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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH C. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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1. SECTION I. GENERAL: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES
   a. PERSONNEL
      (1) The 23d Artillery Group remains assigned to the US Army Vietnam.
      (2) Significant S1 activities.
         (a) Casualties: Killed in action decreased from 9 to 5 over the past quarter. Wounded in action decreased from 42 to 40 over the last quarter. Nonhostile Casualties: There were no deaths, an increase of 2 over last quarter, and 33 injuries which represents a decrease of 15 over last quarter.
         (b) The Group has a shortage in MOS indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASG</th>
<th>FCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12340 Fld Art Crewman</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13540 Asst Chief Fld Computer</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>13550 Fld Art Sr Sergeant</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31050 Tactical Commo Chief</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35420 Mteq Equip Repairman</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36120 Fld Wireman</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76420 Supply Sergeant</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>82420 Survey Chief</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94220 Mess Steward</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
         (c) Awards presented during the period were as follows: 1 Legion of Merit, 93 Bronze Stars, 20 Air Medals, 117 Army Commendation Medals, 36 Purple Hearts, and 44 US Army Certificates of Achievement.

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b. OPERATIONS

(1) The 23d Artillery Group continues support of operations in the III Corps Tactical Zone. The Group Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and all attached battalions were engaged in combat operations, troop movements, and training during the entire reporting period (92 days).

(2) The Group continues to make effective use of its automatic relay on 'ui Bo Den (XT2859). During the reporting period, the Group also established an automatic secure relay capability on 'ui Bo Den.

(3) During the reporting period the 23d Artillery Group conducted a study to design a standard 155mm towed howitzer (M114A1) parapet. A design has been selected which will be used in future construction at all fire support bases. The standard parapet is an all-weather parapet which is built in three phases, depending on the anticipated length of use. The three phase construction concept provides for continuous improvement of the position from a hasty occupation to that which will be constructed for a semi-permanent fire support base. At the end of the reporting period the study is under evaluation and results will be reported in future ORL's.

(4) During the last quarter the 23d Artillery Group has become involved in the Artillery Dong Tien (Forward Together) Program. The purposes of this program are to improve the artillery fire support of maneuver forces and to assist ARVN Artillery by associating their units with US Artillery units thus providing channels for the exchange of ideas and advice. The 23d Artillery Group is participating in the following eight projects:

(a) The associate US/ARVN Battalion and Battery Program.

(b) A combined US/ARVN Fire Support Coordination Center in Binh Duong Province.

(c) Combined US/ARVN Fire Planning between the associate battalions.

(d) Standardized combined US/ARVN Combat Readiness Evaluations.

(e) Combined US/ARVN Unit Refresher Training Programs at the associate battalion/battery level.

(f) A combined US/ARVN Survey Program.

(g) A combined US/ARVN Registration Program.

(h) Broadcasting Meteorological data to the ARVN in Vietnamese.

While the program directs the majority of our efforts towards accomplishing...
specific artillery projects, 23d Artillery Group has not limited itself
and assistance to only these projects. Much is being accomplished through
the exercise of personnel initiative of individual artillerymen at the
battery level.

(5) During the reporting period, the 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery
engaged in operations supporting the 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile), 3d and 5th Mobile Strike Forces. Headquarters and
Service Batteries remained at Phu Loi throughout the reporting period.

(a) Battery A began the reporting period at Phu Loi (XT9517) with the
mission of GSR, 1st Infantry Division Artillery. Three howitzers from A
Battery were participating in operations as a part of D/2/13 (a provisional
battery). On 7 November 1969, one of the howitzers under the control of
D/2/13 was released and reverted back to I/2/13. On 21 December 1969, the
two howitzers remaining under the control of D/2/13 were released and re-
verted back to I/2/13. On 23 December 1969, A/2/13 moved from Phu Loi by
convoy to Phuoc Vinh (XT974/56). Mission upon closure was GSR, 1st Cav Div
Arty (Ambl). On 2 January, A/2/13 moved from Phuoc Vinh (XT974/56) to
Phuoc Vinh (XT973495) with no change in mission.

(b) Battery B began the reporting period at FSB Thunder 11 (T773555)
with a mission of GSR, 1st Inf Div Arty. On 7 November, B/2/13 moved to
FSB Jerri (XU963225) by helicopter and placed under the OPCC of "Task
Force Scares" whose mission was CS, IIIFORCEV. On 20 December, B/2/13
moved to Phuoc Vinh (XT974496) by helicopter. Mission upon closure was
GSR, 1st Cav Div Arty (Ambl). On 30 December, B/2/13 moved to XT099542;
convoy with no change in mission and returned to Phuoc Vinh. On 31 Decem-
ber, B/2/13 moved to XT04566 (no mission change) by convoy and returned
to Phuoc Vinh. On 1 January, B/2/13 moved to XT099542 with no change in
mission and returned to Phuoc Vinh. On 2 January, B/2/13 moved by convoy
to FSB Hammerly III (XT90319) with no change in mission. On 3 January,
B/2/13 moved by air to FSB Florida (XT018333). Mission upon closure was
GSR, 1st Inf Div Arty.

