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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

ACPA (M) (11 Aug 70) FOR OT UT 708028 20 August 1970


OFF DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG Herbert E. Wolff, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
88 Jul 1970

AR 1-26

1. Reference para 6, AR 1-26.

2. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG Herbert E. Wolff. The report covers the period 5 March 1970 - 24 June 1970, during which time BG Wolff served as Commanding General, Capital Military Assistance Command, RVN.

2. BG Wolff is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FROM THE COMMANDER:

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MAV-MAT-SA

15 June 1970

SUBJECT: Debriefing Program (USARV Regulation Number 1-1)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
AFTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. As part of the senior officer debriefing program, I submit this report. I assumed command of the Capital Military Assistance Command on 5 March 1970.

2. Upon assumption of command, I received the following instructions from the Commanding General, II FFV:
   a. Reorganize CMAC and cut it down to muscle and bone.
   b. Work yourself out of a job and convince your counterpart that your deputy will carry on after your departure.
   c. Prepare your deputy for assumption of command.
   d. Establish and maintain excellent relations with General Minh.

3. On 1 April, CMAC was discontinued and Capital Military Advisory Team came into being. A new JTD was published authorizing 159 of which 99 were Team 100 spaces. This represented a reduction of 60%. As of 24 June 1970, the CMAT will operate with 51 officers, 1 WO, and 79 enlisted men—a total of 131.

4. A Letter of Instruction was prepared, staffed with MACV, and published by II FFV on 24 April 1970. This LOI defines the CMAT mission, lists responsibilities, and clarifies command relationships.
CONFIDENTIAL

MACOMAT-SA

SUBJECT: Debriefing Program (USARV Regulation Number 1-3)

5. The Senior Officer, Preventive Maintenance, and Tactics Orientation
   Course was discontinued as a US responsibility on 11 May 1970 when the
   3d ALC taught the first SOPM course. On 27 April 1970, US personnel
   in support of this course were relieved from attachment to CMAT and
   were attached to MACV (SO 112, IFFV, 22 Apr 70).

6. Referring to paragraph 1b above, Lieutenant General Minh and Lieu-
   tenant General Tri are aware of, and have accepted, the fact that the next
   incumbent as SA/CHAT will be an O-6.

7. Referring to paragraph 1c above, Colonel Kyle W. Bowie was assigned
   to CMAT on 16 March. He is an outstanding officer and eminently qualified
   to assume command.

8. Referring to paragraph 1d above, there is abundant evidence that re-
   lations between CMAT and CHQ are at the highest level of efficient coopera-
   tion. The specific empathy with General Minh is firmly planted on mutual
   respect.

9. Some of the significant activities during the past four months are re-
   flected in the following resumes:

   a. Personnel activities (Tab A).
   b. Intelligence activities (Tab B).
   c. Operational matters (Tab C).
   d. Logistics (Tab D).
   e. PSYOPS and civic actions (Tab E).
   f. Engineer advisory activities (Tab F).
   g. Artillery advisory activities (Tab G).
   h. Communications-Electronics advisory activities (Tab H).
MACV-MAT-SA

15 June 1970

SUBJECT: Debriefing Program (USARV Regulation Number 1-3)

10. The tactical situation within CMD as of the date of this report is reflected in the most recent special order published by CMD (Tab I).

11. The organizational structure and unit relationships are shown at Tab J.

HERBERT E. WOLFF
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
On 3 March, CMAC forwarded a letter to MACV Manpower Control requesting that the Local National Civilian TD be increased by 12 spaces. This request was approved on 11 March, authorizing six additional administrative personnel and six mess personnel.

Under the provisions of CMAC GO Number 17, dated 4 March 1970, Brigadier General Herbert E. Wolff assumed command of the Capital Military Assistance Command.

On 12 March, a proposed plan for the amalgamation of CMAC and Capital Military District Advisory Detachment (Advisory Team 100) was forwarded to CG, USARV, for approval. The plan called for the retention of the 99 authorized slots of Advisory Team 100 and the transfer of 80 officers and men from CMAC, all of whom were required to fill positions in the proposed CMAT JTD. The plan also identified 65 officers and men from CMAC who had been scheduled for reassignment and 83 officers and men who would be excess to CMAT requirements on 1 April. Permission was requested to retain the latter group until their scheduled DEROS to assist in an orderly transition to CMAT. All excess personnel were to be phased out through DEROS by no later than 30 June 1970. This plan was approved by CG, USARV on 22 March.

On 26 March, a Meritorious Unit Commendation for the Capital Military Assistance Command was forwarded to CG, II FFV for the period 4 June 1968 to 15 October 1969. A separate letter, dated 26 March 1970, also recommended a Meritorious Unit Commendation for the Capital Military District and Advisory Team 100 for the same time period.

On 27 March, MACV provided CMAC with a copy of the CMAT JTD that had been forwarded to USARPAC for approval. The JTD, as approved by MACV, imposed a strength ceiling of 159 officers and men, a reduction of 20 spaces from the JTD proposed by CMAC. Approval of the JTD by USARPAC is still pending.

On 31 March, CMAC forwarded 11 recommendations for US service awards for members of the CMD staff to CUS I FV. One recommendation was for a Bronze Star Medal, and the others were for an Army Commendation Medal.

Effective 1 April, USARPAC General Order 100, dated 31 March, disestablished CMAC. All CMAC personnel records were transferred to MACV AG record section on this date.

Under the provisions of CMAT Special Order Number 1, Brigadier General Herbert E. Wolff assumed command of the Capital Military Advisory Team on 1 April.

