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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps (u), Period Ending 31 July 1970 (u)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, GCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) Operational Significant Activities.
   a. (U) Command and Organizations.
      (1) (U) Command.
      (a) On 23 May 1970, COL Milton M. Cook, Jr., (USMC), DCS, departed PCS for CONUS.
      (b) On 5 June 1970, COL Wilmer W. Hixson, (USMC) was assigned to XXIV Corps as DCS.
      (c) On 18 June 1970, LTG Melvin Zais, CG, departed PCS to JCS and LTG James W. Sutherland, Jr., assumed command of XXIV Corps.
      (d) On 1 July 1970, MG George S. Bowman, Jr., (USMC), DCG, departed PCS for CONUS and MG James L. Baldwin (USA) assumed duty as DCG.
   (2) (U) Organization.
      (a) On 15 June 1970, the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion was released from OPCON and reverted to General Support of XXIV Corps.
      (b) Task Force Clearwater was disestablished on 1 July 1970 and its missions assumed by the Republic of Vietnam Navy.
The 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW) was attached to Corps Artillery on 20 May 1970.

Battery G, 29th Artillery (SLT) was attached to the 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW) on 20 May 1970.

Battery G, 65th Artillery (MG) was attached to the 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW) on 20 May 1970.

b. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) General Enemy Situation.

(a) Summary: The most significant development within the reporting period was the increased infiltration into western Quang Tri Province by elements of the 9th and 24th Regiments of the 304th Division. In the western mountains, Military Region Tri Thien Huc forces continued their defense of cache sites by attacking Fire Support Bases. In southern I Military Region the enemy attempted to fix allied units by engaging them in the piedmont thereby allowing the local forces to attack the populace in the lowlands without interference. This attempt was unsuccessful.

(b) Quang Tri Province.

1. During the reporting period enemy activity in Quang Tri Province was characterized by harassment of allied installations. The infiltration and deployment of enemy forces through the western areas of the province as well as the attempted infiltration of battalion sized enemy forces into the lowlands was noted.

2. In the eastern Demilitarized Zone area enemy activity consisted of sporadic attacks-by-fire and numerous mining incidents, probably involving elements of the 84th Artillery Regiment and the 31st Group. There was one major ground contact northeast of Con Tien in which allied forces engaged the 4th Battalion, 270th NVA Regiment.

3. The central Demilitarized Zone area was a major area of enemy interest during May and June 1970 as the 246th and 27th Regiments with elements of the 84th and 164th Artillery Regiments conducted operations in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Fuller. The fire support base received mortar fire and ground attacks. The enemy broke heavy contact and apparently moved some elements out of the area in late June 1970. In the lowlands the enemy made two attempts to infiltrate Hai Lang District. The first occurred on 27 May 1970 when the 806th Battalion, 7th Front engaged the Regional Forces/Popular Forces and suffered 81 KIA.
The second occurred on 2 July 1970 when the 806th Battalion, reinforced by the 1st Company of the 52nd Regiment and a signal element of the 4th Battalion, 812th Regiment attempted to penetrate the district. This action cost the enemy 139 KIA and 17 POW. The prisoners stated the mission of their unit was, "to establish the Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure and liberate the lowlands."

In western Quang Tri Province most of the enemy activity has been attributed to the 66th Regiment, 304th Division. On 28 May 1970, the 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment conducted a ground attack on Fire Support Base Henderson. On 2 June 1970, the 9th Battalion, along with the C-20 Sapper Company, 66th Regiment attacked Fire Support Base Tom Taven. It was after the latter attack that the 66th moved towards the Vietnamese salient where it is now located. Between April 1970 and the time the regiment broke contact it suffered 420 casualties. On 8 July 1970, 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry engaged an estimated 200-250 NVA with gunships near Khe Sanh. Ground troops were inserted and contact continued sporadically until 12 July 1970. Total results were 381 NVA KIA and 4 POW. Prisoners identified the unit as the 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment and one company of the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment. The stated mission of the unit was to stay in the western areas, protect the base areas and conduct large scale attacks if allied troops could be drawn out to their area. If this failed they were to make deep penetrations to conduct large scale attacks to destroy allied battalion sized units. The prisoners also told of seeing elements of the 246th Regiment along the infiltration route. Documents captured in this same area earlier stated that the 5th Battalion, 22B Regiment, 304th Division had infiltrated in mid-May to reinforce the 66th Regiment. To date there has been no contact with this unit.

(c) Thua Thien Province,

During the reporting period the enemy continued his previous low level of activity. During May 1970 enemy units were active in the western areas of the province as the 6th Regiment conducted operations in the Fire Support Base Ripcord area, 8034 Regiment in the Fire Support Base Maureen-Kathryn area and the 29th Regiment in the Fire Support Base Vaghel area. The enemy's intention was to keep allied forces from discovering their caches. During June 1970, the enemy forces in western Thua Thien Province broke contact and then avoided contact with allied forces in the area. However, the 4th Regiment launched coordinated attacks on 10 June 1970. Phu Loc District Headquarters, Fire Support Bases Los Banos, Roy, Tomahawk, and Nuoc Ngot Bridge received attacks-by-fire throughout the night with Fire Support Base Tomahawk and the Phu Loc District Headquarters receiving ground attacks as well. Since then the 4th Regiment has been relatively inactive.
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AVII-JCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970. NCS FOR-65 (R)

1 On 1 July 1970, a mortar engagement in the Fire Support Base Rkipood area, utilizing battalions of both the 6th and 8034 Regiments. On 17 July 1970 the base received 120mm mortar fire. This was the first time in 18 months that the weapon had been used in the province. It is unknown which units had the 120mm mortar capability. The situation reached some proportions and the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) evacuated the base on 22 July 1970. The rest of the enemy units in the province were relatively quiet, staying in their base areas in the mountains just east of the A Shau Valley.

2 On 17 July 1970, a mortar engagement in the Fire Support Base Rkipood area, utilizing battalions of both the 6th and 8034 Regiments. On 17 July 1970 the base received 120mm mortar fire. This was the first time in 18 months that the weapon had been used in the province. It is unknown which units had the 120mm mortar capability. The situation reached some proportions and the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) evacuated the base on 22 July 1970. The rest of the enemy units in the province were relatively quiet, staying in their base areas in the mountains just east of the A Shau Valley.

(d) Quang Nam Province

1 Contrary to the previous reporting period in which enemy activity in Quang Nam Province remained generally light, the first 45 days of the current quarter witnessed a substantial increase in the tempo of Front 4 efforts. This increase was highlighted by stages 2 and 3 of the K-700 Campaign, the first stage of which occurred on 31 April - 1 May 1970. Also highlighting Front 4 tactics during this period was a sharp increase in the pressure exerted against the Thuong Duc area in concert with a similar effort against the Hiep Duc area in northern Quang Tri Province.

2 Intelligence reports indicating a second stage of the enemy's K-700 Campaign during late April/early May were substantiated on the night of 7-8 May 1970 when there was a flurry of offensive activity in the eastern portion of the province. This surge was not as intense as anticipated and was characterized by series of light attacks-by-fire as well as several limited ground and sapper attacks. However, preemptive actions on the part of allied forces within the province stopped the enemy from achieving any substantial degree of success.

3 In what proved to be a prelude to this highpoint, a battalion size enemy force launched a heavy ground attack against the Que Son District Headquarters on the morning of 6 May 1970 and at the same time pinned down elements of the 7th Marines at nearby Landing Zone Ross with mortar and rocket fire. Friendly forces sustained moderate casualties and heavy material damage in the attacks while enemy losses were 27 KIA and 4 WIA. A substantial amount of weapons and ordnance were also captured. Interrogation of the prisoners revealed that all were members of the 409th Sapper Battalion.

4 Following the 7-8 May highpoint, analysis of increasing intelligence suggested that Front 4 would attempt to launch another highpoint or about 19 May 1970 to commemorate the birthdays of Buddha and Ho Chi Minh. A slight increase in enemy offensive efforts was recorded on the evening of 20-21 May 1970. However, properly forewarned, friendly forces were successful in limiting the enemy's efforts to such an extent
that this surge was preempted.

2 From 4 forces took advantage of the low phase of lunar illumination on the night of 3-4 June 1970 to increase their offensive efforts in conjunction with stage 3 of the K 700 Campaign. For the most part, the enemy's efforts in Quang Nam Province during this surge were limited to a few light attacks-by-fire as friendly tactical operations again had a substantial preemptive effect on the enemy's endeavors.

