**AD NUMBER**

| AD511097 |

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| TO:        | unclassified |
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AGO, D/A ltr, 30 Nov 1979
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IN REPLY REFER TO

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco 96240

AVGR-C

15 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVSEC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: OPF-P-DT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. General.

(1) Mission: The missions assigned to the 5th SFUA that have a classification of not higher than Confidential are as follows:

(a) To exercise command and control of subordinate detachments.
(b) To advise and assist the Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) and support the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIND) Program.
(c) To provide intelligence to COMUSMACV.
(d) To conduct special operations.
(e) To conduct the MACV Recondo School.
(f) To act as Sector/Subsector advisors as directed by COMUSMACV.

(2) Organizational Structure. See organizational chart at Inclosure 1, troop disposition lists at Inclosure 3, and Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) maps at Inclosure 4.

(3) Commanders and Key Personnel. See list at Inclosure 2.

• NOTE: Missions with Secret classification are found in MACV Directive 10-11, dtd 1 Nov 68 and Combined Campaign Plan AB 1145, dtd 31 Oct 69.
Situation at the Beginning of the Period. In I CTZ, Special Forces assets experienced a decrease in enemy activity. Operations from Camp THUONG 'UC experienced several contacts with up to company size enemy units in the northwestern portions of the Camp's TAOR. The Special Forces Camp at HA THAN was the only other camp which made several contacts with enemy forces, all other camps experienced a low level of enemy activity. II CTZ Special Forces assets also experienced a low number of enemy contacts during the month. In KONTUM Province, contacts were sporadic as enemy forces conducted light attacks by fire against Camp DAK PEK. In the central portion of II CTZ, enemy elements were centered around Camp PLEI MRONG. A platoon captured on 11 February six kilometers northwest of PLEI MRONG, identified the Early Warning Section, 24th IVB Regiment. The PV further stated that the 4th BN, 95th NVA Regiment and the regimental headquarters were located within Base Area 30L, while the K-6 BN was located along Highway 11, approximately six kilometers northwest of the camp. On 17 February an estimated 300 VC initiated contact with a platoon size operation from Camp PLEI ME, ten kilometers north-northwest of the camp. The enemy unit responsible for the attack was probably an element of the 4th BN, 95th NVA Regiment, which was known to be operating in the area. In III CTZ enemy activity was at a low level throughout the month with the exception of the 3d MSFC's area of operations in LONG NINH Province and Camp BEN SOI's TAOR, TAY NINH Province. In PHUOC LONG Province, enemy activity consisted of light attacks-by-fire directed mainly against TVDs in the northern portion of the province. Camp BU DOP received five light attacks-by-fire while Camp DUC PHRONG received one. Elements of the 275th VC and 17th NVA Regiments, 5th VC Division, were both identified by documents captured during the month and were probably responsible for the activity in the province. During the reporting period there was also an increase in reports of enemy food shortages throughout the province. These reports were somewhat sustained by the low level of enemy activity. In Binh Dinh Province, enemy activity consisted of small unit contacts, the majority of which involved elements of the 7th NVA Division. The 111st NVA Regiment 7th NVA Division, was identified on three separate occasions in an area 10 to 15 kilometers northwest of Camp LOC NINH, while the 299th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, remained in an area six to ten kilometers southwest of PH DOP along the PHUOC LONG Province border. Elements of the 165th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, were identified during the last week of February in an area eight to ten kilometers northwest of Camp TONG LE CHON, TAY NINH Province, possibly indicating that elements of the regiment had redeployed from their former area of operations, along the Binh Dinh/PHUOC LONG Province border, northwest of LOC NINH. In TAY NINH Province, Camp BEN SOI experienced an increase in activity during the period 1 to 9 February. On 1 February, the camp received a ground attack by an estimated enemy sapper platoon. On 7 and 9 February, CSF operations engaged an estimated enemy company 10 kilometers west of the camp. Intelligence sources reported that elements of
the 1st Battalion, 272d VC Regiment, 9th VC Division were located north of the camp, and were probably responsible for the activity in BEN SOT's TAOR. Elsewhere in the province, Camp KATUM received seven light attacks-by-fire, probably conducted by elements of the 9th VC Division to screen the movement of troops and supplies in and adjacent to the Camp's TAOR. In HAU NOHIA Province, enemy activity consisted of light attacks-by-fire directed against Free World Force installations located along infiltration routes. An intelligence source reported that Sub-Region 2 was organizing a new regiment from units operating in HAU NOHIA Province. The new regiment would reportedly be composed of the 267th and 269th VC and D6B NVA Battalions and would operate in the CUC HOA area. In LONG XUANH-PH Province, elements of the 3d MSFC discovered 23 caches, the majority of which were located in an area 10 to 15 kilometers northeast of RANG RANG and conducted over 170 tons of weapons, ammunition, and miscellaneous equipment. The material contained in the caches was probably intended for the use of enemy units operating in Sub-Region 5, as elements of both Sub-Region 5 and the 81st Rear Service Group were identified by documents captured in the RANG RANG area. In IV CTZ enemy-initiated activity remained at a low to moderate level throughout the CTZ, characterized by attacks-by-fire and troop movement. Intelligence sources stated that the enemy would conduct the TET Offensive during this period; however, it failed to materialize due to the apparent failure of the enemy to position troops into his reported target areas and the lack of sufficient food, ammunition, and medical supplies. Major targets were to have included the provincial capitals CHAU DOC, MY THO, and possibly CAN THO Cities and numerous district headquarters, villages, and new life hamlets. Primary emphasis was reportedly to be placed on the eastern areas of the CTZ and the Seven Mountains area. During the first week of the month intelligence sources reported that the 261A, 267B, and 269th VC Main Force Battalions, which normally operate in the central areas of the CTZ, were located to the north in Cambodian border base areas. In addition, the 96th NVA Regiment was reportedly operating in the Crow's Nest area with the intentions of infiltrating DINH TUONG Province to participate in attacks against the MY THO City-DONG TAK area. Intelligence sources further indicated that a large enemy force had moved westward along the Cambodian border to Base Area 754. This unit was believed to have been elements of the 95A NVA Regiment, 5th NVA Division. During the second week of the month the enemy suffered substantial losses in the eastern areas of the CTZ, which were believed to have been an important factor in the enemy's decision to postpone the predicted TET Offensive. On 8 February elements of the 2-7 and 2-8 Battalions, 96th NVA Regiment, were contacted approximately 14 kilometers south of Camp BINH THANH THON. This was the first confirmation of the unit's intentions to infiltrate to the central areas of the CTZ. After the contact the unit reportedly returned to the SONG TRANG area of Cambodia to regroup and retrain its personnel. During the remainder of the
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(1) Situation at the Beginning of the Period. In I CTZ, Special Forces assets experienced a decrease in enemy activity. Operations from Camp THUONG "UC experienced several contacts with up to company size enemy units in the northwestern portions of the Camp's TAOR. The Special Forces Camp at HA THANH was the only other camp which made several contacts with enemy forces, all other camps experienced a low level of enemy activity. II CTZ Special Forces assets also experienced a low number of enemy contacts during the month. In KONTUM Province, contacts were sporadic as enemy forces conducted light attacks by fire against Camp DAK PEK. In the central portion of II CTZ, enemy elements were centered around Camp PLEI MRONG. A POW captured on 16 February six kilometers northwest of PLEI MRONG, identified the Early Warning Section, 24th NVA Regiment. The POW further stated that the 6th BN, 24th NVA Regiment and the regimental headquarters were located within Base Area TOI, while the K-6 BN was located along Highway 14, approximately six kilometers northwest of the camp. On 17 February an estimated 300 VC initiated contact with a platoon size operation from Camp PLEI ME, ten kilometers northwest of the camp. The enemy unit responsible for the attack was probably an element of the 4th BN, 558 NVA Regiment, which was known to be operating in the area. In III CTZ enemy activity was at a low level throughout the month with the exception of the 3d MSFC's area of operations in LONG NHIN Province and Camp BEN SOI's TAOR, TAY NINH Province. In PHUOC LONG Province, enemy activity consisted of light attacks-by-fire directed mainly against TBIs in the northern portion of the province. Camp BU DOI received four light attacks-by-fire while Camp DUC PHONG received one. Elements of the 275th VC and 17th NVA Regiments, 5th VC Division, were both identified by documents captured during the month and were probably responsible for the activity in the province. During the reporting period there was also an increase in reports of enemy food shortages throughout the province. These reports were somewhat sustained by the low level of enemy activity. In TAY NINH Province, enemy activity consisted of small unit contacts, the majority of which involved elements of the 7th NVA Division. The 151st NVA Regiment 7th NVA Division, was identified on three separate occasions in an area 10 to 15 kilometers northeast of Camp LOC NHIN, while the 293rd NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, remained in an area six to ten kilometers southwest of BU DOI along the BINH LONG/PHUOC LONG Province border. Elements of the 165th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, were identified during the last week of February in an area eight to ten kilometers northwest of Camp TONG LE CHON, TAY NINH Province, possibly indicating that elements of the regiment had redeployed from their former area of operations, along the BINH LONG/PHUOC LONG Province border, northwest of LOC NHIN. In TAY NINH Province, Camp BEN SOI experienced an increase in activity during the period 1 to 9 February. On 1 February, the camp received a ground attack by an estimated enemy sapper platoon. On 7 and 9 February, CSF operations engaged an estimated enemy company 10 kilometers west of the camp. Intelligence sources reported that elements of

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Divisions, explain the low level of activity experienced during the month. In IV CTZ, enemy activity ranged from a moderate to high level throughout the month. During the period 30 March to 6 April, the enemy conducted the initial phase of his Spring-Summer Campaign, which was directed primarily against military installations and district towns in the north-western portion of the CTZ. Enemy activity remained at a moderate level throughout the remainder of the month in the western portion of the CTZ as the enemy attempted to maintain his offensive posture and counter the pacification program. The failure of enemy units to successfully reach their assigned targets in the eastern portion of the CTZ attributes to the substantially lower level of activity experienced in that area.
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b. Intelligence

(1) Significant Section Activities

(a) Collection: During the reporting period the S2 Collection Branch approved a total of 15 Operational Plans and Audenda. Further, a total of 353 coded informants were terminated and 160 prospective agents were coded. In addition, the Fiscal Year 1970 budget was revised. The proposed Fiscal Year 1971 budget was submitted and approved by the Group Commander. The decrease was a result of the recent reduction in the 5th SFCA's intelligence mission. As a result of discussions between VNSF and SFCA the Combined Intelligence Assistance Team (CIAT) was discontinued. The CIAT will be used in the future upon individual request and/or when deemed necessary. A complete list of unproductive agents was sent to each of the lettered companies and appropriate detachments, thus encouraging termination of dead weight agents and revitalization of existing nets.

(b) Operations:

1. Retrospect studies for February, March, and April were prepared and disseminated. The studies furnished a short history of enemy activity during the corresponding months of 1966, 1967, 1968, and 1969. Conclusions and probable courses of action for 1970 were included. The purpose of the study was to provide SFCA subordinate units with background information on previous enemy activity, as it has been recognized that the enemy often establishes tactical patterns and frequently commemorates particular dates of historical significance with offensive activity.

2. A special study of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups of South Vietnam was completed and disseminated to subordinate units. The forty-page study was intended to provide SFCA elements with a better understanding of each ethnic group represented within the Republic of Vietnam, to include languages spoken and religions practiced by the various groups. The study was produced as a supplement to the 5th SFCA "A" Detachment Handbook in order to familiarize Special Forces personnel with the peoples with whom they are associated on a daily basis. The study included a basic letter and six inclosures containing the information pertinent to the applicable CTA and letter company:

   a. Incl 1 A description of the minority ethnic groups within the applicable CTA.
   b. Incl 2 A listing of ethnic groups residing in provinces containing CIDG camps.
   c. Incl 3 A statistical description of troop ethnic composition in each CIDG camp.
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SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. NCS OSFGR-65

d. Incl 1 A map portraying within the applicable CTZ the location of major ethnic groups.

e. Incl 5 A glossary of terms used in regard to the various ethnic groups.

f. Incl 6 A brief synopsis of major politico-military ethnic or religious sects.

3 The operations section ORDER of battle updates prepared special studies and tactical update on areas of special interest to the Commanding Officer, 5th SFG. The studies, several of which were subsequently forwarded to CCAB (CI), included the current tactical situations at Special Forces Camps 1st and 2nd in I CTZ; PLEI ME, II K/EK, D. C. LANG, and II M/G in II CTZ; and CN. 3rd, 4th, and 5th in IV CTZ. Additionally, a special study of Quang Tri Province was completed for the Commanding Officer, as was a study of significant activities in the Han Forest of IV CTZ for the period 2 - 5 March 1970; in conjunction with these studies a special report of area area 704 was completed. Numerous unit studies were prepared on major enemy units involved in offensive activities against Special Forces assets.

4 The first two intelligence bulletins of 1970 were issued on 10 and 23 April. The bulletins briefed the areas of (1) allied countermeasures to enemy counterattacks, (2) identification of enemy units via thorough post-attack search of the battlefield, and (3) the dates of historical significance to the enemy for the month of May.

5 An evaluation report of the Special Forces Weather Observation Program was provided the Commanding Officer, 5th SFG.

6 On 1 and 2 April, the 52nd Special Forces Conference attended by C and D Detachment CI's. Problems of common interest were discussed in an attempt to improve the overall intelligence effort of the 5th SFGA in the areas of operations, counterintelligence, and collection.

c) Counterintelligence: During the period 13 January to 12 April 1970, the Counterintelligence (CI) Inspection Team conducted 12 announced and 15 unannounced CI inspections of Headquarters staff sections and companies in 5th SFGA. Results of these inspections served as the basis for tightening of security controls and procedures. Strict compliance with security directives by all personnel assigned to the 5th SFGA is essential to the successful accomplishment of the mission of the 5th SFGA.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period ending 30 April 1970. FC 0505R-65 (R-2)

(1) I Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early February enemy strength (*) in I CTZ was between 35,000 and-40,000 troops, of which approximately 25,000 were combat troops. Contacts and enemy activity were at a moderate level during the reporting period, although a substantial increase was noted during April as the enemy introduced his Spring-Summer Campaign. By the end of April, the enemy was estimated to have between 37,000 and 40,000 personnel of which approximately 45,000 were combat troops. This increase in enemy strength was attributed to the return of elements of the 79th, 306th and 324th NVA Divisions into South Vietnam. At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy forces were operating with one division, 12 independent regiments, and 30 maneuver battalions. At the close of the period, enemy forces were operating with two divisions, 15 independent regiments, and 63 to 65 maneuver battalions. In addition, approximately 30,000 to 35,000 troops were believed to be deployed in Laos and North Vietnam within striking distance of installations in South Vietnam.

(b) During February, NVA made several significant contacts with enemy forces along the coastal lowlands. The most significant of these was a 15 February combat by NVA Rangers in the vicinity of Phan Rang, nine kilometers south of Kien Giang City, resulting in 160 VC/NVA killed. The T-39th VC Main Force and the T-14th VC Local Force Battalions were identified during this contact. In TINH THINH province, Camp NOI CHIN experienced no significant enemy activities within its TAOR. In TINH NAM provincia, the T-5th VC Main Force Reconnaissance and the 6-1st NVA Communications Battalions were identified in Base Area 112. On 1 February, personnel from Camp NON GIANG experienced various symptoms usually identified as "Typhus. This was the first reported instance in this area of the enemy utilizing a "typhus capability. Camp operations from VUNG TAN made several contacts with VC forces in the northeastern portion of the camp's TAOR, possibly with elements of the 11st NVA Regiment. In THAN TINH province, a camp of T-5th VC Main Force artillery on VC/NVA forces in the vicinity of CON TRUC, eight kilometers northwest of the camp on 10, 12 and 16 February, resulting in a total of 47 VC/NVA killed. A HOT CHAM, who rallied to the 2nd ARVN Division, stated that a VC/NVA camp and hospital complex were located in the vicinity of DT 50555, 17 kilometers southwest of THAN TAN PHUOC. On 22 and 24 February, ARVN elements discovered two 200-bed hospital complexes in the vicinity of DT 50555, two kilometers east of the HOT CHAM's reported location. The hospitals were believed to have been operated by the Headquarters, 2nd NVA Division. In THAN NGAI Province, Special Forces camps experienced a low level of enemy activity, although Camp HA THINH did experience several contacts, possibly with elements of the 120th VC Local Force Battalion, THAN NGAI Provincial Force. In addition, ARVN elements discovered a 61-ton rice cache in the vicinity of BT 5377789, eight kilometers northwest of Camp HA THINH. The cache was believed to have been destined for elements of the 21st NVA Regiment.

NOTE: * includes those units within the LZ and those in NNW and Laos in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to I CTZ.

