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Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Toledo. Operation Toledo was conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade during the period of 10 August to 7 September 1966. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUSPECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General
II FFU/CV
ATTN: G-3 D&T
APO San Francisco 96227

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D. C. 20310

The following report is submitted in accordance with MACV Directive Number 335-8.

1. General: On 10 August, the Brigade deployed to the portion of Phouc Tuy Province known as the Map Tao Secret Zone, making it the first US force to conduct operations in that area. After Operation "Toledo" began, interrogation of captured VC indicated that the VC forces started to depart the area when the Brigade arrived. The Brigade further deployed to Can My area in an attempt to cut off the retreat of the VC forces. OPORD 17-66 (Operation "Toledo") was issued on 8 August 1966, outlining plans for this operation.

2. Name of Operation: Operation "Toledo"


4. Type of Operation: Search and Destroy

5. Date of Operation: 100800H August - 071600H September 1966/OPORD 17-66

6. Frag Orders 1 - 12.

7. Location: Phouc Tuy and Binh Tuy Provinces

8. Command Headquarters: 173D Airborne Brigade (Separate)

9. Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Paul F. Smith

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9. Task Organization: Control of the operation was exercised by Headquarters 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). A command group comprised of HHC, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) operated from a tactical command post.

a. TF 1/503d Inf - LTC GOAD, Commanding

1/503d Inf
Btry/3/319th Arty
Plt/O/16th Armor
Plt/E/17th Cav
Team RRU
Bde Jump CP

b. TF 2/503d Inf (-) - LTC WALSH, Commanding

2/503d Inf (-)
Sqd Engr
Team RRU

c. TF 4/503d Inf (-) - LTC HEALY, Commanding

4/503d Inf (-)
Sqd Engr
Team RRU

d. TF 3/319th Arty - LTC NORDIN, Commanding

3/319th Arty
A/2/32d Arty (8'/175mm) (105 Tow)
Btry C/2/35th Arty (155 SP)
Btry A/2/13th Arty (105 Tow)

10. Supporting Forces:

a. TF 3/319th Arty (+)

(1) Size of Forces:

(a) H&S/3/319th Arty
(b) A/3/319th Arty, six (6) 105mm (Tow)
(c) B/3/319th Arty, six (6) 105mm (Tow)
(d) C/3/319th Arty, six (6) 105mm (Tow)
(e) C/2/35th Arty, six (6) 155 (SP)
(f) A/2/32d Arty, four (4) 175mm/8 (SP)
(g) A/2/13th Arty, six (6) 105mm (Tow)
(h) A/1/7th Arty, six (6) 105mm (Tow)
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(2) How and When Employed:

(a) Preparation of LZ's: 12 August to 7 September 1966
(b) On call missions: 10 August to 7 September 1966
(c) Harassing and interdictory fire: 10 August to 7 September 1966
(d) Quick reaction fire on VC locations established by intelligence estimates: 10 August to 7 September 1966
(e) Suppressive fire on LZ's after extraction: 10 August to 7 September 1966

(3) Results: During Operation "Toledo", 3/319th Artillery fired 1,421 missions, expending 31,503 rounds. Supporting Artillery expended 17,417 rounds. No opposition was encountered, on LZ's prepared by Artillery. During one VC contact, the enemy fled when Artillery was delivered. No effective determination of actual damage to the enemy was possible because the heavy foliage and high canopy restricted observation both from the ground and from the air. At no time was Artillery reported as "falling among VC forces".

(4) Timeliness: Artillery fire fell into two distinct categories during the operation: fire on suspect VC locations and fire in support of elements during contact. Fire for units during contact was timely and no firing delays were experienced. However, when no contact was involved, safety consideration caused routine delays to insure that no friendly troops were in the target area and that no aircraft were flying in the path of the trajectory. In many cases, the lack of air corridors, and aircraft not adhering to established corridors delayed fire but when contacts were involved, no delays were experienced.

b. United States Air Force:

(1) Size of Force: Three O1 aircraft, 5 officers and 6 EM with the Brigade TACP.

(2) How and When Employed:
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(a) Three arc light missions were flown, striking twelve target areas.

(b) TAC sorties included: F-100 = 214, F-5 = 57, F-4C = 37, A-1H 4, TOTAL sorties 392.

(c) FAC sorties included: FAC = 85, VR = 96, Convoy Escort = 13, TOTAL sorties 194.

(3) Results: This operation was characterized by light VC contact. Airstrikes were preplanned with targets being provided by intelligence sources. All targets were struck with no deviation. One immediate air request was flown to support the extraction of LRRP BARACUDA at YT 620210. Airborne FAC directed the strike of aircraft with CBU and napalm. The LRRP was successfully extracted.

(4) Timeliness: The immediate air request was extremely timely during the incident mentioned in paragraph 9-b-(3) above. All other strikes were executed immediately upon request.

(5) Air request Net Used: Preplanned air requests were made through Army channels by telephone. S3 air requested strikes through II FFORCEV, and G3 requested through TASE (Army Tan Son Nhut Air Base). Immediate air requests went through the Brigade TACG (Air Force) to the III Corps DASC, who scrambled the aircraft. These aircraft could be on target in 15 minutes.

(6) Air Ground Marking System: In all cases, targets for TAC air strikes were marked by the airborne FAC (white phosphorous rockets).

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Size of Force: Army Aviation support of Operation "Tolono" was furnished by the following units:

(a) Co A/82d Aviation Battalion
(b) 173d Aviation Platoon
(c) 145th Aviation Battalion
(d) 11th Aviation Battalion
(e) 74th Aviation Company (fixed wing)
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(2) How and When Employed:

(a) Combat Assault: 13 August to 7 September 1966,
TOTAL sorties - 2,094.
(b) Armed Helicopter: 10 August to 7 September 1966,
TOTAL sorties - 602.
(c) Resupply: 10 August to 7 September 1966,
TOTAL sorties - 2,450.
(d) Command and Liaison: 11 August to 7 September 1966,
TOTAL sorties - 1,382.
(e) Command and Control: 11 August to 7 September 1966,
TOTAL sorties - 182.
(f) Medical Evacuation: 13 August to 6 September 1966,
TOTAL sorties - 28.
(g) Aerial Reconnaissance: 10 August to 7 September 1966,
TOTAL sorties - 84.
(h) Psychological Warfare: 13 August to 5 September 1966,
TOTAL sorties - 132.
(i) Aerial Observer: 10 August to 7 September 1966,
TOTAL sorties - 46.

(3) Results: During Operation "Toledo", supporting Army Aviation
flew a total of 6,951 sorties with outstanding results.
(a) CH-47 aircraft lifted 1,540 tons.
(b) Co A/82d Aviation flew 2,436 hours, transporting 5,851
passengers and moving 352 tons.
(c) CS missions were flown on 14 August, 16 August, 20 August
and were estimated to have covered 80% of the target area.
(d) The "Mad System": (Mortar Aerial Delivery) dropped 32
120mm mortar rounds in an area after a CS ship drew fire from a target area on
20 August.
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(e) One (1) UH-1D, while on a Dustoff mission, crashed at Position Granada, killing 2 and injuring 2. One (1) UH-1D helicopter had tail rotor failure and crashed into the jungle, killing 1 and injuring 2. One (1) UH-1D helicopter lost an engine and hydraulic system 3 miles south of Xuan Loc. The aircraft was successfully brought down with crew and passengers sustaining no injuries.

(4) Timeliness:
(a) Dustoff was accomplished with a minimum of time lag.
(b) Resupply was maintained with exceptional dispatch.
(c) All heliborne assaults were executed with negligible delay thereby reducing exposure time in the LZ area.

d. Company D, 16th Armor:

(1) Size of Force:
(a) Seventeen (17) M113 APC's
(b) Five (5) M106 Armed Mortar Carriers

(2) How and When Employed:
(a) At 0800 hours, 10 August, one platoon joined TF 1/503d Inf. At 0700 hours, 11 August, an additional platoon joined TF 3/319th Arty. At 0830 hours, the remaining elements of D/16th Armor joined TF Support Battalion. At 1330 hours, all elements had arrived at Position Castile and the D/16th Command Post was established at YT 631109.

(b) Commencing at 2030 hours, the second platoon fired H&I with M-70's. The Third Platoon received two incoming grenades at 2208 hours, but there were no casualties. Fire with M-16's was returned with unknown results. At 2330 hours, the mortar platoon received two grenades, and five (5) VC were observed. The VC were armed with three (3) M-16's and one M-1 carbine. The platoon was unable to place destructive fire on the enemy and were last seen moving south. Clearing patrols in the morning reported negative contact.

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(c) At 0645 hours, 12 August, the third platoon departed to escort 3/319th Arty elements to Position Granada and returned without incident at 1815 hours.

(d) During the next two nights, H&I fire and patrols were employed to aid in maintaining perimeter security. At 0700 hours, 14 August, D/16th Armor departed with E/17th Cav and Engineers east on Highway 1 on a roadrunner mission. During the mission, two (2) VC were captured by E/17th Cav. E/17th Cav personnel were wounded by a claymore mine requiring a dustoff. The Engineers repaired one damaged bridge at YT 675033. No further contact was made and the company returned to Position Castile, arriving at 1715 hours.

(e) On 15, 17 and 18 August, D/16th Armor provided convoy and highway security between Position Castile and Granada keeping the route open and free of enemy activity through recon by fire, show of force activities, and airstrikes by Air Force elements.

(f) H&I fire and patrols were continually used by D/16th Armor during the nights to aid in maintaining of perimeter security. Suspected movement was heard on the nights of the 17th and 21st of August. Grenades were thrown but the results were unknown.

