the US Army Support Command, Saigon, would support the 196th Infantry Brigade with supply point distribution at Tay Ninh until such time as a Tay Ninh support activity could be established. Support was planned to be by land LOC on the basis of a convoy on alternate days. This was a large undertaking and required a great deal of coordination since previous operations from Tay Ninh had been supported primarily by air LOC. Operation BLUE JAY utilized direct Air Force airlift from the port of debarkation, Vung Tau, to Tay Ninh for personnel, and land LOC from Saigon for cargo and equipment. The operation proceeded smoothly and with a minimum of disruption. The STON per day in support of this operation averaged 390.

(b) Operation TOLEDO (10 Aug - 7 Sep 66). This operation involving the 173d Airborne Brigade, 10th ARVN Division elements and the 1st ATF, was supported by land LOC from Saigon and Long Binh. Supply point distribution was made to brigade of Class I, II and IV (not to include barrier materiel). Unit distribution of Class III, V and IV (barrier materiel) was furnished to the brigade base vic Gia Ray. Route security for the convoy was furnished by the 173d Airborne Brigade. The initial STON per day was figured at 114; however, with the increase in the tempo of the engagement, the STON per day increased to approximately 140. The primary reason for the increase was the added JP4 requirement generated by two additional airmobile companies being placed in support of the ARVN and 1st ATF units engaged in the operation. The 173d Airborne Brigade requested sixty 2½ ton trucks with drivers to support this operation plus lowboys and tractors with trailers. This imposed a heavy burden on the 1st Logistical Command’s transportation; however, the requests were met.

(c) Operation MALLARD (23 Aug - 29 Sep 66). The purpose of this operation was to support the deployment of the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor into country. The 1st Infantry Division was the sponsoring unit with the Long Binh Plantation site designated as the staging area. Coordination conferences were held with representatives of USARV, II FFORCEV, 1st Logistical Command, 1st Infantry Division and US Army Support Command, Saigon. It was agreed that the unit personnel would debark at Vung Tau, fly to Bien Hoa by C-130 aircraft, then proceed by bus to the staging area. Cargo would be debarked in Saigon and trucked to the staging area. Wheeled vehicles would depart Saigon after 1800 hours and track vehicles would depart Saigon between 2300 and 0400 hours daily. The 1st Infantry Division provided convoy security. Approximately 200 STON of all classes of supply were used to support this.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

operation; however, the tonnage consisted mainly of Class IV barrier materiel needed to secure the staging area.

(2) Operation MEADOW LARK (5 Sep - 29 Sep 66). This operation was conducted in support of the deployment of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to a staging area in the Long Binh Plantation site. The 1st Infantry Division was designated by II FFORCV G-3 as the sponsoring unit. Since the 11th ACR was arriving in country during the same time frame as the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor and would be staged in the same general area, a great deal of coordination was required. Coordination conferences were held with representatives of USARV, II FFORCV, 1st Logistical Command, 1st Infantry Division, US Army Support Command, Saigon, and the S4 advance party representatives of both 2d Bn, 34th Armor and 11th ACR. The deployment of the 11th ACR involved the movement of the advance party by air to Tan Son Nhut; the main body by three passenger ships to Vung Tau, and then by air to Bien Hoa. The cargo, approximately 11,000 STON, from the three passenger ships and seven cargo ships was unloaded at Saigon Port and transported overland by truck to the staging area. The staging area was prepared by elements of the 1st Infantry Division Engineers assisted by engineer elements of the 18th Engineer Brigade, USARV. The 11th ACP advance party, assisted by the 1st Infantry Division and elements of US Army Support Command, Saigon, restocked all classes of supplies to include barrier materiel in the staging area prior to arrival of the main body. The only significant problem was the late arrival of the unit's mess equipment; however, this was resolved by arranging the loan of mess equipment from the 173d Airborne Brigade and a field kitchen from US Army Support Command, Saigon.

(3) Operation ATLANTIC CITY (13 Sep - 20 Sep 66). This tactical operation involved elements of the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade. Units from the 1st Infantry Division were supported with organic capability from their base camp at Lai Khe. Units from the 25th Infantry Division were supported from their base camp at Cu Chi. The 173d Airborne Brigade element was deployed to Dau Tieng in forty-two C-123 sorties, which in turn extracted elements of the 25th Infantry Division. The resupply of the 173d Airborne Brigade was entirely by air from Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa. A major problem arose when the airfield at Dau Tieng deteriorated to such an extent that it had to be closed for two days while engineers from the 25th Infantry Division made sufficient repairs to allow extraction of the unit. While the field was closed, resupply was accomplished by helicopter from Bien Hoa.

(4) Operation WRFN (16 Sep - 19 Oct 66). This operation was in support of the deployment of the 1HILCAGV to Tay Ninh. The 25th
Infantry Division was designated as the sponsoring unit. Due to the nature of the operation, detailed conferences were conducted between representatives of Free World Military Assistance Organization (FWMO), MACV J4, USAFRV, II FFORCENV, 1st Logistical Command, US Army Support Command, Saigon and the 25th Infantry Division. Since most of the PHILCAGV's equipment was in a push package that had not arrived from CONUS, it was necessary for the sponsoring unit to borrow equipment from 1st Logistical Command. This equipment included items such as trucks, tents, generators and kitchen equipment. Logistical support was initially furnished through the 25th Infantry Division on the same convoy basis as for the 196th Infantry Brigade. Initially it was planned that the advance party would arrive by air and the balance would arrive by LST at Vung Tau, then be shipped by air to Tay Ninh III. This plan was changed several times and the problem compounded by the closing of Vung Tau and Tay Ninh III airfields to C-130 traffic because of required repair. In view of this, close coordination was required between USAFRV, MACV, TMA, 1st Logistical Command Transportation Section and the 25th Infantry Division. The major problem was to insure that the supporting elements were kept apprised of the many changes in arrival dates and modes. The 800 PHILCAGV personnel due to arrive in Saigon by LST on 11 September 1966 were diverted to Cam Ranh Bay. Personnel and equipment were then flown to Tay Ninh III airfield. The airfield had been opened on a temporary basis to receive the PHILCAGV. The balance of the contingent, originally scheduled to arrive by LST over a two month period, was flown in directly from the Phillipines to Tay Ninh III during the period 15 - 19 October 1966. Logistical support presently is being furnished to the PHILCAGV through the US Army Support Command, Saigon activity established at Tay Ninh III to support both US and PHILCAGV elements.

(5) Operation ROBIN (3 Oct - 15 Oct 66). This operation was to support the deployment of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division into Bear Cat. The 1st Infantry Division was designated as the sponsoring unit. The personnel arrived by ship at Vung Tau and the equipment and cargo by ship at Saigon. The cargo was transported by civilian truck to the Long Binh holding area. The drivers were replaced by military drivers for the remainder of the trip to Bear Cat. Military drivers were furnished by the 11th ACR, 2d Bn, 34th Armor and 1st Infantry Division to drive the civilian cargo vehicles and military truck and wheeled vehicles. The 1st Logistical Command provided 50 trucks during the period 11 October - 15 October 1966 to transport personnel and TAT from Vung Tau to Bear Cat. Route security was provided by the 1st Australian Task Force and the 173d Airborne Brigade. In addition to the transportation support, another major logistical effort was in furnishing potable water and refrigeration capabilities to the base camp. As a result of the coordination conferences held between this headquarters and representatives of the units concerned, no gap occurred in the logistical support.
(6) Operation SHENANDOAH (17 Oct - 31 Oct 66). This tactical operation by the 1st Infantry Division was supported by the 1st Logistical Command with a forward support area at Lai Khe and Quan Loi. The initial buildup of three days supply, approximately 894 STON, was accomplished by a land LOC and represented a saving of approximately eighty-nine C-130 sorties. For the first time operations from Lai Khe were supported primarily by a land LOC. This represented a savings of approximately ten C-130 daily sorties. The operation from Quan Loi was supported both by land and air LOC. The land LOC was utilized four times during the operation; the balance of the supplies were brought in by C-123 and C-130 aircraft. From a logistical point of view, this was considered to be the most efficient operation to date. The only backhaul of supplies was approximately 30 STON of critical 2.75 rocket and 40mm ammo.

b. Logistical Planning in coordination with 1st Logistical Command.

In early October of this year, the 1st Logistical Command recommended that units forward all requests for logistical support above the unit's organic capability through this headquarters. This recommendation pertained to specific tactical operations as opposed to "base camp" activities. Subsequent discussions determined that what was actually required were the answers to three basic questions:

(1) Is a Forward Support Area (FSA) required?

(2) What type line of communication (LOC) is recommended?

(3) What is the location of the tactical unit's logistic base?

In effect, the 1st Logistical Command actually was more interested in the overall views of this headquarters as pertained to an operation than it was in the units processing their request through this headquarters.

