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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Corps (U)

Date: 30 April 1970 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of I Corps (Group) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
Eighth US Army
ATTN: EAMO-MH
APO 96301

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. The organizational structure of I Corps (Op) is attached as Inclosure 1 as prescribed by TOE 52-17 dated 31 December 1966 and TDA P6WAT399902 approved by USARPAC G0527, dated 25 June 1969.

   b. Attached as Inclosure 2 is the Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Supplement to the Operational Report Lessons Learned.

   c. During the reporting period, I Corps (Op) supported the Republic of Korea by maintaining a heavy operational commitment of forces along the DMZ. Selected ROK maneuver and combat support battalions were diverted
from training missions to construct field fortifications. I Corps (Gp) continues to demonstrate the ability to effectively counter North Korean infiltration through a coordinated effort with paramilitary forces and Korean National Police.

d. Enemy Activities:

(1) On 13 March 1970, at 1048 hours, a fleeting encounter with three hostile intruders occurred in the 25th ROK Division sector within the Demilitarized Zone at CT207204. A patrol of the 25th ROK Reconnaissance Company, while returning from a supply mission of Guard Post 260, spotted three hostile individuals approximately ten meters to their front. In the following firefight, two intruders were killed. The third individual succeeded in escaping the South Korean soldiers and returned to North Korea in the vicinity of North Korean Guard Post 650. The neutralized agents wore ROKA uniforms and deerskin boots. AK47 assault rifles and other equipment, to include radios and $1000 in South Korean money, were captured.

(2) On 7 April 1970, at 0114 hours, personnel from the 5th ROK Marine Brigade, reported sighting three to four unidentified individuals on Kimpo Peninsula in the vicinity of BS826823. Friendly personnel fired M16 and 105mm illumination rounds. The unidentified individuals did not return fire. Three rubber suits were found at the location where the unidentified individuals were sighted. Since it appeared that the individuals escaped to Yu-Do Island (BS833834), a search of the island was made on the following day. With the exception of ten sets of footprints, nothing was found.

(3) On 8 April 1970, at 0810 hours, three hostile intruders were detected by a civilian in the 97th Regimental Combat Team sector in the vicinity of CS028795. The hostile intruders opened fire on the civilian. A Korean National Policeman, who heard the firing, alerted the Korean National Police and the Homeland Reserve Forces. The 97th Regimental Combat Team was alerted and occupied prepared blocking positions within the general vicinity. At 0842 hours, one agent was detected and mortally wounded at CS035778. A second agent was killed at vicinity CS046765 at 0910 hours and the third agent at CS045764 at 0920 hours. Two Homeland Reserve Forces personnel, two civilians, and one Korean National Policeman were wounded during the engagements. Two AK47 assault rifles, three pistols (one with a silencer) and other equipment were captured.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of I Corps (Group) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(I) On 12 April 1970, at 2215 hours, a suspected intrusion occurred in the 28th ROK Division sector in the vicinity of CT261299. An unknown number of unidentified individuals were observed. A friendly patrol fired Claymore mines and small arms at the individuals. Fire was not returned from the unidentified individuals. A search was conducted during the daylight hours but failed to locate any personnel. Three caches were found at CT263300, CT261300 and CT253306. Equipment such as AK47 ammunition, two pile caps, one pair of gloves, three hand grenades and one bloody handkerchief were found scattered on the ground.

(5) On 30 April 1970, at 0011 hours, three hostile individuals were sighted 15 meters in front of an ambush position of the 28th ROK Division at CT247295. Friendly forces immediately fired five Claymore mines and hand grenades. Three hostile individuals were killed in the engagement. Shortly thereafter, North Korean Guard Post 682, located at CT236310, opened fire at South Korean Guard Post 162. Approximately 100 rounds of light machine gun and 6x82mm recoilless gun rounds were fired from the North Korean guard post. There were no friendly casualties and fire was not returned by the South Korean guard post.

e. Defense Conference Map-I FY70.

