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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) (nn). c

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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AVCA TC-XB-GO

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

THRU: Commanding Officer
4th Transportation Command
ATTN: AVCA TC-CL
APO 96307

Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
APO 96307

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVCA DH
APO 96307

Commanding General
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-MH
APO 96558

TO: Headquarters, Department of the Army
ATTN: ACSPOR
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION 1 - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

The 5th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) commanded by Captain Wetzel Brumfield was attached to the Battalion, and personnel arrived from Fort Eustis, Virginia on 19 February 1967. Unit was in-processed at the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) Base Camp at Cat Lai and departed for their duty station at Vung Tau on 21 February 1967. No significant problems were encountered on processing them.
From 17-24 February 1967, eleven (11) men from this Battalion participated in the USARV Boxing Championship at Tan Son Nhut. Battalion placed fourth (4th) in competition with units from throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

Action was taken to assist in repair and construction of a Catholic Church/school in the village of Binh Trung as part of the Battalion's Civic Action Program.

As the English language school at the Cat Lai stronghold continues operation, details of the operation provide insight as to the future operation of other such endeavors. A second language school has been begun. Vietnamese lessons are now offered to U.S. troops at Cat Lai.

As of 19 March 1967, chapel facilities have been moved from the theater to the 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) Day Room. The chapel program now operates in a more fitting and dignified setting.

The Cat Lai Base Development plan which had been submitted in January to USARV was then forwarded by USARV Headquarters to the U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam at Bien Hoa for further surveying and determination of requirements. This project was given to a representative of Leo A. Daly Company, a civilian engineer consulting firm under contract to the U.S. Army. Mr. Daly then made initial plans for preparation of the finalized base layout.

During the month of March, the Cat Lai Base Development plan was put in final form by USAECV and was resubmitted to USARV G-4 Installations for final staffing. The one (1) remaining action required of USAECV was the drafting and staffing of the project directive which was to be accomplished in early April.

Contact was made with the Utilities Branch of USAECV regarding a programmed well at Cat Lai. Based on their recommendation, two (2) exploratory holes were dug with a clam shell to attempt to locate a source of potable water. Water samples were obtained from both holes and were tested for potability. The water had too much salinity, to be considered potable, however, it was useable. Plans were prepared to bring a well drilling rig into Cat Lai and attempt to sink a deep well.

On 11 April, a meeting was held with representatives of the Coast Guard, Commanding Officer 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), Lieutenant Colonel Hoy, and S-4 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) Captain Philbrook on movement of the Explosives Loading Detachment #1 from Nha Be to Cat Lai. As this Detachment has no supply source, it was recommended that they have 1st Logistical Command cut orders assigning them to the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for logistical support.
On 14 April 1967, USAECV issued a construction directive to the 79th Engineer Group to assist this Battalion in beginning building permanent type buildings at Cat Lai. The 79th Engineer Group issued a further directive to the 168th Engineer Battalion located at Di An. First priority was the consolidated mess hall and initial requirements called for a design of what we wanted so that a bill of materials could be prepared for requisitioning.

Two (2) quonset huts were erected next to the Battalion headquarters for the purpose of relocating the Chaplain's office and the Personnel Section. Ammunition Branch moved from Saigon on 15 April and took over the office space left vacant by the Personnel Section.

The dump trucks hauling laterite from Saigon Support Command were stopped in mid-April as we had sufficient laterite in the area for our immediate use. The first heavy rains of the season indicated that we were wrong as many low spots existed. The slope of the fill caused most of the water to flow toward Battalion headquarters and the drainage system around the building was not adequate to handle such a large amount of water.

On 22 April 1967, a meeting was held at Cat Lai with Lieutenant Colonel Hoy, Commanding Officer 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), Captain Philbrook, the Battalion S-4, and representatives from USAECV G-4's office. The topic discussed was a source of water supply for Cat Lai. Several possibilities were discussed including a deep well, desalination equipment, and even the possibility of a desalination unit. It was recommended that the immediate requirement for some of our water needs be taken care of by submitting a work request to PA&E for installation of water purification equipment and utilizing the river as a water source. This would satisfy our shower water requirement and we could continue to haul drinking water with the 5000 gallon tanker.

An outdoor movie theater was constructed in front of Battalion headquarters to include a stage for the various USO shows that are programmed at Cat Lai.

Plans for relocating the ammunition ship to barge discharge from Nha Be to Cat Lai were approved and created the requirement for additional administrative and billeting space. The 188th Military Police Battalion began construction on two (2) tent pads with frames for the MP Detachment that would be billeted at Cat Lai.

A visit by AP correspondent, Henri Huey was made on 1 April 1967. Mr. Huey was previously stationed with the French Army here at Cat Lai stronghold, and wished to take some pictures in preparation for a possible "then and now" story on activities at Cat Lai.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

PX operation and sales continue to increase and present monthly sales average $50,000. Some readjustment in local concessionaires promises better service to the troops. Recreational facilities continue to improve and a Battalion swimming pool should be open by 1 July 1967, as filtration equipment was shipped from San Francisco, California on 9 April 1967.

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment received an IG by 4th Transportation Command on 24 April 1967 and received a rating of SATISFACTORY.

Initiation of a training program and publication of a promotion policy for grades E3-E4 during the month of April has led to better preparedness of all individuals and a more equitable distribution of the limited allocations received.

During the month of February 1967, the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) conceived and implemented a Standard Operational Procedure for Roll on-Roll off ("Ro-Ro") vessels at Area III, Saigon Port. Their coordinated efforts of all units involved has taken much of the confusion and inefficiency out of the discharge of "Ro-Ro" vessels. The implementation of the SOP has given Saigon Port a more effective means of discharging such vessels.

During the month of March 1967, the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) provided a bulldozer for civic action projects at Long Tan in Bien Hoa province. These civic action projects involved clearing an area for a new market place in the village of An Phu. The bulldozer was also utilized in clearing the road shoulders of thick underbrush to lessen the chance of ambush to the American Advisors in the area.

During the month of April 1967, the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) continued operation of Area III, Saigon Army Terminal. Area III consists of three (3) deep draft piers (K-8, K-9, and K-10), two (2) warehouses, and a Can Dock (floating pier) used in the discharge of "Ro-Ro" type vessels.

During the month of February 1967, the 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) continued to perform its two (2) major missions of operating Area IV of Saigon Port and the Nha Be subport. Major emphasis was placed upon building and improving the new base camp area at Cat Lai.

Area IV continued to average 1000 tons of general cargo a day, making February the second month in a row that the 1000 ton a day goal was met and surpassed. During February, a total of 29790 short tons were discharged and backloaded over the K-12 pier. No major problems were encountered although the repair of the bridge to Saigon Port hampered truck traffic which resulted in slow truck turn-arounds and inability to clear...
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cargo from the pier and warehouse. Once again commercial truck support was excellent, but the lack of military trucks resulted in oversized cargo and cargo consigned to Tan Son Nhut being backed up.

Nha Be tonnage for the month of February 1967 was 474,79 short tons. This figure resulted in a higher average daily tonnage than attained during the record breaking month of January 1967.