(c) C Battery remained at FSB Thunder IV throughout the reporting peri-
d with the mission of GSR, 1st Cav Div Arty (Ambl).

(d) At the beginning of the period, D/2/13, the provision-1 battery
made up of three 105mm howitzers from I/2/13 and three 155mm howitzers
from 5/2/12, was at FOB K-thy (XT331904) with a mission of CS, 5th Mobile
Strike Force Command. On 5 November, 3T(155) moved to Phu Loi and reverted
to control of parent unit (B/2/12). On 7 November, 3T(105) moved by
air to Phu Loi, and reverted to the control of parent unit (I/2/13). On
13 November, D/2/13 (made up of 2-105 howitzers from I/2/13 and 2-155
howitzers from B/2/12) moved by air to Bu Dop (XT973288) and was placed
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1. At the start of the reporting period, Headquarters Battery, 7th Artillery, was located at Phu Loi (XT 297516) with the mission of GS, 1st Cav Div, and Headquarters Battery 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, was located at Song Be (XT 287516) during the entire reporting period.

2. Battery A began the reporting period in a split configuration with four howitzers located at FSB Copperhead (XT 286602) and two howitzers located at Tr'Cu (XT 277990) with the mission of GS, IIFORCEV. On 4 December, Battery A moved one tube by air from FSB Copperhead to FSB Jerri (XT 269225) with no change in mission. On 7-8 December, two howitzers moved from Tr'Cu to Song Be (XT 283073) by air with a mission of GSR, 1st Cav Div Arty. Also on 7 Dec, Battery A moved one tube from FSB Jerri by air to Song Be to form a three howitzer platoon. On 19 December, Battery A moved three howitzers from FSB Jerri to Song Be by air making battery complete with the mission of GSR, 1st Cav Div Arty.

3. At the start of the reporting period, Battery B had three

howitzers located at Phu Loi with a mission of CS, JIFORCE and three howitzers attached to D/2/13 (a provisional battery). On 5 December, the three howitzers that were attached to D/1/3 were released and rejoined Battery B at Phu Loi. On 13 November, two howitzers were detached from B/2/12 and attached to D/2/13. On 8 December, the two howitzers attached to D/2/13 were returned to B/2/12 at Phu Loi. On 26 December, Battery B moved from Phu Loi to Chi Linh (XT915735) by air with a mission of GSR, 1st Cav Div Arty. On 12 January three howitzers moved to FSB Jordan (XT490714) by air with no change in mission. On 26 December three howitzers moved from Chi Linh to Phuoc Vinh (XT971495) with no change in mission.

(c) Battery C began the reporting period in a split configuration with three howitzers located at Song Be (XT143073) and three howitzers located at Quan Loi (XT83913) with a mission of GSR, 1st Cav Div Arty. On 8 December, Battery C moved one tube from Song Be to Quan Loi. On 9 December, Battery C moved two howitzers from Song Be to Quan Loi making battery complete at Quan Loi. The mission of the battery for the entire period was GSR, 1st Cav Div Arty.

(d) At the beginning of the reporting period, F/16th Artillery was positioned in a split configuration with three howitzers located at FSB Carolyn (XT267781) and three howitzers located at FSB Thunder III (XT768657). The mission of the element at FSB Carolyn was GS, IIFORCE and the mission of the element at FSB Thunder III was CS, IIFORCE. On 15 December, the mission of F/16 element at Thunder III was changed to CS, IIFORCE. On 15 December, Battery C moved three howitzers from FSB Carolyn to FSB Thunder III, changing the mission of CS, 1st Infantry Division Artillery. On 23 December, F/16 moved three howitzers from FSB Carolyn to FSB Thunder III, making the battery complete at Thunder III. On 1 January, the mission of F/16 was changed to GS, IIFORCE. On 30 January F/16 moved to FSB Thunder II (XT781558) by road with no change in mission. On 30 January, the mission of F/16 was changed to CS, 1st Infantry Division.

(e) During the reporting period, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery remained at Due Tieng (XT498668). Service Battery remained at Cu Chi (XT6615).

(f) Battery A began the reporting period at FSB Stoneman (XT303378) with a mission of GSR, 25th Division Artillery. On 13 November, the battery moved to FSB Hull with no change in mission.

(b) Battery B began the reporting period at FSB Washington (XT140558). On 18 and 30 November, moved one tube to XT120685 and returned to FSB Washington with no change in mission. On 2 December, the battery moved to XT120685 by road with no change in mission. On 4 December, the battery returned to FSB Washington with no change in mission. On 13, 15, and 16

On December, the battery moved by road to XT120585 with no change in mission and returned on the same day.

(c) Battery C remained the entire period at Dau Tieng (YT92472). Initially its mission was GS, IFFORCEV. On 17 December, its mission was changed to GSR, 1st Division Artillery. On 27 December, its mission was again changed to GS, IFFORCEV.