(g) At 0630 hours, 22 August, D/16th Armor and E/17th Cav retrieved the Artillery and Infantry elements situated at Position Granada. The company returned at 1830 hours without enemy contact.

(h) At 0630 hours, 23 August, D/16th Armor joined the convoy to Position Washington south of Xuan Loc; arriving at 1245 hours. On 24 August, no missions were assigned to D/16th Armor. At 0845 hours, 25 August, D/16th Armor, E/17th Cav and attached Infantry elements executed a roadrunner mission south on Route 2 to Position Red in the proximity of the TS 80 grid line. At 1100 hours, a mortar APC was damaged beyond repair by a VC pressure mine at TS 463817. The company returned upon completion of the mission at 1710 hours.
On 26 August, another roadrunner/search and destroy mission was conducted. Particular attention was given to a suspected VC village at YS 4692 and the surrounding area. Automatic fire was received at YS 4585 and the area was reconnoitered by fire and buildings burned. Numerous tunnels, foxholes and underground bunkers were found and searched. All were in excess of one month old and they revealed negative supplies. Another APC was damaged by a pressure mine at YS 456874. Vehicles from E/17th Cav and Engineers were also damaged by mines. No personnel from D/16th Armor sustained injuries.

On 28 August, while participating in a roadrunner/search and destroy mission, the HQ APC was damaged beyond repair. This occurred on Route 2 in the vicinity of Ap Cu Be at 0925 hours. The driver suffered a minor injury and the APC was returned to base camp. The company returned to base camp at 1830 hours along with another damaged APC which was retrieved from Position Red where it was disabled on 25 August.

On the 28th through the 31st of August, no missions were assigned and the days were used for maintenance of vehicles.

On 1 September, the village of Cam My was enveloped by E/17th Cav and D/16th Armor, and attached infantry elements were dismounted and instructed to clear buildings of all personnel. The village inhabitants were gathered at the village center and given limited amount of clothing and medical supplies. Later the inhabitants were determined to be VC dependents and supporters and no further aid was given.

On 2 September, D/16th Armor and E/17th Cav was dispatched to Position Ruby at YS 4817 to provide perimeter security for incoming infantry elements. No contact was met and the company returned to Position Washington at 1630 hours.

At 0930 hours, 3 September, D/16th Armor closed down its area at Position Washington and joined TF Saber enroute to Position Ruby. At 1130 hours, the company arrived at Position Ruby, established a new base camp at YS 418878, and by 1630 hours land line communications were established.
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(o) On 4 September, D/16th Armor, K/17th Cav an ARVN armored unit, and attached infantry were sent to investigate reported VC strongholds in the Don Bien d'Un area. Many fresh foxholes and trails leading into the jungle were found, and a number of VC were later sighted heading north out of the area. The area was cleared of all inhabitants and evacuated to Xuan Loc by the ARVN.

(p) On 5 September, the first and third platoons departed base camp at 0810 hours to escort a supply convoy to Xuan Loc, returning at 1530 hours without incident.

(q) The 6th of September was allocated for maintenance of vehicles. At 1230 hours, 7 September, the base camp position was vacated. At 1630 hours, all elements arrived at Bien Hoa base camp, ending Operation "Toledo".

(3) Results: The mobility, fire power, and armor protection provided by the APC's and the armed mortars, was to a great advantage in conjunction with roadrunner operations and escort missions. They reduced injury by mines and served as a deterrent to VC action.

(4) Timeliness: The speed of the APC's in the Armor company enabled it to accomplish many missions on time and in good order.

e. Brigade Chemical Section:

(1) Size of Force:

(a) 51st Chemical Detachment

(b) One (1) UH-1B helicopter (furnished by Company A/82d Aviation Battalion)

(2) How and When Used:

(a) CS burning type grenade, M7A3, was tactically delivered by UH-1B armed helicopter, using the M3 armament system with Troop Landing Smoke Screen Modification Kit.

(1) Intelligence reports indicated the suspected location of the 5th VC Division Headquarters, vicinity IS 686736. On 14 August, a decision was made to attack the suspected target with armed helicopters, preceded by aerial
delivery of CS. At 1645 hours, a UH-1B (gas ship) attack was made at seventy knots, at treetop level, with two armed helicopters accompanying, firing suppressive fire. A total of 172 CS grenades were delivered in a line source from TS 683732 to TS 683738. Heavy automatic weapons fire was received from the target area but no hits were sustained. From 1650 to 1700 hours, four armed helicopters attacked the target area with 7.62mm machinegun fire, 40mm grenades, 2.75" rocket fire and aerial delivery of thirty-two (32) 81mm mortar rounds. A concentration of CS gas was observed, which covered a uniform area, 500 - 600 meters downwind prior to dissipation of the visible vapor cloud. No evaluation of results was possible because the target was covered by jungle foliage.

2. Intelligence reports indicated a VC R&R center was operating, vicinity YT 867151, within the Brigade TAOR. A decision was made to attack the target with TAC air preceded by aerial delivery of CS. The UH-1B (gas ship) run was made at 1300 hours, at treetop level, at 80 knots, with two armed helicopters accompanying, firing suppressive fire. A total of 222 CS grenades were delivered in a line source from YT 865154 to YT 867148. Automatic weapons fire was received from the target area resulting in 4 hits on the gas ship. The CS attack was followed by a preplanned TAC air strike with three F-100 aircraft with heavy bombs as ordnance load. No bomb damage assessment was made by the FAC due to heavy foliage in the target area. No visual analysis was made of the size and shape of the resulting CS gas cloud.

3. Following the initial CS/armed helicopter attack of the suspected location of the 5th VC Division Headquarters, subsequent intelligence reports indicated the unit moved approximately 10 km (kilometers) north in a period of 24 hours following the strike. Until that time, indications were that the unit had remained within a 2 - 3 km radius, at least for the previous several weeks. When the VC headquarters moved within reach of heavy artillery, it was immediately engaged. All intelligence sources were unable to detect activity for a period of several days.

4. On 19 August and again on 20 August, intelligence sources listed the suspected location of the 5th VC Division Headquarters in the
vicinity of YS 647823. An armed helicopter attack, preceded by a CS run, was planned for the afternoon of 20 August. The CS (gas ship) was made at 1615 hours, at a speed of 80 knots, at treetop level, with three additional helicopters firing suppressive fire. A total of 222 grenades were delivered in a line source from YS 645826 to YS 646820. Heavy automatic weapons fire was received from vicinity of target center. The gas ship sustained damage from 2 hits. From 1620 hours to 1630 hours, five armed helicopters attacked the target area with 7.62mm machinegun, 40mm grenades, 2.75" rocket fire, and aerial delivery of thirty-two (32) 81mm mortar rounds. A concentration of CS gas was observed which covered a uniform area 300 - 400 meters downwind prior to dissipation of the visible vapor cloud. No evaluation of results was possible because the target area was covered by jungle foliage. Following the attack, indication of the location of the headquarters was not received by any of the intelligence sources available until the closing days of the operation. On those occasions the location was within heavy artillery range and was engaged by those weapons.

(b) CS-1, micropulverized, was employed for harassing effect and to restrict VC use of prepared positions and installations.

1. A number of prepared positions for a VC ambush were located on Highway 1, from the junction of Highway 1 with Interprovincial Route 4, south 800 meters on the east side of the road. VC intentions to use the area as an ambush site were revealed in overlays and documentation found on a suspected courier in the previous operation. On 13 August, the positions were contaminated using 36 pounds of CS-1.

2. On departure from the Map Tao area, 11 trails and/or trail junctions were contaminated with CS-1 for harassing effect along VC lines of communication. The CS was delivered by W-1B helicopter from 1620 hours to 1720 hours 21 August. A twelve pound container, with a time fused bursting charge, was dropped on the trails and/or trail junctions at these locations: YS 720965, YS 728967, YS 775858, YS 810862, YS 790844, YS 787922, YS 852966, YS 797963.
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YS 698410, YT 748001 and YT 815004. All eleven devices were observed to function, rupturing the containers and scattering the powder in the local area(s).

2. On 25 August, an additional four trails were contaminated using the same method. The CS delivered was left in the original packaged 8 pound bags and a block of TNT, with an attached time fuse to rupture the bag. Ten (10) 8-pound bags were used at the four locations.

4. Two large base camps and a large cache area were located by ground troops in the AO. Upon departure from the AO, each camp and cache location was saturated with CS-1 after TAC air delivered heavy bombs.

5. On 1 September, 240 pounds of CS-1 were air-dropped by UH-1D's on a base camp, vicinity YS 542851, and cache area, vicinity YS 534858. CS-1 was packaged, fused and delivered as stated earlier between 1630 hours and 1645 hours on the 21st of August.

(3) Results: The effect on the enemy of this activity was not confirmed due to the fact that the target areas were not observable and also that friendly troops were not introduced. However, ground fire indicated that enemy elements were at some of the locations and CS has certain known effects on people in the area of its introduction.

(4) Timeliness: At all times, CS missions were flown at the time requested by the ground commanders.

11. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Situation Before Operation: The operational area was believed to contain elements of the 274th VC MF Regiment, the 275th VC MF Regiment, the 5th VC Division Headquarters, and the 860th Local Force Battalion. The 274th Regiment was believed to be in the vicinity of YS 5586, the 275th Regiment in the vicinity of YS 5473, and the 5th VC Division Headquarters in the vicinity of YS 6779. No specific location was known for the 860th Battalion.

b. Enemy Situation During Operation: Ninety-five contacts were made with VC forces. Fifty-eight of these were VC initiated. The largest VC force contacted
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was platoon size. Exploitation of captured overlays led to the discovery and destruction of the primary and secondary alternate base camps of the 274th VC Main Force Regiment. Aircraft in support of Brigade Operations received ground fire on eighteen occasions, with three aircraft sustaining hits.

c. Area of Operation:

(1) Weather Conditions: The climate within the AO was typical of tropic zones affected by monsoons. Winds were gentle to moderate, with some strong gusts during rainstorms. Rainfall was normal for the time of year, occurring mainly in the afternoon and evening hours. Visibility was generally good, except for early morning fog, which usually dissipated by 0800 hours. Ceilings were approximately 10,000 feet, lowering to 1,000 feet during rainstorms.