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SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons learned of 5th Special Forces Group for the period ending 30 April 1970. HGS CSFGR-65 (R-2)

Division operating in Base Area 12b. During March, enemy activity continued at a moderate level as compared to the level of activity experienced during February. In CUA NG TRI Province, the most significant development was the identification of the 1st NVA Regiment, 412th Division, in the 27th NVA Regiment, B-5 Front. Documents discovered on an enemy kitted by elements of the 1st ARVN Division on 1/27 March identified the victim as a Captain from the 1st NVA Regiment. This was the first identification of elements of the regiment in ground contact since the unit had infiltrated South Vietnam in November 1969. The 27th NVA Regiment was identified on 4/24 March during contact with ARVN elements in the vicinity of YI03609, nine kilometers northwest of Camp MAI LOC. Interrogation of three FLs captured during the battle indicated that all of the regiment's maneuver battalion were operating in South Vietnam. This was the first confirmed presence of the entire regiment in South Vietnam. In GOC 47th NVA Division, camp operations from THUONG MAI were several significant contacts with unknown-size enemy forces 10 kilometers southwest of the camp between 8 and 10 July. These contacts were possibly with elements of the 5th NVA Regiment, acting as security for the Headquarters, 47th NVA Division. In MAI LOC Province, the most significant event was the 12/24 March discovery of an enemy complex in the vicinity of BT03859, 10 kilometers north of Camp TIN HUOC. Investigation of the complex later revealed that it was a hospital facility capable of serving approximately 80 patients. Contacts with C/NVA forces providing security for the complex resulted in 21 VC/NVA killed and nine captured. In CUA NG HUPH Province, Camp operations from MA TO raised an enemy base camp 17 kilometers northwest of the camp, in the vicinity of BT3374, resulting in eight military structures destroyed. An operation from 21st NVA Division initiated contact with an estimated NVA company in the vicinity of BT36417, 14 kilometers north of the camp. Tank and artillery support operation resulting in 21 structures destroyed. The enemy units involved in both contacts were possibly elements of the 21st NVA Regiment, 22nd NVA Division, which had been operating in Base Area 12b. During April, the enemy conducted his most effective attack against a C/N camp in 1/47 since August 1968. On 24 April in CUA NG TRI Province, Camp MAI LOC received a ground attack by an estimated reinforced enemy battalion, employing satchel charges, hand grenades, and Bangalore torpedos against the camp, resulting in 29 friendly killed and 34 wounded; 17 NVA were killed. Interrogation of several prisoners captured following the attacks indicated that elements of the 66th NVA Regiment, 34th NVA Division, and the 33rd NVA Sapper Battalion, South Vietnam, participated in the attack with the primary mission of killing Special Forces personnel. This was the first indication that these units had returned to Vietnam. The 33rd NVA Sapper Battalion had not been identified in contact since 31 July 1969, while the 66th NVA Regiment had been in contact since it attacked and overran former Special Forces Camp LANG VEI on 3/4 July 1968. In CUA NG TIN Province, on 12 April, a camp operation from TIN HUOC raised an enemy base camp and subsequently engaged an unknown-size enemy force in the vicinity of BT03737, 12 kilometers southwest of the camp. The enemy unit involved was possibly an element of the 31st Regiment, 22nd NVA Division. In CUA NG MAI Province, camp operations from MA TO continued to make contacts with unknown-size enemy forces.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (A/Bn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSPDR-65 (R-2)

Eight to nine kilometers west of the camp, probably with elements of the 120th VC Local Force Battalion. In addition, a FAC mission flown on 7 April indicated that an enemy base camp consisting of huts, bunkers, and an extensive tunnel complex was located in the vicinity of 13232623, 16 kilometers southwest of HA THANH. The base camp was believed to have been occupied by elements of the 120th VC Local Force Battalion. Operations from HA TC continued to experience enemy resistance from VC forces eight to ten kilometers north of the camp. The enemy unit involved was possibly the 2-212th VC Local Force Company, which was believed to have been providing security for the 21st Regiment, 2nd NVA Division. In KON TUM Province the only significant event was the 30 April attacks-by-fire and sapper attack against Camp THUC TIN. Interrogation of an NVA POW captured following the attack identified the enemy units involved as elements of the 35th (25th) NVA Regiment, 324th NVA Division.

(c) By the end of the reporting period, the enemy remained deployed for offensive activities as he continued the initial phases of his Spring-Summer Campaign. The enemy remained capable of conducting wide-spread, coordinated attacks-by-fire, supported by sapper attacks, against military installations and population centers throughout the area. With the introduction of several new units throughout the CMZ theater has substantially increased his offensive capabilities. Previous efficiency displayed by enemy sappers and the increased number of enemy personnel reportedly receiving sapper training indicates that the enemy will rely heavily on these tactics in order to gain tactical and psychological victories. Indications are that the enemy will focus his future offensive activities against isolated outposts such as MAI LOC, THANG LOC, NONG SON, and HA THANH, and major population and installation centers such as QUANG NGAI City, DANANG, HUE, and NAM THAN.

(d) II Corps Tactical Zone

(a) In early February, enemy strength was estimated to be 55,900 personnel of which 13,400 were combat troops. Enemy-initiated activity increased from a low level in January to a high level in April, with activity being centered within KON TUM Province. During early April, Camp BEN HET, DAK SEANG, and DAK FEK received moderate to heavy attacks-by-fire, with the enemy utilizing mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles. Camps DAK SEAN and DAK FEK also received ground probes. By the end of April, enemy strength was estimated to be 56,000 personnel of which 16,000 were combat troops.

(b) Special Forces assets continued to experience a low number of contacts with the enemy during February. However, Free World Forces continued to restrict the enemy's movement and thereby decrease his capabilities within DINH DRET Province. A total of approximately 77 tons of rice, ammunition, and food supplies were captured in the province. In KON TUM Province, enemy activity continued to be sporadic as enemy forces conducted light attacks-by-fire against Camp DAK FEK.
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and the surrounding area. On 1 February, the camp received nine rounds of rocket fire, while the district headquarters, which is co-located with the camp, received a ground probe and 33 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in 60% of the headquarters destroyed. Activity around the camp remained at a moderate level throughout the first week, declining to a low level by the middle of the month. Elsewhere in the northern portion of the CTZ, enemy activity was also at a low level. In the central portion of the CTZ, enemy activity was centered around Camp PLEI MEONG. A FW captured on 11 February, in the vicinity of ZA160710, six kilometers northwest of PLEI MEONG, identified the Early Warning Section, 21st NVA Regiment. The FW further stated that the 4th Battalion, 21st NVA Regiment and the regimental headquarters were located with Base Area 701, while the K-6 Battalion, 21st NVA Regiment, was located along Highway 11, approximately six kilometers northeast of the camp. Throughout the month, intelligence sources continued to indicate that PLEI MEONG and PLEIKU City were primary targets for future enemy offensive activity. On 17 February, an estimated 300 VC initiated contact with a platoon-sized operation from Camp PLEI MEONG in the vicinity of ZA200170, 10 kilometers north-northeast of the camp. The enemy unit responsible for the attack was probably an element of the 4th Battalion, 95th NVA Regiment, which was known to be operating in the area. In the southern portion of the CTZ, there was no significant intelligence activity affecting Special Forces assets reported during the month. During March, enemy activity was at a moderate level. In KON TUM Province, enemy activity was centered around the DAK TO area with intelligence indicating that the enemy was combining his forces to conduct offensive activity in late March or early April. Order of battle carried elements of the K-20 NVA Sapper Battalion and the 30th and 306th VC Local Forces Battalions operating in the area. Intelligence also revealed that due to the recent unsuccessful attacks against Dien Bien and Kon Horng, the 306th VC Local Force Battalion was directed to disperse its subordinate elements into squad-size units with the mission of reverting to guerrilla tactics. Elements of the 4th MSF Battalion, operating in the southern portion of Camp BEN HET's TAOR, made sporadic contact with up to platoon-sized enemy forces. Order of battle carried elements of the K-30 NVA Artillery Battalion, 40th NVA Artillery Regiment and the K-86 NVA Infantry Battalion operating in the area. It was possible that the K-33 NVA Artillery Battalion, 40th NVA Artillery Regiment, may have also been operating in the southern portion of BEN HET's TAOR. In PLEIKU Province, elements of the 1st MSF Reconnaissance Company and CSF operation made sporadic contact in the southern portion of Camp PLEI MEONG's TAOR. Intelligence sources revealed that an unidentified battalion was located in the camp's TAOR and had access to various rice and ammunition caches in the area. Order of battle carried elements of the K-631 NVA Artillery-Infantry Battalion and elements of the 21st NVA Regiment operating in the area, both capable of conducting attacks against friendly installations. Free World Forces discovered several rice caches totaling 22 tons in the northern portion of PLEI MEONG's TAOR. Analysis of intelligence revealed that the enemy was possibly infiltrating through the camp's TAOR. Order of battle carried elements of the 4th Battalion, 95th NVA Regiment operating in the northern portion of the
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camp's TAOR. In the southern portion of the CTZ, two PNs captured north of Camp AN LAC identified the H-10-C Company, while documents captured on 9 March in the same vicinity identified the 252nd Transportation Battalion, 250th NVA Transportation Regiment, which was carried by order of battle in the northern portion of the camp's TAOR. Throughout the month intelligence sources indicated that enemy-initiated activity would increase in the northern portion of the CTZ during April. On 1 April, the enemy initiated the 1st Phase of his Spring-Summer Campaign, with attacks-by-fire and limited ground attacks being conducted against all major US/NVA installations within the CTZ. The most prolonged enemy offensive activity was conducted against Camp DAK SEANG, which received daily barrages of mixed mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle fire throughout the month. MSF, CSF, and ARVN forces made heavy contact with up to company-size enemy units, while the camp received unknown-size ground probes. On 7 April, CSF personnel conducted a sweep of the camp's perimeter discovered 222 NVA bodies. Also on 7 April, a PN captured a kilometer south of the camp identified his unit as the C-4 Company, 1-1 Battalion, 28th NVA Regiment. He stated that the K-1 Battalion was attacking the camp from the southwest, the K-2 Battalion from the north, while the K-3 Battalion was acting as security for the Headquarters, 28th NVA Regiment, and had the mission of clearing and covering the withdrawal phase once the camp had been overrun. He further stated that each battalion had a transportation platoon attached and that one platoon of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment and the C-4 Support Company, 28th NVA Artillery Regiment, with an antiaircraft capability, were located southwest of the camp. The source also stated that prior to his unit's infiltration into DAK SEANG's TAOR he had overheard cadre from the 66th NVA Regiment discussing plans to reconnaisse the BEN HÒT area for possible future offensive activity. Another PN, captured ten kilometers west of DAK SEANG, identified the 2nd Transportation Battalion, 3-3 Front. Elsewhere in northern KONTUM Province, Camp DAK FEN received heavy barrages of morta, rocket, recoilless rifle, and small arms fire between 12 and 30 April, while MSF and CSF operations made contact with up to company-size enemy units in the area. On 13 April, CSF elements conducted a sweep of the local area and discovered 120 NVA bodies. Intelligence sources continued to indicate that enemy forces were concentrating in Base Area 609 and possibly preparing for offensive activity against Camp BEN HET. Visual reconnaissance missions flown on 9 April revealed numerous bunkers, foxholes, and tunnel complexes within four kilometers northwest of the camp. On 16 April, a PN captured 15 kilometers south of the camp identified his unit as the C2nd Company, 1-24 Battalion, 30th NVA Artillery Regiment. On 29 April, interrogation of a PN captured by CSF personnel four kilometers northwest of BEN HET revealed that he was a member of the C-16 Battalion, 40th NVA Artillery Regiment. The PN stated that the battalion had the mission of shelling the DAK TO-TANH CANH area in order to draw fire from friendly artillery bases to include Camp BEN HET, thus relaxing the pressure placed on "A" troops within the DAK SEANG area. The PN further stated that the C-10 Company was equipped with PT-76 tanks and that they would possibly be utilized against BEN HET in future offensive activity. The only other significant intelligence received throughout the CTZ pertained to the BU FRANG-DUC LAF area, where intelligence sources continued to indicate.

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increased enemy activity northwest of BU PRANG. Order of battle carried only elements of the 250th NVA Transportation Regiment operating in the NAM LTR Base Area.

(c) There was no new use of weapons or equipment in II CTZ during the reporting period.

(d) At the end of the reporting period, most major enemy units had moved into the northern portion of KONTUM Province in preparation for the anticipated initiation of the 2nd Phase of the Spring-Summer Campaign. Enemy activity will probably be characterized by moderate to heavy attacks-by-fire, acts of terrorism, and limited ground attacks, and will probably be centralized in KONTUM Province. Armor and field artillery will possibly be used in the attempted sieges of Camps DA K SEANG and BEN HET.

(4) III Corps Tactical Zone

(a) In early February, enemy strength in III CTZ was approximately 51,500 troops, of which 33,500 were combat troops. Contacts and incidents remained at a moderate level with sporadic high and low levels of enemy-initiated ground activity. By the end of April, the enemy was estimated to have 50,300 troops, of which 33,800 were combat troops.

(b) With the exception of the 3rd YSFC's area of operations in LONG KHANH Province and Camp BEN SOI's TAOR, TAY NINH Province, enemy activity was at a low level throughout February. In PHUOC LONG Province, enemy activity consisted of light attacks-by-fire directed mainly against FSBs in the northern portion of the province. Camp BU DOP received four light attacks-by-fire, while Camp DUC PHUONG received one. Elements of the 275th VC and 174th NVA Regiments, 5th VC Division, were both identified by documents captured during the month and were probably responsible for the activity in the province. During the month, there was an increase in reports of enemy food shortages throughout the province. These reports were somewhat substantiated by the low level of enemy activity. In Binh LONG Province, enemy activity consisted of small unit contacts, the majority of which involved elements of the 7th NVA Division. The 165th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, was identified on three separate occasions in an area 10 to 15 kilometers northeast of Camp LOC NINH, while the 204th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, remained in an area six to ten kilometers southwest of Camp BU DOP, along the BICH LONG/PHUOC LONG Province border. Elements of the 165th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, were identified during the last week of February in an area eight to ten kilometers northwest of Camp TONG LE CHON, TAY NINH Province, possibly indicating that elements of the regiment had redeployed from their former area of operations, along the BINH LONG/PHUOC LONG Province border, northeast of BINH NINH. In TAY NINH Province, Camp BEN SOI experienced an increase in activity during the period 1 to 9 February. On 1 February, the camp received a ground attack by an
estimated enemy supper platoon. On 7 and 9 February, CSF operations engaged an estimated enemy company 10 kilometers west of the camp. Intelligence sources reported that elements of the 1st Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division, were located north of the camp, and were probably responsible for the activity within the camp's TAOR. Elsewhere in the province, Camp KATUM received seven light attacks-by-fire, probably conducted by elements of the 9th VC Division to screen the movement of troops and supplies in and adjacent to the camp's TAOR.

In HAU NGHIA Province, enemy activity consisted of light attacks-by-fire directed against U.S./Japanese installations located along infiltration routes. An intelligence source reported that Sub-region 2 was organizing a new regiment from units operating in HAU NGHIA Province. The new regiment would reportedly be composed of the 257th and 269th VC and D67 NVA Battalions and would operate in the CUC KGA area. In LONG SHUNH Province, elements of the 3d NSF discovered 23 caches the majority of which were located in an area 10 to 15 kilometers northwest of HAU NGHIA. One cache contained over 170 tons of weapons, ammunition, and miscellaneous equipment. The material contained in the caches was probably intended for the use of enemy units operating in Sub-region 5, as elements of both Sub-region 5 and the 5th Special Service Group were identified by documents captured in the KUNG YI area. During March, enemy activity ranged from a low to moderate level throughout the province. In HAU NGHIA Province, a slight increase in attacks-by-fire was noted in War Zone C during the month, probably in order to screen resupply operations. The 9th VC Division remained deployed in northern War Zone C with all of the division's maneuver elements being identified during the month. The 271st VC Regiment was identified west and southwest of Camp THIT THONG on 10, 19, and 20 March, while the 272nd VC Regiment was identified northeast of THIT THONG on 16 March. The remaining elements of the division, the 950 NVA Regiment, was identified northwest of Camp KATUM. In HAU NGHIA Province, the most significant activity was the numerous helicopter sightings near Camp DUC HUE during the period 7 to 31 March, a total 107 sightings were made. During the month, enemy activity in the KGA Province increased from the level experienced during February. The 11th Division Headquarters and the 113th NVA Regiment were believed to have relocated north of LOC MHN, in Base Area 350. The 209th NVA Regiment, 9th NVA Division, was identified on 6 March in an area six to eight kilometers south and southwest of the 165th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, which had been located in the area. It remained out of contact for most of the month. In PHUC LONG Province, the 5th VC Division Headquarters and the 275th VC Regiment remained in northeastern PHUC LONG Province. Throughout the province, there were no major attacks reported, as it appeared that the enemy was content with avoiding contact in order to resupply and rearm his forces. Throughout the month, there were many intelligence reports which predicted an increase in enemy activity during late March or early April. These reports were later substantiated on the night of 31 March when there were a series of attacks-by-fire directed primarily against enemy locations in HAU NGHIA and HAU NGHIA Provinces. These attacks-by-fire later proved to be the initiation of the 1st Phase of the enemy's Spring-Summer Campaign. During the month of April, there were several significant enemy relocations in
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III CTZ. In TAY NINH Province, the 271st VC Regiment, 9th VC Division, redeployed from the northeastern portion of TAY NINH Province to the southern portion of the province, in an area just north of the Angel's wing. The 255 C NVA Regiment, 9th VC Division, redeployed from an area eight to ten kilometers southeast of KATUM to central Base Area 354, along the western TAY NINH Province/Cambodian border. In KINH LANG Province, elements of the 209th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, relocated from an area west of LOC NINH to the northeastern portion of TAY NINH Province. The 1st Battalion, 20th NVA Regiment, was identified by documents captured approximately 15 kilometers west-northwest of TON LE CHON on 23 April. The 16th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, remained in the vicinity of the Fishhook, the Headquarters, 7th NVA Division and the 1st NVA Regiment were located north of LOC NINH, in Base Area 350. In HUOC LONG Province, the 5th VC Division Headquarters and the 275th VC Regiment remained north and southwest of BU DOP, respectively.