In line with this headquarters' concept of maintaining close liaison and coordination with the 1st Logistical Command, representatives of the 1st Logistical Command were apprised of planned operations that would require increased logistical support. This was accomplished both by informal briefings and formal presentations of logistical plans and concepts to support future operations. One example of this is the logistical estimate for the support of Operation GADSDEN which was forwarded to the 1st Logistical Command for comment and/or concurrence. This plan included STON by class of supply, truck transportation requirements and MSR's. Another example is the logistical...
concept for the support of Operation ENTEnPRISE, which was forwarded to
the 1st Logistical Command with the request that they develop a logis-
tical concept for the support for the operation. Where feasible, a 1st
Logistical Command representative has accompanied representatives of
this office on reconnaissance flights to check proposed MSR's and areas
of planned operations. In addition to joint planning for operations,
joint trips to units and forward support areas has resulted in many
possible difficulties being resolved before they became problem areas.
It is now agreed that the informal briefings, conferences, logistical
estimates and concepts referred to above meet the requirements presen-
ted by the 1st Logistical Command for adequate advance planning.

c. Conference Planning.

Planning for a II FFORCEV G4 logistics conference,
scheduled for 9 October 1966, was accomplished during the later part of
September and the first part of October. The conference was postponed
until 20 November 1966 due to the visit of the Secretary of Defense on the
date originally planned.

d. Command Overview.

In keeping with the OPCON concept of management by exception,
the policy of accomplishing our mission through the means of frequent
staff visits to units has been increased. Uncovering and solving
problem areas is stressed rather than overall control. In line with
this, charts used for weekly command briefings show only those areas
where deficiencies exist and not the complete stock level posture.
As an outgrowth of the weekly briefing charts, the bimonthly trend
charts follow the same management by exception policy. Charts de-
pict management trends rather than the normal routine activities. See
trend chart example at inclosure 9.

e. Transportation.

(1) General.

The transportation officer has the staff responsi-
bility for monitoring and assisting in all phases of transportation
activities for this headquarters plus the assigned/attached and OPCON
units. His primary function is to receive and process requests for
USAF airlift from II FFORCEV units.

(2) Specific Activities.

(a) Sealift - Process requests from units requiring
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-H
15 November 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(3) Airlift Activities.

(a) Airlift activities consist primarily of receiving, coordinating, obtaining approval/disapproval and passing to higher headquarters all requests for emergency type airlifts. After obtaining the data on an approved request, it is passed back down to the using unit through this headquarters.

(b) In addition, airlift requests for movement via USAF C-123 or C-130 aircraft of headquarters elements and company or larger sized units are processed through this headquarters. These requests are passed into routine TMA channels for coordination and processing. The II FFORCEV Operations Section is informed of the requested moves.

On 4 July 1966, this headquarters submitted a letter to MACV, subject: "Air Force Airlift Capability". This letter was prepared by the G4 Section based on a study which pointed up a serious need to improve the responsiveness and flexibility of Air Force airlift capability to meet changing requirements of the tactical situation. The letter recommended as a solution that Movement Control Teams (MCT) be established to operate at each on-load and off-load airfield. These teams would have direct radio communication with the mission commander and the Air Lift Command Center. It was proposed that the Air Lift Coordinator would have authority to divert, through the mission commander, aircraft to respond to the tactical requirements. The recommendations contained in the letter were taken under study by MACV and the Air Force; as a result, Assault Coordination Officers were established and
ASSIGNED down to brigade level. These teams will participate on a test basis in November, after which the system will be evaluated by both the Air Force and the tactical units. In its initial employment with the 25th Infantry Division, the system responded extremely well and actually saved several hours in reaction time for processing an emergency resupply request.

(1) Mechanical Maintenance. Through coordination with advanced liaison personnel of incoming units it has been possible to preclude many of the maintenance problems, particularly in the area of maintenance support. Because incoming units provided this headquarters with equipment density prior to arrival in country and through coordination with Ist Logistical Command, USARV and local support elements, maintenance support problems were minimized. Additionally, the equipment lists provided a basis for establishing a stock of repair parts at the support level and eliminated many delays in receipt of repair parts that would have been encountered.

(2) Materiel Readiness.

(a) During the reporting period, the results of one complete cycle of maintenance assistance inspections were compiled. The value of these inspections became apparent with the improvement in the maintenance posture.

(b) The Materiel Readiness Officer of each unit was required to be present at each monthly Materiel Readiness meeting held during the reporting period.

(c) During these meetings, maintenance trends, PM indicators, inspections and prescribed load lists (PLL) were evaluated and discussed.

(d) The organizational Maintenance Assistance Inspections were extended to include all major categories of equipment for the next round of quarterly inspections. To date fifty percent of the equipment within the unit has been inspected.

g. Supply.

Logistics Newsletter. With the increase in the number of the units under control of II Field Force Vietnam, it became necessary to develop a vehicle to disseminate information on logistical matters. The II Field Force bimonthly Logistics Newsletter was designed to meet
AVFBC-H

15 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

this need by presenting timely and pertinent items covering all phases of logistics. The items are presented in an informal manner to promote reading and comprehension. The first issue of the newsletter was published on 1 October 1966. Distribution was made to all OPCON and assigned and attached units for the information of commanders and supply personnel. This letter will be published every two months. See inclosure 10.

h. Status of Primary Land LOC's as of 15 October 1966.

(1) For the purpose of this report, the following definitions are provided to describe the status of LOC's:

(a) Red signifies that the route is VC controlled and a major military operation or engineer effort would be required to clear it.

(b) Amber signifies that the route is controlled by neither side. Employing adequate security forces, LOC can be used by RVN, US or FWMA Forces. Frequent incidents occur.

(c) Green signifies that the route is controlled by RVN, US or FWMAF. Minimum security forces are required although isolated incidents may occur. Traffic moves on a regular basis.

(2) National Highway 1.

(a) Go Dau Ha to Saigon, Amber, Class 50.

The Cau Bong Bridge at XT712071 was damaged beyond repair on 6 October 1966. Damage was caused by an M58 Recovery Vehicle pulling a tank dozer. An M476 bridge (Class 50) and new approach roads have been installed to the north of the damaged bridge. A new Bailey Bridge (Class 50) will be installed to the south of the damaged bridge by 1 November 1966. A permanent bridge will be constructed on the site of the damaged panel bridge by public works after the first of the year.

(b) Bien Hoa to Xuan Loc, Amber, Class 40.

(c) Xuan Loc to XT631095, Red, Class 40.

(d) XT631095 to II/III Corps Boundary, Red.

Numerous bridges on this portion of Route 1 have been destroyed. By-passes around destroyed bridges are difficult.
AVFEC-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(3) Interprovincial Route 2 from Xuan Loc to Phuoc Le, Red, Class 24.
Limiting factor on this route is a 40 foot SS Bailey Bridge at YS436692. Plans call for replacement of this bridge.

(4) National Highway 4, Amber, Class 16.
All bridges are limited to one way traffic.

   (a) Gia Dinh to Ben Cat, Amber, Class 30. The gaps of four demolished bridges filled with laterite makes wet season trafficability hazardous.
   (b) Ben Cat to Loc Ninh, Red, Class 20. It is necessary to employ AVLB's to negotiate by-passes on this segment of Route 13.

(6) National Highway 15.
   (a) Long Binh to Bear Cat, Amber, Class 50. Public works bridge projects have recently been completed and eliminate some by-passes.
   (b) Bear Cat to Baria, Red, Class 12. Public works projects scheduled for completion in 1966 will upgrade this portion of the route to class 60.
   (c) Baria to Vung Tau, Green, Class 12. Numerous bridges on this segment of the route limit traffic to Class 12.

(7) Interprovincial Route 16.
   (a) RJ N-1A to XT949121, Amber, Class 20. It is planned to replace the bridge at XT949121 during November. This will upgrade the road from XT949121 to RJ Route 1 to Class 50.
   (b) XT949121 to Song Be Bridge (XT925442), Amber, Class 50. The 1st Engr Bn has constructed five panel bridges on this route. The Song Be River Bridge limits traffic to Class 20 past that point.

(8) National Highway 20, Red, Class 16. Two Class 16 bridges limit traffic to class 16. Work has been completed by 10th ARVN Engineers at Phu Lam village (YT7555) to repair a portion of the road that had been washed out. Civilian traffic is now flowing freely to and from Dalat.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSPOR-65)

(9) National Highway 22.

(a) Go Da Hau to Tay Ninh, Amber, Class 35. The 65th Engineer Battalion in coordination with the 30th Engr Gp (ARVN) completed the upgrade of this portion of the route to Class 35 during September 1966.

(b) Tay Ninh to Trai Bi, Red, Class 45. The limiting factor on this segment of the road is the bridge in Tay Ninh (Class 45). There are no other bridges.

(10) Construction Planned or Underway.