(2) Terrain: The area is characterized by steep mountains, dense jungles and the surrounding rolling hills. The area is dominated by these mountains; Nui Chua Chan (YT 6010) elevation 837 meters, Nui May Tuo (YS 7491) elevation 704 meters, and Nui Be (YS 8690) elevation 874 meters. A portion of the AO included rubber plantations on both sides of Interprovincial Route 2, and the surrounding jungle north of Binh Gia (YS 4977).

d. Support from 172d MI Detachment:

(1) II Support: This consisted of imagery interpretation in the rear area as required, as well as II Technical support with the Brigade forward CP. In addition the II Section provided an aerial observer twice daily for visual reconnaissance (VR) of the AO as directed by the S2.

(2) Interrogation Support:

(a) 1,593 documents were processed

(b) 6 NVA, 2 VCC, 2 deserters, and 76 civilians were interrogated.

(3) Maps and overlays of VC base camps and alternate base camps were extracted from documents and forwarded to the S2 for immediate exploration. A battalion sized attack plan for an LZ with an alternate plan for a byway section was forwarded.
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(4) VC radio codes and frequencies were forwarded to JHU.

(5) An MI detachment interrogator and interpreter accompanied a 1/503d Inf patrol who were guided to a VC area by a VC captive with significant results (Ba Na 11:00-00). 

(6) A USAF baseball cap with a LIT bar was found belonging to a mission USAF FAC. It was forwarded to assist in determining his status.

e. Support from the 404th RR Detachment consisted of communication security and intelligence. Two (2) two-man teams provided direct support to each Infantry Battalion. One communication security team provided an average of 6.5 hours of listening coverage daily. The 404th RR Detachment provided ninety (90) enemy locations throughout the operation, many of which were bombarded by artillery.

f. Final Analysis: Introduction of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) into the Nang Tao area probably disrupted the plans and movements of VC units within and around the AO. Extensive use of air strikes and artillery forced the VC to abandon several base camps and storage areas, leaving behind large quantities of equipment and weapons. The destruction of base camps and equipment losses represents what should be a serious supply setback for VC elements in the "Toledo" AO.

12. Concept of the Operation: The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) conducted Operation "Toledo" in five (5) phases as follows:

a. Phase I - Movement to Area of Operation (10 August to 13 August):
The Brigade moved into its AO by a series of motor marches and helicopter lifts. On 100800H August, TF 1/503d Inf with the Brigade Jump CP moved from Bien Hoa to position by road convoy at 110700H August. TF 2/503d Inf with TF 4/503d Inf, attached for the movement only, moved by road convoy to position Castile closing at 121155H August. At 130965H August, TF 2/503d Inf air assaulted LZ/Position Granada (YS 813965) with no contact. 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf air landed at Position Granada and moved south into Ao 2 and 1 respectively. The 3/319th Arty air landed at Position Granada, thus establishing the Brigade fire support base (FSB).
b. Phase II - Search and Destroy Operations out of Position Granada
(11 August to 1 September): 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf moved south from Position Granada into AO 2 and 1 respectively.

c. Phase III - Search and Destroy Operations out of Position Gold (23 August to 1 September): On 22 August, 4/503d Inf moved into AO 5 to commence search and destroy operations. 1/503d Inf secured the FSR at Position Gold and on 23 August, 2/503d Inf moved into AO 6 for search and destroy operations. 2/18th Inf entered the AO on 24 August, supported by 6/1/28th Inf and 4/1/7th Arty.

d. Phase IV - Search and Destroy Operations out of Position Ruby (2 September to 6 September): On 6 and 7 September all elements, organic to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), returned to Bien Hoa. All non-organic elements were released from UPCON (Operational Control) of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) during this period.

13. Execution:

D - Day (10 August 1966)

a. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) commenced Operation "Toledo" with the 1st phase of positioning its elements in the "Toledo" AO south of Gia Ray and southwest of Xuan Loc. At 0800 hours, TF 1/503d Inf departed Bien Hoa base camp by road convoy and moved to Position Castile in the area of Gia Ray, closing at 1105 hours. The Brigade Jump CP was located at YT 634113. One man of E/17th Cav sustained injuries when he detonated a boobytrapped claymore mine.

D + 1 (11 August 1966)

b. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" in the Mep Tao Secret Zone with the Brigade CP opening at Position Castile at TT 629113 at 1208 hours. TF 3/319th Arty and TF Support Battalion closed at Position Castile from Bien Hoa by road convoy by 1305 hours.
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The 1/503d Inf continued to secure Position Castile and conducted local security operations. The Recon platoon of the 1/503d Inf, with one platoon of B/17th Cav and one platoon of D/16th Armor, conducted a roadrunner operation north of Gia Ray for approximately 10 kilometers returning to Position Castile without incident.

TF 2/503d Inf and TF 4/503d remained at base camp in Bien Hoa and made final preparation for commitment to Operation "Toledo".

D + 2 (12 August 1966)

C. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray. The 2/503d Inf conducted an air assault on Position Granada (YS 813965) commencing at 0814 hours and secured the LZ at 0906 hours with negative VC contact.

The 4/503d Inf air landed at Position Granada from 1004 hours to 1049 hours. They subsequently moved south across the Gia Io River into AO 1 to commence search and destroy operations near YS 817948.

The 1/503d Inf completed air landing into Position Granada by 1242 hours and they initiated movement south across the Gia Io river to AC 2 in the vicinity of YS 799800.

The 3/319th Arty lifted into Position Granada by Ch-47 aircraft and had one battery positioned by 1040 hours. The battalion completed movement by 1837 hours utilizing a total of 63 CH-47 sorties.

B/17th Cav conducted a roadrunner operation to near Sui Cat thereby securing the road back to Position Castile, facilitating the movement of the resupply convoy and Btry A/2/13th Arty. The convoy closed into Position Castile at 1115 hours.

Elements of the 173d Engineer Company constructed two footbridges near YS 813964 to enable 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf to cross the Gia Io River. The crossing of the river was necessary to the Infantry's movement south.
The E/17th Cav deployed two Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, Kelly and Elaine, which were dispatched to YT 795010 and YT 613054 respectively. They remained in these positions throughout the hours of darkness. At 2030 hours, a dustoff helicopter crashed approximately 800 meters northeast of Position Granada, killing the 2 pilots and injuring two. The wreckage was secured by elements of the 2/503d Inf.

D + 3 (13 August 1966)

d. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray (YT 629113). The 1/503d Inf continued to secure Position Castile (YT 628112). Elements of the 1/503d Inf recon platoon, E/17th Cav and D/16th Armor conducted a roadrunner operation north along the highway to a position approximately 15 kilometers north of Gia Ray and returned without contact.

The 2/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf departed Bien Hoa and closed at Position Castile at 1155 hours. At 0952 hours, elements of 2/503d Inf received sporadic small arms fire at vicinity YT 343101. Fire was returned with unknown results. There were no friendly casualties, however, two civilians were killed and one was wounded by VC fire during the contact.

In addition, E/17th Cav (-) conducted a roadrunner operation southeast along Route 1 to Soul Cat (YT 592066) and back to Position Castile without significant contact. A/2/32 Arty was attached to the Brigade and closed the AO at 1720 hours.

D + 4 (14 August 1966)

e. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray. The 2/503d Inf continued to secure the fire support base (FSB) at Position Granada.

The 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf continued operations in AO 2 and 1 respectively. At 1630 hours, B/4/503d Inf received three incoming mortar rounds at YT
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791932 resulting in 2 US KIA and 5 WIA, one of whom died later of wounds in the hospital.

E/17th Cav, with elements of D/16th Armor and the 173d Engineer Company, moved southeast along Route 1 to the damaged bridges at YS 675033 and YT 694027. At 0907 hours, elements of E/17th Cav suffered 6 WIA's from a command detonated claymore mine at YT 693026. VC casualties from the action were unknown. The two bridges were repaired at 1630 hours taking 115 5-ton dump truck loads to fill. The E/17th Cav's patrols, Kelly (YT 624055) and Elaine (YT 784017), remained in position with negative VC contact. Riot Control Agent (RCA) was used on line from YS 685732 to YS 683738 at 1645 hours. 274 CS grenades were released from a UH-1B helicopter, equipped with the troop landing smoke screen system to flush VC from prepared positions prior to an air strike. E/17th Cav delivered CS-1 (micropulverized) by hand at 1400 hours on line from YT 631084 to YS 628-076 to restrict VC use of prepared ambush positions along Route 1.

TF Ranger, consisting of the 33d ARVN Ranger Battalion and the 35th ARVN Ranger Battalion, conducted an air assault at 1000 hours on LZ Yankee (YS 756985). They moved south into AO 3 in the vicinity of YS 763958 and YS 798958 respectively with negative VC contact.

D + 5 (15 August 1966)

f. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray with the 2/503d Inf securing the FSB at Position Granada.

The 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf continued operations in AO 2 and 1 respectively with negative contact.

E/17th Cav, with elements of D/16th Armor and the 173d Engineers, escorted C/2/32 Arty to Position Granada without incidents. E/17th Cav LRRP's were extracted with negative contact at 1715 hours.

