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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 8-8-1 U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period 15 October 1969 to 27 July 1971 (U)

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Col H. D. Smith, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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VERNE L. BOWERS
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96370

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - Colonel H. D. Smith

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310


2. Colonel Smith is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DA NANG
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVCD-CO

27 July 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report (U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHC-DST
APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) Reference: USARV Regulation 1-3, Subject: Senior Officer's Debriefing Program.

2. (U) General:

This report is submitted in accordance with the cited reference. During my tenure as commander, the command has undergone a vastly increased mission and concurrently has expanded in strength. Although the exodus of the 3d Marine Division caused elements of the command to assume additional missions in the northern I Military Region, it was not until the announcement of additional withdrawals by the President in December 1969 that the command was called upon to plan and then execute actions necessary to assume the common service support mission for the I Military Region from the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang. Accordingly, the efforts of the command have been oriented toward this tremendous undertaking while, at the same time, pursuing accomplishment of the current mission. The report will be functionally oriented for clarity with comments pertaining to specific functions attached as annexes. I have purposely omitted statistical information since reports, to include Reviews and Analyses, both from this headquarters and that of the 1st Logistical Command, are deemed sufficient for this purpose. Likewise, ORLL's and historical reports submitted from this headquarters provide...
27 July 1970

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SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report (U)

specifies and details to include those applicable to the assumption of the
common service support mission from the US Naval Support Activity,
Da Nang.

3. (c) Comments/Observations:

   a. The supply system in Vietnam is the most responsive that I have
      ever known. Where I found that units were experiencing shortages, in
      general, it has turned out that they had not placed requisitions or that
      the requisitions which they considered valid were, in fact, invalid.

   b. Material readiness rates in Vietnam have been across the board been
      the highest that I have witnessed anywhere in my more than 25 years of
      Army service. This can be attributed to three things: the equipment
      itself, for the most part, is well engineered and designed to provide
      long hours of service; the supply system as noted above is remarkably
      effective; adequate maintenance facilities are available; and, where
      maintenance management is at or above par, deadline rates can be
      expected to be low.

   c. The secret of an effective maintenance system lies in proper
      maintenance management. No matter how proficient the mechanics or
      the sophistication of their tools and equipment might be, without effective
      maintenance management production will be minimal. Proper utilization
      of the production control board at the direct support level is the key to
      effective and timely maintenance support to using units.

   d. Effective transportation management is vital to any logistical
      operation and particularly to that in MR-1. Providing the proper mix of
      over-the-road, rail and sea transportation requires astute management
      and constant attention. Such management and attention must be oriented
      to the commodity or class of supply being moved. When we shifted from
      parcel post (and thereby air transportation) to over-the-road movement
      of Class IX repair parts from the Army depot to outlying direct support
      units, as much as five days of shipping time were saved. This, in turn,
      impacted on the volume of supplies required in the system and also on
      the timeliness of repair of materiel which was delayed. The increased
utilization of the rail system between Da Nang and Phu Bai has materially reduced the necessity for both over-the-road and sea transportation for low priority goods, such as beer, soda, lumber, rations and some fuel. As this mode of transportation can be utilized more extensively, reduction in equipment necessary for other modes can be made.

e. Single management of the total transportation system in MR-I should well afford some additional economies. For example, economies in the use of drayage transportation have already been effected by the throughput of Class I and Class IV commodities direct from the Deep Water Port to the ultimate customer. Additional economies of this nature can be expected.

f. As Local Nationals can be trained in many of the logistical skills such as truck driving, key punch operation, food handling, warehousing, receiving, shipping, MHE operation, and so forth, Type A military units can be effectively changed to Type B units and ultimately can be reduced to TDA organizations that would include a minimum of US Army managerial personnel.

g. Through the medium of Project Buddy, the command has been quite successful in providing on-the-job training and classes for the ARVN logistical personnel. Training has been conducted, and is being conducted, in engine diagnostic techniques, machine shop operation, radar maintenance techniques, ammunition supply operations, warehousing and depot operation techniques and in other similar areas. ARVN personnel are being introduced into shallow draft port operations at Chu Lai, while efforts are being made to do the same at Da Nang and Tan Ky.

h. Retrograde and disposal operations, while among the more important of the command's several missions, will continue to increase in importance as more and more troops are withdrawn from MR-I. Accordingly, it is doubly important to maintain pressure on the reduction of excesses in forward DS units, on the evacuation of unserviceables in a timely manner and on the removal from the battlefield of damaged materiel.
SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report (U)

1. Detailed plans should be made prior to the closeout of any supply operation whether it be at direct support or depot level. Failure to adequately plan will inevitably bottleneck the operation at some point in the system with resultant losses of time and material.

H. D. SMITH
Colonel, OrdC
Commanding
Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang (See Figure 1), being the senior logistic headquarters in Military Region I (MR-I), has responsibilities which span the entire MR-I. The headquarters maintains command/control of the two general support groups, which are the main US Army logistic operating elements in MR-I, plus the more specialized units whose missions cover the military region or whose missions do not relate completely to either of the groups. These latter units include the 5th Transportation Command, that operates the port in Da Nang; the US Army Depot, that provides supply support for the US forces in the entire military region; the 528th Ammunition Battalion, that has responsibility for ammunition service throughout the military region; the 516th Personnel Service Company that provides centralized administrative support for all Da Nang units; and the 2nd Security Company that provides security for the support command elements and certain other facilities throughout the Da Nang area. The US Army, Vietnam China Beach R&R Center, which has a Vietnam-wide support function, is also under the administrative and logistic supervision of the support command. Several specialized detachments are assigned to the headquarters and/or headquarters detachment to make available special skills required for mission accomplishment.

The support command headquarters, in order to provide command and control over so many diverse activities, is functionally organized (See Figure 2). Under the Chief of Staff are nine primary staff officers and seven special staff officers. Each functional area is supervised by an Assistant Chief of Staff, normally in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel. As an example, all maintenance activities, to include those under commercial contract, are supervised by the ACoS, Maintenance. Likewise, the ACoS, Ammunition supervises the entire Class V supply system. The ACoS, Transportation is responsible for the management of all modes of transportation. Unique to the support command staff is the ACoS, Security, Plans and Operations. This officer is the principal coordinator of the staff where operational matters are concerned and it
is upon him that the Chief of Staff depends for the pulling together of actions which involve more than one element of the staff. It is only through such intensive management and through the amassing of statistical data pertaining to these functional areas that the support command commander is able to evaluate whether or not the mission is being executed effectively and efficiently. In addition, the support command commander and his deputy make daily visits both to local and to outlying areas to witness operations at field installations. The key to adequate command and control of this type of logistical enterprise therefore is a combination of field visits on a daily basis and the receipt and analysis of statistics that are the end product of a good management information system.

The principal means of command/control used by the headquarters are telephone (both land line and radio relay) to the major subordinate units, voice radio, courier and signal center support, and a secure radio teletype net, which links the support command with most of the major subordinate commands. The absence of secure voice communications within the entire support command hinders and slows to some degree the handling of classified traffic; however, a means of secure voice communication, using the acronym AUTOSEVOCOM, is available for use in contacts with US Army XXIV Corps, US Army, Vietnam, and major tactical commands supported.

The support command is heavily dependent on air transportation for use in command and staff visits due to the size of the supported area and the wide distribution of the units of the command. While the availability of aviation support has been generally acceptable, the attachment of a small helicopter operating unit of two aircraft, or the "dedication" of a helicopter solely for daily use of the commander and his staff, would materially improve the command and control of this inordinately large and dispersed organization.

The physical configuration of MR-I, together with the location and concentration of tactical units, both combat and combat support units, dictated that the organization of combat service support units be rather unique. While it is true that in Vietnam the logistical island concept is used extensively, and particularly where support commands are concerned, it is also true that within support commands, and particularly in MR-I, sub-islands inside the logistical island have been created.
Within the US Army Support Command, Da Nang, only two so-called "pure" battalions are organized. These are the 39th Transportation Battalion, which manages four truck companies north of the Hai Van Pass, and the 528th Ammunition Battalion which manages three ordnance ammunition companies located throughout the military region. Other battalions are unique in their organization. For all practical purposes, there are four logistical sub-islands in MR-I. Two exist north of the Hai Van Pass, at Quang Tri and Phu Bai, and two exist south of the Hai Van Pass, at Da Nang and Chu Lai. Command and control headquarters are at all four of these locations, and are tailored to meet the specific requirements of the location concerned.

