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AD 510768

(1) The following report is submitted in accordance with U.S. Army Regulation 870-2, 19 July 1966:

SECTION 1
SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

(a) The battalion's operational duty included the performance of its mission for the entire reporting period, a total of 92 days.

(b) The primary mission, that of providing interpretation of aerial imagery taken by the U.S. Air Force in support of all front line ground forces in the Republic of Vietnam, was successfully accomplished during the reporting period. Approximately 5000 separate items of military significance were extracted from aerial imagery and were reported to combat units and headquarters supported by this battalion. These items were disseminated in the form of written reports (approximately 400), mosaics and/or map overlays and checklists.

(c) Secondary missions, reproduction of aerial imagery and delivery of imagery to the requesting units, showed a marked increase. Imagery reproduction increased from 66,000 feet in May to 120,000 feet in June and 142,000 feet in July. Aerial delivery on fixed and organic aircraft also showed a sharp increase from 257 in May to 2,000 in June and 320 in July.

(d) In addition to fulfilling its primary combat support mission, the battalion was able to assist numerous military and civilian organizations with various types of aerial reconnaissance support. Among the many projects developed from aerial imagery were the following:

- A detailed sketch map of the 6th Battalion Special Forces camp was prepared. It was annotated with the exact locations of the bodies of 4 Special Forces soldiers who were killed when the camp was attacked by the Viet Cong in March 1966. The sketch was used by 5th Special Forces to plan recovery of the bodies.

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bodies and subsequently by the Marines to plan an operation to destroy ammunition remaining in the camp. Both operations were successfully completed.

b. A rail and bridge study was undertaken for the Military Rail Service. This study is being used to prepare estimates and plans for the restoration of the entire rail system in the I Corps area.

c. An annotated town plan of Da Nang was prepared when it was discovered that existing maps and town plan were out of date and could not be used by U.S. Forces in the area for contingency planning.

d. A road study of a large portion of Highway 1 in II and III Corps areas was completed for 18th Engineer Brigade for operational planning purposes.

e. A mosaic of an area south of Da Nang was prepared for counterintelligence personal. It was used to debrief 2 Marine prisoners who escaped from a Viet Cong prison camp supposedly located in the general area.

f. A special study of the Song Thu Dan River (South of Da Nang) was completed for a U.S. Naval Advisory Group. This study is being used to formulate river patrol plans.

g. A defoliation study was undertaken of an area along the west coast of the IV Corps area and along the southern tip of Vietnam. This study was used to update maps and to plan future defoliation projects.

h. An annotated mosaic and report on a gravel and mineral deposit location was prepared for IV Corps Engineer Advisor.

i. A study of an area liberated by the Marines was conducted for U.S. Agency for International Development. The study covered building and crop damage in an area where USAID planned possible resettlement of approximately 4000 families.

(C) The battalion has continued to stress the utilization of imagery on file to all supported units. Utilization of the cataloging procedure originally initiated in January 1966 permitted 1042 requests to be filled from imagery on file during the reporting period. The monetary saving resulting from the use of imagery on file versus reflying the target areas is obvious. However, more important is the fact that those requests can be filled expeditiously, sometimes within hours. This latter point, speed in filling a mission request, is extremely significant in Vietnam where ground combat operations are often planned and executed within extremely limited time frames.

(U) To encourage the use of imagery on file, the battalion has initiated a procedure whereby the supported headquarters and major combat units are provided with a map overlay portraying imagery on file within each Corps area. This overlay includes the area covered by each target, imagery scale, date flown and mission...
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0 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

3. The use of aerial reconnaissance is still a problem area. The vast majority of U.S. and allied officers do not understand how the aerial reconnaissance system works nor do they understand how to utilize it properly to gain needed intelligence support for combat operations. Continuous liaison trips to supported units by MIBAS Detachment Commanders has assisted greatly as has the continual distribution of the 1st MIBAS booklet on aerial reconnaissance (Table 1). However, the basic problem still exists and will continue to exist until adequate coverage of the aerial reconnaissance field is presented at all branch and senior U.S. Army schools. Since an overwhelming percentage of all tactical intelligence information is gained through aerial reconnaissance, the subject should be thoroughly understood by all officers, not merely intelligence specialists.

(c) Reproduction of aerial imagery was hindered during the reporting period by a lack of spare parts and maintenance manuals for the 5 organic EE-49 Portable Infrared Recorder. A shortage of generator power to operate this equipment also hindered production. Initial relief was received by the action initiated by this B NSNS in February 1966 to introduce spare parts into normal supply channels. A few spare parts were received, but not in the required quantities nor number of operator issues needed. Personal purchase of projection bulbs from Sears Roebuck and Company kept the photographic printers of the battalion operating. (Following bulbs have been on requisition since February 1966: Lamp, projection, D 11, 21 volt, FSN 6540-901-6737; Lamp, projection, G 11, 150W, 120V, FSN).