TF Ranger continued to work in AO 3, contacting 3-4 VC at 1440 hours at YS 724948. Fire was exchanged with negative results. The VC fled to the northwest.
g. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued to work in the area south of Gia Ray on Operation "Toledo". The 2/503d Inf secured the Brigade FSB at Position Granada. C/2/503d Inf acted as the Brigade Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and also conducted two patrols with negative contact.

The 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf continued operations in their respective AO's. They set up battalion patrol bases and conducted saturation patrolling in sector. At 0945 hours, the recon platoon, 1/503d Inf, found 7 bunkers with overhead cover, 5 huts and one building which seemed to be some type of prison. They also found a small amount of .45 caliber ammunition, grenades and clothing. Documents were also found. The installation was destroyed at YS 764883.

B/4/503d Inf at YS 790855, found 4 campsites with a total of twenty (20) prone shelters. E/17th Cav conducted two dismounted patrols near Position Granada with negative results.

TF Ranger made contact at 0606 hours with VC at YS 726948, killing one and capturing seven. They also captured 1 pistol, 1 chicon carbine and 1 French rifle. They suffered 2 WIA's. At 1145 hours, TF Ranger received additional WIA's at YS 722946 when a grenade was thrown into their perimeter. Friendly fire results were negative.

h. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray. The 2/503d Inf continued to secure Position Granada.

The 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf continued to saturate their AO's with patrols. At 1250 hours, B/1/503d Inf found two mines and an abatis at YS 765882. At 1350 hours, the recon platoon of 4/503d Inf located a small cache of small arms, ammunition and VC money at YS 752880.

E/17th Cav, with attached elements from B/16th Armor and the 173d Engineers, conducted combat patrols near the two bridges at YS 665028. There was no contact, however, 1 patrol found a recently used 4-man campsite at YS 707998.
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At 0835 hours, the 173d Engineer Company suffered 1 WIA from a VC sniper at Position Castile. Fire was returned with negative results.

At 1300 hours, A/82d Aviation Battalion dropped 222 87A3 CS grenades from a UH-1B, with the troop landing smoke system on a line target running from YT 86154 to YT 863148. This was intended to flush out the VC from their positions prior to a preplanned TAC air strike.

TF Ranger made contact with an estimated VC platoon at 1210 hours at YS 710902 with negative results, VC and Friendly. The AHVN later found 30 huts and 5 bunkers in the area with 50 kilos of rice and 300 rounds of small arms ammunition. The Rangers confiscated the rice and ammo, and destroyed the installation. At 1730 hours, the Rangers had one man wounded by a VC sniper. Fire was returned with unknown results. 1 chicom carbine was found. TF Ranger's CP moved from Position Granada to the top of Chui Chau mountain (YT 602101).

D + 8 (18 August 1966)

i. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray. The 2/503d Inf remained at Position Granada for security. The 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf continued saturation patrolling in their sectors. At 1210 hours, B/4/503d Inf fired on two VC at YS 783874 with negative results.

E/17th Cav, with elements of D/16th Armor, 173d Engineer Company and C/2/503d Inf, moved southeast along Route 1 to YS 692977 and set up a patrol base from which they sent patrols into AO 3. Two stay-behind patrols were supplemented by a scout dog team. E/17th Cav's LRRP introduced three patrols into the area north of Position Castile, Shark (YT 561193), Barracuda (YT 625219) and Bass (YT 682701). The CP of the Marine SLF in AO 4 was at YS 823718. The patrols received negative contact. TF Ranger also made negative contact.

D + 9 (19 August 1966)

j. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray. The 2/503d Inf remained in security position covering Position
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Granada. The recon platoon of 2/503d Inf patrolled northeast along Route 1 and at 0930 hours, a cache containing 22 5-gallon cans of fuel at YS 786925 was found, and later evacuated.

The 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf continued to conduct operations in AO 1 and 2. At 1300 hours, near YS 786925, elements of 1/503d Inf found an abandoned chicon 7.62 rifle. At 1840 hours, 1/503d Inf fired on one VC at YS 784926 who fled north.

E/17th Cav's 3 LRRP patrols remained at position. At 1420 hours, Shark sighted 6 VC at YT 568199 and called artillery fire in on them with negative results. The Marine SLF began extracting and returned to their ship. They made no VC contact.

TF Ranger conducted search and destroy operations near objective 32. At 0840 hours, the 33d Ranger Battalion was hit by an estimated VC squad resulting in 2 ARVN WIA's at YS 692899. 277 tons of paddy rice and 2.5 tons of sugar were later discovered in the same vicinity.

D + 10 (20 August 1966)

k. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray. The 2/503d Inf continued its security position around Position Granada. At 2010 hours, near YS 805968, an ambush patrol from A/2/503d Inf was hit by a command detonated claymore mine, resulting in 3 KIA's and 6 WIA's, while they were moving into their position for the night. Fire was returned with negative results.

The 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf continued to operate in AO's 1 and 2. At 1300 hours, B/1/503d Inf found 3 huts at YS 770941 containing wood cutting tools, BBA 301 batteries, miscellaneous medical supplies and some documents. After destroying the huts, the supplies and documents were evacuated. At 1410 hours, A/4/503d Infantry discovered a base camp area at YS 789902 which contained a grass roof hut with metal sides. Company A later destroyed the buildings.
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E/17th Cav conducted two dismounted patrols southwest of Chui Chau mountain with no VC contact. At 1630 hours, LRRP patrol Bass sighted two trucks with 12 unarmed males in each vehicle moving south along the road at YT 680207. The patrol was extracted at 1830 hours without incident.

At 1630 hours, an armed helicopter from A/82d Aviation sustained 2 small arms hits while making a firing pass at YS 645821. There were no casualties. The Marine SLF extracted completely at 1330 hours thus ending Operation "Deckhouse" at 1500 hours.

TF Ranger received 2 WIA from a VC command detonated claymore mine at YS 705942. Fire was returned with negative results. TF Ranger then moved to objective 31. At 1615 hours, 222 M7A3 CS grenades were delivered by a UH-1B aircraft of A/82d Aviation with the troop landing smoke screen system on a line target from YS 645826 to YS 646820 to flush the VC from their position prior to firing Artillery, Army Aviation and TAC air strikes.

D + 11 (21 August 1966)

1. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray. The 2/503d Inf continued to secure the FSB at Position Granada without incident. The 1/503d Inf and 4/503d Inf closed on Position Granada at 1600 hours without incident.

E/17th Cav's patrols, Barracuda and Bass, were extracted at 1500 hours. Prior to extraction, Barracuda reported receiving small arms fire at YT 620210 and then being pursued by an unknown sized VC force. Fire was returned and artillery was called in with unknown results. At 0940 hours, at YT 570063, the resupply convoy coming to Bien Hoa was hit by a claymore mine with no US casualties. Fire was subsequently returned, resulting in 1 US WIA. At 1620 hours to 1720 hours, 11 5-gallon CS-1 (micropulverized) containers were dropped by a UH-1D aircraft of A/82d Aviation at YS 720965, YS 728967, YS 775857, YS 810862, YS 790884, YS 787-922, YS 852966, YS 797943, YS 695910, YS 753001 and YT 818064 to cause persistent harassment along VC trails and lines of communication.

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TF Ranger closed on LZ Yankee at 1415 hours. At 1416 hours, they re-
ported capturing 2 bicycles and a 2 KW generator at YS 745991. The bicycles were
destroyed and the generator was evacuated.

D + 12 (22 August 1966)

m. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo"
south of Gia Ray and southeast of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf conducted an air as-
sault of LZ Gold (YS 619018) at 1115 hours with negative VC contact.

The 4/503d Inf air assaulted LZ Black (YS 580870) at 1445 hours with
no VC contact. At 1630 hours, C/4/503d Inf found a hamlet at YS 580860, in which
they captured assorted small arms ammunition, a bangalore torpedo, 23 black and
khaki shirts, 16 pair of black and khaki trousers, medical supplies, 8 documents
VC web gear and assorted food stuffs for 40 people. The 2/503d Inf moved by
wheeled vehicle from Position Granada to Position Castile closing at 1095 hours.

E/17th Cav and D/16th Armor conducted a roadrunner operation southeast
along Route 1 to Position Granada and escorted the attached 155 SP howitzer bat-
tery of C/2/35th Arty back to Position Granada, closing at 1915 hours. The Bri-
gade support operations center (BSOC) displaced from Position Granada and moved
into the vicinity of Xuan Loc.

TF Ranger was lifted from LZ Yankee to An Loc (YT 110415), starting at
1236 hours and completing at 1329 hours.

D + 13 (23 August 1966)

n. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo"
south of Gia Ray and southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf secured the FSB at
Position Gold.

The 4/503d Inf continued to conduct search and destroy operations in AO
5. At 1600 hours, the recon platoon of the 4/503d Inf found a squad size camp-
site near YS 573859, containing 1 bunker, 1 canteen, 1 entrenching tool, 4 VC
ponchos, 5 pounds of polished rice and 2 documents, all of which were destroyed
except the documents.
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The 2/503d Inf air landed at Position Gold at 1355 hours and then moved south into AO 6 to conduct search and destroy operations near YS 608788.

TF K/17th Cav and 3/319th Arty (-) moved by motor convoy to Position Washington (YT 400025) closing at 1220 hours.

The 1/503d Inf sent one company to Position Washington to secure the Brigade CP. TF Ranger, at YS 485440, reported negative contact.

D + 14 (24 August 1966)

a. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Lay and southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf secured Position Gold and the RSB with 1 company located at Position Washington for Brigade CP security.