(1) Purpose: The purpose of the Defense Conference Map-I FY70 was to conduct a two day Defense Conference Exercise to review the basic plans for the defense of the Republic of Korea and to examine select problem areas associated with these plans. An additional objective of the conference was to develop an atmosphere to further increase esprit de corps and camaraderie among US and ROK officers through professional and social contacts offered by the two day conference exercise.

(2) Concept: The concept for the two day Defense Conference involved formal presentations followed by appropriate discussions. The conference was initiated by the Eighth US Army staff presentation of the Eighth US Army Defense Plan. This presentation was followed by the Air Defense Plans of the 314th Air Division and the 38th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense). The Combat Service Support Plan was presented by FASCOM. These presentations served as the framework for later presentations and discussions. The I Corps (Op) staff followed with a detail presentation of the current situation facing the Corps, with an analysis of the enemy situation, the Corps mission, concept of operation and mission of subordinate units. The intelligence, operations, artillery and logistics aspects of I Corps (Op) OPLAN 27-69 were included in the presentations. Concluding the first day
of the conference were presentation of defense concepts by subordinate units of I Corps (Gp), each followed by discussion periods. The second day consisted of unit presentations on seminar topics addressing specific problem areas associated with implementation of existing defense plans. The topics were carefully selected from recommendations submitted by major subordinate commands and the I Corps staff. Prior to the conference, each command or staff section assigned a topic for presentation, conducted an initial study and assembled data related to the problem. Facets of the problem were then posed to attendees during the conference for resolution during a brief study period which followed the problem presentation. Moderators would then reassemble conference and lead a discussion on problem solution. This general format of problem presentation, study period, and discussion was followed by each US or ROK command or staff section assigned a seminar topic to present.

3) Accomplishments:

(a) The conference encouraged attendees to review their respective estimates and operation plans prior to the exercise and provided an excellent opportunity for newly assigned personnel to become familiar with specific areas of defense plan responsibilities.

(b) The conference brought together major unit commanders and key staff officers which provided an opportunity to exchange concepts and discuss areas of mutual concern in a common effort to improve our existing defensive posture.

(c) The conference provided all attendees a better understanding and appreciation of the mission and problems facing other commanders and counterparts as well as problem areas of mutual concern.

(d) Appraised commanders of support available as well as limitations of support and focused attention on specific problem areas expected to be encountered both in the logistical and operational area.

(e) Provided a forum to consider possible changes or additions desirable in existing operational plans or to pose solutions to existing problem areas. The conference provided an initial "think-tank" atmosphere for the consideration and advance study of problem areas of complex and joint interest to attendees and focused attention on areas requiring resolution.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of I Corps (Group) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(f) Provided a degree of familiarization for attendees of relative new and interesting equipment including the Redeye anti-aircraft missile, the M551 Sheridan armor assault vehicle with Shillelagh missile, various types of surveillance radar, combat vehicles, missiles and rockets.

(g) Provided an opportunity for Korean and American officers to meet counterparts on a professional and social basis, to share common problems and open discussions toward solutions. Greatly assisted in improving understanding, increased two way communications, sharpened an awareness of the need to act together and developed new friendships with desire to meet again. These exercises are considered an excellent opportunity for newly assigned officers to meet counterparts and develop camaraderie.

(h) General Officer Attendance:

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<tr>
<th>Officer Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEN John H. Michaelis</td>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>CINC, UNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG John A. Heintges</td>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>DOO, 8th US Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Patrick F. Cassidy</td>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>CG, I Corps (Gp)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Han, Shin</td>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>CG, FROKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Lee, Min Woo</td>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>CG, V ROK Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Bak, Won Kun</td>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>CG, VI ROK Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Choi, Woo Kun</td>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>CG, I ROK Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Edward F. Smith</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>CG, 7th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Salve H. Matheison</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>CG, 2d Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Ward S. Ryan</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Chief, KNAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Choi, Dae Myung</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Comdt, National War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Lee, Byung Hyung</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>O3, ROKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Kim, Yong Hyu</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>O2, 25th ROK Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO Lee, Joo Ho</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>O2, 20th ROK Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO Walter F. Whinton, Jr.</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>CofS, I Corps (Gp)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BO Yoo, Hak Sung</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>O3, 26th ROK Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO Yoo, Sam Suck</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>O3, 26th ROK Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO Hwang, Young Si</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>O3, 32d ROK Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO Chester H. Johnson</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>O4, 8th US Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO Joseph W. Peadirts</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>CG, Det L, FROKA KNAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO George F. Holm</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>CG, FASCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO Chun, Sung Hak</td>
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<td>CG, FROKA</td>
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<tr>
<td>BO Lee, Hong Kyun</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>CG, 5th ROK Mar Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO Lee, Kae Won</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>DCS, Plans, FROKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO Arthur W. Holderness, Jr.</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>CG, 314th Air Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO Harold O. Moore, Jr.</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>O3, 8th US Army</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of I Corps (Group) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