(c) There were no new weapons or equipment introduced in III CTZ during the reporting period.

(d) Throughout the month, numerous intelligence reports were received stating that the enemy would launch another highpoint of the Spring-Summer Campaign during late April or early May, in conjunction with Communist holidays on 1, 7, and 19 May. The enemy is capable of widespread, coordinated attacks-by-fire and sapper attacks against population centers and military installations and limited ground attacks against CIDG camps, RF/FF outposts, District Headquarters, and fire support bases.

(5) IV Corps Tactical Zone

(a) In early February, enemy strength was estimated to be 49,550 personnel, of which 41,550 were combat troops. Enemy strength rose during the period with the addition of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Sapper Battalions, 16th Armor Office, COSVN, and several other infiltration groups. However, successful friendly operations and accurate intelligence resulted in substantial enemy losses. During the period, the 267B and 269B Sapper Battalions were formed in the SONG TRANG area and had infiltrated to Base Area 470, where they reportedly became subordinate to the DTI and DT2 VC Main Force Regiments, respectively. Elements of the 88th NVA Regiment completed their successful infiltration to Base Area 470, while elements of the 95A NVA Regiment completed their reported infiltration from Cambodia to Base Area 483. By the end of April, enemy strength in IV CTZ was estimated to be 44,575 personnel, of which 36,000 were combat troops.

(b) During the month of February, enemy-initiated activity remained at a low to moderate level throughout the CTZ, characterized by attacks-by-fire and troop movement. Intelligence sources stated that the enemy would conduct the TET Offensive during this period; however, it failed to materialize due to the
apparent failure of the enemy to position troops into his reported target areas and the lack of sufficient food, ammunition, and medical supplies. During the first week of the month, intelligence sources reported that the 261A, 267B, and 269th VC Main Force Battalions, which normally operated in the central areas of the CTZ, were located to the north in Cambodian border base areas. In addition, the 16th NVA Regiment was reportedly operating in the Crow's Nest area with the intentions of infiltrating PHONG Provinces to participate in attacks against the KY THI City-DONG Than area. Intelligence sources further indicated that a large enemy force had moved westward along the Cambodian border to Base Area 704. This unit was believed to have been elements of the 95A NVA Regiment, 5th VC Division. During the second week of the month, the enemy suffered substantial losses in the eastern areas of the CTZ, which were believed to have been an important factor in the enemy's decision to postpone the predicted TET Offensive. On 8 February, elements of the Z-7 and Z-9 Battalions, 66th NVA Regiment, were contacted approximately 44 kilometers south of Camp THI THI than. This was the first confirmation of the unit's intentions to infiltrate to the central areas of the CTZ. After the contact the unit reportedly returned to the SONC TANG area of Cambodia to regroup and retrain its personnel. During the remainder of the month, the majority of enemy activity took place in the CHAU LOC Province area and adjacent areas of Cambodia. Major Elements of the 1013 NVA Regiment, 1st NVA Division, reportedly began their infiltration to the Seven Mountain axes (Base Area 400). Intelligence sources indicated that the regiment would replace the 103 NVA Regiment, which would reportedly move south out of Base Area 400, possibly to the 10MIA Forest area. Elements of the 16th Armor Office, CONVN, were identified in contact on several occasions during the month. On February, the 10th and 11th Battalions, 16th Armor Office, were confirmed when the 16th Battalion's CO and the 5th Battalion's CO were captured near Little NUI GIAB. The captured during the contacts revealed that other elements of the 16th Armor Office were to infiltrate 74 CTZ in the near future. Enemy-initiated activity increased gradually throughout March, culminating with the initiation of the NVA Campaign on 2 March. During the first half of the month, activity was highlighted by a 2 March contact in the TRA Forest, when ARVN and CIDG elements conducted a joint operation against the 3rd Sapper Battalion, 16th Armor Office, CONVN. This operation resulted in 21 enemy fatalities out of a reported unit strength of 250 men. During the month, elements of the 261A VC Main Force Infantry Battalion and the newly formed 267B and 269B VC Main Force Sapper Battalions were located in the northern border areas of PHONG and PHONG Provinces with the intentions of infiltrating to Base Area 470. On 6 March, elements of the 261A VC Main Force Infantry Battalion were contacted while attempting this move. Other intelligence sources also indicated large unidentified units in Base Area 704 with intentions of moving southward into SVN. Previous intelligence sources had indicated that increased infiltration to Base Areas 460 and 470 would occur in the future. Increased friendly operations and serial surveillance of the border areas, however, severely hampered the planned enemy movements. In mid-March, the political situation in Cambodia resulted in a new policy toward the VC/NVA forces within Cambodian territory. Major VC/NVA element.
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Located in the Crow's Nest, SONG TRANG, Base Area 704, and on NUI "C" were forced to either move to more secure areas or to raise large numbers of troops to avoid the offensive operations of the Cambodian Government Forces. During the last week of the month, intelligence sources began to indicate that the enemy planned to initiate his spring campaign in the near future. On 29 March, the enemy used widespread attacks-by-fire, sapper probes, and ground assaults to initiate the predicted campaign. Enemy activity remained at a high level throughout the remainder of the month. The Special Forces camp and ARVN Training Center at CHI LANG were the next heavily engaged targets. Elements of the 10th NVA Regiment and 16th Armor Office were responsible for the attacks. TRI TON District Headquarters also received several heavy attacks-by-fire. After the initial phase of the Spring Campaign, directed primarily against military targets, the terrain shifted to harassment and terrorism of the civilian populace. Intelligence reports stated that this was part of the enemy's plans to liberate a major segment of the population.

During the first week of April, enemy activity remained at a high level. On April 1, activity decreased sharply, possibly in preparation for another series of high points. Intelligence sources reported that the enemy planned large scale attacks against the CHI LANG area in the near future. Intelligence sources also indicated the possible movement of major units from III CTZ to IV CTZ. A FW captured in the vicinity of the Angel's Ring, III CTZ, revealed orders to move from III CTZ to the "Flair Region." The "Flair Region" probably referred to the Plain of Reeds, which encompasses the western portion of KIEN TUONG Province and the eastern portion of KIEN THANG Province. Previous intelligence reports have stated that additional elements of the 7th VC Division, in addition to the 6th NVA Regiment, would relocate to IV CTZ. During the second week of April, intelligence reports and interrogation of captured enemy soldiers revealed that the 261A VC Main Force Infantry Battalion and the 261B and 269B VC Main Force Sapper Battalions had completed their move southward out of the SONG TRANG area to Base Area 470. In addition, the 261B and 269B VC Main Force Sapper Battalions were reportedly subordinate to the LT1 and LT2 VC Main Force Regiments, respectively. This would have given all the enemy regiments in Military Region I an organized sapper battalion. During the second half of April, 14 captured documents, and intelligence sources reported the movement of major elements of the 6th NVA Regiment from the KIEN TUONG-KIEN TRANG Province border areas to Base Area 470. Also during this time, major elements of the 263A NVA Regiment infiltrated south from Cambodia to the northern portions of the L-淮H Forest. Developments in the Cambodian territory adjacent to Sihanouk greatly affected the enemy's planned courses of action.

(c) There were no new weapons or equipment introduced in IV CTZ during the reporting period.

(d) During late April, intelligence sources began to indicate enemy plans for the initiation of the second phase of the Spring-Summer Campaign, reportedly to be initiated on or about 1 May '70. However, it is likely that the current Cambodian situation will affect both the initiation date and the intensity of this second phase.
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**c. Operations.**

(1) I Corps Tactical Zone (Co C)

During the reporting period, Company C assets conducted a total of 104 company, 207 platoon and 138 squad size operations. A total of 179 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy-287 NVA/VC KIA, 62 CIA, 103 weapons CIA. Friendly-one USASF and 45 CIDG KIA, ten USASF, four VNSF, 129 CIDG WIA. During the reporting period RF/PI units advised by USASF conducted 84 company, 323 platoon and 31 squad operations and engaged in 53 contacts. Results: Enemy-68 NVA/VC KIA, nine CIA, 21 weapons CIA. Friendly-nine RF/PI KIA, five WIA. The following significant contacts occurred during the reporting period.

(a) On 10 Feb, a company size CSF operation from TIEN PHUC observed a VC company crossing a river, the operation engaged the enemy with artillery resulting in 30 VC KBA and one 60mm mortar destroyed.

(b) On 16 Feb, a company size CSF operation from TIEN PHUC engaged 60 to 80 NVA/VC with artillery resulting in nine VC KBA and four tunnel complexes destroyed.

(c) On 19 Feb, a company size CSF operation from THIEN PHUC ambushed a VC squad resulting in six VC, one individual weapon, and 400 kilos of rice CIA.

(d) On 24 Feb, a company size CSF operation from TIEN PHUC ambushed an NVA platoon resulting in nine NVA KIA and five individual weapons CIA.

(e) On 2 Mar, a company size CSF operation from MINH LONG made contact with an unknown size enemy force while uncovering a cache. Results were: one CIDG KIA, two CIDG WIA, five VC KIA, one VC CIA, three individual weapons CIA, 4,000 lbs of rice, 300 lbs of salt and 200 lbs of clothing destroyed.

(f) On 5 Mar, a company size CSF operation from TIEN PHUC made contact with a NVA/VC company resulting in seven VC KIA, five VC KBA and two individual weapons CIA.

(g) On 6 Mar, a company size CSF operation from THIEN PHUC conducted a combat assault with a USMC recon team and made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Results were three VC KIA, one individual weapon CIA, two CIDG KIA, two USMC KIA, 15 CIDG and five USMC WIA, two M-16s lost and one CH-46 destroyed.
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(h) On 6 Mar, a company size CSF operation from TIEN PHUOC ambushed two NVA companies resulting in five NVA KIA, eight NVA KIA, one individual weapon CIA and one CIDG WIA.

(i) On 12 Mar, a company size CSF operation from TIEN PHUOC assaulted an NVA base camp. Results were: 21 NVA KIA, nine NVA CIA, four individual weapons CIA and 150 kilos of rice destroyed.

(j) On 7 Apr, a platoon size operation from MINH LONG observed a VC company crossing a river and engaged them with artillery resulting in 15 VC KIA.

(k) On 10 Apr, Camp MAI LOC received a ground attack by a sapper company from the 66th NVA Regt. The attack lasted four hours until relieved by a troop from the 5th Mech Inf Div. The enemy force used mortars, B-40 rockets, satchel charges and small arms in the attack, destroying approximately 50% of the bunkers in the camp. Results: One USASF KIA, 22 CIDG KIA, two VNSF and 16 CIDG WIA. Enemy losses were: Fifteen NVA KIA, three AK-47s CIA, two RPG-2s, 15 B-40 rockets, 30 grenades, 20 bangalore torpedoes, 75 two kilo satchel charges, three gas masks and one Russian radio CIA.

(l) On 16 Apr, a company size CSF operation from HA THANH, in a series of running contacts, killed 12 VC and captured four individual weapons.

(m) On 23 Apr, a company size CSF operation from HA THANH, while searching a VC hamlet, made contact with an unknown size enemy force from 50 to 100 meters resulting in five VC KIA, four individual weapons CIA and 15 detainees.

(n) In the early morning of 30 Apr, Camp THUONG DUC received light small arms fire, B-40 rockets and 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Counter battery fire was directed with 81mm and 4.2 inch mortars. At first light a sweep was made of the perimeter resulting in five VC KIA, one VC CIA, one AK-47, one RPG-7, one mine, 17 hand grenades, 21 one lb blocks of TNT and eight B-40/41 rockets. Four CIDG were wounded.

(o) During the last part of Mar, two companies from the lst MSFC and one company of NONG SON CSF troops swept the SONG THU BON River Valley and evacuated the civilian population to DUC DUC District Hqs at AN HOA. All rice and other crops in the valley were destroyed. This operation not only took a population base from the enemy but also denied them a major source of food. This valley is a highly productive agricultural area and most of the crops went to the VC. The operation took place just prior to and during the harvest time.
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(2) II Corps Tactical Zone. (Co B)

During the reporting period, Company B assets conducted a total of 7,950 operations which resulted in 800 enemy killed, 25 enemy captured and 157 weapons captured.

(a) In February, the most significant incident was the recovery of two US KIA in October in the DAK PEK TACR. One was a USAF pilot, and the other a USASF observer who were shot down by enemy.

(b) In March, PLEI ME was the center of enemy activity. An enemy unit, later identified by a POW statement as the 95B Regiment, initiated contact with a training company on 11 March. The CSF company was supported by mechanized elements from the 4th Inf Div. The CSF company disrupted enemy plans to attack PLEI ME.

(c) In April, there were two camps attacked by indirect fire and ground attacks and one by indirect fire only. DAK SEANG was attacked on 1 April by elements of the 28th Inf Regiment and 10th NVA Artillery Regiment. The siege that the 28th Regiment initiated was carried on throughout April resulting in 975 enemy KIA. During this time the camp was supported by one company from PLATEAU 01 and the 1st and 4th MSF Bns. Also operating in the area were the 22nd and 23rd ARVN Ranger Bns and the 22nd ARVN Regiment.

(d) DAK PEK was attacked by indirect fire and by sappers on 12 April. During the first two days of the attack, three of the five main hills at DAK PEK were taken by the enemy. An assault by the 2nd MSF Recon Company regained the positions. The major portion of the NVA attack against DAK PEK lasted until 18 April. In total 228 enemy were killed in the DAK PEK offensive.

(e) Also during the month of April, BEN HET A-24H, received numerous barrages of 82mm mortar and 75mm RR.
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(3) III Corps Tactical Zone. (c/o A)

During the reporting period Company A assets conducted a total of 2,43 company or larger, 1,507 platoon, and 2,527 squad operations. A total of 189 contacts were made with the following results: Enemy- 100 VC/NVA KIA, four enemy and 1625 weapons captured; Friendly- Two USASF, one VNSF and 66 CSF/MSF KIA, 10 USASF and 256 CSF/MSF WIA, 16 weapons lost.

(a) KATUM A-322: At 021100Feb, a FAC spotted 25 VC/NVA crying out their uniforms. Artillery response from KATUM resulted in 13 VC KIA.

(b) SONG BE B-34: At 201130Feb, a platoon size operation discovered a cache containing the following enemy equipment: three 82mm mortar tubes with bipods, two 82mm mortar sights, one 82mm mortar baseplate, one 60mm mortar tube, two Russian Nagant rifles, one Chicom LMG type 56, and 3,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition.

(c) THIEN NOON A-323: At 211500Feb, a platoon size operation made contact with an estimated NVA platoon. Results: Enemy- Four VC KIA, seven VC KIA, and two AK-L7 CIA; Friendly- one VNSF and four CIDG WIA.

(d) TONG LE CHON A-334: At 212100Feb, a company size operation made contact with an estimated enemy squad. Results: Enemy- Four VC KIA, three AK-L7 magazines, two lbs documents, two bags of rice CIA; Friendly- Negative.

(e) MINH THANH A-332: On 001300Feb, a company size operation initiated contact with an estimated VC squad. Results: Enemy- Two VC KIA, one VC CIA (Warrant Officer), two AK-L7 CIA; Friendly- Negative.