The 2/503d Inf moved to Position Gold and conducted an air assault on LZ Tan (YS 553763) from 1050 hours to 1130 hours, then moved southwest to objective Sierra (YS 550730) to conduct ground exploration of a B-52 raid in that area.

At 1340 hours, Recon platoon of the 2/503d Inf found 1 ammo pouch with 21 rounds of 7.62mm chicon ammunition near YS 553752, while B/2/503d Inf, in the same general area, found a small campsite with fresh footprints leading away to the north. They also found two graves and 2 bodies about 2 weeks old.

The 4/503d Inf continued to conduct search and destroy operations in AO 5, moving toward Position Remote (YS 530860) to occupy blocking positions. At 1305 hours, B/4/503d Inf located 1 hut containing 5,000 pounds of paddy rice near YS 558870 which they destroyed.

The 2/18th Inf conducted an air assault on two LZ's east of Binh Gia (YS 505774) and closed into blocking position at YS 538774 by 1900 hours. B/1/28th Inf and A/1/7th Arty were air landed at Position Red (YS 462784) to support the 2/18th Inf.

TF Ranger moved north to AO 10 to blocking Position Tange (YS 495854). At 1802 hours, near YS 480855, the 35th Ranger Battalion made contact with an estimated VC company. TAC air and artillery supported the Rangers. There were no
Casualties reported on either side but the Rangers took 12.3 tons of rice, 6 tons of salt, 1 chicon carbine and 1 DH-10 claymore mine.

D + 15 (25 August 1966)

p. Th. 73d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray and southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf continued to secure Position Gold and furnished 1 company for security of the Brigade CP at Position Washington. At 1103 hours, B/1/503d Inf captured 2 VCC at YS 599808, one of whom died of wounds prior to evacuation. With the VCC they also captured 2 Mossin-Wigart rifles; 5 grenades and several documents.

The 2/503d Inf conducted operations near Objective Sierra. At 1430 hours, A/2/503d Inf made contact with 4 VC at YS 560734, where they also found 5 huts, 10 tunnels, 1 letter and 1 diary. At 1450 hours, A/2/503d Inf contacted 3 VC dressed in green uniforms at YS 561720 moving northwest. There were no VC casualties.

The 4/503d Inf moved toward Position Romeo. At 1415 hours, at YS 544872, A/4/503d Inf found a battalion size base camp containing 12 bunkers with sleeping quarters, 400 pounds of polished rice, two tunnels and several trenches. A total of 160 3-man bunkers were found along with a road leading to the camp which could be used by trucks. At 1915 hours, an ambush patrol observed 75 - 100 VC at YS 563848. They were wearing black pajamas, soft caps and carrying large rucksacks and at least one (1) 81mm mortar. They were moving north and remained in observation for 45 minutes. No action was taken because of radio difficulties.

TF E/17th Cav, with elements from D/16th Armor, escorted artillery elements from Xuan Loc to Position Red. At 1150 hours, an APC from D/16th Armor hit a pressure mine at YS 463822, damaging 4 road wheels. At 1634 hours, a ½-ton truck of E/17th Cav hit a pressure type mine destroying the vehicle and wounding 4. 20 VC were seen in the area, however they fled before significant contact could be made.

2/18Inf continued search and destroy operations at rear Position Papa (YS 520780). At 1550 hours, near YS 548776, they made contact with 3 VC who fled northwest. At 1840 hours, at YS 523766, A/2/18th Infantry received 2 small arms rounds and returned fire on 4 VC running northwest with negative results. At 1925
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8 hours, B/1/10th Inf's ambush patrol in the vicinity of YS 532777 was attacked by an estimated 15 VC with no casualties.

At 1448 hours, ten (10) 6-pound containers of CS-I (micropulverized) was delivered to 3-1D aircraft of A/303d Aviation at point targets at YS 632910, YS 649304, YS 635800 and YS 645900 to cause persistent harassing effects along suspected VC routes of exfiltration from the AO. It was also used in operation areas on trails to reveal bypassing elements to visual reconnaissance.

7th Ranger occupied blocking positions at Position Tano (YS 495854). At 1240 hours, TF Ranger located a VC village of 70 huts at YS 477853. While burning the huts, a secondary explosion occurred. It was believed to be from stored ammunition. At 2100 hours, the 73rd Ranger Battalion made contact with a squad of VC, killing one (1) VC and taking one (1) carbine with negative friendly casualties.

D + 16 (26 August 1960)

q. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" south of Gia Ray and southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf held at Position Gold until 1800 hours when they commenced an air assault on LZ Yellow (YS 601749).

During the extraction from Position Gold, the 1/503d Inf took 3 WIA's from sniper fire while return fire killed the VC sniper.

The 2/503d Inf continued to work in AO 8, moving to the southwest. At 1200 hours, A/2/503d Inf made contact with 8 - 12 VC at YS 575735 who threw six (6) grenades, detonated 2 claymore mines and then fled north with no casualties.

Company A reported no casualties and also found a bunker with 1,000 s/a rounds, six (6) 60mm mortar rounds, one (1) 81mm mortar shell, 25 grenades, one (1) M-2 carbine, one (1) chicon claymore mine, one (1) US claymore mine, four (4) protective masks (US) and assorted documents. 2/503d Inf moved to LZ Brown (YS 583729) and remained overnight.

The 4/503d Inf continued search and destroy operations in the western portion of AO 5 and maintained blocking position at Romeo. At 1420 hours, C/4/503d Inf reported finding a large camp area that appeared to have been used in the last 24 - 48 hours at YS 542855. It contained 122 bunkers, 9 bomb shelters, two (2) 50 caliber machinegun positions, 27 40mm positions, 2,000 pounds of pol-
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ished rice, test papers and booklets for 200 - 300 people. At 1300 hours 11/4/66
503d Inf located a battalion sized base camp at YS 543851 containing 20,100 rounds
of small arms ammo, 160 60mm rounds, fifteen (15) 81mm mortar rounds, 2 sewing
machines, 700 pounds of clothing and a rucksack of documents. They discovered
another base area at YS 537856 which was checked out on the 27th of August. The
recon platoon initiated a search of a base camp at YS 537856, finding medical
supplies, large quantities of small arms ammunition, a new type of rocket and
miscellaneous items of clothing. They remained in this area overnight.

E/17th Cav, with elements of D/16th Armor and the 173d Engineer Com-
pany, conducted a mounted recon south of Position Courtenay (YS 445863). At
1300 hours, a 5-ton dump truck hit a pressure mine at YS 456863 resulting in a
wheel being blown off but no casualties. At 1350 hours, an APC of D/16th Ar-
mor hit a pressure mine and was lightly damaged with no casualties. At 1620
hours, a ¼-ton vehicle from the Engineer Company hit a pressure at YS 465876
resulting in 2 WIA and the total loss of the vehicle.

The 2/18th Inf worked their way south of Position Papa (YS 538751) and
captured one VCS at 1135 hours at YS 537751, whom they evacuated to the VCC CP.

TF Ranger continued search and destroy operations near Position Tango
and maintained blocking positions at Tango. At 1130 hours, the 33d Ranger Bat-
talion captured 16 VCS at YS 468857 while searching a village in that area. The
35th Rangers reported contact with 3 VC at YS 468853 who escaped to the south-
west. The 3/319th Arty moved by air from Position Gold to Position Papa.

D + 17 (27 August 1966)

r. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo"
south of Gia Ray and southwest of Xuan Loc. At 1050 hours, the 1/503d Inf con-
ducted search and destroy operations near LZ Yellow (YS 601749). They discovered
an extensive tunnel/bunker complex. With the complex they found 3 bottles of
medicine, 3 pairs of combat boots, 1 ID card (VN) and assorted clothing and doc-
uments. The complex was destroyed.

The 2/503d Inf conducted an air movement from LZ Brown (YS 583729) to

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Position Papa and assumed the security of the FSB at the location. C/5/503d Inf was moved to Position Washington to secure the Brigade CP and act as the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). At 1805 hours, a patrol from A/5/503d Inf cleared the area camps discovered on the 26th of August at YS 540760. The area contained a number of large buildings with 60-70 man classrooms. In addition they found 2 M-67 rifle grenade launchers, 3 pair of wire cutters, 200 feet of detonating wire, 15 blasting caps, 4 blocks of TNT, 50 sets of eating utensils, 50 VC flags, 200 pounds of commo equipment including 1 M16/10 (SN 6850), 2 AN/GHC-9 speakers, and documents including an SOI item.

At 1330 hours, C/4/503d Infantry found a VC camp containing claymore mines, 4 huts, 75 tables and a personnel area for 100-120 people. In addition, they found 4 entrenching tools, 7 VC ponchos, 2 khaki uniforms and 1 US baseball cap with a LIT bar. At 1030 hours, recon platoon from the 4/503d Inf near YS 537858 found the following items: 78 rounds of 57mm RR ammunition, 5 AK-50 assault rifles, 3 Thompson submachineguns, 3 BAR's, 6 M-1 rifles, 2 M-1 carbines w/o stocks, 1 MG (unknown type), one (1) 60mm mortar complete, 1 bolt action weapon (unknown type), and 90,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

The 2/18th Inf continued to conduct search and destroy operations in AO 11 (YS 543734). The 3/319 Arty supported Operation "Toledo" from Position Papa (YS 538769). At 1645 hours, a patrol from C/3/319th Arty contacted 12 VC, 9 of whom were armed. Three VC were killed with no friendly casualties. 1 VN male, 7 VN women and 16 children were evacuated from the same area.

TF Ranger conducted operations in the vicinity of Position Tango with no contact.