(c) The generator problem was also partially solved during the reporting period. Again, a shortage of engine parts was primarily responsible for an average of two-thirds of the 10 authorized generators being on deadline during the reporting period. Complicating the parts problem is the fact that the battalion's organic generators are manufactured by 6 different firms and consist of 10 different models. Partial relief was afforded when the Assistant 64 of USNSL was made aware of the problem. By giving the battalion priority in the various generator repair facilities and by the issuance of 3 new generators, the power problem has been alleviated to a great extent.

(c) The need for newer and faster aircraft to accomplish the film delivery mission was noted during the reporting period. The U6 aircraft currently authorized is too slow and its range too limited. Since approximately 20% of all aerial deliveries are made by air drop, a requirement exists for an aircraft with both a vertical landing/take off capability as well as horizontal speed. Further, the R-24-44 (24) and R-24-55 (UA) radios in the U6 are not entirely satisfactory. Radio contact with flight-following stations is often lost when flying over the mountainous
areas of Vietnam. Single sideband radios are needed.

(U) The inadequacy of the U6 to perform the delivery mission was recognized whilst the battalion was stationed at Fort Bragg. A recommended TOE change was submitted to the U.S. Army Combat Development Command Intelligence Agency recommending that 6 XV-4A Hummingbird or aircraft with similar capabilities be authorized when finally approved for purchase by the U.S. Army. (Letter, ATMG-TICO, Eq. 1st MI BN (ARS), subject TOE Change Recommendations (Delivery Platoon), 8 April 1965. The validity of this recommendation has been confirmed here in Vietnam.

(C) This battalion has not received all of its FCXM requisitions of mission essential equipment even though these items were originally requisitioned in September 1965. Items falling in this category are:

- 24 each Light Tables, GPL-918
- 8 each Light Tables, GPL-940 with MD optics kit
- 16 each Survival kit, hot climate
- 16 each Survival kit, over water
- 4 each Generator, 60 KW

(U) After being queried by this headquarters, Army Material Command Logistical Control Office, Fort Mason stated that the 4 generators would be shipped from the manufacturer on 30 September 1966. Despite repeated attempts to ascertain the status of the light tables, this battalion still has not been informed. The last message of inquiry sent to USAVMICO, Fort Mason on 29 June 1966 has not been answered to date.

SECTION 2
Part 1
Observations (Lessons Learned)

Personnel

(U) Item: Two year obligated tour lieutenants.

(U) Discussion: Many obligated tour lieutenants appear to leave the service because they have no sense of accomplishment while on active duty. In the last 16 months that this battalion spent at Fort Bragg, no lieutenants in this category could be convinced to remain on active duty. Here in Vietnam, 4 out of 15 lieutenants changed their category to voluntary indefinite within the first 6 month in-country.
6 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
(RE: CSFOR-65)(U)

(U) Observation: Service in Vietnam gives a young, impressive officer the opportunity to do a worthwhile job and increases the chances of retaining him on active duty.

Operation

(U) Item: Deployment of a MIARS Battalion in a counterinsurgency operation.

(C) Discussion: This battalion has a separate detachment which provides direct support to and is physically located in each of the 4 Vietnamese Tactical Corps areas. This is a departure from the normally accepted method of employment, that of stationing detachments with Air Force reconnaissance squadrons on widely separated airfields.

(U) Observation: The current deployment and method of providing direct support to combat units engaged in counterinsurgency operations is successful and appears tactically sound.

Training and Organization

(U) Item: G2 Air Course, U.S. Army Intelligence School.

(U) Discussion: Subject course was eliminated in 1963.

(U) Observation: Many officers assigned to G2/S2 Air positions are untrained and appear to know little about the aerial reconnaissance field.

(U) Item: New imagery interpretation equipment.

(U) Discussion: New techniques and equipment are constantly being developed in the imagery interpretation field. This equipment is available, but is not being automatically authorized nor provided to field units. In fact, the field units are often unaware that new and better equipment exists. For example, TOE 30-6 and 30-7 authorize the AR 18 light table. This is a LTI model that is obsolete. Two generations of light tables have been developed since the AR 18. Since newer and more efficient models are available, they should be authorized without a unit having to request them on a TOE.

(U) Observation: Current TOE's authorizing imagery interpretation equipment are not being changed automatically to authorize newer and more efficient equipment as it becomes available.

(U) Item: Delivery aircraft.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

(RCS CSFOR-65)(u)

8 August 1966

(U) Discussion: A newer, faster aircraft than the U6 is required to provide timely delivery of perishable intelligence imagery to combat units.