(9) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery, remained at Xuan Loc (XT47096) during the period. Service Battery remained at Long Binh (YT095127).

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period Battery A was located at Duster Compound (YT132111) with the mission of GS, IFFORCEV. On 4 November, three howitzers moved to Blackhorse (YX146981) with the mission of GSR, 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery. On 19 November, the three howitzers at Blackhorse exchanged locations and missions with the three at Duster Compound. On 25 November, Battery A moved three howitzers from Duster Compound to Xuan Loc (YT472095) with no change in mission. On 30 November, Battery A moved three howitzers from Blackhorse to FSB Loc (YT28113) with no change in mission. On 31 December, Battery A moved three howitzers from FSB Loc and three howitzers from Xuan Loc to FSB Dian (YT73017) with the mission of GS, IFFORCEV. On 19 January, Battery A moved to FSB Ritz (YT730218) with no change in mission.

(b) At the start of the reporting period, Battery B was operating as a split battery with three howitzers located at FSB Nancy (YT559381) and three howitzers at Blackhorse (YX446981), both elements having the mission of GSR, 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery. On 4 November, Battery B moved three howitzers from Blackhorse and three howitzers from FSB Nancy to FSB Concord (YT33175) with the mission of GS, IFFORCEV. On 25 November, Battery B moved three howitzers from FSB Concord to Duster Compound (YT132111) with no change in mission. On 22 December, Battery B moved three howitzers from FSB Concord to FSB Nancy (YT559381) with the mission GSR, 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery. On 29 December, Battery B moved three howitzers from Duster Compound to FSB Nancy (YT559381), making battery complete, and assumed the mission GSR, 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery. On 31 December, Battery B moved three howitzers from FSB Nancy to Xuan Loc (YT470964) with the mission of GS, IFFORCEV. On 9 January, Battery B moved three howitzers from Xuan Loc to FSB Nancy (YT564384) with no change in mission. On 10 January, Battery B moved three howitzers from FSB Nancy (YT559381) to FSB Nancy (YT564384), making battery complete, and assumed the mission of GS, IFFORCEV.

(c) Battery C began the reporting period in a split configuration with three howitzers located at Nui Dat (YX146677) and three howitzers at FSB

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Horseshoe (YS495620) with the mission of GSR 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. On 3 November, Battery C moved three howitzers from FSB Horseshoe to Nui Dat, making battery complete with no change in mission. On 11 and 12 November, Battery C displaced three howitzers from Nui Dat to YS20716 for one day artillery raid and returning artillery to Nui Dat prior to darkness. On 16 November, Battery C displaced three howitzers to YS20716 for one day artillery raid and returned to Nui Dat prior to darkness. On 20 November, Battery C displaced three howitzers to FSB Horseshoe (YS495620) for one day artillery raid and returned to Nui Dat prior to darkness. On 27 November, Battery C moved three howitzers from Nui Dat to FSB Horseshoe and returned to Nui Dat on 28 November. On 29 November, three howitzers were displaced from Nui Dat to YS50690 for one day artillery raid and returned to Nui Dat prior to darkness. On 30 December, Battery C moved three howitzers from Nui Dat to YS460781 for one day artillery raid and returned to Nui Dat on 11 December. During the period 3 January to 11 December, Battery C maintained the mission of GSR, 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. On 12 December, Battery C moved three howitzers from Nui Dat to FSB Indigo (YS215852) with the mission GS, 1st Marine Artillery. On 16 December, Battery C moved three howitzers from FSB Indigo and three howitzers from FSB Junct (YS257685) with the mission of GS, 1st Marine Artillery. On 19 December, Battery C moved to Nui Dat (YS34677) and assumed the mission of GSR 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. On 20 December, Battery C moved three howitzers to FSB Horseshoe (YS495620) with no change in mission. On 21 January, Battery C moved three howitzers to Nui Dat (YS34677) making battery complete with no change in mission.

During the reporting period, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 5th Battalion, 1/2d Artillery, remained at Camp William S. Price (X027118). Service Battery was also located at Camp Price during the entire reporting period.

During the entire reporting period, Battery A was located at Tan Tru (YS655620). During the period 1 November through 26 December, its mission was GSR, 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery. On 27 December, its mission was changed to GS, IFFORCEV.

At the beginning of the reporting period, Battery B was located at Thu Thuc (X547702) with the mission of GSR, 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery. On 7 December, two howitzers displaced by air to Tra Cu (YS477992) with no change in mission. On 27 December, both elements assumed the mission of GS, IFFORCEV.