D + 18 (28 August 1966)

1. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf conducted search and destroy operations near Position Yellow. At 1600 hours, B/1/503d Inf located a small VC base camp at YS 614775. They received light sniper fire which they returned at 4 fleeing VC who escaped to the west. There were no US casualties. The 4 huts in the base
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Camp were destroyed and small arms ammunition and documents were evacuated. At 1655 hours, the recon platoon of the 1/503d Inf received fire from 3 black clad VC, who fled east when fire was returned.

The 2/503d Inf secured the FSB at Position Papa and the Brigade CP at Position Washington, sending out patrols reporting negative contact.

The 4/503d Inf continued clearing the base complex at YS 540860. CS crystals were utilized to temporarily deny future VC inhabitation. At 1230 hours, B/4/503d Inf found two chicon D-4-10 mines, which they destroyed at YS 544854. At 1001 hours, C/4/503d Inf found an extensive tunnel complex including 7 bunkers with overhead cover. The tunnels were destroyed and the ammunition, weapons magazines, mortar plotting board and a VC flag were evacuated. The 4/503d Inf remained in the area overnight.

The 2/18th Inf moved south in AO 11 (YS 563692). At 1400 hours, near YS 552704, they received sniper fire, which was returned with negative results.

E/17th Cav moved south to YS 460878 and extracted an ambush patrol that had remained in that location. They apprehended 2 VC during the night. The VC were evacuated to the 172d MI Det.

TF Ranger swept south, astride Highway 2. At 1000 hours, at YS 460896, the 33d Ranger Battalion hit a pressure type mine, resulting in 1 KIA and 2 WIA. An APC of the 5th Cav (ARVN) hit a pressure type mine at 1005 hours at YS 459900, resulting in light damage to the APC and no casualties. TF Ranger evacuated 42 refugees from YS 403860 to the town of Binh Gia (YS 780770).

D + 20 (30 August 1966)

u. The 173d airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf continued search and destroy operations in the vicinity of LZ Yellow. At 1015 hours, the C/1/503d Inf located a hut at YS 595751, containing 50 pounds of wheat, 25 pounds of rice and miscellaneous clothing which were all destroyed by fire. At 1100 hours, B/1/503d Inf continued to clear the base complex at YS 605752. The 2/503d Inf continued its security
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mission of Position Papa and Washington.

The 4/503d Inf continued to clear the base complex at Y: 540860. At 1302 hours, A/4/503d Inf contacted 3 VC armed with automatic weapons who fled without loss when fired upon. At 1605 hours, C/4/503d Inf recovered the bodies of 2 VC in grey uniforms, wrapped in blue cloth and less than a week old.

The 2/18th Inf moved by air from LZ Pink (YS 576688) to Position Red and prepared to stand down.

TF Ranger, at YS 450830, continued operations south of Route 2, made contact with an estimated 10 VC in heavy packs and camouflage helmets, who escaped to the west when fired on.

W + 21 (31 August 1966)

v. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d conducted search and destroy operations near LZ Yellow (YS 560874) with negative results.

The 2/503d continued its security missions at Position Papa and Position Washington. At 1400 hours, a patrol from B/2/503d Inf evacuated a wounded VC male to B Med. The man was found in a hut at YS 526774. He seemed to be the victim of hand I fires.

The 4/503d Inf moved from Position Romeo to LZ Flounder (YS 503851). At 1335 hours, B/4/503d Inf contacted 6 VC at YS 568850 who fled when fired on, with no losses to either side. At 1600 hours, C/4/503d Inf made contact with an unknown number of VC and received 15 rounds of small arms fire, which was returned with no casualties to either side.

The 2/18th Inf stood down at Position Red. E/17th Cav conducted a roadrunner operation south along Route 2. At 0910 hours, E/17th Cav captured 1 VC and two rifles at YS 541894, and observed 2 suspects running west. A patrol was left in the area and at 1649 hours, they ambushed and killed two VC who returned to the area. TF Ranger continued their sweep along Route 2. At 0950 hours, they made contact with 6 VC at YS 449818, killing 1 by body count and capturing 1 VC WIA and two VC. TF Ranger moved on to YS 466798.
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D + 22 (1 September 1966)

w. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of LZ Yellow, with no contact.

The 2/503d Inf made no contact in the security of Position Papa and Position Red. A/2/13th Arty and A/1/7th Arty moved by CH-47 aircraft from Position Papa to Position Emerald (YS 433742).

E/17th Cav's roadrunner operation, south along Route 2 to YS 464805 experienced negative results. At 1615 hours, helicopter from A/82d Aviation received a/w fire from YS 546874, sustaining no hits.

TF Ranger was released from operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) at 0800 hours.

D + 23 (2 September 1966)

x. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued to conduct Operation "Toledo" southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf commenced an air assault on LZ Diamond (YS 365866) at 1216 hours, closing at 1317 hours. They then moved south in AO 15 to the vicinity of objective 151 (YS 375847).

The 2/503d Inf air landed at Position Ruby (YS 415876) closing at 1635 hours. C/2/503d Inf was air lifted from Position Washington to LZ Ruby and the 2/503d Inf was reconstituted.

The 4/503d Inf (-) air landed at LZ Ruby at 0834 hours and secured the area for the landing of the 3/319th Arty. The recon platoon from 4/503d Inf air lifted to Position Red to secure the FSB there.

The 2/18th Inf conducted an air assault on LZ Jade (YS 350778), commencing at 1010 hours and closing at 1043 hours. At 1515 hours, near YS 342773, they located a base camp containing 5 huts, 3 bunkers, numerous trenches and foxholes, 50 pounds of rice and 20 pounds of corn, all of which they destroyed.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

15 December 1966

TF Saber, E/17th Cav, D/16th Armor, A/4/503d Inf and the 4.2 mortar platoon from 2/503d Inf, moved by road convoy from Position Washington to Position Ruby, and secured the area for the air landing of 4/503d Inf (-). At 0815 hours, E/17th Cav located a VC base camp at YS 396867, containing 8 huts and 3 bunkers which were destroyed in place. 2 VC suspects were observed running to the southwest successfully managing an escape.

The 3/319th Arty moved to Position Ruby by CH-47 aircraft, closing at 1618 hours.

D + 24 (3 September 1966)

y. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Teleda" southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf continued to conduct search and destroy operations in AO 15 and moved toward objective 151 (YS 367835). At 0900 hours, C/1/503d Inf discovered a tunnel at YS 373837, containing 3 rifle grenade launchers, 3 81mm mortar bi-pods, 1 81mm tube, 1 flare pistol, one (1) .38 caliber automatic pistol, two (2) 57mm recoilless rifles, 2 Thompson submachineguns, 2 chrome rifles, one (1) 57mm recoilless rifle with tripod, assorted hand grenades, mortar rounds, RR ammunition and small arms ammunition. At 1440 hours, C/1/503d Inf located a camp at YS 343867, containing 23 huts and numerous documents. They made contact with 6 VC who escaped. One building appeared to be a POW compound.

The 2/503d Inf made no contact in AO 16 (YS 413816). The BSOC at Position Red and the FSB at Position Ruby were secured by 4/503d Inf. One company of 4/503d Inf was put under the operational control of E/17th Cav.

The 2/18th Inf continued to conduct screening patrols around LZ Jade. At 1400 hours, the 2/18th Inf destroyed a tunnel system at YS 395760, which showed no sign of recent use.

E/17th Cav, with D/16th Armor and one company from 4/503d Inf, moved with the Brigade TAC CP from Position Washington to Position Ruby, closing at 1330 hours. At 0905 hours, elements of E/17th Cav suffered 2 WIA's from a command detonated claymore mine at YS 448978.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

D + 24 (4 September 1966)

a. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf continued search and destroy operations near objective 151 (YS 375845) and 152 (YS 370035). At 1037 hours, A/1/503d Inf located a bunker system at YS 371829, which contained mines, explosives and detonating devices. At 1150 hours, A/1/503d Inf discovered a cache at YS 371829, which contained 19 US maps, 10 grenades, 2 wrenches, 3 entrenching tools, 195 rounds of linked 50 caliber ammunition, 142 ½-pound blocks of TNT, 2 large claymores, 1 pair of US M-1, 1 pair of fuse crimpers and 1 pair of wire cutters. C/1/503d Inf located a cache at YS 374846, which contained one (1) 81mm mortar round, 2 mark 11 grenades, 1 incendiary grenade, 1 M-1 grenade launcher and 2 potato masher type grenades. The huts and trenches were destroyed. Later at YS 379847, they found a boobytrapped 81mm mortar round and many hand grenades.

The 2/503d Inf continued search and clear operations in AO 16, near objective 162 (YS 408828). The 4/503d Inf secured the FSB at Position Ruby, Position Red and the BSOC at Xuan Loc.

TF Saber, with E/17th Cav, D/16th Armor, a rifle company from 4/503d Inf, and the 3d Troop/5th Cav, moved south along Route 2 near Cam Tan (YS 375995) and then conducted a mounted sweep west through the Ong Que rubber plantation. At 1050 hours, E/17th Cav established contact with 10 - 15 VC near YS 343948. The VC fled north and south, then east. Punji parts and boobytraps were found. At 1310 hours, E/17th Cav captured one male VC at YS 369930. By 1800 hours, E/17th Cav had collected 300 refugees who were sent to Xuan Loc by CH-47 with an MP escort. Seventeen (17) males, of military age, were held as VC. S5 coordinated their disposition with local officials.

The 2/18th Inf conducted screening patrols near LZ Jade (YS 350776) with no contact.
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

D + 26 (6 September 1966)

aa. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf continued search and destroy operations in AO 15 with negative results.

The 2/503d Inf continued search and destroy operations in AO 16 and moved to YS 456842. At 1648 hours, A/2/503d Inf received 2 rounds of small arms fire from 3 VC at YS 445837. The VC fled northeast and were pursued with negative contact. 2/18th Inf patrolled near LZ Jade, AO 17, resulting in negative contact.