Effective 1 April, MACV General Order 2540, dated 3 May 1970, redesignated CMAC to CMAT and assigned CMAT to MACV. This General Order was revoked by MACV General Order 2833, dated 14 May 1970.

Effective 1 April, MACV General Order 2833, dated 14 May 1970, redesignated the Capital Military District Advisory Detachment (Advisory Team 100) as the Capital Military Advisory Team (CMAT). Under the provisions of this directive, CMAT was placed under the command and operational control of COMCPV. Operational control was assumed by the Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam/Senior Advisor, III Corps Tactical Zone. Authorized strength of CMAT was reduced from 159 to 141 officers and men. The reduction of 18 spaces reflected the anticipated transfer of the 3d Ranger Group Advisory Team from CMAT to HQ, US Army Advisory Group, III Corps Tactical Zone.

On 11 May 1970, a proposed revision to the CMAT JTDA was forwarded to MACV Manpower Control. Three positions were requested to provide personnel to operate the message center and classified documents repository. Two spaces were approved on 22 May 1970.

MACV General Order, dated 16 May 1970, amended General Order 2833 to include special instructions concerning court-martial jurisdiction. CMAT personnel were attached to I HQ, US Army Advisory Group, III Corps Tactical Zone for the administration of military justice including special court-martial jurisdiction and to HQ, II Field Force Vietnam for general court-martial jurisdiction.

On 12 June, a proposed revision to the CMAT JTD was forwarded to MACV Manpower Control. The revision identified 18 Major/Captain spots that could be converted from Infantry branch to another branch. The revision also included three changes that corrected errors or omissions in the original JTD.

During the period 1 March 1970 to 15 June 1970, the following awards were approved: Legion of Merit - 3, Soldiers Medal - 1, Bronze Star Medal with "V" device - 1, Bronze Star Medal - 73, Army Commendation Medal - 29, and Air Medal - 11.
(C) Enemy initiated incidents in the CMD AO remained at a relatively constant level during the reporting period, averaging about 49 incidents monthly. Enemy activity continued to consist of small-scale ground and rocket attacks and acts of terrorism designed to disrupt the GVN pacification effort and to discredit the Vietnamese Armed Forces' ability to defend the Capital City. Both the magnitude and the intensity of enemy initiated activity reflected a marked decline over that during the same time frame in 1969. Tho Duc District remained the most active area in the AO accounting for about 50% of all enemy initiated incidents. On several occasions during the reporting period, there were indications that the enemy would intensify their activity, but their scheduled "highpoints" never came to fruition. This may be attributed to the enemy's ever-increasing personnel and logistical problems which were severely compounded by Allied operations in Cambodia in May and June.

(C) At present, the primary threat to the CMD comes from Subregion 4 units which have yet to feel the full impact of the Allied operations in Cambodia. Prior to these operations, Subregions 2, 3, and 6 posed a significant threat to the CMD. But since 1 May, Subregions 2 and 3 have been deprived of combat forces as well as logistical bases, while Subregion 6 base areas have also been disrupted. Subregions 1 and 5, having limited combat capabilities prior to 1 May, have also suffered as a result of the loss of VC/NVA Cambodian sanctuaries. Subregions 1 and 5, although posing no significant threat to the CMD, still maintain a limited capability for small scale, harassing attacks on friendly outposts and occasional rocket attacks on installations and facilities located in CMD. Subregion 6 maintains the capability of conducting random terrorist attacks within Saigon. However, recent activities by CMD G2, coupled with activity of other agencies involved, have significantly reduced this threat.

(U) On 3 March, a class was held for 10 aerial observers from CMD G2, concerning the duties of the Night Hawk aerial observer. Discussion included procedures used by US observers and equipment required. The ARVN officers were enthusiastic and responsive, as evidenced by their questions and participation in discussion.
(C) On 21 April, a review of several captured documents revealed a number of targets for enemy sappers operating within the Saigon-Gia Dinh Metropolitan area. This information, received from G-2, CMD, proved to be of special significance. A message was prepared alerting those headquarters within the Saigon-Gia Dinh Metropolitan area immediately concerned with the security and defense of the targets listed. In addition, a special overlay was prepared for USAIAC. On 22 April, the G-2, CMD, requested assistance from the G2 Advisory Section, CMAT, in reproducing these documents. The Exploitation Section J2, MACV, CDEC, and 69th Signal were contacted and reproductions of all documents were obtained on 24 April. As a result of the high degree of credibility given these documents, command emphasis was placed upon the tightening of security measures for all critical installations within the Saigon-Gia Dinh Metropolitan area.

(U) On 26 April, information obtained from liaison visits by CMAT staff officers concerning the employment of ARVN special reconnaissance teams was collated and analyzed. The analysis concluded that the Special Teams, if properly employed and given sufficient logistical support, could be of considerable value in the gathering of intelligence and the neutralization of the highly elusive enemy element within the CMD AO. It was also discovered that the lack of a unit SOP, poor logistical support, and a shortage of officers had hampered their performance in the past. The findings of this report were briefed to the MACV J-3, and it was decided that these teams would receive increased logistical and personnel support from MACV. It was also decided that centralized control of the teams at Province level would result in more efficient utilization. The G-2, Gia Dinh, was given this responsibility.

(U) On 7 May, documents captured in the Bo Ba Tay area of Cambodia were received from CMD G2. These documents revealed additional reconnaissance reports of numerous ARVN and FWMAF installations within the Saigon-Gia Dinh Metropolitan area that had been targeted by the enemy. This information was published in CMAT INTSUM 128-70 and disseminated to all concerned agencies.