At the beginning of the reporting period, Battery C was located at FSB Concord (X0234174) with the mission of GS, IFFORCEV. On 2 November, Battery C assumed a split configuration with three tubes south by
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road to FSB Passion (YT385261) and three tubes moving by road to FSB Nancy (YT565385); both elements assuming the mission of GSR, 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery. On 7 November, Battery C moved three tubes by air from FSB Passion to FSB Cey Gac (YT303255) with no change in mission. On 11 November, Battery C moved three howitzers from FSB Cey Gac by air to FSB Thoroughbred (YT256277) with no change in mission. On 3 December, Battery C moved three howitzers by air from FSB Thoroughbred to FSB Picton (YT640898) with a mission of GSR, 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. On 22 December, Battery C moved three howitzers by road from FSB Nancy (YT565385) to FSB C-ncord (YT034174) with a mission of GS, IFFORCEV. On 27 December, Battery C moved three howitzers by air and road from FSB Picton (YT640898) to FSB C-ncord taking battery complete. The mission of the battery was GS, IFFORCEV.

(11) Ammunition Expenditure Chart

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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FIRES ISSUED</th>
<th>ROUNDS EXPENDED</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>152mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/13</td>
<td>30,997</td>
<td>93,527</td>
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<td>7/9</td>
<td>8,189</td>
<td>59,243</td>
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<td>9,539</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/42</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>36,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>65,580</td>
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c. TRAINING

(1) Fire Direction Centers and howitzer sections continue to stress basic artillery procedures in order to insure timely and accurate fires in support of maneuver elements.

(2) During the reporting period, the 23d Artillery Group began teaching approximately 55 CIDG students firing battery, fire direction, and observed fire procedures at Trng Sup Special Forces Gp. The course, which lasts 10 weeks, has the objective of training artillerymen to replace the
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ARVN Artillery at Special Forces Camps at Tra Cu (XS4798) and Loc Ninh (XU7308). This is the second course of this type conducted by this Group and they have been found to be extremely effective in producing competent CIDG artillerymen.

(3) During the reporting period, 39 Lieutenants attended and passed the IFFORCEV Artillery FDO School.

d. INTELLIGENCE

(1) Security: The following security clearances were processed during the quarter:

- TOP SECRET clearances validated......................52
- SECRET clearances granted..............................69
- SECRET clearances validated.........................250
- Interim SECRET clearances granted..................6
- Local Filos Checks processed.........................324

(2) Visual Reconnaissance: During the period November 1969 to January 1970, the number of aircraft allocated to the Group for visual reconnaissance missions was reduced from five to two. The VR area for which the Group was responsible was also reduced; however, the area was only reduced from approximately 1800 square miles to approximately 1400 square miles, a reduction in area not commensurate with the reduction in aircraft allocated for the mission. The Group continues, however, to perform the VR mission satisfactorily. A total of 334 VR missions were flown during this quarter compared to 299 VR missions for the 1st Quarter, FY 70. Total hours increased from 709 to 847. This increase is attributed primarily to more efficient aircraft utilization as well as greatly improved climatic conditions.

e. LOGISTICS

(1) Normal supply and logistic support was provided to two 105mm battalions and four 155mm battalions. An average of 5 fixed wing and 15 rotary wing resupply sorties were flown daily.

(2) Batteries of the 23d Artillery Group conducted twelve air-mobile operations during the quarter. At all locations, unit was resupplied exclusively by air.

(3) During the quarter, 7 batteries received USARV GMIs. All batteries received a rating of satisfactory.

(4) During the month of January, considerable effort was expended in the planning for Operation Keystone Bluejay. 7th Battalion, 9th
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Artillery; 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, and Battery F, 16th Artillery will be redeployed or inactivated during the coming quarter. Initial turn in of equipment began on 2 Feb 70.

F. OTHER

(1) Aviation

(a) The 23d Artillery Group continues to operate a consolidated aviation section.

(b) The assigned U6A still remains as a tremendous asset to the Group. It remains useful in carrying most general support missions to include large passenger loads, forward observer parties, and large parts for artillery pieces.

(c) All OH6A aircraft have been turned in and replaced with the OH58. OH58s are being issued on a scheduled basis to include replacing of the OH23G. As anticipated, maintenance and major component failures and/or problems are beginning to rise in the OH23G.

(d) The break down of missions flown and hours flown for the post quarter are:

Rotary Wing: 8 OH58A, 14 OH23G
VR Missions - 295, C&C Missions - 2213, Cargo/C Missions - 387, Troop/C Missions - 4916, Training Missions - 1124, Maintenance Missions - 652,
Total Missions - 305, Cargo - 7 tons, Pax - 295, Hours - 146.

(2) Civil Affairs: During the past quarter 156 MEDCAPS were conducted with a total of 16,731 patient visits. A total of 5,730 pounds of surplus food was distributed. Separate institutions assisted during the reporting period are as follows:

(a) Schools (11)
(b) Hospitals/Dispensaries (10)
(c) Orphanages (3)
(d) Dwellings (1)

(3) Signalls:

(a) An automatic relay was established at Nui Ba Ra (TU1806) to support operations northwest of Song Be. The relay was established 7 November 1969. The relay was established on short notice despite the complete lack of any support facilities at Nui Ba Ra. Equipment was loaded into a conex container, airlifted to the site and then the equipment was operated from the conex. The conex served as a working area and a living area for relay personnel.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS-CSPR-65 (R1)

(b) The Group received the first of the OH58 helicopters in November. Actions were taken to obtain Nestor equipment and installation kits to provide secure voice capability for the FM radio in the OH58's. This equipment is on valid requisition but is not yet available in RVN.