3 The final phase of the K-700 Campaign ended on 31 June 1970 when the enemy staged a heavy attack on Thanh My Hamlet, situated near the Ba Han Bridge, 7 kilometers southwest of Hoi An City. Following an attack-by-fire of 200 rounds of mixed 60 and 82mm mortar an estimated 2 enemy companies attacked the hamlet, lobbing grenades and satchel charges into bunkers where the residents had taken cover and shooting anyone in sight. Seventy-four civilians were killed and 68 wounded. The attack destroyed or damaged 370 homes and structures, including 2 schools and 2 hamlet offices. The hamlet was 85% percent destroyed.

7 Of significance was the increased pressure against the Thuong Duc area during the first half of the period by elements of the 36th and 111th NVA Regiments, supported by the 490th Sapper Battalion and elements of the 577th Rocket Artillery Battalion. This strategy was apparently an attempt to draw allied forces into the Thuong Duc area and tie them down, thereby allowing local force and guerrilla units to attack Free World Military Assistance Forces/Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces installations in the eastern lowlands. However, after a month and a half of almost daily mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle attacks on the Special Forces/Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp and District Headquarters, Front 4 apparently ordered the units to withdraw from the immediate area. Activity in the Thuong Duc area slowed substantially during the second week in June 1970 and the situation has remained relatively quiet since that time. The presence of the 31st, 36th and 111th NVA Regiments, the 490th Sapper Battalion and elements of the 577th Rocket Artillery Battalion within a 20 kilometer radius of Thuong Duc presents a potential division size threat to that area.

8 Concurrent with the termination of the Thuong Duc siege, enemy activity dropped to a low level throughout the province and remained that way for the rest of the reporting period. Scattered, low key attacks-by-mine and booby trap incidents, lob bombings, and terrorist activities characterized the enemy's efforts during this time. On 21 June 1970 there was an attack-by-fire against Danang possibly by elements of the 577th Rocket Artillery Battalion. Nine 122mm rockets impacted within Danang killing and wounding several civilians.

9 Towards the end of the reporting period intelligence reports
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AVII-GCT

12 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XLI Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, MSG CSMB-65 (R2)

within the province suggested the possibility of another highpoint during
the period 17-23 July to commemorate the 20 July signing of the NLF
General Accords. This surge failed to materialize. Maximum lunar illu-
mination and the apparent unpreparedness of most Front 4 units precluded
such an effort.

(a) Quang Tin Province.

The majority of the enemy's efforts during the entire month of May
and the first half of the month of June was centered around Hiep Duc as
elements of the 1st VC Main Force and 3d (A&A: 31st) NVA Regiments, rein-
forced by supporting elements of the 2d NVA Division, attacked and occu-
pied the Hiep Duc District Headquarters and surrounding locales. This
strategy, apparently timed by MA-5 to coincide with a similar type effort
at Thuong Duc in Quang Nam Province, proved to be designed to draw the
maximum number of US and ARVN Forces away from the lowlands, thereby ex-
posing the population to attacks by main force and local force units in
a continuing effort to take the momentum out of the Government of Viet-
nam Pacification Program, disrupt Vietnamization of the war, and gain
control of the civilian populace.

Throughout the Hiep Duc siege, the enemy continued to put up sub-
stantial resistance to operations conducted by elements of the Americal
Division and the 2d ARVN Infantry Division, despite suffering heavy casu-
alties. There were numerous contacts and friendly units occupying Fire
Support Bases Siberia and West received rocket and mortar fire on an
almost daily basis.

Particularly noteworthy in the Hiep Duc action were the state-
ments of two PW and three Ho Chams from the 40th Battalion, 1st VC
Regiment, 2d NVA Division. Interrogation of these individuals revealed
that the Hiep Duc action was part of a three phase campaign (2350)
designed to destroy the Government of Vietnam pacification programs.
Their testimony also substantiated the strategy of drawing allied forces
out of the eastern lowlands.

After sustaining about 1,000 casualties as well as the loss of
4 PW, 3 Ho Chams and a substantial number of weapons, enemy forces
withdrew from the immediate area during the second week of June, but
remained within easy striking distance. Following this withdrawal, the
Hiep Duc area was quiet throughout the remainder of the reporting period.
Elsewhere in Quang Tin Province, the early part of the reporting period witnessed a concerted effort possibly by elements of the 76th Local Force Rocket Artillery Battalion, against the Chu Lai Combat Base. This complex received a combined total of 81 rounds of 122mm rocket fire on the mornings of 4 and 5 May 1970, with an unconfirmed number of rockets impacting in the ocean. The two attacks-by-fire resulted in moderate casualties and material damage. After the attack on 4 May, a reaction force entered the area of the suspected launch site and captured 43x122mm tubes which were rigged for launching.

While not as intense as that experienced in Quang Nam Province, there was a surge of a limited nature in Quang Tin Province during the second week of May 1970 which was consistent with stage two of the K-700 Campaign. In addition to the attacks-by-fire against Chu Lai, most notable was an estimated 300 rounds of assorted 122mm rocket fire, 60, and 82mm mortar fire directed against Tam Ky City on 7 May 1970. This attack was followed by a combination mortar and sapper attack on 9 May 1970 against the 198th Infantry Brigade Headquarters at Fire Support Base Haystack.

Subsequent to this highpoint, enemy activity in the eastern portion of Quang Tin Province consisted largely of scattered attacks-by-fire against allied installations and populated areas as well as friendly tactical positions. The Tam Ky/Chu Lai area continued to be a favorite target for these harassing attacks. On 12, 13 and 21 May 1970, such attacks were received.

A noteworthy increase in enemy offensive efforts was observed in Quang Ngai Province on the morning of 4 June 1970 in conjunction with corresponding increase in the other two provinces comprising southern Vietnam. This activity was more intense than in Quang Nam and marked the final phase of the K-700 Campaign, which consisted mainly of attacks-by-fire complemented by a few limited sapper attacks. On 7 June 1970, the 409th Sapper Battalion, identified by locals, conducted a ground attack against the Thang Binh District Headquarters and nearby Go Thang Out Post. The attack, preceded by 82mm mortar and 57mm recoilless rifle fire, resulted in moderate casualties.

The remainder of the reporting period witnessed a relatively low level of enemy activity in Quang Tin Province. Major enemy tactical units remained out of contact with friendly forces. Local force and tactical units were responsible for what little activity there was in the eastern lowlands.

For Quang Ngai Province,
1. Quang Ngai Province was the least active of the three southern provinces of I Military Region. The southerly movement of the 2d and 22d Regiments of the 3d NVA Division to Binh Dinh Province during the previous quarter and the subsequent disbandment of the latter unit left the 21st Regiment of the 2d NVA Division as the only regimental size unit in Quang Ngai Province.

2. Although intelligence reveals that the 21st Regiment intended to take the offensive, the unit encountered difficulties which precluded the accomplishment of its mission. It planned to conduct an attack against the Nghia Hanh District Headquarters on 17 or 18 May 1970 using the 70th and 40th Battalions in conjunction with the 30th Local Force Battalion and C-75 Local Force Sapper Companies. The Regiment was forced to defer this plan as a result of the capture of the Commanding Officer of the 21st Sapper Battalion. This information was revealed by the Political Officer of the 70th Battalion when he rallied on 13 May 1970. In addition, operations conducted in the Nghia Hanh area during this period by elements of the 2d NVA Division inflicted a large number of casualties on the 21st Regiment. Subsequently the regiment withdrew to the highlands south and west of Nghia Hanh.

3. The initiation of the second phase of the K-70 Campaign, on 7-8 May 1970, witnessed a moderate increase in the tempo of the enemy's efforts in Quang Ngai Province in conjunction with a corresponding increase in the other two provinces of southern I Military Region. Attacks-by-fire in the eastern lowlands characterized MR-5 efforts in the province. These attacks were directed mainly against friendly fire support bases, including 411, Stinson, and Snoopy as well as Quang Ngai City. This surge was short lived, however, as activity soon returned to the low level experienced previously.

4. Despite this low level of activity, during late May and early June there were two significant attacks in Binh Son District. The first of these attacks occurred on 20 May 1970, when an estimated 70 man enemy force comprised of elements of the C-95A and C-95B Sapper Companies, supported by a local village guerrilla unit, attacked Hai Ninh Hamlet, situated 9 kilometers north of Binh Son District Headquarters. An unusual aspect of this attack was the guerrilla unit's use of sampans to cross the Song Tra Bong River. 245 structures were destroyed, 20 civilians and military personnel killed and twenty three others were wounded.

5. Two weeks later an estimated battalion size enemy force attacked the Binh Son District Headquarters. The attacking force fired 80 rounds of mixed mortar, Rocket Propelled Grenades and M-79 prior to launching the attack. Ten civilians and 5 Popular Forces were killed. Fifty-three...
personnel were wounded, including 11 PW in the District jail.

A Communique with increases in offensive activity in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, enemy forces increased their offensive efforts in Quang Ngai Province on the morning of 4 June 1970. This action appeared to be principally the work of local forces and was confined mainly to a few attacks-by-fire and a few limited ground attacks.

