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AUTHORITY

GDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO, D/A ltr 29 1980

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1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, from 149th Military Intelligence Group for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CFC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
149th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

AVGJ-DOP

25 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational report for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1966

(U) The following report is submitted in accordance with USARV Regulation 870-2, 19 July 1966:

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

(C) The 149th MI Group (Collection) was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 1 June 1966 by authority of GO 203, Headquarters, Third United States Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330, dated 23 May 1966 as amended by GO 283 of that same headquarters, dated 19 July 1966, under TOE 30-500D, 59w/C6 and personnel modifications as set forth in the General Orders. The total authorized strength is 55 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 133 enlisted men. The mission of the Group is to perform a collection mission as set forth in AR 381-100. The unit was declared deployable after a final unit readiness inspection conducted by an Inspector General's team of Third US Army on 20 July 1966. It was determined that the Group would be deployed to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in two increments, the first to depart in August 1966 and the second to depart in November 1966. The first increment, consisting of 23 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 68 enlisted men departed Fort Bragg on 9 August 1966 and departed Oakland Army Terminal aboard the USNS William S. Weigel on 10 August 1966. The first increment arrived in RVN on 1 September 1966 and was immediately assigned to USAIV. The 149th MI Group was further assigned to the 525th MI Group, effective 1 September 1966 by authority of GO 5568, Headquarters U.S. Army Vietnam, dated 7 September 1966.

(C) The 12th MI Detachment (Lie Detector) was activated on 1 June 1966 at Fort Bragg, north Carolina, by authority of GO 171, Headquarters Third US Army, dated 5 May 1966 as amended by GO 221, of that headquarters, dated 2 June 1966, under TOE 30-500D, 59w/C6. The total authorized strength is 2 warrant officers. This detachment deployed to RVN in company with the 149th MI Group (see above) and was assigned to the 525th MI Group effective 1 September 1966 by authority of GO 5585, Headquarters, USAIV, dated 8 September 1966. The 12th MI Det was further assigned to the 149th MI Group effective 1 September 1966 by authority of GO 141, Headquarters, 525th MI Group, dated 16 September 1966.

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C Company, 519th MI BN (Fld A), was attached to the 149th MI Group effective 1 September 1966 by authority of GO 39, Headquarters, 525th MI Group, dated 8 September 1966.

On 1 June 1966, the 184th MI Company (Collection) was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, per General Order 203, Headquarters Third United States Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia, dated 23 May 1966 as amended by General Order 283, Headquarters, Third United States Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia, dated 19 July 1966. Authorized strength of the unit is 24 officers and 46 enlisted men. The first enlisted man was assigned to the unit on 26 June 1966. By 10 July 1966, thirty of the enlisted men who were to be deployed with the unit were present for duty. On 15 July 1966, 22 officers joined the unit. Initial inspection of unit readiness was conducted by Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps on 6 August 1966. Normal PCM training and processing was completed on 15 August 1966. Final inspection of unit readiness was conducted by Headquarters, Third United States Army on 18 August 1966. In conjunction with the PCM training and processing, TOE equipment was drawn. The units vehicles and non essential equipment was transported from Fort Bragg, North Carolina to Norfolk, Virginia on 22 August 1966. Minimum essential equipment (Red Tat) was shipped from Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 27 August 1966. On 6 September 1966 all personnel had returned from pre embarkation leave. On 10 September 1966, the main body of the 184th, consisting of 19 officers and 33 enlisted men deployed from Oakland, California aboard the USNS Goliath, arriving at Vung Tau, RVN, on 3 October 1966. On 17 September 1966, the advance party of the 184th MI Company consisting of 3 officers and 1 enlisted man deployed from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, via C-130 on a direct flight to RVN, arriving at TSN AB on 20 September 1966. Upon arrival of the main body of the company, the unit was assigned to the 525th MI Group, per GO 5955, Headquarters USARV, dated 6 October 1966, effective 3 October 1966, and was further assigned to the 149th MI Group.

Because of the nature of the mission in RVN, it has become impossible to effectively use the various attached and assigned sub-units of the 149th MI Group as originally organized in their TOE form. Instead, it has become necessary to organize the 149th MI Group along more functional lines corresponding with missions and tasks. A modified TOE to reflect this functional organization is being prepared for submission. Schematics depicting the present organizational structure of the Group headquarters and subordinate elements are shown as Enclosure 1.

Although the 149th was taxed with organization problems and absorbing smaller units as they arrived in country the Group was never the less successfully operationally engaged in the performance of its mission from 1 September 1966 to 31 October 1966. From 1 August 1966 to 1 September 1966 the unit was engaged in training and troop movement. During the reporting period this Group produced 2,428 information reports. The percentage of reports evaluated 3 or higher has increased from 71% to 78%. Production and delivery time of information reports to the analysts on the MOSV staff has been reduced from 8 days to one day.