The 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) assumed the complete responsibility for the operation of first and second echelon maintenance of the forklift barge at Nha Be. This operation had been plagued with maintenance problems since its conception in September 1966. The 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) personnel had originally been placed on the barge to supervise the charging of batteries. Maintenance responsibility was assigned to Equipment Services Division of Saigon Port in the same manner it supported the MHE allocated to other areas of Saigon Port. It became apparent that the Equipment Services Division could not support the barge due to the distance involved and a shortage of qualified personnel. The 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) did not have trained personnel to operate and maintain these electric forklifts which all are a non TO&E item; however, the 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) was given the total mission. The 586th Transportation Detachment (Maintenance Section) was attached on 1 April 1967 from the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) for the purpose of maintaining these electric forklifts. At the time of mission take-over, nine (9) forklifts were deadlined and the others required some maintenance repairs. Personnel were assigned as second echelon mechanics and the ship NCO's were instructed on first echelon maintenance and the need of increased supervision of the local national drivers. At the end of February 1967, four (4) forklifts remained deadlined awaiting parts and the nine (9) forklifts that had been deadlined were repaired. Parts and third echelon maintenance remained a problem area, but the 185th Maintenance was assisting in both areas.

The company still operated, during February, at over 100 men under-strength and replacements were required with training in maintenance and documentation.

During the period 1 March 1967 through 30 April 1967, the 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) continued to perform its two (2) major missions of Area IV Saigon Port, and the Nha Be - Cat Lai ammunition discharge operation.

On 31 March 1967 at 1100 hours, the Northwestern Victory tied up in the stream at Cat Lai, and the ammunition discharge facility was officially moved from Nha Be to Cat Lai. A control tower was built for command and control, and the Military Police were displaced to Cat Lai for harbor security. No problems resulted as a result of the move and the discharge
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at Cat Lai has proceeded in a smooth and efficient manner. The primary reason for this increased efficiency is attributed to the closer supervision and coordination possible at Cat Lai. On 16 April 1967, a critical shortage of 105mm ammunition existed in the supply points. Military stevedores were called upon to work the Drake Victory and discharge as much 105mm's off as possible in one (1) night. Approximately 175 short tons of 105mm was off loaded out of three (3) hatches before the Vietnamese reported for the scheduled work day the following morning. The electric forklift availability increased steadily throughout the month of March and April as more emphasis was placed on proper driver methods and maintenance received spare parts and experience.

On 1 March 1967, Saigon Port began contracting for stevedores on a low cost commodity rate basis. The immediate result of this change was a complete change of major contractors due to the high cost of the contractors formerly employed. At the start it was readily apparent that the low cost contractors lacked experience, supervision, and gear necessary to perform in an efficient, safe manner. March tonnage was low and stevedore accidents and cargo damage extremely high as an effort was made to use the low cost stevedores. At the end of the period three (3) new companies were barred from working Saigon Port and the old companies were back working at a lower negotiated rate. Area IV was using My Viet contracted laborers as its major contractor and the Ammo System continued to use the two (2) low cost contractors.

The 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) was given its annual Inspector General inspection on 24 April 1967. It achieved a SATISFACTORY rating on all phases of the inspection and drew praises in many areas. The company was hit personnel wise, losing twenty (20) men during the period to support the Cat Lai Military Police Security Detachment, 4th Transportation Operation Rice Check, and USARV Operation Orient. These personnel were levied by MOS and time left in the command and were required to be provided on extremely short notice. The unit experienced one (1) fatality during the period when PFC Arthur Grant drowned while debarking the LCM carrying the work crew from Saigon Port.

During the period 1 February 1967 through 30 April 1967, the ammunition discharge in short tons for Nha Be/Cat Lai was:

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On 31 March 1967, the ammunition discharge site moved from Nha Be to Cat Lai, the present location of the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal). At Nha Be the vessels were discharged while at anchor; however, at Cat Lai the ships are tied up to buoys at the bow and stern. Cat Lai has a total of seven (7) buoys to secure vessels for discharge. Six (6) of the buoys are equally spaced to discharge three (3) deep draft vessels, while the seventh
buoy is spaced at a shorter distance for purpose of securing and discharging LST's. A total of three (3) deep draft vessels or two (2) deep draft vessels and one (1) LST can be discharged at one (1) time. There are also four (4) buoys in the discharge area used to tie up loaded and empty barges. Some of the significant advantages that have been gained by moving the vessels to Cat Lai are less travel time for the military crews that work on the ships, an easier area to secure, less vessel traffic through the discharge area, and better supervision over the vessel discharge. A definite savings in transit time between Cat Lai and the discharge sites have also been experienced. Approximately two (2) hours transit time has been saved between Cat Lai and Cogido, which receives the majority of the ammunition discharged. The move of Ammunition Branch from its former location in Saigon to Cat Lai has greatly enhanced staff coordination and supervision over ammunition discharge and movements. The Duke Victory arrived 31 March 1967; ammunition had been specially stowed horizontally with like lots marked with masking tape to delineate split lots. This special stowage was part of a test conducted to enhance ammunition discharge. It enabled trucks to be loaded according to specific lots and prevented the need to shift the truck to several different locations to maintain lot integrity when it reached the Ammunition Supply Point.

The 402nd Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer) continued to operate barge discharge sites at Cogido, Buu Long, Binh Trieu, and Thanh Tuy Ha.

For the third month in a row the average daily tonnage handled at Cogido was above 1100 short tons. The total tonnage handled at Cogido for the month of February 1967 was 31,052 short tons. Operations came to a stand still at Cogido on 3 February when the Long Binh ASP suffered severe damage from blasts detonated within the depot. Operations were materially effected for two (2) days as the depot ceased operations at night. Civilian trucks were refused access to the depot as a result of the suspected espionage. Operations were back to normal five (5) days later with the site being supported with additional military trucks.

Buu Long tonnages showed an increase during the month of February 1967, despite not having much Air Force cargo. The site was kept in operation by discharging U.S. Army cargo destined for the Long Binh ASP.

Although the holiday period of TET was expected to present serious labor shortages, the barge sites escaped without serious drops in operations. The Cogido site was maintained in operation with four (4) cranes with military stevedores from the 402nd Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer) for a twenty-four (24) hour period. Civilian stevedores returned to work the next day. The Buu Long site remained in operation during the TET period with civilian stevedores. Thanh Tuy Ha and Binh Trieu barge sites were shut down because consignees were not receiving during this period.
The Cogido barge site continued to average more than 1100 short tons handled daily during the month of March 1967, despite a severe drop in tonnage during the last part of the month. It became apparent that the Cogido site would be handling more and more backloads as the Long Binh ASP reached its maximum stockage levels. Majority of backloads were shipped by barge to the sub-depot at Vung Tau. The Cogido barge site set a new record for tonnage handled for a twelve (12) hour period when 1111 short tons were discharged from 1800 hours 20 March to 0600 hours 21 March 1967.

The Buu Long discharge site was again successfully kept in operation by discharging U.S. Army cargo to the Long Binh ASP whenever USAF or VNAF cargo was not available. The result was over a 300 ton daily average and a record monthly total of 10,342 short tons handled.