The Nghia Han District Headquarters received a light attack-by-fire, followed by a small ground attack. A PW captured subsequent to this attack indicated that elements of the 21st NVA Regiment were responsible. It is believed that this attack was intended to be of greater size and intensity, but that the presence of friendly forces in the area stopped the enemy from launching an attack of the proportion it had planned.

(2) (C) Intelligence Collection

(a) General: The Collection Division (Interrogation of Prisoners of War, Ground Reconnaissance, Ground Surveillance and Technical Intelligence) continued to provide timely collateral intelligence information to the AGCS, G2. The division evaluated and distributed five COMUSMACV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) and published three XXIV Corps SICRs during this period.

(b) Interrogation of Prisoners of War.

1 A total of 414 detainees were interrogated in I Military Region. The breakdown by classifications of these detainees is as follows:

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<th>%</th>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<td>27</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>NVA/PW</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>33.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>83</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>VC/PW</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>40.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>73.3</td>
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2 XXIV Corps Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch interrogated 49 of these detainees. In addition, XXIV Corps Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch completed two studies on the tactics of VC units in obtaining shelter provisions, and early warning of Free World Military Assistance Force operations in their areas of operation. This information was obtained from interrogation involving a "round robin" discussion with Ho Chi Chans at the Chieu Hoi Center in Danang. "Go Teams" were used several times to assist interrogation teams at division level to speed the dissemination of significant information obtained from prisoners.
AVL-I-GCT
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters IIIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, NCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(c) Ground Reconnaissance.

1. Ground reconnaissance elements in the I Military Region continued to provide one of the primary sources of intelligence collection as 657 long range reconnaissance patrols were conducted during the quarter. Patrols reported 457 sightings totaling over 3856 enemy personnel and participated in 124 contacts. The patrol contacts, plus air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings, resulted in 682 enemy killed in addition to providing intelligence on personnel movements, lines of communication and infiltration routes used by the enemy. Enemy activity along logistic corridors into and out of base areas continued at a high level. Enemy forces protecting these corridors were aggressive and well disciplined when they encountered our reconnaissance units.

2. This quarter witnessed an increase in the number of patrols deployed in the I Military Region primarily due to better weather conditions allowing the wider use of helicopter insertion techniques. The enemy counter-reconnaissance effort of landing zone watches, tracking, and setting of booby traps continued with an increase in incidents of air attack receiving ground fire around the landing zones. This enemy effort was partially circumvented through a variety of insert/extract techniques employed by our reconnaissance elements.

Long range reconnaissance training for ARVN personnel throughout the last quarter produced positive results. Personnel who received training participated in 107 combined US/ARVN long range patrols. A similar reconnaissance training program for the Republic of Korea 27th Armored Brigade was initiated during this period.

3. Ground Surveillance: The total number of sensors employed throughout I Military Region increased from 1660 to 1725 during the reporting period. The Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART I) located at Chua Tri Province became operational during this period. This facility automatically records all sensor activations, thus allowing the operator to spend all of his time evaluating the recorded sequences, greatly increasing the number of reported targets in that area.

(a) Technical Intelligence: A total of 273 war trophy items were acquired by the Technical Intelligence Branch during this period. This haul included 111 rifles, 83 pistols, and 76 miscellaneous items such as knives and crossbows.

(b) Weather. The southwest monsoon was quite slow in beginning in 1970 and the flow pattern has been quite weak. As a result the weather was generally unfavorable. With few exceptions, planned
operations proceeded with little hindrance from the weather. Operations supported through the period were Battle Glen, Texas Star, Elk Canyon, Iron Mountain, Geneva Park, Iron Mountain, and Nantucket Beach.

C. Plans, Operations and Training.

1. Boundary Changes. There were no permanent boundary changes during the reporting period.

2. The following operations terminated during the reporting period:

(a) Barbara Glade.

   This operation was designed to conduct overt and covert reconnaissance in the South Plain and Da Krong River valley, to gather and tactically exploit intelligence and to interdict enemy infiltration and supply routes. It involved the Project Delta Force, which was placed under operational control of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL). Phase I of this operation commenced on 15 May 1970 and terminated on 30 May 1970 with the following results:

<table>
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<th>FRIENDELY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
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<tr>
<td>WIA (WIA)</td>
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   Phase II of this operation commenced on 23 June 1970 and terminated on 30 June 1970 with negative results. The Delta Force was withdrawn from XXIV Corps.

(b) Clinch Valley. This 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) operation, involving the 3d Brigade and the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry was designed to provide support for operations conducted by the 3d Regiment, 1st (AAM) Infantry Division, whose mission was to locate and destroy elements of the 9th NVA Regiment. This operation was conducted in the Khe Sanh plain area, Quang Tri Province, commencing on 9 July 1970 and terminating on 15 July 1970. Two batteries of 155mm howitzers and one battery of 175mm guns supported the operation. Results were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AMBL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
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(c) Green River. This 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) operation involved the entire assets of the brigade and was conducted through their assigned Area of Operation. The operation was initiated on January 1970 to counter a high threat period and consisted of search
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AVIII-GCT 12 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RSP CSFOR-65 (R2)

and clear reconnaissance in force and ambush operations. It intensified
preparations for the approaching wet period by:

1. Increasing intelligence efforts through reconnaissance and surve-

2. Strengthening Fire Support Bases and strong points to include
    prepositioning of supplies and equipment.

3. Expanding fire support planning.

4. Increasing security of airfields and key bridges.

5. Planning for rapid repair and/or repair of bridges and by-

(a) Texas Star. This 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) operation is
designed to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces, caches, base camps, and
interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands. Extensive air-

(b) Hamburger Beach. This operational nickname was given to the
current search and clear operation conducted jointly by the 198th In-

The operation terminated on 31 July 1970 with
the following results:

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<td>CONG</td>
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<td>45</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(3) The following operations are still in progress. Results to date
are shown in paragraph (j) below.

(a) Texas Star. This 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) operation is
designed to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces, caches, base camps, and
interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands. Extensive air-
mobile combined operations are to be conducted in the area east of the
Shau Valley and west of the populated lowlands of Thu Thien Province. Reinforcement are provided for the Hai Loc Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp and one airmobile infantry battalion as Corps reserve. Assistance is provided to Government of Vietnam pacification and development plans, programs, and civic action. Forces are provided to assist in the defense of Hue and in assisting the Government of Vietnam in assuming full responsibility for combat, pacification and psychological operations in Thu Thien Province. Operations are conducted in close coordination with Territorial Forces to include Regional Forces, Popular Forces, People's Self Defense Forces, National Police Field Forces and Provincial Reconnaissance Units, to deny the enemy access to their sources of supply. The operation commenced on 1 April 1970.

(b) Hamburger Beach. This operational nickname was given to the
current search and clear operation conducted jointly by the 198th In-

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destroy Main Force/Local Force Vietnamese Communist units, and eliminate
the Vietnamese Communist infrastructure and political apparatus to re-
store Government of Vietnam control. This operation commenced on 20
July 1969.

(c) Frederick Hill. This operation commenced on 18 March 1969, in
Quang Tin Province. The operation was initiated by elements of the 196th
Brigade, Americal Division to conduct search and clear/pacification
operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. The Ameri-
cal Division is the controlling headquarters.

(d) Geneva Park. This operation commenced on 18 March 1969, in
Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The operation was initiated by ele-
ments of the 198th Brigade, Americal Division to conduct search and
clear/pacification operations in coordination with Government of Viet-
nam forces. Americal Division is the controlling headquarters.

(e) Iron Mountain. This operation commenced on 18 March 1969, in
Quang Ngai Province. The operation was initiated by elements of the 11th
Brigade, Americal Division to conduct search and clear/pacification
operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. Americal
Division is the controlling headquarters.

(f) Wolfe Mountain. This operation commenced on 22 July 1970, in
support of the I ARVN Corps/PVN/AF, ICTZ, Combined Summer Military Cam-
paign Plan. The operation was initiated by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry
Division (MUSH) and consists of reconnaissance in force, saturation
ambush and continuous reconnaissance operations along the Demilitarized
Zone and western border of the Brigade's Area of Operation in northern I
Military Region. Combined operations with Government of Vietnam
forces to prevent infiltration into the populated lowlands of Quang Tri
Province are also conducted. Additionally, a reaction force is provided
for relief of Mai Loc Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp and perma-
nent liaison with dedicated communications, has been established at
each district/province headquarters in the Brigade Area of Operations.

(g) Pennsylvania Square. This operational nickname was given to
the Americal Division's search and clear and reconnaissance in force
operations in the coastal plain of northeast Quang Tin Province. It
commenced on 29 June 1970 and involves the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry
Regiment of the I ARVN Corps/PVN/AF, ICTZ, Combined Summer Military Cam-
paign Plan.