(a) Ministry of Public Works construction is programmed for completion of Class 60 upgrading on National Highway 15 to Phuoc Le by 1 Jan 67. MACDC is now planning the upgrade of Route 15 from Phuoc Le to Vung Tau.

(b) Upgrading plans for Interprovincial Route 16 include construction of a Class 50 panel bridge at XT949121.

(c) Replacement of the Cau Bong Bridge on National Highway 1 with a Class 50 panel bridge by 1 November 1966 and with a permanent bridge after 1 Jan 67.

(d) The 18th Engineer Brigade is preparing the design for the replacement of the Song Be River bridge on Interprovincial Route 1A to Phuoc Vinh.

6. (U) Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations.

a. Civil Affairs.

(1) Although meaningful statistics on the total effort expended in support of construction and repair of civic action projects are not available, it is evident that commanders increased emphasis on the program and more work was done than in the previous quarter.

(2) The number of patients treated under the MEDCAP II program increased from 23,913 last quarter to 111,708 this quarter.

(3) The number of local laborers hired increased from 5,588 last quarter to 6,104 this quarter.

(4) English was taught to 1469 students this quarter as compared to 447 last quarter.
b. Psychological Operations.

(1) Increased aircraft availability, primarily due to Army augmentation of Air Force aircraft resources, raised the total number of PSYOP air missions to 697 during the quarter. Bulk delivery of leaflets to tactical units having organic aircraft allowed those units to target and deliver rapid reaction leaflets in their TAOR's. With new tactical units arriving in country the demand for PSYOP air support is increasing. More aircraft are needed to meet this demand.

(2) A total of 159,610,000 leaflets were disseminated in the III Corps Tactical Zone during the reporting period, as compared with 29,570,000 leaflets in the previous quarter. The 246th PSYOP Co produced 29,910,000 locally, 30,100,000 were supplied by the 6th PSYOP Battalion and 93,100,000 were procured from off shore agencies. An additional 6,500,000 were produced by the 1st Infantry Division. Equipment problems with plate making machines and paper cutters were experienced by the 246th PSYOP Company. These problems did not seriously effect production during this quarter, but may be troublesome as future demands for increased amounts of printed matter are received.

(3) The 246th PSYOP Company supported US/FWMAF in III Corps Tactical Zone with seven mobile loudspeaker teams and two audio visual teams. Supporting the increased number of US/FWMAF units under II FFORCEV operational control taxes the capability of the company. This problem will be alleviated in part upon the arrival of two additional teams in November. As the number of tactical units in Vietnam increases, the demand for field teams will be beyond the capability of the company unless additional PSYOP units are provided.

(4) During the reporting period a total of 741 ralliers were reported in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Of interest is the increased number of ralliers in Long An Province, 187; Hau Nghia Province, 136; and Binh Duong Province, 146. The large number of ralliers can be credited in part to increased ARVN/US/FWMAF activity in these provinces during this quarter. On the other hand, in Tay Ninh Province the number of ralliers dropped from a monthly average of 50 to 15. Although US/FWMAF units have recently been introduced into this province, they have devoted much of their effort to base development. The number of ralliers in Tay Ninh Province should increase as large scale tactical operations get under way.

7. (U) Inspector General.

a. Significant activities for the Inspector General Section for the period 1 August through 31 October 1966 are as follows:
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(1) Fourteen complaints and twenty-two requests for assistance were received during the period. No unfavorable trends were indicated.

(2) A total of three investigations were conducted during the period.

(3) Regulation number 20-1, this headquarters (Inspector General Activities and Procedures) was published during the period.

(4) Special courtesy inspections were conducted on thirteen headquarters and battery sized units during the period. These inspections were conducted to assist units under operational control of this headquarters to prepare for Annual General Inspections by the USARV Inspector General.

b. No adverse trends were indicated nor were any problems encountered during the period.

8. (U) Information.

a. The 7th Public Information Detachment arrived in country and was attached to II Field Force Vietnam on 1 September 1966. The detachment was activated at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on 1 June 1966 under TOE 45-500E (2 Apr 63) as a Presq Camp Headquarters with an authorized strength of seven officers and eleven enlisted men.

b. The detachment departed Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on 8 August 1966 by rail for Oakland Army Terminal, California, where it embarked on the troop ship USNS General William McNeil on 10 August 1966.

c. Upon attachment to II Field Force Vietnam, the 7th PI Det was reorganized by USARV as a field service Forward Area Public Information Team with the mission of providing information support for a corps or logistical area command. The unit was then relieved from attachment to II Field Force Vietnam on 19 September 1966 and attached to the 1st Logistical Command. It is now stationed in the Long Binh Area.

d. The following fact sheets were published by the Information Office, Headquarters, II Field Force during the quarter to support the Command Information Program.

(1) Fact Sheet #12 "Traffic Guides for Vehicle Operations in Vietnam" (30 July 1966)

(2) Fact Sheet #13 "The Black Market and You" (20 Aug 66)
AVFBC-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(3) Fact Sheet #14 "Foot Care" (25 Aug 66)

(4) Fact Sheet #15 "Rabies Control" (25 Aug 66)

(5) Fact Sheet #16 "The Vietnamese Election" (30 Aug 66)

(6) Fact Sheet #17 "Armed Forces Voters Day 1966" (9 Sep 66)

(7) Fact Sheet #18 "Prevention and Treatment of Heat Casualties" (13 Sep 66)

(8) Fact Sheet #19 "Are You Safety Conscious" (24 Sep 66)

(9) Required orientations, films and directives have been conducted, shown and prepared.

e. In addition to daily pickup in Saigon and distribution of the "Stars and Stripes" for units in the area, the Information Office continues to make liaison visits to subordinate units and higher headquarters. The concept of the Information Office continues to be to provide full publicity support to all units under the operational control of this headquarters. Therefore, information teams (press and audio) are constantly in the field supporting the subordinate units, tactical operations and civic action activities.

9. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE.

a. A command policy established that this headquarters would assume general courts-martial jurisdiction over nondivisional, separate battalion and regimental size units which are attached to this headquarters for operational control and which are not assigned or attached to units commanded by general officers. Exceptions to this policy may be made with coordination between Commanding General, USARV and Commanding General, II FFORCEV. As a result of this policy (and ordinary assignments and attachments) the following units came under the general courts-martial jurisdiction of this command:

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion (Target Acquisition), 25th Artillery, attached effective 23 August 1966. 005445 HQ, USARV.

(2) 9th TC (Car)(Corps) assigned effective 23 August 1966. 005521 HQ, USARV.

(3) 552d MP Company assigned effective 23 September 1966. 005953 HQ, USARV.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(4) 44th APU assigned effective 1 October 1966. GO 5953 HQ, USARV.

(5) 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment attached for general courts-martial jurisdiction effective 26 September 1966. GO 5944 HQ, USARV.

(6) 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, attached effective 26 September 1966. GO 5944 HQ, USARV.

(7) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 54th Artillery Group, attached for court-martial jurisdiction effective 1 October 1966. GO 6103 HQ, USARV.

b. The following assigned or attached units were attached to unit indicated for Article 15, Summary and Special Courts-Martial jurisdiction.

(1) HHC II FFORCEV attached to HQ, II FFORCEV Arty effective 6 October 1966. GO 147 HQ II FFORCEV.

(2) 29th CML Det attached to HQ, II FFORCEV Arty effective 6 October 1966. GO 147 HQ II FFORCEV.

(3) 7th Mil Hist Det attached to HQ, II FFORCEV Arty effective 6 October 1966. GO 147 HQ II FFORCEV.

(4) 16th PI Det attached to HQ, II FFORCEV Arty effective 6 October 1966. GO 147 HQ II FFORCEV.

(5) 517th Engr Det attached to HQ, II FFORCEV Arty effective 6 October 1966. GO 147 HQ II FFORCEV.

(6) HBB, 8th Bn (Tgt Acq), 25th Arty attached to HQ, II FFORCEV Arty effective 24 October 1966. GO 176 and GO 185 HQ II FFORCEV.

(7) 44th APU attached to HQ, II FFORCEV Arty effective 14 October 1966. GO 161 HQ II FFORCEV.

(8) 9th TC (Car)(Abn)(Corps) attached to 53d Signal Battalion, effective 6 October 1966. GO 147 HQ II FFORCEV.

(9) 552d MP Co attached to 53d Signal Battalion, effective 14 October 1966. GO 161 HQ II FFORCEV.

c. Units listed in paragraph 9b above were attached to HQ II FFORCEV Arty and 53d Sig Bn for Article 15, Summary and Special Courts-Martial jurisdiction to relieve the Commanding General, II FFORCEV of acting personally in the administration of military justice for minor offenses.
SECTION II: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Item: VC Infrastructure.