(c) In October, a major realignment of solo user telephone circuits was accomplished when the 2/35th and 5/25th Artillery Battalions were granted from 54th Artillery Group and the 6/27th and 2/32d Artillery Battalions were lost to IIFFORCEV Artillery.

(d) In late November and early December, a major review of all solo user telephone circuits was conducted. At that time, twelve circuits were released for deactivation as no longer required and errors in circuit records of seventeen others were corrected. Nineteen circuits were rejustified with no changes.

2. (c) SECTION 2. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATION, EVALUATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. PERSONNEL. JUNIOR OFFICER RETENTION

(1) Observation: The retention of junior officers, both in quality and quantity, is one of the most important programs demanding attention in the Army today.

(2) Evaluation: The junior officer retention program is receiving command attention at the highest levels of command. Junior Officer Councils have been recently established in the 23d Artillery Group and are proving to be a valuable sounding board for junior officer problems and ideas. Personal involvement on an individual basis by each commander seems to be the most desirable and meaningful method of accurately identifying prospective retention.

(3) Recommendation: That all field grade officers receive some type of formal instruction on the techniques of junior officer retention at some time during their military schooling.

b. OPERATIONS.

(1) Reference Material for CH/CR Teams.

(a) Observation: The Group CH/CR team at FSB Janiri had available to it as reference material, several manuals on enemy weapons. Maximum range capabilities and characteristics of the weapons and ammunition were given. Firing table data was available only for the 82mm mortar and the 107mm rocket. No data was available for fragment identification.

(b) Evaluation: Two elements are always available as a result of crater
ANSC

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Analysis, the back azimuth of the round and the angle of the fall. Fragments are usually available. If firing tables are available, the range can be estimated based on the angle of fall, which can be considered accurate within 200 meters. Fragments, size and shape of the crater, etc., give clues to the type of weapon. Rockets are usually easily identified by the motor section, while mortars have a tail fin. Other weapons which are more difficult to identify are recoilless rifles, howitzers, and guns. Fragment comparison is the most accurate means of identifying these weapons.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that firing tables be compiled for NVA/VC weapons and distributed down to battery level. The tables should include the range and angle of fall for each type weapon and should be developed for all mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles as a minimum. Material for fragment identification for all of the above should also be developed and distributed.

(2) SHELLREFS

(a) Observation: Shellrops are the most common and readily available means of locating hostile weapons.

(b) Evaluation: The AN/MPSQ(A) radar generally requires more than one round to locate a hostile weapon. This is predicated on operator proficiency as much as equipment limitations. The experience at FSB Jerri was that the majority of attacks consisted of two rounds, fired in a few seconds apart, which made radar pick-up unlikely. A further complication was that the majority of the attacks were by very low trajectory weapons. This established the shellrop as the most used device for locating the hostile weapon. It was noted that the majority of the personnel had a very limited knowledge of how to conduct a shellrop or what information to report.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that all persons receive instruction in shellrops as a part of in-country training programs so that the standard shellrop (D. Form 2185-R) be included as a permanent item in all SOI's.

(3) Jungle Battery

(a) Observation

(1) In November 1969, plans for the transfer of responsibility for the fire support of the 3d Mobile Strike Force Command (NSFC) operations from US to SVN artillery were prepared. Support for the 3d NSFC h... been provided by Battery D, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery (Provisional) (Jungle Battery), a composite 105/155 artillery battery.

(2) On 4 December 1969, two SVN 155mm howitzers replaced the US 155mm
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howitzers of the battery. Control and control was retained by the US battery commander.

(2) On 21 December 1969, two ARVN 105mm howitzers replaced the US 105mm
howitzers and the ARVN assumed full responsibility for support of the 31st NFGC.

(4) During the period of transition the US battery personnel conducted:
refresh training for the ARVN in Firing Battery, FDC, and maintenance
procedures. Instruction was also given on the mission of the battery, its
tactical employment, and desirable techniques.

(b) Evaluation: The integration of ARVN into the battery on the
transition from US to ARVN control was smooth and effective. At no time
during the transition was the tactical mission of the battery impaired.

(c) Accommodation: That this method of transition be considered when
replacing US artillery units with ARVN.

(4) Training of CIDG Artillerymen

(a) Observations: On 9 November 1969, the first class of 65 CIDG
Artillerymen was graduated from the 23rd Artillery Group’s CIDG Artillery School
at Truong Son Special Forces Camp. The graduates were formed into artillery
 Platoons which were deployed to Thien Ngam and Ketum Special Forces
Camps. Since arriving at these camps the Platoons have been providing
artillery support to the local CIDG operations and camp defenses. The
 Platoons have been operating independently with periodic liaison and eval-
uation visits by 23rd Artillery Group staff members to monitor their progress.
Thus they have been providing timely and accurate artillery support to
their camps.