North of the Hai Van Pass, the 26th General Support Group (See Figure 3) is headquartered at Phu Bai. The Commanding Officer of this unit is responsible to the Commanding Officer of the US Army Support Command Da Nang for all logistical support aspects north of the Hai Van Pass with the exception of Class V support. As the senior logistical officer in that area, he is also charged with overseeing the Class V mission although direct responsibility rests with the Commanding Officer of the 528th Ammunition Battalion at Da Nang. In other words, the 26th General Support Group Commander acts as a stepfather to the ammunition company in his area of operations. Other than the 39th Transportation Battalion, which is the principal source of transportation assets north of the Hai Van Pass, the 26th Group has, as command and control sub-elements, the 63rd Maintenance Battalion at Quang Tri, the 2nd Maintenance Battalion at Phu Bai, and the 663rd Transportation Command (Provisional) at Tan My.

Although organized by TO&E to be managerial headquarters of a maintenance unit, the 63rd Maintenance Battalion, as used in the northern part of MR-I, is a logistical management headquarters. Attached to the battalion in addition to its main support company, is one maintenance company, the 178th Maintenance Company at Dong Ha, which supports the 3/5th Armored Cavalry Squadron and the 108th Artillery Group. Similarly attached is the 625th Supply and Service Company that provides to all US Army elements in the Quang Tri/Dong Ha area Class I, II and IV support as well as support in the form of services, such as field laundry and bath. To provide local haul, particularly from the ammunition supply point at Quang Tri to the various fire support bases occupied by heavy artillery of the 108th Artillery Group, the 63rd Maintenance Company has attached the 57th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) equipped with 5 ton cargo trucks.
and with some 5 ton tractors that are married up with 5,000 gallon tankers. These tankers are used to resupply the Quang Tri tank farms with MOGAS, AVGAS and diesel fuel from the distribution point at the Tan My Ramp in daily line haul of these POL products. Management of the Quang Tri tank farm and operation of the JP4 pipeline from Camp Evans to Quang Tri is carried out by the 848th Quartermaster POL Platoon. Specialized APU and finance, which provide area coverage type missions, are also attached. Thus, the Commanding Officer of the 63rd Maintenance Battalion, while ostensibly a maintenance officer, has had to become qualified in all aspects of logistical support. Likewise, the staff normally called upon to provide maintenance management is required to provide logistical management and has had to be augmented by officer personnel with military occupational specialities other than those normally found in a battalion headquarters of this type.

The same situation exists with the 2nd Maintenance Battalion at Phu Bai. This battalion has attached to it the 67th Maintenance Company (Divisional-D/S), located at Camp Eagle, that provides direct support maintenance for non-divisional units in the Camp Eagle area and in addition provides back-up support for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), and the 578th Light Equipment Maintenance Company that provides general support maintenance for communication electronic equipment and engineer generators for the entire military region. In addition, this battalion has attached the 148th Supply & Service Company that provides Class I, II and IV supply support and field laundry to US Army elements in the Phu Bai area. This company also provides bakery, self service supply center, and graves registration services to the entire northern MR-1.

Attached for administration, but under operational control of the 26th General Support Group Headquarters, is the 528th Quartermaster (POL) Company that manages the tank farm and bag farms in the Phu Bai area, provides line haul to move MOGAS, AVGAS and diesel fuel from the Tan My Ramp to the Phu Bai/Camp Eagle area, and operates the pipeline from Tan My north to Camp Evans.

At the time the command assumed the operation at the Tan My Ramp from the US Navy, it became necessary to provide another tailored organization. Accordingly, the 863rd Transportation Command (Provisional) was organized as a command and control headquarters to manage the operation of the 403rd
Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer) and the 1st Security Company. The 403rd Terminal Transfer Company was further tailored to operate the ramp at Tan My. The company headquarters plus one terminal transfer platoon and a platoon of the 544th Medium Boat Company were married to form an operating unit for the Tan My/Col Co Island complex. The 1st Security Company was formed to provide local security for this same complex. To round out this operation an element of the 528th Quartermaster POL Company was attached to the 863rd at Tan My to operate the tank farm and to receive bulk POL through the sealines.

The 39th Transportation Battalion, mentioned earlier as one of the two "pure" battalions, provides line haul, local haul and ramp clearance transportation for the northern portion of MR-I, using a variety of trucks ranging in capacity from 2½ ton to 12 ton S&P. The battalion also provides administrative troop transportation back-up to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and operates the unaccompanied baggage facility at Phu Bai.

In order to manage these diverse missions, the 26th General Support Group, at Phu Bai, has also been tailored through the addition of various officers with specified military occupational specialities. As is true with all logistical elements in MR-I, the Group is also directly responsible for the control of a specified portion of the Phu Bai combat base perimeter. Finally, the Group is charged with operating all non-appropriated fund clubs other than those which are peculiar to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

South of the Hai Van Pass, the 80th General Support Group (See Figure 4) provides almost the same type of managerial expertise as is found in the 26th General Support Group. Prior to December 1969, this headquarters had one battalion headquarters under its supervision. It likewise had eight separate companies reporting directly to it.

In December 1969, the 92nd Service Battalion was organized at Da Nang and given the command and control mission over six of the separate companies previously reporting to the 80th Group. The 92nd is probably the most difficult battalion size unit to manage in the entire support
command. Attached to this battalion headquarters is the 363rd Transportation Truck Company that provides line haul between Da Nang and Phu Bai and Da Nang and Chu Lai; the 85th Light Equipment Maintenance Company that provides direct support maintenance to all Army elements in the Da Nang area; the 334th Supply and Service Company that provides retail supply support to all Army elements in the Da Nang area and in addition operates a laundry, a wholesale Class III package distribution point for all of the MR-I, and the Self Service Supply Center that provides for all US military elements in the Da Nang area; the 156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company that provides general support maintenance for automotive, artillery and fire control equipment for the entire MR-I; the 633rd Collection, Classification and Salvage Company that provides collection, classification and salvage functions for all Army elements in MR-I and the Property Disposal Company that operates property disposal points at Tan My, Da Nang and Chu Lai for the receipt of all excess property of US origin in the MR. This diversified mission has required that this battalion headquarters be carefully staffed with personnel schooled in the many disciplines involved.

In a similar manner at Chu Lai, the 57th Transportation Battalion (Truck) has been appropriately staffed in order to provide command and control for the diverse units under its command. This battalion, collocated with the headquarters and special troops of the Americal Division at Chu Lai combat base is responsible for all types of logistical support to non-divisional units in the area and in addition provides back-up support in certain commodities for the Americal Division. The 226th Supply and Service Company, with its attachments, provides Class I, II and IV supply, bakery support, field laundry and bath services, and package Class III supply to all elements in the area of operation of the Americal Division. It also operates the Self Service Supply Center at Chu Lai. Attached to the company is a Pipeline Platoon of the 525th Quartermaster POL Company that operates a POL terminal and two tank farms at Chu Lai. Direct support maintenance for non-divisional units in the area is provided by the 596th Light Maintenance Company which is also attached to the 57th Transportation Battalion. Local and line haul to include ramp clearance is provided by the 63rd Transportation Company of the battalion. This company provides line haul to include POL distribution daily to the 11th Infantry Brigade at Duc Pho. It likewise supports the
23rd Supply and Transportation Battalion of the Americal Division when required. Using its organic assets, it clears the ramp at Chu Lai on a daily basis. To operate the ramp at Chu Lai, the 544th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) (less one platoon at Tan My) has attached to it a Terminal Transfer Platoon of the 403rd Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer). This company, augmented by additional forklifts, discharges all craft at the Sand Ramp at Chu Lai and in addition back loads craft when necessary. Thus, the Battalion Commander of the 57th Transportation Battalion has to be schooled in many disciplines in order to effectively carry out his job.

At Da Nang, the 80th General Support Group, in addition to its normal mission of providing command and control of its two assigned battalions and separate companies, must provide housekeeping capabilities in support of the US Army Support Command troops in the Da Nang area. This includes the provision of billets for its own officer personnel as well as those of the Support Command Headquarters plus the responsibility for the operation of the clubs and messes in the Da Nang area.