(U) On 12 May, G2, CMD and G2, CMAT, flew to Moc Hoa to check on PW's of interest to the CMD. A PW, identified as a member of the 2642 Bn, SR2, was brought back to the CMD for further interrogation. Photographs were also taken of some 80 PW's, and these were compared with existing photographs of suspected SR6 personnel, and then placed in the CMD G2's expanding photo files.
On 1 June, the G2, CMAT, flew to Moc Hoa and brought back 10 PW's for interrogation. Information obtained from these PW's enabled the G2 CMD, to conduct operations in which four members of the Armed Propaganda Section of the Saigon City Party Committee were captured.

During the first two weeks of June, acting on information received from the four PW's of the Saigon City Party Committee, the G2, CMD, captured in excess of 20 PW's of that unit, and uncovered a cache consisting of 20 kilos of C4 explosive, one AK-47, three KS4 pistols, one .45 cal pistol, one B40 round, numerous fuses and blasting caps, and several hundred rounds of SA ammunition.
The period 1 March through 15 June 1970 saw sweeping changes within the Capital Military District. During this three and a half month period, operational emphasis was placed on the reorganization of the AO and the realignment of the forces within it; the development of new combat techniques; the increased security of the Capital City; and the continuing process of Vietnaming. Significant progress was made in all of these areas.

At the beginning of the period, the CMD AO included not only the city of Saigon and Gia Dinh Province, but peripheral areas to the west, south, and south-east which have served as traditional routes for enemy infiltration into CMD. During May and June, several of the peripheral areas were returned to the control of Regular ARVN forces operating in areas adjacent to the CMD AO. The Vuom Thom (Pineapple) was given to the 25th ARVN Division on 9 May, and Kien Giang (Kidney) reverted to the control of the 18th ARVN Division (2/43d Inf) on 8 June.

In early March, Regular Forces operating within CMD were repositioned along the outer edges of the AO, while territorial forces assumed responsibility for the area immediately surrounding the Capital City. The month of May saw the division of Thu Duc, Binh Chanh, and Hoc Mon Districts into smaller special areas under the control of a Regional Force battalion or inter-company group. By 15 June, Territorial Forces were largely responsible for the security of Gia Dinh Province, while Regular Forces were being utilized primarily in a mobile support role.

Along with the territorial changes, even greater alterations were made in the structure of the forces defending the Capital City. On 8 April, the 3d Ranger Group departed the CMD and reverted to the control of III Corps. One month later, the 7th Airborne Battalion was withdrawn from CMD and redeployed in the III Corps area of operations. On 8 June, the 6th Ranger Group departed the Kien Giang area and was repositioned in Thu Duc and Hoc Mon Districts to serve as a mobile reserve force for CMD. Their departure from CMD is scheduled for early July. In addition, several of CMD's Ranger Battalions (51st, 52d, 30th, and 33d) were called upon in May and June to assist in the conduct of allied operations in Cambodia.
(C) Several new combat techniques were initiated in CMD during the reporting period. Probably the most important was the employment of mechanical ambushes. Commencing with demonstrations provided by a team from, CMAT on the 16th of March, both the Regular and Territorial Forces were instructed on the use of these devices. At this writing, an average of 355 mechanical ambushes are employed each night within the AO. While kills are not yet up to expectations, there is reason to expect that effectiveness will increase as experience is gained.

(C) In order to further deny the waterways to enemy infiltrators, the 51st RPG was given full night time mission on the Dong Nai River in early March. At the present time, approximately 20 Naval ambushes per night are employed.

(C) In an attempt to reduce the current unsatisfactory rate of booby trap incidents, CMAT conducted an analysis of enemy employment of booby traps in the AO and briefed the CG, CMD, and his staff on 2 April. CMAT recommended the conduct of a booby trap training course by the Quang Trang Training Center for 1500 small unit leaders. The course is currently in progress and is concentrating on countermeasures and detection.

(C) To increase the security of the Capital, the night air surveillance of the Saigon Rocket Belt, which had been dropped on 31 March, was re-instituted on 18 April. Initially four air corridors were established, but this was reduced to two air corridors on 30 April. The two corridors are currently under surveillance by observers in fixed wing aircraft from 2130 to 0600 hours daily. The 3/17 Air Cav has committed forces to assist in visual reconnaissance and combat operations within the AO. Initial allocation in April was 1 Troop per day. At the present time, CMD receives three hunter-killer teams for 1 1/2 blade hours per day.

(C) In late March and early April, protests and demonstrations by various dissident groups to include student, veteran, religious, and labor organizations began to occur with greater frequency in both the Saigon and Gia Dinh Sub-regions. By early May, this problem reached serious proportions, and the CG, CMD, directed that curfew hours in the Saigon/Gia Dinh area be changed to restrict movement during the hours of darkness. These restrictions remained in effect until 26 May. Additionally, LTG Minh published a communique reiterating clauses of Law 10/68 which prohibits strikes, demonstrations, passage of leaflets, and the storage and use of weapons. Measures were taken to prevent motorcycle parades by students and to limit motorcycle traffic in general. Public and private schools were closed for a period of 16 days, and an offer was made to provide 100 new apartments in
Cholon for rebellious veterans. Finally, four training battalions were brought into the city for a period of about three weeks to assist police in controlling demonstrations. These measures were effective in preventing further expansion of student and veteran unrest, but they failed in overcoming it completely. As the reporting period came to a close, government agencies were still searching for satisfactory solutions to these problems in the light of a threatening coalition among rebellious students, striking laborers, dissatisfied veterans, and militant Buddhists.