(f) KATUM A-322: At 201100Mar, a platoon size operation made contact with 15-20 VC. Artillery and airstrikes supported the contact. Results: Enemy- Six VC KIA, three VC KBA, five AK-L7's and one K-51 pistol CIA; Friendly- One CSF WIA.

(g) BEN SOI A-120: At 281955Mar, a company size operation made contact with an estimated VC platoon. Results: Three VC KIA, one AK-L7 CIA.
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(h) TRA CU A-326: At 090305 Apr, a company size operation made contact with an estimated two VC companies. Enemy initiated contact with mortar and small arms fire. Results: Six CSF KIA, I CSF WIA.

(i) KATUM A-322: At 140900 Apr, a company size operation made contact with an estimated VC platoon. Results: Four VC KIA, one AK-47 CIA.

(j) BEN SOI A-120: At 180910 Apr, a platoon size operation made contact with unknown size enemy unit. Results: One CSF KIA, four VC KIA, two AK-47’s CIA.

(k) TONG LE CHON A-334: At 202330 Apr, the camp received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar and 107mm RR. Rounds impacted inside the compound. Results: Two USASF KIA, six USASF WIA.
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SUR: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. CSF CPR-65 (R2)

(b) IV Corps Tactical Zone, (Co D): During the quarter ending 30 April 1970, Company D conducted 365 company, 3201 small unit and 129 MP operations. The results of these operations were: KIA - six VSASF KIA, 12 VSASF WIA, nine VSASF KIA, seven VSASF WIA, 85 VTG KIA, 365 CIDG KIA, three CIDG WIA, 114 weapons lost; En - 395 VC KIA, 20 VC CTA, 24 detainees, two HoC CHANS and 371 weapons captured.

(a) A-113, DH THANH THON: At 061500 Feb, a VR A/C sighted VC digging in. VC fired on A/C and gunships returned fire. At 061735 troops were inserted and engaged the enemy. At 061850 the troops were extracted. Results: KIA - One CSF KIA; En - 29 VC KIA.

(b) A-113, DH THANH THON: At 071300 Feb, an airmobile operation initiated contact w/est VC company from 200 meters. A-402 troops were inserted at 071705 to flank contact area to the East. Tac Air was called in prior to insertion. At 071900 all troops were extracted, and Tac Air was again called in. At 080130 two companies of the 25th Th, 14th Mvn were inserted. One company from A-113 and one company from A-115 and the 1st Ranger Bn were inserted approximately 081100 and two 105 Howitzers were moved to PHATOC KUTEN for support. At 092305, the 14th Ranger Bn initiated contact w/est 100 VC, gunships and A-119 supported. At 100310 the 14th Ranger Bn reported reported six VC KIA in the area of contact. At 100415 the 14th Ranger Bn reported one VC CTA. Results: KIA - two VC, Seven KIA; Four CSF KIA, one USAF, 12 WIA, 12 VC WIA. Equipment losses: 12 \( \times \) 16 rifles, one CA-15, one M-60 MG, two .50 Cal pistols, one PRC-25 radio, 27 - 39 VC KIA, 82 VC WIA, two VC CTA, 25 AK-47's, four \( \times \) 03 LMG's, three \( \times \) 40 LMG's, one \( \times \) 47 RL, one AK-57, one M-14, 19 hand grenades, one 60mm mortar w/sight, 12 \( \times \) 40 and \( \times \) 41 rockets, 37 gas masks, 16 60mm rounds, four 82mm rds, one 107mm rocket, two Bangalore torpedoes, ten rucksacks, one pair wire cutters, 15 lbs plastic explosive, ten blasting caps, 200 lbs of assorted clothing, equipment, medical supplies and documents cpr.

(c) B-11, MOC H2A: At 111000 Feb, one LOH received ground fire and crashed. At 111040 another LOH receive two .51 Cal hits in tail section. CSF pilot reported that the LOH which crashed was in fire and an explosion was observed. There were no survivors. At 111445 hours, Tac Air put in three air strikes. At 111515 hours one company from A-113 was inserted to set up ambushes. Results: KIA - two VC KIA (LOH pilots), one LOH destroyed. En - 17 VC KIA, five bunkers and 12 weapons positions destroyed.

(d) A-112, SA XAOI: At 110615 Feb, an estimated one WIA company initiated an indirect fire attack with 30 rounds of 82mm mortar, and a ground attack against one CSF company at the FOB. Results: KIA - eight CSF KIA, ten CSF WIA, En - three VC/WIA KIA, one \( \times \) 40 RL, one pair wire cutters CTA.

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C C N F I D E N T I A L

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. HOS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(e) A-403, CHI LANG: At 150300 Feb 70, one NVA squad initiated contact with two NVA squads from 50 meters with claymores. After a 90 minute fire fight, the NVA broke contact and withdrew. Results: FPD - Negative, EN - eight NVA KIA, one AK-50, three rucksacks with C-4, one rucksack with grenades crtr. Army Helicopter gunships and 155 Howitzer's were used in support.

(f) A-403, THONTH THOT: At 171317 Feb 70, one SF company was inserted on an aircobile operation. An unknown size enemy force initiated contact with the CSF from 200 meters. After a sporadic fire fight the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Results: FPD - one OH-1D helicopter shot down and one OH-1D downed with mechanical failure. (Both crews were safely extracted). EN - ten NVA KIA, three NVA KIA, two NVA nurses, one radio (AN/PSD-9), one case of batteries, one R-40 RL, two 9M pistols, one NVA SOI, a maintenance kit for 127mm rocket, two VCI documents, and one AK-47 crtr.

(g) B-43, CHI LANG: At 021510 Mar 70, an Air Cavalry element observed trails leading to a clearing and observed an estimated company size enemy unit testing. Air Cavalry elements put in air strikes and received fire. One company from A-432, two companies of NVA, one NVA CRF, one CRF from A-432, one CRF from A-432 were inserted. After two hours, the VC broke contact and withdrew. Results: FPD - one UH-1D down, one A/C hit in the tail boom; EN - 37 VC KIA, three VC KIA. FPD elements continued the contact the following day with an estimated 300 VC/NVA. Results: FPD - one USAF M1A, one "F" helicopter crew chief KIA, two LOH's downed by ground fire, one OH-1D down due to engine failure; EN - 14 VC KIA, 30 VC KIA, six VC CIA, 18 AK-47, two Chicom type 57 MG's, two 17 barrels, 2 MO Tripods, 3 flashlights, 12 AK magazines, 3 poncho's, 1 carrying case for "M", 1 scissors, assorted medical supplies and documents CIA.

(h) B-43, VINH THIA: At 060800 Mar 70, contact was established with enemy elements and was continued with slight breaks until 1800 hours. Results: FPD - one USAF KIA, one CRF KIA, three CRF "F", one UH-16 lost; EN - six VC/7C KIA, 35 VC/7C KIA, eight AK-47's, two AK-50's, two R-40 RL's, one .50 cal "M", one .30 cal "M", one 12.7 "M", one K-5B pistol, 20 rds R-40 rockets crtr.

(4) B-43, LOC HOA: At 051936 Mar 70, B-43 reported that army helicopter gunships spotted two companies of VC in the open and initiated contact. After a 15 minute fire fight, the gunships broke contact and withdrew to refuel. Results: FPD - Negative, EN - 35 VC KIA.

(5) A-43, THAN THAN: At 060030 Mar 70, one CSF company initiated contact with estimated two companies of VC. At 060125 radio contact was lost with the CSF. At 060315 additional command element was inserted, established contact and assumed control of the CSF company and reestablished radio communications. At 060500 additional troops were inserted to search the area.

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A-3B-G

SUSPECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. PCS OCPD-65 (R2)

Results: 9) A-402, CHI LANI: At 260035 Mar 70, a friendly element initiated contact with one platoon of VC from 100 meters. After a 24 hour firefight, the 1/2A broke contact and withdrew. Results: STS - seven QSF KIA; ST - four 1/2A KIA, 37 chicom grenades, one 60mm, 100 AK-47's, eight 1-60 rockets, one 70mm, 200 fuses, ten 1/2A, two 15 pound claymore mines, four shovels, 150 psychological leaflets, assorted medical equipment, unknown number of documents and assorted clothing and uniforms CIA.

(k) A-402, CHI LANI: At 260035 Mar 70, a friendly element initiated contact with one platoon of VC from 100 meters. After a 24 hour firefight, the 1/2A broke contact and withdrew. Results: STS - seven QSF KIA; ST - four 1/2A KIA, 37 chicom grenades, one 60mm, 100 AK-47's, eight 1-60 rockets, one 70mm, 200 fuses, ten 1/2A, two 15 pound claymore mines, four shovels, 150 psychological leaflets, assorted medical equipment, unknown number of documents and assorted clothing and uniforms CIA.

(l) A-403, CHI LANI: At 290130 Mar 70, an estimated company of VC initiated a cover attack on 1/2A compound from three directions. The ground probe 1/2A entered the compound between bunkers 8 and 9. Contacted for approximately four hours. Results: STS - one CDN KIA, 13 QSF, one "L", five QSF "TA, ST - 22 VC KIA, one VC CTA, five AK-47's, and numerous grenades and 1-60 rockets CTA. A platoon size friendly element from 1/2A, performing security at CHI LANI, were returning to CHI LANI from an ambush position, observed three VC and initiated contact; Results: STS - one CDN KIA, six 1/2A, three QSF CTA.

(m) A-421, BA XQAT: At 290230 Mar 70, Camp BA XQAT came under a ground attack when approximately 30 VC/A/T launched along the pagoda side. Enemy were trapped inside the compound and by daylight a sweep conducted by A-421 elements eliminated the enemy. Results: STS - two CDN KIA, four QSF "TA, one QSF "TA, ST - 22 VC KIA, three VC CTA, three 1-60 H/L's, seven AK-47's numerous grenades, web gear and clothing CIA.

(n) A-402, CHI LANI: At 301137 Mar 70, two companies of 1/2A initiated contact with an estimated VC/A/T company from 100 meters. After a five hour firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew. Results: STS - one CDN KIA, three QSF and five QSF "TA, ST - 22 VC KIA, nine VC CTA, four VC CTA, one 60mm mortar complete, seven AK-47's, two "PB"s, one SKS, 500 booby traps, five 1-60 rockets and one 15 kilo mine CTA.

(o) A-403, CHI LANI: At 091230 Mar 70, 1/2A initiated contact with one NVA company from 50 meters, with the contact lasting 20 minutes. The friendly element received indirect fire for two hours, then another fire fight was initiated which lasted for an hour. Results: STS - two QSF "TA, three CDN KIA, six CDN "TA, ST - 13 VC KIA, one 60mm mortar, one "PB"s, one 1-60 H/L, one SKS, two AK-47's CTA.
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DATE: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Afr.) for the Period Ending 30 April 1973. DSO GSFOR-65 (92)

CPT Forward, OHT LAN: 300020 Mar 73, A-403 received ten 81mm rounds and six 60mm mortar rounds on the east side of the perimeter. At 300100 a sweep of the area was made by 4-403 and 4-403. Results:

- Two 81mm TAs
- Five WC KIA
- Four WC WIA
- Six A-403s
- One AK-50
- 23 reds
- 11 81mm rounds and five rucksacks CIA.

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AVGR-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

d. Plans and Organization.

(1) CIDG Camp Conversion: The following conversion activities took place during the reporting period.

(a) Three CIDG camps converted to RF on 31 Mar 70. An Lac, II CTZ converted 418 CIDG of 482 assigned. My Dien II in IV CTZ converted 244 CIDG of 266 assigned. Lastly, My Phuoc Tay, IV CTZ converted 495 out of 533 assigned. A total of 1,157 CIDG converted from the above named camps.

(b) Two CIDG camps in III CTZ converted to RF on 30 Apr. Bunard converted 270 CIDG out of 299 assigned and Minh Thanh converted 362 of 422 assigned CIDG.

(c) Remaining CIDG camps scheduled to convert as part of Phasedown in FY 70 are Plateau Gi and Whon Co in II CTZ and Duc Phong in III CTZ all of which will convert on 31 May 70.

(d) On 1 March elements of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Mobile Strike Force Commands entered the conversion cycle. MSF conversion plans call for the formation of the following RF companies and Group HQ's: II CTZ - 7 RF companies, 3 Gp HQ's, 918 RF spaces; III CTZ - 7 RF companies, 2 Gp HQ's, 899 RF spaces; IV CTZ - 4 RF companies, 1 Gp HQ's, 511 RF spaces.

(2) MTOE: A modified TOE Concept Plan was submitted to COMUSMACV: ATTN: J3-033, 16 Dec 69 to reorganize 5th SFGA in accordance with the draft revision of TOE 31G (Army 75). Presently this HQ's is awaiting DA approval/disapproval for the proposed TOE which is expected some time after July 70.

(3) USASF Space Reductions: In support of Phase III Redeployment (Keystone Blue Jay), 5th SFGA reduced its authorized and assigned personnel strength to 3,080 USASF. Concurrently, with this 400 man drawdown, Detachment B-57 assets were reassigned to the 525th MI Group thereby reducing this HQ's authorized strength to 3,040 USASF.

(4) Table of Allowance: During the reporting period C Detachment Commanders submitted modifications requests to TA 1-70 based on the special requirements for camp equipment and supplies of each CIDG location. These modifications were in part approved by this HQ's thereby establishing authorization for stockage of camp supplies and equipment.

(5) CIDG Force Developments:

(a) SFOB Security Company - The TOE for the 93 man SFOB Security Company received final approval and was bilingually published.

(b) POLWAR Reorganization: The countrywide 608 POLWAR spaces were reorganized into the following configuration. Each A, B and C Detachment is authorized an eleven (11) man POLWAR team. Also included in this reorganization is a twenty man CIDG Culture Drama Team, a ten man CIDG Motivation
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

and Indoctrination Team and a six man CIDG Editorial Staff all assigned to the VNSF/HC. Bilingual TOE's published 23 Apr 70 are in the process of being disseminated to the field. It should be noted that this reorganization causes the standard authorized strength of a CIDG "A" camp to be reduced from 530 to 525 CIDG.

(6) CIDG Strength Authorization: Based upon C Detachment Commanders request to modify CIDG strength authorizations to meet specific operational requirements of CIDG camps, a directive was prepared incorporating field input. Formerly this directive was entitled "CIDG Strength Reduction." Presently it has been concurred in by VNSF/HC and is awaiting the CO's approval.

(7) Relocation of Bu Prang: Construction of New Bu Prang began on 28 Jan 70 and continued throughout the reporting period. Location of the new camp is T680495 or about 17 KM's to the southeast of the original camp. By close of April, forty four (44) percent of the personnel and equipment had been relocated to the new site.

(8) I CTZ (Company C) Current Plans/Concepts:

(a) Effective 2 March 1970 the majority of the CIDG TAORs in the I CTZ were expanded to place more of the populated and agricultural areas under control of the GVN.

(b) As it has been a common practice in the past for the NVA/VC units to use established military and political boundaries for infiltration and staging areas. A concentrated effort has been made to conduct offensive operations in these newly aquired areas, as well as extending operations past previously established borders. Maximum use of helicopter assets available has been used to insert CIDG and KF troops into these areas.

(c) FWNAF units in the I CTZ have willingly granted AO extensions to the CIDG for these border operations, especially the areas to the west of the camp TAORs, which are normally part of the Reconnaissance zone.

(d) The Americal Division, whose operational area encompasses the 5 southern camps in I CTZ has expressed concern over the expanded TAORs. The Division apparently feels the expanded CIDG TAORs have restricted their control of key terrain and maneuver area along the western edges of their TAOR. The Americal Division has requested XXIV Corps to have the CIDG TAOR eastern boundaries returned to their original configuration. Company C is presently completing its reply to this request, and is basically requesting further expansion of the CIDG TAORs.

(e) Miscellaneous: During the reporting period coordination was made with XXIV Corps Artillery and I Corps Artillery to establish further training programs for the CIDG Artillery program. It has been recommended that future training also include VNSF as well as CIDG. ARVN CORPS Artillery has Training teams that travel to ARVN Artillery battalions and batteries in the CTZ to conduct evaluations of the batteries and to conduct training. Coordination is presently being effected to have one of these teams go to Thuong Duc (A-109) to conduct joint training for the CIDG, VNSF, and USAASF. It is planned to have each camp in the CTZ send two CIDG, one
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VNSF and one USASF to attend the training. Since the training will be given by the ARVN, an interpreter will only be needed for the USASF, who already have a basic knowledge of Artillery procedures and it is felt the VNSF and CIDG will be more receptive to instruction being presented by the ARVN.

(9) III CTZ (Company B) Current Plans/Concepts:

(a) Two camps are processing for conversion to RF: Camps Nhon Co and Plateau G1, which convert on 31 May 70.