f. Redeye Status: During the reporting period, this headquarters published a Redeye SOP. The Redeye missile is not assigned to the South Korean weapon inventory. This command provides the ROK Army Redeye support in event of hostilities. As such, various units within this command are required to support particular ROK Army units. The Redeye SOP redistributed the contingency requirements for the Redeye support. In addition, this SOP outlines firing status and the conduct of liaison visits between support and supported units a minimum of once each quarter. A directive has been written by this headquarters requiring all implementing instructions, staff coordination, and liaison visits be completed not later than 1 June 1970. A Redeye exercise will be conducted in early June requiring all Redeye teams to deploy to the supported units.

g. Airmobile Operations: During the month of February 1970, the 239th Aviation Company completed its first annual field training exercise. The unit displaced from Camp Stanley by motor march and by flying to the field location. The field location selected was R239. The unit bivouacked at this location for three days. Airmobile operations were carried out from field location with the 26th ROK Division. The operation involved ten UHID Huey helicopters and two CH47 Chinook helicopters. Approximately 400 troops were moved to the objective by helicopter. Resupply missions consisted of approximately 20 tons of ammunition, food and wtr. Similar operations were conducted with the 25th ROK Division and the 5th ROK Marine Brigade during March and April, respectively.

h. The upgrading of roads in the I Corps area commenced this year during late March 1970. Paving operations began the last week of April 1970 and will continue throughout the construction season.

i. Through a program initiated last December by the G2 Section, the number of SECRET documents in Headquarters, I Corps (Gp) has been reduced by approximately 50% and the number of TOP SECRET documents by 66%. The Counterintelligence Branch has been instrumental in this program through a program of courtesy inspections designed to aid the various staff sections in the proper procedures for storing, safeguarding, and destroying classified documents.
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j. Civil Affairs:

(1) Arbor Day Activities. Arbor Day in the Republic of Korea (Sunday 5 April) was celebrated by all units of I Corps (Gp). LTG Cassidy emphasized participation of US personnel on a "hand on the shovel" basis. To encourage this, Saturday the fourth of April was declared a training holiday. As Governor Nam Bong Jin's guest, LTG Cassidy attended a ceremony at Kwangnung hosted by the ROK Office of Forestry and attended by President Park Chung Hee and other distinguished guests. Colonel Crane, the Corps G5, represented I Corps (Gp) at the Kyungp Province ceremony which was held at Suwon and hosted by Vice Governor Suh Jung Hwa. Personnel and resources participation were as follows:

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<th>2d Div</th>
<th>7th Div</th>
<th>ICA</th>
<th>ICST</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>19,570</td>
<td>3,460</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>126,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off US Compounds</td>
<td>51,750</td>
<td>11,930</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>116,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142,650</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td>26,060</td>
<td>23,500</td>
<td>243,710</td>
</tr>
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</table>

| US Personnel | 4,000 | 2,729 | 1,578 | 1,000 | 9,307 |

| Vehicle Hours Required | 250 | 107 | 128 | 48 | 533 |

(2) Collateral Activities Funds. End of year excess funds were distributed by Eighth Army in the form of Collateral Activities Funds. I Corps (Gp) received $7,485 which was further allocated by this headquarters as follows:

- HQ, I Corps (Gp): $2,500
- SGS, I Corps (Gp): 185
- 2d Division: 1,500
- 7th Division: 1,500
- I Corps (Gp) Arty: 1,000
- ICST: 800

The $2,500 allocated to Headquarters I Corps (Gp) was provided to the Corps Library Director to purchase books in the Korean language for placement in Special Services libraries for KATUSA's.