(C) Significant advances were made in "Vietnamization" during the reporting period. The CMD staff initiated a bridge and ambush patrol inspection program during the month of April and have continued these inspections on a periodic basis. Vietnamese personnel continued to assume greater responsibility for the operation of the CMD TOC and FSCE and a program was launched to upgrade TOC facilities at the District level. Although CMAT still controls US Army aviation assets, CMD has assumed responsibility for the planning and allocation of airmobile resources and unit advisors have turned over command of air assaults to their counterparts. In addition, CMD now plans for and requests through CMAT all "Light Hawk" surveillance aircraft and other aircraft required for first and last light visual reconnaissance of the CMD AO. Finally, CMD has assumed responsibility for counterinsurgency planning and the defense of critical Vietnamese and US installations within Saigon.
During the period 1-7 March, numerous liaison visits were conducted to the offices of MACV J42, J46, MACMA, and USARV G4 concerning the disposition of excess CMAC TOE equipment and to gain MACV approval for lateral transfer of equipment upon reorganization to Capital Military Advisory Team (CMAT). USARV G4 indicated that approval would be granted to transfer subject equipment, however, the requirements had to be validated by MACMA before MACV J42 would approve the transfer. This necessitated an input change to the Table of Allowances established for Advisory Team 100 and a letter of request for special authorization of all equipment required. Approval was granted by USARV G4 for lateral transfer or turn-in through normal supply channels of all excess TOE equipment. A schedule was established that permitted correlation between the reduction of equipment and the reduction of personnel during the phasedown period. Constant liaison was maintained with G4 II FFV and G4 USARV in order to coordinate the lateral transfer of critical equipment to units having valid requirements.

On 12 March, G4 II FFV contacted CMAC G4 concerning disposition of equipment assigned to D/25th Artillery. II FFV planned to take over all TOE and station property by lateral transfer. A complete listing of equipment was furnished to assist in programming and coordinating the transfer. All property transactions were then coordinated between PBO, D/25th Artillery and II FFV.

A vehicle requirement survey was conducted during the month of March in an effort to determine the administrative and advisory vehicle requirements for reorganization to CMAT. A requirement for five additional advisory vehicles was determined thereby necessitating retention of CMAC vehicles which were currently on hand. On 20 March, a letter was forwarded to USARV requesting temporary loan of vehicles for use by CMAT until ARVN-titled advisory vehicles could be approved and obtained from MACMA. A verbal approval was granted by USARV on 27 March, and the written indorsement forwarded to MACV J42 for concurrence and action. On 31 March, a letter was forwarded to MACMA requesting an increase of five advisor vehicles for CMAT. This request was staffed and held at MACV for action by MSDF Watch Committee.
CMAC TOE equipment utilized in support of ARVN Senior Officer Preventive Maintenance and Tactics Course was laterally transferred to the property account of HHIC, II FFV, on 27 March, then further hand-receipted to SOPM&T Course personnel, thereby removing it from CMAC property book. Other station property in use by SOPM&T will be retained by CMAT until the course is terminated at this location.

On 3 April, approval was given by USARV G3 to salvage the five air boats used to patrol the waterways of Capital Military District area of operations. Excessive maintenance problems and the shortage of repair parts and qualified maintenance personnel dictated this action. Action was then taken to obtain replacement boats through ARVN supply channels for use by CMD forces. Authorization for CMD to replace the air boats with plastic assault boats was received from JGS and furnished to CMD G4 on 9 April with a recommendation that these items be requisitioned through ARVN channels.

On 20 April, individual weapons for CMAT assigned personnel were laterally transferred to the property account of Headquarters Command, MACV. All excess weapons were turned in to depot stocks at 223d Supply and Service Battalion.

Approval for lateral transfer of CMAC TOE equipment to the property book of Capital Military Advisory Team was granted by USARV on 1 May. MACV J42 was notified of the property transaction for accounting purposes.

On 19 May, the CMAT request for additional advisor vehicles was boarded by MACV MASF Watch Committee. Acting upon recommendations of the Advisor Requirements Division, MACMA, the committee approved the addition of two vehicles to CMAT vehicle authorization. Based upon the current shortage of advisor vehicles, authority was granted by MACV for retention of temporary loan vehicles from USARV until advisor vehicles were made available, or until termination of temporary loan on 1 November 1970.

On 23 May, a fact sheet on the status of CMAT Kenner Ski Barges was prepared and presented to II FFV for assistance in obtaining maintenance support for this equipment. Action was initiated through USARV to exchange the unserviceable equipment for serviceable barges at Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (MMAV), Cam Ranh Bay. Shipment of barges to MMAV, Camp Davies, was initiated on 10 June, via water surface transportation. Remaining barges will be shipped as available. This action should assist in alleviating the shortage of riverine craft used in patrolling the numerous waterways within the CMD area of operations.
On 25 May, a joint inventory was conducted on Building 3, Camp Le Van Duyet, by Saigon Post Engineer representative, CMAT, and CMD personnel for the purpose of returning the building to CMD control and use. Upon completion of this inventory, CMD G4 receipted for the building and existing installed equipment.
NARRATIVE OF MAJOR EVENTS - 1 MARCH - 15 JUNE 1970
G-5 ADVISOR, CMAT

During the month of March, increased emphasis was placed on the integration of effective PSYOPS with tactical operations particularly by ARVN forces. CMD Polwar prestocked leaflets and used direct support aircraft to engage seven enemy targets that developed during tactical operations. Normal PSYOPS activities included: 33 aerial broadcast hours, 940 ground broadcast hours and the distribution of over 5 million leaflets by ground Mobile Polwar Teams and aircraft.