(b) The 2d Mobile Strike Force Command has the 2d Bn, 3d Bn and HQs and Service Company standing down for processing and conversion to RF, to be completed 30 June.

(c) The 1st MSF Recon Company was disbanded during the reporting period and personnel integrated into the 1st Bn.

(d) There were no major problem areas during the conversion of Camp An Lac on 31 Mar 70.

(10) III CTZ (Company A) Current Plans/Concepts:

(a) Since the last reporting period, emphasis has been placed on conducting platoon sized operations, with company on standby for reinforcement in the III CTZ. Platoon size operations are able to cover a larger area and this has been an effective countermeasure to the increased enemy infiltration. Past efforts to increase the intelligence gathering capabilities of CIDG forces has begun to be productive and the immediate reaction to this intelligence has been beneficial. This will continue to be a point of particular emphasis. During this reporting period the USASF has turned over the responsibility of requesting and directing all air support in III CTZ to the VNSF. This is taking place at all levels and requests for Preplanned Airstrikes, Immediate Airstrikes and assault helicopter companies are strictly a VNSF function with the USASF acting in an advisory capacity.

(b) As in the past, this HQ's continues planning and directing, as necessary, combat operations of subordinate B detachments in support of Corps objectives. B detachments in coordination with their VN counterparts, continue to assist the A detachment in conducting offensive operations. In recent months this has been to a limited extent as the A detachment continues to accept more of the responsibilities for planning and conducting offensive operations. Of particular note is the role that the VN commanders are playing in the conversion of A teams to RF/FF. Almost all the problems of conversion are handled at A detachment level and only logistical support is required of the higher detachments.

(c) Long Range Plans/Concepts. This headquarters has followed and will continue to follow the assigned missions outlined in the Combined Campaign Plan 1970. At this time we are planning more platoon size operations composed of only VNSF and CIDG, in order to prepare them for the turnover of responsibility and equipment.

(11) IV CTZ (Company D) Current Plans/Concepts: During the reporting period
the phasedown program progressed at a satisfactory rate. Four interior camps have been converted, they are Camps My Da, Kinh Quan II, My Phuoc Tay and My Dien II. Under the current plan we are in the process of converting A-401 and A-403 (IV Corps MSF) to RF. The disposition of Camp Don Phuc is still unknown, while the Can Tho facility (Camp Roger L. Brown, Detachment B-40 compound) will be utilized by the 42nd Ranger Battalion. Problem areas encountered were a lack of suitable motivation and indoctrination program and a failure by Kien Phong Province to properly process and document the MSF and their dependents. Province has primary responsibility for processing these records and problems will arise if it is not completed in a timely manner. The MSF soldier converting to RF has many doubts about his future. If adequate indoctrination and processing is not provided these MSF soldiers will probably leave the program in greater numbers than is acceptable. (12) Project Delta Current Plans/Concepts: The Bomb Damage Assessment Platoon was re-evaluated and reorganized to become a Strike Recondo Platoon. The 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion will continue to perfect the employment of platoon size, one day point reconnaissance type missions began during Operation SABRE & SPURS. An enthusiastic Vietnamization program for PROJECT DELTA continues at this time. (13) Detachment B-55, 5th Mobile Strike Force Command Current Plans/Concepts: (a) A vigorous recruiting program was undertaken to offset losses sustained during the past month. The result was 109 recruits, many with prior experience. At present a training program is being established which will utilize the indigenous capabilities of 5th MSFC to effect proper training of new personnel. MSF operations will continue, and upon completion of training the new personnel will be integrated into existing understrength units. (b) VNSF Force Structure: Det B-22, VNSF, continues under current TOE. Approval has been given by CG, VNSF, to increase personnel strength of B-22 to that authorized by their TOE. The present strength level severely hampers the VNSF capability to parallel the activities of their Det B-55 counterparts.
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e. Training:

(1) Combat Orientation Course:

(a) The program of instruction for the COC was slightly modified to meet the replacement training requirements by USAVV and the needs of the unit. Added to the program of instruction was training in counterrapper techniques, additional land navigation, and M-2 carbine training. As a result of the recent phasedown and low number of incoming replacement personnel, the CJC was granted two weeks for maintenance and refitting of training areas and facilities. During the reporting period the CJC trained 295 US personnel assigned to 5th SFAB.

(b) The following is a breakdown of students for classes 30-70 through 39-70:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CJC Classes</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>C/J/P</th>
</tr>
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<td>32-70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-70</td>
<td>12 Apr to 19 Apr 70</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39-70</td>
<td>19 Apr to 26 Apr 70</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) MACV Recondo School:

(a) The mission of the MACV Recondo School is to train selected personnel from US/FARF units in specialized techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operations in Vietnam.

(b) During the reporting period the MACV Recondo School trained 205
students from US/FWMAF units. During the reporting period, classes R-10-70 through R-13-70 have graduated. The following is a breakdown of students by unit:

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<thead>
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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ENTR</th>
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</table>
(3) Company A:

(a) The III CTZ CIDG Training Center at Det A-301 Trang Sup, continues to provide basic and refresher infantry training and basic artillery training on a Corps wide basis to all CIDG personnel. Most of the CIDG personnel receiving the infantry training have had previous training of varying degrees and for this reason a great deal of the more elementary training has been deleted from the training schedule. As a result more time and emphasis is being placed on squad and platoon tactics and crew served weapons familiarization. The third and last CIDG artillery class will graduate on 5 May. CIDG artillery totalling 14 howitzers will then be located in the seven border camps in III CTZ. Plans are being made at this time to send the heavy weapons specialist from each of these seven camps to the IPFV Artillery one week familiarization course on the 105 mm howitzer. This training will enable the camps to better utilize and maintain the howitzers.

(b) During the reporting period, the following recruits received training at the Training Center:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAINING CO</th>
<th>GRADUATION DATE</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>GAINING UNIT</th>
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<td>92nd Co</td>
<td>3 February</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>THIEN HOU</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KATUH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DUC HUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TRANG SUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93rd Co</td>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>DUC HUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Co</td>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>LOC NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th Co</td>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>RU DAP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The CIDG hospital at Bien Hoa continues to give medical training. At this time twenty one CIDG medics have received basic company medic training and 26 civilians are receiving nurse training. Both courses are twelve week in duration. A six week preventive medicine course was also given at Trang Sup. The 21 students graduated on 3 April.

(4) Company B:

(a) A training program consisting mainly of marksmanship was conducted by all detachments. This was an effort to upgrade the quality of the individual soldier being deployed on operations.
(b) A Mobile Training Team consisting of artillery personnel visited camps in the 6-23 area, providing instruction to US and CSF personnel. The CSF were quick to respond to this instruction and the proficiency of the heavy weapons sections improved.

(c) Company B Training Center has conducted refresher training for three companies from Camps Plei He, Plei Klang, and Tieu Avar. Dependent on the tactical situation, additional companies will be trained during the next reporting period.

(5) Company C:

(a) During the reporting period Co C has continued to conduct basic combat training for CLIQ at the I CTZ Training Center at Ba To. Subsequent training at Ba To will be limited to refresher training for CLIQ company size units. The first course is scheduled to begin on 7 May with a company from A-107. The following is a breakdown of CLIQ recruits trained at Ba To:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruit</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-101</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-102</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-103</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-104</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-105</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-106</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-107</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-108</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The Co C 2nd echelon maintenance Course conducted at Ba Hang graduated six CLIQ on 14 March. Another class is currently in progress with 41 students and is expected to graduate 13 June.

(6) Company D: Training at Co D includes: generator operator and maintenance course and airboat training. CLIQ assigned to the Airboat Company are currently undergoing an extensive training program in preparation for combat operations. The main objective is to include the VNSF in the training program. The airboat training includes capabilities, tactics, driving, communications and maintenance.

(7) Detachment B-51:

(a) Again this quarter, emphasis was placed on the quality of instruction.
being presented at the Vietnamese Special Forces Training Center. The policy of assigning various officers and non-commissioned officers to monitor certain periods of instruction has continued. Additionally, one non-commissioned officer has been assigned each day to the Combat Reconnaissance Platoon, CIDG Leadership, and CIDG Basic Aidman Courses, and monitors that entire day of training. At the end of each week, a weekly monitor report is prepared for the Commander of the VNSF Training Center; G-3, 5th Special Forces Group; G-3, Vietnamese Special Forces High Command; and CO, Detachment D-51.

(b) Work has continued on the upgrading and improvement of the compass course and demolition range. During the reporting period an obstacle course was completed.

(c) USASF personnel are currently revising and updating programs of instruction for the VNSF and CIDG courses presented at the training center.

(d) During the reporting period the CIDG Basic Aidman Course was established. The course was designed to train CIDG medics in the medical skills and techniques which they will utilize during combat operations.

(e) The following is a list of courses graduated or in progress during the reporting period:

**COURSES GRADUATED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>GRAD DATE</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st CIDG Combat Interpreter</td>
<td>17 Feb 70</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd VNSF Medical Specialist (Basic Aidman)</td>
<td>25 Feb 70</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Tae Kwon Do</td>
<td>11 Apr 70</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Mobile Strike Force Refresher</td>
<td>11 Mar 70</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th CIDG Basic Airborne</td>
<td>11 Apr 70</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th VNSF Basic Airborne</td>
<td>11 Mar 70</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th USASF Basic Airborne</td>
<td>11 Mar 70</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12nd Combat Reconnaissance Platoon</td>
<td>3 Apr 70</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3rd CIDG Leadership</td>
<td>10 Apr 70</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COURSES IN PROGRESS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>STARTING DATE</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st CIDG Basic Aidman</td>
<td>2 Mar 70</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COURSES</td>
<td>STARTING DATE</td>
<td>STUDENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd CIDG Combat Interpreter</td>
<td>30 Mar 70</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Taekwondo</td>
<td>6 Apr 70</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th VNSF Radio Operators</td>
<td>24 Nov 70</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th VNSF Basic Airborne</td>
<td>20 Apr 70</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th VNSF Officer and NCO Basic</td>
<td>2 Mar 70</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43rd Combat Reconnaissance Platoon</td>
<td>23 Apr 70</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th CIDG Leadership</td>
<td>23 Apr 70</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (TFN) for Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSWR-65 (R2)

Combat Developments:

1. Acoustic Azimuth Locator: The Acoustic Azimuth Locator is an enemy mortar locator device, deployed to Ba Xoai. The system is made up of five locators and one Telemetry Display Module. Each locator consists of a four-microphone array, an azimuth processor box, a battery rack and interconnecting cables. Army Concert Team, Vietnam (ACTIV) is providing 5 support personnel trained in sound ranging techniques for the evaluation period. During the first 9 day period the locator picked up 20,000 readouts. This problem is caused by the microphones picking up friendly mortar and artillery sounds. During this same period out of nine enemy mortar attacks readout azimuths were given for five. Evaluation of this item continues.

2. Spot Point Sight: The 5th Group has begun evaluation on the Spot Point Sight. With the Spot Point Sight, the weapon is brought to the shoulder, with one eye behind the sight, and with both eyes open, the firer looks at the target. The view of the right eye is a shot at infinity and the immediate area surrounding the target. Where the view of the left eye is not obscured by the sight can see the target, so when both eyes are used these two visions merge into a single picture. From within the sight a bright dot anchors. The firer need only superimpose this dot on the target and fire.

3. Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector (PSID): The 5th Group has received its first issue of PS ID's, on the 10th of March. SFC Duncan, 5/52, J-3-O4 (Huevelnam) instructed representatives from 53, 552, 555 and COC in the employment of the PSID. Basis of issue was 12 to B52, 9 to B55 and 2 to COC to be used for instructional purposes. Additional PSID sets should arrive during the next quarter and be issued to the companies.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RGF CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. Aviation:

(1) Army Aviation Support: Army aircraft for command support continue to be in short supply at the C-Detachment and P-Detachment level. C Company at DANANG receives two UH-1's to support two P-Detachments and nine A-Detachments. D Company at PLEIKU receives two UH-1's daily to support fourteen A-Detachments and two P-Detachments. A Company at RIEN HQA receives two UH-1's to support ten A-Detachments and three B-Detachments. D Company at CAN THO receives two UH-1's to support eight A-Detachments and two P-Detachments. Dedicated helicopter support is in extremely short supply. Additional helicopter support on a mission basis is extremely difficult to obtain in all CTZ's. Support for the 5th SFGA commander and staff when visiting 1, 3, and TV Corps is taken from the C-Detachment’s dedicated resources and is very disruptive to their utilization schedules.

(2) Tactical Airlift Support:

(a) The airlift support provided to 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) units has remained highly satisfactory during this period. The C-7A dedicated resources remain a major asset to the logistical requirements of Special Forces units. The number of dedicated C-7A aircraft for 5th SFGA will be reduced by one aircraft during May. This is in keeping with the reduced number of A-Detachments and C-7A assets available to the US Air Force. Further reductions of dedicated C-7A aircraft in the future are to be expected.

(b) The working arrangement of C-123 aircraft being routed through SFOB enroute to A Company locations with fresh food supplies has been satisfactory. This occurs 5 days each week and is adequate for the required lift.

(c) 5th SFGA detachments have experienced some turbulence in requesting transportation for their unit deployments and redeployments. This was caused, in great part, by a change which brought the Vietnamese High Command staff into the airlift request channel for the first time. By continual monitoring and guidance the problem have been reduced in both frequency and magnitude. Much emphasis has been placed on the proper methods and channels to submit airlift requests, both normal and emergency.

(3) Tactical Air Support: The USAF has attached forward air controllers assigned to Special Forces down to Special Forces C-Detachment (CTZ) level, and sector FAC’s operating out of their associated provinces, providing FAC capability down to P-Detachment level. FAC support has greatly improved in the following areas: VR’s of operating areas, familiarization by both CDO elements and FAC’s with each other’s operational techniques, and routine FAC assistance in such areas as air cover, reconnaissance, radio relay and navigational guidance for long range offensive operations. Immediate FAC air support for CDO elements in contact has been generally outstanding, effective and highly responsive to tactical requirements. Preplanned airstrikes and combat skystops have been flown about 60% of the time, with wide variations existing among the Corps Tactical Zone.
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AVOB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(4) I Corps Tactical Zone (Co C)

(a) Army Aviation Support: The major problem encountered was an insufficient number of aircraft to satisfy the support requirements of subordinate detachments. The need for numerous CC missions resulted in the usual voluminous backlog of personnel and material to be moved. Utilization for resupply aircraft scheduled by S4 Air on a space available basis enabled the S3 Air to satisfy the basic requirements, but, on numerous occasions, special requirements (ie, CC for Combat Assault Operations) could not be met. It is strongly recommended that an additional UH-1H, or at least an OH-6 or CH-58, be made available to this headquarters on a dedicated basis.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: Requests for movement of large numbers of troops were submitted through T Corps G3 Air for fixed wing assets (C-123, C-130) and through XVII Corps Aviation for heavy helicopters (CH-53, CH-47). Heavy lift helicopters were depended upon to a larger extent than in the past reporting Period due to closing of various airstrips for repair/improvement. During the reporting period 1327 personnel were moved by fixed-wing aircraft to include C-74, and 641 were moved by heavy helicopters. Requests for UH-1D lift ships and gunships for combat assault operations were requested initially through ARVN channels to I Corps, and were requested again through US channels to XVII Corps when WNAF assets were not available. Figures for the entire reporting period are not available; however, during the month of April, five (5) combat assault operations, involving approximately 830 personnel, were conducted.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: As in the last quarter, all requests for tactical fighter support were submitted initially to WNAF through T Corps G3 Air. Approximately 20% of all airstrikes were flown by TACP. Nine (9) new AN/PPT-18 Beacon transponder units were issued to C Company on 26 April and will provide all A-Detachments with a Beacon bombing capability. In addition, four of them will replace the obsolete SCT-122/KU models at A-105, 106 and 109.