(b) Evaluation

(1) Untrained CIDG personnel can be trained in the techniques of FDC
and Firing Battery in a relatively short period of time (ten weeks) by con-
ventional artillery unit personnel.

(2) CIDG artillerymen are capable of operating on their own to provide
support to CIDG operations and camp defense.

(c) Recommendation: That this program be extended to include training
of CIDG Artillerymen for Special Forces Camps in other areas.

c. Training

(i) Basic Artillery Gunnery Techniques

(a) Observations: Continuous training is necessary in basic artillery
gunnery techniques.
(b) Evaluation: Units which have been operating in the Republic of Vietnam for several years have gradually begun to use shortcuts and expedients in many areas of operation instead of the accepted basic artillery gunnery techniques. These shortcuts have been especially prevalent in such areas as computation of firing data, position area survey, rapid (but organized) occupation of position, analysis and engagement of targets, and currency of enemy/friendly situation maps. In some cases, FDC's were not organized in a manner that would facilitate proper supervision by the Fire Direction Officer. The sole solution to problems such as those is continuous, comprehensive training of all elements of the firing battery in the artillery basics.

(c) Recommendation: That all artillery units conduct continuous training in basic artillery techniques and that commanders and their staffs monitor this training closely to insure that only accepted procedures are used.

(2) Material Readiness Training

(a) Observation: Material readiness training is often neglected by units.

(b) Evaluation: All units acknowledge the importance of a good maintenance program but many of these same units do not have an effective material readiness training program in progress. Without training to instruct maintenance personnel, supervisory personnel, and equipment users in the proper maintenance techniques, a unit's maintenance program cannot fulfill the desired goals.

(c) Recommendation: That all commanders evaluate their maintenance training programs to see if they are adequately training personnel to perform and supervise maintenance in the most efficient and effective manner.

d. INTELLIGENCE

(1) Rotation of Personnel Manning Technical Positions at Isolated Locations.

(a) Observation: That the efficiency of personnel involved in technical operations at remote locations decreases in proportion to the length of time they remain at such a location.

(b) Evaluation

(c) Personnel who normally function in a technical capacity are more susceptible to strain and adverse conditions than individuals performing nontechnical jobs.
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(2) Such strain adversely affects the operational capabilities of units dependent upon such personnel for support.

(3) Technical personnel who are rotated periodically to base areas for rest and recuperation normally perform more reliably and with greater efficiency than those who are required to remain at isolated locations with limited facilities for extended period of time.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) That personnel who are assigned technical duties at remote locations be rotated periodically to base areas.

(2) That the rotation period not exceed 1 week in duration before personnel are returned to their normal duty station.

(3) That personnel on rotation in a base area be utilized in non-technical capacities throughout the majority of their rotation period.

(2) Camouflage of AN/MPQ4A Radars:

(a) Observation: That the effectiveness of counter-mortar radar operations is limited if the enemy is able to observe the sector being scanned by the AN/MPQ4A radar.

(b) Evaluation: Because of its narrow 150° beam width, it consequently limits the sector of scan, AN/MPQ4A radar operations are of limited effectiveness if the enemy is able to observe the direction in which the radar antenna is oriented.

(c) Recommendation: That AN/MPQ4A radars be camouflaged utilizing a 100' cargo parachute erected over scaffolding material.

(3) Location of AN/MPQ4A counter-mortar radar with respect to supported artillery units:

(a) Observation: That counter-mortar operations are less successful when the counter-mortar radar is located at a position other than with the unit for which primary protection is required.

(b) Evaluation:

(1) If the counter-mortar radar is not collocated with the supported artillery battery, radio communications must normally be used, requiring another radio in the battery FTO or radio use of a radio already committed to another operational requirement. When hostile fire is received, the resulting high level of activity may preclude adequate communications with the radar, particularly when the incoming fire is originating outside of the
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rate sector of scan, necessitating reorientation of the radar. This problem
does not arise when the radar is collocated with the battery, since wire
communications are normally used between radar and FDC, and since radar personnel can observe the incoming azimuth of fire and determine if reorienta-
tion is necessary.

(2) The larger sector of scan to be gained by locating the radar at a
position somewhat distant from the protected installation is not of suf-
ficient advantage to outweigh the loss of the immediate awareness of the
circumstances by radar personnel. If the radar is not collocated with the
battery, and assuming the attack comes from other than the radar's primary
sector of scan, the radar personnel will not know that the distant position
is receiving an attack until they are contacted by radio. Once informed
that an attack is taking place, the radar operator must still determine from
which direction the runs are being received in order to reorient the radar.
These problems are reduced when the radar is collocated with the battery.