Problems were experienced in keeping the Binh Trieu discharge site in operation. The site was not in operation approximately fifteen (15) days, because there was no USAF or VNAF cargo for Tan Son Nhut Air Base or the 531st ARVN depot.

The unit began construction of its permanent buildings at TC Hill, Long Binh, as the first cement pad was constructed on 17 March 1967.

A lack of cargo at the middle of April hurt the monthly tonnage figures. The Buu Long discharge site was closed down from 11 April to 16 April 1967, and the Cogido site was slowed to almost a complete halt during the same time.

Whenever there is a non-availability of Class V cargo, general cargo should be programmed for discharge at the Cogido barge discharge site.

The unit moved into its permanent buildings in April 1967 at TC Hill, and prepared to build more for the anticipated receipt of the other half of the unit. It is expected that the 130 personnel now attached to the 125th Transportation Command will be reassigned to another unit and this unit will receive replacement personnel at Long Binh. This increase in personnel at Long Binh is necessitated by the assumption of complete military operations at Cogido and Buu Long on or about 1 July 1967.

February 1967 saw no change in operational missions for the 1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat). Work loads remained constant, and demand for boats continued to exceed availability. There were no special operations conducted during this month.

At the invitation of 1st Logistical Command, two (2) LCM 81's were prepared for annual yard period during February. These boats are programmed for a period of thirty (30) day overhaul in 2nd Logistical Command facilities in Okinawa. Original shipping dates called for departure between 19 and 25 February 1967. However, by month's end, transportation had not been furnished to start the movement.
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During the month of March 1967, three (3) significant mission changes affected this unit.

The introduction of two (2) Y-class tankers into the Nha Be - Jau Bien Lej JP4 system reduced the demand for fuel barges over the same water way with a corresponding increase in the demand for NACS, diesel, and JP4 barges from Nha Be to Cogido. The off-loading station operated by the 64th Quartermaster Battalion at Cogido (adjacent to the highway 1A bridge) is now capable of off-loading directly to tank trucks at the rate of 300,000 gallons a day when trucks are available.

Tactical missions assigned to Detachment "A" of this unit at Dong Tam now exceed logistical missions. On 30 March, the number of boats at Dong Tam was increased to six (6). Two (2) are employed moving artillery on the Mekong River, and the remaining four (4) are used for small unit moves to tactical positions and for movement of cargo from ship to shore.

On 30 March 1967, a second 45' tug from 4th Transportation Command was assigned to the ammunition point at Cogido, eliminating the twenty-four (24) hour requirement for two (2) LGM 8's at this station. This direct support mission terminated after three (3) months, with over 85,000 tons of cargo handled in movement of loaded barges.

One (1) special operation was conducted during March 1967 in direct support of 2/3 Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. This involved daily resupply to a small base camp in the Rung Sat Special Zone southeast of Saigon. Two (2) additional direct support missions for unit loading craft were ordered during the period, but are pending due to non-availability of water escort.

On 17 March, two (2) LCM 8's were shipped by deck load to 2nd Logistical Command, Okinawa, for refitting. These boats had been prepared for shipment 19 February 1967. Approximately one (1) month of deadline time was accumulated on both vessels as a direct result of non-availability of transportation. No information is available at the time of this report on when the first refitted boats will be returned to this unit.

April saw a radical decrease in the number of ammunition barges moved by this unit, with a resulting decrease in tonnage handled. An average of five (5) boats were committed daily in fuel barge movements.

The unit began a series of movements in support of Operation Enterprise 5 April, with the Vietnamese Navy River Assault Group 24 as escort. This operation has resulted in U.S. flag landing craft entering the lower Oriental and Occidental Rivers as far upstream as Ben Luc and Tan An. The primary mission has been delivery of barges loaded with rock consigned to engineer projects in the area east of national highway four (4). To date, four (4) members of this unit and five (5) from RG 24 have been wounded in action.
Deadline rates remained constant during April for all task vessels. Currently, three (3) boats are operating on three (3) engines due to a lack of blocks to replace cracked blocks. Detachment 2, Marine Maintenance Activity Vietnam, has been unable to furnish the needed replacements.

LCM 8087 and 8099, shipped 17 March for a programmed thirty (30) day yard period in Okinawa, have not been returned to the unit, nor has return shipping information been given this unit. Two (2) operational boats with critical hull conditions are scheduled for this shipyard program as soon as the first LCM's are returned.

LCM 6 deadline has remained constant, with exhaust elbows the critical item. After support maintenance reported they were unable to furnish these elbows, a contract for fabrication was requested through 4th Transportation Command.

LCU 1534, of the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) departed for Cam Ranh Bay for its annual inspection and overhaul on 19 February 1967. Each vessel is scheduled for overhaul on a schedule of one (1) vessel per month.

On 21 February 1967, the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) transported 158 military personnel of the 5th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) from the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) in Cat Lai to Vung Tau. LCU 1508 and LCU 1569 were utilized to transport the unit and equipment.

This unit sponsored the 5th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) which consisted of assisting the new unit in establishing quarters, supplying rations and in administration.

In the latter part of February 1967, the vessels in the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) underwent a transition from COLA (Cost of Living Allowance) to a field ration mess. The reasons for this transition are as follows:

1. Increasing commitments to the Mekong Delta creating difficulty in establishing a schedule to attain the commissary rations in Saigon.

2. Travel time on a round trip to Saigon can accumulate up to three (3) days. This lost time in traveling means lost utilization time of the vessel.

During the month of February 1967, thirty-seven (37) logistical support missions to points in the Mekong Delta were conducted by this unit. Basic cargo being transported was ammunition and general cargo.

There were no organizational or administrative changes initiated during the month of March 1967 that affected the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat). The overall mission remained the same, however, there was a significant
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Shift of operational requirements from transporting cargo between Vung Tau and Saigon and cargo discharge points in the Mekong Delta. A total of fifty-four (54) missions were conducted in the Delta, showing an increase of seventeen (17) over Delta missions conducted during the previous month. The majority of the cargo was discharged at Dong Tam and Vinh Long.

A total of 137 missions were conducted in the Delta during this reporting period.

The plans to establish a Port Steward facility in Vung Tau to provide vessels of this unit with Class I supplies were consummated in March with the acquisition of two (2) twelve (12) cubic foot upright freezers and two (2) sixty-five (65) cubic foot refrigerators from the 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service). Receiving full cooperation from the Class I depot in Vung Tau, the unit facility is now in full operation.

On 15 March 1967, the ARVN personnel receiving advanced training on the five (5) LCM 6 vessels assigned to this unit returned to their home station in Saigon. In order to continue the mission of these vessels, personnel of the 5th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) are assisting us by training Vietnamese nationals. The Vietnamese will again become the operators of the vessels when the 5th Transportation Company's own vessels arrive.

The LCU 1534 returned to Vung Tau on 22 March 1967 after undergoing annual shipyard maintenance at the U.S. Army Marine Maintenance Activity in Cam Ranh Bay.