(5) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B)

(a) Army Aviation Support: Army aviation assets proved extremely adequate for the camps under siege in the N-2K area. However, with first priority going to the besieged camps other operations and units with lighter enemy contacts often lacked support.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: Tactical airlift support was excellent with all missions being flown as scheduled. Over 750,000 pounds of cargo were air dropped to Camps DAK STING and DAK PEAR, with DAK STING receiving their drops at night.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: Tactical fighter support was outstanding. Camp DAK STING had immediate air strike capability during the reporting period with as many as 120 air strikes being used in one day.
AVNID-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

(6) III Corps Tactical Zone (Co A)

(a) Army Aviation Support: During this reporting period the control of all ARVN and LIMA helicopter assets to include dedicated aircraft and air assault companies was given to III Corps Headquarters. Since this has happened, this headquarters has had no success whatsoever in requesting additional aircraft on a day to day basis. As an example, III Corps Headquarters could make no additional helicopters available for BG Phu or COL Healy during their latest staff visit. As a result, this headquarters is forced to utilize its own Q/C and on occasion, a Q/C helicopter from the 3d MSFC to escort visitors throughout III Corps. It is rare however that the missions of visitors coincide with the priorities of Company A.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: This headquarters receives two C-7A aircraft on daily basis and one C-123 aircraft five days a week. These aircraft are supplied to Company A from the 83rd Air Division through TITV.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: With the exception of PROJECT DELTA which receive no fighter support while working in TITZ CTZ, all Special Forces camps and operations to include the 3d MSFC, received TNAF air support. Of 303 missions requested during the reporting period, a total of 261 were flown against preplanned targets. Of these totals however, 174 out of 179 requested were flown during the first month of the reporting period. Since the first of March, preplan requests have decreased appreciably. This can be attributed to the standdown of the 3d MSFC and decrease in enemy activity in III Corps during the month of March. TNAF tactical air support continues for the most part to remain outstanding.

(7) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B)

(a) Army Aviation Support: Army aviation support during the reporting period was provided by the 128th Assault Helicopter Company for Operations 1-70 and 2-70. Six WH-54 and four WH-65 helicopters were allocated to support PROJECT DELTA.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: Tactical airlift support for the period was routine with no major problems.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: Tactical fighter support for the period was...
satisfactory with respect to elapsed time and ordnance delivery. AC-119K (Stinger and Shadow) were again used for further air support. These radar equipped aircraft have side-firing mini-guns and 20mm Gatling guns, for close support.

(9) II Corps Tactical Zone (B-55).

(a) Army Aviation Support: Army aviation support during this reporting period has generally been very good. Aviation units apparently provide as much as possible within the limits of aircraft availability. Support from Navy gunships at Operation SEAFLOAT in TV CTZ was termed excellent in timeliness and accuracy by troops on the ground. Support from Army Cobras during operation ENTREPID in TV CTZ was deemed best overall air support, especially in terms of accuracy. A problem was noted with the TV CTZ "Cav-Pack" concept wherein a number of aircraft must be employed as a unit rather than in types and numbers needed for particular missions.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: Due to the nature of its mission, 5th M7C makes constant use of Air Force aircraft for major movements of men and material. Overall support has been excellent and air movements have run smoothly. This is partly attributed to the cooperation, personal interest, and efforts of the 5th SFPA TALO.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: Navy "Black Pony" aircraft were utilized extensively for Operation SEAFLOAT in IV CTZ. This support was described as being excellent with rapid response and good accuracy. Air Force TAC Air was not often called upon because other air assets were more readily available and support from the other assets was unusually adequate. When heavy resistance was met on NII KHE (Operation ENTREPID) in IV CTZ, numerous missions were requested; however, only two strikes were actually received. Though they were helpful they were considered inadequate under the circumstances. It was felt that total friendly casualties could have been significantly reduced had additional air strikes been received.
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AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RG3 CSFOR-65 (R2)

h. Logistics

(1) Supply

(a) The average number of personnel supported during the period 1 February to 30 April 1970 was:

USASF - 2,527
CSF - 22,535
MSF - 7,524

(b) During April the ISC Supply and Maintenance facilities provided increased support to Company B for combat actions at Dak Seang and Dak Pek. This included assorted medical supplies, various caliber arms and ammunition, protective masks, radios, generators, plastic water cans, fatigues, boots, armored vests, large quantities of air items, and miscellaneous small items. A policy was established on the issue and use of protective masks. All USASF personnel will have a protective mask assigned, fitted, and tested. VNSF personnel and all CIDG - both CSF and MSF will not be assigned protective masks. Experience proves that such assignment only results in the loss or damage of the masks and denies their availability to the CIDG when actually needed. A sufficient quantity of masks in appropriate sizes has been provided to each CTZ. These masks will be maintained at the FSP until the tactical situation dictates their use. Immediately following the emergency the masks will be recovered to the FSP and prepared for the next contingency.

(c) Local purchases during the 3 month period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Feb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>$ 0</td>
<td>$ 615.26</td>
<td>$258.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Purchase</td>
<td>$11,584.75</td>
<td>$4,513.49</td>
<td>$2,129.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$11,584.75</td>
<td>$5,128.75</td>
<td>$258.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Maintenance:

(a) The percentage of deadline equipment for the reporting period was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Feb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served Weapons</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forklifts</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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AVOB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS GSFOR-65 (R2)

(b) A country wide shortage of injection pumps and magnetic amplifiers for generators was a major factor for down time in generators throughout the 5th SFGA. These items are not available in-country and must be procured from CONUS through CISO. The average lead time has been 90-120 days.

(c) A shortage of batteries for 1/4 and 3/4 ton vehicles and a shortage of brake shoes for 3/4 ton vehicles were major factors in down-time for vehicles. These items have been in a shortage during the entire period, and the 1st Logistic Command has cancelled all requisitions submitted. Again requisitions have been placed on CISO in efforts to obtain these critical items.

(3) Movements: The conversion of CIDG Camp A-234 An Lac on 31 March has resulted in a small decrease of Airland total. This camp received direct re-supply by air from the LSC. Cargo moved in short tons during the period from the LSC was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>April</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airland</td>
<td>1,494.4</td>
<td>1,963.1</td>
<td>1,582.1</td>
<td>5,039.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airdrop</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Convoy</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>133.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealift</td>
<td>1,060.7</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,165.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,546.8</td>
<td>2,189.3</td>
<td>1,668.4</td>
<td>6,404.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The Property Disposal Facilities operated by the 1st Log Cmd in Nha Trang were closed. Due to this closure a property disposal collection point was established within the LSC. After classification, all salvage property is transported to Cam Ranh Bay Army Depot for disposal.

(5) The Group Maintenance Officer has implemented a new density report for ordnance and engine equipment to reflect the current status of equipment on hand and deadlined at each Forward Supply Point. The purpose of this report is to manage repair parts distribution and reduce EDP time.

(6) On 1 March the 5th SFGA initiated action to phase-in operations with the ARVN Terminal Command at the Nha Trang Outport facilities. The purpose of this action was to establish coordination and identify problem areas in making the transition from the Alaska Barge and Transport Co (Civilian Contractor) prior to the ARVN Terminal Command assuming complete operational control of the Nha Trang Outport on 1 July 1970.

(7) I Corps Tactical Zone: (Company C)

(a) Supply: This FSP supports 4079 CSF, 699 MSF, and 268 US personal for a total of 5046 troops. Supply emphasis has been on maintaining an adequate
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Basic load of all classes of supplies and eliminating all excess items of equipment at each detachment. The FSP has received an excessive quantity of rice and each detachment has been selling rice to CIDG dependents to alleviate the storage problem. FL supply has been adequate but there has been a delay in the arrival of prog.-med shipments of canned mackerel.
PCL supply has been adequate. Ammunition supply has been reduced considerably due to monetary limitation recently placed on the drawing of ammunition. Other supply categories are adequate with only temporary or minor problem areas. The Naval Support Activity Depot is phasing out and has already turned over many classes of supply to the Army's 1st Logistical Command. POL in bulk (55 gallon drum) is now provided through the army.

(b) Maintenance: The vehicle deadline rate remained fairly consistent at about 5%. The primary problem area is evacuating vehicles back from A Detachments and transporting contact teams to the A-Detachments. Jeep engines and water pumps for 3/4 ton trucks are still in short supply. MHE deadline rate dropped to slightly below 3%. The generator deadline rate rose to about 18% and is expected to rise higher. The primary problem area is lack of repair parts for the Libby 10 kW generator.

(c) Cargo Movements: Increased land transportation is being utilized, however, only one A-Detachment and one B-Detachment can receive convoys on a routine basis. HA THANH is having extensive repair work on their airstrip and all supplies are being airdropped or delivered by CH-47. MAI LOC is closed for C-123 aircraft and will close to C-7A aircraft within the coming calendar quarter. The American Division will be running weekly convoys to MAI LOC and will allocate trucks for the A-Detachment's resupplies. Cargo moved from the FSP in short tons during the reporting period was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airland</td>
<td>2,564.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airdrop</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>368.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealift</td>
<td>162.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,357.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFCR-65 (R2)

(d) Services: The FSP Maintenance Facility conducted the third of a series of courses for CIDO vehicle and generator mechanics for improving camp maintenance posture. A fourth class is scheduled which will be a higher level skill training for graduates of the first three courses. A notable decline in requests for contact teams has been experienced in camps. The 85th Maintenance Company of the Da Nang Support Command has sent, and has programmed again, a weapons repair contact team to all camps to inspect all howitzers, mortars, recoilless rifles, and any other weapons the camp needs to have repaired. This team has been very successful and brings parts and manuals with them for use on site.

(e) Change in Support: With the imminent closing of the NSA Depot, the FSP is planning and programming for increased logistical support from LSC and the 1st Logistical Command. This should not have any effect below FSP level.

(f) Facility Improvements: The FSP completed construction of a new and larger ready-line shed which should increase efficiency of operations between the supply and movements sections. The Maintenance Facility consolidated the Parts Room and Tool Room to reduce personnel requirements. The Maintenance Facility also separated the Motor Pool area from the Maintenance Area to facilitate operations in each area. The lumber yard and outside storage areas have been completely rewarehoused for efficiency.

(8) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B)

(a) Supply: During the reporting period, Company provided logistical support to 11 A Detachments and three B Detachments. This was accomplished by maximum utilization of available aircraft and truck convoys to camps Plei Djereng, Plei Me, Duc Co, Plei Mrong, and Ben Het. Convoys were run to the cities of Kontum, Nha Trang and Qui Nhon. Local purchases averaged VN $ 200 per man for the period.

(b) Maintenance: Maintenance Liaison visits: Sixty visits to A and B Detachments were conducted during the reporting period. Purpose of the visits was to conduct emergency repairs and scheduled preventive maintenance. In the area of Support Maintenance seventy-eight pieces of engineer equipment, sixty-seven pieces of refrigeration equipment and twenty-nine trucks were overhauled and/or repaired. Thirty-seven CIDO received training in maintenance of generators and vehicles. Emphasis was placed on daily maintenance being the key to preventing costly repairs due to neglect of the operator or mechanic. Three foot circular signs were posted throughout the FSP. These are safety signs printed both in English and Vietnamese. The results are better and more courteous drivers and safer conduct by all concerned. An A-frame previously used to pull engines was reinforced for the safety of the maintenance personnel in the motor pool. A special project utilizing two unserviceable 24 ton truck
becks and a 5 ton truck were put together to make a suitable truck to transport employees to and from work. Another project was the construction of a block machine which is capable of producing 1,000 cement blocks a day.

(c) Movements: The only problem encountered during the reporting period was enemy anti-aircraft fire around Camp Dak Seang. Weather during the period was generally good. The following amounts of cargo were moved during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Airland</th>
<th>Airdrop</th>
<th>Convoy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1,811,860 lbs</td>
<td>2,900 lbs</td>
<td>48,364 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2,068,179 lbs</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>521,971 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1,886,399 lbs</td>
<td>718,794 lbs</td>
<td>50,191 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Services: Logistical support of all class I through V are provided from the FSP Pleiku. The maintenance section, with contact teams from the 62nd Maintenance Battalion and Filipino Technical Representatives assigned to Company B, is responsive to all levels requiring maintenance support.

(e) Shortages: The following items were in demand and not available in quantity required; treated timbers, light bulbs, office supplies, and air conditioner parts.

(f) Planned Improvements: Future plans included the completion of asphalting the warehouse area. This area becomes mire during the rainy season, hampering the efficiency of the fork lifts. Revetments in the class V yard are being built and will be completed during the next reporting period.

(9) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A)

(a) Supply: The FSP at Co A support an average of 379 US personnel assigned and attached to the 5th SFGA, 1,975 CIDG in 3rd MSPC Long Hai, and 5,000 CSF deployed throughout III CTZ. A Special Operation was conducted in III CTZ by Project Delta (B-52) which required logistical support from Company A FSP. This support of all classes of supplies was charged to B-52
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-6S (R2)

through LSC. The 3rd MSF conducted operations out of Rang Rang, which required additional support from the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion. This included JP-4 and rockets, which were transported by the FSP Air Movement Section.

(b) Maintenance: The deadline rate continues to be high for Libby 10KW generators and Hotpoint Porta-Cool air conditioners due to the non-availability of parts. Non-standard equipment such as the above should not be used in a combat zone if the repair parts cannot be delivered by the manufacturer. New or rebuilt 1/4 ton engines, transmissions and differentials are still not available through supply channels. This has resulted in a high deadline rate for 1/4 ton trucks.

(c) Air Movements: This headquarters receives two C-7A aircraft daily. These are supplied by the 834th Air Division through II Field Force Vietnam. The majority of troops moved by Company A throughout the III CTZ assigned to the 3rd Mobile Strike Force Command. During the reporting period, a total of 3,897 passengers were moved in 893 sorties. This includes the transport of only the Forward Operational Base and three Battalions assigned to the 3rd Mobile Strike Force Command.

(10) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D)

(a) Supply: During this reporting period the S-4 Section supported the following number of personnel: 315 USASF, 5,849 CSF, and 1,705 MSF. In addition logistical support was provided for S-55 in operations with Sea Float and B-40.

(b) Maintenance: During the month of March, 12 CIDG soldiers were graduated from the Generator Operator Course which makes a total of 52 CIDG soldiers trained as generator operators by the S-4 Section. On 27 April, Generator Repairman Course was started. This is a six week course which will train generator operators in third and fourth echelon maintenance. Daily motor stables using ECCI technicians have been implemented in addition to the previous PM schedules. Deadline equipment is listed below by type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3- 3/4 Ton Trucks for Backload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHE</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>1- 10,000 lb for Backload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>1- 30 KW for Backload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Conditioner</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Pump &amp; Sampen</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outboard Motor</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airboat</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-05 (R2)

REMARKS:

The above deadline equipment is repairable except for the equipment as indicated in the remarks column. The above equipment was backlogged due to non-availability of repair parts.

(c) Movements: The following tonnage of supplies were moved during this reporting period.

1. Airland 1,963 Tons
2. Airdrop 80 Tons
3. Convoy 416 Tons
4. Other 0 Tons
5. Total Tonnage 2,459 Tons

(d) Service: Local Class III support is provided by the 547th S&S Co. Their support is outstanding. They always meet our demands. Local Class V support is provided by the 5th Ammo Base Depot. During the month of April they have not been able to meet all of our ammunition requirements and on several occasions we have had to requisition from LSC.

(11) B-55 (5th Mobile Strike Force)

(a) Supply: During the quarter, this Detachment supported an average of 1,390 Mobile Strike Force Troops, and 74 USAF personnel. Two combat operations of battalion size were supported during the quarter. Most significant of these was operation INTREPID, in the 41st STZ, during March and April. The battalion deployed with sufficient equipment to sustain them for 10 days operations, after which logistical support was rendered through the OPCON headquarters, Co D, 5th SFGA. Ten company-size operations were supported during the reporting period, the most significant of which was operation SEA FLOAT, a joint operation with US Navy elements in the southern reaches of IV CTZ. This operation extended over the entire quarter, and is still in progress. Logistical support has been provided throughout the operation directly from this headquarters. Rotation of the companies every 15 days has enabled operational units to deploy with sufficient supplies to sustain themselves over the entire 15 day period in most cases. Only a small amount of items were purchased through the Post Exchange facilities.

(b) Maintenance: Few problems have been encountered in the maintenance of equipment, due largely to the efforts of the ECCI technical representatives, and command emphasis on maintenance of equipment, with particular emphasis on generators. During operation INTREPID, some technical problems were encountered with the two 3/4 ton trucks which were deployed to Chi Lang; however, this problem was solved by sending one of the Indigenous Civilian Mechanics to Chi Lang to repair and maintain the vehicles.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(c) Movements: A total of 128,708 pounds of supplies and equipment were moved in support of the SEAFLOAT operation and Operation INTRPVID, not including that equipment which was moved by OPCON headquarters. This equipment was moved by Air Force fixed wing aircraft either directly to the final destination, or to an intermediate airfield (as in the case of all increments of the SEAFLOAT operation). From the intermediate airfields, supplies were transported by Army CH-47 Helicopters. The strict, inflexible adherence to Air Force regulations for non-combat essential air movements, which has recently been required by the 14th Aerial Port, is placing an extremely difficult burden on the S-4 section of this detachment. Because of the necessity for loading ammunition externally on CH-47 Helicopters, it was discovered that the simplest and most effective way of preparing for this is to place slings on aluminum aircraft cargo pallets (System 463L), and to load the equipment into the slings. Then at the intermediate airfield, when the cargo is transferred from fixed wing to rotary wing aircraft, the sling can be lifted directly off the pallet on which it was initially shipped. When C7A Aircraft are utilized, the solution is to place the container on wooden "skid" pallets.