(2) When the radar is collocated with, and placed under the operational
control of, an artillery battery, there is generally a greater emphasis on
radar operations including counter-battery operations, radar registrations,
and location of incoming aircraft during the hours of darkness or reduced
visibility. The sense of "ownership" engendered in the artillery battery
commander also results in reduced supply and maintenance problems for the
radar.

(c) Communications:

(1) That when at all possible counter-mortar radars be collocated with
a supported artillery battery and placed under the operational control of
the battery.

(2) That when operational requirements preclude collocation of the
artillery battery and the counter-mortar radar, a standard operating pro-
cedure be prepared by the battery commander and the radar detachment com-
mander, to include:

(a) Communications frequencies and procedures to be used to include
appropriate brevity codes.

(b) Procedures for shifting radar sectors of scan.

(c) Procedures for conducting high-burst and CI registrations.

(d) Resupply requests and procedures for requesting maintenance assistance.

LOGISTICS. T.O.M.N LIVING BUNKER

(1) Observation: There is a need to be able to construct rapidly a two-
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man living bunker to withstand rocket/mortar attacks on fire support bases.

(2) Evaluation: The need for a quickly constructed bunker is obvious. Units of this command have had considerable success constructing a two-man bunker from 4 pieces 72" culvert, 16 dirt filled 105mm ammunition boxes and sandbags. The culverting is placed over a hole 5 feet wide, 7 feet long and 2 feet deep and covered by 3 layers of sandbags. 8 dirt filled 105mm ammunition boxes are used to close one end and 8 are used as a deadman at the other end. Should soil conditions preclude the digging of a hole, additional ammunition boxes may be used to raise the culverting to obtain additional headroom.

(3) Recommendation: That commanders consider using this technique for bunker construction.

f. ORGANIZATION: NONE

g. OTHER

(1) Removal of teletype-writer TT-98 from radio teletype-writer set AN/GRC-142.

(a) Observation: Removal of teletype-writer TT-98 from radio teletype-writer set AN/GRC-142 causes all teletype to run open. Thus, if TT-98 is decoupled, the entire AN/GRC-142 is decoupled unless some action is taken.

(b) Evaluation: The AN/GRC-142 uses two pieces of teletype equipment, a TT-98 (a page printing teletype-writer with keyboard) and a retransmitter TT-76 (a type puncher, a type reader and a keyboard). When the TT-98 is removed, this also removes the ability to receive page copies of messages, however, printed paper tapes could be received in the TT-76. The hub wiring in the AN/GRC-142 causes all teletype to run open if any single piece is removed. To allow use of the TT-76 to send and receive messages when the TT-98 has been removed, it is necessary to complete the teletype loop circuit. This can be done by connecting the loose ends of the black and white wire in cable W2 together. The same is done to the cable W3. Teletype messages can then be received on the retransmitter or printed on paper tape.

(c) Recommendation: That this expedient be used to maintain communications when decoupled TT-98's would otherwise be discarded.

(2) Voltage in radio teletype-writer set AN/GRC-142.

(a) Observation: DC voltage setting in the radio teletype-writer set AN/GRC-142 should be 26.5 volts rather than 28.5 volts as stated in the manual.
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(b) Evaluation: Overheating problems encountered in the AN/GRC-106 transmitter in the AN/GRC-142 appear to be aggravated by setting the input voltage as high as called for in the manual. Coordination with manufacturer's representatives (General Dynamics Technical Representatives working with 1st Long Command) indicates that lower input voltage aids in keeping overheating to a minimum.

(c) Recommendation: That AN/GRC-142 be operated on 26.5 volts DC.

(3) Effectiveness of a ground system.

(a) Observation: The evaluation of the effectiveness of a ground system is difficult. Measurements to determine the resistance of a ground require installation of two additional grounds which must be almost as good as the ground to be measured.

(b) Evaluation: An alternate scheme is to evaluate the effectiveness of the ground. This may be done by placing a fairly simple ground at least 25 feet away from the ground to be tested. Using a long wire to connect an ordinary voltmeter (TS-352 is satisfactory), measure voltage (both AC & DC) between ground being tested and the reference ground while the equipment being grounded is in full operation. Voltages in excess of three to five volts indicate that the ground is inadequate. This test will disclose whether a ground is effective in the application in which it is being used. Even a good ground, by actual resistance measurements, may be inadequate for some applications in which heavy ground currents are flowing.

(c) Recommendation: That such ground tests be used to evaluate grounding systems.

(4) Gaining the support of the Vietnamese.

(a) Observation: There is a greater need to affiliate and promote increased cooperation with the Vietnamese populace.

(b) Evaluation: Projects jointly conducted with the ARVN’s, Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts have proved very effective.

(c) Recommendation: That greater emphasis be placed upon programs that gain the support and cooperation of the Vietnamese people. Decreased emphasis should be placed upon any Civic Action program that cannot later be improved upon and controlled by the Vietnamese.

(5) Vietnamese employees.