(h) Elk Canyon. This Americal Division operation is being conduct-
ed to secure Kham Duc Airfield and destroy or neutralise enemy forces,
logistic bases; and command and control installations in the vicinity of
Kham Duc. The operation commenced on 12 July 1970. The 2d Battalion,
1st Infantry is the participating US unit.

(1) Pickens Forest. This is an operation conducted by the III Marine, 1st Marine Division in the Song Thu Bon valley to destroy the enemy, his facilities and interdict his logistical support. It supports the I ARVN Corps/PMAF, IOTC, Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan, and commenced on 15 July 1970.

(2) Statistical data of current operations:

**FRIENDLY**

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<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
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**ENEMY**

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(4) (c) Increment IV Redeployment. Increment IV redeployment took place during the reporting period. A total of 1173 personnel spaces were redeployed from units under operational control of XXIV Corps. Of this total 836 spaces were from elements of the III Marine Amphibious Force, 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the Force Logistic Command. Army spaces redeployed during this period totaled 337 and were from the 249th Aviation Company (Surveillance Airplane) and the 504th M.D. Detachment (Veterinary Animal Dispensary).

1. (U) Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline.
(1) Civilian Personnel Management. The command continues to be authorized 103 local national direct hire spaces.

(2) Maintenance of Unit Strength. The number of units assigned to XXIV Corps increased over the reporting period from eight to eleven. Authorized strength is now 1771 with 1762 assigned.

(3) Medical. On 15 May 1970 the Naval Support Activity Hospital, Da Nang, ceased operation in accordance with its planned phased-out schedule. Most of the medical activities formerly performed by the hospital have been assumed by units of the 67th Medical Group and USAF Medical Command, to include DaNang ambulance coverage and preventive medicine functions.

(4) Provost Marshal.

   (a) XXIV Corps Regulation 190-1, Military Police Areas of Responsibility; and XXIV Corps Regulation 190-6, Personnel Absences, Off Limits and Curfew were published during the reporting period.

   (b) On 15 May 1970, a ceremony was held honoring the institution of combined police patrols on Highway 1 for the three southern provinces of I Military Region. This makes a total of sixteen combined patrols operating on the primary line of communication in I Military Region.

   (c) Studies were conducted with representatives of USAF to determine the feasibility of USAF assuming operational responsibility of the III Marine Amphibious Force Correctional Facility. This was done in conjunction with a study to determine the amount of additional Army military police resources required to replace departing Navy and Marine police/security personnel.

2. Logistics.

   (1) (G) General. During the reporting period the logistical posture throughout the Corps Area of Operations remained in a high state of readiness and was responsive to all demands.

   (2) (G) Operations.

   (a) Common Service Support. The following common service support functions were turned over to the US Army from the US Navy during the reporting period:

   1. Ferry Ramp (Song Han Pier and Ramps).

   2. China Beach In-country Rest and Recuperation Center.
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AVII-GCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, IIIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS GSFOR-65 (E2)

4 Freight Terminal Depot, maintenance operations and transportation
functions (Chu Lai).
5 Bridge Ramp, Tien Sha Ramp and selected lighterage craft.
6 Retail Class I and Serv Mart (Self Service Store).
7 Supply Depot, Transportation Motor Pool and Unaccompanied Bag-
gage Activity.

7 Facilities Engineering Support to include repair and utilities,
fire protection, vehicle maintenance, power generators, industrial fa-
cilities (Chu Lai and Dakang).
8 Dial Telephone Exchange (Chu Lai).
9 Contracting and Fiscal Services.
10 Area Civilian Personnel Office.
11 Ferry Service.
12 Deep Water Piers and associated service craft.

(b) Real Estate. During the reporting period the following bases
were transferred to the Government of Vietnam. The total number of
structures involved was 296 with an acquisition value of $839,460.00:

1 1st Tank Battalion Cantonment.
2 Ha Noi Plant.
3 9th Engineer Battalion Cantonment at Chu Lai.
4 Monkey Mountain Receiver Site.
5 Gym Bridge.
6 Hoa Khanh.
7 Hoa Khanh Children's Hospital.
8 (U) Inspector General. None.
9 (U) Information. None.
10 (U) Command History. None.

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1. (U) Aviation. None.

J. Signal.

(1) (U) XXIV Corps Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Communications Center. On 10 May 1970, a permanent TOC Communications Center was activated within the XXIV Corps TOC bunker. The permanent TOC Communications Center replaced the temporary installation of four AN/MSc-29 telegraph terminals which had been providing service to the TOC since the relocation of XXIV Corps from Phu Bai to Da Nang on 9 March 1970. The new communication center facility has the capability of terminating 20 full duplex 60/100 word per minute covered teletype circuits. There are a total of 15 full duplex teletype circuits in operation.

(2) (U) Numerical/Authentication and Operational Codes. On 1 July 1970, the CIRCE Wheel Code used for Numerical/Authentication encryption replaced the KAC-Q code. The CIRCE Wheel Code is much simpler to use than its predecessor and is expected to be used more frequently. At the same time the KAC 600 series Operation Code became effective and replaced the KAC-P code.

(3) (C) Communications Support for Quang Da Special Tactical Zone.

(a) During the reporting period, Quang Da Special Tactical Zone relocated its headquarters from the city of Da Nang to an area west of Da Nang. This relocation required the rerouting and retermination of Quang Da Special Tactical Zone Advisor voice circuits from Quang Nam Province Senior Advisor Tactical Operations Center and 1 Corps Tactical Operations Center. Additionally, voice and teletype circuits were activated from Quang Da Special Tactical Zone Advisors Tactical Operations Center to XXIV Corps Tactical Operations Center switchboard and communications center respectively.

(b) The 37th Signal Battalion installed one AN/MSc-29 teletype terminal and one AN/GRC-142 radio set at Quang Da Special Tactical Zone in support of US Advisors. In addition, the US Advisors entered as a station in the XXIV Corps TAG #2 secure FM net.

(4) (C) AUTOSECUCOM.

(a) On 10 May 1970, a narrow band subscriber terminal was activated at the 2d ARVN Division Advisor Tactical Operations Center in Quang Ngai City. The terminal was hooked off SECORD 27 at Chu Lai. Installation of this terminal had previously been held in abeyance pending resolution of power and air conditioning problems which were resolved on 6 May 1970.
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AVII GCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, CSS CSPU-65 (R2)

(b) During the reporting period, a wide band subscriber terminal was installed in the Company C, 5th Special Forces Group Tactical Operations Center at Camp Khe Sanh. The terminal was handed off on 15 July at Monkey Mountain.

(5) (U) Chu Lai Dial Telephone Exchange. During the reporting period, the 37th Signal Battalion assumed complete responsibility for the Chu Lai Dial Telephone Exchange and the outside cable plant in the Chu Lai Combat Base area. The dial telephone exchange and cable plant were formerly operated and maintained by the Naval Support Activity Detachment, Chu Lai. Included in the transfer of responsibility was the American Division Tactical switchboard which is located within the Dial Telephone Exchange.

(c) (C) 11th Army Support for Operation Elk Canyon. As US and ARVN troops were inserted into the area of operations at Kham Duc during the initial phase of Operation Elk Canyon, three U-21 aircraft, provided by the 1st Signal Brigade were utilized to provide FM aerial relay from the area of operations to rear area headquarters at Landing Zone Hawk Hill, Chu Lai and Quang Ngai. Each aircraft was equipped with an AN/ARC-149 (V) radio console and three HYL-3 generative repeaters which enabled the aircraft to automatically retransmit three FM tactical nets simultaneously. Two of these nets operated in the secure mode.

(d) (C) For System Reconfigurations. During the reporting period, four Corps Area Communications Systems were activated and five were deactivated.

(a) Activations.

1 45 channel system, Da Nang RE to Force Logistics Command, Da Nang.
2 23 channel system, Da Nang RE to XXIV Corps.
3 48 channel system, Dong Ha West to Quang Tri Army.
4 48 channel system, Camp Eagle to Camp Evans.

(b) Deactivations.

1 12 channel system, Da Nang RE to Force Logistics Command, Da Nang.
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2 12 channel system, Camp Eagle to Camp Evans.

3 12 channel system, Dong Ha West to Quang Tri Army.

4 12 channel system, Camp Evans to Camp Eagle.

5 12 channel system, Landing Zone Nancy to Quang Tri Army.

8 (U) Circuit Activations/Deactivations/Alterations. During the reporting period a total of 27 circuits were activated, 63 circuits were deactivated and 22 circuits were rerouted or reterminated. The large amount of deactivations was primarily a result of the rejustification of all Defense Communication System sole user circuits on 10 July 1970. All circuits were reviewed within XXIV Corps and its major subordinate commands. Those circuits no longer required were deactivated.