Discussion: The ability to properly identify personnel of the VC infrastructure is a problem of considerable magnitude. This step is of necessity the initial one in the elimination of the infrastructure, which in itself is the key to pacification and revolutionary development in the countryside. Present methods used at this headquarters for compiling, collating and standardizing VC infrastructure data manually in card files have proved to be inadequate. Consequently, a meeting was held with personnel from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), and it was decided that CICV is the agency which should establish a compatible automatic data processing system to record information pertaining to the VC infrastructure. As a minimum, the system should be able to retrieve information regarding key personalities in the following categories:

(1) Names and aliases.
(2) Locations (provinces, district, village, hamlet)
(3) Positions held (civil affairs cadre, guerilla, commo-liaison agent)

A conference is to be held in the near future of all interested agencies to determine the best method to establish the system and to insure that all pertinent data is forwarded to CICV.

Observation: The early establishment of the ADP system would materially assist the anti-infrastructure effort.

OPERATIONS/TRANSPORTATION

Item: Clearance for Air Strikes Outside TAOR/AO.

Discussion: Units have requested unplanned air strikes in areas outside of TAOR/AO, stating that ARVN clearance had been obtained. Inquiry by this office has revealed that ARVN approval had not been passed to III Corps in all cases, and III Corps does not consider that clearance for a strike has been obtained unless III Corps has received information on the requested strike and approved it.

Observation: A parallel request for confirmation of ARVN approval must always be passed by G3 Air through II FFORCEV FSCE and III Corps TOC down...
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

to Province Chief level. Only when approved confirmation is passed back through these same channels may the air strike be approved.

Item: Control of Forward Air Strips.

Discussion: During recent airmobile operations conducted by units under operational control of Headquarters, II FFORCEN, there have been several instances of lack of coordination between fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Airfield closures have taken place without any notification to this office or notice to airmen (NOTAM).

Observation: Under the provisions of MACV Directive 95-9, units utilizing forward air strips are required to appoint an Airfield Control Officer (ACO). The ACO should monitor the activities of the Combat Control Team or Pathfinder Team controlling the aircraft and provide G3 Air with information for publishing NOTAMS when the status of the airfield changes. The ACO should attend the planning conference held prior to each airmobile operation in order to coordinate control requirements.

Item: An increasing number of contingency plans require the use of Air Force airlift.

Discussion: Movement of large units over great distances on short notice require planning and coordination. This data should be readily available for each unit and for all possible contingencies.

Observation: When a contingency airlift request has been forwarded to Traffic Management Agency (TMA), they can react immediately if the plan is put into effect. Much valuable time can be saved by computing the passengers and cargo to be moved. Small adjustments to the original estimate can be incorporated after the initial request has been forwarded to the Air Force.

Item: There is a need for accurate and current data on infrequently used forward airfields.

Discussion: Should an airstrip be insecure or in a poor state of repair, it is too late to turn back once an aircraft has departed for its destination.

Observation: The condition of all airstrips should be determined prior to the start of an operation. An Airfield Control Officer (ACO) should be appointed to survey the airstrip.

Item: Dependence on air line of communication (LOC) during the monsoon season.
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

Discussion: Tactical operations based primarily on air LOC can become difficult to support due to poor flying conditions and/or the deterioration of laterite and earthen airstrips.

Observation: Ideally, select a forward support area (FSA) that can be reached by both air and land LOC.

Item: Airlift Coordination Meetings.

Discussion: Airlift of troops, equipment and supplies is a critical factor in the overall conduct of tactical operations.

Observation: Close coordination between the ground tactical unit, II FFORCE, USAF, TMA and support elements is absolutely necessary to reduce the number of emergency airlift requests submitted during a tactical operation.

Item: Overcommitment of Airlift.

Discussion: The number of requests for Air Force airlift has increased steadily during the reporting period. At the same time, the number of aircraft has remained relatively unchanged. This results in an overcommitment of assets. It is apparent that the available assets have approached saturation usage. This fact has been underscored by the number of "postponed" and "carryover" missions which cannot be completed due to the shortage of aircraft. In addition, it is often necessary to upgrade troop movements from "priority 1" to "combat essential" in order to complete missions within desired time limits.

Observation: A shortage of Air Force aircraft will be a steadily increasing problem, and requests will necessarily be completed as priority demands. Commanders should be informed that the availability of airlift is becoming a major planning consideration.

Item: Reduced Capability of Airfields.

Discussion: On several occasions, especially during Operation EL PASO, ATLANTIC CITY and SHENANDOAH, the inability of a given airfield to handle required traffic has created a critical situation. The reduction of airfield capability was caused by:

a. Airfield congestion due to helicopter traffic in and around the origin and destination airfields. This is usually coupled with minimum air traffic control at forward airfields thus creating safety hazards that have resulted in two incidents and one major accident involving contact between fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.
b. Weather: The onset of the monsoon season has turned several airfields, fully suitable for heavy use during dry weather, into "seas of mud", thus causing the airfields to be closed or at least reducing the capability below that necessary to sustain the operation.

Observation: When planning operations from forward airfields, considerable weight should be given to the capability of the airfield under all weather conditions and to the use of adequate air traffic control to reduce airfield congestion. The departure Airfield Coordinating Officer (DACO) role cannot be overemphasized. He must insure that all air traffic is compatible, and he must work closely with the USAF mission commander.

**SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE**

**Item:** Ammunition Expenditures in Excess of ASR.

**Discussion:** Some units have employed one type of weapon for fire support at the exclusion of others. This practice has caused an ammunition expenditure in excess of the ASR for a particular weapon and a depletion of the stocks of that type of ammunition while other ammunition items remain plentiful.

Observation: Commanders must ensure that all available weapon systems are employed to provide a balanced expenditure of ammunition stocks and to preclude depletion of one type round.

**Item:** Depletion of Prestocks.

**Discussion:** Major units have, on occasion, drawn from Skybolt prestocks to support various tactical operations. Because of the limited resupply capability of the Skybolt managers, many of these prestock points have been left for periods of time with supply levels considerably below the stockage objectives. This results in an overall reduction in the effectiveness of the Skybolt system.

Observation: Use of prestock supplies should be limited to those occasions when the use is dictated by tactical necessity. Any unit employing supplies from a prestock point must take action to replenish that point immediately.

**Item:** Commander's Recommendations.

None.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

For the Commander:

JAMES A. ULVENES
Capt, AGC
Asst. AG

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - ACSFOR, Dept of the Army
1 - CINCUSARPAC
3 - CG, USARV
1 - ACofS, G1, II FFORCEV
1 - ACofS, G2, II FFORCEV
10 - ACofS, G3, II FFORCEV
1 - ACofS, G4, II FFORCEV
1 - ACofS, G5, II FFORCEV
5 - 7th Mil Hist Det
AVHGC-DH (30 Dec 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307
2-4 FEB 1967
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—
Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters,
II Field Force Vietnam.

2. (C) Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Item: VC Infrastructure, Section II, Page 31:
The Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) has established an
automatic data processing system which is intended to identify person-
nel of the infrastructure. Although the system is not fully opera-
tional, many experiments are being conducted to determine the best way
to obtain and recall the required information.

b. Reference Paragraph 3c(2), Section I, Page 7: It is cur-
rently planned that the 73d Aviation Company (AS) at Vung Tau will be
placed under operational control of II Field Force Vietnam sometime in
the 4th Quarter of FY 67.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. J. THORNTON
1st Lt. AGC
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
2 copies
nc

DOWNGRADED AT 1 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLAS AFTER 12 YEARS,
DOD DIR 5200.10
### Units Attached/Assigned or under OPCON of II FFORCEV 1 Aug - 31 Oct 66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GAIN</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; HQ CO II FFORCEV (Assigned)</td>
<td>10 Jan 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; HQ Btry II FFORCEV Arty (Assigned)</td>
<td>17 Jan 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div (OPCON)</td>
<td>15 Mar 66</td>
<td>DI AN</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div (-) (OPCON)</td>
<td>22 Mar 66</td>
<td>CU CHI</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde (Sep) (OPCON)</td>
<td>22 Mar 66</td>
<td>BIEN HOA</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Avn Gp (OPCON)</td>
<td>15 Mar 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Chem Det (Attached)</td>
<td>10 Mar 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d Arty Gp (OPCON)</td>
<td>15 Mar 66</td>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Mil His Det (Attached)</td>
<td>1 Jun 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th PI Det (Attached)</td>
<td>4 Jun 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303d RR Bn (Attached)</td>
<td>8 Jun 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Sig Det (Attached)</td>
<td>16 May 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53d Sig Bn (OPCON)</td>
<td>4 Jun 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st Med Det (Attached)</td>
<td>25 Jun 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219th MI Det (Attached)</td>
<td>20 May 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Units Attached/Assigned or under OPCON of II FFORCEV 1 Aug - 31 Oct 66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GAIN</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>517th Engr Det</td>
<td>4 Jun 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Attached)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st ATF (OPCON)</td>
<td></td>
<td>NUI DAT</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196th Inf Bde, Sep (Lt) (OPCON)</td>
<td></td>
<td>TAY NINH</td>
<td>8 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; HQ Btry 8th TAB/25th Arty (Ass)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>13 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Trans Co (Car) (Assigned)</td>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>23 Aug - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 34th Armor (Attached)</td>
<td>12 Sep 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>12 Sep - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>552d MP Co (Assigned)</td>
<td>23 Sep 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>23 Sep - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR (OPCON)</td>
<td>26 Sep 66</td>
<td>XUAN LOC</td>
<td>26 Sep - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th APU (Assigned)</td>
<td>1 Oct 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Oct - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det 32, 5th Weather Sqdn (Attached)</td>
<td>1 Oct 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Oct - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Arty Gp (OPCON)</td>
<td>1 Oct 66</td>
<td>XUAN LOC</td>
<td>1 Oct - 31 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DELETED AT DA