(a) Observation: Proper management, utilization, and training of the Vietnamese employed by US Forces is needed.
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Ending 31 January 1970, RCS-CSFOR-65 (R1)

(b) Greater effort should be placed upon training US Forces personnel
about Vietnam, its culture, and its people. Additional English and
job skill courses should be effectivly utilized to increase the quality
and quantity of work output. Military personnel working directly with the
Vietnamese employees require additional knowledge of the employment system,
management methods, and Vietnamese sociological background that will aid in
the creation of an environment that is conducive toward improvement of the
employer-employee relationship. Efforts in this regard definitely improve the image of the US Forces in Vietnam. This training is being held
in the 3rd Artillery Group and it has been effective.

(c) Recommendations: That establishment of training in these areas be
undertaken by all organizations that hire Vietnamese nationals.

(6) Avioni maintenance.

(a) Observation: The OH58A has proven an acceptable replacement for
the OH6A and OH2G. A few minor problems have developed during its initial utilization by this test unit.

(b) Evaluation:

(1) Damage has been incurred to the honeycomb structure of the aircraft from both flying foreign objects and rotor wash. The honeycomb material can not be repaired as easily as sheet metal nor with normal methods.

(2) Doors have been damaged through daily use because they have been
forced beyond their normal opening limits. On some occasions the doors will
impair the vision of the pilot to the rear of the aircraft.

(c) Recommendation:

(1) That take-off and landing be confined, where possible, to areas
where there is relatively little danger from flying objects.

(2) That doors be removed from the aircraft during normal operation.

(7) Aviation training.

(a) Observation: It has been found through experience that the requirement
to use instruments in normal flight is becoming more prevalent.

(b) The OH58A's have the minimum number of instruments necessary to
conduct IFR flight for short periods of time. Their primary purpose is to
aid the pilot in case instrument conditions are encountered. These instruments are designed to aid the pilot in navigating to areas of better cond-
tions where visual flight is possible. Since there is a possibility for
instrument flight in the new helicopters, check rides should be given to
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, Paris
Ending: 31 January 1970, RCS-CSFM-65 (d1)

To ensure pilot proficiency,

(c) Recommendation: That instrument rated aviators be appointed as instrument instructor pilots and that check rides be given to every pilot. Currency rides involving instrument procedures and flight qualifications should be given to all pilots throughout RVN much like the 90-day standardization training.

JOSEPH V. HERN
Colonel, FA
Commanding

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3 - Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery

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AVFB-FAC (13 Feb 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 23d Artillery Group for Period Ending

31 January 1970. RCS CHWOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-NZ, APO 96266

This headquarters has reviewed the quarterly report of the 23d Artillery
Group and concurs with operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. G. PARRISH
LTC, FA
ADJUTANT
AVFBC-RE-H (13 Feb 70) 2nd Ind


DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group for the period ending 31 January 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. BARTEL, JR.
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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AVHCC-DST (13 Feb 70) 3d Ind
SUBJ: Operational Report of Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RC3-JOR-65 (R)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96775
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATT: GFR-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from headquarters,
23d Artillery Group and concur with the comments of the headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning Reference Material for CTV/CR
Teams", page 11, paragraph 2b(1). Confidential firing tables for many
NVA/VC weapons have been published. These tables may be obtained by
contacting U.S. Director, Combined Material Exploitation Center, APO
96307. Item and comment have been extracted for possible inclusion in
the next issue of the USAV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by
DA or USAFAC is recommended.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Removal of Teletypewriter TT-29
from Radio Teletypewriter set AN/GRC-142", page 17, paragraph g(1): concur.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Voltage in Radio Teletypewriter
Set AN/GRC-142", page 17, paragraph g(2). The AN/GRC-142 is designed
to operate with an input voltage of 26.5 - 28.5 VDC. The preferred operating
voltage is 27.5 VDC.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Effectiveness of a Ground Systen","n
page 18, paragraph g(3): concur. This method has been employed by LSCH
with good results.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Aviation Maintenance", page 29,
paragraph 2g(6): concur. The 17 March 1970 issue of the USAV Aviation
Safety Weekly Summary contained an article re-emphasizing to all units the
hazards associated with loose debris and equipment in helicopter operating
areas. The OH-58A operator's manual (TM 55-1520-22"-10) states that the
OH-58A may be flown with the aircraft doors removed. However, with the
doors removed, care must be exercised that those seat belts not in use
are secured. This matter was published in the February 1970 newsletter
of the 34th General Support Group.

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f. (U) Reference item concerning "Aviation Training", page 19, paragraph 2g(7): concur. USARY Supplement 1 to AN 95-1 requires that unit commanders conduct an instrument training program for aviators under their command. Additionally, instrument flight proficiency is an item evaluated during each 90 day proficiency checkride. This information has been passed to the Aviation Officer, 23d Artillery Group. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Cpt. L. D. Murray

Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (13 Feb 70) 4th Ind (U)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 APR 1970
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310
This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.
FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SMORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 23d Artillery Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.