On 12 March, the CMD Market Place was officially opened. This joint civic action project was sponsored by Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam with materiel support provided by this headquarters. This facility services approximately 700 families.

March was marred by a terrorist incident that occurred in Hoc Mon District at 2200 hours, 23 March. This act, which occurred during a religious observance, cost the lives of 22 civilians, mostly women and children. The civilian populace was angered by this incident and CMD Polwar exploited the incident by distributing special handouts, dropping several thousand leaflets, and making aerial broadcasts.

In April, as in the previous month, continued emphasis was placed on tactical PSYOPS. Five hundred thousand special leaflets were distributed against specific enemy units by CMD Polwar. Additionally, 100,000 quick reaction leaflets were distributed as a result of information received from ralliers and 1 million leaflets were aerial dropped against six enemy targets that developed during tactical operations. Normal PSYOPS activities included 43 aerial broadcast hours, 1,518 ground broadcast hours and the distribution of over 7 million leaflets by ground Mobile Polwar Teams and aircraft.

On 14 April, an eight room, modern medical dispensary was officially opened in the 5th Ranger Group Dependent Housing area in Thu Duc District. This was an extensive project since it boasts running water, latrines, and the latest maternity facilities.

A delegation of 11 newsmen touring South Vietnam as members of the H. Ross Perot party visited CMD on 2 April. They were briefed by the CG, CMD on the security plan for Saigon and the mission of CMD.
The national-scale Chieu Hoi appeal campaign, NGUYEN TRAI III, commenced on 16 April and is scheduled to terminate on 16 August 1970. CMD Polwar is actively supporting this joint US/VN campaign throughout the CMD area of operations. In an effort to counter enemy casualty-producing booby traps, a joint CMD/CMAT "Voluntary Booby Trap Informant" campaign was launched on 30 April. A special leaflet announcing the campaign was developed and informants will receive a small transistor radio as a reward for turning in booby trap items or devices.

The month of May was highlighted by the successful ARVN and US drive into enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia. In an attempt to capitalize on ARVN successes in Cambodia, an active Polwar campaign was conducted throughout the AO, particularly in the rural areas. At the onset of the operations, the six CMD Mobile Polwar Teams were given news releases which they broadcasted over their public address systems. In addition, 2,000 copies of a MACCOURIS "mini-newspaper" were distributed daily in the rural areas by the Vietnamese Information Service. Normal PSYOPS activities accounted for 38 aerial broadcast hours, 1,378 ground broadcast hours, and the distribution of over 7 million leaflets by ground Mobile Polwar Teams and aircraft.

The CMD Social Welfare Section finalized the necessary documents in order to initiate a widows and dependents food program with assistance from the Catholic Relief Service. Members of 164 families will now receive PL 480 food commodities on a regular monthly basis.

The tempo of political activities began to increase in May as preparation for the 28 June 1970 elections got underway. The elections are for 36 councilmen seats in the Saigon Capital Council, and 27 seats for the Gia Dinh Province Council. CMD has the mission of providing security for the elections against possible disruptions caused by the Viet Cong.

Command emphasis was placed on the New Horizon Program during the first two weeks of June in an effort to raise the morale and fighting ability of the territorial forces. As part of this program, two Regional Force Companies and two Popular Force Platoons were inspected by the Deputy Commander of CMD. Plans have been made to conduct monthly inspections of all New Horizon units within the area of operations.

PSYOPS activities thus far for this month include: 21 aerial broadcast hours, 720 ground broadcast hours, and the distribution of 3,700,00 leaflets by ground Mobile Polwar Teams and aircraft.
During this reporting period, the following totals depict PSYOPS activities by individual months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS</th>
<th>#MEDCAPS/ DENTCAPS</th>
<th>#PATIENTS TREATED</th>
<th>#HOI CHANHS TREATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>11,380</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>9,399</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>9,742</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E-19
The single most significant action of the Engineer Section during the month of March was the turn-over of bridge security lighting systems to CMD. On 3 March the last of 19 bridge lighting systems was converted from generator to commercial power. With this accomplished, only 13 bridge lighting systems remain on generator power. All generators supplying power to these bridge lighting systems are ARVN generators and are maintained and operated by ARVN personnel. The complete turn-over of responsibility was completed on 1 April.

On 12-13 April inspections were made of all the U.S. radar towers to determine the stability of the towers against high winds. One tower was replaced as a result of these inspections and minor adjustments were made to the guy wires of two additional towers. Upon completion of these adjustments and construction of the new tower, it was determined that all towers were safe. The remainder of the month was devoted to monitoring the CMD Engineer Section in the maintenance of bridge lighting systems. Minor problems were resolved in establishing ARVN logistical support for this mission.

With the change from CMAC to CMAT, and the accompanying loss of personnel, action was taken during May to consolidate CMAT Headquarters. This consolidation resulted in the turn-back of one building from U.S. control to GVN control. This action was completed on 25 May.

On 22 May an inspection was made of the physical defenses of the Cat Lai Sensitive Zone. Following this inspection, a plan for the physical defenses was prepared and submitted to G3, CMAT, for incorporation in the overall defense plan of Cat Lai. Technical assistance to Cat Lai was continued into June and will be provided until the upgrade of the physical defenses is complete.
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NARRATIVE OF MAJOR EVENTS 1 MARCH 1970 - 15 JUNE 1970

ARTILLERY ADVISOR, CMAT

(U) CMD Artillery conducted five two-week courses of instruction to enhance the ability of Regional Force platoon leaders and CMD Naval officers to call for and effectively adjust artillery fire. The first course began on 13 March, and the last course was graduated on 10 June. A total of 132 Regional Force officers and 4 CMD Naval officers successfully completed the course.