(3) Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) Program. Funding for the AFAK Construction Program, which has long played an important role in
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I Corps Civil Affairs, was terminated. The distribution of remaining AFAK materials for small contingency projects and the completion of yet unfinished AFAK projects will continue through the fiscal year. Twenty-one FY69 projects were dedicated during this reporting period leaving 8 projects out of 61 uncompleted.

(1) Support of Charitable Institutions. The Sam Kwang Orphanage located in Uijongbu City was closed by order of the ROK Government. This action was taken after it was found that the orphanage could not account for several children and its foundation was inadequate. The children of the orphanage were redistributed among three other orphanages sponsored by units of I Corps.

(2) Liaison Activities. Representatives of the Korean Boy Scouts and 4-H Clubs in Kyunggi Province were contacted and a channel of communication for requesting and supplying assistance for their programs was established.

k. Inspector General.

(1) The Inspector General, assisted by members of the other staff sections of this headquarters, conducted the Annual General Inspection of six company size units, four detachment size units and performed an inspection visit to two ROK Army Engineer Battalions. The I Corps (Gp) NCO Open Mess also received its Annual General Inspection. Three visits were made to compounds which were responsible for the physical security of the Redeye missiles assigned to the units.

(2) Headquarters, I Corps (Gp) received a Special Inspection from the Inspector General, United States Army, Pacific, on 2-6 March 1970. The overall rating of SATISFACTORY was awarded. (Only a rating of SATISFACTORY or UNSATISFACTORY was considered). The report indicated that the mission of the headquarters was being accomplished in an outstanding manner. The state of discipline, morale, and esprit de corps was outstanding. Courtesy, appearance, and job interest of all personnel observed were excellent. Police was outstanding. The report contained 28 findings. Six of these findings were in outstanding areas and were highly complimentary in nature. They were:

(a) Drug Suppression Program.
(b) Junior Officer Retention Program.
(c) Special Service Activities.
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(d) Reduction of Classified Material.

(e) G3 Section.

(f) ADM Plan.

One finding was chargeable to Headquarters, Eighth United States Army. Of the 21 deficiencies, five were in the area of Funds Administration and seven were in Personnel Management and Records.

1. The Camp Red Cloud Craftshop was reopened on 1 February 1970 following a NAF construction project which connected two buildings and added an additional 800 square feet of floor space. The shop received numerous new items and is now considered the best facility North of Seoul. The jewelry program is now 100% complete with the addition of a vacuum casting machine and a local CPF purchased faceting machine.

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel. None.
   b. Intelligence. None.
   c. Operations. None.
   d. Organization. None.
   e. Training.

   Protective Labeling of the XM76 Redeye Trainer Container.

   (1) OBSERVATION: The XM76 Redeye Trainer container resembles the actual tactical Redeye missile container with the exception of the colored corners. The tactical Redeye missile container has a yellow corner whereas the XM76 Redeye Trainer container has a blue corner. Due to the classified nature of the tactical missile and the XM76 Redeye Trainer, both items are stored within secure structures and in the same CONEX container.

   (2) EVALUATION: Since these items are stored within the same CONEX container, it is possible for personnel to remove the wrong container. This could result in an actual tactical missile being fired during
training or in event of hostilities, the gunner attempting to fire an inert training round. In an attempt to preclude either of these possibilities from occurring, this headquarters has instructed major subordinate commands assigned Redeye to stencil 2-inch lettering in the color blue on all flat surfaces of the trainer container with the exception of the front and rear ends. Text of the lettering is as follows: FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY. The color blue was selected in order to correspond with the current Army color coding system.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all commands employing Redeye and equipped with the XM76 Redeye Trainer be instructed to place the protective markings on the trainer containers already in use. That the labeling of the containers become part of the required specifications for future purchasing of the XM76 Redeye Trainer container from authorized sources.

f. Logistics.

(1) Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program.