INCL # 3-5
CONFIDENTIAL
25th Infantry Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Bde 4/9 Bn</th>
<th>2/14 Bn</th>
<th>2d Bde 1/5(M) Bn</th>
<th>2/27 Bn</th>
<th>DivArty</th>
<th>3/4 Cav(-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General support</td>
<td>Troops attached to brigades as required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

196th Light Infantry Brigade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2/1 Bn</th>
<th>4/31 Bn</th>
<th>3/21 Bn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ATTLEBORO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

- 1/503 Bn: SIOUX CITY
- 2/503 Bn: ROBIN
- 4/503 Bn: UNIONTOWN
- 4/503 Bn: WINCHESTER

1st Australian Task Force

- 5th RAR: CANBERRA
- 6th RAR: QUEAN BLYAN
- 6th RAR: BATHURST

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

- 1st Sqdn: MEADOWLARK
- 2nd Sqdn: UNIONTOWN
- 3rd Sqdn: MEADOWLARK
- 3rd Sqdn: HICKORY
## IN THIS ISSUE YOU'LL FIND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSION, ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION, ACOfS, G4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOfS, G4 ORGANIZATIONAL CHART</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOfS, G4 TELEPHONE DIRECTORY</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLASS I</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SNEAKIEST ENEMY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GETTING YOUR SHARE?</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THOSE TASTY MCI'S THINKING BIG!</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLASS II &amp; IV</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DID YOU KNOW?</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLASS III &amp; IIIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPID REFUELING REQUIREMENTS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLASS V</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAINTENANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOMOTIVE</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERATOR</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT VEHICLES AND WEAPONS</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIRCRAFT</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECT SUPPORT UNIT</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANNIBALIZATION</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDESIGNATION OF MAINTENANCE SUPPORT UNITS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MISCELLANY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REQUESTS FOR AIR FORCE AIRLIFT (P&amp;O)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A BOOST TO ICE MACHINES (FOOD ADVISOR)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOULD YOU BELIEVE? (SUPPLY)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORRY 'BOUT THAT! (SUPPLY)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE II FIELD FORCE LOGISTICS NEWSLETTER IS PUBLISHED BY G4, II
FORCEV FOR THE INFORMATION OF COMMAND AND SUPPLY PERSONNEL UNDER
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF HQ II FORCEV AS WELL AS ASSIGNED AND ATTACH-
ED UNITS. ITS PURPOSE IS TO DISSEMINATE PERTINENT AND TIMELY ITEMS
OF INTEREST COVERING ALL PHASES OF LOGISTICS, TO FORWARD INFORMATION,
AND TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE. THE NEWSLETTER WELCOMES YOUR SUGGESTIONS,
IDEAS, AND COMMENTS.

THIS IS THE FIRST OF THE SERIES. HOPE YOU FIND IT HELPFUL.

10-11

48
1. The G4 Office is organized and trained to insure adequate logistical support to all units of the Force regardless of the type of operations; G4 coordinates and supervises the logistical support of Force Troops. Utilizing an intimate knowledge of the situation; of the supply, maintenance, and services status of supported units; of tactical plans for forthcoming operations; and of the capabilities of supporting activities; he is responsible for insuring the most rapid and efficient service for supported units as well as to assigned Force Troops. He is, in effect, a coordinating officer between support elements and supported units.

2. The G4 Office is organized as indicated below:
   a. Administrative Branch
   b. Plans and Operations Division
   c. Supply and Services Division

3. The functions of the Administrative Branch and the Divisions are as follows:
   a. The Administrative Branch will:
      (1) Maintain and control classified material; make periodic inventories; conduct security checks as required and maintain classified security check lists and access roster.
      (2) Receive and distribute incoming correspondence; control flow of administrative work; assign work priorities as required, in coordination with Divisions.
      (3) Administratively manage all enlisted personnel.
      (4) Operate consolidated typing pool; review all correspondence for proper military format, accuracy, and neatness.
      (5) Maintain suspense file for all reports; prepare routine administrative reports for dispatch.
      (6) Submit monthly requisition for supplies, equipment, publications and blank forms.
      (7) Control office transportation.
      (8) Perform housekeeping functions.
      (9) Accomplish drafting requirements.
b. The Plans and Operations Division will:

(1) Perform logistical planning for current and future operations and maintain required logistical maps.

(2) Prepare necessary administrative order and logistical annexes to operations plans as required.

(3) Develop and maintain requirements for various classes of supply for different size forces.

(4) Receive all USAF airlift requests from subordinate commands, with exception of requests for resupply of operations in which 1st Log Command has established a Forward Support Area, obtain required approval from this headquarters, and forward requests to higher headquarters.

(5) Compute and maintain aircraft load data based on experience factors obtained from previous operations.

(6) Coordinate with 4th Transportation Command for notification on incoming vessels carrying troops and/or equipment of units assigned or under operational control of this headquarters.

(7) Process requests from units requiring vehicles beyond their organizational capability to move supplies and personnel.

(8) Process requests from units requiring sealift.

(9) Process requests from units requiring highway clearance through Saigon.

(10) Maintain data on MSR's including class of road.

(11) Collect and develop briefing information and present briefings on timely logistical matters.


c. The Supply and Services Division will:

(1) Provide coordination between assigned and supported units, and supporting activities, on all matters concerning technical assistance as pertains to supply, maintenance, ammunition, and services.

(2) Make periodic visits to each direct support maintenance and supply activity under the operational control of IT FFORCEV.

(3) Advise and assist units on acquisition, storage and preparation of Class I and general improvement in the Food Service Program.
(4) Provide guidance in all matters pertaining to materiel readiness and make recommendations for equipment status improvements to the Materiel Readiness Officer.

(5) Prepare plans pertaining to supply, maintenance, ammunition and services in connection with future operations.

(6) Obtain Required Supply Rate ammunition report from OPCON units, consolidate and forward report to USARV.

(7) Research and develop briefing material pertaining to supply and services.
TELEPHONE DIRECTORY
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G4 - AVFBD

Building 3, II FFORCEV Compound

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Quarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col Vernon C. Ramberg</td>
<td>Ofc 204</td>
<td>BH259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPUTY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Col Thomas G. Woods</td>
<td></td>
<td>BH288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SERGEANT MAJOR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMAJ T. P. Farley</td>
<td>Ofc 204</td>
<td>BH245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PLANS &amp; OPERATIONS DIVISION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Col Thomas G. Woods (Chief)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BH288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj W. K. Murray (Asst P&amp;O)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BH249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt J. L. Campbell (Trans)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BH245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC D. J. Rodgers (Trans)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BH245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUPPLY &amp; SERVICES DIVISION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Col Darsey Mason (Chief)</td>
<td>Ofc 221/236</td>
<td>BH288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj J. L. Baker (Maintenance &amp; Mobility)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BH249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj J. A. Chernault (General Supply)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BH245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt F. R. Buttler (General Supply)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BH245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt A. C. Voll (Food Advisor)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BH245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSG R. H. Garrett (Ch Sup Sgt)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BH245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10-6
CLASS I
THE SNEAKIEST ENEMY

Perhaps the sneakiest of all enemy is a family named Food Poison. Meet these enemies by their given names: Sinister Sam, Bad Bart, Wicked Willy, and Pussy Priscilla. They all are members of the same family; they’re all FOOD POISONS. Each can be extremely dangerous, but they need your help to be that way, and you can prevent them from doing their devious work.

Sinister Sam is a chemical compound or agent. You'll find him in insecticides. By spraying, spilling, or otherwise contaminating food, food preparation and/or cooking and feeding utensils with insecticides, ole Sinister Sam will get into the bellies of your troops. Once there he becomes a wildman. He has also been known to act as an agent for OXIDENT. He gets into your food if it is prepared in gray enamel pots and pans which are chipped or damaged. This type equipment is not an item of issue and should not be purchased at the local market. Sinister Sam is sneaky, but you can successfully outwit him. Be 007; stop him every chance you get.