(U) Observation: The XV-4A or an aircraft with similar vertical landing/takeoff capabilities plus near-mach speed, appears ideal to perform the aerial delivery mission of this battalion.

(U) Item: Organic generators.

(U) Discussion: There are too many makes and models of generators in the U.S. Army. The maintenance and spare parts problems appear to be compounded unnecessarily.

(U) Observation: A new family of generators with various capacities, but with interchangeable parts, is required to facilitate maintenance and reduce the logistical spare parts problem.

Intelligence

(U) Item: Utilization of aerial reconnaissance to gather intelligence information.

(U) Discussion: The average officer's knowledge of the aerial reconnaissance field appears extremely limited. Many senior commanders and staff officers do not know how to utilize aerial reconnaissance even though it is the most productive of all intelligence operations in providing rapid and accurate tactical intelligence information.

(U) Observation: The coverage of aerial reconnaissance in branch and senior service schools appears inadequate.

Logistics

(U) Item: Spare parts for the ES-29 Portable Photographic Darkroom.

(U) Discussion: This comparatively new item of equipment is capable of performing the reproduction functions for which it was designed. However, spare parts problems continue to plague this battalion even though these problems have been brought to the attention of all supply agencies in CONUS. Although the ES-29 has been in the Army inventory for over 1½ years, maintenance manuals and spare parts lists with federal stock numbers are still not available nor is an adequate supply of spare parts.
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

(U) Observation: The agency responsible for buying the ES-29 and for making arrangements for adequate maintenance support apparently did not do a thorough job.

(U) Item: Common items of supply.

(U) Discussion: Projection bulbs are either not available or are available in extremely limited quantities through normal supply channels. These bulbs are available in quantity through commercial sources and have been purchased from Sears Roebuck by members of this battalion.

(U) Observation: If priority requisitions cannot be filled from Army stocks in CONUS, civilian sources should be utilized by CONUS supply agencies to fill mission-essential requirements.

(U) Item: POM Requisitions.

(U) Discussion: There appears to be no standard system for keeping deployed units informed on the status of their POM requisitions.

(U) Observation: Specialized units could plan their operations better if they had an indication of when receipt of mission essential items of equipment on POM requisition could be expected.

Other

(U) Item: AN/GRC 26 radios (Non-TOE to this battalion).

(C) Discussion: This battalion depends on Signal Battalion radios to transmit highly perishable intelligence to using units. These radios along with TSEC/KX-7 cryptographic equipment have not been entirely satisfactory and appear to be unable to provide 24 hour operation with any degree of dependability.

(U) Observation: The range and dependability of a single sideband radio capable of handling cryptographic teletype messages is needed.

SECTION 2
Part II
Recommendations

1. (U) That as many obligated tour officers as possible serve the last year of their tour in Vietnam.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

2. (U) That the current method of operation of this battalion be adopted
   as standard for future counterinsurgency type operations.

3. (U) That the G2 Air course be reinstated at the U.S. Army Intelligence
   School.

4. (U) That all officers selected as replacements to fill G2/S2 Air
   position requisitions attend the G2 Air course prior to their arrival in Vietnam.

5. (U) That the U.S. Army Combat Development Command Intelligence Agency
   review the TOE of all units authorized imagery interpreters and take necessary
   action to authorize the best equipment currently available. Further, that changes
   to these TOE’s be made automatically as newer and better equipment becomes avail-
   able.

6. (U) That the XV-4A or an aircraft with similar capabilities be provided
   to MI Battalions (ARS) when accepted and purchased by the U.S. Army.

7. (U) That standardized generators be provided within Vietnam as soon as
   possible to replace non-standard models.

8. (U) That the U.S. Army Intelligence School review the adequacy of aerial
   reconnaissance instruction in all U.S. Army branch and senior service schools and
   make appropriate recommendations to strengthen intelligence instruction.

9. (U) That expeditious action be taken to obtain an adequate supply of
   ES-29 spare parts and to publish spare parts lists and necessary maintenance manuals.

10. (U) That commercial sources of supply be utilized to fill mission-essen-
      tial requisitions when the Army supply system cannot provide common items of supply.

11. (U) That action be taken to replace the AN/GRC 26 and TSRC/WMT crypto-
      graphic equipment with a more reliable radio.

12. (U) That a procedure be established in CONUS to keep deployed units
      informed on the status of their FOM requisitions.

Incl: MBARS Booklet (U)

MICHAEL TYCHER
Lt Colonel, AEC
Commanding

8 CONFIDENTIAL
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AVGJ-HOADX (11 Aug 66) Lst Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
(HCS GSPCR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 525th Military Intelligence Group, APO 96307, 9 Sep 66

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: MVC-DH,
APO 96307

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

The Operational Report of the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion
(ARS) (FLD A) for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1966 has been
reviewed by this headquarters and contains detailed resume of the
activities of the unit for the reporting period and the recommendations
contained therein are valid.