(U) D Battery, 25th Artillery, was transferred to IFFV Artillery on 27 March. All personnel and property were moved to Long Binh, with the exception of a seven-man support detachment. The support detachment was billeted in the Montana BDE and given space in Peeler Compound to establish an operations office, supply room, and motor pool. The support detachment will remain in the Saigon area to support and maintain the ground surveillance radar sections OPCON to CMAT.

(C) Major Tengler from Training Directorate, MACV, visited CMAT Artillery on 22 April to discuss unit organization and equipment requirements for 20 PPS-5 radar sections which may be assigned to CMD. The matter was discussed in detail with LTC Trang, CMD Artillery Officer. LTC Trang indicated that a radar battery would be organized if the PPS-5s were assigned. Equipment lists that provided for a battery and platoon headquarters as well as the 20 radar sections were developed and submitted to Major Tengler on 24 April.

(U) A joint CMD/CMAT Tactical Operations Center (TOC) inspection team was formed to inspect the Province and Special Zone TOC's beginning 23 March. The purpose of the inspection was to provide guidance to Special Zone Commanders and US Advisors for the improvement of their TOC's and the development of timely, standardized reporting procedures. The inspection was completed on 2 April, at which time LTG Minh, CG, CMD, published an order specifying the standardization desired and the minimum requirements for the operation and manning of each TOC. Periodic reinspections to review progress are planned.

(U) A radar plotting center was established in the CFSCE on 28 March 1970 to improve the accuracy of target location and to provide a check on the plotting done at each radar site. The plotting center has also proved a valuable tool in training new radar plotters and in conducting remedial training when necessary.

Tab G

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(U) CMD Artillery took steps to improve the capabilities and effectiveness of their observation towers by conducting a three-day course of instruction for Regional Forces personnel assigned to the flash towers, by increasing the number of personnel assigned to each tower from three to six and by establishing four additional towers. The course of instruction was conducted during the period 23 through 25 April. The four new towers began operation on 27 April.

(U) Vietnamization of the artillery shell report and visual reconnaissance teams became a reality on 11 April. On that date CMD Artillery organized and lead joint shell report and visual reconnaissance teams during the rocket attack. They have continued to lead the joint teams during eight subsequent attacks. Their aggressive leadership and proficiency has resulted in the identification of the type rockets fired in each attack and the confirmation of four launch sites. A chronology of rocket attacks is listed below for information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTACK</th>
<th>DTG</th>
<th>NO &amp; TYPE ROCKETS</th>
<th>AREA HIT</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>110230 Apr</td>
<td>2 - 122</td>
<td>Hoc Mon</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>132324 Apr</td>
<td>4 - 122</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>150001 Apr</td>
<td>2 - 122</td>
<td>Hoc Mon</td>
<td>XT765106 Con</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>150320 Apr</td>
<td>2 - 122</td>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>XS013798 Con</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>160220 Apr</td>
<td>3 - 122</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>XS960919 Con</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>252250 Apr</td>
<td>3 - 122</td>
<td>Hoc Mon</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>060605 May</td>
<td>6 - 122</td>
<td>Thu Duc</td>
<td>XS017966 Sup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>112105 May</td>
<td>2 - 122</td>
<td>Hoc Mon</td>
<td>XT765099 Sup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>120153 May</td>
<td>3 - 122</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>XS962919 Con</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) A joint CMD/CMAT Artillery study of enemy launch sites and targeting within the CMD AO continues. It is anticipated that the study will identify those installations that the enemy considers as primary rocket targets as well as the areas most likely to be used to launch rockets. Data accumulated by CMAT Artillery thus far is presently being analyzed by CMD Artillery.

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NARRATIVE OF MAJOR EVENTS - 1 MARCH 1970 - 15 JUNE 1970
C.I.F. ADVISOR, CMAT

Since 1 March, the events of significance in the Communications-Electronics field can be categorized into three general areas. These are matters strictly related to the evolution of the Capital Military Advisory Team from the Capital Military Assistance Command; matters dealing solely with the operation and improvement of the U.S. communications facilities; and finally, those matters of advisory or Vietnamization significance.

In the beginning of March, many of the details concerning personnel and equipment authorizations for CMAT were still far from finalization. It was known, however, that the Radio Relay and Radioteleprint equipment and personnel would no longer be required. Since the departure from CMD of the last of the CMAT OPCON units in October of 1969, these sections had been retained only to meet contingency requirements. On 1 March, approval was granted to turn-in all equipment related to these two communications means. The bulk of the equipment was turned-in through logistical channels but the mobile VHF Radio Relay equipment was laterally transferred to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division to meet their urgent requirements.

During March, all communications required by CMAT were planned, enumerated and justified in the minutest detail for inclusion in a series of letters submitted through channels for final approval. In addition, the personnel and equipment necessary to provide these communications were incorporated into the overall CMAT requirements with detailed justification.

Also related to the transition of CMAC to CMAT, plans were developed late in March to dismantle approximately fifty percent of the teletype and related Signal and COMSEC equipment in the CMAC Command Center. This equipment was originally installed to provide teletype circuits to OPCON U.S. units and was no longer required. The actual disassembly and removal was accomplished during the period 17 April to 22 April.