The US Army Depot in Da Nang, previously operated as the 34th Supply and Service Battalion with six separate companies, has been reorganized during the period into a TDA unit, which is composed of the normal sub-elements found in a typical Army depot (See Figure 5). While this unit, in its current configuration, is relatively new, it appears that the only problem that may be associated with its operation is that of having to operate in three separate locations. Having taken over the mission of the Naval Support Activity Depot in Da Nang on 1 July 1970, the Depot Headquarters has now moved to the previous location of that Depot and in addition has continued to operate its previous depot location and a large Class IV yard in the Da Nang East area. As supplies are drawn down and units move from the Da Nang area, at least one and probably both, of the outlying facilities can be closed. Hence, in the foreseeable future, the Depot Commander will have all of his assets, both manpower and materiel, within a single location.

The problem concerning command and control of the 528th Ammunition Battalion is one of distance and communications (See Figure 6). These are problems which are found in any unit where subordinate elements are scattered over a 200 mile span. Use of a special radio teletype net to link the ammunition supply points within the battalion has materially
enhanced the operation and has provided much needed flexibility to the ammunition supply system in MR-I.

The 5th Transportation Command (Terminal A) (See Figure 7) joined the US Army Support Command, Da Nang, on 1 June 1970. As a Terminal Command Headquarters, it is organized to provide command and control of one or more terminal transfer battalions and associated units. The command is charged with the responsibility of operating the port complex at Da Nang, that is the largest port operation in Vietnam, and in addition, is charged with the supervision of the drayage contract which provides for port clearance. To perform this mission, the commander has, in addition to his staff, two transportation companies (terminal service), a transportation company (medium boat), and a transportation company (heavy boat). In order to effectively perform this mission, much tailoring of individual companies has been necessary. Because of the number of US Navy craft taken over to provide the intrazone shuttle of supplies between Da Nang and Tan My and Da Nang and Chu Lai, the heavy boat company has, of necessity, been augmented by utilizing personnel from within the Transportation Command resources. The medium boat company, besides its organic assets, has taken over many lighterage craft used by the US Navy in the operation of the Da Nang port. The 264th Transportation Company (Terminal Service), which normally would provide stevedore gangs at the Deep Water Port, has instead been utilized to provide checker and documentation personnel and gang supervisors for the 22 Local National gangs that provide stevedoring services at the Deep Water Port. In addition, stevedoring services are provided by contract and, in particular, all ammunition discharge is provided by contract stevedores. The other terminal service company, plus a terminal transfer platoon, operates the two shallow draft ramps in the Da Nang area.

One last subject that I would like to address under the title of Command and Control is that of the management of the Supply and Service Company. There are four such companies in this command. In addition to the normal problems in commanding a company (particularly in Vietnam), the company commander is charged with a multitude of different responsibilities. These include the operation of Class I, Class II and Class III (Package) and Self Service Supply Centers and may also include the operation of a bakery, a field laundry, and/or a graves
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registration point. The thrust of my comment is that today's Quartermaster Captain, unless he is a very unusual person, has neither the experience nor the maturity to cope with such a large organization with so many diverse responsibilities. Accordingly, consideration should be given to placing a Major in command of this type of organization with a Captain as his Executive Officer.
Figure 1   US Army Support Command, Da Nang Command Organization Chart (Simplified)
Figure 2  Organization of HQ, US Army Support Command, Da Nang  (Simplified)
Figure 3  26th General Support Group (Simplified)
Figure 4  80th General Support Group (Simplified)
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5th Trans Comd (Terminal A)

264th Trans Co (Tml Svc)  870th Trans Co (Tml Svc)  329th Trans Co (Hvy Bt)  1098th Trans Co (Mdm Bt)

Figure 7  5th Transportation Command (Terminal A) (Simplified)

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On 15 October 1969, the Support Command was responsible for the provision of Army-peculiar Class II and IX materiel from the US Army Field Depot, Da Nang and for the retail support of Class I, III, and IV supplies to Army units within Military Region I (MR-I). The retail mission was carried out by four supply and service companies, located at Quang Tri, Phu Bai, Da Nang and Chu Lai.

**CLASS I SUPPORT**

Prior to 1 July 1970 the US Navy was responsible for receiving through the Da Nang Port the necessary Class I supplies for the support of all personnel in MR-I. This included dry rations, frozen foods, fresh fruits and vegetables. Frozen foods and fresh fruits and vegetables were introduced into the command through shipment by reefer ships and/or Sealand van. Class I supplies destined for Northern MR-I were moved either by sea, by rail or by truck. Ultimate destinations were the Class I supply points at Quang Tri and Phu Bai. Adequate facilities existed at both Class I supply points for the maintenance of seven days of dry and refrigerated rations and three days of combat rations. Milk, ice cream, fresh fruits and vegetables, and frozen foods are moved overland using Sealand vans pulled by Army tractors. Milk and ice cream for support of troops in Da Nang, Phu Bai and Camp Eagle were produced by the Foremost Dairy under contract to the Navy. Bread for the NMR-I was provided by the Army bakery at Phu Bai.

South of the Hai Van Pass, rations were issued in the Da Nang area from the Naval Support Activity Depot and in the Chu Lai area from the Naval Support Activity Sub-Depot. At Da Nang, an Army Liaison Group maintained the proper records to provide for ration breakdown to Army units in the Da Nang area. Likewise, this group provided the interface between the Army and Navy elements north of the Hai Van Pass for shipments out of the Naval Support Activity Depot. In Chu Lai, rations were issued directly from the Naval Sub-Depot to an Army unit which provided a breakdown to those elements of the Americal Division and non-divisional units in the Chu Lai area. Milk and milk products were provided by the Foremost Dairy at...
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Chu Lai while bread was provided by the Army bakery. Prior to 15 February 1970 the rations were shipped from Da Nang and from Chu Lai to Sa Huynh for use by the 11th Infantry Brigade at Duc Pho. Assets of the 57th Transportation Battalion moved these supplies from Sa Huynh to the support command operated Class I supply point at Duc Pho. This supply point was closed out on 1 May 1970. Class I supplies are now moved on a daily basis from Chu Lai to Duc Pho by Army 7½-ton reefer vans.

On 1 July 1970 the US Army Depot assumed from the Naval Support Activity the wholesale Class I mission for MR-I. Planning for this assumption began in late December 1969 and personnel moved into the Depot for on-the-job training in early March. Requisitions for supplies to fill the pipeline were initiated in mid-April. No major problems have resulted from the assumption of this mission, nor are any contemplated.

The biggest single problem in Class I supply is the amount of lead time required by transportation. Responsiveness of all modes of transportation is the key factor to subsistence supply. Proper performance of the Class I mission requires intense supervision at the support command level and as well at the group, battalion and company level. Similarly, constant supervision is required at the supply point to insure that rations are handled in the proper manner to preclude excessive losses.

CLASS III

Prior to 26 February 1970 the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang had the wholesale POL mission in MR-I. North of the Hai Van Pass, the Army operated a 43 mile pipeline which moved JP4 from the Tan My Ramp north to Quang Tri. Distribution of other products both to the Quang Tri, Camp Evans and Phu Bai area was made by 5000 gallon tankers running between the Tan My Ramp and points of discharge. Retail distribution in the Da Nang area was made by assets under the control of the Naval Support Activity with the exception of one Army operated retail fuel point.

In the southern portion of the MR, the Naval Support Activity Sub-Depot at Chu Lai provided Class III support to the Americal Division and other Army elements on the Chu Lai combat base. Support to the 196th Infantry Brigade at Hawk Hill was provided by line haul from Chu Lai. Support
to the 11th Infantry Brigade at Duc Pho was provided by line haul from naval barges which docked at Sa Huynh. The 63rd Transportation Truck Company performed this mission for the support command.

On 26 February 1970, the command assumed from the Navy the wholesale mission north of the Hai Van Pass. This consisted of taking over the ocean terminal at Tan My/Col Co Island. Fuel is provided by T-1 tankers through the only monobuoy-sealine installation in Vietnam. Thereafter the Army provided the total Class III mission support to the northern MR-Subsequent to this time the pipeline between Tan My and Quang Tri was made more flexible through the provision of a means to strip off JP4 for the bag farms at Camp Evans. The pipeline is buried between Hue and Quang Tri and consists of invasion-type pipe which is in excess of a year old. By pumping at reduced pressures, breakage and JP4 losses attributable thereto have been maintained at a low level.