RICHARD E. ADAMS
Colonel, AIS
Commanding
AVIMC-DN (8 Aug 66) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307
22 Dec 1966

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96358

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1966 from Headquarters, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

   a. Reference Part I, Section 2, Item: Two Year Obligated Tour for Lieutenants, and Paragraph 1, Part II, Section 2, Page 7: Concur with commander’s observation that service in Vietnam is stimulating and provides personnel with a sense of accomplishment. The commander’s recommendation that 2-year obligated service officers spend their last year in Vietnam has merit.

   b. Reference Paragraphs 3 and 4, Part III, Section 2, Page 8: Concur that training in aerial reconnaissance matters would enhance the ability of an individual to perform his duties in a G-2/S-2 Air position. Current DA personnel requisitioning procedures make it difficult to identify these personnel early enough in the replacement cycle to send them to CONUS Schools. The feasibility of USARV establishing a short indoctrination course for personnel newly assigned to G-2/S-2 Air positions is being investigated.

   c. Reference Paragraph 2, Part III, Section 2, Page 8: Concur that current deployment of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (MR3) is sound and successful and that providing elements in direct support of tactical units should be standard procedure in counterinsurgency operations.

   d. Reference Part I, Section 2, Pages 4 and 5, Item: Delivery Aircraft, and Part III, Section 2, Paragraph 6, Page 8: Concur with comments. A recommended TOE change was submitted to the US Army Combat Development Command Intelligence Agency recommending that 6 XV-4A Kneel T version or an aircraft with similar capabilities be authorized when approved for purchase by US Army. (Letter ATIMC-PIC, Headquarters, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (MR3), Subject: TOE Change Recommendations (Delivery Platoon), 18 April 1965.) No further action can
AVHGC-DH (6 Aug 66)  2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period, Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

be taken until such time as the aircraft requested are received into
the US Army inventory. At present they are in a proposed test status.

e. Reference Part I, Section 2, Page 6, Item: Organic Generators and Paragraph 7, Part II, Section 2, Page 8: A generator
standardization program is presently in progress in this command and
when fully realized should alleviate many of the problems that have
been experienced with multiple makes and models.

f. Reference Paragraph 8, Part II, Section 2, Page 8: Concur.
Increased knowledge of the aerial reconnaissance systems would enable
tactical commanders to judge more accurately the value of intelligence
obtained from these sources.

g. Reference Part I, Section II, Page 7, Items: Common Items
of Supply, and Paragraph 10, Part 2, Section II, Page 8: A limited
quantity of 750 watt projection bulbs are now available in depot stocks.
Additional quantities are on requisition and due-in.

h. Reference Part I, Section II, Page 6, Items: Spare Parts
for ES-29 Portable Photographic Darkroom and Paragraph 9, Part II,
Section II, Page 8: Coordination with the 1st Military Intelligence
Battalion on 19 November 1966 revealed that this problem has now been
corrected.

i. Reference Part I, Section II, Page 7, Item: AN/GRC-26
Radios and Paragraph 11, Part II, Section II: The Radio Set AN/GRC-26
has been the Army standard long range, heavy duty TOE radio for signal
units. Concur with the recommendations that action should be taken to
replace the AN/GRC-26. DA is presently considering the use of Radio
Teletypewriter Set AN/GRC-103 to replace the AN/GRC-26. The AN/GRC-
103 is a proposed shelter—mounted (3/4 ton truck) radio set providing
full duplex capability for single sidband voice, cu, and secure radio-
teletypewriter communication for forward area tactical use. The AN/GRC-
103 teletypewriter reliability for short range (0-50 mi) is approximately
95% and long range (200-1500 mi) is approximately 98%. These tests
were conducted in CONUS. Planning distance is 100 miles ground wave;
1500 miles sky wave. Type antennas used are 15 foot whips or doublets.
CONTIDENIT

AVEGO-DH (8 Ag66)

SUbJECT: Operational report-Lessons learned for the period ending 31 July 1966 (ECS CS080-65)

CONTIDENIT

LANOC-DH (6 Aug 66)

24 Ind

SUBJECT: Operational report-Lessons learned for the period ending 31 July 1966 (ECS CS080-65)

FOR THE COMMANDER

CONFIDENTIAL

M. J. MORRIS

AGC

CONFIDENTI

L. THORNTON

Acting Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-OT (8Aug66) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, AFO San Francisco 96558 23 Aug 66

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. L. McMULLIN
CPT, AGQ
Asst AG

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1966.

CO, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion

**Report Date**
8 August 1966

**Report Title**
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion

**Descriptive Notes**
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1966.

**Author**
CO, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion

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