A Mission and Functions Manual for the Group was prepared and is being published.

A Special Administration Manual was completed and distributed to operational elements of the Group. In conjunction with the publication of the SOP all source decisions were re-visited for better operational reference and control.
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(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

(U) A Security SOP was revised and distributed to all elements of the Group.

(U) A visitor control and badge system was implemented in the Group Headquarters.

(U) This Group received a letter of appreciation from Major General John Horton, Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for the support rendered his command by certain operational elements of this Group during Operations Thayer I and II and Irving. Copy of letter is attached as Inclosure 2.

(C) Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements levied upon this Headquarters are researched and developed by the Collection Branch in order to provide more specific collection guidance and direction to operational elements in the field. This has resulted in more comprehensive information reports being received by the tactical commander and this Headquarters from our field elements.

SECTION II

Part I
Observations (Lessons Learned)

Personnel

(C) Item: Travel restrictions resulting from Special Intelligence Security Clearances.

(C) Discussion: As personnel of this organization are drawn from various intelligence military occupational specialties, the number of personnel under security travel restrictions is high. Many personnel arrive in the Republic of Vietnam and are held in the Saigon area while a determination of waiver, release, etc. is pending thereby severely hampering the operations of the Group.

(C) Observations: Some method of identifying and processing of release applications should be initiated prior to arrival in RVN.

OPERATIONS

(C) Item: Timely reporting of intelligence information to the tactical commanders.

(C) Discussion: One of the biggest problems encountered is with communications. The timely reporting of intelligence information to the tactical commander to enable him to act before the information becomes history is of utmost importance to this Group as well as to the field tactical elements.

(C) Observation: A more sophisticated communication net is needed to speed up the reporting of intelligence information to the tactical commanders.

TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

(C) Item: Training class for B Detachment 57, 5th Special Forces Group, on clandestine collection.

(C) Discussion: Due to B Detachment 57, 5th Special Forces having a collection mission and not having a sufficient number of clandestine collection trained personnel, this Group provided designated personnel of the Detachment an abbreviat...
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training course on clandestine collection techniques. To fulfill instructor
requirements it was necessary to pull certain operational personnel of this group
from the field to conduct selected hours of instruction.

(C) Observation: Due to the war situation in Vietnam it is felt that training
of this nature should not be undertaken in country, but rather should be con-
ducted in OWMU or Okinawa in order to fulfill these Special Forces requirements.

LOGISTICS

(U) Item: Protection of OWI in vehicles during overseas shipment.

(U) Discussion: This organization experienced considerable loss, through
pilfering, of items stored in vehicles during shipment. For the most part these
items are difficult to replace in OWI.

(U) Observation: Locks should be placed on all storage compartments and on
spare tires during vehicle shipment.

LOGISTICS

(U) Item: Packaging of Red T&T cargo to prevent damage in shipment.

(U) Discussion: Because of the nature of Red T&T equipment (essential items
to be saved with the unit's stored cargo) packaging consists of suitable bulking
and bonding. Much of this organization's Red T&T material arrived in a dam-
aged condition.

(U) Observation: After due consideration is given to its weight, every
effort should be made to package and reinforce Red T&T material to prevent damage
or loss in transit.

LOGISTICS

(U) Item: Equipment that has been determined to be excess in OWI.

(U) Discussion: Although called for by the initial directive for an initial
activation, such equipment (e.g., rubber overshoes, mountain sleeping bags, etc.
trailers) has been found to be in excess to the needs of the unit. In addition
the equipment requires considerable maintenance to withstand the extremely
conditions.

(U) Observation: As a critical analysis should be made of essential
equipment for an intelligence collection unit and excesses reduced accordingly.

LOGISTICS

(U) Item: Movement of inessential items by Red T&T shipment.

(U) Discussion: This organization moved a considerable amount of individual
field gear, tents, etc., with every Red T&T shipment. While such items are

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essential for units landing in remote areas, this organization knew in advance that it was moving into a built up area and was being hosted by a subordinate element in RVN.

(U) Observation: Equipment such as tentage, rations, etc should be moved by Red T.T. as opposed to shipment by sealed cargo U.S.K. containers, only when conditions indicate debarkation at a remote area.

LOGISTICS

(C) Item: Lack of Support in obtaining essential operational housing.

(C) Discussion: Difficulty has been encountered in obtaining necessary approval for operational housing. Since arrival in country the Special Operations Battalion of the Group has had to re-locate three times, twice at the insistence of Headquarters Area Command, and at present is co-located with the Unilateral Battalion.