(c) (C) NESTOR Support for Advisor Communications.

(a) During the reporting period sufficient NESTOR assets were made available and distributed to I d 457th Infantry Division advisors to equip Advisor units down to battalion level. All US advisor units in I Military Region now have a secure capability.

(b) During the reporting period, Civil Operations for Rural Development Support Advisors received sufficient NESTOR equipment to establish secure FM communication from each province to all districts within each province.

k. Engineers.

(t) (U) Redeployment. During the reporting period, the 7th (less one company reinforced) and 9th Force Engineer Battalions (USMC) as well as the 1st Marine Engineer Battalion (less two companies) stood down in preparation for redeployment and both Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 121 and 7 redeployed. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 62 (less one half its vertical capability) arrived in DaNang. The 18th Engineer Brigade also assigned a well drilling detachment to 45th Engineer Group. The detachment is presently stationed in Chu Lai.

(2) (U) Construction projects completed during the reporting period.

(a) The 14th Engineer Battalion completed construction of the DART I site in Quang Tri on 21 June 1970.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps.
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-55 (22)


(d) The 3rd Naval Construction Regiment completed construction of 9 Force Structure Increase cantonments during this reporting period.

(e) Continuing construction projects.

(a) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10 started construction of the 0.8 miles of POL pipe line from Tam My to Hue.

(b) The 27th Engineer Battalion started work on the relocation of the existing revetment walls and construction of 8500 linear feet of new revetments for the 10th Aviation Battalion (Assault Unit) at Phu Bai.

(c) The 3rd Naval Construction Regiment started construction of 3000 linear feet of revetments at Danang Air Base for Marine Aircraft Group 11.

(d) The 27th Engineer Battalion started the upgrading of Phu Bai roads, with paving to be accomplished by Naval Mobile Construction 10 (5.4 miles of roads and 55,000 square yards of hardstand), and continues on this project.

(e) Work continues on the Phu Bai airfield upgrade, with an estimated completion date of 1 August 1970.

(f) Work continued on the upgrade of Fire Support Bases A-4 and C-2, with construction expected to be completed during the next reporting period.

(g) Land Clearing.

(a) On 23 June 1970, the 59th Land Clearing Company completed land clearing operations in the Khe Loc area. Eight thousand acres of 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MARFA) area of operation had been cleared.

(b) On 26 June 1970 a platoon of the 59th Land Clearing Company started clearing in the Tam Thu area and had cleared 2000 acres at the end of this quarter.

(c) During this quarter, the Second Provisional Land Clearing Company, which consisted of elements of the 9th Force Engineer Battalion (USMC) and the 39th Engineer Battalion was deactivated after completing the barrier Island project.
(d) The Third Provisional Land Clearing Company was formed of elements of the 39th Engineer Battalion and the 26th Engineer Battalion. This company is clearing in the Mo Duc area. Approximately 2500 acres have been cleared this quarter.

(e) During early July 1970, the 59th Land Clearing Company (-) moved to the Batangan Peninsula and began land clearing operations. As of the end of this quarter, approximately 3500 acres have been cleared.

(5) (U) Primary LOC construction.

(a) During this quarter, the 7th Force Engineer Battalion (USMC) completed upgrade of HL 540 to MACV standards, less paving, from the Cobb Bridge to Liberty Bridge and to a single lane all weather standard from Liberty Bridge to An Hoa.

(b) As of the end of this quarter, QL-1 will be complete with two exceptions:

1. Approximately 17 kilometers between Tu My and Tam Ky which require some repairs, a second lift of asphalt pavement and reconstruction within the city of Tam Ky.

2. 14 kilometers from Dong Ha to Gio Linh which is planned for post-1970.

(c) Due to the redeployment of USMC engineer units, the 32d Naval Construction Regiment has assumed full responsibility for the completion of QL-1.

(6) (U) Tactical roads.

(a) In the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MFNE) area the 14th Engineer Battalion started and completed Route 73 and the road from Mai Loc to Fire Support Base Holcomb.

(b) In the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) area of operations, Phase II upgrading of the access road from Landing Zone Nancy to Fire Support Base Barbara and the access road from Landing Zone Sally to Fire Support Bases T-Bone and Geronimo were started by the 14th and 27th Engineer Battalions, respectively, and upgrading continues. Other road upgrading projects started this quarter are the road from QL-1 through Camp Eagle to the Pohl Bridge (27th Engineer Battalion), the road between Fire Support Bases Arrow and Arsenal (27th Engineer Battalion), the Xom Pho road (extension of Street Without Joy), HL 597B to HL 555A (14th Engineer Battalion), and the road from Fire Support Base T-Bone to the Song (27th Engineer Battalion). The latter road was completed this
quarter. HL 547 between Fire Support Bases Bastogne and Vaghar was
reopened and upgrading is being performed by the 27th Engineer Battal-
on. HL 547 also opened temporarily between Fire Support Bases Vaghar
and Blaza for an artillery raid on 27-28 June 1970.

(c) In the Ist Marine Division area of operations, Mobile Construc-
tion Battalion 62 started upgrading the portion of LTL 4 between HL-1D
and HL-540. The lst Force Engineer Battalion (USMC) opened LTL 4 from
Fire Support Base Rawtide to Thong Duc as a pioneer road.

(d) In the Americal Division area of operations, the 39th Engineer
Battalion started upgrading of HL 524/523. HL 521 and relieved the 9th
Force Engineer Battalion (USMC) on the upgrading of HL 533. The 26th
Engineer Battalion initiated a dry weather road program of which 14
kilometers have been completed and 25 kilometers are under construction.
HL 529 and HL 533 were opened on several occasions, beyond the present
limits of upgrading, for 3 convoys to Tra Bong and 14 convoys to Tien
Phuoc.

1. Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs.

   (1) (U) Civic Action.

   (a) Military Civic Action. The summary of military Civic Action
   accomplishments for the reporting period is as follows. A total of
   35,237 man days based on a 10 hour day, were expended in support of
   military Civic Action. Total monetary expenditures were 17,541,928 $VN
   which includes 15,205,828 $VN from military resources; 1,071,657 $VN
   from the Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Assistance in Kind Fund
   and 1,264,423 $VN from voluntary contributions. The estimated average
   percentage of each project that was completed using self help labor was
   67% with 27% of the materials furnished by the people. A breakdown of
   the civic action effort follows:

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</table>

   The number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period
   was 312 schools, 12 orphanages, 215 hospitals/ dispensaries and 327
   other institutions.

   (b) Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP): A total of 239 350
persons were treated by MEDCAP personnel; 1,556 resulted from hostile action. Also 3,428 persons received dental treatment. A total of 8,548 immunizations were administered: 2,542 plague, 2,326 cholera, 567 smallpox and 3,112 miscellaneous injections. Eight hundred and twenty six Vietnamese Health workers were given training in first aid and nursing techniques in conjunction with MEDCAPs and in provincial hospitals. Three hundred and ninety personnel hygiene/sanitation classes were given with 6,330 persons attending.

(2) (C) Psychological Operations.

(a) The I Corps Combined Psychological Operations Coordinating Center was established on 4 May 1970 as a combined operational element for planning, programming, coordinating and controlling all Psychological Operations activities conducted by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and US/Free World Military Assistance Forces in I Military Region. The Center is jointly staffed by ARVN and US personnel. The director of the Center is an ARVN field grade officer and the greater percentage of the staff is furnished from ARVN Political Warfare assets. The Center is physically located at I ARVN Corps Headquarters. The Center has become an effective operating element and will eventually become the controlling agency for Psychological Operations activities within I Military Region after US resources are withdrawn.

(b) On 15 June 1970, the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion was changed from operational control of XXIV Corps to a role of general support of XXIV Corps. Command and control of the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion will be exercised by 4th Psychological Operations Group.

(c) Four Psychological Operations Orders have been promulgated establishing national guidance for three continuing campaigns and one national program. These are:

1. PSYOP-OPORD 1-70 (Rice Denial PSYOP Campaign), dated 12 May 1970.
2. PSYOP-OPORD 2-70 (Chieu Hoi Campaign), dated 29 May 1970.
3. PSYOP-OPORD 3-70 (Support of Pacification and Development), dated 31 May 1970.

One additional order, PSYOP-OPORD 5-70 (Redeployment of Combined Action Platoons), was written establishing psychological operations activities in support of the redeployment or withdrawal of Combined Action Forces assets within the XXIV Corps Area of Operation.
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AVI1-G0T

12 August

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps

Period Ending 31 July 1970, RRS CB003-66 (E2)

(a) XXIV Corps letter (AVI1-G0) subject: Aerial Psychological Operations Support, dated 2 July 1970, explaining the aerial psychological operations assets of Flight "A" 9th Special Operations Squadron and leaflet operations was published. This letter was designed to assist in improving psychological operations involving the use of the C-130 (Super Skymaster) and C-47 (Skytrain) aircraft through an explanation of the aircraft's designed uses, limitations, and command policy concerning their employment. Wide dissemination of Civil Operations for Rural Development Support (CORES) I Corps Tactical Zone letter, subject: Establishment of Armed Propaganda Teams, dated 21 June 1970, was made. The letter explained command policy for the use of Armed Propaganda Teams in support of US Forces operations within the XXIV Corps area of operation.