(d) Services: The S-4 Section, B-55, was able to provide 53, 5th SFGA, with planning data for the resupply of a classified operation to be conducted by a sister detachment. This detachment was able to provide some assistance to Detachment B-43 in improving camp defenses, in moving supplies, etc. In addition, backloading was kept to a minimum by leaving excess ammunition with the detachment at Chi Lang when B-55 was redeploying to Nha Trang.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS GSFOR-65 (R2)

1. Engineer.
   (1) Organization: N/A.
   (2) Construction & Rehabilitation: There were 135-906 projects underway at the end of the reporting period. The majority of these projects are well underway. 31 May is the projected completion date for all outstanding projects and there are no new projects programmed at this time.
   (3) Well Drilling Operations: Wells have been completed at Ba Xoai (A-221), To Chau (A-263), Katum (A-322) and Thien hgon (A-323) during the reporting period. Wells are underway at Ben Het (A-244) and Bu Prang (A-236) at this time. Future wells are planned at Bien Hoa (C-3) and Dak Pak (A-242).
   (4) Budgeting and Funding: N/A.
   (5) Post Engineers: R&I and maintenance of existing facilities is being increased to a maximum effort in view of the reduction in new construction. Power supply in many camps is still being hampered by unauthorized utilities and improper installation of generators and wiring. This is checked continually by the various Staff Engineers out camps continue to accomplish the unauthorized installations.
   (6) Miscellaneous: Transportation of materials continues to be a problem in II and IV Corps with IV Corps being the hardest hit. The Air Force will not fly material from the LSC to D Company leaving only barge traffic available. D Company depends on Nha Trang for the bulk of its engineer supplies.
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j. Political Warfare (POLWAR)

(1) General:

(a) S5 activities have stressed the importance of achieving completion of projects utilizing GVN resources. Many Special Forces units have in the past failed to coordinate closely with GVN, CORDS and MACV agencies. It is now somewhat difficult to gain immediate support from these agencies. This problem is especially significant to those Special Forces units which are turning over converted camps to territorial security command.

(b) S5, 5th SFGA has begun to infuse the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) information report as a tool of management within the Group. Category ratings of all evaluated hamlets which lie within a 5 km radius of all A-Detachments have been prepared and processed for use by the commander. As the experience factor increases, it is expected that the HES family of reports will become a very important tool for analysis within 5th SFGA.

(c) Activities were highlighted by the staff visit of MG Flanagan from JFCENMA at Fort Bragg. Presently the Group S5 Section is preparing an in-depth staff study to appraise the 5th SFGA S5 program in RVN and to offer concrete proposals for CONUS training of prospective Civil Action Psychological Operations (CA/PO) Officers and NCO's.

(2) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)

(a) Problems in general PSYOPS orientation have been brought forth in subordinate detachment's reports. Generally, it is felt that there is too much emphasis placed upon the Chieu Hoi program at the expense of supporting the GVN 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. The importance of political mobilization to RVN must be explained to all of the civilian population, for the time is opportune to establish a viable village self development program and organize the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF). However, the population must be made aware of the importance of these programs.

(b) Concerted efforts are being made to involve VNSF S5 personnel in the preparation and planning of PSYOP missions. Coordination is being effected to tax VNAP air assets for leaflet/soundspeaker support and ARVN POLWAR Battalions for printing reproduction assistance.

(3) Motivation and Indoctrination (M&I)

(a) During March, S5, 5th SFGA compiled and distributed the first copy of its CA/PO newsletter. This media will attempt to keep subordinate elements informed and up to date with the new developments in the GVN and advisory elements, as well as to clarify current 5th SFGA policies and guidance in S5 activities.
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(b) It has come to Group SF's attention that ARVN POLWAR teams are not carrying out their responsibilities as far as conducting M&I classes for the conversion from CIDG to RF. The Group M&I officer visited several conversion sites where this was the case, and submitted reports to CO, 5th SFGA, and to MACV and ARVN officials in III CTZ.

(c) The T&E of the camp POLWAR team was changed from 16 men to 11 men, and POLWAR teams at B and C-Detachments are to be added to table of distribution.

(4) Civic Action (CA)

(a) In keeping with the overall plan of coordinating with GVN agencies, CA projects are designed to fit within the framework of GVN resources and take advantage of VSD as much as possible.

(b) Agricultural projects are now being utilized more as a vehicle of instruction rather than just a fresh food source. Large farm and animal husbandry projects at the C teams are concentrating on setting up courses of instruction for selected CIDG from camps and dependent villages surrounding Special Forces Detachments.

(5) I Corps Tactical Zone (Co C)

(a) Psychological Operations

(1) During the reporting period approximately 47,000,000 leaflets were air disseminated on suspected base areas and trails used by the enemy.

(2) During the period intelligence reports indicated that the enemy in I Corps is having great difficulty acquiring and maintaining an adequate diet. Therefore, he is severely taxing the local population to obtain supplies.

(3) Thirty seven Hoi Chans were reported by the districts surrounding I Corps Camps.

(c) Motivation and Indoctrination.

Lectures and rallies by Camp Commanders and POLWAR teams keep the CIDG informed on current events. An evening question and answer period conducted by the camp commander is effective in improving motivation.

(6) II Corps Tactical Zone (Co B)

(a) Psychological Operations

(1) Major emphasis during the reporting period has been to obtain increased district and province support for civilian communities within the Co B Tactical areas of responsibility.

(2) Increased attention has been paid to development of the
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Village Self Development program. Additionally, Special Forces S5 personnel have acted as a liaison between GVN and the local villagers in assisting to develop and train People Self Defense Forces in those villages adjacent to A-Detachments.

(b) Civic Action.

Two classes for CIDG on agriculture and animal husbandry were conducted on the Bamiu farm by S5 personnel. Subjects included crop production, soil preparation, and breeding of livestock.

(7) III CTZ (Co A)

(a) Psychological Operations.

(1) B-Detachment S5's are developing specific EBI's on enemy units operating in their respective areas. As EBI's are developed it will become easier to target specific units and insure more timely and accurate responses to their presence.

(2) Emphasis has also been placed on encouraging the VNSF S5 to assume more responsibility in the planning and execution of POLWAR efforts. The VNSF S5 Section now submits weekly leaflet/loudspeaker requests through proper channels, and recently has become more involved in leaflet design and development. This marks a significant gain over the last reporting period.

(b) Civic Action.

(1) A policy has been established of using USAF manpower, funds and expertise only after all avenues of action have been used and expended thru the Village Self Development Program and RVNAF military civic action programs.

(2) Because of a reduction in funds many non-essential CA commodity type items have been eliminated. Although the quantity of the overall civic action program was reduced, it has not effected the quality of Company A's Civic Action Program.

(8) IV CTZ (Co D)

(a) Psychological Operations.

A PSYOP campaign with primary emphasis placed upon Chieu Hoi's has been initiated in both Border Control Command Region's I and III. PSYOPS leaflets with Chieu Hoi rally maps containing designated rally points have been printed and disseminated. The PSYOP dissension campaign between the VC/NVA continues in the seven mountains area.

(b) Civic Action.

Rabbit breeding and poultry programs have been established at Det C-4. Both these programs are designed to provide a diet supplement and will eventually
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be used as a training center for the CIDG.

(9) Detachment B-55.

Motivation and Indoctrination.

Several photographs of actor John Wayne in his latest movies, wearing his Montagnard bracelet were received from Mr. Wayne. These autographed photographs were reproduced into each of the ethnic languages represented in the 5th Mobile Strike Force Command, given to each CIDG Company Commander and posted on the CIDG bulletin board. This personal identification with a man of Mr. Wayne's reputation and esteem to the CIDG has had tremendous motivational value. The John Wayne project has proven highly successful and appeared as a featured article in the April issue of the Green Beret magazine.

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k. Personnel.

(1) Strength: Authorised and assigned strengths at the beginning and at the close of the period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period: 1 Feb 70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorised:</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2765</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>675</td>
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<td>2766</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(b) Close of Period: 30 Apr 70

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>691</td>
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<td>2765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2431</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(c) Strengths for CTZ's

I CTZ (Co C)

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<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorised:</td>
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<td>180</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>161</td>
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</table>

II CTZ (Co B)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Authorised:</td>
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<td>299</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
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<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>262</td>
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</table>

III CTZ (Co A)

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<td>301</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>286</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>252</td>
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</table>
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IV CTZ (Co D)

OFF / EM

Authorized: 80
Assigned: 92
Assigned: 79

(2) Replacements: Replacement input has been consistent with our current phaseback program. The objective of filling critical slots, especially in support areas, while allowing for a gradual reduction in group strength is progressively being achieved.

(3) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) Judicial Punishment:

**THIS QUARTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
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<td>General Court-Martial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
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<td>0</td>
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**LAST QUARTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(b) Non-Judicial Punishment:

**THIS QUARTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 15, UCMJ</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
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**LAST QUARTER**

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<td>Article 15, UCMJ</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
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(a) Legal Assistance: Legal assistance was rendered to 322 clients, a decrease of 133 from the past quarter.

(d) Provost Marshal Activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass Violation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off Limits Violation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew Violation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Violation</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMOL</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Morale and Personnel Services.

(a) The following M&R allocations were received by the 5th SF Op (Abn) for the last quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOKYO</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>BANGKOK</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANILA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWAII</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONGKONG</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINGAPORE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>277</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5th SF Op (Abn) has been allocated, on the average, 23 less spaces per month on MAF flights than during the previous reporting period.

(b) Promotions: A total of 303 promotions were effected by this headquarters.

(c) Reenlistment:

The following are the 5th SF Op (Abn) Reenlistment Statistics for the last quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>ELIGIBLE</th>
<th>REENLISTED</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RA 1st TERM</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA Career</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS, Draftee</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO/Reservist</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP TOTALS</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS:

1. 31 EM extended their ETS

2. Two EM discharged Convenience of Government, accepting Commissions in USAF.

3. There were no amendments.

(d) Postal. The following statistics represent number of certified, insured and registered pieces of mail handled by SFOR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSURED MAIL</th>
<th>REGISTERED MAIL</th>
<th>CERTIFIED MAIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>OUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVOC-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(e) Awards and Decorations:

1. The total number of decorations awarded to 5th SF Op (Abn) personnel for the period ending 30 April 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D&amp;C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS-V</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM-V</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM-V</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIB</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMB</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Awards of the Bronze Star and below are approved by 5th SF Op (Abn). Silver Star to Distinguished Service Crosses are approved by USARV.

2. Percentage of each unit’s personnel who were decorated for the period ending 30 April 1970:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>VALOR</th>
<th>SERVICE/ACHIEVEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>2.72 1.41 1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>2.26 21.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2.38 1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>5.88 8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCN</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>10.00 0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.57 1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.36 2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.14 1.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Special Services.

1. General. The Group has been active in sports during this reporting period. Arrangements were made with USARV Special Services for the establishment of a craft shop and photo-lab. The estimated completion date is 1 July 1970.

2. Library. Attendance in the library was 475 for February, 485 for March, and 490 for March 1970.

(g) Religious Activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services Conducted</th>
<th>262</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>3646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Parish Activities</th>
<th>Invocation/Benedictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Visits</td>
<td>Conducted 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling</td>
<td>Attendance 243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Interviews 3176  Staff Meetings 158
Communion Services 177  Camps Visits 396
C/A Payops Activities 19  Camps Visited 159
Memorial Services 12
Attandance 873

5) Personnel Management: Personnel management has experienced a minimum of complications. All MOS's have been available for assignment except O5C and MI personnel which have not been filled against requisitions sufficient to meet DROS and unprogrammed losses. Qualified Civil Affairs and PSYOPS personnel are also not available due to the termination of SF CAPO schools, Ft Bragg, N.C.

6) Civilian Personnel:

(a) General. The civilian personnel office continued to monitor promotions, hiring and other personnel actions closely to insure that strengths and grades did not rise above the authorized strengths and grades. Recommendations and comments were received for the staff and units on the proposed civilian TD. They will be evaluated and the Final Civilian TD published sometime in May 1970.

(b) The following is a breakdown of the civilian employees by units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co A</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>B-55</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>JCOE</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>SFOB</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-51</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2751</td>
<td>2727</td>
<td>2702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The following is a breakdown of the number of employees hired and terminated at the SFOB.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RC5 OIPFOR-65 (R2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hired</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminated</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Miscellaneous: The following are miscellaneous activities programs conducted by 5th SF Op (Abn) during the last quarter.

(a) CIDO Strength and Accounting. CIDO strength for February was 30,587 and March was 29,534. All the reports for April have not been received so no figure is available for April 1970.

(b) Safety.

1. General. Safety news letters and command letters on Safety continued to be published monthly.

2. Injuries and Deaths by Accidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. Medical

(1) USASF Medical Care.

(a) The capability of providing USASF personnel with unit-level medical care remains unchanged. USARV hospital medical support has remained excellent during the reporting period; however, this support is expected to be reduced during the next quarter. The Naval Support Activity hospital in I Corps Tactical Zone withdrew during the reporting quarter leaving the 95th Evacuation Hospital and the Hospital Ship Sanctuary to provide all US hospital care in that area.

(b) During the reporting period, the two Group Dental Officers undertook a program to visit all 5th SFGA detachments to render dental care. Ninety-five percent of this goal had been achieved at the end of April.

(2) CIDG Medical Care. CIDG medical capabilities are being expanded to meet the requirement being placed by the imminent USARV hospital phasedown: an X-ray unit is being obtained for a dispensary at Kontum to provide support to northern I Corps camps and CCC, and to reduce the load on the CIDG hospital at Pleiku; the B-55 dispensary at Nha Trang is being expanded in bedspace and an X-ray unit is on order for this dispensary which will serve as a hospital for Nha Trang area CIDG troops.

(3) The Company A medical supply warehouse was destroyed 1 April by enemy rocket fire at a loss of $90,000, but has been replaced. Medical supply drawdowns for the 5th SFGA for the reporting period totaled $211,854.11. Percentage-fill dropped to ninety-five percent because of a directive to the Medical Supply Officer to maintain no due-outs from the 32nd Medical Depot since 7 April 1970. This directive resulted in submitting requisitions on a hit-or-miss basis to the depot until the directive was rescinded at the end of April.

(4) Training Programs. Vigorous efforts have been made to accelerate training programs for the Vietnamese, both CIDG and VNSF. Standardized programs of instruction were developed or obtained from ARVN/Ministry of Health sources and published for the training of CIDG medics, village and district health workers, camp sanitation teams, emergency medical care, and health education aides. Medicine, dental, veterinary, and preventive medicine specialists are being trained by VNSF (with USASF advisors monitoring) in order to assist in offsetting the shortage of professional CONFDENTIAL
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. MCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

*practicability in these areas. Efforts are continuing to win GVN certification for medics, nurses, and other health workers now employed at the CIDG medical care facilities.
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

m. Signal.

(1) Operations: During the reporting period all elements of the 5th Special Forces Group Communications System continued to provide highly responsive and reliable command and control communications to Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group and its subordinate detachments.

A high quality half duplex microwave secure teletype circuit was installed between Detachment C-1 at Da Nang and Detachment B-11 at Chu Lai on 10 January 1970. Activation of this circuit completed Detachment C-1's internal teletype network.

Beginning 10 March 1970 an analysis of the emergency communication capabilities of each A and B Detachment was conducted. Operational tests were performed to insure each detachment retained both an AM and FM capability even though the primary communications bunker, generators and all above ground antenna systems are destroyed. Test results were highly successful and those few detachments requiring assistance have been furnished equipment and/or expertise in order to achieve desired results.

On 15 April 1970, FM secure voice communications from Detachment C-1 at Da Nang to Detachment A-101 at Mai Loc was established through a XXIV Corps secure retransmission station. This link has proven to be an invaluable addition to the single sideband circuit between above mentioned detachments.

During this quarter, utilization of tactical FM secure voice communications reached a high level. The widespread use of secure voice in all four corps tactical zones has tremendously enhanced the 5th Special Forces Group's Communications Security posture.

(2) Training: The persistent shortage of OSC personnel within this command has necessitated a program in which OSC personnel are cross-trained in teletype operations. Daily instructions in addition to on-the-job training are presently being conducted.

(3) New Concepts/Equipment: A special quality data circuit (secure teleprinter) for Detachment C-3 has been approved and the equipment received. Detachment C-3 is currently installing the equipment. This link will facilitate coordination of classified information between Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, Detachment C-3 and IIFFV Headquarters.
n. Comptroller:

(1) A new 5th SFGA Regulation 37-1 took effect on 1 March 1970. Several significant changes from the old regulation were made. A single salary system was introduced for CIDG, combining base pay, allowances and incentives; only CRP and airborne incentive pay remain separate. A pay raise of 400SVN for all grades was introduced in March, but was reduced in April to rates more equitable with those currently being paid other Vietnamese armed forces. The basic subsistence rate for CIDG was increased to 750SVN per day.
2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel: None.
   
   b. Intelligence:

      (1) Destruction of Unclassified Waste.