Significant losses were experienced as a result of pilferage. In recent months these have been reduced to less than one percent of total volume pumped through the means of pumping on a daily basis. Current pilferage losses are experienced primarily in the Hue area, since it is between Hue and Tan My that the pipeline is exposed. The Seabees are currently involved in burying this pipeline and will replace the current exposed line with a welded steel line. This project is expected to be completed prior to the onset of the monsoon season after which time it is expected that losses due to pilferage will be greatly reduced.

Utilizing the 525th Quartermaster POL Company (Depot) this command assumed from the Navy on 26 March 1970 the wholesale or bulk POL mission for MR-I. The company minus one pipeline platoon is employed in the Da Nang area under operational control of this headquarters. It manages four tank farms and a large retail distribution point, supervises two commercial tank farms and provides local distribution using organic tanker assets. This has allowed the command to reduce by 80 percent a contract formerly operated by the Naval Support Activity for local distribution.

The company likewise receives through four sealines all incoming products from ocean going tankers and manages the assets aboard the Hampton Roads, a T-2 tanker stationed in the port of Da Nang for
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flexibility during the monsoon season, and to provide for the limited
backload capability of the sealines. It also provides direction to two
T-1 tankers stationed in the Da Nang area that provide the means to
move bulk fuel from Da Nang to Tan My in the north and to Chu Lai in
the south.

In the south at Chu Lai, the bulk POL mission was assumed by the
pipeline platoon of the 525th Quartermaster Company and consists of
operating two tank farms and one POL distribution point. Bulk fuel
for use by the 11th Brigade at Duc Pho and the 196th Brigade at Hawk
Hill are moved by line haul, utilizing tanker assets belonging either to
the 63rd Truck Company of this command or the 23rd Supply and
Transportation Battalion of the Americal Division. Bulk product at Chu
Lai is also introduced into the tank farm through sealines.

Package POL points are also operated by elements of the Da Nang Support
Command at Chu Lai, Da Nang, Phu Bai and Quang Tri. Wholesale
distribution, to include that of liquid petroleum gases, is made from Da
Nang.

The Class III mission of the Da Nang Support Command is carried out
under the staff supervision of the Director of Petroleum, Oils and
Lubricants, who works under the staff guidance of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Supply, of this headquarters. POL is probably the best managed
commodity within the supply system. The only significant problem that
faces the command is that of maintenance for the sealines. Experience
has shown that these lines are subject to being out of service by reason
of breakage or through other damage as a result of weather. In the past,
the US Navy has provided the maintenance necessary to keep the lines
operational. The mission now belongs to the Engineer Command of the
United States Army, Vietnam. Efforts are being made at this time to
provide maintenance support for these vital lines through the use of
contract help.

CLASS II AND IV

Prior to 15 March 1970 the Class II and IV common service support mission
for MR-I was the responsibility of the US Naval Support Activity, Da Nang.
This included operation of Servmarts for the retail distribution of fast moving items such as paper products, office supplies, individual components of tool sets, and housekeeping materials. Wholesale distribution of bulk lots of Class II materials was made from the Naval Support Activity Depot at Da Nang for that city and northern MR-I and from the Naval Support Activity Sub-Depot at Chu Lai for the Chu Lai area and south. Class IV supplies were distributed from the Navy yard in the Da Nang area. These supplies were moved primarily through the use of sea transportation.

On 15 March 1970 the Army began to assume the Class II and IV common service support mission. The initial phase called for the Army to take over operation of the Servmart at Phu Bai and this was accomplished. A Self Service Supply Center (SSSC) was opened under the 148th Supply and Service Company at Phu Bai to provide this type of support and service for all units north of the Hai Van Pass. Control is maintained by dollar limitations on purchasing power of individual units. Each unit is authorized to draw from the store on the basis of an allowance of $7.50 per quarter per individual assigned on the morning report. Quantities required over and above this limitation must be approved at the support command headquarters.

On 1 June 1970 the Servmart at Chu Lai was reopened as a SSSC under the auspices of the 226th Supply and Service Company. On 15 June the Servmart at Da Nang was reopened as a SSSC under the control of the 334th Supply and Service Company.

On 1 July the United States Army Depot, Da Nang, took over operation of the wholesale Class II and IV common service supply mission from the Naval Support Activity. As with the assumption of the Class I and Class III mission, this mission assumption was accomplished through several months of planning, on-the-job training and constant liaison between Army and Navy personnel. This takeover also included assumption of the operation of an IBM 1401 computer previously owned and operated by the Navy. In preparation for the takeover, considerable liaison was also required with the Inventory Control Center, Vietnam and the Logistics Data Service Center, both located at Long Binh. Much effort was expended in insuring that the requisite quantities of supplies would either be on hand when the Army took over the mission or would be on order and in the pipeline. In a similar manner, considerable effort
was expended with the Navy to insure that quantities of supplies not required by the Army would not be on the ground. This was accomplished by the Navy through normal attrition and excessing procedures with residual quantities relegated to the property disposal activity also operated by this command. Proper disposition of these excesses is in progress.

CLASS II, VII AND IX (ARMY-PECULIAR)

Responsibility for the receipt, storage and distribution from a wholesale standpoint of Class II, VII and IX Army-peculiar items rested with the US Army Depot, Da Nang. Retail distribution was made utilizing the direct support units, both maintenance and service and supply, belonging to the support command, or organic to the supported divisional size units.

In October 1969 the US Army Depot, Da Nang, was a customer of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon. Items on hand in depot stocks did not appear on the Availability Balance File (ABF) of the Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (ICCV). Instead the depot was operated as a large direct support unit. Requisitions for replenishment of stocks were placed upon the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon. Shipments were made either from that depot or from other depots where referrals were necessary, or directly from CONUS. Automatic data processing capabilities of the depot consisted of two UNIVAC 1005 card processors. Since no tape capability existed, it was difficult to provide some type of interface with the ICCV. However, it was recognized that it was necessary to reflect the assets of the depot on the theater ABF. Accordingly, the depot ABF was placed on cards and provided to the ICCV where it was reproduced on tapes. On 15 February 1970 the US Army Depot, Da Nang's ABF was merged with that of the ICCV, thereby giving the theater visibility of Da Nang's assets.

Subsequent to that, in anticipation of Da Nang becoming a full-fledged theater depot, efforts were made to have the ICCV compute requisitioning objectives for the Da Nang Depot and place the necessary replenishment requisitions just as they do for the other depots. Thus, on 17 February 1970, the Army Depot at Da Nang ceased requisitioning on the Qui Nhon Depot when requisitioning was taken over by the ICCV. Concurrently, the depot began preparation of a Table of Distribution and Allowances to allow it to convert to the type of management which is afforded the other
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depots. Prior to this time, the depot was operated by the 34th Supply and Service Battalion which had under it six separate companies with various supply capabilities.

During the reporting period, the depot, with the help of the ICCV, has made great strides in the reduction of on-hand fringes. Under Project Fringe, several thousand lines have been shipped directly to the 2nd Logistical Command in Okinawa and, in recent months, these have been shipped in suitable pack so that upon receipt in Okinawa they are readily identifiable and can be placed immediately into depot stock.

One of the problems associated with Class II and IX repair parts supply has been that of reducing, in the forward areas, the volume of supplies on the ground. This has been accomplished, in some cases, by the consolidation of direct support technical supply operations, such as that of the 63rd Maintenance Battalion's Headquarters and Main Support Company. The technical supply element of the 178th Maintenance Company at Dong Ha and that of the 555th Maintenance Company were eliminated and consolidated with that of the 63rd Main Support Company. While this resulted in a consolidation of several hundred lines that were common to each operation, it also identified a problem. It became clear that the number of personnel afforded the average technical supply element could not possibly identify, segregate, pack and ship the excess supplies generated by the consolidation of items which became fringe to the operation. This problem existed not only at Quang Tri but also at other locations where the command had technical supply units as well as in those of divisions. Accordingly, arrangements were made with the US Army Depot to set up a processing line which could receive such excesses from the outlying units, process them, and either place them in stock or ship them on to other destinations. The foregoing procedure has allowed the command to greatly reduce on-the-ground stockage of Class II and IX repair parts. Daily convoys returning from north of the Hai Van Pass and from the southern part of the MR continue to bring back supplies which will be placed back into the Army supply system. The immediate benefit of this is that the command regains visibility of these items. In the processing, those items which are identified as belonging on the authorized stockage list of the depot are segregated and placed in stock. Those items that are identifiable but are fringe to the operation are packed in suitable containers and shipped to Okinawa.