In the area of Vietnamization, the final phase of one project and the initial phase of another was accomplished during March. On 13 March, the final course for CMD AN/PPS-4 radar operators was completed. The program had been underway since November 1969 and had included the training of
twenty three-man teams during five U.S. conducted courses and the subsequent training of an additional twenty-four operators to serve as a source of trained replacements. The latter students were trained by CMD instructors.

Also in March, the long term project of consolidating the CMAC and CMD telephone switchboard system and the training of ARVN personnel to operate both systems was initiated. This consolidation allowed several of the U.S. personnel formerly authorized in the CMAC Communications Platoon to be deleted from the CMAT authorization. This project is still underway and will eventually result in the complete turn-over of the system to CMD control.

During April, a major effort was begun to improve Communications Security within the Capital Military District. A NESTOR Implementation Plan was developed to serve as a guide in the installation of available secure FM radio equipment assets. Since that time, a secure radio capability has been provided for the advisors at the Province and District levels and those at the Ranger Groups and Battalions. Also the ground surveillance radar net, which provides the U.S. radar sites around Saigon with their communications link to CMD, has been secured. Throughout this program, the use of this equipment by ARVN personnel to report sensitive information has been encouraged.

During May, those projects which had been initiated earlier were continued. Substantial improvements were made by CMD personnel in their operation of the joint CMAT/CMD telephone switchboard system. At this point, training began in the installation and routing of circuits through the circuit distribution frame and limited organizational maintenance procedures were taught.

In the communications security area, improvements made during May included the installation of secure equipment at some of the critical installations in the Capital Military District. On 13 May, NESTOR equipment was installed at USAHAC Headquarters and on 23 May similar equipment was installed at the Cat Lai TOC operated by the 159th Transportation Battalion, with favorable results attained in both endeavors.
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Republic of Vietnam
Prime Minister's Office
Saigon/Gia Dinh Military Governor's Office

Republic of Vietnam
Dept. of Defense
Jus/RVNAF
III CTZ

No. 610/BKT/74 T1/SG-GD

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 01/70
OF
LT GEN., COMMANDING GENERAL OF CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT
CONCURRENTLY
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF SAIGON/GIA DINH

TO: COL., Major of Saigon concurrently CO of Capital Sub-Region
COL., Chief of Gia Dinh Province concurrently CO of Gia Dinh Sub-Region
Director of Capital National Police
COL., CO of 5th Ranger Group
LTG, CO of 6th Ranger Group
Commander, CO of Riverine HQ/CMD

SUBJECT: Operational Guidance During The Rainy Season

REFERENCE:
   a. HQ/CMD and SG-GD Military Governor Office OPLAN DAN CHI 70.
   c. Map of Vietnam, scale 1/50,000/sheets 06230/I-II, 6330/I-II-III-IV.

1. SITUATION:
   a. GENERAL:
      (1) Since early May 70 and following the political developments in
          Kampuchia, the RVNAF and Allied Forces have continuously conducted operations
          against the enemy safe base areas in the territory of Kampuchia.

      (2) The consequences of these operations have greatly influenced the
          enemy activities in the territory of Capital Military District:

          (a) The main force units of VC regions and sub-regions have suffered
              heavy personnel losses.

          (b) Safe base areas are destroyed.

          (c) Supply sources, rear services are cut off.
b. SPECIFIC:

(1) VC Sub-Region #1:

(a) This Sub-Region's sapper units continue to attempt to infiltrate into Hoc Mon area.

(b) Some reconnaissance actions by Quyet Thang Regiment were reported at the boundary between Hoc Mon/Go Vap.

(2) VC Sub-Region #2:

(a) Suffered heaviest losses during the operations conducted by RVNAH and Allied Forces in Kampuchia.

(b) The increase of contacts, recently reported at Tan Binh, indicates that the enemy is still trying to infiltrate into the friendly infrastructure at area west of Tan Son Nhat Airport.

(c) A document, seized on the body of a VC, indicates that the VC 613 Binh Tan Battalion is still dispersing and hiding in the areas of Tan Kien, Tan Nhat, Tan Tao of Binh Chanh District.

(3) VC Sub-Region #3: 506th and 508th VC Battalions are still reported in area south of Nha Be, Binh Chanh and continue to infiltrate in small groups to increase pressure on the districts bordering the Capital in the South.

(4) VC Sub-Region #4:

(a) Operating capabilities remain intact.

(b) Is continuing to increase activities in area east of Thu Duc to place pressure on the installations located along the Saigon/Bien Hoa highway and in the 9th Precinct of the Capital. Attempts are also being made to shell the Capital.

(5) VC Sub-Region #5: The capture of some reconnaissance elements of Dong Nai Regiment at area south of Lai Thieu indicates that the enemy still wants to infiltrate into Heip Binh area (west of Thu Duc) where his activities at Cia Binh City are launched.

(6) VC Sub-Region #6:

(a) Suffered heavy losses during the operations conducted by combined VN/US Forces in Kampuchia.
(b) According to a document captured recently, VC Sub-Region #6 has, however, conducted detailed study of several military, governmental and allied installations in the Capital and Gia Dinh City to prepare for some important sabotage actions which could cause psychological reverberations and save his prestige.

c. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES: Though the enemy has suffered significant losses in Kampuchea battle field, he is still capable of conducting the following activities which should be kept in mind by responsible commanders (particularly VC Sub-Region #6):

1. Shell the Capital.
2. Infiltrate to harass government infra-structure.
3. Conduct sapper, sabotage acts against government, military, and allied installations located in the center of the Capital city.
4. Conduct some raids in field areas with sappers against special zone, battalion, company CP's and friendly critical installations.