The LCU 1580 departed on 24 March to undergo annual shipyard maintenance with the unit's Pickett Boat (J-3781) loaded in the well deck for complete overhaul of its engines and electrical system. The LCU 1508 was returned to Vung Tau on 30 March because it was not possible for USAMMA to perform annual maintenance for a period of at least six (6) weeks.

This unit is rapidly approaching the rotation date for a large percentage of its personnel. Consequently, there have been numerous personnel changes within the unit during the reporting period.

During the quarter ending on 30 April 1967, this unit transported the following tonnages:

- Ammunition: 25,220.45 S/T
- General Cargo: 803,24 S/T
- Passengers: 3757

On 1 April 1967, a fire erupted on a wide wooden barge loading platform being constructed on the Delong Pier (Vung Tau). The Harbor Tug (ST-2122) organic to this unit assisted the local fire detachment in extinguishing the blaze by removing expensive floating equipment from the site and utilizing its installed fire fighting apparatus.
On 15 February 1967, the advance party for the 5th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) left Port Eustis, Virginia with the majority of the unit equipment. The remainder of the unit followed within a week. There were no major problems in conjunction with the above move. The 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) had a representative present to meet the personnel as they arrived. Recommend that this policy be continued as it eliminates confusion which might be present when a new unit arrives in-country.

Upon arriving at APO 96291, 53rd G.S. Group Area, 5th Transportation Company's appointed place of designation, the unit began to construct permanent type buildings. With all personnel working, the buildings were ready for occupancy within a few weeks. All of this work was done using the self help program.

The unit's category "Z" equipment arrived in-country on 14 March 1967 and was shipped from Port of Entry, APO 96307, to the unit's area, APO 96291, two (2) days later. During the month of March, the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) had operational control of the unit's J-Boat until 1 April when the boat underwent engine repair. It is being utilized as a security patrol craft as well as moving personnel to and from ships at the Cat Lai explosive anchorage.

On 15 March 1967, the 5th Transportation Company received from the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) five (5) LCM 6 boats for operational control. The primary mission of these vessels is to transport the Military Police escort from the Vung Tau Port complex. Two (2) of the vessels were called to Saigon on 16 March 1967 for overhaul and modifications.

Effective 3 April 1967 this unit was assigned to the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), APO 96307, by General Order 23.

The unit's first six (6) boats arrived on 5 April 1967 and were unloaded from their carriers, the SS Orion; with only minor difficulties. The vessels were prepared for commitments in only seven (7) days, and are presently carrying cargo from Saigon to the Delta Region.

In addition three (3) LCU's were transferred to this unit from the 4th Transportation Command. The transfer was for maintenance and operations. This was accomplished on 14 April 1967. At the present time there are Vietnamese nationals on-board assisting the skeleton crew. The vessels are presently operating between Vung Tau and Saigon.

The tug boat, which was the last vessel to be shipped overseas, arrived on 19 April 1967. It was off-loaded from the SS Aisbell Lykes; however, due to many major mechanical difficulties it has not been placed into operation as yet.

On 23 April 1967, an LCU of this unit, collided with a Victory Ship, in the Vung Tau Harbor, while proceeding to Saigon. There was no damage to the
Victory Ship and only minor damage to the LCU. There were no major injuries associated with the collision; however, two (2) crew members of the LCU required hospital care. They were treated and were immediately released.

Changes of key personnel in this command during the reporting period included the departure on 14 March of the Battalion Executive Officer, Major Kevin L. Maher whose replacement Major Thomas L. Taylor arrived in the Battalion on 15 March 1967.

On 1 April, Captain Charles M. Andrean assumed command of the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service), relieving the former commander, Captain (now Major) John D. Andrews.

On 22 February, 1LT Richard L. Mauser assumed the staff position of Battalion Maintenance Officer from 1LT (now Captain) Elijah H. Toney.

On 25 February, CW3 Atloe J. Troyer assumed duties of Unit Personnel Officer with the departure of W01 Jose A. Montalvo.

The 5th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) commanded by Captain Wetzel Brumfield was attached to the Battalion and personnel arrived on 19 February 1967.

On 7 April 1967, SGM Albert Wright rotated and was replaced by 1SG Talmadge R. Carroll, formerly of the 124th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) as Battalion Sergeant Major.

All units in this organization conducted normal operations during two (2) twelve (12) hour shifts twenty four (24) hours a day during the last reporting period. OJT was conducted approximately eight five (85) % of the time with two (2) to three (3) hours of formal classroom instruction each week, in all subordinate units.
AVCA TC-XB-CO
13 May 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (HCS CSFOR - 65)

11TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL) ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

11TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (T/L)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AMMUNITION BRANCH</th>
<th>117TH TRANS CO (TS)</th>
<th>124TH TRANS CO (TS)</th>
<th>1099TH TRANS CO (MB)</th>
<th>329TH TRANS CO (HB)</th>
<th>5TH TRANS CO (HB)</th>
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<tr>
<td>H'S &amp; HCS DET</td>
<td>592ND DET MHE (Hvy)</td>
<td>588TH DET MHE (Hvy)</td>
<td>259TH DET FLT CR MAINT</td>
<td>783RD DET CARGO DOC SEC</td>
<td>262ND DET CR CPR</td>
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<td>511TH TC DET (TML) CONTR SU-V</td>
<td>265TH DET CR C.R.</td>
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</table>
Section 2 - Part 1 Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel
   a. Item: Listing Personnel Records Jacket
      Discussion: DA Message 805396 from EPHP-P dtd 14 Mar 67 requires certain personnel records to be forwarded to an appropriate Overseas Replacement Station.
      Observation: An increasing number of individual replacements are arriving this station without military personnel records jackets. The above stated message is believed to be responsible for the "lack of" these cases. Personnel cannot be properly in-processed or paid as a result of this lack of records.
   b. Item: Untrained Personnel
      Discussion: While it is a recognized fact that the majority of enlisted skills in the Army can be acquired through on-the-job training, there are a number of skills that do not lend themselves to quick or easy acquisition.
      Observation: One of the MOSC which serves as a good example of a skill that is not easily acquired is 61G, Marine Engineer. Most authorized positions call for experienced personnel in grade E5, 6, and 7. Personnel received are recent school graduates in grades E1 or 2 with no experience, or personnel selected for OJT without regard for aptitude or motivation. The scope of responsibility involved is too great to entrust to personnel received. The results can be catastrophic.

2. Operations
   a. Item: Packaging of Cargo
      Discussion: The packaging of cargo in their plywood boxes has become a problem in the efficient handling of cargo.
      Observation: For the quick discharge of a vessel and for a more efficient cargo handling operation with less damage, a heavier reinforced plywood container with a pallet type base that will withstand the weight of containerized lead is necessary. Present containers now in use will not withstand their own weight.
   b. Item: Classified Cargo
      Discussion: Occasionally cargo arrives on vessels and is manifested as classified cargo. The most recent vessel was the Duke Victory Voyage #1-1140 which arrived at Cat Lai on 31 March 1967. The cargo in question is Fuse, Proximity, M514, M523, and M 513 AI.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSPOR - 65)

Observation: Security guards are placed on the cargo from the time it arrives in port until it reaches final destination. This places a great burden on the present security guard contingent. When the above mentioned cargo reaches the consignee it is found that the cargo is not classified and therefore additional requirements as outlined in AR 380-55 did not exist.

c. Item: Self Sustaining Vessels:

Discussion: Very frequently vessels arrive at Cat Lai with inoperative cargo handling gear that is constantly breaking down. The latest vessel was the Drake Victory, Voyage # P-1283, which arrived at Cat Lai 15 April 1967.