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Another technique initiated during this period has been the utilization of the NCR 500 142 program which, when run, identifies those lines on the units' balance file, the requisitioning objective of those lines and the shortages and excesses thereof. Utilizing the printout generated from this program which is run monthly throughout the command, the ACofS, Supply, has been able to laterally transfer between direct support units the items that are excess in one unit and at zero balance in other units. Similarly, we are able to use this device as a means to reduce deadlines throughout the command by screening assets on hand in direct support units against daily deadline reports and laterally transferring as required.

With respect to Class VII, or end item supply, the command has operated a vehicle park at Da Nang and has, where deemed advisable, prepositioned certain end items both north of the Hai Van Pass and in the area of the Americal Division. While these assets have remained under the control of units of the command, they have been available for immediate release to combat units against bonafide combat losses. This has allowed us to markedly reduce the transportation times inherent in movement of this type of equipment from the Da Nang area north or south. The same device has been utilized in the handling of Closed Loop System items. Closed Loop assets have been prepositioned at direct support units, both to the north and to the south. As direct support units have retrograded unserviceables, they have been allowed, where available, to back-haul serviceable components. In general, the Closed Loop System has worked well in MR-I. Where shortages of some components have developed, the 1st Logistical Command was able to redistribute from within the country to provide timely resupply. More will be said about the Closed Loop System in the annex devoted to Retrograde and Disposal.

As a final note, the Army supply system has worked well in Vietnam. It has been my observation that when requisitions are placed using the proper Federal Stock Numbers and where the requisitioner has followed up, with few exceptions, the supplies have arrived where required and in a timely manner. Almost inevitably, where a unit complained that it was not getting supplies, it was found that they had not requisitioned supplies or else their requisitions were not valid.
The command's maintenance assets on 15 October 1969 consisted of eight companies providing direct support service and two companies providing general support.

North of the Perfume River, the Main Support Company of the 63rd Maintenance Battalion, coupled with the 178th Maintenance Company at Dong Ha and the 555th Maintenance Company at Camp Evans supported three heavy artillery and one air defense artillery (AW) battalion of the 108th Artillery Group, the 3rd Squadron of the 5th Cavalry with an attached tank company, one combat engineer battalion of the 45th Engineer Group with attached land clearing company, and other non-divisional units. Further it provided back-up support to the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

In December 1969, the technical supply operations of all three companies were consolidated within the technical supply operation of the Main Support Company. Initially, this was a very traumatic exercise, because concurrently, the Main Support Company moved into vastly improved facilities vacated by the Force Logistics Command of the III Marine Amphibious Force. By dint of Herculean efforts and constant supervision, this operation has become a worthwhile one which has resulted in significant savings both in personnel and materiel assets. One NKR 500 was generated as excess by this consolidation.

In the Phu Bai/Camp Eagle area, the Main Support Company of the 2nd Maintenance Battalion and the 67th Maintenance Company (DS) provide direct support maintenance services to non-divisional elements which include one heavy artillery battalion and one combat engineer battalion, and also provide back-up support to the 801st Maintenance Battalion that is organic to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). Likewise, in this area, the 578th Light Equipment Maintenance Company provides general support maintenance for communication and electronic equipment, generators and refrigeration equipment for the entire Military Region I (MR-I).
In the Da Nang area, the 85th Light Maintenance Company provides direct support maintenance services to non-divisional elements. Its automotive capability is augmented by the 12th Ordnance Detachment that was moved from Gia Le concurrently with the move of the US Army XXIV Corps to the Da Nang area. In general support of MR-I for automotive and artillery materiel is the 156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company located at Da Nang.

At Chu Lai, under the command of the 57th Transportation Battalion were the 588th Maintenance Company and the 596th Light Maintenance Company. The 586th Maintenance Company was released to the 1st Logistical Command and transferred to the Saigon Support Command on 19 February 1970 to provide maintenance support for Operation Keystone Bluejay assets generated by the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division. The 586th provides direct support maintenance for non-divisional elements in the Chu Lai area and in addition provides back-up support for the 723rd Maintenance Battalion which is organic to the Americal Division.

The problem with maintenance in MR-I has been one of maintenance management, or lack thereof. Intensified management of the maintenance effort has produced markedly decreased backlogs, improved quality, better diagnostic techniques, improved control and better maintenance support to using units. Deadlines of all types of equipment have decreased in the ensuing months. In April 1970, the 156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company was moved from a field type installation to an area where adequate enclosed space and hard stand are available. In the interim the company has tripled its production and additionally has, on the side, produced unprogrammed assemblies and components when called upon to do so. The point to be made here is that no matter what the skills may be that are assigned to a unit, production is also a function of work environment. Accordingly, where possible, every effort should be made to provide adequate working facilities for these specialized units. The payoff more than offsets the expense of erecting the facilities.

Limited contractual assistance was provided during the reporting period. Through the provision of MPR's, existing contractual facilities under US Navy contracts were utilized to provide back-up support for certain component and assembly overhaul as well as for tire recapping. Effective 1 July 1970 these facilities and contracts came under the aegis
of the support command. Additionally, the Army contracted for maintenance support of a greatly enlarged transportation motor pool that was assumed from the Navy, and for the vastly increased materiel handling equipment workload.

As a result of proper planning, the component overhaul program began with little trouble on 1 July 1970. Similarly, the contractual maintenance support for the transportation motor pool and the materiel handling equipment began as scheduled on 1 July with little or no problems.

Beginning in November 1969, the M551, Armored Reconnaissance Assault Vehicle (General Sheridan) was introduced into MR-I. The receipt, issue and support of these vehicles required intensive coordination throughout the support command staff with higher headquarters. Prior planning, in the form of instruction of mechanics for direct support units at Long Binh and the use of the New Equipment Team, helped in the introduction of these vehicles. A general support component overhaul program was developed in the command to provide a fast, efficient repair program to maintain this vehicle. The turret component general support overhaul program became fully operational at the 156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company early in March 1970. All units having this vehicle were instructed to job order all repairable turret components to the 156th Company. Associated with this program, a mobile test stand, housed in a 12 ton trailer, was constructed to provide a rapid test and evaluation of unserviceable components. This van has been highly successful in operation and has increased the productive capability of the command in supporting M551 turret components. At the current time, this test van is the sole general support testing and rebuild capability for all M551 turret components in MR-I.

Artillery maintenance requirements were significantly increased during the period March - June 1970 as a result of greatly increased firing in northern MR-I. Larger quantities of cannon assemblies, tubes, and gun mounts were required on both the 8 inch howitzer and the 175 mm gun. In searching for the causes for the large usage of the M158 mount, it was discovered that units were apparently introducing dirt and other foreign material into the recoil system while bringing recoil fluid levels up to the required point. The recoil fluid is normally issued in 5 gallon cans. After a can had been partially used, it was not protected from the dust.
which exists on the fire support bases in large quantities, thereby providing a means of introducing dirt into the recoil system. This problem was further aggravated by shortage of the prescribed recoil fluid OH-T and the requirement therefore to mix OH-A fluid with OH-C fluid to provide the requisite quantities. Our analysis revealed that in all probability, the vessels in which the fluids were mixed were dirty. To alleviate this problem, it was necessary to drain and flush all recoil systems within the 108th Artillery Group. At this writing, it is too early to determine whether this was the salient reason for the excessive failure of the recoil systems.

A constant problem plaguing the maintenance personnel has been the repair of materiel handling equipment. Both commercial and rough terrain forklifts have required considerable maintenance effort. Downtime has been in excess of 20 percent during most months and this generally has been as a result of lack of responsive repair parts supply. Lack of qualified maintenance personnel has been overcome through on-the-job training. Engines and hydraulic components were the most difficult to obtain. Engines have been, and continue to be, rebuilt by in-country contract maintenance. However, returns from this source are slow and fail to keep up with the demand. A recent program for the repair of hydraulic components has been initiated within the command. Due to the shortage of repair kits for hydraulic cylinders, pumps and valves, returns from this program will not be effective for some time. In an effort to resolve the repair parts problem, maintenance units have made maximum use of cannibalization from the collection, classification and salvage company activities.

With the assumption of the common service support mission, maintenance support for Army floating craft was established at Da Nang utilizing a marine maintenance detachment that was moved from Qui Nhon. This detachment is providing repair parts and DS/GS maintenance support to all the boat units in the MR. The boat density in the support command is 112 items of marine floating equipment and self propelled watercraft.