Bad Bart is a guy who knows his way around plants and animals. He may hide in foods obtained from unauthorized sources. He's been notorious for years for hiding in mushrooms and mussels. You can find this same fellow in many of the Vietnamese vegetables and seafood. And beware! Bad Bart is a tough one. Even cooking may not kill him. Don't mess with Bad Bart and he won't mess with you. Don't buy food from unauthorized sources.

Wicked Willy really gets around. You find him everywhere because he's kin to bacteria which is found everywhere in nature. He and many of his buddies are found in improperly processed canned foods. Therefore, do not serve canned food which has an acid or vinegar odor of doubtful nature. Do not warm canned foods which have a doubtful odor of appearance. You also find him lurking while you're preparing food and in leftover food. He reproduces rapidly at temperatures from 50°F to 130°F, and especially between 68°F to 115°F. Prevent him by preparing all food so that cooking is accomplished just prior to serving. And do not allow the following cooked food to stand uncovered at room temperatures: chicken, turkey, pork, and cured ham, cream sauces and fillings, meringues, and custards, potatoes and other starchy foods. Wicked Willy can also affect the digestive tract. When he gets into it, you experience cramps and nausea usually from 12 to 48 hours after eating affected foods. You can avoid him by following sanitary practices of food handling, proper personal hygiene and sanitation, consuming only pasteurized milk products, and heating any questionable food to water boiling point temperatures.
And then there is Pussy Priscilla. She's a real jewel. She's also a genuine imposted passing herself off as food poisoning. She is really a food borne infection. She causes diarrhea, cramps, and nausea--with or without vomiting. She comes in three shades: blonde, brunette, and redhead. As a blonde she causes dysentery by introducing herself into food through unsanitary practices by carriers. As a brunette she causes infection of the intestines by implanting small single-celled animals in the human. And as a redhead she causes trichinosis which is transmitted to people through eating infested pork that is insufficiently cooked. The best way to avoid her is through proper cooking of food and use of properly treated water.

Your best safeguards against the sinisterism of this sneaky family are:

1. Use only items of issue - both food items and kitchen equipment/utensils.

2. Inspect food carefully for contamination. (Beware of scarred and healed-over markings on fruit. This may indicate that farmers are practicing the old Chinese trick of wicking fruit, or that they have injected swampwater into fruits with a hypodermic needle adding weight to the fruit, money to their pocket, and misery to your men.)


4. When cooking is called for, practice proper cooking procedures with special emphasis on timely preparation.

5. Above all, maintain the highest level of sanitation and hygiene standards.

* * *

GETTING YOUR SHARE?

Are you getting your share? The numbers to know are 8970-268-9934. Wow! That's the FSN for Ration Supplement, Sundries Pack. 1st Logistical Command Supply Bulletin Number 48, dtd 9 Aug 66, will give you the whole story on basis of issue, and requisitioning procedures.
Remember though, they are for use only when operating under field conditions in areas not served by exchange facilities. Prevent abuse of this policy. Use them at the right time in the right place.

* * *

THOSE TASTY MCI'S

Eaten any old Meal, Combat, Individual lately? The right kind of inspection, storage, and rotation will go a long way in preventing this. Good "poop" can be found in 1st Logistical Command SB #58, dtd 20 Aug 66.

Quick points to check:

1. Watch the date of pack and check out the SB for current information.

2. Inspect quarterly.

3. Use covered storage. Remember, CONEX containers confine heat and humidity thereby advancing deterioration. They're a bad substitute for warehouse or covered storage.

* * *

THINK BIG!

Turkey time is just around the corner, so it's not too soon to do some big thinking. Make plans right now to have your men say, "That is the best dinner I ever ate in my life." Make it an all out effort on the part of everyone. It's a real chance for mess personnel to show what they can do.

Perhaps most important to a successful holiday meal is planning. Begin about two weeks in advance with a review of the menu, turkey preparation, roasting and carving. Then, 3 or 4 days before the holiday, decide upon the method of serving turkey and ways in which the holiday dinner can be made more attractive.

Good advanced planning will go a long way. Start thinking about it now, and THINK BIG!
DID YOU KNOW?

That 4 ounces of insecticide sprayed from a 50-foot height covers one acre. The insecticide is piped from a 200-gallon tank to a "spinner" nozzle extending from a helicopter. This is one of the aerial spray devices to help fight malaria that is being developed by the U.S. Medical Research and Development Command.

That the Protective Mask has been modified. The new ones are designed so that a canteen may be attached so wearers may drink without unmasking. Also a tube may be coupled to mask allowing wearer to give resuscitation to nerve agent casualties.
CLASS III & IIIA

61

10-13
KEEP 'EM MOVING

The trend nowadays is towards "Keep 'em moving." This means that when things are real hot over there in the bush, the boss wants those choppers over the objective, and not sitting back at base of operation waiting their turn to get a drink. The answer to the logistician's ability to sit down without caution has been found in "rapid refuelling capability." The names of these gadgets are: MINIPORT, BOONDOCK, KINCO, FLYING COW, well, you name it and it's somewhere in the system. The question is: Do you have it, or is it on the way? A better question might be: How many of what do you need to softer the chair cushion? Here is where some planning and analysis can be of great assistance. How about giving the subject a lot of thought, and seeing if there is some point where we can start standardizing in order that back-up support can be provided once the equipment is obtained?
CLASS V

63
10-25
HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

GET ME SOME AMMUNITION UP HERE! How often have you shook to that cry? Of course that is a rhetorical question. How long have you been in the supply business? I suppose the answer to, "How much is enough?", starts with the preparation of the monthly RSR which starts somewhere around the middle of the month preceding the month of requirement.

Here is where the "2" element hauls out the crystal ball and tells the "3" element where Charlie is, how many are there, and how long he will be there. The "3" element then oils up the old slipstick and computes how much ammo it takes to obliterate old Charlie. Then he calls on old man Wisdom to lay the plans to get the job done. It appears now that from the work of these experts, everything is set and just waiting for Charlie to rear his ugly head. But wait, the logistician has got to get these two pieces of paper from the tactician and figure out when he is going to do what and with how much. Here is where the planning begins. If done properly and timely, TAC E's and ER's will be a thing of the past and you should never have to shake from that old familiar cry, "GET ME SOME AMMUNITION UP HERE!"
AUTOMOTIVE

1. Clutch disc and pressure plate failure 2 1/2 ton and 5 ton vehicles.


   b. A portion of this failure can be attributed to improper driver and maintenance practices, facts outlined in the above reference are furnished for emphasis.

      (1) Clutch "free travel" will be adjusted to 2 inches.

      (2) Free travel will be checked at intervals not to exceed 1,000 miles.

      (3) For vehicles engaging in "stop and go" type driving, free travel will be checked weekly.

      (4) Vehicles equipped with multifuel engines, loaded or empty, MUST be started in first gear.

      (5) Vehicles will not be "down-shifted" at high speeds in lieu of brakes.


   a. References:

      (1) Msg (Unclas) USATAC SMOTA-M (NMP) 4 - 11704 Apr 66.

      (2) Msg (Unclas) USATAC SMOTA-M (NMP) 4 - 11705 Apr 66.

   b. Above cited messages were forwarded in response to EIR's submitted to US Army Tank Automotive center and are quoted for information.

"(1) Defective Zenith Carburetor on M151A1 1/2 ton vehicle. Investigation has revealed that deterioration of diaphragm is result of stale gasoline caused by long vehicle storage, which allowed buildup of gum and varnish in the fuel system.

(2) Based on above findings, a change will be made to processing for shipment. In addition, new production diaphragm will be introduced into an oil bath prior to assembly.

(3) Zenith carburetor, FSN 2910-788-8457 is optional with Holley Carburetor, FSN 2910-678-1857 and these two are the only carburetors authorized for use on M151 series vehicles. Empire is manufacturer identification used on Holley carburetor.

77

10-18
3. Battery Maintenance: Seems there is always trouble with batteries. Better get with the driver TM. That is where most of the trouble lies. Are hold-downs tight? Are battery post clamps clean, tight and greased? Is the water at the proper level?

* * *

GENERATOR MAINTENANCE

1. Engineer Ground Equipment:

   a. There is a critical shortage of power generating equipment within the command, therefore, proper emphasis should be placed on maintenance in this area to prevent failures of equipment on hand. Make sure the scheduled services are being performed and that proper operating procedures are being followed.

   b. The Preventive Maintenance Monthly (PS Magazine) issue 164, 1966 carries a very good article on portable generator maintenance checks.

2. Operating Procedure of Generator Sets.

   a. Reference Unclas Ist Log Comd Msg AVLC-CM-G 005305, undated, subject as above.

   b. Applicable portion of reference message is quoted for your information and implementation:

   "1. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR THE STARTING AND STOPS OF ALL GENERATOR SETS AS OUTLINED IN THE APPLICABLE OPERATORS TECHNICAL MANUALS SHOULD BE STRICTLY ADHERED TO.