(a) OBSERVATION: More frequent samplings of OH23G Helicopter engine oil have increased the efficiency of the Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program (SOAP) in determining potential engine failures of that aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION: During this report period, units assigned to I Corps (Op) experienced three engine failures with the OH23G helicopter. The SOAP was considered in attempting to determine potential engine failure; however, it was found to be ineffective as units were not complying with the full requirements and oil sampling was taken at too infrequent intervals. Subsequently, corrective action was taken with OH23G engine oil sampling interval being reduced to every five hours of operation. Laboratory results did identify three potential engine failures. Further, I Corps (Op) recommended that as a result of SOAP laboratory findings, the time interval for change of OH23G engines be reduced from 900 to 600 hours. US Army Aviation Support Command did not concur in the recommendation, but is monitoring closely this problem area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be given to the SOAP in determining aircraft engine failures.

(2) Review of Materiel Readiness Reports.

(a) OBSERVATION: Review of Materiel Readiness Reports (DA Form 2406) and Equipment Status Reports (AR 711-5) submitted by I Corps (Op) units
revealed a significant number of variances in authorized and on hand quantities between the two reports.

(b) EVALUATION: The quarterly materiel readiness and equipment status reports submitted by units in I Corps (Op) evidence little reconciliation with Property Book entries and with each other. Army Audit Agency reviews brought the aforementioned to the Corps attention. Follow-up reviews of copies of these reports on file at Corps Headquarters generally support the AAA findings. Units were requested by letter to give this matter greater emphasis. Additionally, quarterly procedures whereby units bring the reports to headquarters I Corps (Op) for review before submission have been established.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Continued emphasis be given to procedures established at unit level to reconcile Materiel Readiness Reports and Equipment Status Reports with authorization documents and property books.

3) Containerized Cargo Shipments to Korea.

(a) OBSERVATION: In March of 1970, Containerized Cargo shipments to Korea were initiated by the Sea-Land and Matson Shipping firms, under contract of the U.S. Army. This service reached as far forward as the 7th US Infantry Division area, and is planned for the 2d Division as well. However, some problems were encountered in proper receipt of these containers.

(b) EVALUATION: The introduction of Container Service to Korea precedes an era of reduced shipping times and greatly reduced shipping costs which will eventually have far-reaching effects. It is even foreseeable that a reduction in order-ship time may result in lower necessary stockage levels and a reduced inventory, leading to a more flexible and more responsive supply system. However, the savings realized can be liquidated in penalty fees through improper handling and needless, unauthorized retention of the containers. Only 72 hours is allowed for transport from the container yard at Inchon to the consignee, discharge, and return of the empty containers. This requires a responsiveness of a high degree on the part of the consignee, and a thorough use of communication channels available to inform the consignee of the impending arrival of the container. It is assumed that, once the frequency of containerized shipments is such as to make receipt routine, there will be little difficulty in this field. But this is not the case with rail cars, which, even though received with great frequency, are often allowed to sit and require the payment of penalty fees. The only real answer is communications between
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of I Corps (Group) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

The movement control center and the consignee, to insure awareness on the part of the latter of his responsibilities in this regard.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis be placed on informing the consignee, with as much advance notice as possible, of the impending arrival of a containerized shipment at his location, and of his responsibilities with regard to rapid turnaround of the container. This can only be accomplished through the efforts of the Movements Control Center and the ATMO/TMO serving the consignee.

g. Communications. None.

h. Materiel. None.

i. Other. Inspector General.

(1) Preparation for a Major Inspection.

(a) OBSERVATION: The preparation of a Corps headquarters for a major inspection requires timely guidance to the staffs on what to expect from the inspectors and detailed pre-inspections of each staff section to insure they are prepared.

(b) EVALUATION: Each staff section was furnished their appropriate portion of TB IG-2 indicating Inspector General interest in his section and a copy of the major areas of interest furnished by the inspecting command. The preparation for the inspection used these two documents as a basis for their preparation. This information was furnished approximately 60 days in advance and a pre-inspection was conducted approximately three weeks in advance of the actual inspection. This timing permitted appropriate preparation and sufficient time to correct deficiencies prior to the actual inspection. All staff sections furnished information for a brochure which contained a mission statement, special subjects for inspection, and major areas of interest in their purview and how these were being implemented by this command. This input also included accomplishments during the past year and future projects or programs. The brochure was assembled by the IG section and presented to the inspecting officer upon arrival. It was determined that this brochure assisted immeasurably in the conduct of the inspection.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The preparation of a Corps headquarters for a major inspection be started at least 60 days in advance of that inspection and that timely guidance and assistance be afforded each staff section by the Inspector General.
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(2) Results of Annual General Inspections on Subordinate Units.