(C) Observation: Current operations are being severely hampered due to over crowded living conditions, lack of operation space, and lack of necessary compartmentation. Approval to obtain and maintain necessary operational sites would enhance the accomplishment of this Group's mission.

LOGISTICS

(C) Item: Lack of adequate billeting facilities for assigned personnel arriving from CONUS.

(C) Discussion: During the reporting period, difficulty was experienced in securing billets for incoming officers and enlisted men as Headquarters Area Command would not honor requests for billets from this organization. An interim arrangement, using seven (7) day certificates of non-availability of quarters, was made, but a final solution was not reached concerning these personnel whose assignments would require them to remain in Saigon.

(C) Observation: These unit assignment moves to Vietnam were directed by DA at the request of MACV. The support agencies in country are aware of pending arrivals of personnel and units; therefore, adequate billeting support could and should be made available to this headquarters.

SECTION II

Part 2

Recommendations

PERSONNEL

(C) Recommend that IS Branch take action to obtain a waiver or release of travel restrictions when personnel with Special Intelligence clearances are alerted for assignment to the Republic of Vietnam.

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(UCS CSFOR-65) (U)

OPERATIONS

(U) No recommendation is offered for this problem area. Steps are being taken to alleviate this problem in the preparations of this Group's modifications of Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE).

TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

(C) If US Special Forces are to assume an additional mission of clandestine collection, it is recommended that selected Special Forces Personnel be school trained at Fort Holabird and awarded the MOS. This would alleviate in-country training and would insure the proper conduct of collection operations on the part of Special Forces.

LOGISTICS

Recommend that necessary action be taken to insure this Group gets proper logistical support from Headquarters Area Command since this Group is assigned to USARV.

Recommend that unnecessary items of equipment be deleted from unit and personal equipment lists prior to leaving CONUS. In a unit have the unnecessary equipment causes undue administrative work and results in a storage and maintenance problem when equipment arrives in RVN.

WILLIAM O. PECK
Colonel, AIS
Commanding
HEdquarters, 525th Military Intelligence Group, APO 96307 6 February 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVG-DH, APO 96307

This Headquarters concurs with recommendations of 119th Military Intelligence Group, APO 96307.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
M.A. Freeman
MAJ, AIS
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307
18 FEB 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 149th Military Intelligence Group as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

   a. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Personnel, Page 3; and Part 2, Section II, Personnel, Page 5: Concur. Action is required at the Department of the Army level.

   b. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Operations, Page 3; and Section II, Part II, Preparations, Page 6: Concur. Efforts are currently being made to reduce the time lapse between initial (agent) acquisition of information and availability of raw intelligence to tactical commanders by expansion of radio reporting capability on the part of the agent.

   c. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Training and Organization, Pages 3 and 4 and Part 2, Section II, Item: Training and Organization, Page 6: Concur. Efforts to handle this problem have been coordinated between Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Holabird, Md. A new course has been established at US Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, to instruct company grade officers from Fort Bragg destined for Vietnam assignments. It is recommended that, wherever feasible, instructors for such abbreviated training course be veterans of the Vietnamese conflict who have served in some capacity within the field of clandestine collection, as the nature and many of the problems involved locally are peculiar to Vietnam and may sometimes not be within the scope of formal curriculum offered by the US Army Intelligence School.
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   d. Reference Part I, Section II, Items: Lack of Support in Obtaining Essential Operational Housing and Lack of Adequate Billeting Facilities for Assigned Personnel Arriving from CONUS; Page 5; Part II, Section II, Logistics, 1st Paragraph, Page 6: Most operational and living areas in Saigon are overcrowded at the present time. However, as the relocation of units out of the Saigon area progresses, this condition will improve.

   e. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Equipment That has been determined to be excess in RVN, Page 4; and Part II, Section II, Logistics, 2d Paragraph, Page 6: Considerable discretion and judgement must accompany a decision made on deleting equipment for deploying units. Diversion of units while intransit and changes in unit missions and stationing plans, makes it extremely risky to chance deletion of items of equipment and supply in anticipation that they will not be required. It is preferred that units find themselves with excess equipment on hand following arrival rather than be in a position of having requirements that may not be available in-country. In this regard, units are authorized turn-in of equipment and supplies excess to their requirements after they have become operational.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THURSTON
Brig. Gen., AGC
Assistant Commanding
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

ROBERT L. BURCH
Lt Col, AG
Asst AG
**Operation Title:** Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 149th Military Intelligence Group

**Descriptive Notes:**
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Jun to 31 Oct 1966.

**Author(s):** CO, 149th Military Intelligence Gp

**Report Date:** 25 November 1966

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