   2. IN THE MAIN MOST STARTING AND STOPPING PROCEDURES SPECIFY THAT THE VOLTAGE ADJUSTING RHEOSTAT CONTROL BE TURNED FULLY COUNTER-CLOCKWISE AND ALSO THE OPERATOR INSURE THAT THE CIRCUIT BREAKER OR LOAD SWITCH BE IN THE OFF POSITION WHEN STARTING AND STOPPING.

   3. THE BASIC REASON FOR THIS PROCEDURE IS TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO CONTROL DEVICES OF THE SET. IF THE VOLTAGE ADJUSTMENT RHEOSTAT IS NOT TURNED DOWN PRIOR TO STARTING WHEN THE FIELD OF THE GENERATOR IS FLASHED THE FULL IMPACT OF CONTROL CURRENTS IS FELT BY THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR AND OTHER CONTROL DEVICES. THE END RESULTS ARE OVERHEATED OR BURNED OUT RESISTORS, SEMI-CONDUCTOR DEVICES IN THE CIRCUITS RELAYS AND ALSO PRINTED BOARD CIRCUITS."
4. IN ORDER TO PREVENT UNWARRANTED FAILURES OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL COMPONENTS IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT PROPER STARTING AND STOPPING PROCEDURES BE FOLLOWED.

c. Adherence to these procedures will assist in preserving available generator assets.

* * *

COMBAT VEHICLES AND WEAPONS

1. Wheel, Idler, self propelled Howitzer M108 and M109. Wheel, idler FSN 2530-823-5605 is no longer authorized for issue. Future requisitions for subject wheel will cite FSN 2530-823-7113, ordnance part number 11593540. Technical manuals used for preparing requisition should have this stock number entered in ink. When ordering wheel under the new stock number a requisition will also be prepared for FSN 2530-999-1102, Spacer, one of which is required with each two wheels.

2. Use of obturator pad for 175mm M113 on M107 SP vehicle.

   a. The polyurethane obturator pad, drawing 8769484, FSN 1025-015-2975 issued with Gun, 175mm, M113 on M107 SP is not limited to an upper ambient temperature of 40 degrees Fahrenheit. It is considered adequate for use in ambient temperatures up to 125 degrees Fahrenheit.

   b. Some of the early issued pads were slightly larger than specification size and as a result might prevent breech closure at ambient temperatures above 90 degrees Fahrenheit. In this instance, requisition new polyurethane pad and dispose of old pad.

* * *

AIRCRAFT

1. A word on first aid kits: A good mechanic checks his aircraft thoroughly and keeps the maintenance up. He should also check one of the most neglected items in aviation today; the first aid kit. This kit now gets inspected every year by medics, but it will also be inspected during the daily inspection to ascertain that kits are identified in accordance with paragraph 6, figure 1 TB Aviation 10, dated 19 May 1965, and that the seal is intact. If the seal has been broken, a red diagonal will be entered in block 16 and a statement in block 17 of DA Form 2408-13 until a serviceable kit is installed. Kits on which seals are broken will be returned to the station Medical detachment. Remember if the seal is broken, the First Aid Kit is unserviceable. Do not neglect this item and keep it in good condition. It might save your life.
2. Requisitioning Information: Decals

a. Decals are not stocked, stored, or issued as an item of supply.

b. Painting and marking of aircraft should be in accordance with applicable portions of the five-part technical manuals for individual aircraft models and also with TB AVN 7, consistent with the appropriate echelon of maintenance. Existing aircraft markings comprising detailed legends, such as maintenance and service instructions, should be used as a guide in the renewal of both exterior and interior aircraft markings.

c. The appropriate general support maintenance activity should be contacted when painting and marking requirements are beyond the capacity of the using activity.


* * *

DIRECT SUPPORT UNIT

Your Direct Support Unit wishes to get better acquainted with Unit Motor Officers, Motor Sergeants, and Parts Supply Personnel. A closer working relationship makes for better service. Let them know your problems and get to know theirs, mutual assistance will help to get the job done.

* * *

CANNIBALIZATION POINT

Quite often the fastest way to procure a priority 12 type repair part is through your local CP. The 185th Ordnance has numerous vehicles and vehicle components available for cannibalization.

* * *

REDESIGNATION OF MAINTENANCE SUPPORT UNITS

1. Effective 20 July 1966, several Maintenance Support Units were redesignated. These units are listed below giving both their former designation and current designation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMER DESIGNATION</th>
<th>CURRENT DESIGNATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq, 185th Ordnance Battalion</td>
<td>Hq, 185th Maintenance Battalion (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th Ordnance Company (DS)</td>
<td>Maint Support Company, 185th Maintenance Battalion (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Ordnance Company (DS)</td>
<td>19th Maintenance Company (Light)(DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178th Engineer Company (Maint)(DS)</td>
<td>94th Maintenance Company (DS)(DIV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon, 129th Ordnance Company, (C&amp;C)</td>
<td>218th Collection, Classification, and Salvage Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. No changes were made in the designations of the 140th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (GS), the 177th Ordnance Detachment (B&TS), and the 349th Signal Detachment (Rdr Rep).

3. Unit missions and support procedures remain unchanged pending revision of the Long Binh support area maintenance support plan. Telephone numbers and locations of support facilities also remain unchanged.
REQUESTS FOR AIR FORCE AIRLIFT

Getting delays on requests for AF aircraft is easy. Avoiding these delays is easier! Here is all you have to do:

Submit Priority 1 and lower requests directly to your TMA office. (To find your TMA office, check MACV Directive 55-4.)

If you're interested in the background on this, here it is: A conference was held, and probably some staff studies (the C&GS variety, no doubt) were made. The end conclusion was that processing requests for normal resupply through Hq II FFORCEV caused delays in getting the request to the action agency. The official "word" was put out in letter form, subject: Request for Airlift Support, dated 31 August 1966.

* * *

A BOOST TO AN ICE MACHINE

Does your ice-making machines produce ice at the rated capacity? If you have a Pellet Ice-Maker, Model V-2M, the maximum production capacity is 200 pounds every 24 hours. However, this rate of ice-making is based on an average atmospheric temperature of less than 90°F. Therefore, normally when these machines or ones similar to these are used in Vietnam, they can be expected to produce substantially reduced amounts. The largest single thing that can help you increase production on your Pellet Ice-Maker is to readjust the metering device (expansion valve). They are set to meter at normal temperatures. Excessive heat tends to overfeed them which defeats the ability of the machine to maintain the critical 120° temperature difference necessary for the formation of ice. Readjustment of one and one half turns clockwise will limit the pressure which in turn will give you a consistently lower evaporating temperature. Give it a boost, and good icing!

* * *

WOULD YOU BELIEVE?

That rust sweating from a vehicle wheel lug nut is a dead giveaway that the lug nut is loose.

* * *

10-24
SORRY 'BOUT THAT!

But if you don't remove those battery terminal clamps and clean the acid deposit corrosive film from the inner portion of the clamp and the terminal post at least once each month, that battery is going to die; for sure.
UNIT
SUPPLY
SOP

PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY

SUPPLY PROCEDURES FOR
TOE AND TDA UNITS OR
ACTIVITIES

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OCTOBER 1965

INCL # 11
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Para</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment in Excess of TOE Authorization</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveys</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>8a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
<td>8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>8c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III and III A</td>
<td>8d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>8e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of Facilities</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
APO 566

AVFBd

SUBJECT: Supply Standing Operating Procedures

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. PURPOSE: To provide a logistical guide for commanders and supply personnel arriving in Vietnam with assignment to this headquarters.

2. SCOPE: This SOP is applicable to all units assigned or attached to Hq II FFORCEV.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:
   a. Unit commanders are responsible for establishing property book accounts, rendering initial reports, and obtaining necessary supplies and equipment to accomplish assigned mission.

   b. Sponsoring unit commanders are responsible for providing initial billeting and transportation requirements to the advance party and assisting the advance party in obtaining necessities for reception and billeting of the main body.

   c. G4, II FFORCEV is responsible for providing logistical guidance and necessary assistance to unit commanders.

4. GENERAL:
   a. Logistical Support: All units authorized a property book will receive primary logistical support from 1st Logistical Command elements. The primary support element for the Long Binh area is the 29th General Support Group of the US Army Support Command, Saigon.

   b. Engineer Class IV support is provided by the 159th Engr Gp at Long Binh.

   c. Property Book Account: Immediately upon arrival, the Property Book Officer must establish a property book account with MACV using the following procedures:

      (1) Prepare a letter request to Commanding Officer, Transportation Movements Agency, (TMA), MACV, ATTN: MACTM-AGS, APO 96309, requesting that an activity address code be assigned unit.