(b) Two incidents received major psychological operations emphasis during the reporting period:

1. The Ba Xan massacre, Thanh My Village, Que Son District, Quang Nam Province, occurred on 11 June 1970. Psychological Operations support of this incident was coordinated by Quang Nam Province using all assets available to achieve maximum exploitation. The Province officials used Vietnamese Informative Service (VIS), 110th Vietnamese Air Force Squadron, the 10th Political Warfare (POLWAR) Battalion and all Province assets in a superior manner gaining local, national, and international news media coverage of the atrocity. US/Free World Military Assistance Forces Psychological Operations support stayed in the background in order to allow the Government of Vietnam to gain status in the eyes of the local population.

2. On 1-2 July 1970, Quang Tri Province Territorial Forces defeated the 812th NVA Regiment in Hai Long District. Over 15 hours of aerial broadcast, 25 hours of ground broadcast and 210,000 leaflets were disseminated by US Forces to supplement the local district and provincial Psychological Operations efforts. Continuing psychological operations activities exploiting the situation are being conducted within the area. The theme for the operation pointed out that Territorial Forces can defend the local population.

(c) During the reporting period, 7,922 leaflets were requested with 7,734 being published and disseminated; 55,191,000 leaflets were produced and disseminated by XXIV Corps subordinate commands and the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion during the three month period.

m. Corps Artillery.

1. (G) Organization.
(a) On 1 April 1970, the 48th ARVN Artillery Battalion was activated (18 x 105mm) and assigned the mission of Direct Support of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division.

(b) On 15 May 1970, the 48th ARVN Artillery Battalion was activated (18 x 155mm) and assigned the mission of General Support of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division. Upon activation of this unit, G Battery, 44th Artillery (6 x 155mm) was released from the operational control of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division and returned to its parent unit, the 44th Artillery Battalion, which is General Support of the Quang Da Special Zone.

(c) On 12 July 1970, the 2d Artillery Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps (18 x 105mm) displaced from the 3d Military Region with the 258th Vietnamese Marine Corps Brigade to the 1st Military Region and Quang Da Special Zone. The mission of the 2d Battalion is Direct Support of the VMNC Brigade and is under the operational control of Quang Da Special Zone.

(d) On 20 May 1970, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW) relocated from Dong Ha to Danang, and was attached to XXIV Corps Artillery.

(e) On 20 May 1970, G Battery, 56th Artillery (SLT) and G Battery, 65th Artillery were attached to the 1st Battalion 44th Artillery (AW).

(f) On approximately 18 May 1970, the 30th ARVN Artillery Battalion (18 x 155mm), General Support Reinforcing of the 2d ARVN Division Artillery, was redesignated the 20th Artillery Battalion with no change of mission.

(g) On approximately 16 May 1970, the 34th ARVN Artillery Battalion (18 x 155mm), General Support Reinforcing of the 1st ARVN Division Artillery, was redesignated the 10th ARVN Artillery Battalion with no change of mission.

(i) Personnel Changes. On 30 April 1970, Colonel Edward Greer was appointed Deputy Commander, XXIV Corps Artillery.

(j) Significant Activities.

(a) Support for Operation Texas Star. Corps Artillery reported positions of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) and the 1st ARVN Infantry Division from Gia Le (YD628151); Fire Support Base Birmingham (YD70)(023), Banters (YD620005), Veghel (YD550095), Blaze (YD570502); Namer (YD6104), Stug (YD473264), Jack (YD495287); Southwest of Jack (YD481289), (YD76261), (YD69262), and (YD435271); Landing Zone Sally.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, III/7, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG3 CSPGR-65 (R2)

(IDo6527); Camp Evans (YD53534); Lentin; Zone Nancy (YD27314)

Support Bases Barbados (YD27317), Daytona (YD13467), and Fort W. Vanderbilt (YD006356).  

Support bases Barbados, 45, 46, Daytona (YD01467), and Fort W. Vanderbilt (YD006356).  

Support units supported operations of the 1st Brig., 1st ARVN Division (KSC) and the 1st ARVN Division from Dong Ha Combat Base (YD235605); Fire Support Bases C-1 (YD212675), C-2 (YD13645), A-1 (YD19701); and Camp Carroll (YD006354).  

Artillery raids/moves for reinforcing fires - Artillery units conducted several heavy artillery raids and moves of short duration in order to provide reinforcing fires in support of maneuver elements.  

Middle/Other Artillery units during the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>INCLUSIVE DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/1 3</td>
<td>3 x 8h</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>3, 4, 5 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1 3</td>
<td>2 x 8h</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>8 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1 3</td>
<td>2 x 8h</td>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>8 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2 3</td>
<td>1 x 8h</td>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>9 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1 3</td>
<td>1 x 8h</td>
<td>Sally</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>9 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1 3</td>
<td>1 x 8h</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>1 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>10 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1 3</td>
<td>1 x 8h</td>
<td>Sally</td>
<td>1 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>10 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1 3</td>
<td>2 x 8h</td>
<td>Sally</td>
<td>1 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>11 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1 3</td>
<td>2 x 8h</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>5 1/4 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>14 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1 3</td>
<td>2 x 8h</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>13 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1 3</td>
<td>1 x 8h</td>
<td>Sally</td>
<td>3 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>15 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1 3</td>
<td>2 x 8h</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>5 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>26 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1 3</td>
<td>2 x 8h</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>8 June 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1 3</td>
<td>4 x 8h</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Stud*</td>
<td>12-14 June 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1 3</td>
<td>3 x 8h</td>
<td>Veghel</td>
<td>Blaze</td>
<td>28 June 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2 3</td>
<td>1 x 8h</td>
<td>Veghel</td>
<td>Blaze</td>
<td>28 June 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2 4</td>
<td>2 x 8h</td>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>Daytona*</td>
<td>3-17 June 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/8 4</td>
<td>2 x 175</td>
<td>Carroll</td>
<td>Vanderbilt</td>
<td>9-16 July 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/8 4</td>
<td>2 x 175</td>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>Vanderbilt</td>
<td>9-16 July 1970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = unit or move of short duration in order to provide reinforcing fires in support of maneuver elements.

3. Battle Damage Assessment. Battle Damage Assessment for XXI Corps Artillery units during the reporting period was as follows.
## TARGET DESCRIPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Destroyed</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Damaged</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA Weapons Destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Weapons Destroyed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Weapons Damaged</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets Destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KB Artillery (confirmed)</td>
<td>1047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KB Artillery (unconfirmed)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Destroyed</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Damaged</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles Destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges Destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges Damaged</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenchline Destroyed, Meters</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Naval Gunfire.

1 There were 16 Naval Gunfire Support ships utilized in the 1st Military Region. In addition to regular assets, a heavy cruiser, the USS St. Paul, aided heavy firepower with 9 x 8" guns during two three-week periods on the gunline. The southeastern Demilitarized Zone was still the main targeting area with over 70% of the naval gunfire rounds being fired into the area in support of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MARCH). The 2d ARVN Infantry Division, Americal Division, 101st Airborne Division (AMEL), and 1st Marine Division also received Naval Gunfire support. Due to the pacification program in the coastal areas, Naval Gunfire rounds expended have decreased 20%.

2 In view of the assets available, one ship on the gunline for daily operations with an additional ship available for ten days each month, and the lack of targeting areas, ANGLICO consolidated the Quang Ngai team with the one at Chu Lai. The unit now provides the FM 6000 at XXIV Corps and Liaison/Spot teams located at Quang Tri, Dong Ha, Fire Support Bases G-1, A-1, A-3, and Chu Lai.