Observation: The vessel only had three sets of gear that could work at one (1) time due to an inoperative generator. This slowed discharge operation considerably and caused an excessive amount of time on berth. Cat Lai has no floating cranes or other means of discharging these vessels in stream. This is predominate of GAA type vessels.

d. Item: Stowage of 155 MM Projectiles.

Discussion: Projectiles arrive stacked four high separated by 2"x12" dunnage of various lengths. During the course of operations, discharge becomes quite difficult. After the projectiles of the top layers are discharged, the dunnage protrudes over the projectiles of the bottom stowed ammunition. The protruding dunnage must be broken or removed the best way possible.

Observation: On the test vessel SS Duke Victory a new method of stowing the 155 projectiles was used. A special platform 14 feet long and 4 feet wide made of 2"x12" and 2"x4" lumber was used. This platform enabled the projectiles to be stowed six (6) pallets in length, three (3) wide and four (4) high. This expedited discharge operations since the platforms could be removed when each layer is discharged and eliminates the protruding dunnage.

e. Item: Stowing Ammunition too High.

Discussion: Problems have been encountered with ammunition stowed on vessels too high. The cargo was evidently loaded by electric forklifts with low booms.

Observation: Present electric forklifts at Cat Lai have high booms and are unable to remove the top pallet since the boom hits the overhead and cannot clear the cargo. This necessitates snaking the ammunition out of the wings which is very dangerous.

f. Item: Handling of Newsprint.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (HCS CSFPR - 65)

Discussion: It has been noted that conventional commercial forklifts are inadequate in the handling of newsprint.

Observation: The forks on them will not open wide enough to handle the newsprint. This results in many spills and causes double and sometimes triple handling.

g. Item: Need for River Forecasting on Song Dong Nai.

Discussion: Operation of the Buu Long Barge Discharge Site is controlled in a good part by the effects of tide and river run-off. Specific limitations between the city of Bien Hoa and the pier are two-fold:

(1) During normal dry season flow, barges can be taken to and removed from the site only during high water, which allows passage over dangerous rocks.

(2) Overhead clearance on the Highway 1 Bridge restricts the height of the barge and cargo which can be handled.

Observation: Experienced towboat operators can, during normal dry season run-off, pass the navigation obstructions during the four (4) hours of highest water on most diurnal tide days. During spring tides, and when the build-up of run-off occurs from showers upstream, the time of passage can be extended several hours because of the presence of higher water levels. Conversely, during periods of high run-off, as experienced in September 1966, overhead clearance becomes the restrictive factor, with passage limited to the day's lowest tidal range. No hydrographic forecasting is available on this river to plan operations, except for Bien Hoa adjusted tide tables. With the addition of POL barges at Buu Long, planning information is vitally needed.

h. Item: POL of vessels prior to being deployed to a combat area.

Discussion: Any boat unit which is deployed to a combat area should have all vessels put into a shipyard for POL repairs and overhaul. Boats should then be overhauled and returned to the unit at least sixty (60) days prior to the unit's equipment readiness date. This is necessary so that the unit may operate the vessels to find any discrepancies. The sixty (60) day period is the period where, if any, problems are found, the shipyard is obligated to repair them with no additional expense to the government.

Observation: This procedure would enable the unit deploy with its vessels to POL standards, so that when they reach the combat area, they have a minimum of relocation time. When the 5th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) was deployed it was deprived of the above, and as a consequence there are many discrepancies in the unit's vessels. Inclosure one (1) is an item breakdown.
3. Training and Organization
   a. Item: Mandatory Training

      Discussion: During this reporting period this battalion received from higher headquarters, directives to establish a training program to comply with Department of the Army training requirements.

      Observation: Due to the type of mission being performed by this organization and transportation requirements it is felt that training should be limited to:

      (1) Minimum mandatory training

      (2) Training that would be beneficial to the type of mission we are presently performing.

4. Intelligence
   a. Item: VC Tactics

      Discussion: River ambush techniques employed by the VC in Long An Province have proved effective and damaging to landing craft of the 1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat). Bunkers have been constructed behind the first fringe of Nipper palms on the river banks. As a result, the ambushing force can observe boats, while gunners aboard can not observe the muzzle flash of enemy weapons.

      Observation: Elimination of either the palms or the bunkers would equalize the situation, making the VC vulnerable to automatic weapons fire from the boats. Both projects are beyond the capability of this unit.

5. Logistics
   a. Item: Lubrication of 4000 pound Electric Forklift

      Discussion: The lube order for 4000 pound electric forklift in TM 10-3930-257-20 states the lift should be lubed every 250 hours.

      Observation: It has been noted that when working in the hot dusty hole of a ship this is too long a period between maintenance measures.

   b. Item: Battery Tie Down in the 4000 pound Electric Forklift when rollers are used.

      Discussion: When the rollers are used within the 4000 pound electric forklift the battery has a tendency to slide against the door, damaging the door and the battery wiring.
Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

Observation: The small stops for this purpose do not work.

c. Item: LCM 8 Armor Plate

Discussion: Wheel house armor plate on the LCM 8 has proven ineffective against 30 caliber AP rounds. One of the most severe wounds to date occurred when splinters from the armor ricocheted in the wheel house. The presence of B44 anti tank grenades now adds to the threat as the grenade is fully capable of causing extensive personnel injury when it contacts the boat hull or wheel house.

Observation: Machine gunners, although protected by sandbags from direct fire, are inadequately protected from shrapnel, as are personnel in the wheel house. Current tests by this Headquarters include placement of armor plate in a second layer off set around the wheel house to dissipate effects of AP rounds. It has been noted that when these rounds and the B44 grenades strike the wooden portions of the boat, they do not have the same lethal effect of sending metal fragments into personnel.

d. Item: Vulnerability of LCM 6 to sinking

Discussion: The design of the LCM 6 provides for water tight compartments. Characteristically, when an exhaust line or the exhaust elbow is removed for repair, the boat is very vulnerable to taking on water and sinking stern-first. The result is a costly flooding of the engine room.

Observation: Boats can be easily protected from this danger by stern beaching whenever exhaust lines or exhaust ports have proven less than satisfactory in a close boat morrge, as plugs are knocked loose by other craft.

Section 2 - Part II Recommendations

1. Personnel

a. Recommendation: That personnel records jacket be air mailed to either the US NAVY Transient Detachment or the ultimate unit of assignment by the losing organization in CONUS or overseas command, rather than forwarding them to the overseas replacement station.

b. Recommendation: That more emphasis be placed on aptitude or basic qualification, and motivation of individuals selected for training in this skill. A call for volunteers with previous experience in related fields would help alleviate the situation.