      (2) Letter may be mailed or hand carried to the Service Section, 2d floor of the M&M Building at Saigon Port, (Granada Compound). Two copies of the movement orders will be attached to the letter. See Appendix II for location.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY 11-1
AVFBD
SUBJECT: Supply Standing Operating Procedures

5. EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF TOE AUTHORIZATION: Upon determining that additional equipment over and above TOE authorization is required, a USARV Form 47, with requisition attached, will be forwarded through this headquarters, ATTN: AVFBD, to USARV for approval. Upon receipt of approval, items will be drawn from 1st Log Comd supply system. Approval of the Form 47 does not constitute an MTOE.

6. REPORTS OF SURVEY: Surveys will be prepared and forwarded to the next level of command for appointment of a Surveying Officer, IAW AR 735-11 as changed. After completion by the Surveying Officer, the Appointing Authority will complete the report through block 25 and forward to Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command, Saigon, for Installation Commander's action.

7. REPORTS REQUIRED:

   b. Commercial Design Vehicle Report. For units with commercial design vehicles only. Report must be submitted within 30 days after arrival in country. USARV Reg 58-6, Administrative and Commercial Design Vehicle Requisitioning, Allocation, Control and Reporting Procedures.


8. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT BY CLASS OF SUPPLY:
   a. Class I: (1) Issue cycle for nonperishable components of type A ration 2 - 2 - 3 (M - W - F).
      (2) Perishable components must be picked up from issue point NLT 1000 hrs daily.
      (3) Request for type A (and/or B) rations should be submitted to the supporting unit 10 - 14 days in advance of consumption date.
      (4) Ration Request, DA Form 2970, must be prepared in dupe, signed by the Mess Officer or Company Commander, prior to issue of type A (and/or B) rations.
      (5) Request for Issue, DD Form 1150-1, is required for drawing C rations for basic load or field use.
AVFRED

SUBJECT: Supply Standing Operating Procedures

(6) Coordination with supporting unit prior to opening mess is required so that rations can be programmed.

(7) Signature cards must be prepared by unit prior to issue of rations.

(8) Condiments are issued approximately three (3) times each month. Exact dates will be posted at Class I Supply Point Office.

(9) Ice is issued based on number of meals requested. Approximately 3 lbs per man per day is authorized.

(10) Cash Collection Sheets, DD Form 715, are issued from the Class I Supply Point and are accountable documents.

(11) Indigenous personnel will not be allowed to work in mess halls prior to undergoing a physical examination. Further information may be obtained by contacting the 61st Medical Detachment (MBL), Hurricane 250.

(12) Minor mess hall improvements and beautification projects may be paid for with imprest funds. Imprest fund accounts may be established by units operating a troop mess, in accordance with para 5, I FFORCES Regulation 37-6 and para 6, USARV Regulation 37-6. A letter request, with complete justification to include anticipated monthly expenditures and amount of funds requested, should be sent to CG, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: Comptroller.

(13) Basic lawn of C rations will be maintained IAW AR 31-60 and MACV Dir 30-2.

(14) A supply of Disinfectant, Food Service, Chlorine, FSN 6840-270-8172, will be on hand in all messes for washing vegetables.

(15) Cook's whites are issued through unit supply channels.

(16) Ration Supplement, Sundries Pack, FSN 8970-268-9934 is authorized for issue only to units actually operating under field conditions in areas not served by exchange facilities. Issue is controlled by 1st Log Comd IAW 1st Log Comd Supply Bulletin Nr. 48, 9 Aug 66.

b. Class II: (1) Request for generator and wheeled vehicle repair parts are submitted to the 185th Maintenance Battalion (Long Binh) on DD Form 2765-1. See Appendix I for location.

(2) Requests for other supplies, except Medical, Signal Crypto and Special Services, are submitted on DD Form 2765-1 to 624th Supply & Services Company. DA Form 2407 is prepared and submitted with footwear for classification and/or repair. If footwear is classified not economically repairable, direct exchange can be effected with DD Form 1150-1.
AVFBD
SUBJECT: Supply Standing Operating Procedures

Direct exchange of clothing items can be effected on DD Form 1150-1. Turn in and issue days are Monday, Wednesday and Friday. See Appendix I for location.

(4) Expendable office supplies and housekeeping supplies are issued from the Self Service Supply Center operated by the 624th Supply & Services Company. A "country store" stockage list may be obtained from the SSSC.

(5) Office machine and furniture repair shops are located at the Rice Mill, Area Nr. 4, in Saigon. DA Form 2407 will be prepared on items turned in for repair. See Appendix II for location.

c. Class IV (Engineer): (1) Requests for construction materials for new construction under the self-help program are submitted on DA Form 2496-1 (in dupe), with consolidated bill of material (in dupe) and DD Form 2765-1 for each line item, through Engineer Section, Hq, II FORCEV to S3, 159th Engineer Group. Upon approval, 159th Engineer Group will pass DD Forms 2765-1 to Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) in Saigon. PA&E will edit requests and notify requesting unit when and where to pick up supplies. Transportation is a unit responsibility. See Appendix I for location of PA&E storage areas in Long Binh Area.

(2) Requests for construction materials for alteration, change or repair of existing facilities are submitted on Job Order Request, DA Form 2701. DA Form 2701 will include bill of materials required and a sketch of proposed use, and will be routed thru Headquarters Commandant, Hq, II FORCEV for signature as requestor, to Post Engineer, Long Binh Sub-Area Command. If approved by Post Engineer, PA&E will issue supplies and notify unit when and where to effect pick up. See Appendix I for locations.

(3) Field fortification material is requested on DD Form 2765-1 (one per line item). DD Form 2765-1's should be hand carried to the S4, 159th Engr Gp for approval. The 2765's will be forwarded to PA&E Storage Area Nr. 207 for release and issue. See Appendix I for location.

d. Class III & IIIA: (1) Class III basic load is prescribed by unit commander.

(2) Class III dispensing station is operated by the 624th Supply & Services Company, located at Long Binh. See Appendix I for location.

(3) Signature receipt for MOGAS and/or Diesel at dispensing point.

(4) Basic load of oil, greases and lubricants is maintained as prescribed by the unit commander.
SUBJECT: Supply Standing Operating Procedures

(5) Oils, greases and lubricants are requested on DD Form 2765-1 from the 624th Supply & Services Company, Long Binh.

(6) The Class III dispensing station is open seven days a week, 24 hours each day.

(7) Units authorized aircraft may contact the II FFORCEV G4 Section for information on refueling requirements.

   e. Class V: (1) A basic load of ammo will be maintained as prescribed in TA 23-100. Basic loads for some common type weapons are as follows:

   (a) Rifle M14 - 100 rounds per weapon - Ball Ammo.

   (b) Pistol, Caliber .45 - 21 rounds per weapon.

   (c) 3.5" Rocket Launcher - 3 rounds per weapon.

   (2) Resupply of basic load and special requirements are requested on DA Form 581 through the 3d Ordnance Battalion (Ammo). See Appendix I for location.

9. LOCATION OF FACILITIES: Appendices I and II show locations of various supply and support activities in the Saigon-Cholon and Long Binh areas.

10. REFERENCES:

   a. AR 711-5, Army Equipment Status Reporting System

   b. AR 735-11, Accounting for Lost, Damaged, and Destroyed Property

   c. USARV Reg 37-6, Financial Administration

   d. USARV Reg 58-6, Motor Transportation

   e. USARV Reg 701-5, Logistics Responsibilities POL Supply Procedures

   f. USARV Reg 711-5, Army Equipment Status Report
SUBJECT: Supply Standing Operating Procedures:

g. II FORCEN Rev. 37-6, Procurement of Supplies Within Vietnam
h. II FORCEN Rev. 750-20, Materiel Readiness

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Robert L. Alderman
Major, AGC
Asst AG

2 Appendices
1. Long Binh Sub-area sketch
2. Saigon Supply Points

DISTRIBUTION:
Special
DELETED AT DA

INCL #12  84
## Statistical Summary
### Tactical Air Support
1 August - 31 October 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US Air Force</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>VNAF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total air sorties during period:</td>
<td>9,221</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>3,045</td>
<td><strong>12,418</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Number sorties flown by US aircraft in support of ARVN:</td>
<td>4,043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Number sorties flown by VNAF in support of ARVN:</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Total number sorties flown in support of ARVN:</td>
<td><strong>6,033</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Number sorties flown by US aircraft in support of US Forces:</td>
<td>5,310</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Number sorties flown by VNAF aircraft in support of US Forces:</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Total number sorties flown in support of US Forces:</td>
<td><strong>6,385</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Number SKY SPOT missions flown in support of ARVN:</td>
<td>263</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Number SKY SPOT missions flown in support of US:</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Results of air strikes</td>
<td>KIA (BC)</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>16,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KIA (EST)</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>8,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structures destroyed</td>
<td>3,124</td>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>409,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structures damaged</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>NAPALM</td>
<td>11,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary explosions</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>20mm</td>
<td><strong>493,669</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

INCL # 13

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 Aug to 31 Oct 1966.

CG, II Field Force Vietnam

15 November 1966

N/A

N/A

N/A

DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310