3 During the period 4315 missions were fired for a total expenditure of 20,758 rounds with the following damage assessment:
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AVII-GR

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

TARGET DESCRIPTION

Number

Bunkers Destroyed 42
Structures Destroyed 20
Secondary Explosions 15
KIA (confirmed) 16
KIA (probable) 4

(f) Friendly Fire Incidents. The following friendly fire incidents were reported in I Military Region during the period 1 May - 31 July 1970:

1 Number of incidents and accidents.

| Artillery Motor Aerial Field Artillery Naval Gun Fire |
|-----------|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| May       | 7             | 6               | 4               |
| June      | 3             | 3               | 3               |
| July      | 4             | 0               | 0               |

2 Casualties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) Firing Battery Inspection Team (FBIT). During the reporting period, primary emphasis of the Corps Artillery Firing Battery Inspection Team continued to be placed on technical assistance to ARVN artillery units. With the full concurrence and cooperation of the Commanding Officer, I ARVN Corps Artillery, firing batteries in the 1st ARVN Infantry Division, Quang Da Special Zone and the 2d ARVN Infantry Division were evaluated by the team. Detailed technical checks of fire direction procedures, firing battery operations and maintenance, and safety were made in each battery which was visited. On-the-spot critiques were given during and at the end of each visit, and a formal report was forwarded to I ARVN Corps Artillery. Although it was not possible to visit all of the ARVN batteries in 1 Corps, good coverage of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division and the Quang Da Special Zone was obtained.

(h) Regional Forces/Popular Forces.

Corps Artillery participated in one major artillery training program for Vietnamese forces. In cooperation with the Commanding Officer of I ARVN Corps Artillery and the I ARVN Corps Deputy Commander for territorial forces, an extensive program to train territorial forces in procedures for requesting and adjusting artillery fire was initiated.
A team of officers from XXVII Corps Artillery and I ARVN Corps Artillery conducted a survey on 16-20 April 1970 to determine the present level of proficiency of Regional Forces/Popular Forces personnel in artillery adjustment procedures and to ascertain the desirability of conducting training in this subject. The team spoke with Government of Vietnam officials and/or US advisors in all five provinces and eleven districts; all agreed upon the necessity for forward observer training for Regional and Popular Force personnel and enthusiastically endorsed a combined program by XXVII Corps Artillery and I ARVN Corps Artillery to conduct such training.

Two separate training programs were undertaken, one for Regional Forces and one for Popular Forces personnel.

The goal for the Regional Force program is to train the following numbers of officers from the various Regional Forces command echelons:

- Sector Headquarters - 1
- Subsector Headquarters - 1
- Battalion Headquarters - 2
- Company-Group Headquarters - 2
- Company - 3

A total of 889 Regional Force officers will be trained in artillery adjustment procedures in I Military Region. The Regional Force training is conducted at the Americal Division as a part of the Regional Forces/Popular Forces Leadership and Orientation Course. The first class started on 10 June 1970.

The Popular Forces training program is being conducted by ARVN artillerymen who will conduct classes at 12 sites in I Military Region at local ARVN batteries. Each class is being conducted over a three day period and stresses basic essentials and actual firing. The Popular Force training program will train a total of 3138 Popular Force leaders in artillery adjustment procedures. The Popular Force training began on 15 June 1970. It is anticipated that the Popular Force training will last for eight weeks.

(1) Meteorological Quality Control Team (MQCT). Following is a listing, by month, of the number of soundings checked during the quarter with results as indicated. The high unsatisfactory sounding rate at the beginning of the quarter was due primarily to inadequate employment of two (2) metro sections.
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AVAIL-GCOT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps
Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROB 41576-65 (12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SOUNDINGS</th>
<th>SATISFACTORY</th>
<th>INSATISFACTORY</th>
<th>UNSATISFACTORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1970</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1970</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1970</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(j) QM1 Team.

1. The XXIV Corps Artillery QM1 Team formed in 1968 to inspect Army Artillery units was discontinued in June 1970. The mission was assumed by the XXIV Corps G-4 Maintenance Division, on 1 July 1970. Prior to Artillery unit disbanding the inspection team, the remaining units of Corps Artillery were inspected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 April 1970</td>
<td>G Battery, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 April 1970</td>
<td>G Battery, 29th Artillery</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The Corps Artillery QM1 Team during the twenty-four months it was active, completed three cycles of inspections. Although unsatisfactory ratings were received by several units during the final cycle, January through April 1970, both maintenance and maintenance management standards improved in all battalions. An awareness of the value of good maintenance and maintenance programs was impressed on Commanders and personnel. The value of a QM1 effort does not and must not cease when the formal inspection is completed. The service and assistance of the team as a Command assistance and instructor group must continue and in fact, be more active than during the actual inspection cycle. Command at all levels must make wide use of this resource.

(k) Communications.

1. On 8 June 1970, the XXIV Corps Artillery Command Fire PM secure net was activated at Camp Horn. This net made possible secure voice communications to Corps Artillery units and to other artillery units within the Corps. This net served as a back-up to the AUTOSTOCOM terminal and was the primary and sole means of secure voice to the units which did not have access to the AUTOSTOCOM terminal. This net could not be activated from D-64K previously because of excessive distances involved for man-powered PM equipment, and obstructive terrain features as well as the amount of secure retransmission equipment available.

2. The obtaining of secure voice automatic digital repeater equipment for retransmission capabilities has given this unit the capability to transmit to all major artillery units within XXIV Corps Artillery in the Military Region. However, when attempting to locate this equipment.
The best site to obtain extended range, interference was experienced. This was the result of the same frequencies being used by two or more units within I Military region (I Military Region is divided into three frequency usage areas). These areas are: from the Demilitarized Zone south to Hai Van Pass; from Hai Van Pass south to Hoi An; and from Hoi An south to the southern I Military Region boundary. This break down, with its prominent terrain features, allows multiple use of the same frequencies.

b. When retransmission units were located on prominent terrain features, reception of traffic, interference and unintentional jamming by friendly units was frequent. In order to correct this problem, retransmission equipment operated on low power when practicable and directional antennas were used where possible. These measures were satisfactorily employed by this headquarters and subordinate units both north and south of the Hai Van Pass.

2. Due to recent possible enemy attempts at jamming of the Corps Artillery Command Fire FM Net, helicopters were employed using onboard direction finding equipment to search for the transmitting stations and were most successful in locating the interference.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel.

(1) Narcotics suppression.

(a) Observation: Combined narcotics and black market suppression teams are effective in reducing the flow of contraband items.

(b) Evaluation: Emphasis on conduct of these operations on a continual basis.

(d) Recommendation: That turnover of personnel assigned to these teams be kept to a minimum to allow for development of contacts/informers and a harmonious working relationship with Vietnamese officials.

b. (C) Intelligence/Counterintelligence.

(1) Automatic Sensor Readout Recordings.

(a) Observations: The Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART I) facility at Quang Tri became operational during this period. The facility screens out sensor activations caused by RFI, hypersensitivity, etc, based on preset criteria and automatically records all other activations.
This permanent recording of valid sensor activations allows the operator
full time for evaluation and provides the supervisor an inspection dev-
thus ensuring more attentive operators.

(b) Evaluation: The sensor readouts on DART I comprise 100% of all sens-
sors employed throughout I Military Region. However, since DART I be-
came operational, 85% of all targets reported in I Military Region were
reported by DART facility.

(c) Recommendation: That all unattended ground sensor monitor sites
be equipped with some sort of an automatic recording device as soon as
possible (DART, Event Recorder, X-T Platter).

(2) Document Exploitation.

(a) Observation: Enemy documents captured by US Forces are evacua-
te expediently to XXIV Corps and subsequently via a dedicated courier to
the Combined Document Exploitation Center in Saigon. Consequently, full
and partial readouts of these documents have been available to the cap-
turing unit and all other interested organizations within 36 to 48 hours
after evacuation. However, documents captured by ARVN units are some-
times held for exploitation by the capturing unit. Although significant
information is usually passed to US Forces in the area via briefings,
other interested organizations do not receive the information on a timely
basis as desired. XXIV Corps Interrogation Prisoner of War Branch
now maintains a portable 3M "107" copier to duplicate documents captured
by ARVN units which they do not desire to release for Combined Document
Exploitation Center exploitation immediately. A "Go Team" is dispatched
with the copier whenever this problem is now encountered.

(b) Evaluation: The use of the copier satisfies Combined Document
Exploitation Center requirements for timely evacuation of enemy docu-
ments captured by ARVN units while allowing the capturing unit to fully
exploit the same documents in the field. This arrangement satisfies all
requirements and has strengthened liaison and cooperation between US and
ARVN document exploitation personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That US document exploitation personnel ex-
periencing the problem of timely evacuation of ARVN captured docu-
ments arrange for reproduction of such documents.

(3) Operations.

(1) Reduction of Friendly Fire Accidents.

(a) Observation: The majority of friendly fire accidents are caused by a lack of experience and failure of personnel to be
properly briefed on locations of friendly troops.

(b) Evaluation: Briefings by responsible personnel, down to the squad leaders level, must be thorough and constantly updated as regards the current situation and status of friendly troops. This is particularly true during the hours of darkness when land navigation and identification of friendly forces is most difficult. Movement around ambush sites and night defensive positions must be kept to an absolute minimum. Personnel departing these areas must insure that other personnel are aware of their departure, direction of departure and return. This requirement is receiving continued daily emphasis.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders concerned, and appropriate service schools, continue to stress the need for thorough and updated briefings on the status of friendly troops.

d. (U) Organization. None.

e. (C) Training.