2. Operations

a. Recommendation: The use of a thicker wooden container for cargo or different configuration of the container to help in cargo handling.
AVCA TC-XB-00

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS GSPOR - 65)

b. Recommendation: Consignors carefully screen ammunition that is being shipped to Vietnam and verify if it is actually classified.

c. Recommendation: That all cargo handling gear on ammunition vessel destined for Cat Lai be checked prior to departure from CONUS and an adequate amount of spare parts be placed on the vessel for immediate repair purposes.

d. Recommendation: That the new type platforms be used for all 155 MM Projectiles. If required these platforms could be stacked, banded and returned to CONUS on the same vessel for reuse.

e. Recommendation: A 4½ inch clearance must be maintained from the bottom of the coaming to the top of the highest pallet so present cargo handling gear can be used to discharge the ammunition.

f. Recommendation: That the MHE shop in Saigon Army Terminal be provided with clamp trucks for the proper handling of newsprint. This will eliminate double and triple handling that must now be done.

g. Recommendation: That three (3) river forecasting stations be established at the following locations: the village of Vinh Sa (YT 389), Xom Cay Xcai (TideWater) (YT1427), and Buu Long (XT 9613). That information be furnished on a regular weekly basis until a one-year pattern can be established, and that subsequent to that time river watchers apply their readings on a basis similar to that used by the US Weather Bureau in reporting trends which may indicate flooding or unusual drought.

h. Recommendation: That there be a stringent review of present POM procedures for deploying boat companies, specifically boat conditions and operational standards required in a combat zone, prior to their deployment.

3. Training and Organization

a. Recommendation: That higher headquarters limit training requirements to coincide with unit's mission.

4. Intelligence

a. Recommendation: That preparation be made in known VC areas to clear river banks of bunkers and vegetation before frequent boat missions are executed, and that ground forces execute periodic ambushes to discourage re-establishment of the positions.

5. Logistics

a. Recommendation: Lube lifts on an as needed basis for the 4000 pound electric forklift.

b. Recommendation: The forklift should be modified to facilitate battery tie down and at the same time allow for quick release to facilitate change of batteries.
c. Recommendation: That all US Army LCM 6's planned for river use be outfitted with a full complement of weapons, configured in protected turrets. Vietnamese Navy LCM 3's currently assigned to IV Corps have been so modified providing both crew protection and heavy firepower capabilities. This modification also increases wheel house armor to protect the vessel from swain.

d. Recommendation: That all units operating LCM 6's be advised of the vulnerability of these vessels to sinking, and that they use caution and beach the craft stern to when exhaust line repairs are required.
1. The attached Operational Report for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1967, submitted by the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) has been reviewed and is deemed representative of the reporting period.

2. The following are this headquarters' comments keyed to the appropriate paragraphs in Section 2, Parts 1 & 2 of the subject report:

   a. Para 1a. Missing Personnel Record Jackets:

      (1) Although nothing official has been published concerning the processing of USARV Replacements in CONUS; this headquarters has been advised that the entire system for port-calls, records processing and subsequent movement to Vietnam has changed. Basically, all personnel coming to USARV now report to Oakland Army Terminal and are further assigned to the USARV Transient Detachment. This system replaces the old method of direct port-calling to Travis AFB. As a result, personnel are sometimes required to remain at Oakland for five (5) or more days before departure. An overseas replacement station is geared primarily toward group travel personnel and particularly significant during wartime, overseas troop buildups etc. The majority of this type personnel processing is accomplished directly from the personnel records with the individual's presence not required. Thus, most of the processing has been completed prior to the individuals' arrival. In addition, necessary paperwork can rapidly be processed for AWOL, desertion and hospitalized personnel who have not reported to the overseas replacement station.

      (2) The number of misplaced, lost or damaged personnel records as opposed to the control features offered in AR 640-10 (Forwarding of Records by Mail) have been open for argument for years. However, Department of the Army has taken the records consolidation approach and apparently the results achieved have proved this is the best method.

   b. Para 1b. Untrained Personnel: Unfortunately, during peace time operations the requirement for marine type personnel is limited as most water terminal activities are handled for Department of the Army via commercial firm contracts. Most marine type MOSC require much formal training and experience; still another reason for the higher grade structure in this field. This situation is controlled at Department of the Army level and commands have no choice except the OJT route in the absence of qualified personnel.

   c. Para 4a. VC Tactics:
As part of the planning for a specific operation of the 1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) this headquarters contacted appropriate naval and intelligence organizations for information. Based on the information obtained, VC river ambushes were to be anticipated on the route to be traveled. The unit was advised of the probability of ambush attacks prior to the start of the mission.

The only action possible by this command to alleviate the situation is to contact the command responsible for operations in the area involved and request sweeps to clear out the VC. This was done in the case of the 1099th Trans Co operation.

A defoliation project is beyond the capability of this headquarters. Prior to future operations a request for defoliation of specific areas can be made, however, approval for such a project is doubtful.

This headquarters can and will assess the security of water routes for future operations and determine which routes would offer the most security if alternative routes are available.

d. Para 5a. Lubrication of 4000 pound Electric Forklifts: Lubrication intervals should be reduced because of abnormal working conditions. Lubrication orders state intervals for normal operating conditions and recommend reduction of intervals when equipment is operated under abnormal or severe operating conditions.

e. Para 5b. Battery Tie Down in the 4000 pound Electric Forklift when rollers are used: USA Mobility Equipment Command has granted permission to weld two metal strips at 90° angles to the rear plate of the battery compartment for additional shielding and protection of the stop and taillights armored cable. Unsatisfactory condition was reported on a EIR, USAMED Case No 3643-0607-03, published in TB 750-971-1, January 1967. Information has been given to the Battalion Maintenance Officer.

f. Para 5c. LCM 8 Armor Plate: Addition of a second layer of armor plating would appear to be of value in dissipating the effects of AP rounds, full evaluation should await completion of tests.

g. Para 5d. Vulnerability of LCM 6 to sinking: Stern beaching should be accomplished where beach and tidal conditions permit. Care should be taken where stern beaching is not feasible in the length of wooden plugs used. Plugs driven into the exhaust ports should not extend beyond the thickness of the bumpers or fenders of the craft. A watch should be established to immediately detect loose or accidental removal of plugs.
h. Para la, Part II. As explained in Para 2a, above, the presence of the Personnel Records Jacket (201 file) at the Overseas Replacement Station is necessary under the replacement system currently in effect. In addition, this provides control through the replacement processing point that would not otherwise be available. Lower ranking personnel are not programmed for any particular USARV Transient Detachment until they arrive at Oakland and may be diverted once they arrive at the transient detachment and so the forwarding of records direct to a specific transient detachment or unit would only cause greater difficulty than presently exists. No benefit would be derived from the recommended change.

i. Para 1b, Part II: The basis for assigning personnel for on-the-job training is listed below:

1. Civilian training
2. Related hobbies
3. Battery score
4. Civilian education

In addition all records of this headquarters, and the 11th and 71st Battalions were screened in an attempt to locate potential and/or qualified marine personnel. The efforts made in this area to date are correct in every respect. The training administered at unit level will often result in the weeding out of personnel who for some reason cannot meet the demands of the training. In the absence of qualified replacements the system utilized leaves little to be desired.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

TEL: Saigon Port 238

JON C. SUIT
1LT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
AVCA 00-0 (13 May 67)  2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS GSPOR 65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND, APO 96307  3d Jul 1967

TO: Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN:
AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the
11th Transportation Battalion for the quarterly period ending 30 April
1967 is forwarded.