         (a) OBSERVATION: It has been recently discovered that Vietnamese merchants in several populated areas near Allied installations are utilizing unclassified waste to wrap merchandise.
         
         (b) EVALUATION: Unclassified waste, although not containing classified defense information, is nonetheless subject to exploitation by the enemy, and should be destroyed whenever possible before reaching the local populace.
         
         (c) RECOMMENDATION: Measures should be taken to ensure that waste material, even though unclassified, is not acquired by foreign nationals. Such waste should be destroyed by burning whenever possible.

      (2) Productivity of Counterintelligence Nets.

         (a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted through the study of intelligence reports and fund expenditures that many counterintelligence nets have not been fully productive due to the type of Essential Elements of Information and Other Intelligence Requirements being levied upon counterintelligence agents.

         (b) EVALUATION: Hard Essential Elements of Information such as "Known VC among camp personnel", "VC/NVA sympathizers in the camp", "Persons in camp who have a reputation of being troublemakers", and "Persons in camp who have information of a collection nature" are very seldom answered in the affirmative on a regular basis. Because of the low level of operations and the fact that the type of intelligence information above is seldom discovered, the agents in the counterintelligence nets become unproductive. Not being able to answer the above type questions, the agents do not report anything and thus are not paid. Without being paid, which in the majority of cases is the motivating factor, the agents lose all interest in working in the counterintelligence net. As a result, Intelligence Report production either drops or becomes unreliable. Continued utilization of counterintelligence nets under these conditions will not provide complete intelligence coverage within the counterintelligence area of interest. The agents do not report regularly, are not training regularly, and are thus not paid regularly.

         (c) RECOMMENDATION: In addition to the hard Essential Elements of Information mentioned in subparagraph (2) (b) above, counterintelligence net case officers should levy upon their agents security related ESI such as "Moral of employees", "Rumors among employees", "Reports of stealing and/or suspects of stealing", and "Report on any security weaknesses." This type levy results in (1) an answer of yes, no, or indifference; (2) regular meetings with the agent; (3) regular opportunities for continued training; and (4) most importantly, the response obtained when properly
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recorded and evaluated can lead to early indicators of possible positive information concerning hard Essential Elements of Information.

(3) Continued Enemy Use of Old Base Camps.

(a) OBSERVATION: VC/NVA forces frequently utilize partially destroyed bunkers in supposedly old and abandoned base camps as living areas and fighting positions.

(b) EVALUATION: USAF forward air controllers and FMAF ground forces recently reported finding old enemy base camps containing partial destroyed bunkers that are still in use. Many of these bunkers had been as much as 50% destroyed by artillery and airstrikes. No repairs or improvements had been made, thus giving the appearance of complete abandonment. In some cases additional tunnels had been dug in the still-covered portion of the bunkers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Continual close surveillance by aerial observers and ground forces should be placed on old, partially destroyed bunker complexes. Any indication of renewed use of these bunkers should warrant reaction by air, artillery, or ground elements. When possible, actions should be taken to completely destroy all structures that can be of any use to the enemy.

(4) Debriefing of Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: While advisory personnel are being debriefed at the conclusion of operations, it has been noted frequently that many indigenous personnel are not being debriefed at the conclusion of the same operation.

(b) EVALUATION: Indigenous unit leaders have considerable combat experience, and are often able to report items of operational or intelligence value overlooked or unobserved by advisory personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That indigenous unit leaders as well as advisory personnel be debriefed at the conclusion of operations.

c. Operations: Reduction in Enemy KIA's.

(1) OBSERVATION: During recent months, the number of enemy killed as a result of friendly initiated contacts has dropped considerably.

(2) EVALUATION: This decrease in para-military forces effectiveness can be attributed to two factors, poor marksmanship and lack of aggressiveness. Contacts initiated at a distance of 10 meters by friendly forces which result in negative enemy casualties is the result of poor marksmanship. Contacts at greater distances, both friendly and enemy initiated, result in many cases, in friendly forces immediately assuming a defensive posture, thus allowing the enemy to police the contact area and break contact.
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(3) RECOMMENDATION: To increase the effectiveness of para-military forces the following is recommended: (1) Advisors must influence their counterparts to give increased formal marksmanship and weapons training. Coupled with this increased formal training a program of informal off-duty marksmanship competition should be initiated. In the past para-military forces have been very receptive to informal competition especially if small prizes are awarded. (2) Advisors must influence their counterparts to increase formal training in combat formations, fire and movement and fire and maneuver, stressing the concept that victory on the battlefield goes to the force that most effectively and aggressively moves its combat power to neutralize, overcome and finally pursue the enemy force.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training: Artillery.

(1) OBSERVATION: The para-military personnel have been very receptive to the A2VN and U.S. Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) which have conducted artillery training on site.

(2) EVALUATION: The use of MTT's in artillery training eliminates the need for transporting indigenous troops to and from a training center. The troops are able to train on their own weapons with instruction oriented toward peculiarities of their tactical area. The training remains standardized and the local advisors are able to monitor the training received by the troops.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the Mobile Training Team concept be widely accepted for para-military artillery training.

f. Logistics: Use of Discarded Flare Containers.

(1) OBSERVATION: Aircraft Parachute Flares come in styrofoam containers, which are usually discarded after the flares have been used.

(2) EVALUATION: Rather than destroy or discard these containers, there are several ways in which they can be useful. The foam is a natural insulator. Some buildings such as TOC's, COMMO, and medical bunkers which use air-conditioners to cool equipment could use this type of insulation. Cooler air is maintained for a longer period of time and the temperature difference is quite noticeable when using this form of insulation. In addition the same foam torn into small pieces and dissolved in gasoline will result in a glue or a thickened fuel much like napalm. By dissolving, applying to a surface, and allowing to dry, a strong adhesive is formed. By dissolving and sealing in a container the fuel remains in the thickened state and does not dry.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That these secondary uses be put into practice as the situation warrants.

g. Communications: None.

h. Materials: None.
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(Adn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. REF EOR-65 (R2)

1. Political Warfare:

(a) OBSERVATION: In many instances personnel assigned to jobs in the S5 field have little or no first hand knowledge of agriculture or animal husbandry, nor have they had any actual experience or training in either field. Many projects in this area fail because this lack of knowledge prevents S5 personnel from properly planning and carrying out a new project.

(b) EVALUATION: Prior to initiating an agriculture/animal husbandry project, the S5 advisor must conduct a thorough evaluation of the proposed project.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: (1) That basic instruction in agriculture and animal husbandry be taught to prospective Special Forces and S5 personnel at the USAJFKCMENNA, Fort Bragg, N.C., and the Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia. A study prepared by S5, 5th SFOD, 1st SF recommending such instruction is being forwarded to CG, USAJFKCMENNA, Fort Bragg, N.C. (2) That an agriculture/animal husbandry field manual be compiled for S5 personnel operating in underdeveloped countries. (3) To insure success of a given project, it is recommended that S5 advisors insure that: (a) The proposed project is practical and will benefit the people. (b) The proposed project is one the people desire. (c) Selected personnel have been trained in agriculture techniques and are capable of maintaining the project with a minimum of supervision. (d) The proposed project has been coordinated with the local agriculture advisor, the local veterinarian, and with the local governmental officials. (e) Adequate facilities are available to house and protect the proposed livestock. (f) A source of supply is available to feed the livestock. (g) The village/hamlet chief will assume responsibility for the upkeep, care and protection of livestock, garden plots, etc.

(2) Role of the S5.

(a) OBSERVATION: Often staff personnel at all levels have a stereotype view of the S5 function and capabilities and tend to over-look that staff office in operational planning and utilization in field operations. The ignorance of the S5's capabilities in the fields of PSYOPS and POW/WAR can gravely affect a unit's mission, whether on the field of battle and/or dealing with civilian populace.

(b) EVALUATION: Since an active and timely reaction from the S5 can contribute greatly to the mission's effectiveness, it is imperative that action be taken to eliminate this problem. There are five problem areas which diminish the effectiveness of the S5: (1) Lack of coordination between, S2, S3 and S5. (2) Lack of qualified personnel in the S5 field. (3) Ignorance of the important role of POW/WAR. (4) Improper utilization of the S5. (5) Unwillingness to support the S5.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The S5 should brief the other staff members on S5 functions, capabilities and limitations. Units without an S5 should be
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS OEFOR-65 (R2)

made aware of S5 responsibilities and consider implementing S5 activities in their operations. The S5 activities should receive command emphasis and the S5 should be included to advise and assist in the planning of any mission in the field requiring the warning of civilians, lessening of enemy morale, and the weakening of VC/NVA hold on civilians. Any significant achievement, as a direct result of S5 efforts should be recognized and the members of the command be made aware of the results.

(3) PSYOPS Exploitation of VC/NVA Atrocities. (HQ, S5)

(a) OBSERVATION: The VC/NVA have been able to turn PSYOPS ThA propaganda exploiting VC/NVA atrocities to their own use on several occasions due to the lack of careful planning by PSYOPS personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: Because propaganda intended to direct the people's attention to VC/NVA atrocities was not carefully prepared, the enemy was able to turn leaflets pictorially depicting civilians killed by the VC/NVA into anti-Chieu Hoi leaflets supposedly representing Hoa Caukhs who had rallied and had been assassinated by the VC/NVA.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all personnel involved in the preparation of propaganda carefully scrutinize their work for anything that would give the enemy a chance to use that same propaganda to his benefit, particularly pictures of the dead.

j. Engineer: Sandbag Conservation. (B-41 Co D)

(1) OBSERVATION: Sandbags for construction or repair of bunker and overhead cover are becoming increasingly hard to obtain in the Delta region.

(2) EVALUATION: The extremely heavy rains in Vietnam quickly deteriorate sandbags which weakens the defensive structure of the camp, as well as giving the overall impression of being rundown. Many houses in Vietnam are made of an adobe-type mud, mixed with straw which, when dried, becomes hard as concrete and withstands the hardest rains. By using this same type mud to adobe the existing bunkers, the problem of deteriorating sandbags is eliminated. The cover is increased and the camp's appearance is improved.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That this method of construction be included in publications for individuals working in developing areas of the world.

k. Medical: Professional Medical Personnel. (HQ, Surg)

(1) OBSERVATION: Vietnam does not have enough professional medical personnel to perform all of the required services, either within ARVN or in the civilian field.

(2) EVALUATION: In order to implement Vietnamization, USAF advisors have assisted their VNSF counterparts in implementing training programs to produce VNSF enlisted specialists in Dental, Veterinary, and preventive medicine areas. These enlisted specialists are very highly trained in order that graduates can substitute in a limited manner for fully trained
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CGFOR-65 (R2)

Dentists, Veterinarians, and Preventive Medicine doctors in the same way that USASF medics substitute, with limitations, for a doctor. Such training can be applied elsewhere within ARVN, and also in the civilian medical field.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: (1) Advisors to the ARVN and Minister of Health consider the possibility of such short-term training of sub-professionals to help fill the gap until enough professional Veterinarians, Dentists, and Public Health doctors are provided in RVN. (2) Medical planners consider the need for such training at a much earlier stage in the conduct of future military assistance programs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

8 Incl
See Table of Contents Pg 8-1
Incl 2,3,4,7,8 wd HQ DA

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1 - IV CTZ CORDS, APO 96215
1 - CO, 1st SFGA, 1st SF APO 97331

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

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1 - CO, 7th SFG (Abn), 1st SF, Fort Bragg, N.C. 28307
1 - CO, 8th SFG (Abn), 1st SF, APO 09837
1 - CO, 10th SFGA, 1st SF, Ft Devens Mass. 01433
1 - CO, Special Forces Det (Abn), Europe APO NY 09050
1 - 16th SF Co, 1st SF, APO 96291
1 - JCCD, 5th SFGA, 1st SF APO 96243
1 - En HQ, 5th SFGA Principal and Special Staff Office
1 - Co A, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96227
1 - Co B, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96313
1 - Co C, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96337
1 - Co D, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96215
1 - En Snp B-Det, 5th SFGA, 1st SF APO 96240

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AVHGC-DST (15 May 70) 1st Irl
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group

for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96358

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn).

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Army Aviation Support", page 39, paragraph 15(4)(a). XXIV Corps has recently provided two (2) UH-1H aircraft to Company C, 5th Special Forces Group, on a dedicated basis. XXIV Corps is advising this unit to submit an appropriate, formal request if an additional, dedicated aircraft is required. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Army Aviation Support", page 40, paragraph 15(6)(a). US helicopter assets, in the form of assault helicopter companies and cargo helicopters, are provided III Corps by IIIFFV on a daily basis for further allocation to units which have requested this type support through III Corps. Other aviation assets, such as the additional aircraft cited in this ORLL, are allocated directly to the requesting units by IIIFFV based upon priorities established by CC, IIIFFV. This unit has been advised to coordinate directly with IIIFFV for the additional aircraft required. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Destruction of Unclassified Waste", page 67, paragraph 2b(1): concur. Although classified waste material must be destroyed, every attempt will also be made to destroy unclassified waste. Even though unclassified waste does not contain classified information, there may be some item in it for which the enemy is looking. Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.
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AVHGC-DST (May 72) Ist Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Productivity of Counterintelligence Nets", page 67, paragraph 2b(2); nonconcur. Paid informants should not become involved with information regarding larcenies, thefts, moral turpitude or other criminal acts. Reporting of this type of information is likely to lead to too frequent contact between the agent and the case officer which could lead to compromise of both operatives within a counterintelligence net. An agent should not be paid to provide information that is not needed by the Commander to accomplish his mission. If payment is made for just any scrap of information reported, agents are likely to resort to reporting only this information since it is far easier to obtain and, in most cases, does not jeopardize the life of the individual who reports it as does reporting of information regarding VC/NVA activities, cache sites, and known VC personalities. When this sort of activity begins, it is virtually impossible to identify significant information. Therefore, the recommendation that an agent handler should levy security related ERI on their agents is valid but these ERI should be clearly intelligence related and levied as being of secondary importance and stress. Unit has been so advised.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Continued Enemy Use of Old Base Camps", page 68, paragraph 2b(3); concur; Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Debriefing of Personnel", page 68, paragraph 2b(4); concur. Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Agriculture/Animal Husbandry", page 70, paragraph 21(1); concur with the recommendation, however, parts (1) and (2) reflect a local requirement of Special Forces. Guidelines on implementing new programs and starting new projects are contained in USARV Regulation 515-1 and USARV Pamphlet 515-1. Action by USCONARC is recommended.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Role of S5", page 70, paragraph 21(2); concur. There are numerous Army field manuals describing the functions and responsibilities of an S5 and describe his activities. This recommendation can be implemented by the local commander in his area of responsibility. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

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AVHGC-ST (15 May 70) lst Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. (U) Reference item concerning "PSYOP Exploitation of VC/NVA Activities", page 71, paragraph 21(i); concur. Policy and guidelines on preparation of propaganda to counter the effects of VC/NVA terrorism and atrocities are contained in MACV Directive 525-203. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

j. (U) Reference item concerning "Sandbag Conservation", page 71, paragraph j(1); concur. Although this Headquarters was not furnished information concerning the availability of adobe-type mud or the amount of time necessary to construct adobe bunkers, this method of construction has merit in the right locale.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

[Name]

Chief W Stevens Jr.

MACV

Assistant Adjutant General

5th Special Forces Group

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GPOP-DT (15 May 70) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

S.D. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
AFCENT 66
## Confidentia!

### Statistical Data

1. **(C) Missions:**

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2. **(C) Contacts:**

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3. **(C) Confirmed enemy losses:**

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4. **Quarterly Comparison of Confirmed Enemy Losses Country-Wide:**

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5. **(C) USASFP losses:**

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD Dir 5200.10

Incl 5 to 5th SFCA ORLL for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970.

**Confidential**

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d. Quarterly comparison of USAF casualties country-wide:

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5. (C) VNSF Losses:

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6. (C) CIDG Losses:

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d. Quarterly comparison of CIDG casualties country-wide:

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7. (C) RF/PF Losses:

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<td>377</td>
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### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 5th Special Forces Group

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.**

**CO, 5th Special Forces Group**

**REPORT TITLE**

- Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 5th Special Forces Group

**DESCRIPTION NOTES**

Type of report and inclusive dates:

- Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.

**CONTRACT OR GRANT NO**

N/A

**PROJECT NO**

N/A

**OTHER REPORT NUMBER**

702053

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**ABSTRACT**

N/A