(l) Mechanical Ambush Triggering Device Project.

(a) Observation: Recent field experience with mechanical ambushes revealed that the enemy is adapting to the use of mechanical ambush triggering devices by allied forces and has begun to neutralize unmanned ambushes, particularly by severing the trip wire.

(b) Evaluation: Most triggering devices in use that are fabricated in the field are of the single action type. Pulling the trip wire closes a set of contacts which completes an electrical circuit to the Claymore mine. Cutting the trip wire disables the circuit. Use of a dual action triggering device of the pull/release type will cause the enemy additional disarming or neutralization problems.

(c) Recommendation: That units make more use of easily fabricated double action triggering devices. A letter explaining fabrication of two field expedient double action triggering devices for mechanical ambushes, made from commonly available materials, was distributed by XXIV Corps.

f. (U) Logistics. None.

g. (U) Communications. None.

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12 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CPFOR-65 (R2)

1. (U) Material: None.

2. (U) Other: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. E. SHEDD
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

JOHN D. GARD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Incl 1 w/d HQ DA
AVHCC-DST (2 Aug 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 3rd July 1970, RCS CYPOR-45 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-X, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 3rd July 1970 from Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference items concerning "Intelligence/Counterintelligence," Section 2, page 31, paragraph 2b(1) and "Document Exploitation" Section 2, page 32, paragraph 2b(2) have been extracted and will be considered for possible inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

   b. Reference item concerning "Automatic Sensor Readout Recording," page 32, paragraph 2b(1)(c); nonconcur with recommendation. The value of the event recorders is recognized. However, in many locations its use is impractical because of cost, activity in the area, and the temporary or mobile nature of the operation. Recommend that the recommendation be changed as follows: "That all Division and Brigade level unattended ground sensors..." Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Signature

Cy ltr

XXIV Corps
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 Sep 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D.D. Cline
2LT, AGO
Asst AG

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AVII-GCT
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TROCF ýI2T AZ Cr 11.LY
1970
24th Pl
27th Avn Bn (CPCON)
Co C, 5th Special Forces Op (CPGON)
Combined Action Forces (CPGON)
204th MI Det
29th Civil Affairs Co
48th Chemical Det
108th Trans Co (MAT)
2d Plat. Co B, 504th MP Bn (CPGON)
31st Mili Hist Det

AVII CORPS
HIM, AVII Corps
24th PT Det
227th Avn Bn (CPGON)
Co C, 5th Special Forces Op (CPGON)
Combined Action Forces (CPGON)
204th MI Det
29th Civil Affairs Co
48th Chemical Det
108th Trans Co (MAT)
2d Plat. Co B, 504th MP Bn (CPGON)
31st Mili Hist Det

AVII CORPS ARMY
HIM, AVII Corps Arty
1st Bn, 44th Arty (Twin 40’s)
Btry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight)
Btry J, 66th Arty (.50cal MG)
108th Artillery Op
HIM, 108th Artillery Op
8th Bn, 4th Arty (175mm – 8”) (SP)
1st Bn, 39th Arty (155mm) (SP)
1st Bn, 33rd Arty (175mm – 8”) (SP)
2d Bn, 94th Arty (175mm – 8”) (SP)
Btry P, 20th Arty (Tgt Acq)
235th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
239th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
240th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
245th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
250th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

III Mili
Hq Co
1st MP Bn
3d MP Bn
1st Radio Bn
9th Comm Bn
1st Force Recon Co (-)

IST Mili
Hq Co
1st Mar Rept
Hq Co
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn
5th Mar Rept
Hq Co
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn

INCLUDATIONS:
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 12 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, KEFP Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, 200 GPO Box 69 (K)

7th Mar Regt
HQ Co
1st Bu
2d Bu
3d Bu
11th Mar Regt
HQ Btry
1st Bu
2d Bu
3d Bu
4th Bu
1st Recom Bu
1st Bnk Bu
1st Med Bu
1st MT Bu
1st Bridge Co (-)
7th Bnk Bu (-)
9th Bnk Bu

101st Abn Div

1st Mane
MAG-1
MAG-11
MAG-13
MAG-16
MAGO-18
MAG-17

101st Abn Div (AMRL)

1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AMRL)

1st ABn (AMRL), 327th Inf
1st ABn (AMRL), 501st Inf
2d ABn (AMRL), 502d Inf
42d Inf Bn (Scout Dog)

2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AMRL)

3d ABn (AMRL), 187th Inf
2d ABn (AMRL), 327th Inf
1st ABn (AMRL), 502d Inf
47th Inf Bn (Scout Dog)
34th Pub Info Det (Pub Info)

3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AMRL)

3d ABn (AMRL), 501st Inf
1st ABn (AMRL), 506th Inf
2d ABn (AMRL), 506th Inf
50th Inf Bn (Scout Dog)
25th Pub Info Det (Pub Info)
CONFIDENTIAL

Period ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR 65 (82)

11th Arty
21st Arty
21st Arty
4th Arty (Aerial Arty)
13th Arty (AMBL)
1st Trans Det (Art. Maint)
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70th Art. (Armament Maint)
101st Arty (Art. Maint) (AMBL)
1st Arty (Supp) (AMBL)
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CONFIDENTIAL

12 August 1970


91st Div. Div (Aust Maint)
501st Inf Div (Aust Maint)
16th MCT (AMBL)
901st Signal (AMBL)
101st MCT (AMBL)
557th Inf Bn (Obt Tracker)
265th Med Bde Med Co
10th Mil Pol Det
50th Comm Bn (MM)
224th Mil Med Det
101st Mil Eng (MM)
Operating Location C
5th Weather Det (MM)
84th TASS Det

AMERICAN DIV

11th Infantry Brigade
9th Bde, 11th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 28th Inf
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 1st Inf
7th Bn, 1st Inf
144th Bn, 1st Inf
9th Bde, 1st Inf
308th Bn, 1st Inf
9th Public Information Det
10th TASS Det
2nd Security Team

19th Infantry Brigade
9th Bde, 29th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 28th Inf
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 1st Inf
7th Bn, 1st Inf
144th Bn, 1st Inf
9th Bde, 1st Inf
308th Bn, 1st Inf
9th Public Information Det

16th Infantry Brigade
9th Bde, 16th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 16th Inf
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 1st Inf
7th Bn, 1st Inf
144th Bn, 1st Inf
10th TASS Det
9th Public Information Det

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROS CSF08-65 (R2)

ARMED FORCES ARTILLERY

8th Div Art
1st Bn, 14th Aty
1st Bn, 82d Aty
3d Bn, 10th Aty
3d Bn, 18th Aty
3d Bn, 3d Aty
6th Bn, 11th Aty

Metro Section, 2d Bn, 11th Aty

3d Plt, 1st Bn, 19th Aty (Searchlight)
21st FA Art (Radar)

11th Corp Aviation Group

HHC, 11th Cav (Obt)

14th Maint Art Bn

1st Art Co

133d Art Co (Aid Spt Hal)
136th Art Co (Aid Spt Hal)
170th Art Co (Aid Spt Hal)
178th Art Co (Aid Spt Hal)

3d Med Det

123d Art Bn (Obt) (Inf Div)

Trp D, 1st Spt, 1st Cav
Co E, 723d Maint Bn
Trp F, 82d Cav

335th Trans Co

American Division Support Command

HHC and Bn

23d Admin Co

23d Med Bn

23d Spt Bn

723d Maint Co

634 Inf Plt (CTF)

Co U (Rang... 51st Inf

American Division Division (AOV)

Ch. Lt Col, C/2d Div (PMIV)

Headquarters, American Division

HHC, American Division

1st Spt, 1st Cav (O)

26th Eng Bn
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-C61T 12 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lecese Learned, Headquarters, III Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, ECS CRFB8-65 (H2)

523d Sig Bn
23d MP Co
146th MP Plat, 504th MP Bn
3d Mil Hist Det
635th MI Co
328th RA Co
OL, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

Non-Divisional Units
6th CA Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)
Det 3, 7th Payop Bn (DS of Div)
USABSG, ACSI, DA

1ST BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)
HHC, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div
1st Bn, 11th Inf
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 77th Armor (Tank)
5th Bn, 4th Arty (155mm) (SP)
Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav
Co P, (Ranger), 75th Inf
Co A, 7th Engr Bn
Co C, 2d Bn, 14th Armor (Attached from 25th Div to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div)
3d Sqdn, 5th Armed Cav (-D Troop) (Attached from 9th Div)
C/3d Sqdn, 17th Air Cav
43d Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
75th GS Spt Bn
18th MI Det
86th Cal Det
298th Sig Co
517th MI Det
407th RR Det
77th ABCT Tracker Det