2. (U) Reference page 15, paragraph 1a and 1b: Paragraphs 2a
and 2b, 1st Indorsement, are appropriate.

3. (U) Reference page 15, paragraph 2a, and page 19, paragraph
2a: Exterior shipping containers conforming to specifications PPP-B-
601, overseas type, are of cleating plywood construction with a pallet-
type base. This type container will withstand the weight of container-
ized loads. All supplies being shipped to Vietnam should be packed in
accordance with specifications. Shipments should be checked to deter-
mine compliance by the shipper. If supplies are shipped in accordance
with the specifications and packaging is still considered inadequate,
this headquarters should be notified. If notified, this headquarters
will request that specifications of containers be revised.

4. (U) Reference page 15, paragraph 2b, and page 20, paragraph
2b: Concur. Consignors should carefully screen ammunition that is
being shipped to RVN and verify classification.

5. (U) Reference page 16, paragraphs 2c, 2d, and 2e, and page 20,
paragraphs 2c, 2d, and 2e. Concur with observations and recommendations
as stated.

6. (U) Reference page 17, paragraph 2g:

a. This headquarters concurs with the need of a river for-
casting system, but does not concur on the location of the three pro-
posed forecasting stations on the Song Dong Nai.

b. The 579th Engineer Terrain Detachment is currently working
on a river stage, velocity, and flood prediction system. The plan is
to utilize the data collected by the Bureau of Navigation. The system
is expected to be operational on or about 1 September 1967.

7. (U) Reference page 17, paragraph 2h, and page 20, paragraph
2h: Concur with observations and recommendations as stated.

25
Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

8. (U) Reference page 18, paragraph 3, and page 20, paragraph 3: Training Directive No 14, this headquarters, outlines mandatory training requirements as directed by higher headquarters. Provisions are made for major subordinate commanders to deviate from these requirements if operational requirements so dictate.

9. (C) Reference page 18, paragraph 4, and page 20, paragraph 4: Concur.

a. On 24 March 1967 this headquarters forwarded a letter to HQ, USARV pointing out the inadequate security provided US shipping and requested that additional security measures be implemented. On 8 April 1967, this headquarters was informed by HQ, USARV that COMNAVFORV is continually reviewing the situation in an effort to attain an acceptable degree of security. The Navy pointed out that river security cannot be fully achieved until the banks of the rivers are secure. To assist in ship protection the following air cover was provided by USARV:

(1) Fire fly mission nightly.

(2) One helicopter fire team airborne 0630 - 1800 daily.

(3) One light fire team on five minute standby twenty-four hours per day.

(4) One light fire team on fifteen minute alert, 1800 - 0630 nightly.

(5) Two OV-1 reconnaissance aircraft airborne during daylight hours.

b. Request for assistance in illuminating the ambush sites and bunkers along the river banks should be forwarded to the Commanding General, II FORGEV. It is not economically feasible to clear the river banks of all vegetation.

10. (U) Reference page 18, paragraph 5a and 5b, and page 20, paragraphs 5a and 5b: Concur with observations and recommendations as stated.

11. (U) Reference page 19, paragraphs 5c and 5d, and page 21, paragraphs 5c and 5d: Concur with observations and recommendations as stated.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS CSFOR 65)

12. (U) Reference page 20, paragraph 2f: Justification and requisitioning of these items of equipment should be initiated at the local level.

13. (U) The 11th Transportation Battalion engaged in combat service support for 89 days during the reporting period.

14. (U) Concur with basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: Lynx 430/782

CARLOS R. NOE
/LT, INF
Acting Asst. AG

1 Incl.
nc
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (13 May 67) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, AFO San Francisco 96375

JUL 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFO-P-OT,
AFO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons
Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 11th Trans-
portation Battalion (Terminal) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning exterior shipping containers, Section
2, part I, paragraph 2a, page 15; Section 2, part II, paragraph 2a, page 19
and paragraph 3, 2d Indorsement: Concur with 2d Indorsement comments.
Recommend CONUS shipping agencies insure that shipping containers conform
to prescribed requirements.

b. Reference item concerning classified ammunition cargo, Section 2,
Part I, paragraph 2b, pages 15 and 16; Section 2, Part II, paragraph 2b, page
20 and paragraph 4, 2d Indorsement: Concur with 2d Indorsement and with
unit observation and recommendation. Recommend CONUS ammunition shipping
activities verify necessity for indicating cargo as classified.

c. Reference item concerning river forecasting system, paragraph
2g, page 17; paragraph 2g, page 20 and paragraph 6, 2d Indorsement: Concur.
The observation that river forecasting is required on the Song Dong Nai
is valid. Although a river forecasting capability is being developed that
should be operational by September 1967, initial emphasis has been placed
on rivers of the Mekong Delta. Hydrologic services will be expanded to
include other rivers at a later date.

d. Reference item concerning mandatory training, paragraph 3,
page 18; page 20 and paragraph 8, 2d Indorsement. Nonconcur with recom-
mandation to limit mandatory training. All requirements for mandatory
training, as outlined in USARV Regulation 350-1, are minimum requirements
as established by Department of the Army. As indicated in paragraph 5,
USARV Regulation 350-1 commanders are authorized to deviate from mandatory
requirements when, in their judgement, the operational mission of their
unit necessitates such deviations. Command emphasis on an effective
training program will enhance the preparedness of the unit.

e. Reference item concerning VC tactics, paragraph 4, page 18;
paragraph 4, page 20 and paragraph 9, 2d Indorsement: Concur. The obser-
vation that elimination of bunkers and vegetation along river banks would
AVHGC-DST (13 May 67) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

lessen allied vulnerability to VC river ambush techniques is valid.

f. Reference item concerning MOS qualification, Section 2, part I, paragraph 1b, Inclosure 2; and paragraphs 2b and i, 1st Indorsement: Concur with the observation that the skills required for MOS 61C are not easily acquired through OJT, and that full qualification in the higher grades depends to a great degree upon experience. However, until such time as a sufficient number of experienced personnel become available for assignment, the use of newly school trained individuals and on-the-job-trainees will have to provide the necessary manpower. The criteria for selection for assignment outlined in paragraph 2i, 1st Indorsement is appropriate. No matter how carefully the selection process is applied, actual training usually results in some washouts.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc

E. L. KENNEDY
Cpt, AGC
Ass. Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 from HQ, 11th Trans Bn (Terminal) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 16 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference Section 2 - Part I, para 2b, pages 15 and 16, Part II, para 2b, page 20, basic letter; para 4, 2d Ind; and para 2b, 3d Ind. MILSTAMP (DOD Reg 4500,32R) contains sufficient water commodity codes to properly identify the type of ammunition. The basic TCMD for manifesting purposes must, under MILSTAMP procedures, be accompanied by trailer card data which includes abbreviated explosives nomenclature. All ammo items have an ICC and Coast Guard classification which is often confused with a "security" classification. It is, therefore, requested that CONUS ammunition shipping activities refrain from indicating that shipments are classified, within the meaning of requiring security protection, unless actually the case.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. OSBORN

1 Incl
nc
## Item Breakdown of LCU Discrepancies

<table>
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<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Arrive Shipyard</th>
<th>Depart Shipyard</th>
<th>Prepare For Overseas Shipment</th>
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<td>1. Holes in stern &amp; ramp caused by towing from S/Y.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Exhaust flappers ripped off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1513</td>
<td>reentered S/Y</td>
<td>31 Jan 67</td>
<td>4 Feb 67</td>
<td>7 Feb 67</td>
<td>17 Feb 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Battery charger wired incorrectly.</td>
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<td>2. Ventilation meters inoperative.</td>
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<td>3. Tachometers not calibrated.</td>
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<td>4. Breaks in ramp; free fall inoperative.</td>
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<td>5. Used vessel's &quot;on board&quot; spare parts for repairs.</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Center main engine (pneumatic) inoperative; needed cleaning and repair; finally replaced.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Battery charger wired incorrectly.</td>
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<td>4. Faulty grounds throughout electrical system; poor wiring.</td>
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<td>5. Seal in starboard generator not tight; losing oil.</td>
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<td>6. Fuel pump inoperative on port engine.</td>
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<td>7. 3 days deadline (D/L) due to hull repair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1531</td>
<td>16 Dec 66</td>
<td>17 Feb 67</td>
<td>22 Feb 67</td>
<td>13 Feb 67</td>
<td>1. Center main transmission throwout bearing seized; incorrect grease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2. Poor overhaul on fuel injectors.</td>
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<td>3. Port main transmission poor adjustment &amp; repair; exceed deadline.</td>
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<td>4. Let water pump leak as a result of poor seals; inadequate repair job.</td>
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<td>5. Poor rebuild of bilge &amp; fire pump.</td>
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<td>6. 14 days D/L.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl. 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VESSEL</th>
<th>ARRIVED SHIPYARD</th>
<th>SHIPYARD DEPART</th>
<th>PREPARE FOR OVERSEAS SHIPMENT</th>
<th>SHIPPED OVERSEAS (CREW LEFT)</th>
<th>DISCREPANCIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1532</td>
<td>21 Dec 66</td>
<td>17 Feb 67</td>
<td>18 Feb 67</td>
<td>24 Feb 67</td>
<td>1. Replace starter on port main engine.</td>
</tr>
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<td>2. Port main engine has oil leaks - poor gaskets &amp; seals.</td>
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<td>3. Tachometer drive plate replaced due to faulty installation.</td>
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<td>5. Battery chargers needed readjusting.</td>
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<td>6. Fuel linkage bolts broken; not replaced by S/Y.</td>
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<td>7. Suction pipe from oil sump to oil pump improperly replaced.</td>
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<td>8. Center main propeller positions out of alignment.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9. No days D/L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1546</td>
<td>7 Dec 66</td>
<td>30 Jan 67</td>
<td>2 Feb 67</td>
<td>10 Feb 67</td>
<td>1. Starboard main transmission clutch bearing frozen - poor lubrication from S/Y.</td>
</tr>
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<td>2. Clutch plate - starboard - scored; must be replaced.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Center &amp; port tachometers should have been replaced.</td>
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<td>4. Exhaust not tight; repaired with new gaskets.</td>
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<td>5. Shipyard placed 8 old unservicable batteries aboard vessel.</td>
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<td>6. Refrigerator poor repair.</td>
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<td>7. 2 days D/L.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. 3 days D/L.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Fire &amp; bilge pump do not work properly.</td>
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<td>3. Vibrator damper not overhauled.</td>
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<td>4. Port transmission overheating; possible D/L.</td>
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<td>5. 3 days D/L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VESSEL</td>
<td>ARRIVED SHIPYARD</td>
<td>DEPART SHIPYARD</td>
<td>PREPARE FOR OVERSEAS SHIPMENT</td>
<td>SHIPPED OVERSEAS (GUN LEFT)</td>
<td>DISCREPANCIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1578</td>
<td>12 Dec 66</td>
<td>10 Feb 67</td>
<td>10 Feb 67</td>
<td>17 Feb 67</td>
<td>1. No D/L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1584</td>
<td>18 Oct 66</td>
<td>2 Dec 66</td>
<td>12 Jan 67</td>
<td>13 Feb 67</td>
<td>1. Battery charger wired incorrectly. 2. No D/L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>16 Oct 66</td>
<td>9 Dec 66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Port transmission inoperative. 2. Excessive smoke from all main engines. 3. Fresh water systems valves leak (no pressure). 4. Circulating pump on heating system inoperative. 5. Insulated wiring throughout vessel. 6. Rewind which needed repairs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ITEM: BREAKDOWN OF LCU DISCREPANCIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VESSEL</th>
<th>ARRIVE SHIPYARD</th>
<th>DEPART SHIPYARD</th>
<th>PREPARE FOR OVERSEAS SHIPMENT</th>
<th>SHIPPED OVERSEAS (GREEN LEFT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ST 2198</td>
<td>11 Aug 66</td>
<td>22 Sept 66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 Dec 66</td>
<td>20 Jan 67</td>
<td>9 Feb 67</td>
<td>16 Feb 67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The discrepancies noted are of two types:

A. Shipyard repaired but not adequately.
B. Shipyard should have repaired but did not.

A. Approx. 1 Apr 64 Vessel Sunk
   13 Apr 64 Vessel Raised
   Went to shipyard for all repairs and complete renovation to put in operational condition.
   1. Shifting mechanism
   2. Ventilation system
   3. Steering and controllers
   4. Air compressor
   5. Air starting system

B. 1. Air starting system
   2. Governor
   3. Sanitary pump
   4. Hydro starter
   5. Ventilation system
   6. Cracked heads (six)
   7. Air starting system: Valves
   8. Air compressor
   9. Operation was not checked properly - may cause head trouble
   10. Flow meter
**Report Title**: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Transportation Battalion

**Summary**: Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 Feb to 30 Apr 67.

**Author(s)**: CO, 11th Transportation Battalion

**Report Date**: 13 May 1967

**Contract or Grant No.**: 670398

**Other Report Nos.**: N/A

**Distribution Statement**: N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity**: DA, OACS FOR, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract**: 

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The document contains additional headers and fields typically found in a U.S. military report form, including fields for security classification, report control data, and specific data points related to the report's source, date, and content. The report appears to be a lesson learned summary based on experiences in counterinsurgency operations from February to April 1967. The report is classified as CONFIDENTIAL and is intended for internal use within the sponsoring military activity. The form is designed to standardize reporting within the military and includes sections for report title, summary, author(s), date, and other relevant details.