Technical representatives provided by the US Army Materiel Command have been a significant help to the command. These personnel have provided a reservoir of knowledge and expertise. They have been utilized to troubleshoot, to analyze and to come up with ways and means to attack
particular problems. Further, they have been flexible in their approach and have provided invaluable assistance. Presently being felt in the command are the cutbacks in technical representatives resulting from economy moves by the AMC. It is recognized that such economy moves must be made; however, in many cases the know-how of these personnel makes a significant difference in the timeliness of repair and return of equipment to the using combat units. This is particularly true in the communication and electronic field.

In the field of maintenance, special effort was devoted not only to the repair of nonoperational equipment, but on the diagnosis of the causes of failures in order to preclude recurrence of those malfunctions. This program was extremely beneficial to the entire command, and in some cases, resulted in engineering changes to equipment and/or modifications in technical manual procedures.
The command's transportation assets on 15 October 1969 consisted of seven truck companies. The 57th Transportation Company (Light Truck) at Quang Tri was charged with clearing the Dong Ha ramp and with performing such other missions as required by the 63rd Maintenance Battalion to which it was attached.

The 39th Transportation Battalion (Truck) at Gia Le managed the other transportation assets in northern Military Region I (MR-I). Subordinate to the 26th General Support Group at Phu Bai, the 39th Battalion had attached to it four truck companies. The 666th Transportation Company (Light Truck) was in direct support of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). The remaining three companies, the 515th, 585th and 805th were charged with clearing the Tan My ramp and providing local and line haul as required. Tonnage of all classes discharged through the Tan My ramp averaged 1,000 short tons per day during the period.

In the Da Nang area, the 363rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck), assigned to the 92nd Service Battalion of the 80th General Support Group, provided line haul from the Da Nang area to Phu Bai through the Hai Van Pass and to Chu Lai. In Chu Lai, the 63rd Transportation Company (Light Truck), assigned to the 57th Transportation Battalion, augmented the transportation assets of the Americal Division and provided line haul south to the 11th Infantry Brigade at Duc Pho. A platoon of the company at Duc Pho provided line haul from the shallow draft port at Sa Huynh to Duc Pho.

Convoy operations throughout MR-I were subject to interdiction by enemy action at any time. However, protection was provided both from organic assets and through assistance from military police and other units depending upon the Tactical Area of Operations. All in all, little disruption was felt from enemy actions.
In December 1969, due to shortages of authorized trailer assets, trailer transfer points were organized at Phu Bai, Quang Tri, Da Nang and Chu Lai. Trailer assets were pooled and color coded with certain trailers designated for line haul north and others for line haul south of Da Nang. While promoting efficiency in trailer utilization, this method of operation has required constant surveillance and initially resulted in degradation in trailer maintenance.

In February 1970, the shallow draft ports at Dong Ha and Sa Huynh were closed. Cargo previously introduced through these ports was brought through Tan My and Chu Lai respectively. This action had an impact on command trucking assets, since it increased line haul distances both in the north and in the south. Likewise, during the same time period, increased tonnages were moved by truck from the US Army Field Depot at Da Nang after a study revealed that shipping time could be reduced by as much as five days through use of trucks rather than moving the same items through the postal system using air transportation. Also, as a result of the inability of the US Air Force to provide timely movement of milk and other perishables, refrigerated Sealand vans were placed in service necessitating their being moved north over the Hai Van Pass and south to Chu Lai by Army tractors. These additional requirements were assumed without an increase of assets but were operated successfully through improved management of assets on hand. Some relief from over the road movements was felt through the upgrading of the Vietnamese Railroad operating between Da Nang and Hue. In early 1970, a siding at Phu Bai was completed making it feasible to move Army cargo to that point for handling by elements of the 26th General Support Group. In May, June and July 1970 these tonnages, consisting mostly of lumber, rations, beer and soda, reached 5,000 short tons. As the railroad is expanded further north to Quang Tri, additional usage will be made of it.

In late March 1970, this command assumed the operation of the shallow draft port at Tan My. A provisional transportation command, consisting of a terminal transfer company (minus two platoons), an attached medium boat platoon and a newly organized security company (minus one platoon), operates the ramp. This group of just over 300 military personnel is commanded by a Major. Since operations began, the port has discharged an average of 1,000 short tons per day of all classes of supply.

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On 1 June 1970, the command assumed the mission of operating the shallow
draft port at Chu Lai. A medium boat company (minus one platoon) with
an attached terminal transfer platoon was assigned to the 57th
Transportation Battalion (Truck) at Chu Lai for accomplishing the mission.
One platoon of the security company from Tan My provides ramp security.
Approximately 800 short tons of all classes of supply are discharged at
this ramp per day.

The 5th Transportation Command (Terminal A) moved from Qui Nhon to
Da Nang in early June 1970. Joining the headquarters of the command at
Da Nang were the 1098th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) and the
264th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) also from Qui Nhon,
the 870th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) from Cam Ranh
Bay and the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) from Saigon.
The Transportation Command assumed operation of the Bridge and Tien
Sha shallow draft ramps in Da Nang on 15 June. On 1 July the command
assumed from the US Navy operation of the Deep Water Port and associated
port operation functions within the MR to include intracoastal shipping that
consisted of ships of the LCU/YFU class that ply between Da Nang and
Tan My and/or Chu Lai.

Drayage, or clearance, of the port complex in Da Nang is performed by
contract. This is a new venture for the command and is being accomplished
by the current stevedoring contractor, utilizing vehicular assets which were
provided by the US Navy. Unfortunately, the assets initially forecasted to
be available by the Navy did not completely materialize, thereby causing
a problem in getting the contract off to an efficient start. Likewise,
those assets that were provided were in poor mechanical condition and
required excessive maintenance effort at the outset. Although the quality
of the assets provided to the contractor does not meet that which was
called for in the contract, the Navy was clearing the port with those
assets. An additional 50 commercial tractors were moved from Saigon
to Da Nang to pick up the slack.

The proper functioning of all aspects of the transportation system within
MR-I has a profound effect upon the proper operation of the other
functional areas. It is probably the single functional area which must be
most closely supervised. However, through constant supervision, the
timeliness of movements and shipments can be materially enhanced.
In connection with the assumption of the common service support mission, the support command also assumed the responsibility for processing all individual personal effects shipped from MR-I and for operating the large transportation motor pool that serves the Da Nang area. Personal effects are shipped from Chu Lai and Phu Bai to a central operation at Da Nang. Currently, over 7,000 shipments per month are processed. The transportation motor pool function includes the control of nearly 300 commercial design vehicles to include bus, taxi and user driver vehicles.
I have elected to address ammunition supply in a separate annex since it is a separate element of the supply system. In Military Region I (MR-I), each separate service (US Army, US Marine Corps and US Air Force) manages its own Class V supply system with some few exceptions. Those exceptions generally relate to common items such as small arms ammunition, flares, and the like, and are generally covered by Interservice Support Agreements.

The Army's Class V supply system in MR-I is managed by the 528th Ammunition Battalion which is headquartered at Da Nang. The battalion consists of three companies: (a) the 571st Ordnance Ammunition Company which operates north of the Hai Van Pass and is headquartered at Phu Bai; (b) the 40th Ordnance Ammunition Company which is collocated in Da Nang with the 528th Ammunition Battalion Headquarters; and, (c) the 661st Ordnance Ammunition Company which is headquartered at Chu Lai. The command operates six ammunition supply points (ASP) -- three north of the Hai Van Pass at Quang Tri, Camp Evans and Phu Bai, one at Da Nang in association with the US Marine Corps, and two in the Americal area of operations at Chu Lai and at Duc Pho.

Ammunition is received from two sources, either from CONUS through the deep water port at Da Nang or from intratheater shipment, generally from Cam Ranh Bay. The stockage objective for the entire system is approximately 35,000 short tons. Well over half of this is located north of the Hai Van Pass, since the heavy tonnage items fired by the 108th Artillery Group account for a large part of the MR-I tonnage.