(a) OBSERVATION: Nine units were rated UNSATISFACTORY in the overall Safety Program which included Small Arms Safety and Vehicle Safety.

(b) EVALUATION: The majority of these units received UNSATISFACTORY ratings because they did not comply with regulations, directives, and their own SOP in conducting appropriate training or having unit Safety Council Meetings.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Additional command emphasis is needed in all aspects of the Safety Program.

(3) Complaints.

(a) OBSERVATION: One hundred and sixty-nine (169) complaints or requests for assistance were registered with the Inspector General. There was a total of 65 complaints, 29 of which were considered justified. Of all of the visits, 38 per cent were in the area of Unit Administration and 20 per cent were in the area of Assignment and Reassignment.

(b) EVALUATION: In many instances, there appeared to be a breakdown of communications between commanders and supervisors and the subordinates of these personnel in these areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders and senior NCO's make themselves available to the junior enlisted men to provide counseling, guidance, and assistance in the solving of the men's problems.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DONALD R. WARD
Brigadier General, GS
Chief of Staff

2 Incl
as
Incl 2 wd HQ DA
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96359

The following comments supplement the report.

2. Reference item concerning Protective Labeling of the D76 Redeye Trainer Container, page 9, para 2a. Concur. The preferable solution to the problem of readily distinguishing the Redeye trainer from the service round would be to provide storage facilities. If it is necessary to store the items together due to lack of a secure area for the trainer, the "FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY" stencil may be used.

3. Reference item concerning Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program, page 10, para 2(1). Concur. Action is in progress to train personnel and install spectrometric analysis equipment to provide Eighth Army with internal spectrometric oil analysis capability. However, this program should not be used to take the place of proper flight or maintenance procedures.

4. Reference item concerning Review of Material Readiness Reports, page 12, para 2(2). Concur. Variances in authorization and "on hand" quantities between the Material Readiness and Equipment Status reports will occur for several reasons. For example, the Material Readiness report contains the current operating allowances. Those two allowances differ in FQ authorization documents. Also, the Material Readiness report lists and tallies by utilization codes, whereas the Equipment Status report gives one "on hand" total by equipment line item number. To ascertain total "on hand" quantities on the Material Readiness report, all utilization code totals must be added together. Frequently, the utilization code "on" total is used as the Material Readiness report "on hand" quantity. Recommendations should result in a more valid authorization and "on hand" report data on the Material Readiness and Equipment Status reports.

5. Reference item concerning Containerized Cargo Shipments to Korea, page 12, para 2(3). Concur. The 25th Transportation Center (TC) has published a JP which outlines both consignee's and transportation officers' responsibilities for close coordination and receipt of the containers.

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report.
6. Reference item concerning Complaints, page 13, para 21(1). Concur. Further evaluation indicates that the breakdown in communication between commanders, supervisors and subordinates stems from the fact that many units of company/battery/detachment size are commanded by junior officers. Additionally, many of the NCOs of these units are also young and inexperienced. This situation is further aggravated by the fact that the next section of command (battalion/group), although commanded by a field grade officer, in many instances is staffed by inexperienced lieutenants or captains. This places the entire load of training, guiding and counseling the young commanders exclusively on the shoulders of the field grade commander. The foregoing causes many soldiers to seek inspector general assistance when most of their personal problems could normally be resolved at unit level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Copies Furnished:
2-AGS (R, D)
1-C, I Corps (Gp), APO 96358 (Ind only)
GPOP-DT (22 May 70) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I Corps (Group) for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 31 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. R. McLAUGHLIN
COL, AGC
Adjutant General
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, I Corps

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.

CG, I Corps

22 May 1970

N/A

DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310

N/A