E/17th Cav conducted a roadrunner operation between Position Emerald and Xuan Loc. Sniper fire was received from YS 437919 at 0840 hours and at 1635 hours. A stay-behind patrol was left in the area. At 1500 hours, E/17th Cav picked up one VCS at YS 455878.

A/2/13th Arty moved from Position Emerald to Xuan Loc, closing at 1614 hours. 160 pounds of RCA (riot control agent) CS-1 (micropulverized) was delivered by a UH-1B aircraft from A/82d Aviation, at 1630 hours, at a base camp at YS 542851 and a cache area at YS 534858. This restricted VC entry into known caches.

The 3d Troop/5th Cav (ARVN) participated in the security of Position Ruby.

D + 27 (6 September 1966)

bb. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued Operation "Toledo" southwest of Xuan Loc. The 1/503d Inf continued operations in AO 16. At 1100 hours, A/1/503d Inf contacted 2 VC who fled from YS 349836 with negative results. A/1/503d Inf destroyed 2 huts and 2 tons of rice at this location. At 1445 hours, A/1/503d Inf received 1 US KIA from sniper fire at YS 349841. A/1/503d Inf, at 1910 hours, reported 1 VC WIA (poss) resulting from a contact with 6-10 VC at YS 352838. The 2/503d Inf moved from AO 16 by road convoy to Bien Hoa base camp, closing at 1326 hours. The 4/503d Inf continued its security missions with Company A receiving 2 grenades at 2200 hours with no casualties. The 173d MP platoon removed a boobytrapped roadblock just east of the junction of Highway 1 and Highway 20.

The 2/18th Inf, extracted from LZ Jade by 1030 hours, was relieved from
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15 December 1966

operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). At 1505 hours, at
Xuan Loc, the 2/35th Arty and AHVN cav were released from the operational control
of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate).

D + 28 (7 September 1966)

cc. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) terminated Operation "Toledo"
at 1600 hours. The 1/503d Inf moved by road convoy from Xuan Loc to Bien Hoa,
closing at 1430 hours with no contact. The 4/503d Inf moved by road convoy from
Position Ruby to Bien Hoa closing at 1338 hours. The 3/321st Arty moved by road
convoy from Position Ruby to Bien Hoa, closing 1217 hours, with TF Saber. C/2/32d
Arty, at 1348 hours, was released from the operational control of the 173d Air-
borne Brigade (Separate) when they closed from Xuan Loc.

IV. Civic Action and Psychological Operations: The S5 activities were con-
ducted in three phases during Operation "Toledo: Toledo I, Toledo II, Toledo III.
The S5 section centered its activities in the following areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VILLAGE</th>
<th>LOCATION/PHASE</th>
<th>LOCATION/PHASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gia Ray</td>
<td>YT630120 I</td>
<td>Hung Loc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suoi Cat</td>
<td>YT592065 I</td>
<td>Suoi Tre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Phu</td>
<td>YT530670 I II III</td>
<td>Nui Tung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suoi Cat II</td>
<td>YT578065 I</td>
<td>Tan Lap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tran Hung Dao</td>
<td>YT363100 II</td>
<td>Ba Hao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Cam Tam</td>
<td>YT440055 II III</td>
<td>Nui Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoi Giao</td>
<td>YT535015 II III</td>
<td>Bao Binh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Phong</td>
<td>YT438045 II III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Toledo I: (11 August 1966 - 22 August 1966)

(1) MEDCAP/DETCAP:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MEDCAP PATIENTS</th>
<th>DETCAP PATIENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug 66</td>
<td>Gia Ray</td>
<td>YT630120</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>Gia Ray</td>
<td>YT630120</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug 66</td>
<td>Gia Ray</td>
<td>YT630120</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Psychological Operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Amount/Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Surrender or Die&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Chieu Hoi/Surrender&quot;</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;ARVN/Allied Power&quot;</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;173d Will Find You&quot;</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Chieu Hoi&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Aug 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Surrender&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;173d Scare/Surrender&quot;</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Chieu Hoi&quot;</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Safe Conduct&quot;</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Aug 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Surrender&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Safe Conduct&quot;</td>
<td>211,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Surrender/Power&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;173d/Power&quot;</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL Leaflets Dropped** ........................................... 801,000

**TOTAL Leaflet missions** ........................................... 8

**TOTAL Speaker missions** ........................................... 3
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

(i) Distribution:

- Cooking oil (cases) .................................................. 11
- Beans (cases) .......................................................... 4
- Clothing (pounds) ...................................................... 575
- Borax (cases) ........................................................... 14
- Soup (cases) ............................................................. 10
- Candy (pounds) ......................................................... 5
- Soap (cases) ............................................................. 11
- Tools (miscellaneous) ................................................ 48

b. Toledo II: (23 August 1966 - 1 September 1966) On 28 August 1966, in coordination with Phuoc Tuy Province Officials and Advisors, the 55 assisted in the evacuation of approximately 40 families from the town of Ba Mao (YS 599-758). These families had long been situated in a VC dominated area outside GVN control. The 55 made clothing, soup, milk, soap and candy available to the refugees at the relocated area, vicinity Binh Gia (YS 65777). Also, the services of an AEVN Psy Ops team were utilized with good results during phase II of Operation "Toledo". Toledo totals of phase II are:

(1) MEDCAP/DENTCAP:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MEDCAP PATIENTS</th>
<th>DENTCAP PATIENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Aug 66</td>
<td>Tran Hung Dao</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Aug 66</td>
<td>New Cam Tan</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hung Loc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 66</td>
<td>Suoi Tra</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nui Tung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug 66</td>
<td>Tan Lap</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug 66</td>
<td>New Cam Tan</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Aug 66</td>
<td>Nui Do</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gia Lew</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Aug 66</td>
<td>Tan Phong</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thoi Giao</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15 December 1966

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MIDUCA Patients</th>
<th>DENTCUP Patients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 66</td>
<td>Ho Cong</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thoi Giao</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sep 66</td>
<td>Hinh Cau Tan</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tran Hung Dao</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>165</td>
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(2) Psychological Operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>AMOUNT/TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Scare&quot;</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Aug 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Surrender&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Chieu Hoi&quot;</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Power&quot;</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;VC Loneliness&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Aug 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Surrender&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;VC Living Conditions&quot;</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Victory&quot;</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Aug 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Surrender&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Chieu Hoi&quot;</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;175d Will Find You&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Return to Your Family&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL Leaflets Dropped ................................ 890,000
TOTAL Leaflet missions .................................. 4
TOTAL Speaker missions .................................. 5
National Productivity Magazines ....................... 50
JUSPAO Newsletters ..................................... 200

(3) Distribution:
Cooking Oil (cases) .................................... 5
Beans (cases) ........................................... 14
**CONFIDENTIAL**

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**SUBJECT:** Combat Operations After Action Report

**Reporting Period:**

- Clothing (pounds) .......... 100
- Soup (cases) ............... 9
- Soap Powder (cases) ........ 11
- Milk Powder (cases) ....... 3

**c. Tsung Liel:** (2 September 1966 - 7 September 1966)

1. **MEDCAP/DENTCAP:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MEDCAP PATIENTS</th>
<th>DENTCAP PATIENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Sep 66</td>
<td>Tan Phong</td>
<td>YT437048</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sep 66</td>
<td>ARVN Area</td>
<td>YT446676</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sep 66</td>
<td>Hung Loc</td>
<td>YT322095</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sep 66</td>
<td>Tan Phong</td>
<td>YT437048</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** .......... 629 .......... 90

2. **Psychological Operations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>AMOUNT/TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Sep 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;173d&quot;</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Surrender&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;VC Letter&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sep 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Surrender&quot;</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Safe Conduct&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Safe Conduct&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sep 66</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>&quot;Safe Conduct&quot;</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Chieu Hoi&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sep 66</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>&quot;Chieu Hoi&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Return to Your Family&quot;</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL Leaflets Dropped** .......... 270,000

**TOTAL Leaflet missions** .......... 3

**TOTAL Speaker missions** .......... 1

**National Productivity Magazines** .......... 75

**JUSPAO Newsletters** .......... 200

3. **Distribution:**

- Beans (cases) .......... 2
15. Administrative Matters: To support operation "Toledo", a Brigade Support Operations Center (BSOC) was established at Gia Ray and later, when the Brigade moved to a different area of operations (AU), a BSOC was established at Xuan Loc. Included in the BSOC complex were elements of Co "B" Med, Co "C" SAT, Co "D" Maintenance, and BSO, 173d Support Battalion. Infantry battalions and 3/319th Arty trains were also located at the BSOC complex. Security for the BSOC at Gia Ray was provided by elements of Troop E, 17th Cav and Company D, 16th Armor while security at Xuan Loc was provided by Platoons from E/17th Cav and 4/503d Inf.

a. Supply and Transportation: Resupply of the Brigade was accomplished daily by road convoy (Land LOC) from Bien Hoa/Long Binh to Gia Ray and later to Xuan Loc. The 173d Support Battalion furnished Class I, II, and IV items while the 1st Logistical Command units furnished Class III, IIIA, and V items. Three officers and twenty-four enlisted men operated the Brigade Supply Office. Resupply of the forward infantry battalions and forward artillery elements was accomplished by UH-1 and CH-47 aircraft, utilizing a total of 748 and 163 sorties respectively for the entire operation. Elements that were in road contact with the BSOC were resupplied by road convoy. A total of 3,194.2 short tons (ST) of supplies were handled during the operation. Breakdown by Class of supply is as follows:

- Class I ........................................... 600.6 tons
- Class II & IV .................................... 81.9 tons
- Class III & IIIA .................................. 980.4 tons
- Class V ......................................... 1,531.3 tons

A graves registration (GR) team was attached to the Brigade and provided GR coverage. A shower point facility was established by an element of the 266th Supply and Service Battalion.

b. Maintenance: A contact team from Company D Maintenance, 173d Support Battalion, provided direct support (DS) maintenance employing two officers and 26
enlisted men. Support was provided for all types of equipment organic to the Brigade except aviation, chemical, medical, cryptographic and quartermaster air items. Back up maintenance and supply support was provided by Co D Maintenance which remained at Bien Hoa. Daily resupply was accomplished by armed vehicle convoys between Bien Hoa and the forward area. Unserviceable direct exchange (DI) items and unserviceable major assemblies were evacuated to Bien Hoa on the return movement of the daily resupply convoys. During Operation "Toledo", a total of 389 jobs were received. Detailed breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>JOBS RECEIVED</th>
<th>JOBS COMPLETED</th>
<th>JOBS UNCOMPLETED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Maintenance</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jobs not completed, at the time the operation terminated, were returned to Bien Hoa where necessary repairs are being made.

c. Medical: Company B Med provided medical support for Operation "Toledo", employing four officers and 37 enlisted men, offering full medical, surgical, and dental support. One surgeon from the 7th Surgical Hospital was attached to the Brigade for the entire operation. The forward clearing station served as the primary evacuation facility, receiving patients via Dustoff helicopter. Patients requiring further medical attention were evacuated via helicopter or road convoy, depending on the nature and seriousness of the injury. A twenty bed holding facility was maintained in the field with a 72 hours holding policy. Back up support was maintained by Company B Med at Bien Hoa, the 3d MASH, and the 93d Evacuation Hospital. A total of 573 patients/casualties were treated during the entire operation.

d. Communications: The primary means of communication between units was FM voice radio, with interior comso provided by wire. A UHF reseptor was used between the forward Brigade TOC and the rear Brigade TOC. No problems were encountered with communications except the effect of water in AN/PRC-5 roadsets.
16. Results of Operation "Toledo": The statistical results of Operation "Toledo" serve to emphasize the nature of the fighting which was characterized by extremely short engagements with a fleeting enemy and the VC's preference of abandoning base camps and supplies rather than fighting. Operation "Toledo" resulted in the following losses:

a. US Forces (Losses):

   Personnel:
   KIA .................................................. 7
   WIA .................................................. 45
   MIA .................................................. 0
   Non Battle Dead ................................. 4
   Non Battle Injured ..................... 23

   Equipment Lost or Destroyed:
   1/2 Ton Truck M151 ................................. 2
   5 Ton Dump Truck M51A2 .......................... 1
   3/4 Ton Truck M37B1 .............................. 1
   APC M113 ........................................ 2
   Radio Set AN/VRC-47 .............................. 2
   Radio Set AN/GRC-125 ........................... 1
   Radio Set AN/VRC-53 ............................ 1
   Radio Set AN/VRC-25 ............................ 1

b. VC Forces (Losses):

   Personnel:
   KIA (BC) ........................................... 8
   KIA (pave) ..................................... 1
   VCC ................................................. 11
   VCS .................................................. 80

   Weapons:
   German Mauser Rifle ......................... 1
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicon M 556-Magnum Carbines</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK 56 SMG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson SMG</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US BAR's</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Rifles</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Carbines</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 Grenade Launchers</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-2 Carbines</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>57mm Recoilless</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-60 MG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verry Pistol</td>
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<tr>
<td>.38 Cal Automatic Pistol</td>
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Ammunition:

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<th>Ammunition Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>12.7mm rounds</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 Cal rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Arms rounds</td>
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<td>81mm Mortar rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>81mm (WP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.62mm Recoilless Rifle rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>57mm Recoilless Rifle rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>B40AT Rockets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicon AT Rockets</td>
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<tr>
<td>V/1 Rockets</td>
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<tr>
<td>DH-10 Claymore Mines</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Claymore Mine</td>
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<tr>
<td>US M111 AT Mine</td>
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<table>
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<th>Item</th>
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<tr>
<td>M-6 Mine</td>
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<tr>
<td>V-1 AP Mine</td>
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<tr>
<td>V-1 Mines</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore Torpedo</td>
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<tr>
<td>105mm Arty round (bootytrapped)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time Fuses</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slm Mortar Fuses</td>
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<td>Foodstuffs:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polished Rice (tons)</td>
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<td>Paddy Rice (tons)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat (pounds)</td>
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<td>Salt (tons)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sugar (tons)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooking Oil (gallons)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea (bags)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuc Mnt (bags)</td>
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<td>Cowa</td>
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<td>Installations:</td>
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<td>Base Camps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Huts</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunnel Systems</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Special Equipment:

a. Due to the dense vegetation and lack of suitable clearings for landing zones in the operational area, it was necessary on many occasions to use power chain saws for preparing LZ's for extraction of casualties and resupply of equipment. These items of equipment proved to be invaluable in this task.
b. The chemical equipment detector was employed in the initial stages of the operation. It was found to be useless in jungle areas due to the operator being unable to move fast enough to stay beyond his own influence. Additionally, the equipment is bulky and fragile. Battery life is also unsatisfactory.

18. Commander's Analysis and Lessons Learned:

a. Commander's Analysis:

(1) Operation "Toledo" was directed at locating and destroying VC/NVA units in the Mao Tao Secret Zone and later to seek and destroy VC/NVA elements in Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces. The VC in these areas elected not to fight against the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). Of the 95 contacts, none were with elements larger than a VC platoon. In every case the VC fled after initial contact.

(2) It was determined that the 5th VC Division (Main Force) had no fixed installation in the Mao Tao area. Personnel of the 250th NVA infiltration group were found, indicating their infiltration. The most significant aspect of Operation "Toledo" was the large scale capture and destruction of vast quantities of weapons, ammunition, equipment and food stuffs found in the operational area, indicating extensive VC supply and cache activities. Introduction of the Brigade into the May Tao disrupted the plans and movement of VC units within the AO.

(3) The Civic Action/Psychological Operations program which was coordinated with local Vietnamese officials had a significant effect on the people in the area. The image of the American soldier improved greatly by the constructive actions of our troops. In addition, aid and sanitation measures were provided for the Vietnamese people through the distribution of foodstuffs, medical and dental treatment by MEDCAP and DENTCAP teams. Repairs and construction by the 173d Engineers also enhanced the American image in these areas. The security provided by the presence of US forces, not only relieved the people of their fear of the VC, but also strengthened the position of local Vietnamese Officials.
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was especial true where Vietnamese Ranger Battalions and the forces worked hand
in hand. However, these achievements were only temporary. Upon the withdrawal
of US troops, regression was experienced.

(4) Intelligence and medical supplies captured indicated that the
VC were hard hit by malaria. When elements of the 4/503rd Inf entered the area
and remained for several days they too were exposed and infected by the mosqui-
toes and at the end of the operation reported many cases of malaria.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) As with all operations, certain new techniques were developed
to increase efficiency of operations. In order to maintain an easily accessible
and free exchange of information (and due to the classified nature of the informa-
tion), it is necessary to keep the MI Detachment near the Brigade TOC. Separa-
tion of the MI Detachment from the TOC increases reaction time to intelligent
information. This separation restricts the flow of information and thus tends
to reduce the overall effectiveness of the unit.

(2) "Stay-Behind" ambush techniques again have proven to be invaluable.
When the mission objectives and need for resupply force the VC to return
to their base camp, stay behind ambush sites were effective in destroying the VC.
Stay behind ambushes should be equipped with claymore mines, an M60 machine gun
and a designated commander responsible for triggering the ambush.

(3) The increase in malaria cases made it necessary to take the
temperature of each man twice daily in order to evaluate potential cases prior
to each day's operation. If a man appeared to be running a fever, he could be
evacuated prior to commencement of the day's activities. Incidence of malaria
increased when units remained over night in former VC camps.

(4) When on patrol, it is vitally necessary that a line of communica-
tion (to the other elements in the unit) be open at all times. A radio failure
could mean the lives of every man on the patrol. One ambush patrol during this
operation had such failure after having spotted 75 - 100 VC. The importance of
keeping equipment in serviceable order can not be over-emphasized. One way of preventing failure is to insure that the AN/PRC-25 radio handset does not become wet by protecting it in a plastic bag. KHU's should at all times be sure that their equipment is in perfect working order.

(5) Troops employed have a tendency to fire prematurely when observing enemy troops. Additional indoctrination is necessary to emphasize the importance of letting the enemy move in closer with the higher possibility of achieving first round kills. Units must also conduct additional marksmanship training while in base camp with emphasis on rapid, snap fire shooting and aiming low.

(6) The Civil Affairs program has continued to enhance the relationship between US forces and Vietnamese populace. It has also been found that publicising the success of previous engagements has been effective in demoralizing VC elements. This type of Psychological Operation should be continued until such time that the VC realize the futility of their efforts.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. B. ROBERSON
CPT, AGO
Asst AG
ANNEX E - Operations Overlay - 8 August 1966 (Pages 1 & 2)
ANNEX A to FRAG ORDER 5 - Operations Overlay - 21 August 1966
ANNEX A to FRAG ORDER 6 - Operations Overlay - 23 August 1966
ANNEX A to FRAG ORDER 2 - Operations Overlay - 26 August 1966
ANNEX C to FRAG ORDER 10 - Operations Overlay - 30 August 1966
Combat After Action Report - Operation Toledo

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 10 Aug to 7 Sep 1966.

CG, 173d Airborne Brigade

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ABSTRACT