Ammunition is moved from Da Nang by sea or by land transportation. Because of its heavy tonnage, where possible, it is moved by sea transportation utilizing assets which, prior to 1 July, were under the management of the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang. Land transportation is the principal mode of redistribution between ASP's within MR-I. Where a shortage of a particular item is pronounced and resupply from outside the MR is necessary for tactical reasons, the US Air Force is occasionally called upon to provide air shipment.
The management of Class V commodities requires constant attention. While some items in short supply are allocated, the volume at which ammunition is fired depends upon the combat activity in the area concerned. Illumination items are particularly difficult to manage. Although the command generally has advance knowledge of deep water shipping and can plan on redistribution, all too often required delivery dates are either not met or the ammunition arrives well ahead of the time required. Accordingly, the ammunition managers must constantly distribute and redistribute ammunition based on the available capacity of particular ammunition supply points. Similarly, those items which are in short supply must be monitored on a daily basis to ensure that at no point will a using unit be without the requisite ammunition.

Experience has shown that during the monsoon season the management of ammunition assets becomes increasingly difficult; and this is occasioned by the difficulty of timely discharge of ammunition from deep draft vessels in the Da Nang harbor. Ammunition discharge is performed in the stream usually utilizing barges and at times, all too often, the swells in the harbor preclude discharge operations. Likewise, the same kind of weather effectively precludes the timely movement of the ammunition from the Da Nang port to that of Tan My and/or Chu Lai. Thus, the transportation truck assets of the command are called upon more and more in the movement of ammunition during this critical period. In an effort to preclude this in the oncoming monsoon season, additional capacity in the Quang Tri, Phu Bai and Chu Lai area ASP's is being sought; and it will be realized by a combination of increasing the waivered limits of the individual pads within the ASP's and through the construction of additional pads.

Insofar as the handling of ammunition is concerned at the ASP, the key is having serviceable rough terrain forklifts. Each ammunition supply company is authorized eight 6,000 lb. rough terrain forklifts. With the quantity of ammunition being handled at the various ASP's in MR-I, this has not proven to be sufficient. Consequently, the support command has had to augment the ammunition companies with assets from other sources. As a general rule, it has been found that one rough terrain forklift is required for each 1,000 short tons of ammunition stored in a particular area. This, plus an intensive maintenance program on these valuable pieces of materiel handling equipment, has allowed the command to maintain timely ammunition support to its using units. It should also be noted that in the
Dong Ha area, where the 108th Artillery Group has the bulk of the heavy artillery assets of the MR, the command has been called upon to provide transport for ammunition from the ASP to the forward Fire Support Bases. This has been done utilizing the truck company stationed at Quang Tri.

By dint of extreme effort and great managerial endeavor, the Class V supply for MR-I has been maintained in a suitable posture. The 528th Ammunition Battalion and its three companies have continued to do a commendable job in providing Class V support for the combat units in the MR.

The command is now examining the feasibility of collocating certain ASP's with those of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces. It now appears that the ASP currently operated by the US Marines at Chu Lai will be turned over to the Army and ARVN forces at such time as the Marines vacate it. At that time, there appears to be no good reason why the ASP cannot be jointly operated by US Army and ARVN elements and that eventually the entire operation cannot be taken over by the ARVN.
One of the most important missions of the command has been that associated with retrograde of serviceable and unserviceable materiel and the disposal of serviceable and unserviceable excesses. To provide the requisite emphasis on this important aspect of the command's mission, I placed the most aggressive and capable staff officer, in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, that I could find, in the job of Assistant Chief of Staff, Retrograde and Disposal. These are areas which require constant emphasis.

PROPERTY DISPOSAL

In MR-I, the support command is responsible for operating property disposal yards for the receipt, segregation, storage, sale or disposal otherwise of all excess property of US origin generated in the area. The property disposal yards are operated at Chu Lai, Da Nang, and Tan My. Subsequent to my assumption of command, a property disposal company had been organized at the direction of the former 1st Logistical Command Headquarters. The program has been improved and this company has been gradually brought up to strength. Concurrently, equipment necessary to carry out the mission has been located and brought into service. Additional emphasis was placed on the program by placing a field grade officer as Property Disposal Officer, replacing the civilian accountable officer with a more effective and aggressive individual, and placing the unit under the operational control of my headquarters.

During my tenure the command had two contracts with the same contractor for the removal of scrap products from the Chu Lai and the Da Nang areas. Because of difficulties we experienced with lack of equipment and problems associated with the removal of the scrap from the Vietnamese shores, the contractor was making little or no progress in either area. With increased emphasis on management on the part of the command, the program has gradually taken shape and is now moving in a satisfactory manner. The contractor's operations at Chu Lai have been terminated, and he is in the
final phase of his operation at Da Nang. The problems associated with his removal of scrap from Vietnam using ships chartered by him have been reduced to a minimum and it now appears that he will be able to successfully export that scrap for which he has taken delivery and that which he expects to take delivery on in the foreseeable future.

In the meantime, new contracts are being negotiated for additional scrap in the Chu Lai area, the Phu Bai area and for that in the Da Nang area, which is already on the ground or expected to be generated. This is a program that requires skilled personnel, great command emphasis and constant surveillance.

RETROGRADE

The retrograde program is one of extreme importance to the command. The timely recovery of reparables and battlefield losses has a profound impact upon the supply system, the maintenance system and the property disposal operation. Likewise, the timely return of excesses from the direct support units to the depot system has a great impact upon both the supply and maintenance systems. In this command, great emphasis has been placed upon the cleaning of the battlefield. The Closed Loop Support Program, whereby selected unserviceables including components, assemblies and end items, are shipped to designated overhaul facilities and then returned on a programmed basis, has been of extreme importance to performance of the mission of this command. The timely return of unserviceables through maintenance channels has required constant supervision from this headquarters. Where possible, direct exchange programs have been instituted making it mandatory that unserviceables be turned in before serviceables could be drawn.

The collection, classification and salvage company has been operated separately from the depot, a departure from the practice utilized in other support commands. A constant problem which has required inordinate command emphasis has been the return of unserviceables properly preserved in serviceable and sturdy containers and with the requisite documentation. While considerable progress has been made, additional effort must be exerted in this area. The requirement for proper processing of unserviceable end items and particularly those destined
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for return to CONUS has required that the collection, classification and salvage company perform many long hours of cleaning and washing. High pressure washing and the use of a great deal of manual effort goes into the removal from the individual items of equipment of the accumulation of weeks and months of mud and dirt. Such equipment must be examined by representatives of the US Public Health Service and certified that it meets the standards of the Department of Agriculture for import back into the United States. To meet these standards has not been an easy job.

In the area of serviceable excesses, the command has gone to a great deal of effort in providing a means whereby several years accumulation of Class II and IX items at the direct support unit level could be returned to the depot supply system. Directives have always been in force requiring direct support units to identify, document and return to the depot system all excesses to authorized stockage list requirements. Presently, the average direct support unit technical supply section is only authorized around twenty personnel of whom almost half are tied up in the NCR 500 operation. Accordingly, these people have all that they can do to maintain their current operations of receiving, storing and issuing without taking time to perform the necessary operations to return excesses to the supply system.

In this command, arrangements have been made with the depot to receive any and all excesses from outlying units, with minimum paperwork. These excesses, which are now going into the depot in a constant stream, are processed so that those items that are on the authorized stockage list of the depot go back into stock, those items that can be identified but are fringe are processed for shipment to Okinawa, those items that cannot be identified but are serviceable are set aside for further identification, and those items that are obviously unserviceable are segregated for further shipment to property disposal. The end product is that direct support units subordinate to this headquarters are now at last reaching the position where they can properly store and maintain those stocks necessary to support their using units.
I have alluded to the importance of personnel in other annexes. The importance of skilled personnel with whom to perform the mission cannot be overemphasized. In the Da Nang Support Command, the experience quotient is found in the field grade officers. Where there is a shortage of field grade officers, commanders are called upon to double their vigilance and to devote an extraordinary amount of time to personal supervision. The young officers in the grade of Captain and Lieutenant coming through the personnel system perform magnificently but within the spheres of their inexperience. The company commander of today is faced with problems over and beyond those which faced the company commander of only a decade ago. These young officers who come from the same age group as those lower grade enlisted men for whom they are responsible are generally not equipped emotionally or otherwise to solve the problems with which they are faced.

I have no panacea for the solution to this problem. I have endeavored to provide the strongest Captains that I could find for the command of the company size units in the support command. In so doing, I have recognized that the strength of the command lies in the capability of these young officers to get the job done with assets which the replacement system provides. The mission of the command is performed by the company size units. The battalion and group staffs, as well as the support command staff, can only provide guidance and expertise toward mission performance.