2. PURPOSE: This Special Order is to provide guidance for CMD units, agencies during the rainy season (2nd Semester 1970).

3. CONCEPT: Capital Military District will concentrate efforts on the following activities:

a. Maximum use of Regular Force units in mobile operations at the boundary area outside CMD territory and continue to return to HQ/IIICTZ 1st Ranger Group in July 1970.

b. Return the operations and security responsibilities of Gia Dinh territory to concerned local forces on 15 June 1970.

c. Upgrade the local forces on:

1. Personnel
2. Strength and equipment
3. Combat techniques

d. Continue to improve the activities to:

1. Counter shelling
2. Interdict infiltration
4. EXECUTION:

a. CIA DINH SUB-REGION.

(i) Assume operation and security responsibilities within CIA DINH territory with local forces, effective 15 June 1970.

(ii) Arrange and redeploy forces to form a Task Force (designated as Le Van Duyet Task Force) with the following units:

(a) HQ/Task Force

(b) 4 Maneuver Battalions: 53rd, 55th, 86th and 3/1 RF Battalions. This Task Force must be formed prior to 15 July 1970 and be ready to conduct mobile operations under the Sub-Region's direct command, with priority for Thu Duc Special Zone.

(iii) Urgently upgrade the local forces on:

(a) Personnel:

- Select competent, experienced cadre and assign them to the positions of battalion commander, inter-company group commander, company commander, and platoon leader.

- Arrange the staff at Sub-Region, Special Zone levels to obtain efficiency, particularly the S2, S3, Signal and Artillery Section.

- Recommend to HQ/CMD for transfer out of CMD unefficient cadre.

(b) Strength and Equipment:

Strength:

- Priority replacement is given to RF units on mobile operations.

- Raise the combat strength of each RF Company to more than 100 men (presently the combat strength of 15 of Gia Dinh SR's 53rd RF Companies is less than 100 men each).

Equipment:

- Provide RF/PF units with sufficient weapons/equipment as authorized by TO&E.

- Provide sufficient steel helmets to all RF units.
(c) Combat Technique: Establish refresher training program for RF units and PF platoons on combat techniques, particularly on A/M operation (contact concerned advisors to request for helicopter support). (C.S. note: All helicopters must be requested by Vietnamese thru channels, there are no helicopter assets available to U.S.).

b. CAPITAL SUB-REGION:

(1) Continue to increase efforts to maintain security as instructed in OPLAN JAN CHI 70. Pay special attention to the boundary special zones.

(2) Review plan of employment of reaction units to conduct large scale police operations and act as reserve assault force to support National Police and People Self Defense Force.

(3) Improve and control the defense of installations, strong points which have been studied by VC (details have been disseminated by HQ/CMD).

c. 5TH RANGER GROUP:

(1) Return the operation responsibilities inside Gia Dinh territory to Gia Dinh Sub-Region, effective 15 June 1970. The group's efforts will be concentrated on the boundary area outside Gia Dinh Sub-Region with priority on the areas west, north, and south of CHD (see overlay).

(2) Depending on intelligence and upon request by Gia Dinh SR, the Group could conduct joint operations with local forces inside Gia Dinh territory.

d. 6TH RANGER GROUP: The Group acts as reserve force for CMD and will be employed to conduct operations in Gia Dinh territory, with priority in Thu Duc Special Zone, while waiting for return to HQ/IICITZ.

e. RIVERINE HQ/CMD:

(1) Maximum use of available means to provide priority support to Gia Dinh Sub-Region.

(2) Continue to specially concentrate efforts on Dong Nai River to intercept the infiltration by VC SR #4 into the area east of Thu Duc.

5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

a. Gia Dinh Sub-Region and Capital Sub-Region must specially increase the control at the following control posts to prevent the enemy forces from moving in and out:

(1) Hong Chau Control Post.

(2) Thanh Phu Long Control Post.
(1) Binh Trieu Control Post.
(4) Xa Lo Control Post.
(5) Phu Lam Control Post.
(6) Nhi Thien Duong Control Post.
(7) Tan Thuan Control Post.
(8) Ba Queo Control Post.
(9) Cay Da Xa Control Post.

(10) In addition to the above fixed control posts, mobile and surprise control teams must be organized.

b. Push up the Phuong Hoang plans at ward, sub-ward, village, hamlet levels and exploit the popular intelligence from the 2 following agencies:

(1) Low level Phuong Hoang committees.
(2) People Self Defense Force.

c. Defoliate conceal areas, infiltration axis and enemy rocket launching sites under the form of community development with security provided by local forces.

d. Pay attention to the low level psywar activities. Local authorities (ward, sub-ward, village, hamlet) must maintain permanent contacts with the population (this method is helpful to obtain popular intelligence).

e. 5th Ranger Group, Sub-Regions, Special Zones must select target and objective (VC Main Force, Local Force, Guerrilla elements, etc.) for each unit based on intelligence and OB at each locality.

f. 5th Ranger Group, Gia Dinh Sub-Region, Capital Sub-Region submit detailed plans to execute this Special Order to HQ/CMD NLT 30 June 1970 for follow-up and supervision.

APO 4423, 15 June 1970

LTG Nguyen Van Minh
CG/CMD concurrently Saigon/Gia Dinh
Military Governor
(s/s)

Copies to:
DSA, Gia Dinh
SA, 5th Ranger Group
CMAT Staff

I-30
### Report Title
Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG Herbert E. Wolff

### Descriptive Notes
Experiences of units engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

### Report Date
23 July 1970

### Report Number
70B028

### Distribution Statement
N/A

### Abstract
N/A

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