There has been a dearth of experienced supply personnel (both officers and enlisted men) in the command during my tenure. Company supply Sergeants have been almost impossible to come by. Qualified NCR 500 supervisors have likewise been in extremely short supply. While it is true that there has been some input of NCR 500 qualified personnel in the grades of E-4 and E-5, supervisory personnel in the grade of O-6 and at the O-1/O-2 level have not been provided by the pipeline.
Likewise, depot qualified personnel have simply not come through the pipeline. While this is understandable, since the CONUS training base does not make adequate provision for the training of such personnel, certainly consideration should be given to specialized training for depot personnel. The depot commander is called upon to solve enough problems without expecting him to also provide a training program for those officers who are provided to assist him.

Maintenance personnel have, for the most part, been provided in a constant stream. Some consideration should be given to the provision of more qualified materiel handling equipment/engineer equipment mechanics.

The command, from time to time, has experienced a shortage of qualified mess personnel. Where these personnel are not available, the impact is directly felt in lessening morale, since one of the few things that can be done in Vietnam to enhance morale is the provision of well prepared food in attractive mess halls.

I have been disappointed in the quality of First Sergeants who have been provided through the replacement system. While the command has generally received the requisite number of E-8 personnel, the requirement to place some of these personnel with little or no previous First Sergeant experience into positions as First Sergeants has created problems. It may be even more vital to have a strong First Sergeant in a logistically oriented company than it is to have a strong company commander. I say this because if the mission is to be carried out, the company commander must be out of the company headquarters and involved in the mission areas on a constant basis. Accordingly, the operation of the company in the purely company area, must be carried out by the First Sergeant. Where the First Sergeant is weak, the non-commissioned officers inevitably are weak. Likewise, where the First Sergeant is weak, I can usually depend upon a mediocre performance from the company commander unless he is an exceptional young officer. Where the company commander is an exceptional young officer, my experience is that within a short period of time after he takes command, the First Sergeant is looking for a new home.

My Command and Staff Sergeants Major have, for the most part, been exceptional men. It has only been through their continual marshaling of
E-6, 7 and 8 personnel at the battalion, group and support command level that we have been able to make the non-commissioned officer system work.

The junior officers, Lieutenants and Captains, have for the most part done yeoman service in the support command. Where the young officer has had a strong leader and has been given a piece of the action to be managed within reasonable guidelines, he has turned out a sterling performance. Where leadership has been weak and/or where the manner in which he has been allowed to operate has been overly restrictive, the officer has generally not performed satisfactorily.

Likewise, the Warrant Officer Corps has done magnificently. These technicians, with their marvelous background and experience, have, in many cases, provided the difference between getting the job done and not getting it done. When the chips are down and a problem requires a solution from a technical standpoint, almost invariably a Warrant Officer will come up with the solution. I know of no particular discipline in which the Warrant Officers of this command have been weak. I decry the fact that the technical supply Warrant Officer is no longer in the system in sufficient numbers. The average Lieutenant, after having had a ten week supply course, normally cannot step in and run a supply platoon; and there is not sufficient time in the day to provide on-the-job training.

For the most part, I have been very pleased with the quality of field grade officers afforded the command. Where there have been those who could not work in a particular position or in a particular command, I have been able to move them into a different position or under a different commander and make effective use of their experience. My battalions, across the board, have operated with two field grade officers during my tenure.

Similarly, my staff and those of the general support groups, the depot and the terminal command have operated with shortages. While I do not advocate the reduction in the number of field grade spaces in the command, as long as the command is maintained at approximately 80 percent of field grade strength and sufficient Captains are available to make up the difference, I believe that it will continue to function in a satisfactory and efficient manner.
The problem of security is ever present and is necessarily of great concern to the logistical commander. While it is normal to be concerned about physical security because of potential loss of supplies and equipment, in Vietnam the logistical commander has the additional worry of tactical security. Manpower assets to perform tactical security must come from those personnel assets provided to the commander for the performance of his logistical mission. He can either provide guards on a daily basis from a duty roster or else he can select personnel from each type unit that he has and establish a provisional guard detachment. Regardless of the method he chooses to attack the problem, he loses, on a daily basis, logistically skilled individuals who otherwise would be performing the mission. This generally results in reduced production in such areas as the maintenance shops, the laundry, the Class I supply point, or the ammunition supply point. Normally, such commanders, if located on a combat base, are held responsible, by the combat base commander, for the surveillance over, and defense of, a specific sector of the overall perimeter. Such a situation currently exists with the 63rd Maintenance Battalion at the Quang Tri combat base, the 26th General Support Group at the Phu Bai combat base, this headquarters in the Da Nang East area, and the 57th Transportation Battalion at the Chu Lai combat base.

The support command commander has three officer personnel to provide him with expertise in the security area. The command Provost Marshal has, as a primary responsibility, the supervision of physical security throughout the command. His responsibility includes the assurance that measures are taken to preclude the loss of supplies through pilferage from convoys, from depot areas, and from billeting areas. To help the Provost Marshal execute his responsibilities, one other officer and a small number of enlisted personnel are provided.

In addition, the commander has, as his personal expert in the field of tactical security, a Special Assistant for Combat Security (SACS). In the past, this individual has been an officer with previous combat troop
experience, who was well acquainted with requirements for defense of installations in Vietnam. In my command, I called upon my SACS to visit all of my installations, to make detailed surveys of their defense capabilities, to make recommendations on how they could be improved, to make resurveys to insure that recommended improvements have been carried out and to provide an interface with combat elements in the various areas. In addition, this individual has organized the defense of the Da Nang area for which my headquarters is responsible. Further, he has: supervised convoy operations to insure that standing operating procedures are proper and that they are executed while the convoy is in operation; held rehearsals of defense plans and has critiqued the rehearsals with the unit responsible; and provided an invaluable source of knowledge for the command in the area of combat security.

The third officer associated with security is the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations. This officer, with his staff security officer and small staff, acts as a coordinator in the overall area of security and in addition concerns himself with those other allied matters normally handled by the intelligence officer of a unit. Were the SACS not available as my special advisor, the ACofS, SP&O would necessarily be called upon for far greater efforts with regard to combat security.

Only since the assumption of various missions from the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, has the command been afforded the opportunity to organize company size elements which are devoted exclusively to security. The 1st Security Company (Provisional), minus one platoon, is located at Tan My/Col Co Island and reports directly to the 863rd Transportation Command (Provisional). This unit is authorized four officers and 112 enlisted men, and its sole mission is to provide security for the Tan My/Col Co Island complex. The advantages of this type of arrangement are obvious. The overall commander has one commander whom he can charge and hold responsible for the security of the complex. That commander has his own personnel assets with which to carry out the mission to include the upgrading of wire and improvement of other defenses. This is particularly important in the Tan My/Col Co Island complex since its physical location can probably be termed the Achilles' heel of the logistical support mission in northern Military Region I. The third platoon of this company is authorized one officer and 32 enlisted men and is located at Chu Lai. Its mission is to
secure the shallow draft port at Chu Lai.

The recently organized 2nd Security Company (Provisional), located in Da Nang, reports directly to this headquarters and is under the operational control of the Provost Marshal. This is a unique company in that it is composed of five officers, 200 enlisted men and 300 Local Nationals. These personnel guard all of the Da Nang Support Command facilities plus certain other special points in the Da Nang area. The Local Nationals were previously hired by the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, and for the most part, are veterans of the Republic of Vietnam Army. It is anticipated that if these personnel continue to prove capable and trustworthy, more and more Local Nationals can be introduced into the local security setup and thereby release more American soldiers.

The fact that the 2nd Security Company provides local security for many installations in the Da Nang area does not preclude other elements of the support command from providing their own local security in their billeting areas.

Provision of security for the various ammunition supply points (ASP) is carried by different means dependent upon location. ASP 107, located at Da Nang, is secured by one magazine platoon of the 40th Ordnance Ammunition Company. Other ASP's are within combat base perimeters so that ASP personnel are only called upon to participate as members of reaction forces or roving patrols or as gate guards.

The constant threat of infiltration and of sapper attacks on the logistical installations throughout the military region dictates that every means possible be used to insure the safety of both personnel and facilities.
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<th>DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate Author):</strong> HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. REPORT TITLE:</strong> Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Col H. D. Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates):</strong> Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 15 October 1969 to 27 July 1970.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name):</strong> Col H. D. Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO:</strong> N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT:</strong> N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES:</strong> N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12. ASSOCIATING MILITARY ACTIVITY:</strong> OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
</tr>
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